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transcript
Framework for Climate Migration
Readiness for Fiji for Relocation of
Pacific Islanders to Fiji
Nilesh Nirvaan Bilimoria PGDTT, PGDCC, LLB, PDLP, LLM, GDLP
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Faculty of Law Queensland University of Technology
2020
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Keywords
Climate Change-induced Human Mobility, Climate Migration Readiness, Criteria for
Readiness, Cross-border Relocation, Displacement, Forced Resettlement, Human Rights-
based Approach, Pacific Islanders, Planned Relocation, Relocation Guidelines, Readiness,
Sovereign Borders
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Abstract
The central question in this thesis asks how ready is the Fijian Government to respond to
climate-induced cross-border relocation of the Pacific Island communities from Kiribati and
Tuvalu to Fiji? This investigation stems from the announcement by the Fijian Government,
delivered at the Paris UN climate conference in 2015, that it would provide a permanent home
to its Pacific neighbours disproportionately affected by the debilitating impacts of climate
change. The announcement brings to the fore questions about the readiness of Fiji, which the
thesis aims to explore and analyse.
To determine the readiness of the Fijian Government, this thesis employs multiple layers of
analysis from three main sources. This study employs doctrinal analysis of the experiences
and lessons learned from the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders and multidisciplinary
literature on readiness to identify a host of determinants across legal, operational and
procedural dimensions. This study also analyses empirical evidence obtained through semi-
structured field interviews with state and non-state actors in Fiji and shows that readiness
spanning legal, policy and institutional arrangements is inadequate. The empirical evidence
also draws upon participants’ perspectives of what it means to be ready in the Fiji context. The
analysis reveals further requirements for readiness in Fiji, including the availability of land for
relocation, citizenship and nationality status determination, funding and the sovereignty of
states, among other factors identified in this study.
This thesis synthesises and analyses the different sources of data to conceptualise and
articulate a set of criteria for readiness that has not been explained elsewhere in the literature.
These criteria are then applied as an analytical framework to appraise Fiji’s readiness,
analysing the empirical evidence gathered in the research. This thesis shows that Fiji is not
ready to receive and relocate Pacific Islanders in the context of climate change. Moreover, this
thesis identifies an array of determinants extrapolated from the sources of data as a starting
point to guide decision-makers in the development of a framework for climate migration
readiness. This thesis also identifies within existing laws where possible reform is needed. The
set of criteria and determinants represent a significant original contribution to the existing
knowledge on readiness studies, and more specifically in the Fiji context.
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Table of Contents
Keywords……………………………………………………………………………………...1 Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………...….2 Table of Contents……..………………………………………………………………………3 List of Abbreviations………………………………………………………………………….5 Statement of Original Authorship………………………………………………………….…7 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………...8 Chapter One: Introduction ………………………………………………………………..9 1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..9 1.2 Contextual Background …….………………………………………………………15 1.3 Gaps in the Literature……………………………………………………………….19 1.4 Research Objectives ……………………………………………………………..…26 1.5 Research Questions…………………………………………………….…………...27 1.6 Methodology ……………………………………………….………………………28 1.7 Research Significance ………………………………………………...……………29 1.8 Interpretation of Terms……………………………………………………………...30 1.9 Outline of Chapters...……………………………………………………….………32 Chapter Two: Methodological Approach and Research Design...………………………35 2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………35 2.2 Research Paradigm….……………….……………………………...………………35 2.3 Research Methodology………………………………………………………….…..36 2.4 Research Design…………………………………………………………………….39 2.5 Research Limitations………………………………………………………………..50 2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..52 Chapter Three: Human Mobility of Climate Vulnerable Populations of Pacific Island Nations and International Arrangements under International Law……………………53 3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………53 3.2 Brief Synopsis for Investigation…………………………………………………….54 3.3 Scientific Basis of Climate Change…………………………………………............56 3.3.1 Scientific Climate Evidence………………………………………………………...56 3.3.2 Food Insecurity and Future Livelihoods……………………………………………59 3.4 Climate-induced Displacement and Migration Outlook and Planned Relocation….61 3.4.1 Susceptibility to Environmental Change……………………………………………61 3.4.2 Compounding Migration Perceptions………………………………………………65 3.4.3 Adaptation Strategy of Last Resort…………………………………………………68 3.4.4 Magnitude of Human Mobility……………………………………………………..74 3.4.5 Snapshot of Future Mobility Planned Relocation…………………………………..78 3.4.6 Determinants of Planned Relocation………………………………………………..81 3.5 Climate Displacement and Migration under International Law…………………….91 3.5.1 Global Mobility Dynamics………………………………………………………….91 3.5.2 Legal Protection Gap………………………………………………………………..91 3.5.3 Gap in Terminology………………………………………………………………...93 3.5.4 International and Regional Climate Treaty…………………………………………99 3.5.5 Soft Law Mechanisms……………………………………………………………..105 3.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………110
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Chapter Four: Historical Resettlement in the Pacific Islands Region ………………..112 4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..112 4.2 Case Studies of the Banabans, Vaitupuans, Gilbertese and the Carteret Islanders..117 4.3 Lessons Learned about Mobility of Pacific Islanders……………………………..131 4.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………134 Chapter Five: Readiness–A Multidisciplinary Perspective.…………………………....135 5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..135 5.2 Disaster Preparedness …………….……………………………………………….136 5.3 Climate Finance Readiness...……………………………………………………...144 5.4 International Humanitarian Assistance Preparedness…..........................................152 5.5 Public Health Preparedness………………………………………………………..161 5.6 REDD+ Readiness…………………………………………………………………170 5.7 Readiness Literature Elements and Considerations ………………………………181 5.8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………185 Chapter Six: Readiness–Insights from Empirical Evidence…..……………………….187 6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..187 6.2 Internal Relocation Experiences and Lessons …...………………………………..188 6.3 Readiness of the Fijian Government……………………………………………....195 6.4 Legal Readiness of the Fijian Government ……………………………………….197 6.5 Cross-border Relocation to Fiji …………………………………………………...201 6.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………226 Chapter Seven: Analysis of the Fijian Government’s Readiness………………………229 7.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..229 7.2 Multifaceted Determinants ………………………………………………………..230 7.3 Criteria for Analysing Readiness.............................................................................234 7.4 Importance of Criteria…………….…………………………………………….....245 7.5 Readiness of the Fijian Government………………...…………………………….248 7.6 Reform Perspective and Direction for Framework………………………………..257 7.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………262 Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Directions for Future…………………………………265 8.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..265 8.2 Summary of Key Findings………………………………………………………...265 8.3 General and Specific Contributions……………………………………………….270 8.4 Limitations of the Study and Future Directions...…………………………………271 8.5 Overall Conclusion………………………………………………………………...275 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….277
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List of Abbreviations
Description Abbreviation Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS
Asian Development Bank ADB
Climate Finance Readiness CFR
Conference of Parties COP
Convention on Biological Diversity CBD
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees Refugee Convention
Emergency Management EM
Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility Safeguard Policies FCPF Safeguards
Framework Convention on Climate Change Cancun
Adaptation Framework Cancun Adaptation
Framework
Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific 2017-2030 FRDP
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration Compact for Migration
Green Climate Fund GCF
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement UN Guiding Principles
Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Hyogo Framework
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance IDRL Guidelines
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre iDMC
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies IFRC
International Finance Corporation IFC
International Humanitarian Assistance IHA
International Labour Organisation ILO
International Law Commission ILC
International Organisation for Migration IOM
Least Developing Countries LDCs
Legal Preparedness LP
Measurement, Reporting and Verifications MRV
Millennium Development Goals MDGs
National Accredited Entity NAE
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National Climate Funds NCF
Official Development Assistance ODA
Pacific Climate Change Migration Project PCCM
Pacific Climate Change Treaty Model Treaty
Pacific Community SPC
Pacific Conference of Churches PCC
Pacific Island Countries PICs
Pacific Islands Climate Action Network PICAN
Pacific Island Development Forum PIDF
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat PIFS
Paris Climate Change Agreement Paris Agreement
Principle of Equitable Sharing of Benefits ESB
Principle of Free, Prior And Informed Consent FPIC
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees Protocol to the Refugee
Convention
Public Health PH
Public Health Emergency Preparedness PHEP
Public Health Preparedness PHP
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation REDD
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme SPREP
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 SFDRR
Small Island Developing States SIDS
UN Collaborative Programme on REDD UN-REDD Programme
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples UNDRIP
United Nations UN
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea UNCLOS
United Nations Development Programme UNDP
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific UNESCAP
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction UNISDR
University of the South Pacific USP
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Statement of Original Authorship
QUT Verified Signature
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Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge and thank the spirits of the land and the divine source of energy
for providing strength for the completion of my thesis. I would also like to thank the
administration of the Queensland University of Technology in granting the scholarship award
[QUT Postgraduate Award (QUTPRA)] to undertake my studies, as I had been making
numerous attempts to secure a scholarship award through various scholarship schemes by
different institutions at different countries in previous years. Thank you.
My sincere and heartfelt gratitude extends to my supervisory team consisting of Dr Bridget
Mary Lewis, as my principal supervisor and Dr Rowena Grace Maguire, as my associate
supervisor. My supervisory team was invested in my project from the outset of the proposal
stage. Thank you for your copious support in this journey. I would also like to acknowledge
Professor Reece Albert Walters, who spent the first twelve months as an associate supervisor
with the supervisory team towards my project. To Bridget, Rowena and Reece, my prayers to
the Almighty, will always be with you. Thank you.
Alongside, the supervisory team, my gratitude extends to Professor Belinda Carpenter,
associate Dean of Research (faculty of law), for her leadership towards the circumstances of
my journey. And, how can I forget her fantastic administration student support staff since my
journey began. They included Leana Sanders, Ilana Bolingford, Catherine Mackenzie and
Mayuko Bock. Thank you for your swift responses to my emails and the assistance you
provided.
I wish to also extend my gratitude to Professor Jennifer Corrin, director Centre for Public,
International and Comparative Law at The University of Queensland. Jennifer, you have been
the pillar of encouragement for many years. My sincere thanks also goes to Dr Evan Vaughan
Hamman at the Queensland University of Technology for his availability for our conversations
on my project. I extend my gratitude to Dr Fiona Bucknall (www.thethesisdoctor.com.au) for
her copious care in copyediting and proofreading my thesis. Thank you, Fiona, for
accommodating my request and you have been fantastic. For my interview participants, thank
you for your time and testimonies you shared during my field research.
Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to my wife, Heena Bilimoria. Heena without your emotional
support over many years and just not limited to my present studies, I would not have reached
here. Thank you. Together the end of this journey opens a new chapter of our lives we can
share that lies ahead.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Declining human security exacerbated by the accelerating global effects of climate change,
particularly for Pacific Island nations, is projected to cause unprecedented human population
movement across international borders in the twenty-first century. The contribution from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Groups I, II and III to the special report
on global warming released in 2018 (Special Report 1.5 0C) reports that ‘[g]lobal warming is
likely to reach 1.5 0C between 2030 and 2052’ if concerted global climate action is not
accelerated by state parties to the Paris climate accord.1 The Special Report 1.5 0C further
reports that ‘[s]mall islands are projected to experience multiple inter-related risks at 1.5 0C
and 2 0C of coastal flooding and impacts on population, infrastructure and assets, freshwater
stress, and risks across marine ecosystems, limiting adaptation opportunities, and migration
internally and internationally owing to sea level rise.’2 Similarly, the findings of the first
household regional survey conducted in Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru into climate change
migration in 2015 presented at the Pacific Climate Change Migration Project (PCCM) at the
twenty-first climate change conference of parties in Paris in 2015 (COP 21) revealed that more
than 70 per cent, 70 per cent and 35 per cent of households respectively, believed that
migration was a necessary response to climate change impacts such as worsening droughts and
floods or increased rising sea levels.3
1 Myles R Allen et al, ‘IPCC: Global Warming of 1.5°C - Summary for Policymakers’ in Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al (eds), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C - An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018) 6. 2 Ove Hoegh-Guldbery et al, ‘Impacts of 1.50C of Global Warming on Natural and Human Systems’ in Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al (eds), ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C - An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty’ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018) 181. 3 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Pacific Climate Change Migration Project’ (Research Survey Fact Sheet, European Union, International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Development Program, 2015) 2 (‘PCCM Fact Sheet’).
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The global climate trajectory identifies the need for significant consideration of cross-border
population movement of climate-vulnerable populations in the not too distant future.4 This
means that receiving states need to be ready to manage legal, policy, institutional, geopolitical,
socio-economic and cultural dimensions as well as cross-jurisdictional issues, such as
statehood and the sovereignty of states to effectively facilitate and implement all phases of
large-scale human population cross-border relocation.5 This presents a conundrum,
particularly for Fiji, in opening its border to its Pacific island neighbours for relocation in
response to climate change.6 The focus on Fiji and the need for further exploration of its state
of ‘readiness’ stems from the announcement delivered at the COP 21 by the Fijian Government
that it would permanently accommodate the populations of the atoll island nations of Kiribati
and Tuvalu disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change.7
There is a growing body of literature peppered with references to readiness and preparedness
spanning multiple fields of study.8 However, a precise interpretation of the phenomenon of
readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility is undetermined.
Contributors to this body of knowledge, which includes significant field research, have
directed little attention to examining readiness specifically within the context of climate
4 Bruce Burson and Richard Bedford, ‘Facilitating Voluntary Adaptive Migration in the Pacific’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 54–5. See also Jane McAdam and Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate: Unpacking the Legal and Conceptual Issues’ (2015) 4(1) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 137–166; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Lessons from Planned Relocation and Resettlement in the Past’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 30–2. See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC-Paris COP 21: Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility November 2015’ (Research Report, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 2015) 3; see also Climate and Development Knowledge Network, ‘The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report: What’s in it for Small Island Developing States?’ (Research Report, Overseas Development Institute and Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014) 16–17 (‘CDKN Report’). 5 See above n 4 and accompanying text. 6 Burson, above n 4 and accompanying text. 7 Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, ‘Fiji’s Statement at the COP-21 United Nations Conference On Climate Change’ (Speech delivered at the Leaders Event at the Paris Climate Conference – COP 21/CMP 11, Paris, 30 November 2015) < http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_leaders_event_fiji.pdf>; see also Richard Black et al, ‘Migration, Immobility and Displacement Outcomes Following Extreme Events’ (2013) 27S Environmental Science and Policy S32, S40. 8 Lorenzo Guadagno, ‘Human Mobility in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2016) 7(1) International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 30–40; see also Jale Samuwai and Jeremy Maxwell Hills, ‘Assessing Climate Finance Readiness in the Asia-Pacific Region’ (2018) 10(4) Sustainability 1192–1209; see also Kirsten Nakjavani Bookmiller, ‘Professional Standards and Legal Standard Setting: INSARAG, FMT, and International Disaster Volunteers’ (2015) 48(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 957–84. See also Anthony D Moulton et al, ‘What is Public Health Legal Preparedness?’ (2003) 31(4) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 672–83; see also Malayna Raftopoulos, ‘REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing the Urgent Need for a Full Community-based Human Rights Impact Assessment’ (2016) 20(4) The International Journal of Human Rights 509–30.
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change-induced human mobility.9 To address this gap in the literature, this thesis employs
multifaceted doctrinal analysis, synthesis of the multidisciplinary literature and empirical
evidence generated in this study to articulate a set of criteria for analysing readiness for climate
change-induced human mobility. This set of criteria is then used as an analytical framework
to appraise Fiji’s readiness to receive Pacific Islanders. This thesis also identifies some key
areas within existing laws where reform may be needed. Furthermore, the thesis identifies
overarching determinants as first steps to guide the direction of a broad framework spanning
legal, social, cultural, economic and political dimensions. The investigation undertaken in the
thesis using multiple lines of scientific evidence and the body of knowledge on human mobility
stemming from sudden- and slow-onset environmental change is threefold. First, this thesis
examines the existing legal assistance and protection arrangements under international law for
population movements in the context of climate change. In acknowledging the existing ad hoc
and non-binding international instruments and normative frameworks, this thesis argues that a
comprehensive framework specifically tailored to climate change-induced human mobility is
underdeveloped.10
Second, this thesis investigates the policy, institutional and legal arrangements advanced by
the Fijian Government to facilitate large-scale climate change-induced mobility of
communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. The long-term habitability of Pacific Island
nations may sever from the future impacts of climate change which supports the inquiry into
the arrangements of the Fijian government.11 To determine whether the Fijian Government is
ready for climate change-induced human mobility, this thesis uncovers the determinants for
what it means to be ready from various sources of data. The sources of data encompass: case
studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders; the phenomenon of readiness from
multidisciplinary perspectives and the findings recorded in the field research conducted with
eighteen participants (n = 18) in Fiji. These are discussed in chapters four, five and six. The
determinants from the sources of data are synthesised and analysed to identify the criteria for
readiness. The analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the criteria is further determined by using
data from field interviews. This thesis establishes that the underlying arrangements understood
as readiness for all phases of large-scale climate change-induced mobility of communities
from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji is lacking (program, policy, guidelines and laws, for example)
9 See above n 8 and accompanying text. 10 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 1–8; see also Bart W. Edes, Francois Gemenne, Jonathan Hill and Diana Reckien, ‘Addressing Climate Change and Migration in Asia and the Pacific’ (Research Report, Asian Development Bank, March 2012) 55–8 (‘ADB Report’). 11 John Campbell and Olivia Warrick, Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2014) 2–10.
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by the Fijian Government. This thesis argues that sustained funding, preservation of cultural
identity, inclusiveness and participation of communities in decision-making, and the allocation
of suitable land for relocation, for example, are determinants that demand concerted and
nuanced consideration as a starting point to facilitate and implement all phases of large-scale
relocation of communities across sovereign borders from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji.12
Moreover, this thesis identifies overarching determinants as a starting point to guide the Fijian
Government in crafting a framework that spans legal, social, cultural, economic and political
dimensions. This thesis does not limit its analysis to narrowly construed legal domains of
immigration, citizenship, land rights, social security and administrative decision-making
typically associated with migration matters.13 Instead, it adopts a broad focus to consider a
wider range of social, cultural, economic and political dimensions that interact with the legal
structures and processes to influence the degree of readiness.14 This reinforces the need for a
wide-ranging set of determinants in determining a framework for readiness. The framework
informs a tool and provides impetus for decision- and policy-makers to design well-rounded
policies, plans, programs, guidelines and standards of all phases of climate change-induced
human mobility. Finally, this thesis provides a brief overview of the key areas for reform
within the existing laws.
There is a considerable body of literature on human resettlement in the context of development
projects, including numerous empirical studies on the historical migration and relocation of
Pacific Island communities in the Pacific. This literature documents the existing experiences
12 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 152, 163; see also Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Planned Relocation and Climate Change’ (Policy Brief Report No 8, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 31–5. 13 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; ibid 137–166; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Under Two Jurisdictions: Immigration, Citizenship, and Self-governance in Cross-border Community Relocations’ (2016) 34(2) Law and History Review 282, 282–333. See also David Fisher, ‘Regulating the Helping Hand: Improving Legal Preparedness for Cross-border Disaster Medicine’ (2010) 25(3) Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 208, 210; see also International Organization for Migration, CADRI Capacity Assessment and Planning Tool for Disaster Risk Management: Human Mobility The CaDRi Partnership < https://www.cadri.net/en/cadri-tool-en> click “Human Mobility”. 14 McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; see also Jane McAdam, ‘From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement’ (2016) 39(4) The University of New South Wales Law Journal 1518, 1518–46; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. See also The Nansen Initiative, ‘The Nansen Initiative: Disaster-induced Cross-border Displacement, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change Volume 1’ (The Nansen Initiative, December 2015) 6–10 (‘Protection Agenda Volume 1’); see also ADB Report, above n 10, 47–9; see also Black et al, above n 7, S32-S43. See also Frank Vanclay et al, ‘Social Impact Assessment: Guidance for Assessing and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects’ (Guidance Note, International Association for Impact Assessment, April 2015) iv, v.
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and lessons learned.15 This body of knowledge underpins planned relocation (sometimes
equated with ‘managed relocation’, ‘voluntary adaptive migration’ or ‘government-led
relocation’) from non-climatic and climatic determinants.16 The research to date has tended to
focus on planned relocation but has not dealt with what it means to be ready for large-scale
relocation of communities across sovereign borders as a result of climate change.17 Because
the phenomenon of readiness in relation to climate change has not been explained elsewhere
in the literature, fresh questions need to be asked. First: What are the criteria for readiness in
the context of climate change-induced human mobility? Second: What pragmatic
arrangements, mechanisms and measures need to be developed by the host country Fiji, with
acute economies of scale and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, to open its
sovereign borders to relocate Pacific island neighbours permanently to Fiji? This thesis
establishes the need for a broad inquiry as to what it means to be ready. The researcher
acknowledges that this thesis is not specifically designed to consider the change in future
political leadership in Fiji including the merits of the announcement to relocate Pacific island
communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. This limitation means that caution must be
applied, as the study findings into readiness might not be transferrable under a new
administration by the Fijian government in the future.
Both Kiribati and Tuvalu, as countries of origin cited for permanent relocation to Fiji, have
actively taken ownership to independently manage the risks of climate change in their
communities already.18 Kiribati’s national policy on migration with dignity is a key example
as a starting point. This policy, through a series of initiatives, programs, and activities, provides
‘a long-term merits-based mobility strategy that embraces education and vocational training
to make Kiribati citizens competitive and marketable in international markets.’19 However, the
policy has been scaled-down through the introduction of the Kiribati 20-Year Vision (KV20)
2016–2036.20 The KV20 is a national policy in present times developed in an attempt to
15 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Walter Kalin, ‘Results from Nansen Initiative Regional Consultation to Date’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 24–9. 16 Scott Leckie, ‘Human Displacement’ (Policy Brief No 8, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 26, 28; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 4, 54–5; see McAdam and Elizabeth Ferris, above n 4, 137–66. 17 See above n 16 and accompanying text; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 142; see also ‘climate change may induce migration from a large number of Pacific island countries and territories and from a broad range of environmental settings’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 19. 18 Jane McAdam, ‘Climate Change-related Displacement of Persons’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 534; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1544. 19 McAdam, ‘Climate Change-related Displacement of Persons’, above n 18. 20 Office of Te Beretitenti Republic of Kiribati, Kiribati 20-Year Vision (KV20) <http://www.president.gov.ki/kiribati-20-year-vision-kv20/> (‘KV20’); see also Office of Te
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alleviate the risks of climate change by ‘mainstreaming climate change adaptation and
mitigation into development programming for sustainable development’ and livelihoods of I-
Kiribati citizens.21 The Tuvalu Government has been similarly proactive on behalf of its
citizens. At the seventy-first session of the UN General Assembly it submitted a ‘UN
Resolution on the establishment of a legal process’ for the long-term security and human rights
protection and assistance for the climate-vulnerable populations of Tuvalu.22 Despite a lack of
financial resources, the government has also established the Tuvalu Climate Change Survival
Fund as a local mechanism to manage climate change impacts.23 In establishing measures to
respond to climate change adaptation and mitigation through its nationally determined
contributions prescribed by the Paris Agreement, the Tuvalu Government has pointed out that
‘they have a right to pursue any and all means to ensure their nation survives and the legacy
remains, with future generations living productive lives on these islands.’24 Both Kiribati and
Tuvalu have established long-standing foreign policies on regional cooperation partnerships
advanced by Australia and New Zealand through seasonal labour programs and educational
schemes as prospective routes by which to seek migration in the future.25 The scale of
progressive action undertaken by both island nations demonstrates their resolution to address
the risks of climate change independently. The motivation of the Fijian prime minister to
deliver the announcement at the COP 21 lies beyond the scope of this study, and suffice to
say, the announcement has been made and what it means to be ready for climate change-
induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji remains undetermined.26 The researcher
Beretitenti Republic of Kiribati, Tobwaan Ao Karikirakean Kiribati: Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016-2036, 9, 56 <http://www.president.gov.ki/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/kiribati-20-year-vision-2016-2036%E2%80%A2sept.final_.pdf> (‘Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016-2036’); see also Elenoa Turagaiviu, ‘Kiribati Government will not relocate its people to Fiji’ (Media Release, 22 October 2019) <https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/kiribati-government-will-not-relocate-its-people-to-fiji/>; see also Ben Walker, ‘An Island Nation Turns Away from Climate Migration, Despite Rising Seas’ (Media Release, 20 November 2017) <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20112017/kiribati-climate-change-refugees-migration-pacific-islands-sea-level-rise-coconuts-tourism>; 21 See above n 20 and accompanying text. 22 Sopoanga, Enele Sosene, ‘Tuvalu’ (Speech delivered at the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 23 September 2016) para 8; see also Sopoanga, Enele Sosene, ‘Tuvalu’ (Speech delivered at the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 21 September 2017) paras 25 and 26. 23 Sopoanga, ‘Tuvalu’ (2016), above n 22 para 27. 24 Government of Tuvalu, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (27 November 2015) 9 <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Tuvalu%20First/TUVALU%20INDC.pdf>. 25 Milla Emilia Vaha, ‘Hosting the Small Island Developing States: Two Scenarios’ (2018) 10(2) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 229, 230; see also Justin T. Locke, ‘Climate Change-induced Migration in the Pacific Region: Sudden Crisis and Long-term Developments’ (2009) 175(3) The Geographical Journal 171, 177–9; see also Harriet Farquhar, ‘Migration with Dignity: Towards a New Zealand Response to Climate Change Displacement in the Pacific’ (2016) 19 Victoria University of Wellington Legal Research 29, 29–55. 26 ‘I (Epeli Nailatikau-President of Fiji) want to assure you all that Fiji will stand shoulder with you (Kiribati)…Today I repeat what our Prime Minister told the world at the recent Pacific Islands
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acknowledges the potential variance in future political leadership of national governments in
Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu and making dormant representations for climate change-induced
mobility of Pacific island communities in the future.27 Caution must be applied to the
generalisability of the study findings.
In summary, this introductory chapter sets out the background and context of research, details
the significance of the study and identifies the gaps in the literature before presenting the
research objectives, research questions and the research design adopted to respond to the
research questions posed in the study. The introduction chapter concludes with an outline of
the remaining chapters of the thesis.
1.2 Contextual Background
Climate Change Trajectory and Island Communities
The global scientific evidence related to climate change established through the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirms that ‘warming of the climate
system is unequivocal.’28 Among the findings reported by the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report
conference on conservation and protected areas. If sea level continues to rise because the international community won’t tackle global warming, some or all of the people of Kiribati may have to some and live and Fiji. Fiji will not turn its back on our neighbours in their hour of need…’ as cited in Epeli Nailatikau, ‘His Excellency Ratu Epeli Nailatikau-Address at State Dinner Hosted by the President & First Lady of Kiribati’ (Speech delivered at the State dinner hosted by the President & First Lady of Kiribati), Tarawa-Kiribati, 10 February 2014) < https://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Centre/Speeches/HIS-EXCELLENCY--ADDRESS-AT-STATE-DINNER-HOSTED-BY->; see also Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, ‘Prime Minister’s Closing Speech of the 9th Pacific Islands Conference on Conservation and Protected Areas’ (Speech delivered at the Pacific Islands Conference on Conservation and Protected Areas, Suva–Fiji, 6 December 2013) < https://www.sprep.org/news/prime-ministers-closing-speech-9th-pacific-islands-conference-conservation-and-protected-areas>. 27 See above n 20 and accompanying text; see also Sosene, above n 22 and accompanying text. 28 Thomas F Stocker et al, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 8–14 (SPM B - E, 4, Chps 1, 8); see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 16–17; see also ‘A Special IPCC Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.50C Above Pre-industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pathways is to be Released in 2018. Two other special reports are also to be released in 2019, one on Climate Change, Oceans and the Cryosphere as well as a special report on Climate Change Decertification, Land Degradation, Sustainable Land Management, Food Security and Greenhouse Gas Influxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems’ as cited in Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, ‘Pacific Islanders Encouraged to help Develop IPCC Climate Change Science Reports’ (Media Release, 12 November 2016) <http://www.sprep.org/climate-change/pacific-islanders-encouraged-to-help-develop-ipcc-climate-change-science-reports>; (‘Pacific Community 1.50C’); see also ‘The science will confirm that we do need 1.5 to stay alive, it will confirm what our Small island and Pacific Islands have been saying all along that yes, we need to make it happen’ as cited in Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, ‘1.5 to stay alive to be supported by IPCC Report’ (Media
16
(IPCC AR5), one of the more significant findings of the Working Group I (AR5 WG 1)
confirmed that ‘global mean surface temperatures for the period 2081-2100 (relative to 1986-
2005)’ are projected to rise from 0.30C-1.70C under the lowest emissions scenario to 2.60C-
4.80C under the highest emissions scenario.29 In reinforcing the existing findings, the Special
Report 1.5 0C, as highlighted earlier, maintains that global warming of 1.50C between 2030
and 2052 is imminent unless ‘rapid and far-reaching transitions in land, energy, industry,
buildings, transport, and cities’ are significantly advanced to limit anthropogenic greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions.30
The implications of existing GHG emission pathways accelerating, particularly for Pacific
Island nations as reported by the IPCC, are detailed in two stages. Under the lower emissions
scenario, the impacts of climate change will threaten natural systems in Pacific Island
communities and result in ‘risk of loss of marine and coastal ecosystems, biodiversity and the
ecosystem goods, functions and services they provide for coastal livelihoods.’31 Under the
higher emissions scenario, the impacts will ‘increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive and
irreversible impacts to which it will be difficult to adapt, such as disrupted livelihoods due to
storm surges, coastal flooding and sea level rise.’32 A further strand of scientific evidence from
the IPCC delineates that the existing anthropogenic GHG emission pathways are ‘projected to
increase displacement of people’, particularly Pacific island populations, where the ‘majority
of human communities and infrastructure is located in coastal zones with limited on-island
relocation.’33 The impacts of climate change on Pacific Island communities include sea level
rise, coastal erosion, storm surges and groundwater salinity. These impacts are formidable and
will potentially necessitate the internal relocation of coastal communities, or alternatively,
relocation across international borders as an adaptive response of last resort.34 In addition to
the documented human mobility of Pacific Island communities in the Pacific from climatic
Release, 9 November 2016) <http://www.sprep.org/climate-change/q15-to-stay-aliveq-to-be-supported-by-ipcc-report>. 29 Stocker et al, above n 28, 20 [SPM-E1]; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 6, 10–11. 30 Allen, R. Myles, et al, above n 1, 14, 17; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.50C Approved by Government’ (Media Release, 24/PR, 8 October 2018) 2. 31 Leonard A Nurse et al, ‘Small Islands’ in Vicente R Barros (ed), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part B: Regional Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 39; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 10. 32 See above n 31 and accompanying text. 33 Rajendra K Pachauri et al, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers (Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Switzerland, 2015) 16 (SPM 2.3); see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1619. 34 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618.
17
and non-climatic factors in the past, preliminary empirical studies conducted by seminal
authors such as McAdam, Barnett and Webber, Campbell and Warrick, Donner, Edwards,
McNamara, and Nunn substantiate assertions advanced by the IPCC on the internal relocation
of coastline communities inland.35
The Fijian Announcement
In 2015, at the twenty-first session of the Conference of Parties (COP 21) held under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris, the Fijian Prime
Minister Voreqe Bainimarama delivered the ground-breaking announcement that ‘Fiji is
willing to provide a permanent home to the entire populations of Kiribati and Tuvalu, our two
closest neighbours…we have made this offer to our fellow Pacific islanders with open hearts
because we understand how vulnerable they must feel.’36 In the researcher’s initial attempts to
uncover the research problem from a plain reading of the announcement revealed to the
researcher that national governments will potentially have a host of considerations to carve out
at the micro and macro levels. Some of the preliminary underlying questions that struck the
researcher were as follows:
1) When will the wholesale population resettlement of Pacific Islanders to Fiji take place?
2) How many Pacific Islanders are projected to relocate to Fiji?
3) What political strategy, policy and legal frameworks exist in facilitating dignified
relocation?
35 Jane McAdam, ‘Disappearing States’, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 105–29; see also Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, ‘Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 37–55; see also Simon D Donner, ‘The Legacy of Migration in Response to Climate Stress: Learning from the Gilbertese Resettlement in the Solomon Islands, (2015) 39 Natural Resources Forum 191, 191–210. See also Julia B Edwards, ‘The Logistics of Climate-induced Resettlement: Lessons From the Carteret Islands, Papua New Guinea’ (2013) 32(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 52, 52–78; see also Lacey Allgood and Karen E McNamara, ‘Climate-induced Migration: Exploring Local Perspectives in Kiribati’ (2017) 38 Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 370, 370–85; see also Patrick Nunn and Roselyn Kumar, ‘Understanding Climate-Human Interactions in Small Island Developing States (SIDS): Implications for Future Livelihood Sustainability’ (2017) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 245, 245–272; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–34. 36 Bainimarama, above n 7; see also The Fiji Government, ‘Fiji’s Statement at the COP-21 United Nations Conference on Climate Change’ (Media Release, 12 December 2015) < http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Speeches/FIJI%E2%80%99S-STATEMENT-AT-THE-COP-21-UNITED-NATIONS-CONF.aspx?feed=news>; see also Fiji, Parliamentary Debates, Members of Parliament, 18 March 2015, 969 (M. Vuniwaqa-Minster for Lands); see also Nailatikau, above n 26 and accompanying text.
18
4) Will the Fijian Government implement any guidelines, standards and processes from a
number of non-binding global initiatives or policy agendas?
5) How will issues surrounding sovereignty be addressed?
6) Is the Fijian Government offering a short-term solution to Pacific Islanders?
7) As a destination country, has the Fijian Government considered the social (demographic,
cultural, community, socio-psychological) impacts, costs of resettlement (economic and
fiscal) and health impacts that wholesale population resettlement may potentially present?
8) How does the Fijian Government plan to proportionately make land available when Fiji
faces many of its own challenges in internally relocating its own vulnerable communities
facing climate change and disaster relocation in Fiji?
9) What strategies will be used to resolve conflicts and tensions in relation to land?
Moreover, some of the more precise questions narrowed from the preliminary questions led
the researcher to focus on the legal, policy and institutional arrangements at both national and
regional levels, and to draw on the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian
Government as a backdrop to uncover potential issues in the context of cross-border relocation
schemes to inform readiness.
The announcement brings to the fore a fundamental challenge for the Fijian Government as a
host country to be ready. There are policy, legal, economic, social and political dimensions to
accommodating and permanently re-settling communities of origin from Kiribati and Tuvalu.
The announcement provided the motivation to the researcher to investigate into what it means
to provide a whole-of-government response to climate-induced cross-border relocation and to
draw on the framing of readiness. Against this background, the key areas of inquiry of the
thesis are situated around the phenomenon of readiness: What are the criteria informing a legal
framework for climate migration readiness? What does it mean for the Fijian Government to
be ready for the large-scale climate-induced cross-border relocation of Pacific Islanders to
Fiji?
The investigation in this study takes a legal perspective that engages in-depth analysis of the
legal literature and literature from multifaceted disciplines. The aim is first, to extrapolate the
determinants of readiness for contributing to and guiding decisionmakers towards crafting a
legal framework and second, to inform the criteria of readiness in the context of climate
change. The coverage of the investigation is expansive because no previous study has
investigated climate migration readiness. This is discussed further in chapters four and five.
Much uncertainty still exists on climate-induced cross-border migration in global policy fora
and under international law, as is highlighted in the discussion that follows.
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1.3 Gaps in the Literature
Legal Gap
There is widespread consensus among scholars and practitioners in the field of slow-onset
environmental studies that no legal instrument or framework under international law exists to
respond and manage climate change displacement and migration.37 A precise and definitive
legal terminology, legal instrument—or convention and assistance and protection framework
for human mobility dimensions of climate change under international law—are lacking.38
Whilst there are extensive legal gaps in the context of climate change, a notable exception
from the standpoint of international law and international institutions is the existence of widely
established non-legally binding voluntary instruments that draw on a broad human rights
framework, embodying binding principles and norms. These address the ‘protection and
assistance needs of persons displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including the
adverse effects of climate change’, for example, the Platform on Disaster Displacement.39
Other examples of initiatives and instruments articulated at global policy fora include the
37 Koko Warner et al, ‘Changing Climate, Moving People: Framing Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation’ (Policy Brief No 8, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 10; see also: ‘Emerging climate policy related to human migration, displacement and planned relocation can provide a stepping stone for transitions between immediate-term use of existing approaches to necessary longer-term paradigm changes about population shifts, governance of borders and mobility, livelihood viability and planning locally, regionally and globally’ as cited in Warner et al, 13. See also W. Neil Adger et al, ‘Human Security’ in Christopher B Field (ed), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 768, 771 < https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/>; see also Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre & Norwegian Refugee Council, Quarterly Update (April – June 2016) <http://internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/IDMC-quarterly-update-2016-QU2final.pdf>; see also ADB Report, above n 10. 38 Warner, above n 37; see also Adger et al, above n 37; see also ADB Report, above n 10; see also Lauren Nishimura, ‘Climate Change Migrants: Impediments to a Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies’ (2015) 27(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 107, 108. 39 Nishimura, above n 38, 107, 109, 117; see also McAdam, above n 14; see also Michelle Yonetani, et al (ed), ‘Global Estimates 2015: People Displaced by Disasters’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, July 2015) 11, 76 (‘IDMC GRID 2015 Report’); see also Protection Agenda Volume 1, above n 14. See also Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Economic and Social Council, 54th session, Agenda Item 9 (d0, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (11 February 1998) (UN Guiding Principles) para 2 Forward, Principle 2 Scope and Purpose, Para 2 Introductory Note; see also: ‘Although they do not constitute a binding instrument, these Principles reflect and are consistent with international human rights law and humanitarian law and analogous refugee law’ as cited in UN Guiding Principles Para 2 - Introductory Note <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GPEnglish.pdf >.
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Global Compact for Migration (Migration Compact), the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement (UN Guiding Principles) and the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction (SFDRR). However, much uncertainty remains under international law in
providing a meaningful and coordinated legal response to climate-induced human mobility.40
In recognising gaps in international law, this thesis is not advancing a critique of the
international law but considers its usefulness.
Moreover, gaps in the development of legal mechanisms at the Pacific regional level to
respond to climate-induced migration resonate with uncertainties in international law
identified in chapter three. The formulation of a concept proposal to develop a Pacific Climate
Change Treaty (Model Treaty) remains poorly articulated in regional policy fora.41 Briefly,
the model treaty aims to offer a ‘new source of international law and provide a beacon of
inspiration for Pacific island states to tackle climate change.’42 The thinking surrounding the
40 Walter Kaelin, ‘Global Compact on Migration and Disaster Displacement Prof. Walter Kaelin, Addresses Member States’ (Media Release, 24 May 2017) 1–9 <https://disasterdisplacement.org/global-compact-on-migration-and-disaster-displacement>; see also Sarah Opitz Stapleton et al, ‘Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: The Need for a Risk-informed and Coherent Approach’ (Research Report, Overseas Development Institute and United Nations Development Programme, November 2017) 24–9. See also General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘United Nations Finalises First Ever Global Compact for Migration’ (Media Release, 13 July 2018) 1–2 < https://www.un.org/pga/72/2018/07/13/press-release-united-nations-finalizes-first-ever-global-compact-for-migration/>; see also Refugees and Migrants, Compact for Migration (2018) <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact>; see also Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, GA Res 73/195, UN GAOR, 73rd session, 60th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES73/195 (11 January 2019) <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195> (‘Compact for Migration’). See also Alwyn Didar Singh, ‘Making the Global Compact on Migration Count’ on World Bank People Move (14 December 2017) <http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/making-global-compact-migration-count>; see also Pacific Community (SPC), Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) and University of the South Pacific (USP), ‘Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific - An Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP) 2017–2030 - Voluntary Guidelines for the Pacific Islands Region’ (Research Report, Pacific Community, 11 September 2016) 9 <http://www.pacificdisaster.net/dox/FRDP_2016_Resilient_Dev_pacific.pdf> (‘FRDP 2017-2030’). 41 Michael Slezak, ‘Pacific Islands Nations Consider World’s First Treaty to Ban Fossil Fuels’, theguardian (online), 14 July 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/14/pacific-islands-nations-consider-worlds-first-treaty-to-ban-fossil-fuels>. 42 Pacific Island Development Forum, Outcome Document - Fourth PIDF Leaders’ Summit-Stewardship for Healthy Oceans & Health Nations (12–13 July 2016) 20 (‘PIDF 4 2016’) <http://pacificidf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2016-Leaders-Summit-and-Presummit-Outcome-Document.pdf>; see also Official website: Pacific Islands Climate Action Network <https://pacificclimateactionnetwork.wordpress.com/>. See also ‘PICAN is a regional network of 30 non-governmental organizations, coalitions, social movements, and educational institutions from the Pacific who work to address climate change and sustainable development goals. PICAN is the Pacific regional node of the Climate Action Network International, which has a membership of over 950 NGOs in more than 110 countries – the largest climate network in the world’ as cited in Scoop Independent News, ‘Pacific Islands Climate Action Network Pacific Must Continue to Lead Climate
21
model treaty demonstrates the significant solidarity of Pacific Island nations as a region in
responding to insecurities exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Whilst the full text
of the model treaty is unavailable, conversational pieces and media reports cite the following
thematic areas present in the model treaty:
1) banning or ‘phasing out of fossil fuels;’
2) ensuring ‘“universal access” to clean energy by 2030’, which will be facilitated through
the establishment of the ‘“Pacific framework for renewable energy”’ in line with the
Sustainable Development Framework Agenda 2030;
3) establishing a fund to ‘provide compensation for communities that have suffered climate-
change-related losses;’ and
4) ‘climate-related migration and adaptation.’43
It can be argued that the move towards a climate treaty by regional leaders is premature
because it raises concerns about the extent and influence of international law in its formulation
and the kind of regional leadership it is providing to the international community in light of
the migration compact and accelerated global climate action under the Paris climate accord.
Similarly, other regional cooperation policy agendas exist, such as the Framework for Resilient
Development in the Pacific 2017–2030 (FRDP), which is a voluntary hybrid regional
framework for climate change and disaster risk management to be used to inform regional
policy negotiations and deliberations.44 To date, no single study exists that has evaluated the
scope and implementation of the FRDP across the Pacific region, and it remains descriptive in
nature.45 The gaps in regional policy agendas also validate the investigation of this thesis on
Action’ (Media Release, 22 April 2016) <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1604/S00038/pacific-must-continue-to-lead-climate-action.htm>. 43 Slezak, above n 41; see also Lealaiauloto Aigaletaulealea Tauafiafi, ‘Pacific Leaders Agree to Further Consultations on Proposed Pacific Climate Treaty’ on Pacific Guardians 15 July 2016 <http://pacificguardians.org/blog/2016/07/15/pacific-leaders-agree-to-further-consultations-on-proposed-pacific-climate-treaty/.html>. 44 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, Forty-Seventh Pacific Islands Forum, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia-Forum Communique (8–10 September 2016) (‘2016 PIFS 47’) <http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/embeds/file/2016_Communique_FINAL_web>; see also ‘The FRDP was developed in response to recommendations from the Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk Management and Pacific Climate Change Roundtable in 2011 and endorsed by the Pacific Island Forum Leaders in 2012’ as cited in Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, New Framework to build resilience to climate change and disasters in the Pacific Islands (16 September 2016) <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/press-statements/2016-media-releases/new-framework-to-build-resilience-to-climate-change-disasters-in-pacific-islands.html>. 45 Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, ‘Forty-Ninth Pacific Islands Forum’ (Forum Communiqué, 18(10), Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 3–6 September, 2018) 1–14 (‘2018 PIFS 49’); see also Pacific Community, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, ‘Implementation of the Framework for Resilient Development (FRDP) in
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the readiness of potential climate-induced cross-border relocation of Pacific Island
communities in the future.
Data Gap
There is widespread consensus in both the scientific literature and the growing body of
published studies in the Pacific region that there is much uncertainty regarding the future
human mobility patterns of Pacific Island communities arising from the impacts of climate
change. One of the published studies of the Secretariat of the Pacific Environment Programme,
conducted in partnership with other intergovernmental agencies and regional institutions on
the Pacific Island countries’ and territories’ (PICTs) climate change outlook, has confirmed
that ‘data collection issues (data collection and data consistency), data management and
dissemination, data analysis and interpretation, and the use of data to inform and direct policy
responses to climate change presents significant challenges within PICT.’46 However, progress
has been made on informing fragmented desk-based estimates. For example, the preliminary
field-based research conducted in Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu towards the PCCM
project in 2013 reveals that ‘the pressure to migrate is likely to be relatively high among these
countries’ as population growth in these low-lying atoll nations becomes heavily concentrated
in urban centres escalating to approximately ‘298,000 people in 2050 compared to 170,000
people in 2013.’47 In 2015, the PCCM concluded that international migration trips for
Kiribati—with a population of approximately 175 560 in 2055— would increase by 35 per
cent, and for Tuvalu—with a population of approximately 13 246 in 2055—would increase by
100 per cent.48
It is acknowledged in the literature that the generalisability of published data on climate-
induced mobility for the Pacific region is problematic. This is due to an array of factors, for
example, varying elevation on coastal settlements.49 Other factors include the difficulty in
the Pacific - Establishment of the Support Unit and the Taskforce for the Pacific Resilience Partnership (PRP)’ (Media Release, 19 January 2018) 1–3. 46 Secretariat of the Pacific Environment Programme, ‘Pacific Environment and Climate Change Outlook’ (Research Report, Secretariat of the Pacific Environment Programme, 2012) 1, 4. 47 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 16–17. 48 PCCM Survey Fact Sheet, above n 3 and accompanying text; see also United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations Development Program, and International Labour Organisation, ‘Pacific Climate Change & Migration Project’ (Newsletter, February, 2016) 1 (‘UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter’) <http://www.unescap.org/resources/pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project-newsletter-february-2016>. 49 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 18; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 7.
23
extrapolating ‘scenarios and projections from global climate change models to the resolution
required for small island developing states’50 (SIDS) and variability of extreme events
(frequency, intensity, for example).51 These factors represent gaps in information about the
Pacific Island region. This suggests that consistent and coherent targeted quantitative and
qualitative research into the human mobility dimensions of Pacific Island communities is
needed to inform Pacific Island governments in decision-making and to craft well-defined
policies, plans and regulatory frameworks. These need to be supported by appropriate budgets
to respond to climate-driven migration to neighbouring Pacific Island countries in the future.52
Approaches to strengthen data collection, retention and dissemination that can be adopted by
Pacific Island nations (among others) could include: periodic national censuses; investment in
technological apparatus; capacity building and sharing of data.53 This thesis does not explore
any extended discussions specific to the approaches cited.
Together, the evidence presented in relation to the legal and information gaps at the global
level and more importantly, at the Pacific regional level, reveals extensive issues and
challenges. These are more important for receiving states in the context of climate-induced
human mobility. This also suggests that proactive mechanisms and flexible approaches will
need to be tailored to respond to cross-border migration and relocation by countries of origin
and the host country to effect readiness.
Knowledge Gap
As discussed earlier, no previous studies to date have investigated the phenomenon of
readiness in the context of climate change human mobility. Similarly, no single study has
investigated a whole-of-government response from a legal perspective to inform climate
migration readiness at either the national and Pacific regional levels. However, there has been
some emerging empirical investigation by scholars such as McNamara and Combes, Klepp
and Herbeck, Bertana, Piggott-McKellar et al, and Charan, Kaur and Singh, into the internal
50 See above CDKN Report, above n 4, 7. 51 Hoegh-Guldbery et al, above n 2, 273; see also ‘climate model projections of trends over the next five decades and beyond…suggest an increased frequency of heavy precipitation events at global scale…in some regions…predictions are weak and inconsistent between different models’ as cited in Black et al, above n 7, S32, S34. 52 Adelle Thomas and Lisa Benjamin, ‘Policies and Mechanisms to Address Climate-induced Migration and Displacement in Pacific and Caribbean Small Island Developing States’ (2018) 10(1) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 86, 95–7. 53 ADB Report, above n 10, 53–4
24
relocation of coastal communities inland in Fiji.54 These internal relocations have been
initiated and implemented by the Fijian Government.55 The findings provided some important
insights to the researcher in framing the research questions, the interview questions and the
ethics application submitted to undertake field research in Fiji. The researcher employed
qualitative modes of inquiry into participants’ experiences and the lessons learned from the
internal relocation projects to inform the determinants of readiness for climate change-induced
mobility of communities across sovereign borders to Fiji.
A number of studies have examined readiness from a variety of perspectives, for example,
accessing climate finance through global funding mechanisms for low-carbon development
projects (climate finance readiness) and preparedness for sudden-onset natural hazards
(disaster preparedness). These are discussed further in chapter five.56 The variety of
perspectives make only infrequent linkages and provide only a smattering of references to
readiness and preparedness in the context of climate change. To date, none have explained and
investigated readiness in the context of climate change, which provides the rationale to adopt
a broad approach to inform the phenomenon of readiness. The knowledge gaps in the
phenomenon of readiness and the findings of the field research are discussed further in
chapters five and six.
To address gaps in the literature, this thesis employs various layers of analysis and synthesis
of the literature as well as new empirical evidence. These are presented in chapters four, five
and six to guide the development of the framework, which spans the legal, social, cultural,
economic and political dimensions of climate migration readiness. Chapter four articulates and
54 Karen E McNamara and Helene Jacot Des Combes, ‘Planning for Community Relocations Due to Climate Change in Fiji’ (2015) 6(3) International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 315, 315–19; see also Silja Klepp and Johannes Herbeck, ‘The Politics of Environmental Migration and Climate Justice in the Pacific Region’ (2016) 7(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 54, 70; see also Amanda Bertana, How a Community in Fiji Relocated to Adapt to Climate Change (10 January 2017) Scholars Strategy Network <https://scholars.org/brief/how-community-fiji-relocated-adapt-climate-change>. See also Annah E. Piggott-McKellar et al, ‘Moving People in a Changing Climate: Lessons from Two Cases Studies in Fiji’ (2019) 8(5) Social Sciences 133–150; see also Dhrishna Charan, Manpreet Kaur and Priyatma Singh, ‘Customary Land and Climate Change Induced Relocation – A Case Study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji’ in Walter Leal Filho (ed), Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific Countries – Fostering Resilience and Improving Quality of Life (Springer International Publishing, 2017) 19–33; see also Pierick, C.M. Martin et al, ‘Responding to multiple climate-linked stressors in a remote island context: The example of Yadua Island, Fiji’ (2018) 21 Climate Risk Management 7; see also Jon Barnett and Celia McMichael, ‘The effects of climate change on the geography and timing of human mobility’ (2018) 39(4) Population and Environment 339-356. 55 McNamara and Combes, above n 54 and accompanying text. 56 Feja Lesniewska, ‘UNFCCC REDD+ COP Decisions: The Cumulative Effect on Forest Related Law Processes’ (2013) 15(1) International Community Law Review 103, 103–21; see also Ademola A Adenle, Dale T Manning and Joseph Arbiol, ‘Mitigating Climate Change in Africa: Barriers to Financing Low-carbon Development’ (2017) 100 World Development 123, 123–32.
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catalogues the experiences and lessons learned from the historical migration case studies in
the Pacific, including literature specifically dealing with the concept of readiness and
preparedness from a range of disciplines.57 Chapter four also presents the first phase of analysis
of the determinants of readiness. Chapter five presents the second phase of the analysis of
readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives in order to unpack the determinants of readiness.
Chapter five also supplements the analysis in chapter four. Chapter six presents the empirical
evidence generated from participants’ lived experiences of the internal relocation projects
initiated by the Fijian Government and the institutional knowledge of historical incidences of
migration in the Pacific. The phases of analysis are consolidated in chapter seven, which
synthesises the determinants of readiness from the sources of data to articulate a set of criteria
for analysing readiness. The set of criteria for readiness is then applied as an analytical
framework to appraise Fiji’s position, analysing the empirical evidence gathered in this study
as reflected in chapter six.
There is a considerable body of experience in the literature that documents the phenomenon
of human mobility from sudden-onset natural hazards and development projects. The gamut
of standards and guidelines in the context of mega-project development, such as the World
Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement and the International Finance
Corporation Performance Standards, are notable examples of global lending institutions
assisting in voluntary resettlement.58 Similarly, SFDRR priority action four identifies the need
to ‘enhance disaster preparedness for effective response recognising the importance of
planning and preparedness of communities and local authorities to the threat or impact of
disasters.’59 In both these fields of study, the reference to voluntary or managed is not uniform
or expressly cited. However, a plain reading of the relevant experience has advanced appeals
for planned relocation in response to population movement. The references to planned
relocation in the literature offer important insights into the broad nature of the inquiry into
57 McAdam, above n 4. 58 Bogumil Terminski, Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes, Consequences, and Socio-legal Context (Columbia University Press, 2014) 17, 51; see also Bogumil Terminski, Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Theoretical Frameworks and Current Challenges (University of Geneva, 2013) 162. See also The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The International Development Association, World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social Framework (4 August 2016) The World Bank <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/08/04/world-bank-board-approves-new-environmental-and-social-framework>; see also Nicholas K Tagliarino, ‘The Status of National Legal Frameworks for Valuing Compensation for Expropriated Land: An Analysis of Whether National Laws in 50 Countries/Regions Across Asia, Africa, and Latin America Comply with International Standards on Compensation Valuation’ (2017) 6(2) Land 1, 7–8. 59 Michelle Yonetani, ‘Positioned for Action: Displacement in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction’ (Briefing Paper, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, 16 February 2017) 8.
26
readiness. This is because some aspects of planned relocation, such as ‘resources available in
the place of new residence; appropriate infrastructure; sustainable environmental conditions;
and restoration of livelihoods’ resonate with conceptualising readiness for climate change-
induced human mobility.60 However, there is no explicit reference in planned relocation
literature to readiness, that is, what it means for a host country to be ready to respond to climate
change-induced mobility of communities across sovereign borders.61 It can thus be suggested
that to advance the understanding of the phenomenon of readiness in the context of climate
change, there needs to be a shift in focus in the body of research on planned relocation to
underscore and develop the understanding of readiness in greater depth.
In summary, there are significant gaps in the literature. First, the assistance and protection
arrangements under international law, including coordinated responses at the Pacific regional
level for human mobility from the impacts of climate change, are inadequate and poorly
defined.62 Second, there is a lack of coherent and robust data on the influx, magnitude and
timeframe for cross-border relocation of Pacific Island communities. It is well established that
there is a general lack of research on readiness in the context of climate change (thereby
referring to previous references).
1.4 Research Objectives
The key objectives of this research aim to address the gaps identified in the literature. The first
objective is to articulate the criteria for readiness from the synthesis and analysis of the sources
of data presented in chapters four to six. The second objective is to assess Fiji’s readiness
against these criteria by using data obtained from the field interviews, which is discussed in
chapter six. Finally, key areas within existing laws where reform is needed—and the
60 Terminski, Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes, Consequences, and Socio-legal Context, above n 58, 404. 61 The researcher acknowledges that developing an understanding of readiness from the perspective of the country of origin is also important to provide insights into well-rounded considerations and issues to implement cross-border relocation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to frame readiness from the perspective of the country of origin which can be explored through further research. See also political leadership in Kiribati and perspectives on migration as cited in KV20 above n 20 and accompanying text. 62 Much uncertainty still exists about law and practice as McAdam points out that: ‘there has been no systematic analysis of state practice relating to relocations and the legal issues involved…the legal framework for decisions for relocation varies from state to state, and very few states have developed laws or policies relating specifically to relocations…by the effects of climate change. In some countries, constitutional provisions may restrict the state’s ability to relocate specific communities, such as indigenous groups. But even where legal guidance exists, it requires implementation and enforcement to effective’ as cited in McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 161.
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determinants to guide and contribute to a framework spanning legal, social, cultural, economic
and political dimensions—are identified and presented in chapter seven. The identification of
criteria for analysing readiness and the determinants to guide the framework for readiness in
the context of climate change-induced human mobility make a significant and original
contribution to the growing field of readiness studies to inform the policy making, future
coordination of, and practice in, managing climate change-induced human mobility at both
local and Pacific regional levels.
1.5 Research Questions
In order to achieve the research objectives outlined above, this thesis proceeds by defining and
investigating a number of core research questions:
Research Question 1: What are the criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-
induced human mobility?
Research Question 1(a): What can we learn from the historical experiences of human mobility
across the Pacific Islands regions?
Research Question 1(b): What can we learn from the experiences and lessons learned from
the internal relocation of communities in Fiji?
Research Question 1(c): What can we learn from the literature on other forms of mobility or
other contexts of readiness?
Research Question 2: What is the current state of Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale
mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change?
Research Question 3: What reforms are necessary to ensure that Fiji is ready to receive Pacific
Islanders as a result of climate change?
The responses and findings relating to the research questions posed in this study provide a
basis on which to respond and fill the identified gaps in the literature that have not been
previously examined in climate change migration studies.
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1.6 Methodology
The methodological approach employed to respond to the research questions comprises
doctrinal legal research and qualitative empirical legal research. Doctrinal research
methodology entails ‘primary sources of legal doctrine’ (legislation and case law) and
‘secondary literature and commentary.’63 This research draws on an extensive range of primary
and secondary sources to determine the legal arrangements on population movements from the
impacts of climate change under international law, including existing legal arrangements at
the Pacific regional level.64 The review of the different sources of data and material is assessed
as part of doctrinal analysis and reported on in chapters three, four and five. It examines
existing legal arrangements, knowledge gaps and the determinants of readiness in the context
of climate change-induced human mobility to guide the development of a framework for
readiness. Moreover, this research engages doctrinal analysis of the historical migration
documented in case studies in the Pacific in chapter four, and the phenomenon of readiness
from multidisciplinary perspectives in chapter five, to uncover the determinants of readiness.
Qualitative empirical legal research methodology is used to answer RQ 1(b), which focuses
on the lived experiences of the participants involved in the internal relocation projects initiated
by the Fijian Government. This is achieved by conducting field interviews with senior state
officials from within the Fijian administration and non-state actors, such as in-country regional
institutions, intergovernmental agencies and the church, among others. The field research
draws on phenomenological and grounded theory approaches, which are underpinned by
interviews.65 The interview data is discussed in chapter six.
This study uses a multimethod approach, which reflects the need to draw on different sources
of data generated.66 This study also applies triangulation to enhance the reliability of the field
63 Nigel Duncan and Terry Hutchinson, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83, 113; see also Terry Hutchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 13, 22. 64 See above n 63 and accompanying text. 65 Barbara M Grant and Lynne S Giddings, ‘Making Sense of Methodologies: A Paradigm Framework for the Novice Researcher’ (2002) 13(1) Contemporary Nurse: A Journal for the Australian Nursing Profession 10, 17; see also M Cole, ‘Qualitative Research a Challenging Paradigm for Infection Control’ (2006) 7(6) British Journal of Infection Control 25, 27; see also Paul D Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Omrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design (Merrill, first published 1993, 2010 ed) 141–2. 66 Grant and Giddings, above n 65; see also Lyn Spillman, ‘Mixed Methods and the Logic of Qualitative Inference’ (2014) 37(2) Qualitative Sociology 189, 197; see also Moin Syed and Sarah C Nelson, ‘Guidelines for Establishing Reliability When Coding Narrative Data’ (2015) 3(6) Emerging Adulthood 375, 383. See also John Tribe, ‘Research Paradigms and Tourism Curriculum’ (2001) 39(4)
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data of various participants generated from the interviews.67 The strategies and approaches,
including both doctrinal and empirical methodological approaches, are discussed in chapter
two.68
1.7 Research Significance
There are several important areas where this study makes an original contribution. First, this
is the first study to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the historical migration case studies
in the Pacific and the phenomenon of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives to
conceptualise the determinants of readiness in the context of climate change-induced human
mobility. This is also the first study of this kind that has developed a set of criteria for readiness
in the context of climate change-induced human mobility through comprehensive analysis of
the literature and empirical evidence presented in chapters four to six. The criteria for readiness
are applied as an analytical framework to examine Fiji’s position in response to the climate
change-induced mobility of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji and are presented
in chapter seven. This study demonstrates for the first time that Fiji is insufficiently ready for
climate change-induced mobility of communities to the host country Fiji. The analytical
framework for climate migration readiness is a key outcome and an original contribution to
the field of studies on mobility dimensions from slow-onset environmental change. Moreover,
the determinants to guide the direction of a framework spanning legal, social, cultural,
economic and political dimensions will serve as a base that could be usefully explored and
developed in further research.
In addition, the findings about the level of Fiji’s readiness are the first empirical investigation
conducted on this issue. These findings make an original contribution to the existing empirical
studies of the Pacific on mobility dimensions from sudden-onset and slow-onset
environmental change. Although the findings are generated from a relatively small pool of
participants (n = 18), the analysis has nonetheless extended our knowledge of what it means
to be ready as a starting point for mobility of communities as a result of change climate across
sovereign borders. The participants in the field research had firsthand knowledge, including
institutional knowledge, on the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government
for coastal communities in Fiji. The participants provided insights on what issues,
Journal of Travel Research 442, 445; see also Nancy Carter et al, ‘The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research’ (2014) 41(5) Oncology Nursing Forum 545, 545. 67 See above n 66 and accompanying text. 68 Ibid.
30
considerations and aspects could resonate in terms of what it means to be ready in the context
of climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji. The experiences and lessons
of participants provided enabled the researcher to conceptualise readiness in the context of
climate change human mobility.
1.8 Interpretation of Terms
Climate Change
The term climate change from the scientific body of research encompasses ‘a change in the
state of the climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity and which can
be identified (e.g. by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its
properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer.’69 The natural
causes for ‘a change in the state of the climate’ entails ‘external forcings such as modulations
of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition
of the atmosphere and land-use change.’70 The ‘impacts of climate change include higher
atmospheric and oceanic temperatures, changing rates of precipitation, increased intensity of
extreme events and decreased fresh water availability and sea level rise.’71
In this thesis, the term climate change is used to refer to the ‘slow-onset effects of climate
change (e.g. sea level rise, coastal erosion, increased drought frequency, coral bleaching, and
storm surges).’72 The broad use of the term climate change is sometimes equated with ‘extreme
weather event’ pertaining to natural hazards ‘(e.g. floods, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones and
heatwaves)’ because climate change is considered ‘to increase the frequency, severity and
intensity of natural hazards, raise sea levels, and change rainfall variability.’73 The researcher
utilises the term climate change to refer to slow-onset event in this thesis to address ‘human
69 Katherine J Mach, Serge Planton and Christoph von Stechow, ‘Annex II: Glossary’ in Pachauri, K. Rajendra, et al, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers (Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Switzerland, 2015) 120; 70 Ibid. 71 Mach, Planton and Stechow, above n 69, 120–121; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86 –7. 72 Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus, ‘The first climate refugees? Contesting global narratives of climate change in Tuvalu’ (2012) 22 Global Environmental Change 382, 382; 73 Black et al, above n 7, S32–S33; see also Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also Nansen Initiative, ‘The Realities of Climate Change-Related Human Mobility to be Addressed in Paris’ (Discussion Paper, The Nansen Initiative, September 2015) 1; see also Mach, Planton and Stechow, above n 69, 120–1, 123.
31
mobility (migration, displacement and relocation)’ in the context of Pacific island nations.74
The researcher reiterates that extreme weather event can also be considered to address human
mobility which the reader should not rule out. The investigation of this thesis does not focus
on extreme weather event as a basis to respond to the dimensions of human mobility.
Resettlement and Relocation
There is widespread consensus among seminal authors such as McAdam and Ferris, Campbell,
Connell, Donner, and Warner et al, that the terms resettlement and relocation are used
interchangeably in the context of population movement from ‘sudden- and slow-onset
environmental change, and large-scale project developments.’75 Human mobility entails
‘voluntary and involuntary movement both short- and long-distances’ spanning ‘internal and
across international borders.’76 McAdam asserts that ‘relocation and resettlement–both posit
as intellectual constructs and tools for population management.’77
Resettlement can be defined as a ‘process by which a number of homogenous people from one
locale come to live together in a different locale.’78 Resettlement entails restoration of the
‘housing, assets, livelihoods, land, access to resources, and the living standards’ of
communities relocated.79 The broad use of term resettlement encompasses ‘identifiable
proponents such as local governments, national governments, local and international
corporations, as well as development banks and finance corporations, responsible for planning
and organising the activity of resettlement.’80
74 Warner et al, above n 37, 7–11; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 87. 75 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 141; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Relocation and Resettlement from Colonisation to Climate Change: The Perennial Solution to Danger Zones’ (2015) 3(1) London Review of International Law 93, 94; see also John Campbell, ‘Climate-induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The Meaning and Importance of Land’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 57-79; see also John Connell, ‘Population Resettlement in the Pacific: Lessons from a Hazardous History?’ (2012) 43(2) Australian Geographer 127, 127-142; see also Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also Donner, above n 35, 191–210; see also Brooke Wilmsen and Michael Webber, ‘What can we learn from the practice of development-forced displacement and resettlement for organised resettlements in response to climate change?’ (2015) Geoforum 76, 76–85; see also Alex Arnall, ‘Resettlement as climate change adaptation: what can be learned from state-led relocation in rural Africa and Asia?’ (2019) 11(3) Climate and Development 253, 253. 76 Warner, et al, above n 74, 10-11; see also McAdam, ‘Relocation and Resettlement’ above n 75, 93, 94. 77 McAdam, above n 75, 93, 94. 78 Campbell, above n 75, 58. 79 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 141. 80 Wilmsen and Webber, above n 75, 76, 77.
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The term relocation tends to be used to refer ‘the physical movement of people that can be
carried out without resettlement (for example, when government transports urban squatters to
the outskirts of a city and leaves them there without providing housing or ensuring access to
public services).’81 The broad use of the term relocation has come to be used in the context of
‘extreme weather-related disasters, gradual environmental deterioration, and the long term-
term impacts of climate change as a permanent mechanism for moving communities out of
harm’s way.’82 A further definition of relocation described by Campbell entails:
the permanent (or long-term) movement of a community (or a significant part of it) from one location to another, in which important characteristics of the original community, including its social structures, legal and political systems, cultural characteristics and worldviews, are retained; the community stays together at the destination in a social form that is similar to the community of origin.83
The researcher recognises the variety of perspectives of the terms and adopts them to be used
interchangeably in this thesis. The terms are used in their broadest sense constituting of three
layers. First, is the physical movement of affected communities from ‘sudden- and slow-onset
environmental change’ to a new location inland and across international borders.84 Second, is
the permanent re-establishment of communities by restoring their livelihoods in the new
location in the country of origin (inland) and destination country (cross-border). Third, is a
whole-of-government response by the country of origin (inland); and country of origin and
destination country (cross-border) to facilitate population movement.
1.9 Outline of Chapters
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This introductory chapter outlines the research problem,
contextual background, significance of the research, underlying objectives of this research,
knowledge gaps and research questions and provides a brief summary of the other chapters in
this thesis.
Chapter two discusses the methodological approach adopted to respond to the research
questions posed in this thesis. It also sets out the research design to explain the extensive
processes engaged by the researcher to gather, code and analyse the data generated from the
field interviews. Chapter two details the multimethod approach adopted in this study, including
81 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 141. 82 Jane McAdam and Marc Limon, ‘Human Rights, Climate Change and Cross-border Displacement’ (Research Policy Report, Universal Rights Group, August 2015) 18; see also McAdam, above n 75, 93–4. 83 Campbell, above n 75, 58–9. 84 Black et al, above n 7, S32–S43.
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triangulation as a strategy to demonstrate the reliability of the data generated to inform the
different strands of considerations to articulate the determinants of readiness.
Chapter three presents a comprehensive review of the literature in the field of human mobility
dimensions from sudden- and slow-onset environmental change. The review details the
scientific evidence underlying global warming and projections of global climate change
impacts and risks in the twenty-first century.85 The review also examines numerous empirical
studies conducted in the Pacific region to demonstrate the existing and future declining human
security risks to Pacific Island communities from the impacts of climate change. The literature
review on the body of experience on human mobility dimensions from non-climatic factors,
such as development projects and the historical migration of Pacific Islands communities, is
also detailed.86 Additionally, the literature review identifies knowledge gaps spanning legal,
information and data dimensions of population movement in the context of climate change as
part of validating the research problem. The detailed and considered analysis of the body of
knowledge demonstrates the scale and urgency of the climate change problem in the Pacific.
This study provides an important opportunity to advance the understanding of readiness in the
context of climate change human mobility.
Chapter four draws on historical case studies documenting the mobility of Pacific Islanders,
primarily during the period of British colonial government administration of territories in the
Pacific Islands region.87 Chapter four examines Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and
experiences of mobility within and across sovereign borders in the past century. This
corresponds with RQ 1 (a): What can we learn from the historical experiences of human
mobility across the Pacific Islands region? It also presents the first phase of analysis to uncover
the determinants to guide the way to articulate the criteria for readiness in chapter seven.
Chapter five examines the phenomenon of readiness documented in the literature from
multidisciplinary perspectives and uncovers what might be learned from the considerable body
of experience on readiness. This corresponds with RQ 1(c): What can we learn from literature
on other forms of mobility or other contexts of readiness? Additionally, this chapter unpacks
85 Warner et al, above n 37, 1–58. 86 Brent Doberstein and Anne Tadgell, ‘Guidance for Managed Relocation’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 27, 27-–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. 87 Jane McAdam, ‘Historical Cross-border Relocations in the Pacific: Lessons for Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate Change’ (2014) 49 (3) The Journal of Pacific History 301, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9. See also Connell, above n 75, 127, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78.
34
the determinants of readiness across a range of disciplines and presents the second phase of
analysis.
Chapter six presents the findings of the field research conducted with a total of eighteen
participants (n = 18) in Fiji. It corresponds with RQ 1 (b), which focuses on the participants’
accounts of the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government. Chapter six
also presents the third phase of analysis and produces a list of determinants of readiness as a
basis to articulate the criteria of readiness in chapter seven. The determinants from chapters
four and five are synthesised in this chapter to generate the set of criteria for readiness in
chapter seven.
Chapter seven brings together the strands of determinants generated in chapters four, five and
six to articulate a set of criteria for readiness in response to RQ 1. Chapter seven demonstrates
that this is the first study to undertake a comprehensive analysis of different sources of data.
It also demonstrates that the criteria for readiness presents a new way of conceptual thinking
about climate migration readiness, as readiness is not explained elsewhere in the literature.
Additionally, the criteria for readiness in chapter seven is applied as an analytical framework
to assess Fiji’s ability to respond to climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Islanders to
Fiji. The examination of Fiji’s ability response against the criteria for readiness is buttressed
by the empirical evidence generated in chapter six. Moreover, this chapter provides a brief
overview of the key areas for reform within the existing laws and identifies overarching
determinants as a starting point to inform a framework for readiness spanning legal, social,
cultural, economic and political dimensions.
Chapter eight provides conclusions drawn from the entire thesis, and chapter seven in
particular. Chapter eight highlights priority areas where the Fijian Government will need to
extensively direct attention to implement relocation schemes in the future, such as funding and
identification of land, followed by other areas such as institutional, sectoral and community
capacity building. Chapter eight concludes by identifying areas for further research and
potential directions for future.
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Chapter 2: Methodological Approach and Research Design
2.1 Introduction
The introductory chapter provided the overall synopsis of the thesis and set the tone of the
investigation of the thesis. This chapter discusses the research methodology and design
adopted by the researcher to gain insights into this study’s inquiry into readiness.
2.2 Research Paradigm
The philosophical approach to this research is grounded in both quantitative and qualitative
traditions.88 The interpretive paradigm, interchangeably expressed as the constructivist
paradigm, is synonymous with qualitative research and situated squarely in the qualitative
tradition.89 Grant and Giddings argue that ‘[a]s a researcher in the interpretive paradigm, you
relate and interact with your participants in an effort to come to understand their experiences
and the meaning they ascribe to the phenomenon under scrutiny’ by you as the researcher.90
Similarly, Tribe argues that ‘the interpretive tradition treats the social world as subject
encouraging it to speak for itself.’91 The researcher relied on the qualitative tradition, which
required qualitative modes of enquiry, including examination of the lived experiences of
participants and institutional knowledge of the state machinery, as a basis to answer RQ 1(b).92
88 Sandip Mukhopadhyay and Rajen K Gupta, ‘Survey of Qualitative Research Methodology in Strategy Research and Implication for Indian Researchers’ (2014) 18(2) The Journal of Business Perspective 109, 109–10; see also above n 65 and accompanying text; see also Tribe, above n 66, 442–8; see Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook Of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 929–31. 89 Grant and Giddings, above n 65,10–28; see also Cole, above n 65, 25–30; see also Tribe, above n 66, 442–8; see also Webley, above n 88. 90 Grant and Giddings, above n 65, 16–17. 91 Tribe, above n 66, 442, 445. 92 Webley, above n 88; see also Hutchinson, above n 63, 7–33.
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2.3 Research Methodology
The researcher adopted doctrinal and empirical research methodological approaches to answer
RQ 1 (a–c). The researcher used a doctrinal research methodology as a basis to understand and
examine the determinants underpinning readiness in the context of climate change-induced
human mobility.93 As noted by Hutchinson, doctrinal research methodology is commonly used
in research projects that are legal in nature.94 Within the discipline of law, a researcher ‘would
need to use doctrinal research to identify the pertinent law before embarking on an empirical
work on the policy or context behind the implementation of the law, or the subsequent effects
of the law on the community.’95 In addition, doctrinal research method involves ‘locating the
sources of law and then interpreting and analysing the text.’96 The researcher carried out a
comprehensive review and critical analysis of primary and secondary law materials.
The primary sources encompassed constitutions, statutes, regulations and cases, primarily
those of Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu.97 The secondary resources included international
instruments and agreements, international soft law instruments, global policy frameworks and
principles and scholarly literature including journal articles, texts, published reports, and
empirical studies conducted in the Pacific.98 In addition, documentary resources such as
content in conversational pieces, media reports, parliamentary debates and materials publicly
accessible from websites formed part of the secondary materials.99 The review enabled the
researcher to examine the current state of knowledge on readiness to advance the
understanding of the determinants of readiness from various legal, social, cultural, economic
and political dimensions. The review of the sources of data from the standpoint of doctrinal
research methodology traverses chapters three, four and five.
Hutchinson also argues that ‘[n]ot all doctrinal research begins with a legal problem.’100
Hutchinson claims that doctrinal research presents an opportunity for the researcher to account
for ‘what is known and not known about the topic’, including the relevant law.’101 The
literature documents that the relocation of Pacific Island communities due to the effects of
93 Hutchinson, above n 63, 7–28; see also Duncan and Hutchinson, above 63, 83–119. 94 Hutchinson, above n 63, 28. 95 Ibid 11. 96 Ibid 13. 97 Hutchinson, above n 63, 9, 11, 22. 98 Ibid 22. 99 Ibid. 100 Hutchinson, above n 63, 14. 101 Ibid 13–14.
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climate change is imminent.102 It is argued in this thesis that the provision of non-binding
international soft law principles present in international instruments may serve as a basis to
respond to climate change-induced mobility of communities across sovereign borders.103
However, the development of a concerted and conclusive response towards a legal framework
under international law is uncertain, and there are inadequate tailored and pragmatic solutions,
particularly for Pacific Island nations to respond to climate change-induced mobility of
communities across sovereign borders.104 The determinants of readiness, that is, what it means
for a host country to achieve readiness, are unknown. The researcher adopted a
multidisciplinary approach to understand the various perceptions of readiness to inform the
criteria of readiness from secondary sources as part of the doctrinal analysis.105
Alongside doctrinal research methodology, the researcher employed qualitative empirical
legal research ‘which shares its underpinnings with the interpretive paradigm’ to answer RQ
1(b).106 According to Reeve and Weller, empirical legal research is an ‘investigation of legal-
and justice-system-related questions that attempt to understand a topic through data-driven,
statistically based, controlled experiments, interview responses, case studies, historical
analysis, or other quantitative or qualitative data collecting mechanisms.’107 The researcher
used the qualitative research method of semi-structured interviews, as well as the more
inductive methods of phenomenology and grounded theory within the qualitative tradition.108
The integration of phenomenology and grounded theory methods was considered appropriate
102 McNamara and Combes, above n 54. 103 Sam Adelman, ‘Climate Justice, Loss and Damage and Compensation for Small Island Developing States’ (2016) 7(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 32, 34; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54–73. 104 See above n 103 and accompanying text. 105 Hutchinson, above n 63, 22; see also Webley, above n 88, 938–9. 106 See Cole, above n 65, 25–30; see also Webley, above n 88, 926–50. 107 Allison C Reeve and Travis Weller, ‘Empirical Legal Research Support Services: A Survey of Academic Law Libraries’ [2015] 107(3) (Summer) Law Library Journal 399, 400–1; see also ‘A useful definition by Epstein and Martin to round empirical legal research is noteworthy which they describe as the ‘investigation of legal-and justice-system-related questions that attempt to understand a topic through data-driven, statistically based, controlled experiments, interview responses, case studies, historical analyses, or other quantitative or qualitative data collecting mechanisms’ as cited in Reeve and Weller, 401. See also Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herbert M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford University Press, 2010) 901–25. 108 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Sage Publications, 4th ed, 2014) 189; see also Tribe, above n 66, 442, 445; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 141–2. See also Webley, above n 88, 930, 932, 937; see also ‘In qualitative research, the data are usually collected through three main methods used singly or in combination: direct observation, in-depth interviews and analysis of documents’ as cited in Webley, above n 88, 928.
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in gathering and analysing data as part of qualitative empirical research in the present study
because both approaches are synonymous with interviews.109 Both are discussed in turn below.
Phenomenology ‘attempts to understand people’s perception, perspectives, and
understandings of particular situations (lived experiences).’110 RQ 1(b) in particular, required
research participants to reflect on their lived experiences, interactions with local and non-
governmental bodies and communities, including the lessons learned from internal relocation
projects initiated by the Fijian Government. Against the background of these internal
relocation projects, participants were encouraged to provide insights into determinants that
could potentially be transferable in the context of climate change-induced mobility of Pacific
Islanders from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. The researcher also engaged in phenomenology to
examine the extent of readiness of the Fijian Government buttressed by using the interview
data. This corresponds to the second research question (RQ 2): What is the current state of
Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate
change?
A grounded theory approach was used to supplement the phenomenological stance adopted by
the researcher. Grounded theory ‘focuses on a process (including people’s actions and
interactions) related to a particular topic, with the ultimate goal of developing a theory about
that process.’111 The use of, and engagement with, grounded theory occurred at various levels
to explore and examine the underlying phenomenon of readiness. The various levels entailed
using material from the literature and the interview data on readiness at different stages in this
study as a basis to articulate the criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-induced
human mobility. The researcher uncovered the determinants of what it means to be ready by:
conceptualising the determinants that emerged from the body of research, case studies and the
empirical data in chapters four, five and six respectively; synthesising and analysing the
sources of data to articulate a set of criteria for readiness; and using the set of criteria for
readiness as an analytical framework to appraise the Fijian Government’s readiness as
presented in chapter seven. The different stages and integration of the sources of data on the
phenomenon of readiness demonstrate a process as grounded approach adopted by the
researcher. Phenomenology and grounded theory approaches have a number of underlying
features that were appropriate in complementing the overarching method of collecting data
through interviews for the phenomenon under investigation.
109 Grant and Giddings, above n 65, 10, 17; see also Cole, above n 65, 25, 27. 110 Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 141. 111 Ibid 142.
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Overall, qualitative empirical legal research methodology was considered appropriate to
investigate and gain insights into the Fijian Government’s readiness for climate change-
induced mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders to Fiji. This encompassed the
experiences, interactions and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by
the Fijian Government, conceptualising the determinants of readiness as well as the set of
criteria for analysing the Fijian Government’s readiness. Taken together, doctrinal and
empirical research methodological approaches provided a basis to inform the criteria for
analysing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.
2.4 Research Design
There is widespread consensus by qualitative research practitioners including Flick, Webley
and Gray that ‘[t]he design of an investigation touches almost all aspects of the research, from
the minute details of data collection to the selection of the techniques of data analysis.’112 The
research design adopted by the researcher took its cue from the suggested approach and is
outlined and described in the following sequence: the approach deployed to collect data; the
technique used to code the data; and the further techniques used to analyse the data.
Data Collection
Interview data generated from semi-structured individual interviews formed part of the field
research.113 Semi-structured individual interviews were considered appropriate for
investigating the underlying aspects of readiness because they offered the researcher a holistic
account of the arrangements of the Fijian Government in responding to cross-border
112 Uwe Flick, Designing Qualitative Research: Qualitative Research Designs (Sage Publications, 2007) 37; ‘Flick relied on Ragin’s definition of the term research design…Research design in qualitative traditions extend to encompass other areas of studies such as cross-sectional, comparative and longitudinal studies to name a few’ as cited in Flick, 45; see also David E Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (Sage Publications, 2nd ed, 2009) 164–215; see also Webley, above n 88, 932–3, 941. 113 Webley, above n 88, 937; see also ‘There are a number of research strategies, including experiments, historical analyses, interviews and surveys used to determine views and perceptions, case studies, documentary analysis and analysis of researcher-generated or extant statistics such as cost/benefit analyses…individual and group interviews; observation and participant observations; document analysis; and case study research’ as cited in Webley, 933, 936. See also Creswell, above n 108, 189–93; see also ‘Qualitative researchers typically gather multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, documents, and audio-visual information rather than rely on a single data source. Then the researchers review all of the data, make sense of it, and organise it into categories or themes that cut across all of the data sources’ as cited in Creswell, 186.
40
relocation, delineated the experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects
and informed the determinants of readiness in the context of cross-broader relocation. As noted
by Webley, ‘[i]ndividual interviews are used extensively by qualitative researchers examining
legal phenomena, and perceptions of law and the legal profession.’114 Similarly, the use of
individual interviews, as Hennink, Hutter and Bailey argue, allows the researcher to explore
the experiences of participants and complex issues that are less conducive to group
discussions.115 The semi-structured interview questions consisted of six skeleton topical areas.
In addition, the researcher exercised flexibility in anticipating and accommodating a host of
other issues and concerns presented by the participants during the field interviews. The topical
areas consisted of the:
1) reactions of participants to the announcement advanced by the Fijian Government ‘to
provide a permanent home to the entire populations of Kiribati and Tuvalu’116
(announcement);
2) extent of arrangements to respond to cross-border relocation spanning the legal, economic,
social, political dimensions at the local, national and regional levels by the Fijian Government
(readiness);
3) experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian
Government (internal relocation);
4) potential focus areas from the internal relocation projects that can be adopted in the context
of cross-broader relocation by the Fijian Government (readiness focus areas); and
5) historical migration arrangements of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji
(historical migration).
Alongside noted references in individual interviews, the researcher acknowledges the
possibility of bias in gathering data. ‘Biases can occur at any stage of information gathering,
selection, conversion, or processing’ as identified by Sipes.117 The researcher recognises that
data collection through individual interviews may affect data quality because participants may
carry ‘preconceived theories and expectations’ on cross-border relocation and the Fijian
114 Webley, above n 88, 937. 115 Monique Hennink, Inge Hutter and Ajay Bailey, Qualitative Research Methods (Sage Publications, 2011) 139–40. 116 Bainimarama, above n 7; see also Fiji Government, above n 36 and accompanying text; see also Elfriede Hermann and Wolfgang Kempf, ‘Climate Change and the Imagining of Migrations; Emerging Discourses on Kiribati’s Land Purchase in Fiji’ (2017) 29(2) The Contemporary Pacific 231, 231-405. 117 Richard Grey Sipes, ‘A Test for Coder Bias’ (1976) 11(3) Behavior Science Research 149, 150.
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Government’s stance on accommodating Pacific peoples to Fiji on grounds of climate
change.118
A purposive sampling strategy was deployed by the researcher to select research participants
so as to gain insights from various perspectives into the underlying aspects of readiness.119
Identifying issues, considerations and focus areas from local government bodies, non-
governmental bodies and communities in the context of internal relocation projects initiated
by the Fijian Government provided a basis to inform the criteria of readiness for cross-border
relocation of communities of origin to Fiji. In his review of an array of sampling approaches
in qualitative research, Robinson points out that ‘purposive sampling strategies are non-
random ways of ensuring that particular categories of cases within a sampling universe are
represented in the final sample of a project.’120 Robinson argues that ‘[t]he rational for
employing a purposive strategy is that the researcher assumes, based on their a-priori
theoretical understanding of the topic being studied, that certain categories of individuals may
have a unique, different or important perspective on the phenomenon in question and their
presence in the sample should be ensured.’121 In the same vein, Webley notes that the
‘researcher may seek out key people or events that are likely to provide rich sources of
information or data.’122 The researcher conducted field interviews with representatives from
government and non-government bodies in an attempt to seek rich data on the underlying
aspects of readiness. The information on the recruitment of participants was sourced from
material accessible to the public (google search; official websites of government ministries,
organisations and institutions; and print material) and snowball technique. The discussion that
follows expands on the recruitment of participants for the field research.
Prior to commencing the field research, ethical clearance was sought and granted from the
Office of Research Ethics and Integrity (OREI) at the Queensland University of Technology
(QUT). The application for human research ethics approval comprised of the principal
application form which set out three broad areas as follows: research proposal overview;
participant overview; and data management. In responding to the particulars of the form, the
researcher was required to support the application with a set of interview questions to conduct
118 Paul D Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Omrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design (Pearson, 11th ed, 2016) 260. 119 Webley, above n 88, 934; see also Creswell, above n 108, 189. 120 Oliver C Robinson, ‘Sampling in Interview-based Qualitative Research: A Theoretical and Practical Guide’ (2014) 11(1) Qualitative Research in Psychology 25, 32. 121 Ibid. 122 Webley, above n 88, 934.
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field interviews with his participants. Forty two questions for the first set of participants (state
actors) was prepared followed by twenty two questions for the second set of participants (non-
state actors). The researcher exercised flexibility with the interview questions submitted as
part of the ethics application. The researcher also allowed the interviews to take their natural
course using the interview questions as a guide for the categories of participants. The set of
questions were prepared from the topical areas (1-5) listed in the preceding page. Moreover,
other supporting material included the: participant information sheet; participant consent form;
participant recruitment strategy. The participant information sheet detailed the nature of the
research project, expected benefits for participating in the research, risks associated with the
interview and the research in question, maintenance of privacy and confidentiality of the
participant, and a complaints mechanism for the participant. The participant consent form set
out information about the voluntary participation by the participant and the opportunity to
withdraw at any stage of the field interview. It also offered the participant to voluntary consent
to audio recording. The researcher adopted email and verbal recruitment strategies to conduct
field interviews which was facilitated by QUT generic templates tailored respectively. As
noted by Flick, ‘[i]n the analysis of qualitative data, anonymity and confidentiality are central
issues from the angle of ethics - in transcription, in analysis itself, and most of all in presenting
results and excerpts from the data.’123 The anonymity of all participants was maintained and
their data rendered non-identifiable for the purpose of data analysis. The names, organisations,
agencies and institutions were sourced from publicly available material. A total of eighteen
participants (n = 18) participated in the field interviews, of which seven participants were state
actors and eleven were non-state actors. All interviews were conducted in English.
The first category of participants comprised state actors representing senior state officials with
the Fijian Government ministries. These included the:
1) Ministry of Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster
Management;
2) Ministry of Defence, National Security and Immigration;
3) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
4) Climate Change Unit under the Ministry for Economy, Public Enterprises, Civil
Service and Communications.
123 Flick, above n 112, 103–4.
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The second category of participants comprised non-state actors representing a wide array of
institutions and agencies, such as civil society organisations, intergovernmental agencies and
United Nations organisations. These included the:
1) Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP);
2) Pacific Community (SPC);
3) Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS);
4) United Nations Development Program (UNDP);
5) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(UNESCAP);
6) Pacific Conference of Churches (PCC)
7) Asian Development Bank (ABD);
8) International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN);
9) Fiji Environmental Law Association (FELA); and
10) High Commission of Kiribati.
One of the reasons for selecting this category of participants (non-state actors) was because
these participants represent to some degree communities’ “voices” and institutional knowledge
beyond that of government machinery. Together, the categories of participants (state and non-
state) provided important insights into the determinants of readiness. The initial list of
participants was broadened by use of the snowballing technique to ensure that hard-to-reach
participants were included.124 As Hennink, Hutter and Bailey describe, this technique of
participant recruitment method ‘is based on using social networks in the community and
shared knowledge about individuals.’125 This technique is effective as it introduces the
researcher to “information-rich” participants.126 This technique enriched the data collection in
the field research, particularly with regard to participants’ experiences of the processes
involved with the internal relocation of communities adversely affected by the risks posed by
climate change impacts in Fiji. The experiences of these participants enabled them to relate
and extrapolate potential focus areas for determining the readiness of the Fijian Government
for cross-border community relocation of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change to Fiji.
Attention is now turned to the approaches adopted to code the data generated from the field
interviews conducted in Fiji followed by the strategies employed to analyse the qualitative
empirical data.127
124 Webley, above n 88, 934. 125 Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, above n 115, 100. 126 Ibid 85, 87, 100–1. 127 Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 137–45; see also Webley, above n 88, 940–5.
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Data Coding
There is widespread consensus among researchers and practitioners that there are no rigid
formulae in coding data that have been generated inductively (for discovery) or deductively
(for testing).128 Coding, as identified by Baralt, is an ‘activity that the researcher engages in,
while codes are the names or symbols used to stand for a group of similar items, ideas, or
phenomena that the researcher has noticed in his or her data set.’129 Similarly, coding ‘is about
naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorises, summaries, and
accounts for each piece of data’ as described by Thornberg and Charmaz. 130
The researcher adopted a manual approach to code the qualitative data obtained from the
interview transcripts. Manual coding allowed the researcher to conceptualise the determinants
of readiness and articulate the criteria for analysing readiness.131 Before proceeding with a
description of the coding process, it is important to mention the steps deployed by the
researcher to prepare the data.
The participants’ interview records were transcribed from the audio recordings of the field
interviews. A minority of participants (n=3) did not agree to audio recording. Their narratives
were captured by note-taking and then transcribed with their agreement.
As with the coding, transcription was undertaken solely by the researcher. The researcher
adopted a narrow transcription format as opposed to a broad format.132 This is because narrow
transcriptions present ‘quite precise and highly sophisticated’ detail from the conversational
data despite its ‘very time- and labour-intensive enterprise.’133 The researcher spent eight-ten
hours on average transcribing each hour of conversation. The transcripts were sent to
128 Jose P Esteves and Joan Pastor, ‘Using a Multimethod Approach to Research Enterprise Systems Implementations’ (2004) 2(2) Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods 69, 70; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 137–45; see also Webley, above n 88, 940–5; see also Epstein and Martin, above n 107, 909–12. 129 Melissa Baralt, ‘Coding Qualitative Data’ in Alison Mackey and Susan M Gass (eds), Research Methods in Second Language Acquisition: A Practical Guide (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 222–3. 130 Robert Thornberg and Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory and Theoretical Coding’ in Uwe Flick (ed), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis (Sage Publications, 2014), 157. 131 Webley, above n 88, 942; see also ‘…the basic procedures…followed with traditional pen-and-paper methods or with other software programs’ as cited in Baralt, above n 129, 222. 132 Andrea Revesz, ‘Coding Second Language Data Validly and Reliably’ in Alison Mackey and Susan M Gass (eds), Research Methods in Second Language Acquisition: A Practical Guide (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012) 206. 133 Ibid.
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respective participants to confirm the accuracy of their narratives. The participants were also
provided with the opportunity to amend any section(s) of their transcripts. All the interview
transcripts were then used in coding and analysing the data. The discussion that follows
describes the coding process.
The researcher adopted an ‘inductive data-driven bottom-up approach’ to code the interview
transcripts of participants.134 According to Syed and Nelson, this approach involves identifying
common themes from the data.135 The first task (task 1) undertaken by the researcher involved
identifying segments or units of analysis present in the interview transcripts in relation to
emerging themes or criteria.136 For example, the allocation of “land” for cross-border
community relocation by the host country emerged in the data in connection with the
phenomenon under investigation. The researcher deployed three steps to code the data. The
first involved interacting with the data, for example, pertaining to “land”. The second involved
allocating a unique identifier/label. Lastly, a code “L” to reflect “land” (for example) was
attached as one of the emerging categories or criteria. The code was placed in the margins of
the transcript. These steps were undertaken manually and different coloured highlighters were
used to identify and highlight any other emerging themes or criteria present in the data.137 The
researcher followed these recursive steps for all 18 transcripts. The researcher continuously
interacted with and examined emerging patterns generated in the data.138 Moreover, the
frequency of the themes or criteria present in the transcripts was accounted for and the
transcripts were then compared and contrasted by the researcher.139 The final step for task one
was to generate a preliminary list of codes.
The second task (task 2) was identical to the first task, except that the researcher identified
emerging peripheral themes or criteria, sub-themes or sub-criteria connected to the core or
major theme or criteria identified in the first task. For example, “consent” by landowners to
make land available for the relocation of the communities of origin to the host country was a
134 Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 375, 377. 135 Ibid. 136 “unit of analysis” – ‘…section of qualitative data that will receive a code’ as cited in Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 375, 377. 137 ‘In traditional pen-and-paper methods of qualitative coding, coding is done manually by physically writing the code on the margin of a paper, right next to the text it represents. Codes done this way are usually in the form of letters that represent a code (e.g., ANZ for “anxiety”). The researcher may also choose to do color coding with different highlighter pens, and highlight the text to represent a coding decision…researchers manage codes by keeping the coding label, its definition, and an example in a separate codebook’ as cited in Baralt, above n 129, 231. 138 Ibid 223, 231–44. 139 Ibid.
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sub-theme that emerged in the data in connection with land. “Consent” was manually
highlighted with a different colour to represent its connection with the core category of “land”.
It was given a sub-code as “L-1”, that is “land-consent”. Task 2 was applied to all 18 transcripts
to identify various emerging sub-themes or sub-criteria. The researcher was also vigilant in
detecting any repeated core themes or criteria that might have been overlooked during task 1.
The themes/criteria were coloured manually using different highlighters. The themes/criteria
were then allocated different identifiers and sub-labels and organised under respective labels
in the margins of the transcripts. The preliminary list of codes generated from task 1 was then
revisited to account for sub-codes generated from task 2. Thus, a revised list of codes (codes
and sub-codes) was generated.
Once all coding was complete, the next task (task 3) involved systematically organising all the
codes and sub-codes and re-arranging them in terms of commonality from the most frequent
to the least frequent. The sub-codes corresponding to the core codes were highlighted manually
with the same colour. Other codes and sub-codes that remained independent were coloured
manually in different colours. A comprehensive list of codes (codes and sub-codes) was
generated from task 3.
The researcher observed that some codes and sub-codes emerged ‘directly from things that
participants’ said verbatim, commonly referred as in vivo (living) code.140 An in-vivo code is
defined as ‘a code that comes from the data itself…the word or phrase that is so descriptive
and illuminating that the researcher abstracts the data as its own code.’141 The refined list of
codes was used for interpretation and analysis.
The inductive approach used to code the qualitative data manually was useful. The researcher
originally considered using computer software as an alternative to manual coding but
determined that the manual coding approach was most appropriate. Recent research has
suggested that the intervention of computer generated software such as NVivo, has been useful
to code and analyse qualitative and quantitative data electronically.142 Each has its advantages
and drawbacks.143 Baralt, in citing the work of Johnston, distinguished between electronic and
140 Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 293. 141 Baralt, above n 129, 230–1. 142 Ryan S Hoover and Amy L Koerber, ‘Using NVivo to Answer the Challenges of Qualitative Research in Professional Communication: Benefits and Best Practices’ (2011) 54(1) IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication 68, 76; see also Nancy L Leech and Anthony J Onwuegbuzie, ‘Beyond Constant Comparison Qualitative Data Analysis: Using NVivo’ (2011) 26(1) School of Psychology Quarterly 70, 70–84. 143 See above n 121 and accompanying text.
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manual modes of coding and analysis.144 He pointed out that the former ‘allows for closer
examination of the process, whereas’ the latter ‘focuses on the final product.’145 One drawback
with the use of electronic software is that it has the potential to ‘turn the process into a
ritualistic act where the researcher continuously codes documents without interpretive
introspection.’146 One of the key reasons the researcher conducted manual coding in the present
research was because the “data was speaking to the researcher”. What this meant was that
whilst conducting field interviews with the participants and transcribing the narratives, various
themes or focus areas explicitly spoke for “themselves”. For example, the issues of land,
sovereignty and funding immediately became apparent from the transcripts for the
phenomenon under investigation. Having discussed the steps deployed to code the data,
attention is now turned to the approaches used for the data analysis
Data Analysis
The qualitative data obtained from the transcripts were coded and analysed simultaneously
and separately to examine the underlying aspects of readiness.147 According to Gray, ‘the task
of data collection and analysis is not necessarily sequential but can be an iterative process.’148
Each process informed the other with respect to discovering emerging themes or focus areas
and the frequency with which they occurred in the data. Furthermore, the preliminary findings
generated from these processes were compared, contrasted and integrated with the existing
body of knowledge and empirical studies on the phenomena under investigation using a
grounded theory approach, as discussed earlier.149 Briefly, ‘[t]he term grounded refers to the
idea that the theory that emerges from the study is derived from and grounded in the data that
have been collected in the field rather than taken from the research literature.’150 Leedy and
Ormrod point out that ‘[n]o matter what form (verbal statement, visual model, or series of
hypothesis) the theory takes, it is based entirely on the data collected.’151 Similarly, Esteves
and Pastor argue that ‘by using grounded theory a theory is inductively derived from the study
of the phenomenon.’152 The grounded theory approach of investigating and conceptually
144 Baralt, above n 108, 224–9. 145 Ibid 228. 146 See above n 142 and accompanying text. 147 Webley, above n 88, 943–4; see also Thornberg and Charmaz, above n 130, 154. 148 Gray, above n 112, 511. 149 Thornberg and Charmaz, above n 130, 154; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 142. 150 Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 142. 151Ibid 143. 152 Esteves and Pastor, above n 128, 76.
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analysing the underlying aspects of readiness enabled the researcher to systematically organise
similar and contrasting themes or focus areas from the data which “spoke for themselves”.153
The processes used shaped the research design and enabled the conduct of the empirical legal
research.154 Attention is now turned to the quality of data generated from the field interviews
and the generalisability of the empirical evidence.155
Multi-method and Triangulation
The researcher used a multimethod approach complemented by triangulation to scaffold the
research design and support the quality of the data generated.156 The term multi-method has
come to be used to refer to the integration of ‘different sorts of quantitative methods, or
different sorts of qualitative methods (such as interviews and textual analysis)’ for data
analysis.157 The data generated from the qualitative and doctrinal research techniques were
triangulated. Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe and Neville, define triangulation as
‘the use of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative research to develop a comprehensive
understanding of phenomena.’158 The researcher employed ‘method triangulation which
involves the use of multiple methods of data collection about the same phenomenon.’159 For
example, the inductive themes and focus areas, such as land, sovereignty, funding and
citizenship, which emerged from the empirical evidence were triangulated with the themes and
focus areas that emerged from the large volume of published studies and research literature
(availability of land, regulation, participation, for example).160 In addition to using
153 Gray, above n 112, 505; see also ‘Process means showing the evolving nature of events by noting why and how action/interaction (in the form of events, doings, or happenings) will change, stay the same, or regress’ as cited in Gray, 511. 154 Webley, above n 88, 928–9, 936; see also Creswell, above n 108, 187. 155 Leedy and Omrod, above n 118, 86–7, 260–1, 301, 311–12. 156 Ibid. 157 Spillman, above n 65, 197. 158 Carter et al, above n 65, 545. 159 Ibid. 160 Meghan D. McGinty, et al, ‘Legal Preparedness for Hurricane Sandy: Authority to Order Hospital Evacuation or Sheltering-in-Place in the Mid-Atlantic Region’ (2016) 14(2) Health Security 78–85. See also Rebecca Barber, ‘Legal Preparedness for the Facilitation of International Humanitarian Assistance in the Aftermath of Vanuatu’s Cyclone Pam’ (2018) 8(1) Asian Journal of International Law 143–65; see also Marleen Buizer, David Humphreys and Wil de Jong, ‘Climate Change and Deforestation: The Evolution of an Intersecting Policy Domain’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science & Policy 1–11. See also Apriwan and S. Anita Afriani, ‘Local Readiness towards REDD+ UNFCCC Scheme (Study in Province of West Sumatera Indonesia)’ (2015) 28 Procedia Environmental Sciences 649, 649–56; see also Nicholas K Tagliarino, ‘Encroaching on Land and Livelihoods: How National Expropriation Laws Measure up Against International Standards’ (Working Paper, World Resources Institute, 2016) 1–44, 23; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 103–21.
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triangulation to ‘compare multiple data sources in search of common themes’, it was necessary
to ‘minimise some of the concerns surrounding the validity and reliability’, that is ‘increasing
the robustness of results…’161
There has been a shift by qualitative researchers to employ terminologies of dependability and
integrity in qualitative study.162 This is because difficulties can arise when ‘applying positivist
interpretations of reliability to qualitative research, which is less concerned with quantity and
distribution and more with people’s understandings of the meanings of social facts.’163 As
described by Syed and Nelson, ‘…the closest thing to reliability is the concept of rigor…is a
product of the entire research process and derives from the researcher’s presence, the nature
of the interaction between researcher and participants, the triangulation of data, the
interpretation of perceptions and rich, thick descriptions…’164 They add that ‘the rigor is as
much a product of the researcher and research context, bias, and subjectivity as it is the data.’165
There are also explicit references, such as ‘quality, credibility, trustworthiness, confirmability
and interpretive rigour’ to connote the veracity of data present in qualitative research.166
The rigour of the qualitative data in the present research was not limited to the theme/focus
area level (land, sovereignty, for example). It was underpinned by multiple data collection
methods (qualitative and doctrinal) and in-depth analysis. The multilayered methods employed
allowed the researcher to compare, contrast and integrate themes/focus areas and examine
‘consistencies or inconsistencies among the data.’167 These methods further allowed the
161 Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 375, 376; see also Leedy and Omrod, above n 65, 86–8, 260, 301, 312; see also Mukhopadhyay and Gupta, above n 88, 109–10; see also Cole, above n 65, 27; see also Esteves and Pastor, above n 128, 73–4; see also Mandy Burton, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds), Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 62; see also ‘Reflexivity is a term that has come to be used in variety of ways…It is important to recognise, as part of reflexivity, that research is an active process, in which accounts of the world are produced through selective observation and interpretation of what is seen and heard, through asking particular questions and seeking to understand what is said in reply, through writing fieldnotes and transcribing audio- and video-recordings…’ as cited in Martyn Hammersley and Paul Atkinson, Ethnography Principles in Practice (Routledge, 4th ed, 2019) 15, 17. 162 Flick, above n 112, 368; see also Webley, above n 88, 935; see also Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 260; see also ‘Data by qualitative researchers must be both (a) reasonably accurate with regard to the characteristics and dynamics of the entities to situation being studied (this is validity) and (b) consistent in the patterns and dynamics they reflect (this is reliability)’ as cited in Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 260. 163 Webley, above n 88, 935. 164 Syed and Nelson, above n 66, 383. 165 Ibid. 166 Leedy and Ormrod, above n 118, 88; see also ‘trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability as criteria for qualitative research’ as cited in Flick, above n 112, 376. 167 Leedy and Ormrod, above 118, 260.
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researcher to uncover new layers of meaning, or theory to develop, or a more nuanced
understanding of readiness under investigation.168 Having described multimethod and
triangulation strategies as part of the research design, attention is now turned to some of the
limitations of the study.
2.5 Research Limitations
The generalisability of the results is subject to at least five limitations. First, the researcher
acknowledges potential English language differences when conducting field interviews with
participants. This is because some participants ‘may have limited knowledge of English’ and
familiarity with technical terms which may have been ‘borrowed phrases, essentially
becoming loanwords’ for participants.169 The interpretation of technical terms may have
resonated differently with participants when conducting the field interviews in English. The
researcher offered explanations to participants where required and exercised caution when
coding and analysing the field data to mitigate the potential language barrier. Second,
representatives from the private sector such as the Fiji Commerce and Employers Federation
and private legal practice, for example, were not included in the list of participants. Other
institutions, bodies and agencies that were included in the participants list, such as the Human
Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission (HRADC), Delegation of the European Union
for the Pacific (EU Pacific), International Federation of Red Cross (Fiji), The World Bank
Group, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), could not be reached due
to the non-availability of senior representatives during the period that the field interviews were
conducted in Fiji. Their participation would have reinforced the existing core themes and focus
areas that emerged from the data by existing participants. Alternatively, the participants could
have illumined additional themes and focus areas to identify the aspects of readiness specific
to the Fiji context. Third, communities that have already been relocated internally by the Fijian
Government, or those communities marked to be relocated in the near future, were not
included in the list of participants. The head of a village (Turaga-ni-Koro), including members
resident in a particular village community, would have provided firsthand experiences of their
168 Ibid 86, 260; see also Gray, above n 112, 502. 169 Peter Rudiak-Gould, ‘Promiscuous corroboration and climate change translation: A case study from the Marshall Islands’ (2012) 22 Global Environment Change 46, 48; see also ‘…translator can resort to…foreignizing, source based translation…simply imports the foreign term as a loanword…resort to compensation, circumlocution…in which a poor translation is used but compensated for with additional comments…final option…translator…perform a domesticating translation in which the mismatch is simply ignored, and the closest lexical equivalent is used, discrepancies be damned’ as cited in Rudiak-Gould, 49-50.
51
relocation and the manner in which the Fijian Government and other agencies engaged with
the whole internal relocation project. Fourth, the Banaban and the Vaitupuan communities,
located on the islands of Rabi and Kioa respectively, in the group of islands in Fiji were
excluded due to time constraints in terms of travelling to these two islands. A further limitation
was the duration of the research project. The researcher acknowledges that the participant pool
could have been expanded to include the host of communities that have experienced internal
relocation (Vunidogoloa, Narikoso) and cross-border relocation (Rabi and Kioa) employing a
bottom-up approach in gathering the empirical data.170 The researcher further acknowledges
that the data would have uncovered personal and collective community-centred accounts of
significant drawbacks and advantages with respect to a whole-of-government response to the
human security and protection arrangements on these settlements and islands. The empirical
data would have been beneficial in enhancing the existing interview data integrating a variety
of perspectives. In this thesis, a small pool of participants were selected based on their ability
to contribute diversity of views within a limited time. Further research is needed to include the
host communities. Lastly, senior representatives from the Kiribati and Tuvalu Governments
were outside the scope of the research with the exception of an I-Kiribati national’s
perspective, which was recorded. The present research was also limited by the lack of
information on the readiness by the States of origin (Kiribati and Tuvalu) in terms of the legal
and/or alternative arrangements for its citizens to relocate them across sovereign borders on
the grounds of climate change to the host country (Fiji). The researcher acknowledges that
with the existing sample size for this study, caution must be applied, as the empirical evidence
might not be transferrable to inform decision makers, planning and programs addressing large-
scale cross-border relocation of communities from the impacts of climate change.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical evidence of the present research into
investigating the determinants of readiness offers a starting point for further comprehensive
targeted research into readiness in the Fijian context. Moreover, there is also abundant room
for Pacific Island governments at a regional level to identify tailored and pragmatic responses
to address cross-border relocation, which presents an opportunity for future targeted research.
170 Cosmin Corendea, ‘Climate Law and Governance: Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific’ (Working Paper No 3, United Nations Development Program, University of Cambridge, University of Nairobi and Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2016) 15-17; see also ‘…migration process in the Pacific should…be implicitly addressed, in a local bottom-up context, placing climate-induced migrant at the core of the problem and to be considered at the national and regional level when developing policy and design actions around migration due to climate change’ as cited in Corendea, 17.
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the methodological approach and research design adopted by the
researcher is suitable for investigating the underlying determinants of readiness present
through RQ 1 and RQs 1 (a–c). This chapter has also demonstrated the usefulness of adopting
the interpretive paradigm underpinned by qualitative research tradition in investigating and
understanding the determinants of readiness present from real and practical events, lived
experiences and behaviours of human beings, corresponding with RQ 1 (b). Moreover, this
chapter has also shown the extensive multilayered processes and tasks (participant recruitment,
ethical clearance, colour coding, for example) adopted by the researcher. These was then
integrated into each stage of the research design (data collection, coding and analysis) for in-
depth analysis of the empirical data generated from data obtained to answer RQ 1 (b). To
enhance the quality of the data generated from both doctrinal and empirical research
approaches, a multimethod approach followed by the technique of triangulation was employed
to bolster the robustness of the investigation into the underlying determinants of readiness.
This chapter also detailed the limitations of the investigation. The multitude of approaches,
techniques and strategies is indicative of the rigour of the data from in-depth analysis and the
overall quality of the investigation into the determinants of readiness.
This chapter has laid the foundation for chapters four, five and six. Chapter four examines
Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of mobility within and across sovereign
borders during the period of British colonial government administration of territories in the
Pacific Islands region.171
Chapter five outlines the determinants of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives.
Chapter six reports on the findings of the empirical research and details the themes and focus
areas of readiness specific to the Fiji context. The determinants of readiness are analysed in
chapter seven to inform the criteria for readiness. The next chapter provides a comprehensive
review of the body of knowledge and published studies on human mobility in the context of
slow-onset environmental change under existing international arrangements from a legal
perspective, including developments at the Pacific regional level and gaps in the literature.
171 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78.
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Chapter 3: Human Mobility of Climate Vulnerable Populations of Pacific Island Nations and International Arrangements under International Law
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the research design underpinning the thesis and the
methodological approach adopted to undertake the field research to answer RQ 1(b). This
chapter presents an in-depth review of the body of research spanning established scientific
evidence, including the growing evidence in the field of climate-induced displacement and
migration studies. It also identifies and explores some key initiatives developed in the Pacific
regional context that demonstrate the growing concern about, and recognition of, climate-
induced displacement and migration issues in the coming decades. This chapter also includes
a review of the literature and the scholarly and policy debate surrounding responses in the
context of the legal, institutional and governance arrangements to address mobility within
countries and across international borders on the grounds of climate change. It then considers
the growing scholarly debate to advance a rights-based approach embedded in soft law
mechanisms as an alternative to respond to climate change-induced displacement and
migration in contemporary international policy fora and in international law.172 Importantly,
this chapter also introduces planned relocation as a strand of human mobility to underpin future
climate change-induced displacement and migration within countries and across international
borders, which is widely acknowledged in the scholarly discourse and global policy
deliberations in contemporary times.173 It considers the lessons and experiences learned from
the resettlement of populations from development projects and historical population
movements in the Pacific as to their relevance in the future relocation of communities on the
grounds of climate change. It also identifies some of the key considerations in this thesis,
172 McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 2, 13–23; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 163; see also McAdam, above n 10, 15, 237–66. 173 See above n 172 and accompanying text.
54
which are developed in later chapters, to complement the analysis of readiness of the Fijian
Government for cross-border relocation of climate vulnerable communities from Kiribati and
Tuvalu to Fiji in the future. This chapter concludes with a brief summary.
3.2 Brief Synopsis for Investigation
Anthropogenic climate change is increasingly recognised as a pertinent global phenomenon
characterised to accelerate the trajectory of human mobility in the twenty-first century,
particularly for Pacific Island nations. There is widespread consensus and high confidence
among the scientific community that ‘climate variability (temperature, precipitation, oceanic
circulation, etc.) and shifts in climate patterns associated with glacial melt, seas level rise and
desertification’ are projected to globally reorder the ‘patterns of climate-driven human
mobility (migration, displacement and planned relocation).’174 This is particularly pertinent
for regions such as the ‘low-lying islands, deltas, coastal zones, glacial-fed water systems’,
which will become more vulnerable and ‘sensitive to climatic stressors’ in the coming
decades.175 These views are shared by institutions—such as the IPCC and World
Meteorological Organization (WMO), international development and operational
organisations and institutions—such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB),
United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and
International Organization for Migration (IOM), as well as migration scholars and
practitioners—such as Jane McAdam, John Campbell, Olivia Warrick and Jon Barnett.
There are some immediately dependable conclusions in the scientific literature and published
studies that establish and explain the correlation between human mobility and converging
human insecurities (food, livelihoods and health for example) in response to the debilitating
impacts of climate change on Pacific Island nations and low-lying coastal communities.176 This
literature confirms that the strands of human mobility, that is, displacement, migration and
relocation, in response to sudden-onset events (disasters, floods, cyclones) within sovereign
borders is already a global phenomenon.177 It also confirms and reinforces that human mobility
across international borders in response to slow-onset environmental change (desertification,
land degradation, sea level rise) is imminent, particularly in the case of Pacific Island nations
174 Warner et al, above n 37, 9, 14–15; see also ‘…climate-related extremes, such as droughts, floods, cyclones and wildfires, reveal significant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystem and many human systems to current climate variability’ as cited in Pachauri et al, above n 33, 8. 175 See above n 174 and accompanying text. 176 Adger et al, above n 37, 758–60, 768–9. 177 Ibid 767.
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that are on the “frontlines” of climate change.178 From a broader perspective, a variety of
pragmatic and coordinated responses with regard to the protection regime (c.f. refugee law,
human rights law and complementary protection), legal (security), policy (development) and
migration governance (environmental migration) arrangements at all levels (global, regional,
and national) are urgently needed.179 The last section of this chapter addresses the international
response to human mobility from the impacts of climate change.
It is widely acknowledged in both the legal and non-legal literature that ‘Small Island
Developing States (SIDS), as which all Pacific Island Countries (PICs) identity, have been
labelled as some of the most vulnerable places to climate change’ among other nations (Alaska,
Bangladesh and Maldives, for example).180 This is because ‘majority of communities,
infrastructure, agricultural areas and freshwater supplies are situated in coastal zones exposing
low-elevation PICs to extreme tides, wave, surge events and sea level rise.’181 It is also
acknowledged that one of the implications of this is the ‘complete disappearance of people’s
land on islands, exacerbating livelihood risks due to loss of economic and social assets’,
inevitably resulting in some islands becoming uninhabitable in the future.182 This suggests
178 Christopher B Field et al, ‘Technical Summary’ in Christopher B Field (ed), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects (Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 62–3; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1616, 1619–20. See also Sam Adelman, ‘Human Rights in the Paris Agreement: Too Little, Too Late?’ (2018) 7(1) Transnational Environmental Law 17, 21; see also Dina Ionesco, Daria Mokhnacheva and Francois Gemenne, The Atlas of Environmental Migration (Routledge, 2017) IX (‘Atlas Report’); see also Walter Kalin, ‘The Nansen Initiative: Building Consensus on Displacement in Disaster Contexts’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 5, 5. See also ‘…slow-onset environmental change or degradation process (such as desertification) affecting people who are directly dependent on the environment for their livelihood and causing them livelihood stress’ as cited in Olivia Dun and Francois Gemenne, ‘Defining Environmental Migration’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 10, 10; see also Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘19.3 million displaced by disasters but mother nature not to blame’ (Media Release, 20 July 2015) < http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201507-globalEstimates-2015/20150706-GE-2015Press-release-FINAL-v1.pdf>. See also The Nansen Initiative, Norwegian Refugee Council, Prepare and Adapt: Climate Change and Human Mobility in Paris and Beyond (27 November 2015) Platform on Disaster Displacement Follow-up to the Nansen Initiative <https://disasterdisplacement.org/prepare-and-adapt-climate-change-and-human-mobility-in-paris-and-beyond>; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 19–20; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 179 McAdam, above n 10, 1, 39–51, 52–98, 267–70; see also Alexander Betts, ‘Towards a Soft Law Framework for the Protection of Vulnerable Irregular Migrants’ (2010) 22(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 209, 209–36. 180 Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54, 1; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86–7; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–166; see also Roger-Mark De Souza et al, ‘Re-framing Island Nations as Champions of Resilience in the Face of Climate Change and Disaster Risk’ (Working Paper No 17, United Nations University Institute of Environment and Human Security, February 2015), 2; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 14, 17. 181 See above n 180 and accompanying text. 182 Ibid.
56
mobility of ‘Pacific island communities across international borders’ formidable in the
future.183
The body of research from scientific climate assessments and published reports on the
observed and projected impacts of climate change on human systems (biophysical, coastal
ecosystem, terrestrial biodiversity for example) of small island nations184 establishes the
veracity of the problem and the evidence to extend the claim of potential wholesale relocation
of Pacific Island communities across international borders in the future on grounds of climate
change.185
3.3 Scientific Basis of Climate Change
3.3.1 Scientific Climate Evidence
As discussed in chapter one, the Fifth Assessment Report (AR 5) of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) confirms that ‘warming of the climate system is
unequivocal.’186 The IPCC AR5 scientific assessments project with ‘95% certainty that human
activities have been the dominant cause of observed warning since the mid-20th century.’187
Due to past global emission trends, further warming from anthropogenic processes, such as
‘population size, economic activity, lifestyle, energy use, land use patterns and technology’, is
reported to significantly escalate and amplify the existing recorded adverse impacts in the
twenty-first century and beyond.188
One of the central findings by the IPCC Working Group I (WG I) to the Fifth Assessment
Report (AR5) (IPCC WG I AR5) confirms that ‘global average surface temperatures for the
183 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–166; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86-105; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 372. 184 McAdam, above n 13, 283. 185 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625. 186 Stocker et al, above n 28, 14 (SPM B - E, 4, Chps 1, 8); see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 1–41, 16–17; see also Pacific Community 1.50C, above n 28; see also Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, above n 28. 187 CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 188 Allan Lavell et al ‘2012 Climate Change: New Dimensions in Disaster Risk, Exposure, Vulnerability, and Resilience’ in Christopher B. Field (eds), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 25–64, 29. See also Pachauri et al, above n 33, 8; see also ‘In 2010, in Cancun, Governments agreed on a long-term global goal (LTGG) to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels’ as cited in Alliance of Small States, ‘Small Islands Propose Below 1.50C Global Goal for Paris Agreement’ (Media Release, 8 June 2015) <http://aosis.org/small-islands-propose-below-1-5%cb%9ac-global-goal-for-paris-agreement/>.
57
period 2081-2100 (relative to 1986-2005) is projected to rise from 0.30C-1.7oC under the
lowest emissions scenario to 2.60C-4.8oC under the highest emissions scenario.’189 The IPCC
reports that the impact of these projections on small island nations is twofold. In terms of
projections under the lower emission scenario, the impacts of climate change will threaten the
natural systems of small island communities such as ‘risk of loss of marine and coastal
ecosystems, biodiversity and the ecosystem goods, functions and services they provide for
coastal livelihoods.’190 With respect to the higher emission scenario, the impacts will ‘increase
the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts to which it will be difficult to adapt,
such as disrupted livelihoods due to storm surges, coastal flooding and sea level rise’
extending to ‘increase risk of death, injury, or ill-health.’191 The contribution from the IPCC
Working Group II to the AR5 (IPCC AR5 WG II) confirms that while small islands contribute
only negligibly to global emissions, the adverse impacts such as rising sea levels on them are
palpable.192 Similarly McAdam, in her book Climate Change, Forced Migration, and
International Law, asserts that ‘small island countries emit less than 1 per cent of global GHGs,
their small physical size, exposure to natural disasters and climate extremes, very open
economies, and low adaptive capacity make them particularly susceptible, and less resilient,
to climate change.’193
At the Paris twenty-first Conference of Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the campaign by Pacific Island nations of “1.5 to
stay alive”, and a joint global effort by global leaders and Pacific small island developing states
to limit global mean surface temperature received robust traction in the Paris Agreement on
climate change adopted in 2015 and entered into force in 2016.194 The states signatories to the
189 CDKN Report, above n 4, 6, 10–11; see also Stocker et al, above n 28, 20 [SPM-E1]. 190 CDKN Report, above n 189; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 39. 191 See above n 190 and accompanying text. 192 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618. 193 McAdam, above n 10, 19. 194 Paris Climate Change Agreement, opened for signature 16 February 2016, 63.2016 UNTS XXVII.7d (entered into force 4 November 2016) art 2(1)(a) (‘Paris Agreement’); see also UN Department of Public Information, ‘Paris Climate Agreement to enter into force on 4 November’ on UN Department of Public Information, Sustainable Development Goals (5 October 2016) <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/10/paris-climate-agreement-to-enter-into-force-on-4-november/>. See also Patricia Espinosa and Salaheddine Mezouar, ‘Paris Enters into Force - Celebration and Reality Check’ on UN Climate Change Paris Agreement, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (4 November 2016) <http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/paris-agreement-enters-into-force-celebration-and-reality-check/>. See also: ‘The Paris Agreement is a legal instrument that will guide the process for universally acting on climate change. It is a hybrid of legally binding and nonbinding provisions. The Agreement consists of a core agreement that governs the international process will be binding on parties, while there are elements that are not part of the legally binding agreement. These parts, such as the intended nationally determined contributions, may be binding at the national level’ as cited in UN Department of Public Information, ‘Paris Agreement Frequently Asked Questions’ on UN Department of Public Information, Sustainable
58
Paris Agreement committed to ensuring that its increase was limited to well below 20C, as
compared with pre-industrial levels, and attempting to limit it to 1.50C.195 The COP 21 also
provided an opportunity to states parties in the margins of the climate summit to address issues
of ‘human mobility arising from the impacts of climate change.’196 However, climate change
as one of the drivers for population displacement and migration was not strongly reflected in
the wording of the Paris Agreement. The inclusion of the term “migrants” appears in the
preamble of the Paris Agreement rather than as a dedicated stand-alone section.197 This
suggests that the global community has not considered climate change-induced human
mobility in much detail compared to low-carbon development, financing mechanisms, and
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), which have been
integrated into the operative part of the Paris Agreement.198
The scientific evidence demonstrates fine distinctions between the high- and low-emission
assessments. For example, Schleussner et al claim that:
the difference between 1.50C and 20C marks the transition between an upper limit of present-day natural variability and a new climate regime in terms of heat extremes globally, and that changes in water variability and local agricultural yields are already unevenly distributed between world regions at 1.50C and even more so at 20C. Under a 20C warming, coastal tropical regions and islands may face the combined effects of a near-complete loss of tropical coral reefs, on-going sea-level rise above present-day rates over the 21st century and increased threats by coastal flooding and inundation.199
Development Goals (12 December 2015) <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-paris-agreement-faqs/>. See also United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, UN Chief Offers Thanks to Civil Society for its Role in Paris Agreement (14 December 2015) <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/12/un-chief-offers-thanks-to-civil-society-for-its-role-in-paris-agreement/>; see also Sebastian Oberthur, ‘Compliance Under the Evolving Climate Change Regime’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 120–3. See also Benoit Mayer, ‘Human Rights in the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 109, 109–11; see also PCCM Survey Fact Sheet, above n 3; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above n 48, 1. 195 Paris Agreement, above n 194 and accompanying text; see also Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al, Differential Climate Impacts for Policy-relevant Limits to Global Warming: The Case of 1.50C and 20C’ (2016) 7(2) Earth Systems Dynamics 327, 327–8; see also Carl-Friedrich Schleussner et al, ‘Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris Agreement Temperature Goal’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 827, 827–30. 196 UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above n 48, 1; see also United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, ‘Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project Makes Waves at COP 21’(Media Release, 16 December 2015) <http://unu.edu/news/news/pacific-climate-change-and-migration-project-makes-waves-at-cop21.html>. 197 Paris Agreement, above n 194; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above n 48; see also Mayer, above n 194, 109–17. 198 Paris Agreement, above n 194, art 4–10. 199 Schleussner et al, ‘Differential climate impacts’, above n 195, 343–4.
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A special report by the IPCC working group to the Sixth Assessment Report (IPCC AR6) is
marked for release in 2023 during the UNFCCC inaugural global stocktake.200 This is when
the States signatories to the Paris Agreement ‘will review the progress made towards ensuring
that global warming remains below 20C and further efforts to prevent it rising as high as
1.50C.’201 In light of the Special Report 1.5 0C highlighted earlier in chapter one, the permanent
representative to the United Nations and Solomon Islands Ambassador to the United States,
Colin Beck pointed out:
The issue now is the impact of 1.50C reaching us in less than five years, much of our livelihoods in the Pacific islands will be impacted. The IPCC 1.50C Special Report…tell us, the consequences and impacts of a global temperature increase to 1.50C or more above pre-industrial and how important the 1.50C is for our survival. Not just for the vulnerable countries, but for everyone.202
Global leaders need to take ownership of the Paris Agreement and raise the ambition for global
climate action to limit GHG emission levels to 1.50C, particularly for a chance of survival of
Pacific Island communities.203 The special reports are timely and awaited to predict the future
trajectory and propensity of GHGs on natural and human systems.204 Having examined the
scientific projections on Pacific Island nations and what it may potentially translate to in terms
of the habitability of small island communities, attention is now turned to the impacts of
climate change on the food security of Pacific Island communities. This adds to the dimension
of insecurity of Pacific Island communities, which advance the claim that a strong case may
exist for human migration in the future.
3.3.2 Food Insecurity and Future Livelihoods
The IPCC AR5 projects that ‘climate change will progressively threaten food security and
economic growth in complex ways in small island nations.’205 The IPCC AR5 maintains that
the marine ecosystem is ‘linked to the ongoing coastal and subsistence food productivity of
200 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘The IPCC and the Sixth Assessment cycle’ (Media Release, October 2017) 1. 201 Ibid; see also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.50C Approved by Governments’ (Media Release, No 24, 8 October 2018) 1–4; see also Allen et al, above n 1; see also Hoegh-Guldbery et al, above n 2. 202 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, above n 28; see alsoAllen et al, above n 1, 1-32. 203 Allen et al, above n 1, 6–19; see also Hoegh-Guldbery et al, above n 2, 177–181, 212–21, 231. 204 See also above n 203 and accompanying text. 205 CDKN Report, above n 4, 2; see also The term ‘food security is determined by a range of interacting factors including poverty, water availability, food policy agreements and regulations, and the demand for productive land for alternative uses’ as cited in Adger et al, above n 37, 763.
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small tropical islands and wellbeing of many island communities.’206 The IPCC AR5 confirms
the risks of them experiencing adverse impacts arising from climate change. 207 Moreover, the
IPCC AR5 projects ‘[t]he annual economic damage of ocean-acidification-induced coral reef
loss by the end of the century to be US$528-870 billion’, which in its assessment ‘represents
a very large Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss for the economies for many coastal regions
or small islands that rely on the ecological goods and services of coral reefs.’208 The
contribution from the IPCC Working Groups I, II and III to the AR5 in the Synthesis Report
(IPCC SYR) concedes that ‘global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity in
sensitive regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other
ecosystem services.’209 The IPCC SYR claims that the increase in competition for water in
subtropical regions will adversely impact food security, and that this will include the
production of food, access to food and the stability of food process.210
Supplementing IPCC (AR5, SYR) claims, the inaugural field research in 2011 by the ADB on
the potential effects of climate change on the food security of nations in the Pacific Island
region reported that climate change-induced projected impacts on ‘land, soil and water
resources, agricultural productions systems (including those of livestock and fisheries),
infrastructure, and social (community) systems will in turn exacerbate the consequences of
climate change on food security.’211 It recorded that agricultural production per capita for the
last 45 years in the Pacific region declined.212 It further recorded that the ‘agricultural output
per capita’ is projected to further decelerate due to climate change-induced natural disasters
and the increase in sea level.’213 The ADB noted disruptive habitat disturbances from
destructive practices such as coastal trawling for fish, pollution from land-based sources such
as ‘inappropriate coastal development and industrial wastewater’ and the overharvesting as
well as the misuse of resources as examples of the food security vulnerability of Pacific Island
communities.214 The ADB acknowledges that given the ‘uncertainty of future climates,
assessments of the impacts of climate change on Pacific agriculture can only be broad’, and
206 CDKN Report, above n 4, 12; see also Mohammed Ahmed et al, ‘Food Security and Climate Change in the Pacific: Rethinking the Options’ (Research Report, Asian Development Bank, September 2011) viii (‘ADB Food Security Report’). 207 See above n 206 and accompanying text. See also Global Landscapes Forum, Climate Change and Migration (2018) < http://events.globallandscapesforum.org/climate-change-and-migration/>. 208 CDKN Report, above n 4, 12. 209 Pachauri et al, above n 33, 14. 210 Ibid. 211 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, viii, xix, 1, 8, 28-31; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 1621, 1632. 212 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, viii. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid 8–9, 34.
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may lend itself to unprecedented human movement in the longer term.215 It also acknowledges
that ‘climate change impacts and food security vulnerability bear the influence of economic
growth, poverty reduction, status of environment, resource productivity, and improvement of
infrastructure and social services.’216
Similarly, the 2016 Post Disaster Needs Assessment Report (PDNAR) compiled by the Fijian
Government in partnership with the international development community (World Bank,
United Nations, European Union, for example) reported that in Fiji in 2016 Cyclone Winston
destroyed agricultural crops, ‘compromising the livelihoods of 60 percent of Fiji’s
population.’217 The preliminary findings from the ADB and the PDNAR closely mirror the
IPCC’s assessment of the adverse effects of climate change on the food security of small island
nations.218
3.4 Climate-induced Displacement and Migration Outlook and Planned Relocation
3.4.1 Susceptibility to Environmental Change
Section 3.3 presents an account of the scientific evidence and a number of published studies
and reports to establish the gravity of the climate change problem, particularly for Pacific
Island nations. Pacific Islanders face potential migration in the longer term. The following
section sets out two areas on population displacement widely documented in the literature and
in the growing body of research on adaptation to respond to climate change by Pacific Island
communities. The first relates to Pacific Island nations’ high susceptibility to sudden- and
slow-onset environmental change and displacement.219 This encapsulates discussions related
to rural-urban migration, mobility decisions and the drivers for human mobility, which are
interconnected with population displacement and migration. Another area of discussion relates
to climate-induced migration as an adaptation strategy of last resort, particularly for Pacific
low-lying coastal communities. This research acknowledges other widely investigated and
215 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, 30. 216 Ibid 34–5; see also ‘Other threats to future food security in the Pacific region include rapid urban population growth, land degradation and declining land productivity, erosion of crop genetic diversity, coastal and coral degradation and declining productivity of fisheries, and breakdowns in traditional social safety nets’ as cited in ADB Food Security Report, ix. 217 Ministry of Economy, ‘Disaster Recovery Framework: Tropical Cyclone Winston 20 February 2016’ (Research Report, Ministry of Economy, World Bank, United Nations, European Union, Asian Development Bank, Pacific Community, September 2016) 2; see also: ‘combined damage and loss reached 20 percent of Fiji’s GDP in 2015’ as cited in Ministry of Economy, 2. 218 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, viii–ix, 8; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 761–2; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 12. 219 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370.
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prominent focus areas in the growing body of research and ongoing discourse on global
migration agendas. These concern the international arrangements to facilitate and support
climate-induced population movements, the governance of migration and other arrangements
(location, scale and the integration of communities for example) by the host and destination
countries, which intersect with the discourse on climate vulnerable populations and regions
and adaptation to climate change (two focus areas).220 Some of these areas are briefly
considered further on in this chapter. Attention is now turned to the two focus areas, which are
discussed in turn.
The observed (shoreline change, groundwater resources and human health, for example) and
potential (sea level rise, food security, extreme dry/wet events, for example) impacts of climate
change on Pacific Island nations can be attributed to their remote physical geography, spatial
topography and frequent exposure to weather-related hazards (such as heatwaves, floods and
cyclones, for example) and slow-onset hazards (sea level rise and desertification, for
example).221 This is reinforced by the joint research report of the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre (iDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) on global disaster-
induced displacement (iDMC 2016), which reported that ‘[S]IDs face disproportionately high
disaster risk because their mostly low-lying, coastal populations tend to be exposed to a range
of hazards, particularly cyclones, floods, landslides, earthquakes and tsunamis.’222 This is
evident from the case of the category five tropical Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu in 2015, which
affected 22 islands and an estimated 166 000 people, with approximately 65 000 of those
people displaced internally.223 Likewise, approximately 62 000 people were displaced
internally from Cat 5-TC Winston in Fiji in 2016.224 The 2016 PDNAR following the Cat 5-
TC Winston reported the deaths of 44 people and 40 000 people needing immediate assistance.
The toll included ‘30,369 houses, 495 schools, and 88 health clinics damaged or destroyed.’225
220 Ibid 370–2. 221 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1616, 1619–26; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 19–20; see also Norwegian Refugee Council, above n 178. See also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3; see also Adelman, above n 178, 21; see also The Nansen Initiative, Norwegian Refugee Council, above n 178; see also Atlas Report, above n 178, IX; see also Kalin, above n 178, 5. 222 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘GRID 2016: Global Report on Internal Displacement’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2016) 19 (‘IDMC GRID 2016 Report’). 223 Ibid 19–20. 224 ‘IDMC GRID 2016 Report’, above n 222, 5, 19–20; see also Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘GRID 2017: Global Report on Internal Displacement’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2017) 37 (‘IDMC GRID 2017 Report’); see also Borge Brende and Didier Burkhalter, ‘Foreword’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 4, 4. 225 Ministry of Economy, above n 217, 3; see also Simone Esler, ‘Fiji Post-disaster Needs Assessment: Tropical Cyclone Winston 20 February 2016’ (Research Report, Government of Fiji, May 2016).
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It also reported the total damage of physical assets and economic losses sustained as a result
of economic production as FJD1.98 billion.226
The IPCC WG II AR5 to the IPCC Report on Small Islands (IPCC AR5 on Small Islands)
points out that the majority of the population and concomitant infrastructure of small islands
‘is located in coastal zones with limited on-island relocation opportunities.’227 The IPCC
Report on Human Security (IPCC AR5 on human security), in citing the contribution from the
IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance
Climate Change Adaptation (SREX), concludes that ‘an increasing incidence and changing
intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change will lead directly to the risk of
increased levels of displacement.’228 The IPCC AR5 on human security reports that while some
population displacements will be short term, a proportion of these will result in ‘more
permanent migration.’229 This view is expanded upon by the SREX, which reports that the
long-term impacts of climate change will significantly affect migration and result in permanent
displacement in the future.230 In the case of extreme weather events, the studies conducted by
the iDMC 2015 identify the social networks and property of displaced populations, including
the need to register for assistance in an emergency’, as some of the key reasons for them
returning to their places of origin, which complements the findings reported by the IPCC AR
5 on human security.231
In recognising the claims of the IPCC AR5 on human security and the SREX, McAdam and
Limon, in a joint policy report on human rights, climate change and cross-border displacement,
point out that the act of migration will not be straightforward. Some of the population will
migrate before a major deterioration in conditions occurs; however, others will only move as
a result of displacement arising from ‘sudden-onset disasters or slow-onset processes.’232
Moreover, governments may need to engage in the planned relocation of people for safety
reasons.233 An example of this is the (internal) national relocation project deployed by the
Fijian Government to relocate coastal communities in Fiji, with at least three low-lying coastal
226 See above n 225 and accompanying text. 227 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1619. 228 Adger et al, above n 37, 767. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid 768–9; see also Adelman, above n 178, 21; see also: ‘Climate change is anticipated to lead to more frequent and severe natural disasters, and in some cases its impact may render some parts of the world uninhabitable’ as cited in McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 2. 231 Adger et al, above n 37, 767; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 17. 232 McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 2. 233 Ibid.
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settlements relocated inland since 2014.234 Another example is provided by the first nationally
representative household survey into Pacific island migration conducted by the United Nations
University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), and European
Union (EU) under the PCCM project in 2015.235 It recorded an increase of 83 per cent for
internal migration trips for the period 2005 to 2015 in Kiribati, ‘two-thirds of whom
constituted people moving from outer islands to South Tarawa.’236 The 2015 PCCM Survey
Fact Sheet reports that for Kiribati and Tuvalu, ‘internal migration is not a solution as most
internal migration is to the already overpopulated capital cities.’237 By 2055, the PCCM Survey
Fact Sheet projects a 100 per cent and 70 per cent increase in internal migration in Kiribati
and Tuvalu respectively, based on the medium range climate modelling scenario.238 The
impacts of the rapid-onset disasters on small island communities and the impending
projections of population displacement reinforce the susceptibility of Pacific Island nations
and suggest that the future relocation, particularly of low-lying island nations across
international borders is potentially inevitable in the coming decades.
The findings of Campbell and Warrick’s published report on climate change and migration
issues in the Pacific stemming from the PCCM project in 2014239 reinforce those reported in
the 2015 PCCM Survey Fact Sheet referred to earlier. The capital cities of ‘the atoll States
such as Funafuti, Tuvalu; Tarawa, Kiribati; Majuro, Marshall Islands and the island of Ebeye,
Marshall Islands have some of the highest population densities in the Pacific.’240 They claim
that ‘[i]t is not unreasonable to anticipate that rates of rural-urban migration may be increased’
in the context of climate change.241 For instance, ‘urban population is projected to more than
234 The Fijian Government, ‘Making Communities the Focus of Climate Change Relocation’ (Media Release, 19 February 2015) < http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Press-Releases/MAKING-COMMUNITIES-THE-FOCUS-OF-CLIMATE-CHANGE-REL.aspx>; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Acting Permanent Secretary sets Priorities for Climate Change Division Issue 10 (March, 2015) <http://www.pacificdisaster.net/pdnadmin/data/original/FJI_2015_CC_Newsletter_March_Issue_10.pdf>; see also McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19. 235 United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), International Labour Organization (ILO), European Union (EU), ‘Pacific Climate Change and Migration Project’ (Newsletter, November 2015) 7 (PCCMP Newsletter 2017); see also PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3, 2; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 371. 236 See above n 235 and accompanying text. 237 Ibid. 238 PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3, 1–2. 239 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–56. 240 Ibid 2, 19. 241 Ibid.
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double to 107% of 2010 levels, growing from roughly 2.5 million to 5 million.’242 A global
perspective adopted by the IPCC AR5 on human security validates this claim, that is, that to
date migration has largely centred on urban areas within a country.243 It projects that by 2030,
the global population trend for urban mobility will reach 59 per cent.244 Campbell and Warrick
note that such “movements” ‘strain the capacity of urban areas’, accelerating demand for
development and services (infrastructure, amenities and housing, for example) against the
declining environmental conditions of low-lying atoll nations.245 They argue that ‘as urban
populations continue to grow there is likely to be increased demand from urban populations
for international migration’, for instance, Pacific Access Category (New Zealand), migration
with dignity policy (Kiribati) and planned relocation, to list a few.246 The concentration of
Pacific Island communities in urban centres offers a temporary response to the impacts of
climate change arising for other reasons (such as socio-economic, for example). Robust policy
deliberations and decisions at all levels (local, national and regional) are needed to manage
migration across international borders on the grounds of climate change in the future.247
3.4.2 Compounding Migration Perceptions
McAdam asserts that ‘[t]he economic, social, and political capacity of small island nations,
including its infrastructure, economic resilience and ability to assist its people to rebuild their
lives will necessarily affect mobility decisions’ (adaptation, climatic impacts).248 This view is
supported by Barnett and Webber who maintain that ‘without improved political and economic
institutions to reduce poverty and marginality, environmental change will continue to be an
important proximate factor in migration decisions.’249 The iDMC, in acknowledging that
‘future displacement will be influenced by climate change and environmental degradation’,
points out that much uncertainty about the impact of climate change, including responses to
242 ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, 7. 243 Adger et al, above n 37, 770. 244 Ibid 767. 245 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 2, 19; see also ADB Food Security Report, above n 206, 7. 246 See above n 245 and accompanying text; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 767. 247 ‘Government of Pacific Island countries have not sufficiently addressed displacement and resettlement in their national legal frameworks. They should: a) review their national laws and policies to identify areas where legal or policy changes are needed, and b) implement the necessary changes’ as cited in Elizabeth Ferris, Michael M Cernea and Daniel Petz, ‘On the Front Line of Climate Change and Displacement: Learning from and with Pacific Island Countries’ (Research Report, The Brookings Institute, September 2011) 31. 248 McAdam, above n 10, 1. 249 Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 38.
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them, remains.250 One of the reasons for this can be attributed to the data gaps in the growing
field of human mobility studies. In the context of global internal displacements from sudden-
onset disasters and conflict (armed and communal, for example), the iDMC admits that the
‘limited geographic coverage across and within countries’, the ‘disaggregate and geophysical
flow of data on IDPs and their movements’, including keeping an account of ‘all types of
displacement’ inhibit conclusive reporting.251 For example, the iDMC recorded the differing
governance capacities as a barrier to obtaining comprehensive displacement data for East Asia
and the Pacific.252
Similarly, there is consensus among scholars in the field of climate science to orient regional
‘(Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Oceans and Mediterranean islands, for example)’ scale
climatic projections to ‘smaller spatial scales’ particularly for Pacific Islands nations because
the ‘climate scenarios are generally much smaller than the resolution of the global climate
models (mathematical models and computer simulations, for example).’253 They note that by
introducing ‘statistical downscaling models’, the problem remains, as ‘long-term quality
controlled climate data for at least three decades for a number of representative points on the
widely dispersed islands is sparse.’254 This is primarily due to the uneven ‘climate change risk
profiles of small islands’, which means that ‘climate change impacts, vulnerability and
adaptation varies from one island region to another and among countries in the same region.’255
In light of these concerns, the ‘lack of data on the scale and patterns of possible climate change-
related migration is one of the key factors’ that influences human mobility decisions.256
Aside from data gaps, some of the other reasons for mobility decisions are also notable. The
‘social differentiation in access to resources’ is another factor that influences mobility
decisions.257 The contribution from the IPCC WG II AR 5 focusing on human security
identifies ‘culture, identity, cultural ecosystem services and cultural attachment to place’ as
some of the compelling reasons for people choosing to remain at their place of origin and
250 IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 15. 251 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Global Report on Internal Displacement’ (Research Report, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, May 2018) (‘IDMC GRID 2018 Report’) 5–7, 28–9, 72–81, 75. 252 Ibid 28–9. 253 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1626–7, 1644; see also Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 234. 254 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618, 1626; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 255 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 3. 256 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618, 1625, 1643–4; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 20; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 8. 257 Adger et al, above n 37, 767.
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confront future environmental conditions.258 In contrast, ‘well-being, livelihoods, and
economic opportunities and other human factors’ are also reasons considered to influence
people’s decision to avert anticipated environmental risks and migrate.259 This dichotomy
brings to the forefront this widely established argument made by many scholars, multinational
organisations and institutions in the field of migration, development and resettlement studies
that multiple factors affect migration.260
Kalin, in citing the findings of the 2012–2015 global consultations of the consultative
institution established by the Norwegian and Swiss Governments outside the ambit of the
institutions of the United Nations, that is, the Nansen Initiative on cross-border displacement
in disaster context, confirms that ‘population movements are occurring in the context of
disasters and climate change rather than being caused exclusively by such events.’261
According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ‘[e]nvironmental change,
including climate change is nevertheless rarely the sole or direct cause of population
movements’ as it is layered with ‘[e]conomic, social, cultural, political and demographic
factors.’262 Likewise, Nishimura points out the differences in the impact of mobility between
‘[s]low and sudden-onset events. For example, reasons behind migration arising from slow-
onset events include ‘stability, better security, livelihood opportunities, and a sustainable
source for food’, while in the case of disasters ‘needs are immediate.’263 In the same vein,
McAdam admits that migration resulting from climate change effects occurs because it ‘tends
to multiply pre-existing stressors, rather than causing movement on its own’, as indicated
above.264 Issues such as ‘political or social tensions’, and ‘economic and social vulnerabilities’
are notable examples of stressors or pressures that influence human mobility patterns
(displacement, migration and relocation).265
It is largely acknowledged that a number of underlying causes influence the decision-making
process to migrate as indicated by scholars within the field of migration studies. As Gemenne
and Blocher argue, ‘[p]eople move short and long distances within the larger frame of their
258 Ibid 770; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625: see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 15. 259 See above n 258 and accompanying text. 260 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1625. 261 Kalin, above n 178, 5; see also Brende and Burkhalter, above n 224, 4. 262 Ileana-Sinziana Puscas, ‘Central and North America: Migration and Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Environmental Change’ (Research Policy Report Issue 1 Volume 4, International Organization for Migration, March 2018) 5. 263 Nishimura, above n 38, 112–13. 264 McAdam, above n 18, 520, 532. 265 Nishimura, above n 38, 112; see also McAdam, above n 10, 267; see also McAdam, above n 18, 520, 532; see also The Nansen Initiative, Norwegian Refugee above n 178.
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responses to the world around them, an evolving relationship shaped by subjective and non-
environmental factors.’266 However, there is a general lack of research and empirical data to
conclusively link climate change with human mobility. The incongruous motivations that
influence migration add another layer of complexity in terms of the legal definition and
protection arrangements for population mobility on the grounds of climate change, which is
addressed in the section related to the international response.267 Having considered a host of
factors (susceptibility and urbanisation, for example) and their linkages (mobility decisions
and drivers) with the projected trends in human mobility of Pacific Island communities, the
next section addresses the second area of focus, that is, migration as an adaptation strategy of
last resort.
3.4.3 Adaptation Strategy of Last Resort
Almost every scholarly discourse in the field of population displacement and climate-induced
migration and scientific studies includes a section relating to adaptation strategies and
interventions in response to the effects of climate change.268 However, there are recognisable
differences in the arguments posed by many scholars. These are discussed in turn.
Some literature supports the claim of migration as an adaptation strategy. Briefly, by way of
background, the global advocacy around the inclusion of the strands of human mobility ‘dealt
with under adaptation’ originate from international climate policies such as the Cancun
Adaptation Framework (CAF) and Doha Climate Gateway Decision (Doha Decision) adopted
by the Conference of the Parties (COP) at the sixteenth session (COP 16) in 2010, and the
eighteenth session (COP 18) in 2012 respectively under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).269 For instance, paragraph 14(f) of the CAF
266 Francois Gemenne and Julia Blocher, ‘How can Migration Serve Adaptation to Climate Change? Challenges to Fleshing out a Policy Deal’ (2017) 183(4) The Geographical Journal 336, 338. 267 Nishimura, above n 38, 112. 268 Koko Warner et al, ‘National Adaptation Plans and Human Mobility’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 8, 9; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 7–8; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 76 2, 777; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1640–3. 269 Warner et al, above n 37, 5, 10, 14–15; See also Walter Kalin, ‘Changing climates, moving people: Distinguishing voluntary and forced movements of people’ (Policy Brief No 8, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2013) 40, 44, 46; see also Koko Warner, ‘Human Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaption to Climate Change: the Cancun Adaptation Framework and Potential for Future Action’ (2012) 30(6) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 1061, 1061; see also David Freestone, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change - The Basis for the Climate Change Regime’ in Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard G Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 96–119.
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obliges states parties to the UNFCCC to take ‘measures to enhance understanding,
coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration
and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels.’270
The accretion of climate negotiations in the UNFCCC policy process complements human
mobility responses within potential in situ adaptation strategies as well as migration as an
adaptive strategy of last resort on account of sudden-onset extreme events and slow-onset
environmental change.271 This binary is buttressed by Article 4 of the UNFCCC, which
outlines adaptation measures in response to environmental change.272
The IPCC AR–5 on human security asserts ‘migration and mobility are adaptation strategies
in all regions of the world that experience climate variability. Extreme weather events provide
the most direct pathway from climate change to migration. Expanding opportunities for
mobility can reduce vulnerability to climate change and enhance human security.’273 Some of
the strands of adaptation from a broader perspective include ‘diversifying household income
sources to increase adaptive capacity (temporary and seasonal migration)’, providing
‘transformational opportunity (different income streams from different locations) to increase
long term resilience for individuals and households’ and finally, as the iDMC articulates, ‘a
life-saving adaptive measure of last resort in response to a crisis.’274
270 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Adaptation Framework, GA Dec 1/CP.16, 16th session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011) <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4> (‘Cancun Adaptation Framework’); see also Warner et al, above n 37, 5, 11, 14; see also Freestone, above n 254, 96–119; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 112. 271 Warner et al, above n 37, 15; see also Graeme Hugo, ‘Climate Change-induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2012) 10, 23–7. 272 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 14 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) (UNFCCC) <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en>; Article 4 (1) 9e) (‘UNFCCC’); see also Christine Gibb and James Ford, ‘Should the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Recognise Climate Migrants? (2012) 7 Environmental Research Letters 1, 2, 4; see also Warner et al, above n 268, 8. See above n 269 and accompanying text. 273 Adger et al, above 37, 758, 767 (para 12.4.1.2); see also United Nations Higher Commissioner for Human Rights, International Organization for Migration, United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, United Nations Development Programme, International Labour Organisation, Sciences Po-Ceri and Refugees International, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change: Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility COP 20 Lima, Peru’ (Research Report, International Organization for Migration, 2014) 5–6 3, <https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/pbn/docs/Human-Mobility-in-the-context-of-Climate-Change.pdf>. 274 Michelle Yonetani, ‘Seizing the Momentum’ (Briefing Paper, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2 November 2016) 4; see also Richard Black et al, ‘Migration and Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities’ (Research Report, Foresight, 20 October 2011) 175; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 371–2. See also Cecilia Tacoli, ‘Migration and Mobility in a Changing Climate: A Policy Perspective, (2011) 19(36) Revista Interdisciplinar da Mobilidade Humana 113, 120; see also Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 38; see also ‘migration decisions…are largely within the control of people’ as cited in Barnett and Webber, 38.
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Similarly, with regard to the PCCM project referred to earlier, Campbell and Warrick
acknowledge that ‘[m]ost Pacific island countries have now established policies, strategies or
planning tools to guide national in situ adaptation activities’ such as ‘disaster risk reduction,
improved agricultural practices and access to freshwater sources’, which are incorporated into
national adaptation programs of action (NAPAs).275 However, they remind us that such options
may prove inadequate and that migration of some kind may be considered and pursued as an
alternative and realistic response in the future.276 Moreover, Campbell and Warrick point out
that the general lack of research data on Pacific small islands, as indicated earlier, reduces the
capacity of governments in the Pacific region to develop ‘strategies and policy options with
regard to human migration’ on the grounds of climate change.277 Furthermore, Campbell and
Warrick assert that ‘migration is an ingrained part of Pacific history and their culture and
society for generations so they could maximize resource opportunities and expand social
networks as a common strategy for reducing risks associated with climate pressures.’278
Similarly, the ADB supplements the claims and points out that ‘migration planning as an
adaptation strategy is virtually non-existent in policy design.’279 The ADB maintains that in
Asia and the Pacific region ‘[f]ew if any national action plans for adaptation give serious
attention to migration.’280
Along with in situ issues of human insecurities, the IPCC SYR argues that ‘adaptation and
mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate
change.’281 There is widespread consensus that adaptation and mitigation technologies, such
as geoengineering and solar radiation management for example, ‘deliver and confer co-
benefits to countries over different timeframes.’282 The Climate and Development Knowledge
275 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 7–8. 276 Ibid; see also KV20 above n 20 and accompanying text. See also Sosene above n 22 and accompanying text. 277 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 8, 22; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1618, 1625. See above n 31 and accompanying text; see also CKDN Report, above n 4, 20. 278 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 3, 11, 23, 25; see also Sandra McCubbin, Barry Smit and Tristan Pearce, ‘Where does Climate Fit? Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Context of Multiple Stressors in Funafuti, Tuvalu’ (2015) 30 Global Environment Change 43, 43–55; see also ‘identity, culture, community and livelihoods are deeply interwoven in the historical and cultural fabric of communities’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, 11, 23, 25 and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 53. 279 ADB Report, above n 10, 46–7. 280 Ibid. 281 Oxford University Press, Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (at January 2011) ‘Climate International Protection’ [2]; see also: ‘As an intergovernmental body jointly established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) had provided policymakers with the most authoritative and objective scientific and technical assessments in the field’ as cited in Pachauri et al, above n 33, v, 17–19. 282 CDKN Report, above n 4, 7, 11.
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Network (CDKN) points out that ‘these technologies raise questions about costs, risks,
governance, and ethical implications.’283 In addition, caution must be applied ‘to ensure that
donors do not drive the adaptation and mitigation agenda in small islands’284 because of the
‘risk that options under this scenario may result in the loss of scarce resources.’285 The
published studies of the IPCC and the CDKN are complemented by Tacoli, a leading scholar
on human settlements. She argues that ‘linking adaptation and mitigation initiatives and
policies is the next unavoidable challenge for local, national and global actors.’286 In the case
of Pacific Island nations, the ‘general absence of credible regional socio-economic scenarios
at spatial scales’ and the ‘local lenses (cultural, ecological, etc.) through which wholesale
transfer of adaptation-migration options’ occur are considered to be barriers to the energy
security of island nations.287 The scholarly works and the scientific literature are consistent,
which supports such claims to advance the argument of migration as a strategy of last resort.
According to the IPCC AR–5 on small islands, the trajectory in response to the climate risks
of small islands predominantly ‘focuses on managing present-day risks through risk transfer
(index-based insurance), risk spreading (social networks), or risk avoidance (engineered
structures)’ and is seldom clear cut to ‘address high future risks.’288 Similarly, the CDKN
argues that while nations with ‘[m]ore diversified economies’ are sufficiently equipped to
‘respond to climate stresses’, the Pacific Island nations are presented with a host of adaptation
planning and implementation barriers.289 Some of these barriers include ‘low economies of
scale in production, inadequate access to financial, technical, human resources, culture, ethics
and attitudes to risks.’290 These barriers also straddle in the context of rural-urban migration
where the ‘residents of low-income informal settlements, often do not have the skills, financial
capital and social networks to move to the urban centres.’291 Recent trends in urban population
growth have led ‘most governments in low- and middle-income nations’ to concede ‘migration
as a growing problem and a key policy issue.’292
283 Ibid 11. 284 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1643. 285 Ibid. 286 See above n 277 and accompanying text; see also Tacoli, above n 274, 122. 287 CDKN Report, above n 4, 11, 25. 288 Nurse et al, above n 31, 1637–8. 289 Ibid 1639; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 21. 290 CDKN Report, above n 4, 21; see also Britta Heine and Lorenz Petesen, ‘Adaptation and Cooperation’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 48, 48. 291 Cecilia Tacoli, ‘Crisis or Adaptation? Migration and Climate Change in a Context of High Mobility’ (2009) 21(2) Environment and Urbanisation 513, 514–15. 292 Ibid.
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Anchored in contrast to the projections of the IPCC and the observational and empirical data
gaps for Pacific Island nations detailed earlier, the CDKN acknowledges that ‘[t]here also
remains limited evidence as to which regions will experience the largest sea level rise and
worst climate impacts.’293 Likewise, Tacoli admits that it is difficult to ‘predict with any
precision how climate change will impact on population distribution and movement.’294 Tacoli
lists two reasons for this, while also acknowledging improvements in scientific projections.295
First, it is due to the ‘relatively high levels of uncertainty on the locally-specific impacts of
climate change and the speed at which they may occur.’296 Second, it is due to the ‘lack of
comprehensive data on migration, especially movements (and particularly temporary ones)
within national boundaries or cross-border flows in and between low-income nations that are
likely to be most affected by climate change.’297 The CDKN reminds us, as noted earlier, that
the ability of Pacific Island nations to raise financial capital is scant, especially given the costs
required for adaptation projects, such as sea walls and surge barriers, for example.298 This view
is supplemented by the iDMC, which, in recognising the contribution of the IPCC, points out
that ‘more research is needed on the adaptation strategies appropriate for different types of
islands under different socio-economic scenarios.’299 It further points out that ‘[t]he impact of
different adaptation strategies on displacement and migration will be influenced by the scale
of climate change and human factors such as their cultural and social acceptability and
communities confidence in their effectiveness.’300 Similarly, the CDKN cautions that
‘[r]esettlement and migration should only be regarded as a last resort on islands, as they may
actually discourage viable adaptation initiatives, by fostering over-dependence on external
support.’301
The scholarly and scientific evidence presented so far suggests that ‘migration as a long-term
adaptation option’, particularly for Pacific Island nations is plausible.302 Along with this
argument, the final report on ‘addressing climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific’
by the ADB is noteworthy.303 The ADB recognises, as indicated earlier, that adaptations that
293 CDKN Report, above n 4, 22. 294 Cecilia Tacoli, ‘Not Only Climate Change: Mobility, Vulnerability and Socio-economic Transformations in Environmentally Fragile Areas of Bolivia, Senegal and Tanzania’ (Working Paper No 28, International Institute for Environment and Development, February 2011) 2. 295 Ibid; see also Tacoli, ‘Migration and Mobility’, above n 274, 114. 296 Tacoli, above n 294. 297 Ibid. 298 CDKN Report, above n 4, 17–18, 21–2; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 7–8, 15. 299 IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 15. 300 Ibid. 301 CDKN Report, above n 4, 21. 302 Ibid 22. 303 ADB Report, above n 10, 1–94.
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enable populations to remain in situ are expected to be pursued rather than migration.304 From
a policy development and practice perspective, the ADB recommends ‘the need to develop
new and effective governance systems and policy mechanisms’ in at least two respects.305
First, to cope with mobility-based adaptation strategies from ‘sudden-onset cataclysmic
events’, which trigger population displacement.306 Second, to cope with non-mobility-based
adaptation strategies from ‘longer-term processes which see an incremental decline in the
ability of an area to provide livelihood.’307 Collectively, the growing body of research adds
weight to extend the argument of human migration as an alternative strategy to the impacts of
climate change in the future.
While some literature supports the claim of migration as an adaptation strategy, as argued
above, many other scholars and published reports depart drastically from the future-focused,
migration-centric strategy to claim ‘migration as an adverse impact of climate change and an
adaptation failure.’308 The IPCC AR–5 on human security highlights that ‘[v]ulnerability to
weather extremes and long-term environmental change is inversely correlated with
mobility.’309 It notes that those who are most vulnerable are also those with the least capacity310
because migration usually occurs in the context of a climate emergency.311 These
circumstances ‘create conditions of debt and increased vulnerability, rather than reducing
them’ (displacement).312 This distinction is further exemplified in the global field research
conducted by Warner, Dun and Stal. Their case study examined 22 locations in six regions
under the Environmental Change and Forced Scenarios (EACH-FOR) project, which assessed
the migration in the context of environmental change at local, national and regional levels.313
The evidence from the case studies reveals that ‘[m]igration may be an adaptation mechanism
for those with resources to move early’ while ‘in extreme cases migration may be an
expression of failed adaptation for those with fewer means to move.’314 This view is supported
by Gemenne and Blocher, who argue that ‘[s]hort term coping strategies that mitigate harm
may be seen as adaptive, but in many cases have proven to be maladaptive in the long term.’315
304 Ibid 37. 305 Ibid; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 22. 306 ADB Report, above n 10, 37. 307 Ibid. 308 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 371–2; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 18–23. 309 Adger et al, above n 37, 767–7. 310 Ibid. 311 Ibid. 312 Adger et al, above n 37, 767. 313 Koko Warner, Olivia Dun and Marc Stal, ‘Field Observations and Empirical Research’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 13, 13–15. 314 Ibid. 315 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 338.
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Some of the other reasons advanced by scholars such as Campbell and Warrick, and Allgood
and McNamara, relate to concerns that if the strands of human mobility—particularly
migration and planned relocation—are presented as a solution, then this may potentially derail
concerted global climate efforts by the global community to reduce GHG emissions and global
warming targets to 20C, or closer to 1.50C.316 Likewise, Gibb and Ford point out that dismissing
migration within existing adaptation strategies, ‘could undermine and render adaptation efforts
maladaptive, and even permit powerful actors to use forced migration for political and
economic gain.’317 The ADB cautions that ‘[i]f migration is not carefully planned and assisted,
it can turn into maladaptation, i.e. leave people more vulnerable to environmental changes.’318
The divergent responses to the migration-adaptation nexus to sudden- and slow-onset
environmental change provides important insights for unpacking a host of issues and
identifying variables for future empirical research, particularly for Pacific Island climate-
vulnerable populations.319 The comprehensive suggestion of Gemenne and Blocher is notable.
They state that ‘all vantage points of migration should be weighed objectively and
comprehensively and it is necessary to develop a better appreciation of how migration, when
employed as a strategy to respond to climate change, affects the adaptive capacities of
migrants, communities of origin, and communities of destination.’320 These present
interwoven considerations for emerging global policy deliberations by the international
community on contemporary mobility dimensions in the future.
Having considered the existing vulnerabilities, future resilience capacity and the potential
human mobility and migration of Pacific Island nations in response to the impacts of climate
change, attention is turned to the rich variety of perspectives that have set out to determine the
magnitude of internal and cross-border migration of climate vulnerable populations at a global
level, including the potential case of Pacific Island nations and communities most susceptible
to climate change.
3.4.4 Magnitude of Human Mobility
The Nansen Initiative asserts that ‘both sudden- and slow-onset climate-related hazards
combined with rapid urbanisation, population growth and pre-existing social vulnerabilities
316 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 25; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 372. 317 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 3. 318 ADB Report, above n 10, 47. 319 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 338; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 762. 320 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 344.
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and poverty are likely to increase displacement and migration in the future, including across
international borders.’321 The 2018 global report released by the iDMC recorded ‘30.6 million
new internal displacement associated with conflict and disasters in 2017 across 143 countries
and territories’, of which ‘8.6 million accounted from floods and 7.5 million from storms.’322
The iDMC further recorded a stand-alone total of 18.8 million displacements from disasters
(droughts, wildfires, landslides, for example) in 135 countries.323 The iDMC confirms that the
East Asia and Pacific regions are more widely affected by climate hazards than any other
regions, with 36 per cent of ‘global disaster displacement risk’ concentrated there.324
A number of prominent scholars from the field of environmental and migration studies, such
as Corendea, Warner, Warren, Johnson, Edwards, Brown, and Wannier and Gerrard,
acknowledge the frequently cited seminal work of Professor Myers of Oxford University and
Lord Stern of Brentford. They forecast global population displacement and migration from
climate change and disasters to be around approximately 200 to 250 million by 2050.325
Similarly, projections determined by the United Nations (UN) institutions and agencies are
notable. For example, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights projects the displacement
of 50 to 200 million refugees by 2050 across borders, either permanently or temporarily.326
Similarly, the UN Environment Program (UNEP) projects ‘50 million environmental refugees
in Africa alone’ by 2060.327
Likewise, the report released by the global charitable agency for poverty alleviation Christian
Aid, reports that a billion people from developing countries will be forced to leave their homes
by 2050, of which approximately 50 million will be because of natural disasters, 645 million
321 Brende and Burkhalter, above n 224, 4–5; see also Warner et al, above n 37, 5. 322 IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 251, v, 2, 5–7, 52. 323 Ibid. 324 Ibid 28. 325 Craig A Johnson, ‘Governing Climate Displacement: The Ethics and Politics of Human Settlement’ (2012) 21(2) Environmental Politics 308, 308; see also Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier, ‘Overview’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 5–7; see also Cosmin Corendea, Legal Protection of the Sinking Islands Refugees (Vandeplas Publishing, 2016) 24–5. See also Michelle Leighton, Xiaomeng Shen and Koko Warner, ‘Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction’ (Research Report No 15, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, 25–31 July 2010) 13; see also Phillip Dane Warren, ‘Forced Migration After Paris COP 21: Evaluating the Climate Change Displacement Coordination Facility’ (2016) 116(8) Columbia Law Review 2103, 2113; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78; see also also Oli Brown, ‘The Numbers Game’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 8, 8–9. 326 Brown, above n 325, 8–9, 8; see also Warren, above n 325, 2113. 327 See above n 326 and accompanying text.
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because of development projects, and 250 million because of climate change.328 Scholars
Leighton, Shen and Warner argue that ‘[t]he deepening of problems for developing countries
in water scarcity, food insecurity, spread of disease, job losses and human displacement’ due
to climate variability ‘may lead to migration between four and seven billion’ by 2050.329 For
Brown, ‘on current predictions, the carrying capacity of large parts of the world, the ability of
different ecosystems to provide food, water and shelter for human populations will be
compromised by climate change.’330
In the case of Pacific Island nations, little is known about ‘migration and resettlement patterns
and trends’ as there have been few empirical investigations.331 Some of these empirical
investigations include field research conducted with Pacific Island communities by Nunn,
which takes the form of ‘86 case studies of community relocations’, Campbell and Warrick,
who adopted quantitative measures and qualitative analysis on the ‘causes and consequences
of climate change and its impact on migration’ in eleven Pacific nations, and the empirical
evidence presented in the 2015 PCCM Survey Fact Sheet (2015 PCCM), as indicated earlier.332
According to the 2015 PCCM, ‘[m]ore than 70 per cent of households in Kiribati and Tuvalu,
and 35 per cent of households in Nauru felt that migration would be a likely response if
droughts, sea level rise, floods or saltwater intrusion worsens.’333 The 2015 PCCM recorded
that by 2055, international migration trips for Kiribati, with a projected population of 175 560,
will increase by 35 per cent, and that for Tuvalu, with a projected population of 13 246, that
will increase by 100 per cent.334
Similarly, Campbell and Warrick report that the combined atoll population of Kiribati, the
Marshall Islands and Tuvalu was approximately 170 000 (in 2013) and that by 2050 it would
increase to 298 000.335 In adding other atoll populations of the Federated States of Micronesia,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tonga, they project that the total
328 Rachel Baird et al, ‘Human Tide: The Real Migration Crises’ (Research Report, Christian Aid, May 2007) 1, 5–6. 329 Leighton, Shen and Warner, above n 325, 17. 330 Brown, above n 325, 9. 331 Nurse et al, above n 31, 73. 332 Ibid 1625; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, iv; see also PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above 48, 1. See also United Nations University - Institute for Environment and Human Security, above n 196; see also Ted Scheinman, ‘Disaster and Migration in the South Pacific: A Failure of International Law’ (Media Release, 2 December 2015) <https://psmag.com/disaster-and-migration-in-the-south-pacific-a-failure-of-international-law-104817a19ed9#.r2h32dk8i>. 333 PCCM Fact Sheet, above n 3. 334 Ibid; see also UNDP, ESCAP, ILO Newsletter, above 48. 335 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 16.
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population by 2050 may comprise 350 000 people, ‘who under the worst possible scenarios
would become displaced and the pressure to migrate is likely to be relatively high among this
population.’336 They acknowledge that due to the barriers created by current elevation data on
coastal settlements that estimates of the population likely to be adversely affected by climate
change, and especially the number of those who will migrate, is difficult to determine.’337 The
empirical evidence for Pacific Island nations has resulted in estimates, but there is still
insufficient data. However, the combined official national census may offer policymakers
insights as a starting point for the planning phases of relocation.
It is evident that large-scale projections for population displacement and migration in the
context of climate change are not uniformly represented in the literature. Corendea points out
that ‘[s]uch estimates have a large margin of error and depend on underlying assumptions
about population growth, economic development, temperature increase, or the degree and
timing of climate change impacts.’338 This view is supported by Johnson, who recognises that
‘[s]uch estimates are of course speculative and controversial’ and reminds us that ‘they also
raise important questions about the ways in which, and extent to which, national governments
and international institutions may be expected to accommodate and protect populations
displaced by climate change.’339 According to Gibb and Ford, the scale of displacement and
migration ‘represents a global affirmation that climate change induced mobility takes on
different forms and needs diverse policy approaches.’340 McAdam, in acknowledging the
widely held view that ‘there will be cross-border movement on account of climate change’,
departs from the ‘magnitude often predicted’ and argues that such estimates cannot necessarily
be equated ‘in the nature of refugee-like flight.’341 She reminds us that caution must be applied
‘when it comes to devising appropriate legal and policy responses, which must be attuned to
the reality of movement.’342
With these broad perspectives anchored in both available information and data gaps, there is
general agreement in the literature that ‘nobody really knows with any degree of precision
what climate change will mean for human population distribution.’343 Brown suggests that
‘objective and empirically-based detailed numerical scenarios, advanced climate models,
336 Ibid 16–19; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 6. 337 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 18. 338 Corendea, above n 325, 25. 339 Johnson, above n 325, 309. 340 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1. 341 McAdam, above n 10, 16–17. 342 Ibid. 343 Brown, above n 325, 9.
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building capacity of institutions and governments to track forced migrants both within and
across national boundaries’ are some measures that can be developed to obtain a fuller and
more precise understanding of the trajectory of global human displacement and migration from
anthropogenic climate change in the coming decades.344 The global population movement in
response to sudden- and slow-onset environmental change affirms the magnitude of the global
migration crisis; one that demands robust global coordinated action by the international
community (states, agencies, organisations, etc.) and an array of actors (private public
organisations, etc.) around global population displacement and migration, particularly in the
case of Pacific Island nations by the middle of the twenty-first century.345
Having examined the copious trajectories of human mobility, attention is now turned to
planned relocation, which is frequently cited in the literature as part of adaptation planning.346
This is in addition to other adaptation interventions (ecosystem conservation) and human
mobility dimensions of voluntary and involuntary human migration and population
displacement.347
3.4.5 Snapshot of Future Mobility Planned Relocation
The scholarly literature on population displacement and migration from sudden– and slow-
onset environmental change and the large volume of published studies drawing on the
experience of other strands of mobility (internal displacement and forced migration, for
example) from large infrastructure and development projects have broadened the narrative of
human mobility in the twenty first-century.348 Moreover, several studies acknowledge the
significant contribution of the leading expert, ‘Michael Cernea’s impoverishment, risk and
344 Ibid. 345 Bogumil Terminski, ‘The Concept of Human Security as a Tool for Analysing the Consequences of Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement’ (Research Paper, 25 March 2012) 31. 346 Koko Warner et al, ‘Integrating Human Mobility Issues within National Adaptation Plans’ (Policy Brief No 9, United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 4. 347 Warner et al, ‘Changing Climate, Moving’, above n 37; see also Koko Warner, ‘Environmental Change and Migration: Methodological Considerations from Ground-breaking Global Survey’ (2011) 33(1) Population and Environment 3, 3; see also Tacoli, above n 291, 513. 348 Anthony Oliver-Smith and Alex de Sherbinin, ‘Resettlement in the Twenty-first Century’ (2014) 45 Forced Migration Review 23, 23–5; see also Scott Leckie, ‘Human Rights Implications’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 18, 19; see also Marine Franck, ‘National Adaptation and Planning for Relocation’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 35, 37; see also Koko Warner, Walter Kalin and Susan Martin, ‘Outlook for Adaptation Planning and Human Mobility’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 43. See also Doberstein and Taggell, above n 86, 23–5, 27; see also Warner, Dun and Stal, ‘above n 313, 13; see also McAdam, above n 10, 1, 3; see also ADB Report, above n 10; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222.
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reconstruction model (IRR)’ in the field of development-forced displacement and resettlement
studies (DFDR).349 The model represents ‘eight impoverishment risks embedded in forced
relocation projects, with targeted counter strategies for risk prevention.’350 These include
‘landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food security, and increased health
risks, loss of common lands and resources, and social disintegration.’351 Cernea’s IRR model
emerged as a reliable predictor of ‘resettlement schemes in terms of its planning, negotiation,
and execution’ of development projects.352 The key argument that the majority of this body of
knowledge emphasises is with regard to the need for specific consideration of planned
relocation in adaptation planning to respond to the future impacts of climate change and
organised resettlement in the context of development projects.353
Before proceeding to outline further arguments, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is
widespread consensus among migration scholars and practitioners that ‘mass relocation of
whole populations’ triggered from slow-onset environmental change within sovereign borders
and potentially across international borders in the future ‘provides a rare opportunity to plan
for responses.’354 This is because such population movement ‘is less likely to be in the nature
of sudden, spontaneous (and desperate) flight.’355 The enumerated grounds (race, religion, for
example) for seeking legal protection pursuant to the refugee instrument ‘where people flee
across an international border’ is one example of sudden onset movement.356 This view is
supported by Thomas and Benjamin, who note that in the case of Pacific Island countries and
territories, planned relocation means that being able to relocate ‘on their own terms, in advance
of the potential devastation or of migration processes that may be developed externally and
forced upon them.’357
349 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 67; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58–66; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 152; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 350 See above n 349 and accompanying text. 351 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 67; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 352 See above n 349 and accompanying text. 353 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23–5; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also Warner et al, ‘Integrating Human Mobility’, above n 346, 5, 31–8; see also Doberstein and Taggell, above n 86, 23–5, 27–9. See also ADB Report, above n 10; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58. 354 McAdam, above n 10, 267–9; see also McAdam, above n 13, 283; see also Jane McAdam, ‘Refusing ‘Refuge’ in the Pacific: (De)constructing Climate-induced Displacement in International Law’ (Research Paper No 27, University of New South Wales, 2010) 1. See also Walter Kalin, ‘Conceptualising Climate-induced Displacement’ in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 81–103. 355 See above n 339 and accompanying text; see also ‘…in slow-onset scenarios, it is likely that movement will happen in several stages rather than spontaneously. First, a general deterioration in conditions, which may be exacerbated rather than directly caused by climate change…’ as cited in Jane McAdam, ‘Review Essay: From Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 579, 583. 356 See above nn 354–5. 357 Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also Nunn and Kumar, above n 35, 1–28.
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Moreover, the probable explanation from empirical studies conducted in the Pacific Island
countries with respect to the trajectory of potential future population movement caused by
slow-onset environmental change reveals that the best places for relocation are other islands
in the Pacific because of the similarities in culture and environment.358 This view is
corroborated by case studies undertaken by Edwards, and Thomas and Benjamin, who point
out that while ‘[i]t is almost impossible to replicate island life anywhere other than on another
small island, the long history of mobility based on clan and kinship networks and solidarity
after disasters’ including the ‘diaspora of Pacific island communities’ could lead climate-
induced movements to neighbouring Pacific Island countries in the coming decades.359 In the
same vein, policy analyst of the Expert Council of German Foundations on integration and
migration, Popp, one of the contributors towards the book on the variety of perspectives of
environmental change on migration, corroborates the views of Edwards, and Thomas and
Benjamin. She adds that ‘pre-existing migration routes and networks and the typically low
levels of resources available to those affected by environmental degradation and natural
disasters combine to favour nearby destinations over distant ones.’360 Likewise, numerous
reports originating from the ADB for the Asia and the Pacific region complement the variety
of perspectives on the trajectory of future movements and highlight that 50 per cent of cross-
border migration comprises people from developing countries moving to other developing
countries and that around 80 per cent of this movement comprises migration to neighbouring
countries.’361
As indicated at the beginning of this section, further arguments uniformly presented in the
literature are discussed next. First, the decades of experience and lessons learned (human (in)
security) from the myriad of cases of community resettlement from various phases (design,
planning, implementation) of development projects may offer a strong basis for managed
inland relocation and potential cross-border relocation where ‘large areas of a country are
deemed unsuitable for habitation’ as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change.362
Second, that ‘well managed migration has the potential to increase resilience of climate
358 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 20. 359 Edwards, above n 35, 77; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 18. 360 Karoline Popp, ‘Regional Policy Perspectives’ in Etienne Piguet and Frank Laczko (eds), People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration (Springer, 2014) vol 2, 229–30. 361 ADB Report, above n 10, 47. 362 Warner et al, above 346, 31–5; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58–62; see also Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23–5.
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vulnerable populations’ (new livelihoods).363 On the other hand, migration may compound the
existing vulnerabilities of relocating communities, which can be illustrated by specific risks
such as ‘economic exploitation, discrimination and abuse’ of marginalised groups (such as
women, the elderly and Indigenous people, for example.) to list a few.364 Each has its
advantages and drawbacks, which is why there is widespread consensus by scholars in the
field of displacement and migration studies that place a number of caveats on the inception of
planned or managed relocation with respect to the implementation and post relocation of
communities, particularly in the destination area or host country. The respect for the rights and
self-determination of the population, including restoration of the living standards (housing,
assets, livelihoods, etc.) of communities of origin through normative measures (safeguards,
guidelines, risk factors, etc.) and legal and policy responses are primarily notable
considerations.365
3.4.6 Determinants of Planned Relocation
Scholarly discourse on planned relocation does not specifically answer the research questions.
However, as cited above, it offers some important insights into a spectrum of issues for
consideration by the host country and communities of origin to implement planned relocation
in response to the accelerating risks exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. Some of
the issues contribute to developing an understanding of readiness, which offers important
insights in answering RQ 1. These insights are addressed in detail in chapters four and five
and used to articulate the criteria for analysing readiness presented in chapter seven. What
follows next is a brief overview of a variety of perspectives that detail the significance of
planned relocation, including well-settled issues stemming from a body of experience on
involuntary relocation and development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR),
commonly cited also as development-forced displacement and resettlement (DFDR). One
purpose of this study is to support the claim that the cross-border relocation on the grounds of
climate change of communities of origin from Kiribati and Tuvalu to the host country Fiji need
363 Marine Franck, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC-Paris COP 21’ (Research Report, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 2015) 7; see also Nurse et al, above n 31, 1643; see also ‘Strategies and actions can be pursued now which will move towards climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development, while at the same time helping to improve livelihoods, social and economic well-being and effective environmental management’ as cited in Pachauri et al, above n 33 , 31. 364 See above n 363 and accompanying text. 365 Franck, above n 363, 7; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 382; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 58–62; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also McAdam, above n 10, 266.
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to be adequately planned, or as the ADB states, the ‘real option to relocate to a more secure
place with livelihood options.’366
With regard to the extensive experience and technical assistance extended by international
development agencies, such as the World Bank and the ADB in the field of DIDR to list a few,
the ADB argues that ‘migration planning as an adaptation strategy should be seen in the
context of the broader, complex dynamics of migration, and that responses should be
considered as part of wider development efforts aimed at sustainably raising living
standards.’367 The ADB claims that ‘both internal and cross-border migration often can
improve livelihoods, reduce poverty, meet labour force needs, bolster economies, and
strengthen links between communities and countries’ if managed properly and accentuated in
the ‘adaptation scheme or migration policy.’368 The ADB further claims that ‘[t]he onus is on
decision makers in central and subnational governments to take action’, which needs to be
complemented by the concerted efforts of a wide range of sectors, organisations, institutions
and agencies.369 Moreover, the ADB reminds us that it is imperative to ensure that
communities of origin are entitled to equality of rights as well as the benefits of the population
of the community in which they will settle, as alluded earlier, to avert potential violence and
conflict over resources among communities post relocation.370 Similarly, in the case of host
communities, the ADB points out that the impacts on the local economy, the environment as
well as the social impacts resulting from the migration are significant factors for
consideration.371 There are relevant determinants that need to be considered.
Commenting on the policy interventions detailed by the ADB, Tacoli argues that ‘[t]here is a
real risk’ of climate-induced migration resulting ‘in inappropriate policies that will do little to
protect the rights’ of climate vulnerable populations.372 She reminds us that ‘policies try to
influence the volume, direction and types of movement rather than accommodate flows and
support migrants’ (duration, destination and composition).373 Similarly, McAdam draws
attention to the special case of communities of origin where the ability to remain in the long
term is threatened, and reminds us that ‘more sustainable options’ that ‘place the needs and
rights of the affected individual in the centre, so that legal and policy responses are human-
366 ADB Report, above n 10, ix. 367 Ibid vii, 46–7. 368 Ibid. 369 Ibid. 370 ADB Report, above n 10, vii, 47–8, 72. 371 Ibid 72. 372 Tacoli, above n 291, 514. 373 Ibid 514; see also Tacoli, ‘Not Only Climate Change’, above n 294, 15–17.
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rights focussed’ are needed.374 These, including migration support and flows outlined by
Tacoli, are pivotal issues that need to be considered.
The joint empirical study conducted by the UNU-EHS and the Nansen Initiative in 2014 that
set out to investigate the linkages between mobility and ‘climate change-related policies and
planning’ reveals that the realistic response to situations in which areas are declared to be
‘permanently uninhabitable because of the effects of climate change and when no other means
of adaptation is available to allow individuals to continue to live in the same location’ is
planned relocation.375 Similarly, the joint study by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Platform on Disaster Displacement
(PDD) in 2018 on the ‘slow onset effects of climate change and human rights protection for
cross-border migrants’ launched at the thirty-seventh session of the Human Rights Council
reported that it is likely that land will become uninhabitable due to other factors before
submergence by sea level rise of SIDS such as Tuvalu.376 Moreover, both the OHCHR and
PDD reported that ‘[t]he possibility and need for planned relocations have been repeatedly
raised for some Pacific Island states as questions about their continued habitability persist in
which significant international movement may become inevitable over time.’377 The OHCHR
and PDD argue that ‘[l]oss of territory and population also poses a threat to governance and
statehood.’378 These are issues that need to be considered.
Other examples relate to the widely acknowledged history of population movements across
international borders and on-island (local) migration of Pacific Island communities in the
scientific and academic literature. This can be illustrated briefly by isolated instances of the
less benevolent resettlement of island communities triggered by non-climatic drivers such as
population redistribution, large-scale mining projects, nuclear testing and military activity for
example.379 In addition, other contributing causes include geophysical hazards such as
374 McAdam, above n 10, 266. 375 Doberstein and Taggell, above n 86, 19; see also Franck, above n 363, 37; see also Warner, Kalin and Martin, above n 348, 43; see also Warner, Dun and Stal, above n 313, 13; see also McAdam, above n 10, 3. 376 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Slow Onset Effects of Climate Change and Human Rights Protection for Cross-border Migrants 37th session, Agenda Items 2 and 3, UN Doc A/HRC/37/CRP.4 (22 March 2018) para 111, 34–5 (‘Human Rights Council 37th session, Mar 2018’); see also McAdam, above n 10, 1. 377 Human Rights Council 37th session, Mar 2018, above n 376, para 116, 36. 378 Ibid para 111, 34–5. 379 Colette Mortreux and Jon Barnett, ‘Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu’ (2009) Global Environmental Change 19 Global Environment Change 105, 105–112; see also Kelly Wyett, ‘Escaping a Rising Tide: Sea Level Rise and Migration in Kiribati’ (2014) 1(1) Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 171, 171–85; see also Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Sea Level and Maritime Zones: Preserving the Maritime Entitlements “Disappearing States’’’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E
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volcanic activity, as well as human-induced migration from environmental degradation—such
as drought and sea level rise to list a few examples—as indicated earlier in the section on
global climate evidence.380 This evidence can be clearly seen in the case of the resettlement of
the Banaban (Kiribati) and Vaitupuan (Tuvalu) communities to Fiji, Gilbertese (Kiribati) to
Ghizo (Solomon Islands), Carterets (Papua New Guinea) to Bougainville (Papua New
Guinea), and the Bikinians and Enewetakese (Marshall Islands) to the United States of
America, for example.381
The resettlement of Pacific Island communities over the past few centuries is exemplified in
the works undertaken by a host of seminal authors such as Connell, Donner, Edwards,
McAdam, Mortreux and Barnett, and Campbell and Warrick for example. According to
Connell, the historical cases of resettlement and migration of communities at the time of
British colonial administration in Pacific Island countries and territories is ‘no longer regarded
as politically feasible’ in contemporary times due to international borders, maritime zones,
sovereignty of states and the seldom clear-cut global response to address human displacement
and migration, such as internally displaced persons, asylum-seekers and refugees.382
Moreover, Connell points out that one of the prominent issues is the access of, and tenure to,
land that was relatively easily designated for resettlement in colonial times in Pacific Island
countries.383 However, Connell also claims that ‘[i]n post-colonial times, land boundaries have
become frozen and land too valuable for most islanders to be willing to enable even displaced
people to lease or purchase it.’384 Moreover, Connell argues that ‘post-colonial governments
have been without financial resources, management capacity, commitment and focus to
develop effective settlement schemes or identify the need for them.’385 These present some
key determinants for consideration.
Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 167, 167–91. See Connell, above n 75, 127–42; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30–2; See also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 2–3, 14–25; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78; see also Donner, above n 35, 191–210; see also Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231-405. 380 See above n 379 and accompanying text. 381 Ibid; see also ‘…researchers have that spiritual beliefs, traditional governance mechanisms, and a short-term approach to planning were barriers to understanding of climate change…few initiatives pay little more than perfunctory attention to the importance of awareness, knowledge, and understanding in climate change adaptation’ as cited in Nurse et al, above n 31, 1640. 382 See above n 379 and accompanying text; see also Connell, above n 75, 129, 138. 383 Connell, above n 75, 135. 384 Ibid 136. 385 Ibid 135; See also ‘Political sovereignty brought increased and disproportionate costs for state functions, including environment protection, infrastructure development, national defence and international representation, otherwise undertaken by colonial authorities’ as cited in John Connell, Islands at Risk? Environments, Economies and Contemporary Change (Edward Elgar, 2013) 19.
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Connell further claims that ‘[m]ost Pacific island governments do not have the will or capacity
to develop, legislate for or administer effective resettlement policies in the face of local
anxieties, tensions and hegemony over land.’386 One possible implication of this (land), as
Connell points out, is that governments may need to consider the compulsory acquisition of
land in the future to respond to climate-vulnerable populations in Pacific Island countries.387
Similarly, Campbell and Warrick, in commenting on land tenure security, point out that land
ownership in Pacific Island countries and territories remains predominantly customary land,
which raises key political issues with respect to rights to land, ‘nationality, and the
responsibility for the costs of moving and resettlement’ of the communities of origin in the
destination area.388 Likewise, many seminal authors, in acknowledging the importance of land
for relocation, hold the view that ‘it offers no solution unless affected communities also have
the right to enter and reside in the other country, enjoy their full range of human rights, and
not be subject to expulsion.’389
Commenting on the availability of land for relocation, Edwards points out that the duration of
time needed to access land affects the physical relocation of affected communities to the
destination area or country.390 Edwards argues that resettlement planning is a lengthy process
that can span years given protracted negotiations that can occur between stakeholders.391 This
view is supported by Ferris, who recounts one of the chief outcomes from the lessons and
experiences of DIDR and claims that in the context of adaptation planning in response to
climate-induced migration that governments must plan relocations ‘at least several years’ prior
to the actual move and that the process of planning needs to be anchored in adaptation funding
mechanisms.392 Moreover, Ferris maintains that little is known about the ‘optimal time for
resettling people in the case of climate change’ and reinforces the importance of not only
planning but funding to avert increased vulnerability of climate vulnerable communities in the
destination area or county.393 These are essential issues that need to be considered.
There is widespread agreement in several published studies and the emerging body of research
which pays particular attention to the significant provision of costs and access to funding for
involuntary resettlement associated with development projects and human mobility from
386 Connell, above n 75, 138–9. 387 Ibid. 388 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 21. 389 McAdam, above n 13, 284. 390 Edwards, above n 35, 65, 75; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 391 Ibid 75. 392 Ferris, above n 12, 34. 393 Ibid.
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sudden- and slow-onset environmental change.394 There are several independent and isolated
tiers (international, regional, national, public, private) from which to mobilise financial
resources for population movements from an array of factors (armed conflict, generalised
violence, disasters, asylum, for example) presented in the literature that lie beyond the scope
of this project.395 However, global efforts by the international development community and
multilateral agencies through the establishment of funding avenues to respond to human
insecurities of affected populations from development projects and climatic events are
notable.396 Some these include adaptation and mitigation funding for developing countries
through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) under the auspices of the UNFCCC, sudden-onset
disaster relief assistance through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and global
humanitarian aid in response to armed conflict and natural disasters through the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Other funding avenues
are available through international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and
organisations, such as the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, ADB, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development for example, towards infrastructure projects
pursuant to policies (Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement), standards (Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability), safeguards (social safeguards) and
guidelines (Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement).397
This list is far from exhaustive, but it is representative of the funding vehicles at a global level.
There has been little attention drawn by the global community to articulate financial resources,
394 Ibid 32–5; see also ADB Report, above n 10, ix, 52, 60–71; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 23–4, 26–7, 29–30; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 767; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 380. 395 Ferris, above n 12, 32; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 30, see also ADB Report, above n 10, 64; 67; IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 5; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 771–9. 396 Ferris, above n 12, 32–5; see also ADB Report, above n 10, ix; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 23–4, 26–7, 29–30. 397 CDKN Report, above n 4, 29–30; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 60–1, 68, 70; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 380; see also The World Bank, Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook: Planning and Implementation in Development Projects (The World Bank, 2004) xviii, xxiii, xxxi, 3–6, 82. See also Lidewij van der Ploeg and Frank Vanclay, ‘A Human Rights Based Approach to Project Induced Displacement and Resettlement’ (2017) 35(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 34, 34–52; see also Eddie Smyth and Frank Vanclay, ‘The Social Framework for Projects: A Conceptual but Practical Model to Assist in Assessing, Planning and Managing the Social Impacts of Projects’ (2007) 35(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 65, 65, 67, 70–2; see also International Finance Corporation, IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability Effective January 1, 2012 <https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications_handbook_pps>. See also United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Financing < https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing>; see also United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian Overview 2018 <https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/globalhumanitarianoverview/>; see also Christian Aid, ‘A Time to Lead: Our Position on the Global Refugee and Migration Summits (September 2016)’ (Working Paper, Christian Aid, July 2016) 18.
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tools and activities for climate-induced internal relocation, including cross-border
relocation.398 This is evident in the case of the Paris Agreement.399 The operative parts of the
Paris Agreement overlook the inclusion of a dedicated section on climate-induced migration
and appropriate funding mechanism to underpin the global phenomenon.400 By contrast, the
appeals of the global community for a loss-and-damage mechanism, which addresses the
‘collateral effects of inadequate or failed mitigation and the limits of adaptation’, advanced
unabated in Article 8 of the Paris Agreement.401
With regard to empirical studies conducted by the ADB in Asia and the Pacific region on
climate change funded projects, the ADB points out that there has been no reliable evidence
of ‘funds being used for migration of any kind’, and ‘where funding for relocation is included,
e.g., in adaptation funds, it is not clear how often its purpose is to accommodate the project
rather than to facilitate.’402 The ADB claims that ‘migration planning as an adaptation strategy
is virtually non-existent in policy design.’403 McAdam and Ferris, in acknowledging and
synthesising the findings of the Nansen Initiative Pacific Report, confirm that the ‘Pacific’s
national disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation policies and planning
instruments shows weak, almost non-existent reference or inclusion of human mobility
challenges in the context of natural disasters and climate change (e.g. displacement, relocation,
evacuation, protection, etc.).’404 The ADB highlights that at a ‘domestic level, governments
need to factor in migration-related spending needs into development plans, poverty reduction
strategies, and National Adaptation Programs of Action.’405 This view is complemented by
Ferris, who adds that ‘[i]f adaptation strategies are to include planned relocations, then funding
needs to be made available to support basic institutional capacity-building and international
guidelines to guide government actions and to support government efforts to plan.’406
However, the ADB maintains that ‘new climate change funds are still under development and
funding for climate-induced migration is, at best, a theoretical possibility.’407 A possible
explanation for this situation described by the ADB might be the less-well established legal
398 CDKN Report, above n 4, 24–30; see also ADB Report, above n 10, ix, 74, 70; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. 399 Paris Agreement, above n 194, art 2(1)(a). 400 Ibid; see also ‘ADB Report’, above n 10, 1. 401 Paris Agreement, above n 194; see also Maxine Burkett, ‘Reading Between the Red Lines: Loss and Damage and the Paris Outcome’ (2016) 6 Climate Law 118, 119. 402 ‘ADB Report’, above n 10, 70. 403 Ibid 47. 404 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 161. 405 ADB Report, above n 10, ix. 406 Ferris, above n 12, 35. 407 ADB Report, above n 10, 70.
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definition and protection arrangements for climate vulnerable populations at a global level,
which are addressed later on in this chapter.408
Likewise, the research report by the CDKN, which synthesis the key findings for SIDS from
the contribution of the IPCC working groups to the AR5, acknowledges that the SIDS do not
possess the resources for relocation, which is likely to continue to impede the ability of States
to obtain the needed finance locally to design, implement and monitor planned projects.409
According to the ADB, ‘money-raising strategy is risky.’410 This is because of the various
layers that may exist. For instance, funding, including its appropriate distribution may
germinate from ‘bilateral and multilateral agencies’ and extend to the next level of assistance
and resources from donor agencies which may not necessarily be readily accessible. This is
because financial assistance and technical support from bilateral and multilateral agencies as
well as donor agencies is tailored for specific projects as part of their short- and long-term
assistance arrangements for example, in emergencies such as natural disasters, and future
focused projects such as climate change adaptation and low-carbon development projects.411
This view is supported by advocates of the global organisation Christian Aid, which in
exploring the financial programs and plight of refugees argues that ‘reality is that donors do
not follow through on pledges made, and financial systems in place at the receiving end are
not functioning well.’412 The CDKN also acknowledges that the SIDS ‘rely heavily on
multilateral finance and technical support to design and deliver major climate compatible
development policies.’413 The CDKN suggests that the provision of technical assistance and
support, which is advanced by various civil society organisations in the SIDS, may potentially
animate the pathway to finance from sources other than the local level.414 In addition, the
CDKN admits that international support is critical.415 The ADB also admits that international
cooperation is pivotal for migration across borders, which can potentially be established and
advanced through ‘[b]ilateral and multilateral agreements’ to constitute a ‘regional network of
law and standards’ in the context of climate-induced migration.416 These are issues that need
to be considered.
408 Ibid 70–1. 409 Ibid 52; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 23–5; see also Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23–5; see also Doberstein and Tadgell, above n 86, 23–5. 410 ADB Report, above n 10, 48, 61. 411 Ibid; see also Takako Morita and Christina Pak, ‘Legal Readiness to Attract Climate Finance: Towards a Low-carbon Asia and Pacific’ (2018) 1 Carbon and Climate Law Review 6, 6–14. 412 Christian Aid, above n 397, 2. 413 CDKN Report, above n 4, 23. 414 Ibid. 415 Ibid 26. 416 ADB Report, above n 10, 72–3.
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Similarly, Ferris, in acknowledging the lessons and experiences of DIDR—including the
stewardship (guidelines, safeguards, etc.) of multilateral financial institutions and agencies to
finance and facilitate the resettlement of communities associated with development projects—
points out that the costs of resettlement are integrated in the overall budgets of such institutions
and agencies for resettlement projects.417 She further points out that ‘relocation of communities
because of the effects of climate change will not generally be carried out in the expectation of
realising increased revenues which can support the resettlement projects; rather the funds
would likely have to come from government budgets.’418 Moreover, Ferris argues that in the
case of Pacific Island nations and low-lying atoll communities with acute economies of scale,
‘it is unlikely that governments will have the necessary resources to plan and implement
resettlement plans that uphold the rights of communities’, and therefore international financing
is imperative.419 Against the stands of evidence in the field of DIDR, Ferris further argues that
several questions remain unanswered and queries whether the “platform” for development
projects in terms of international project development funds, policies, standards and
safeguards, as indicated earlier, can be adopted to access funding and resources to respond to
inland (local) and cross-border planned relocation of communities on grounds of climate
change.420 The issues surrounding relocation costs and access to international finance or
alternative financing avenues are among key determinants that need to be considered in
response to internal and cross-border climate induced relocation.
Another important aspect of resettlement associated with development projects and human
mobility in the field of migration studies is the consideration of the inclusion and participation
of communities of origin and host communities in all phases of the project processes (plans,
programs, implementation, etc.).421 It is well established in the literature that ‘[a] concerted
effort to engage from the outset those vulnerable groups (women, children, people with
disabilities and the destitute, for example) could prove to be an effective strategy to improve
the chances for a successful assessment of how migration, displacement and planned
relocation would best feature in a country’s NAP.’422 Likewise, Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin
point out that the ‘displaced must be seen as active social agents with their own views on rights
417 Ferris, above n 12, 35. 418 Ibid 33, 35. 419 Ibid 35; see also CDKN Report, above n 4, 24. 420 Ferris, above n 12, 35. 421 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 23. 422 Ferris, above n 12, 35; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 52; see also Youssef Nassef, ‘National Adaptation Plans and Building Adaptive Capacity’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 17.
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and entitlements.’423 Yonetani, in acknowledging these considerations points out that ‘[e]ven
when relocation is planned in ways that respect a community’s perspectives and wishes’,
caution must be applied as ‘a lack of adequate policy and governance mechanisms and
prohibitive financial costs may prove significant obstacles when it comes to implementation,
leaving communities trapped in vulnerable situations.’424 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin suggest
that ‘[r]esettlement is a complex social process’ and ‘at its best it should support and nourish
the coping and adaptation processes that enable a population to regain the functionality and
coherence of a viable community.’425 These are some key markers to mediate into all levels of
decision-making in planned relocation that need to be considered.
Taken together, a host of considerations identified from the lessons and experiences of human
mobility in the context of development projects and sudden- and slow-onset events from
environmental change provide important insights to unpack determinants of readiness. The
comprehensive set of considerations espoused by authors such as Kalin, Warner and Ferris,
for example, relate to concerns for ‘sufficient and sustained financing to resettle people in a
way that respects their rights, having sufficient lead time to enable careful participatory
planning processes, to giving particular attention to sensitive issues around land acquisition,
and maintaining the identity and cultural ties’ of communities origin and host communities.426
Alongside the foregoing considerations for planned relocation, it is important to explore the
preliminary question of the responsiveness of both laws and institutions at the international
level to the protection, security, institutional and governance arrangements that address human
mobility on grounds of climate change in contemporary times, which is discussed in the
following section. This is among other areas of focus (adaptive capacity of Pacific Island
nations, and migration as an adaptation option of last resort) as was mentioned earlier in this
chapter.427
423 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 25. 424 Yonetani, above n 274, 4. 425 Oliver-Smith and Sherbinin, above n 348, 25. 426 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 35; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Warner, Kalin and Martin, above n 348, 38–42. 427 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 3, 11, 23, 25; see also McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43–55; see also ‘identity, culture, community and livelihoods are deeply interwoven in the historical and cultural fabric of communities’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, 11, 23, 25 and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 53.
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3.5 Climate Displacement and Migration under International Law
3.5.1 Global Mobility Dynamics
There is widespread agreement in the field of migration studies that climate–driven population
displacement and migration is ‘no longer a matter of migration policy but rather of
environmental policy.’428 This is due to ‘[t]he prospect of migration’ as ‘a powerful adaptation
strategy’, which has culminated in international climate policies, for example, the CAF and
the Doha Decision adopted under the UNFCCC, and the prevalence of multifaceted drivers
(economic, cultural, environmental degradation, for example) surrounding migration
decisions, as discussed earlier.429 However, as Leighton, Shen and Warner argue ‘[t]he
international community has so far been slow to grasp the political reality of environmental
migration.’430 This view is reinforced by Werz and Hoffman who point out that the
‘[c]umulative effects of climate change and associated migration have serious implications for
stability in nations.’431 They suggest that the primary focus of international leaders and
governments should be on the well-being of people affected by the outcomes of climate change
and its consequent migration, insecurity and conflict.’432
3.5.2 Legal Protection Gap
Examining the legal and policy discourse to explore arrangements for climate change-induced
human mobility by the international legal community spans legal scholarship and includes
broader perspectives from the field of scientific, anthropological and sociological published
studies that confirm that the global response in terms of the protection, security, institutional
and governance dimensions is not well established to address population movement on the
428 Francois Gemenne, ‘One Good Reason to Speak of Climate Refugees’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 70, 70–1; see also Demola Okeowo, ‘Examining the Link: Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration’ (2013) 15(4) Environmental Law Review 273, 277. 429 Okeowo, n 428, 274–3; see also McAdam, above n 18, 520; see also Andrew Morton, Philippe Boncour and Frank Laczko, ‘Human Security Policy Challenges’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 5, 5–7; see also Gemenne, above n 428, 70–1; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 767, 771. See also Walter Kalin and Claudine Haenni Dale, ‘Disaster Risk Mitigation-Why Human Rights Matter’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 38, 38–9; see also United Nations University Migration Network, Pacific <https://migration.unu.edu/research/forced-migration/pacific.html#outline>. 430 Leighton, Shen and Warner, above n 325, 13; see also Warner et al, ‘Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration’ (2010) 55(3) Natural Hazards 689, 691–2. 431 Michael Werz and Max Hoffman, ‘Climate Change, Migration, and the Demand for Greater Resources: Challenges and Responses’ (2015) 35(1) SAIS Review of International Affairs 99, 99–100. 432 Ibid.
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grounds of climate change. It is widely acknowledged by scholars such as McAdam, Corendea,
Warner, Nishimura, Kalin, and Koser for example, who confirm that ‘no international
agreement or protection framework exists that explicitly accounts for climate-change induced
migration.’433 The body of knowledge and practice across forced migration and displacement
studies maintains that ‘international law acknowledges only a very small class of forced
migrants as people whom other countries have an obligation to protect (refugee and stateless
persons), and those eligible for complementary protection (non-return to torture)’ compared
with climate-induced displacement and migration.434 Similarly, Cohen and Bradley point out
that climate-vulnerable populations are not recognised as refugees and therefore ‘there is no
normative framework to address their specific needs and vulnerabilities and States have not
been willing to commit to more than temporary protection on an ad hoc basis.’435 Many
scholars and migration practitioners maintain that where international law extends to offer
protection, as discussed above under existing ‘refugee, environmental, and human rights law
regimes’, it fails to ‘account for climate change-induced displacement and migration, creating
legal gaps in protection.’436
In acknowledging the ‘lack of clarity about the status and protection needs’ of climate-
vulnerable populations, Cohen and Bradley argue that the largest gap in protection is that for
populations crossing borders.437 Similarly, McAdam and Ferris acknowledge that ‘planned
relocations by the effects of climate change are expected to occur within an affected country’s
own borders’; however, they argue that ‘international relocations may be necessary in some
regions, such as the Pacific’, which demands consideration of impending legal protection
issues such as social and cultural rights, citizenship and nationhood (to list a few) by the
international legal community.438 Moreover, international climate policies for instance, the
CAF and Doha Decision adopted under the UNFCCC, including the Paris Agreement, which
also stems from the UNFCCC, remain poorly equipped to respond to the legal and protection
arrangements.439
433 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–9. 434 Ibid 107–34; see also McAdam, above n 18, 521; see also Farquhar, above n 24, 32–6; see also Corendea, above n 325, 52; see also ‘International law recognises only a small category of forced migrants as people whom other countries have an obligation to protect: refugees, stateless persons, and those eligible for complementary protection (under international human rights law)’ as cited in Jane McAdam, above n 14, 1520. 435 Roberta Cohen and Megan Bradley, ‘Disasters and Displacement: Gaps in Protection’ (2010) 1 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 95, 95–6. 436 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–9. 437 Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95. 438 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 142–3, 162–3. 439 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1–4; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 114–18; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 691–5; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 276–8, 282–9.
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Against this background, Nishimura’s account of a host of impediments for a unified
international legal and policy protection framework is notable.440 These include:
(a) a lack of political will; (b) the current security discourse surrounding climate change-induced migration; (c) institutional capacity issues; (d) the complicated causes underlying climate change and the desire of global actors to avoid responsibility; and (e) the inability of civil society to organise effectively around climate change-induced displacement.441
In the same vein, Leighton, Shen and Warner, in commenting on these protection gaps, claim
that they ‘present key challenges for governments, particularly for both sending and receiving
countries, where migrants cross borders to protect their lives or seek alternative livelihoods.’442
Against this background, a parallel layer of uncertainty resonates with respect to the
appropriate terminology for human mobility on grounds of climate change.
3.5.3 Gap in Terminology
To date, a uniform terminology to account for vulnerable populations crossing international
borders on the grounds of climate change and in search of protection is lacking in international
fora.443 This is despite multidisciplinary literature spanning legal, economic, development and
sociological studies for example, containing an array of terminologies such as ecological or
climate change refugees, survival migrants, and environmentally-induced migrants to list but
a few.444 Similarly some scholars acknowledge ‘clinical terms such as climate-induced
migrants or mobility in the context of climate change.’445 The term ‘‘environmental refugees’’
is frequently used in the literature and is equated with the broad use of the term ‘‘climate
refugees’’.446 The vast majority of studies on human displacement and migration in the context
of sudden- and slow-onset environmental change include a section to acknowledge the
440 Nishimura, above n 38, 118–25. 441 Ibid; see also Liv Feijen, ‘Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law’ (2012) 28(75) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 61, 63. 442 Leighton, Shen and Warner, above n 325, 12. 443 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34; see also Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1–4; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 691–5; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 273–4, 284–5. 444 Nishimura, above n 38, 110–14; see also Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 1–4; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 689–715; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 273–89. See also Monika Mayrhofer and Margit Ammer, ‘People Moving in the Context of Environmental Change: The Cautious Approach of the European Union’ (2014) 16 European Journal of Migration 389, 399; see also ‘...environment-related migration will primarily occur in the developing world, with migrants moving either internally or to countries in the same region…Many persons displaced inter alia by environmental factors in particular those who cannot return permanently or long-term have similar protection needs as refugees or persons qualifying for complementary forms of protection’ as cited in Mayrhofer and Ammer, 428. 445 Gemenne, above n 428, 70. 446 See above n 444 and accompanying text.
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contribution of seminal authors, including Lester Brown and El-Hinnawi, who introduced the
term environmental refugee.447 Environmental refugees are defined as ‘people who are forced
to leave their places of habitual residence because of human or naturally induced
environmental issues.’448 Similarly, climate refugees is the term used to depict, as McNamara
and Gibson argue, a ‘particular discursive category’, which embodies ‘entire nationalities of
people in the Pacific region, whose future residential stability (island homelands)’ is
disproportionately at risk of the exponential impacts of climate change and projected to be
subject to mass migration in the foreseeable future.449 The lack of a uniform terminology has
implications for these vulnerable populations in areas such as policy responses and protection
of rights, to identify but a few.
Moreover, ‘human movement is theorized as a continuum, with forced migration at one end
and voluntary movement at the other.’450 Legal scholarship recognises that movements on
account of climate change constitute a grey area in that they are ‘neither entirely forced nor
entirely voluntary.’451 Much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between voluntary
and forced movements coalescing around environmental factors.452 Furthermore, ‘temporary
and permanent, internal and across an international border’ movements are strands, or aspects,
of human mobility.453 This creates a difficulty in establishing the essential elements for the
legal definition of movement of people due to environmental and climatic factors.454 The
nearest definition scholarly discourse offers relates to the widely employed term
“environmental migrants”.455
447 Ibid. 448 Okeowo, above n 428, 275. 449 Karen Elizabeth McNamara and Chris Gibson, ‘We do not Want to Leave our Land: Pacific Ambassadors at the United Nations Resist the Category of Climate Refugees’ (2009) 40(3) Geoforum 475, 483, 475–6, 480–2. 450 Bridget Lewis, ‘Neighbourliness and Australia’s Contribution to Regional Migration Strategies for Climate Displacement in the Pacific’ (2015) 15(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Review 86, 89–92; see also McAdam, above n 10, 1–8. 451 International Organization for Migration, IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (International Organization for Migration, 2014) 6, 21–2 (‘IOM 2014 Report’); see also McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; see also Yonetani, above n 39, 13–15; see also Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10. 452 Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34; see also Warner et al, above n 430, 693. 453 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451 and accompanying text. 454 Corendea, above n 325, 52, 110. 455 McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; see also Feijan, above n 441, 62–3; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 110–15; see also Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10; see also Kalin, above n 354, 89–91. See also Warren, above n 325, 2109–117; see also Gregory White, ‘The Securitization of Climate-induced Migration’ in Kavita R Khory (ed), Global Migration-Challenges in the Twenty-first Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 1, 27–30.
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In 2007, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) framed a broad working and
advocacy definition, or as expressed by the IOM, ‘a non-normative definition’ in an attempt
to channel global efforts for human migration policy and practice.456 While no legal definition
exists, IOM defines environmental migrants as:
persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.457
This definition mediates between the continuum of ‘forced and voluntary migration, as it
engages the expressions ‘obliged to leave’ and ‘choose to do so’, respectively.’458 On the one
hand, the introduction of a working definition can be celebrated in legal academic work even
though it is not fully articulated with protection needs and the rights of people or populations
in the context of climate change-induced displacement and migration.459 On the other hand,
considerable uncertainty remains in settling on a precise legal definition for “such” a category
of people as indicated earlier.
Forced migration practitioners, legal scholars and policymakers in existing migration studies
have identified multiple implications arising from the lack of a precise definition. Some of
these relate to the:
1) development of appropriate policy responses for migration flows triggered by
environmental or climatic factors;460
2) ‘difficulty in systematically progressing deliberations about appropriate multilateral legal
and institutional responses;’461
3) governance arrangements under existing agreed climate policy or emerging climate policy
under the UNFCCC;462 and
4) recognition of rights and protection of environmental migrants.463
456 ‘IOM’s working definition is not intended to serve a legal and/or normative purpose or have implications for the granting of rights. Rather, it represents an attempt to capture the complexity of the issue at hand’ as cited IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 22. 457 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 6; see also Warner et al, above n 37, 10; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 14. 458 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451 and accompanying text. 459 Ibid; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34. 460 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10. 461 McAdam, above n 10, 7. 462 Ibid. 463 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 10.
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In the same vein, Gibb and Ford extend the governance implications to include the ‘scale of
governance at all levels (e.g. local, regional or international).’464 Moreover, they include the
‘extent of the
phenomenon, and state and institutional responsibility, as well as on whose agendas are
served.’465 However, they suggest that ‘articulating a clear definition of persons displaced by
climate change would thus appear to be an essential starting point for international
protection.’466
Other scholars in the field of migration and displacement studies are more concerned with
ensuring that the definition is as broad as possible so as to capture the largest number of people
as possible.467 McAdam’s work on existing international protection frameworks cites ‘one-
size-fits-all’ when attempting to frame a legal definition for climate displaced populations.
Legal and non-legal literature recognises that to frame a generic definition would: 1)
‘downplay the cultural and livelihood needs of displaced communities and local knowledge
bases for adaptation; 2) potentially overlook migrants in need for protection and assistance;468
and 3) ‘draw larger or bigger numbers of migrants.’469
Against this background, many scholars have attempted to offer possible explanations with
respect to the debate around the lack of a precise definition. A likely explanation articulated
by McNamara and Gibson is that the ‘category of climate refugees reduces the ability of
national ambassadors representing Pacific small island states at the United Nations to pressure
for change, lessening the onus on multilateral institutions and industrialised nations to curb
greenhouse gas emissions.’470 Another possible explanation is that ‘environmental conditions
do not constitute a basis for international protection’ within international refugee law, which
falls short of constituting ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ within one of the enumerated
grounds of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion as set out in Article 1A under the 1951 Refugee Convention.’471 As McAdam
maintains, making a claim on account of the adverse impacts of climate change under the
refugee protection regime is difficult because the definition of a refugee is limited to a person
464 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 3. 465 Ibid 2. 466 Ibid. 467 Gibb and Ford, above n 272, 3; see also McAdam, above n 10, 7; see also Jane McAdam, above n 18, 520–42. 468 See above n 467 and accompanying text; see also Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 11. 469 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178, 11; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 9. 470 McNamara and Gibson, above n 449, 475, 481–82. 471 Warner et al, above n 430; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 273–5, 284–5; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 114–5.
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who has already engaged in cross-border movement and there is disparity between
‘characterising “climate change” as “persecution”, which entails violations of human rights
that are particularly egregious owing to their inherent nature or cumulative impact.’472
Similarly, Corendea concludes that the ‘notion of the climate refugee is problematic and
controversial, problematic because it has no legal standing under existing international refugee
and asylum law, and controversial because there is little agreement as to what to do about the
problem it presents’ in international policy fora.473
The ineffectiveness of relying on the impacts of climate change, such as the rise of sea level
to establish refugee status, has been exemplified in the most recent ruling by the Supreme
Court of New Zealand in the case of Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of
Business Innovation and Employment. The applicant applied for refugee status pursuant to
section 129 of the Immigration Act 2009 (NZ) on the grounds that: ‘1) his homeland Kiribati,
was facing rising sea levels, increasing coastal damage through erosion, infrastructure losses,
reduced quality and quantity of water resources, damage to agriculture crops, and deterioration
in public health as a result of impacts of climate change’, and ‘2) over time, the rising sea level
and the associated environmental degradation will force the inhabitants to leave their
islands.’474 The New Zealand Immigration and Protection Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dismissed
the applicant’s argument on the grounds that ‘there was no evidence establishing that the
environmental conditions the applicant faced or was likely to face on return to Kiribati would
be so parlous as to jeopardise his life or mean he and his family would be unable to resume
their prior subsistence life with dignity.’475 The Tribunal concluded that the ‘applicant was
unable to show that there was a sufficient risk to his life ‘at the present time’’, which was also
472 McAdam, above n 18, 521–3; see also Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 248 (Dawson J) as cited in McAdam, above n 18, 523; see also Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 1 AC 489, 499–500 (Lord Hope), Minister for Immigration v Haji Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, 48–9 (Gummow J) as cited in Jane McAdam, above n 18, 523. See also: ‘General claims based on climate change do not fit this framework, as decision-makers have explained in a number of cases in Australia and New Zealand in which Pacific Islanders have sought to claim asylum on the basis of climate change impacts on their home countries’ as cited in McAdam, above n 18, 522. See also Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2015] NZSC 107 (20 July 2015) (‘Teitiota’s Case-NZSC’), Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173, Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] NZHC 3125, AD (Tuvalu) [2014] NZIPT 800517-520, AF (Kiribati) [2013] NZIPT 800413, Refugee Appeal No 72314/2000, RSAA (Oct. 2000) (Tuvalu) as cited in McAdam, above n 18, 522. 473 Corendea, above n 325, 110. 474 Teitiota’s Case-NZSC, above n 472; see also Mark Baker-Jones, and Melanie Baker-Jones, ‘Teitiota v the Chief Executive of Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment - A Person Displaced’ (2015) 15(2) Queensland University of Technology Law Review 102, 103–4; see also ‘Immigration Act 2009 (NZ) s 129 (invokes the test for a refugee set out in the Refugee Convention)’ as cited in Teitiota’s Case-NZSC, above n 472, para 5. 475 See above n 474 and accompanying text.
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categorically upheld by the New Zealand courts during each stage of the applicant’s appeal.476
This case clearly illustrates how the adverse impacts of climate change are misplaced within
the refugee narrative, particularly the Refugee Convention grounds for seeking refugee status.
A number of similar Australian and New Zealand cases have been brought by Pacific Islanders
seeking asylum as a result of the adverse impacts of climate change. These have also been
unsuccessful.477 The Convention grounds refute claims based on the grounds of climate change
or environmental degradation.478
According to Corendea, ‘[u]se of the term climate refugee is, in other words, nothing more
than a quasi-definitional description, not legally enforceable under any current international
treaty, convention or instrument.’479 It ‘represents an unrecognised category of migrants that
risks falling through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policy.’480 There is
consensus amongst migration and border agencies such as IOM and the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—and across scientific and legal
literature—that the terms currently used are problematic and misleading.481 The terms
“environmental refugees” or “climate refugees” could potentially ‘undermine the international
legal regime for the protection of refugees’.482 Moreover, ‘it would be difficult to obtain
international agreement on the global stage that climate change impacts, natural disasters or
environmental degradation constitute “persecution” under the refugee instrument.’483
However, some forced migration practitioners and legal scholars depart drastically from this
view and argue that the use of the term environmental or climate change refugees works well
by ‘mixing those displaced by environmental causes with those defined as refugees’ under the
476 Ibid; see also McAdam, above n 18, 525–6; see also McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 15–16; see also Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 2728/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2106 (7 Janurary 2020) 1 (‘Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand’); see also Kate Lyons, Climate refugees can’t be returned home, says land UN human rights ruling (20 January 2020) The Guardian < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/climate-refugees-cant-be-returned-home-says-landmark-un-human-rights-ruling>. 477 See above n 476 and accompanying text. 478 ‘Political opinion, race, nationality, religion or membership of a particular social group’ under the definition of the term “refugee” in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) art. 1(A) (2) (‘Refugee Convention’); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (‘Protocol to the Refugee Convention’). See also Mayrhofer and Ammer, above n 444, 416–18; see also McAdam, above n 18, 522; see also McAdam, above n 10, 3 (para [V]). 479 Corendea, above n 325, 111. 480 Ibid 110. 481 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 22, 28; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 771 (Box 12–4). 482 See above n 481 and accompanying text. 483 IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 23; see also McAdam, above n 10, 3 (para [V]).
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Refugee Convention.484 Gemenne echoes similar sentiments and claims that to dismiss these
terminologies, ‘is in a way, foregoing the idea that climate change is a form of persecution
against the most vulnerable and that climate-induced migration is a very political matter, rather
than an environmental one.’485
Similarly, a broader perspective has been adopted by some scholars who argue that
government-induced environmental degradation is an appropriate terminology on the basis
that it equates to ‘a form of persecution usually by the home government of the person seeking
refugee status or a non-state actor and, furthermore, that such persecution is taking place by
reason of environmental refugees’ membership in a social group.’486 Taken together the
definitional issue remains unresolved in academic research and the international policy fora.
Having considered the compounding layers of complexity and existing gaps in legal and policy
protection arrangements, including the seldom clear-cut definition under law at the
international level to formally situate population movements on grounds of climate change
across international borders, attention is briefly turned to the parallel scholarly debate to
underscore a new international convention exclusively for ‘this new, unrecognised
category.’487
3.5.4 International and Regional Climate Treaty
At one end of the debate over ‘legal protection and climate change policy’, scholars such as
Biermann and Boas, and Hodgkinson and Young, and Docherty and Giannini, coalesce in
arguing for a unified global multilateral climate treaty or convention that acknowledges both
rights and responsibilities for climate-induced population displacement and migration at the
international level.488 For example, this group of scholars proposes a ‘single stand-alone
convention for climate-change-displaced persons (CCDPs)’ to underpin the rights of ‘those
displaced internally and those who cross international borders’, including ‘adopting a
484 Dun and Gemenne, above n 178; Morton, Boncour and Laczko, above n 429, 5; see also Protocol to the Refugee Convention, above n 478. 485 Gemenne, above n 428, 71. 486 Okeowo, above n 428, 284–5. 487 Corendea, above n 325, 110–11; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10. 488 Okeowo, above n 428, 285–6; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10–11; see also David Hodgkinson and Lucy Young, ‘In the Face of Looming Catastrophe: A Convention for Climate-change-Displaced Persons’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 229–36; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 125–6.
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multifaceted, cooperative and international approach to provide assistance for both temporary
and permanent relocation, and protect CCDPs.’489 In addition, alternative proposals include
the: ‘1) adoption of Protocols to the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to serve the interest of people
displaced by environmental impacts’, and ‘2) expansion of current agreements to add a right
to a healthy and safe environment.’490
More recently, two parallel developments have been advanced by prominent scholars and
migration policy experts such as Kaelin, Gemenne, Adamo, Doyle, and Siegel at global policy
fora. The first relates to the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
(Compact for Migration).491 It is marked to be adopted formally as an agreement under the
auspices of the existing ‘non-binding political New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants’ by the UN Member States to the UN General Assembly in December 2018.492 The
Compact for Migration is the ‘first intergovernmental negotiated agreement, to cover all
dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner.’493 A press
statement released by the Platform on Disaster Displacement adviser, Professor Walter Kaelin,
outlined that the Compact for Migration embeds and synthesises principles contained in
existing international regimes and guidance documents spanning the Paris Agreement, Sendai
Framework, 2030 Agenda and the Protection Agenda.494 It aims to ‘address drivers of
migration, build on domestic law and practices and achieve the noble goal of safe, orderly and
regular migration for all, including those crossing borders in the context of climate change and
disasters.’495 The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), in acknowledging that the Compact for Migration ‘aligns with existing
international frameworks on climate change’, notes that much uncertainty still exists about a
‘framework for implementation.’496 The ODI and UNDP argue that the impact on the policy
positions of individual States is as yet unknown.497
489 Hodgkinson and Young, above n 488, 300, 307–9. 490 Okeowo, above n 428, 285–6; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 118. 491 Kaelin, above n 40; see also Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24–9; see also Compact for Migration, above n 40; see also General Assembly of the United Nations, above n 40, 1–2; see also Singh, above n 40. 492 See above n 491 and accompanying text. 493 Ibid. 494 Kaelin, above n 40, 1–9. 495 Ibid. 496 Stapleton et al, above n 40, 27. 497 Ibid; see also Global Policy Initiative Columbia University, Model International Mobility Convention 25 August 2017 <http://globalpolicy.columbia.edu/mobility-convention>.
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The second development relates to the Model International Mobility Convention (MIMC)
which stems from the Columbia Global Policy Initiative (CGPI) under the international
migration project steered by signatories in the ‘fields of migration, human rights, national
security, labour, economic and refugee law’ in 2017.498 The ‘MIMC consists of 213 articles
divided over eight chapters.’499 The provisions spell out the ‘rights held by a wide array of
mobile people, from visitors, students, tourists, migrant workers, investors and residents,
forced migrants, refugees, family members, migrant victims of trafficking and migrants caught
in countries in crises.’500 There is general consensus among scholars such as Doyle, Borgnas,
Banerjee, and Achiume, all of whom argue that while some of the groups of mobile people
have rights under existing laws regimes,501 that the MIMC is unique for three key reasons.
First, it provides a single framework for these groups of people.502 Second, it ‘serves the
ambitious goal of creating a holistic, rights-respecting governance regime for all aspects of
international migration, filling in the gaps in the existing international legal regime and
expanding protections where needed.’503 Third, it ‘makes realising collective and fair
responsibility sharing a core element of international protection by proposing a framework for
allocating shares among State Parties to provide adequate funding and resettlement as well as
establishing a mechanism to ensure accountability.’504 The draft treaty is still in its infancy.
Several questions remain unanswered as it is subject to future engagement by a number of
academics at a global level before it precipitates as global policy and lawmaking under
international law.
Turning to the other end of the debate, scholars such as McAdam, Corendea, Nishimura,
Okeowo, Wyman, Zetter and Koser for example, refute considerations of the alternative
proposals suggested earlier under existing international law.505 Some scholars speculate that a
498 Global Policy Initiative Columbia University, above n 480; see also Michael W Doyle, ‘The Model International Mobility Convention’ (2018) 56(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 219, 221; see also Emma Borgnas, ‘An Overview of the Model Convention’ (2018) 56(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 238, 238-47; see also Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Taking Mobility Seriously in the Model International Mobility Convention (2018) 56(2) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 296, 296–302. 499 See above n 498 and accompanying text. 500 Ibid. 501 Ibid. 502 Ibid. 503 Ibid. 504 Aleinikoff, above n 498, 302. 505 McAdam, above n 355, 2–3; see also McAdam, above n 10, 1–8; 67–70; see also McAdam, above n 18, 520–37; see also Corendea, above n 325, 49–53, 110–11. See also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10–11; see Nishimura, above n 38, 125–9; see also Katrina M Wyman, ‘The National Immigration Policy Option: Limits and Potential’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 337–68. See also Roger Zetter, ‘Legal and Normative Frameworks’ (2008) 31
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treaty is not necessarily the best way to advance the rights of people forced to relocate as a
result of climate change.506 McAdam is concerned ‘whether those displaced would be subject
to individual status determination (similar to refugee status determination), or whether
protection would be granted on the basis of the objective country of origin conditions from
which people flee.’507 Other scholars such as Okeowo and Koser argue that ‘[n]egotiating a
convention is a time consuming process; there is unlikely to be significant consensus around
a convention that cuts to the very heart of state sovereignty; even binding conventions
sometimes have little impact in reality.’508 Okeowo argues further that ‘[t]he economic, social
and political implications of making environmental commitments in the form of treaty
ratification may also be a source of reluctance for states to agree a treaty on climate change
refugees.’509 Similarly, Zetter cautions in replicating established ‘normative and legal
instruments’ because it is difficult to characterise ‘climate-change induced migration as forced
environmental change.’510 Similar points of view by Wyman, who argues that ‘[p]olicymakers
should recognise the potential utility of building on the existing immigration policies of likely
destination countries and think of the option of a new multilateral climate displacement treaty
as a backdrop rather than a top priority.’511 Alongside the argument over the need for a new
convention, scholars maintain that it would likely be ineffective due to either being ‘‘watered
down’’ or not adopted at all by relevant countries. They expressed concern that ‘efforts to
secure a new international convention will detract from more practical efforts to use and
improve on existing channels.’512
One unanticipated proposal by way of a UN Resolution for a ‘binding instrument on the
protection of persons displaced by the impacts of climate change’ including the ‘establishment
of a legal process to ensure human rights protection and security’, was submitted by Prime
Minister Enele Sopoanga of Tuvalu at the seventy-first session at the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 2016, and followed subsequently at the seventy-second session in 2017.513
At both sessions the proposal was less well received.514 Prime Minister Sopoanga, in delivering
his statement, alluded to the ‘uncontrolled mass migration and mass violation of human rights’
Forced Migration Review 62, 62–3; see also Khalid Koser, ‘Gaps in IDP Protection’ (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 17; see also Okeowo, above n 428, 285–86. 506 McAdam, above n 355, 3. 507 Ibid. 508 Okeowo, above n 428, 285; see also Koser, above n 505, 17. 509 Ibid. 510 Zetter, above n 505, 62–3; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 125–9. 511 See also Wyman, above n 505, 338–9. 512 Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10. 513 Sopoanga, above n 22 and accompanying text. 514 Ibid.
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in Europe as a yardstick to propose that ‘preparation must include developing appropriate
international legal tools to cope with the complex and multifaceted challenges posed by
climate change, which cut across a number of different areas of international law’ to ‘formulate
effective international systems to protect the human rights ultimately to save the lives of people
displaced by climate change.’515 The proposal was reiterated at the sidelines of the thirty-
seventh session of the Human Rights Council in 2018 and received little traction.516
In like manner, the deliberation of Pacific small island states at the international policy fora
contrasts with policy initiatives at the regional level by the Pacific island leaders who joined
the regional call which led to the development of a concept proposal for the creation of a
Pacific Climate Treaty in 2016.517 The draft Pacific Climate Change Treaty (“Model Treaty”)
while still in its infancy, has been formulated by a coalition of non-governmental organisations
recognised as the Pacific Islands Climate Action Network (PICAN).518 It is intended to offer
a ‘new source of international law, provide a beacon of inspiration for other states working
together to tackle climate change, and help drive the sustainable development of the Pacific
through enhanced cooperation among Pacific Island states and their development partners.’519
The emergence of a model treaty is a recent prominent regional initiative and consideration
for future empirical and desk-based research detailing the model treaty would be interesting.
Whilst the full text of the model treaty is unavailable, conversational pieces and media reports
make reference to the following thematic areas in the model treaty:
1) ‘phasing out of fossil fuels;’520
2) ensuring ‘universal access to clean energy by 2030’, which will be facilitated by a ‘Pacific
framework for renewable energy’ in line with the ‘Sustainable Development Framework
Agenda 2030;’521
3) ‘establishing a fund to provide compensation for communities that have suffered climate-
change-related losses;’522 and
4) ‘climate–related migration and adaptation.’523
515 Ibid; see also Human Rights Council 37th session, Mar 2018, above n 376, para 117, 36. 516 See above n 515 and accompanying text. 517 Slezak, above n 41; see also McNamara and Gibson, above n 449, 475-83. 518 PIDF 4 2016, above n 42 and accompanying text. 519 See above n 518. 520 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 521 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 522 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 523 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43.
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These offer insights into appropriate responses to support climate-induced on-island relocation
and may potentially lead to relocation across international borders.524Although the draft model
treaty is inconclusive at present, it is relevant in analysing the readiness of the Fijian
Government for climate-induced cross-border migration, which needs to be considered.
Assuming that the Pacific climate change treaty is ratified by Pacific Island nations, first
impressions are that it will demonstrate the solidarity of Pacific Island leaders with respect to
the political will, leadership and cooperation at regional policy fora on the issue of climate
change displacement and migration in the Pacific.525 However, it can also be argued that the
move towards a climate treaty by regional leaders is premature, because it raises concerns as
to the extent and influence of international law in its formulation. These concerns include the
kind of regional leadership it is providing to the international community in light of global
climate action efforts underway by the international community under the Paris Agreement.
Other practical and operational issues may also arise during the implementation and
enforcement phases of the treaty at national levels. Nevertheless, Nishimura points out that
while a ‘focus on regional solutions will not solve all the underlying issues that allow legal
gaps to persist, these changes will provide a necessary starting point to advance protection
efforts for climate change migrants.’526
The host of markers required to reach consensus and develop a new international climate
convention at the international stage is lacking as identified by the scholarly debate above.
According to McAdam, ‘there is little political appetite for a new international agreement.’527
If the debate is to be advanced, a better understanding of ‘all forms of movement due to
environmental factors or climate change’ needs to be conclusively established.528 Okeowo
suggests that ‘it might be academically sound to establish, based on empirical findings, how
climate change affects people’s decision to move.’529 Commenting on empirical studies,
Gemenne and Blocher also suggest that ‘[m]ore empirical evidence at micro- and macro-levels
is needed to fill the gaps in current knowledge in order to develop’ uniform policy approaches
for climate affected populations across regions.530 The overall consensus in legal academic
524 Slezak, above n 41; see also Tauafiafi, above n 43. 525 See above Slezak, above nn 520-4; see also Tauafiafi, above nn 520-4; see also Margaretha Wewerinke, ‘Thinking Globablly, Acting Regionally: The Case for a Pacific Climate Treaty’ (Research Report, Pacific Islands Climate Action Network and Pacific Island Development Forum, 23 June 2016) 1–22. 526 Nishimura, above n 38, 134. 527 McAdam, above n 18, 532. 528 Feijen, above n 441. 529 Okeowo, above n 428, 274. 530 Gemenne and Blocher, above n 266, 344.
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research and the impetus for a new international convention at international policy fora by
global leaders for climate-induced human mobility across-borders under existing international
law is yet to be resolved.531
3.5.5 Soft Law Mechanisms
Having considered the legal and policy arrangements for climate-vulnerable populations,
which are fraught with normative, definitional and protection caveats under international law,
attention is turned to the scholarly discourse that draws on soft law approaches, also cited as
‘international soft law mechanisms’ or ‘soft law initiatives.’532 These embody established
‘protection norms, general principles and operational guidelines’, such as ‘duty to cooperate’,
‘duty of the affected State to seek external assistance’, ‘principles of humanity’, and ‘principles
relating to protection from displacement’ from an array of voluntary, non-binding global
initiatives, instruments and agreements.533 These agreements include the 2030 Agenda, UN
Guiding Principles, Platform on Disaster Displacement, Peninsula Principles on Climate
Displacement, Sendai Framework and Protection Agenda, among others, which traverse the
‘current body of international law’ and protection regimes (refugee, asylum, environmental,
humanitarian and human rights).534 The soft law mechanisms stem from within the UN system
(UN Guiding Principles) or ‘through state-led processes’ (Protection Agenda) or ‘by legal
experts (non-state actors).’535
In their examination of the ‘alternative ways that legal and normative frameworks can be used
to uphold the rights of those displaced internally or across borders in the context of
anthropogenic climate change’, Ferris and Bergmann reiterate that the ‘present hard law
531 Hugo, above n 271, 31. 532 Elizabeth Ferris and Jonas Bergmann, ‘Soft Law, Migration and Climate Change Governance’ (2017) 8(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 6, 14; see also IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 251, 14, 18–19, 57; see also Nishimura, above n 38, 107–34; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95–142; see also McAdam, above n 18, 531–4. 533 Alexander Betts, ‘Governance Questions for the International Community’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 72, 72–6; see also Prabal Barua, et al. ‘Ensuring the Rights of Climate-displaced People in Bangladesh’ (2017) 54 Forced Migration Review 88, 88–91; see Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24–9. See also Nishimura, above n 38, 109; see also Corendea, above n 325, 109–13; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95–142. See also McAdam, above n 18, 530–4; see Okeowo, above n 428, 273–89; see also Farquhar, above n 25, 30; see also Feijen, above n 441, 61, 62. See also Zetter, above n 505, 63; see also UN Guiding Principles, above n 39; see also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (2016) art. 4–7, 11 [‘ILC Draft Articles’] <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/6_3_2016.pdf>. 534 See above n 533 and accompanying text. 535 Zetter, above n 505, 62; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 14; see also Koser, above n 505, 17; see also Kalin, above n 178, 5.
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system governing movement of people is poorly equipped to handle complexities of
population movements in the context of climate change.’536 They claim that much uncertainty
still exists as to whether any significant shift or transformation will occur in international law
fora and policy on climate change and human mobility in the coming decades.537 Ferris and
Bergmann also argue that the focus should be on developing soft law mechanisms rather than
attempting to merge climate change-vulnerable populations and ‘existing legal
frameworks.’538 They acknowledge that the ‘real impact of both hard and soft law remains a
function of rigorous follow-up processes, including targeted advocacy, as well as technical,
financial and implementation support to enable the recommended extend and quality of
actions.’539 Similarly, Popp argues that to ‘analyse environmental migration exclusively
within the logic of migration policy’ requires caution.540 This is because ‘it tends to be
embedded in broader discussions, principally in the fields of migration, climate/environment,
security and human rights.’541 Popp confirms that policy on environmental migration as a result
of climate change ‘has begun to permeate international policy agenda, mainly through
exhortatory statements of intent and soft policy tools.’542
Before proceeding to illustrate some of the soft law mechanisms, attention is briefly drawn to
some of their advantages and disadvantages. For example, soft law mechanisms are ‘[n]on-
binding agreements, easier to negotiate because they are less binding on states and less
threatening to state sovereignty.’543 Moreover, ‘soft law processes can yield relatively rapid
results as they bypass lengthy and politically contentious domestic ratification.’544 Despite
their efficacy, soft law mechanisms suffer from serious weaknesses, for example, their non-
binding nature makes them legally unenforceable.545 Moreover, their compliance mechanisms,
including ‘monitoring, assessing and reporting obligations and responsibilities of States’,
intrinsic in treaties under international hard law, are seldom clear cut in soft law
mechanisms.546 Illustrations of some of the soft law mechanisms are discussed next.
The UN Guiding Principles provide States with the impetus to introduce measures to ensure
adequate protection to displaced populations, and address situations leading to internal
536 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 6–7, 14. 537 Ibid; see also Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24. 538 See above n 537 and accompanying text. 539 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 28. 540 Popp, above n 360, 230–1. 541 Ibid. 542 Ibid. 543 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 12–13. 544 Ibid. 545 Ibid. 546 Ibid.
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displacement in the event of disasters, generalised violence and armed conflict.547 Moreover,
they underpin ‘normative grounding for the development of guidelines for operational
agencies’, for example, the Operational Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations
of Natural Disasters.548 Commenting on the usefulness of guidelines, Yamamoto and Esteban
argue that the ‘merit of using a Guideline for climate change displacement would be that States
would choose when and in what conditions they might turn such guidelines into hard law in
their domestic legislation.’549 The African Union (AU) Convention for the Protection and
Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) commonly cited in the literature as the
Kampala Convention presents a unique example how soft law mechanisms can be turned into
hard law in regional policy fora in Africa.550 It is the ‘first legally binding mechanism on
internal displacement’ under the auspices of the UN Guiding Principles.551 However, scholars
and migration practitioners note that there are certain drawbacks associated with the Kampala
Convention. Some of these relate to the exclusion of legal protections for people affected by
cross-border displacement as a result of both disaster and climate change, as well as the
‘institutions charged with the ‘implementation of the convention.’552 The ‘lack of capacity,
failure to make the issue a political and economic priority, and unclear budget allocations at
the national level’ are noted as some of the key barriers to effectively implement provisions of
the convention.553
Another example relates to the empirical findings entrenched in the Agenda for the Protection
of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection
Agenda), which stems from the inter-governmental and regional consultations conducted by
the Nansen Initiative, a state-led process between 2012 and 2015.554 The Protection Agenda
underpins the Platform on Disaster Displacement and was adopted in 2016.555 Briefly, the term
“protection”, which appears throughout the operative text of the Protection Agenda refers to
‘any positive action undertaken by States on behalf of disaster displaced persons or persons at
547 McAdam, above n 18, 530–4; see also IDMC GRID 2016 Report, above n 222, 34, 40, 48–9, 60, 82, 84. 548 Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 16. 549 Lilian Yamamoto and Miguel Esteban, Atoll Island States and International Law: Climate Change Displacement and Sovereignty (Springer, 2014) 253. 550 Black et al, above n 259, 152–5; see also IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 236, 14, 18–19, 57; see also Tamara Wood, ‘Developing Temporary Protection in Africa’ 49 (2015) Forced Migration Review 23, 23–4. 551 See above n 533 and accompanying text; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 515, 14–16. 552 See above n 534 and accompanying text. 553 Black et al, above n 274, 152–5; see also IDMC GRID 2018 Report, above n 251, 19; see also Wood, above n 550, 23–5. 554 Brende and Burkhalter, above n 224, 4; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 6–7, 18–20; see also Kalin, above n 178, 5. 555 McAdam, above n 14, 1518–46; see also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 19.
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risk of being displaced.’556 McAdam argues that the Protection Agenda ‘marks a tentative “first
step” towards international policymaking’ in the cross-border displacement and rights-based
field of studies.557 With regard to the Platform on Disaster Displacement, McAdam further
argues that ‘like the Nansen Initiative, the Platform will also play a lead role in coordinating,
contemplating and/or feeding into existing activities and processes, rather than reinventing the
wheel, since no single institution or body can harness the resources or expertise to provide
authoritative guidance across the vast majority of policy areas involved.’558 These soft law
mechanisms are among others, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on Protection
for Internally Displaced Persons and the Protection of persons in the Event of Disasters of the
International Law Commission, to list a few.559
Alongside the soft law mechanisms, the emerging tailored regional efforts by leaders of Pacific
small Island states is notable with the formulation of the Framework for Resilient
Development in the Pacific 2017-2030 (FRDP), which was endorsed by Pacific Island Forum
Leaders at its forty-seventh session (PIF 47) in September 2016 at Pohnpei, the Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM).560 The FRDP is the:
world’s first integrated regional framework to: 1) ensure that climate change and disasters are understood as a development challenge with priority actions to address vulnerability to climate change and disasters, and to 2) build resilience across all development sectors (such as health, education, water and sanitation, social assistance, energy, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, tourism, mining, culture, environment, transport and infrastructure).561
556 The Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change Final Draft (6 October 2015) para 1, II–III (‘Protection Agenda-Final Draft’). 557 McAdam, above n 18, 534. 558 McAdam, above n 14, 1518–46, 1532–4. 559 McAdam, above n 18, 529–34; see also Feijen, above n 441, 63–4; see also UN Guiding Principles, above n 39; see also IOM 2014 Report, above n 451, 27–9; see also Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper, Protection of Internally Displaced Persons: Inter-Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper (Policy Paper, December 1999) [‘IASC’] <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy files/FINALIDPPolicy.pdf>. See also: Text of the draft articles on the protection of persons in the event of disasters Articles 1 - 18 para E in the Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-eighth session (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016)’ as cited in International Law Commission (ILC), 68th session, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/71/10, (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/reports/2016/english/a_71_10.pdf>; see also International Law Commission (ILC), 68th session, UN Doc A/C.4/679/Add.1 (31 March 2016) <http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/679/Add.1>. 560 2016 PIFS 47, above n 44; see also ‘The FRDP was developed in response to recommendations from the Pacific Platform for Disaster Risk Management and Pacific Climate Change Roundtable in 2011 and endorsed by the Pacific Island Forum Leaders in 2012’ as cited in Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, New Framework, above n 44. 561 See above n 560 and accompanying text.
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The FRDP implementation aligns with global frameworks, which include the ‘Agenda 2030,
Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework, and the Small Islands Developing States Accelerated
Modalities of Action (S.A.M.O.A).’562 The FRDP establishes a body identified as the Pacific
Resilience Partnership to oversee the delivery of development initiatives set in the FRDP.563
One of the key features of the FRDP is that it entrenches human rights principles from a wide
range of international human rights instruments to accomplish its goals.564 It enables
vulnerable groups to access humanitarian and development assistance from a human rights
perspective.565 It also extends protection to the ‘communities most vulnerable to climate
change displacement and migration and post-disaster displacement.’566 The FRDP is a further
display of regional leadership and the political will of Pacific Island leaders to engage with
international human rights and humanitarian law—as articulated in international soft law
protection norms and principles to address human mobility.
With respect to the gap in legal protections, Nishimura points out that ‘[t]o date, there is no
binding human rights agreements that address climate change migrants or that contemplate
expansion for their inclusion.’567 Nishimura reminds us that the uncertainty surrounding the
protection gap, including the ‘lack of institutional mechanisms to ensure the enjoyment of a
number of human rights, including the right to life, health, housing food, water, and adequate
standard of living’ of climate vulnerable populations will remain underdeveloped ‘until the
‘international community is willing to consistently enforce human rights for migrants, or
provide clarity as to what constitutes a legal violation in the climate change context.’568
There is widespread agreement among a number of academics, migration and humanitarian
intergovernmental agencies and institutions of the need to campaign for and advance a ‘human
rights-based approach within a broad human rights framework’ to address gaps in protection
for both internal displacement and displacement across international borders triggered by
sudden-onset and slow-onset environmental change.569 Specifically, ‘addressing all forms of
562 Ibid; see also Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Programme, New Framework, above n 44; see also FRDP 2017-2030, above n 40, 10, 17, 33. 563 FRDP 2017-2030, above n 40, 33. 564 Ibid 22–3 (goal 1), 30–1 (goal 3). 565 Ibid 23. 566 Ibid 16, 22–4 (goal 1), 30–1 (goal 3), 36. 567 Nishimura, above n 38, 117. 568 Ibid. 569 Maria J Fernandez, ‘Refugees, Climate Change and International Law’ (2015) 49 Forced Migration Review 42, 42; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 4, 54–5; see also Mayrhofer and Ammer, above n 444, 390; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95, 102; see also International Law Commission Sixtieth Session, Protection of persons in the event of disasters (Agenda item 8: Document A/Cn.4/598, 5 May 1998) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/60/> and <http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_598.pdf&lang=ESX>.
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migration that are influenced by environmental change, including displacement as a rights-
based challenge’, particularly at the operational and practical levels, ‘inevitably demands that
affected populations are fully involved in developing response strategies, and that advocacy
tools and processes are enhanced to promote their rights.’570 Moreover, there is scholarly
appreciation for ‘a more accessible entry point to establish solutions that focus on rights, needs,
and the harm faced’ by affected populations on the grounds of climate change to effectively
ensure ‘partnership and engagement’ on the global stage in response to human mobility
arrangements and challenges in the coming decades.571 There is abundant room for further
progress to take a “protection” stance with non-binding legal soft law mechanisms under
international law to escalate protection arrangements potentially legal protection for climate
vulnerable populations.
3.6 Conclusion
Climate change poses a minefield of unanswered questions in both global policy fora and
international law. This chapter documents the scientific evidence, and the growing evidence
of climate-induced displacement and migration, particularly for the future habitation and
livelihoods of Pacific Island nations, leading to migration to potential destination countries in
the near future. This demonstrates the merit of this thesis, which seeks to assess the readiness
of Fiji for the cross-border migration of Pacific Island communities in the future as an
adaptation strategy of last resort.
This chapter also documents the widely acknowledged scholarly debate around advancing and
pursuing planned relocation as a strand of human mobility when adaptive strategies, coping
capacities and resilience to sudden- and slow-onset environmental change is no longer
avoidable, particularly in the case of Pacific Island communities. It shows that the historical
migration of Pacific Island communities and the existing experiences and lessons of
resettlement of communities from development projects account for a host of considerations
(for example, land tenure security, finance and sovereignty), which are discussed briefly in
this chapter. This provides a platform to extend the discussion to identify further issues that
570 Zetter, above n 505, 63; see also also Ferris and Bergmann, above n 532, 28; see also Black et al, above n 274, 155. 571 Nishimura, above n 38, 129; see also Stapleton et al, above n 40, 24–9; see also ‘…attention to some of the ongoing challenges relating to legal scope/protection gaps and current commitments, as well as identifying entry points across agendas for partnership and engagement’ as cited in Stapleton et al, 24.
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need to be considered in the relocation of communities on the grounds of climate change as
well as what it means to be ready for cross-border migration.
Finally, this chapter documents that there are no established legal, institutional and governance
arrangements under international law to address human mobility within countries and across
international borders. The absence of a resolute global response and protection framework for
“this category” has reinvigorated the global policy and legal fora to engage with, and embrace,
a human rights-based approach embedded in soft law mechanisms. This chapter demonstrates
a shift in the debate surrounding this category of people and that this incisive proposal as an
alternative needs to gain sufficient momentum and priority in contemporary global human
mobility agenda and policy deliberations. The next chapter examines case studies of Pacific
Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of mobility within and across sovereign borders
during the last century to inform the determinants of readiness as building blocks to articulate
the criteria for analysing readiness for climate change-induced human mobility presented in
chapter seven.
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Chapter 4: Historical Resettlement in the Pacific Islands Region
4.1 Introduction
This chapter draws on historical case studies conducted by seminal authors such as McAdam,
Campbell, Connell and Edwards on the mobility of Pacific Islanders primarily during the
period of British colonial government administration of territories in the Pacific Islands
region.572 This chapter seeks to examine Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of
mobility within and across sovereign borders in the past century, which corresponds with RQ
1 (a). RQ 1 (a) asks: What can we learn from the historical experiences of human mobility
across the Pacific Islands regions? The experiences and lessons learned from the historical
resettlement of Pacific Islanders examined in this chapter, in conjunction with chapter five,
which draws on readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives and the empirical evidence
recorded in chapter six, contribute to articulating the criteria for analysing readiness presented
in chapter seven.
There are many historical case studies of the mobility of Pacific Islanders from large-scale
development projects and non-climatic factors, such as famine and sudden-onset hazards.573
They demonstrate that the mobility of Pacific Islanders in the region is not uncommon. These
issues involved for example, restoration of livelihoods, access to local services, food security
and citizenship, and are relevant to the contemporary relocation of Pacific Islanders within
borders and across international borders.574 Moreover, the experiences and lessons
documented in the case studies offer insights to inform the criteria needed for the successful
future mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change.
This chapter examines four case studies. It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the
manifold historical case studies documenting resettlement of Pacific Islanders in the Pacific
Islands region.575 This chapter documents the resettlement of the Banabans to Rabi, the
572 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78. 573 Connell, above n 75, 128–35. 574 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also McAdam, above n 13, 284, 333; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 151, 165–6. 575 ‘A series of…resettlements has occurred where islanders have been moved away from land or less forcibly acquired for military and other purposes…migration from islands such as Bikini…to make way for nuclear testing-and from different islands in Kwajalein atoll (Marshall Islands) for a US
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Vaitupuans to Kioa, the Gilbertese to Ghizo and the Carteret Islanders to Bougainville
respectively.576 First, the two case studies of the Banabans and Vaitupuans have direct
relevance to determining existing arrangements extended by the Fijian government which
might be transferable for the future relocation of Pacific Islanders from Kiribati and Tuvalu to
Fiji. Second, the three case studies of the Banabans, the Vaitupuans and the Gilbertese
occurred across sovereign borders which offers insights into the host of issues national
governments might need to consider facilitating future cross-border migration of Pacific
islanders. Third, the resettlement of the Pacific Islanders in these three case studies offers an
overview of the recent history of mobility marshalled by the British colonial administration.577
Fourth, the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders is concerned with mobility within sovereign
borders which might assist in our understanding of the host considerations when planning for
resettlement for the local host communities.
The case study of the resettlement of the Banabans to Rabi reveals the need for the
inclusiveness and participation of whole populations in relocation decisions.578 This case study
details the involuntary resettlement of the Banabans as a result of large-scale phosphate mining
on Ocean Island.579 The resettlement of the Vaitupuans to Kioa documented in the second case
study shows that resettlement occurred voluntarily and demonstrates the provision of agency
to communities in making decisions about their future livelihoods.580 The third case study,
documenting the resettlement of the Gilbertese to Ghizo, reveals the need to identify suitable
and available land as a basis for sustained food security and acquisition of land, and land
missile range….short distance migrations…in Bougainville (PNG) and at Gold Ridge (Solomon Islands)…from large-scale mining...’ as cited in Connell, above n 75, 131; see also J R McNeill, ‘Of Rats and Men: A Synoptic Environmental History of the Island Pacific’ (1994) 5(2) Journal of World History 299, 299–349; See also McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43–55; see also The researcher acknowledges the work of historian McNeill, who traces the arrival of Pacific Islanders before the pre-European contact (1769) to the oceanic islands approximately ‘3,500 years ago’ who endured ‘robust challenges during the long age of island settlement with shrinking low islands, drowning reefs, and impoverished landscapes’ which suggests ‘a long history of human occupancy and resilience to changing socioeconomic and environmental conditions’ by Pacific Islanders as cited in McNeill, 303, 310, 312; and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 43. See also ‘…land insecurity affected by extreme sea-levels and storminess and also by increasing population and changing pattern of land use has caused human settlement to expand into low-lying areas’ as cited in McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, 53. See also The researcher has considered the historical case studies during the period of the British colonial administration as instructive (as opposed to pre-European contact) in uncovering the experiences and lessons of Pacific Islanders to inform the determinants for climate migration readiness. 576 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42; see also Edwards, above n 35, 60, 62. 577 See above n 572 and accompanying text. 578 Ibid. 579 Ibid. 580 See above nn 577–9.
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rights.581 The final case study documents the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders in the 1990s
to avoid the debilitating effects of slow-onset environmental change ‘across cultural
boundaries’ of Papua New Guinea.582 This resettlement occurred under the ‘provincial
government resettlement scheme’, which was short-lived and succeeded by the ‘Tulele Peisa
(Sailing the waves on our own)’, an autonomous Bougainville Government resettlement
scheme marked to conclude by 2020.583 The resettlement reveals the need for concerted
support and prioritisation by the government of the day to ensure that the planning and
designing of resettlement schemes is future focused. Adequate ‘financial resources to secure
land’ and restore the livelihood of communities from the impacts of slow-onset environmental
change are required.584 The four case studies highlight several important areas, such as socio-
economic and legal dimensions, and cultural characteristics for example, that assist in our
understanding of what it means for national governments to be ready for large-scale human-
mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders.585
Before examining the case studies, this chapter presents a brief overview of the arrangements
in place for resettlement of Pacific Islanders during the colonial administration and details the
reasons why these arrangements are less likely to be relevant in contemporary times. This
chapter also outlines issues from the body of research on the Pacific historical mobility of
islanders. The arrangements made by the colonial administration offer a basis upon which to
inform relocation of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders.
Colonial Administration Arrangements
The purpose of detailing the arrangements for the resettlement of Pacific Islanders during the
period of British colonial administration is to show existing and amenable arrangements
between British colonies in the Pacific region. The geography, ‘smallness, isolation,
fragmentation and barrenness of island’ nations situated in the South Pacific region offers a
probable explanation ‘for the political appropriation of the space (islands as experimental
space) political point-scoring’ by the colonial authorities to capitalise on ‘an already
581 Donner, above n 35, 191–201. 582 McAdam, above n 87, 317–18; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–8; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42. 583 John Connell, ‘Last Days in the Carteret Islands? Climate Change, Livelihoods and Migration on Coral Atolls’ (2016) 57(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 3-15, 10; see also Edwards, above n 35, 64–7. 584 See above n 583 and accompanying text. 585 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also McAdam, above n 13, 284, 333; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66.
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marginalised population.’586 Another possible explanation for the encroachment of the colonial
administration as detailed by Farbotko might be related to ‘the islands as intrinsically poor in
natural resources, offering few opportunities for development and economic self-sufficiency
for their inhabitants ever to be able to rise above their present condition of dependence on
wealthy nations.’587 Some of the areas of concern emerging of the ‘vulnerability in the Pacific’
as described by Farbotko and Lazrus relate specifically to ‘greater openness to islander
emotions, Pacific economic, social, and cultural values…human rights and global
citizenship…Pacific people’s indigenous knowledge and understanding of the their
movements’ and spaces ‘(structural, economic, and political environments).’588 The colonial
authority’s governance arrangements in the past suggests a weak link in contemporary times
to respond to future mobility of Pacific Islands across borders in the context of climate change.
The arrangements may no longer be meritorious for relocation schemes between national
governments. It can therefore be assumed that ‘small island states continuing position remains
marginal to international political and economic interests.’589 However, Pacific Island
governments have the agency to respond to and scale up efforts on issues such as future
relocation affecting Island nations in contemporary times. This suggests that relocation
schemes will need to embody an array of issues, such as land and costs for relocation,
compensation to relocating communities, and economic opportunities for relocating
communities, among others, in the planning and design stages before implementation for
relocation of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders takes place between national
governments.590 The arrangements and issues assist in uncovering determinants for readiness
in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.
As noted by Campbell, flexible arrangements, such as waiving the requirement for passports,
recognition of residency and citizenship and granting visas to Pacific Islanders, were non-
existent. 591 Moreover, colonial administrators retained autonomy and agency over ‘decisions
about land and community locations’, including ‘moving people across international
boundaries provided the territories were colonized by the same metropolitan power.’592 There
is widespread consensus among seminal authors of human mobility studies in the Pacific that
586 Carol Farbotko, ‘Wishful sinking: Disappearing islands, climate refugees and cosmopolitan experimentation’ (2010) 51(1) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 47, 51; See also Farbotko and Lazrus, above n 72, 384–6. 587 Farbotko, ‘Wishful sinking’ above n 586, 51. 588 Farbotko and Lazrus, above n 72, 388. 589 Ibid 387. 590 See above n 585 and accompanying text. See also Farbotko, ‘Wishful sinking’ above n 586, 47-60; see also Farbotko and Lazrus, above n 72, 382–390. 591 Campbell, above n 75, 77. 592 Ibid.
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the colonial arrangements may no longer be valid or appropriate under post-colonial
governments of sovereign states of the Pacific Island regions.593 For example, Campbell points
out that ‘[i]t is highly unlikely that it would be possible to transplant a community from one
cultural and environmental setting to another in the contemporary Pacific.’594 This is because
relocation demands ‘drastic changes in lifestyle, economy, politics, legal systems and cultural
norms.’595 Connell argues that ‘[i]n post-colonial times land boundaries have become frozen
and land too valuable for most islanders to be willing to enable even displaced people to lease
or purchase it.’596 Connell further argues that far too little attention has been directed by Pacific
Island governments ‘to commit and develop effective settlement schemes or identify the need
for them’ primarily because ‘governments have been without financial resources and
management capacity.’597 Together, this suggests that a strong link may need to be established
between governments of sending and receiving countries with well-coordinated and proactive
arrangements at the heart of future relocation of Pacific Island communities.
Issues for Relocation
The issues arising from the historical mobility of Pacific Islanders have received considerable
attention by seminal authors and provide insights into future relocations of Pacific Island
communities. Future relocations bring to the fore issues such as:
1) land issues spanning ‘the availability and quality of land; early identification of land,
including suitable land sites; appropriate land acquisition; and the recognition of
customary land tenure systems;’598
2) ‘financial commitments to ensure sustained and sufficient financing’ in all phases of
relocation; and logistical costs such as the ‘organisation of transport, transfer of property
and assets’ of relocatees to the destination country;599
593 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326; see also Campbell, above n 75, 59, 77–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 135–8; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78. 594 Campbell, above n 75, 77. 595 Ibid 78. 596 Connell, above n 75, 136. 597 Ibid 135. 598 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 93, 124; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89, 97; see also Connell, above n 75, 127; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27. 599 McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35.
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3) ‘re-establishing sustainable livelihoods’ to include the ‘provision of necessary
infrastructure, housing, assets and access to public services;’600
4) ‘preserving and maintaining cohesion of communities of origin through linguistic, cultural
and spiritual identity and traditional values;’601
5) articulating mechanisms to address tensions and conflicts emerging between communities
of origin and local host communities over land and unequal access to resources and
services;’602
6) ‘political commitment and management capacity’ of Pacific Island governments of host
and sending countries to ‘negotiate, develop, legislate for and administer effective
resettlement policies in the face of local anxieties, tensions and hegemony over land;’603
and
7) engaging local communities of origin and the local host communities in meaningful and
participatory relocation decision-making processes that are ‘gender-sensitive, equitable
and transparent.’604
These issues are central to our understanding of the determinants of readiness in the context
of climate change-induced human mobility. Attention is now drawn to the case studies. The
case studies demonstrate the host issues and provide more definitive evidence of the
experiences and issues of Pacific Islanders’ resettlement in the past to inform future relocations
of Pacific Island communities.
4.2 Case Studies of the Banabans, Vaitupuans, Gilbertese and the Carteret Islanders
Rabi Island
The resettlement of the Banaban community on ‘Banaba (also known as Ocean Island) and
present-day Kiribati to the island of Rabi in north-eastern Fiji’ occurred between 1945 and
600 McAdam, above n 87, 327; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141, 152; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 601 McAdam, above n 87, 310, 320, 326–7; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Franck, above n 348, 37; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 20. 602 McAdam, above n 87, 327; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19–20; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 363, 107. 603 McAdam, above n 66, 305, 327; see also McAdam, above n 576, 130; see also McAdam, above n 338, 4; see also Connell, above n 66, 135, 138; see also Ferris, above n 12, 34, 35. 604 McAdam, above n 66, 305; Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 100, see also Connell, above n 75, 140.
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towards the end of the twentieth century.605 The ‘forced resettlement of the Banabans
instigated by the British colonial government was premised on commercial interests generated
from the phosphate mining activities by the British Phosphate Corporation’ on Ocean Island,
among others.606 The resettlement to the uninhabited island of Rabi provided an option for the
Banabans to return to Ocean Island after two years.607 The debilitating effects of the mining
operations on the biophysical environment permanently derailed the return of the Banabans to
Ocean Island.608 Several archival and empirical studies conducted by seminal authors such as
McAdam, Connell, and Campbell and Warrick investigating the Banaban population
resettlement have been published and reveal both the drawbacks and strengths of the
resettlement.609
One major drawback was the lack of meaningful participation and concerted engagement
extended by the colonial administration to the Banabans in resettlement decision-making.610
A number of studies reveal that representations about the destination island of Rabi were
misleading and there was far too little attention directed to the conditions on arrival on Rabi
as well as the long-term arrangements for the Banabans. For example, the ‘Banabans had to
live in canvas tents beside the beach and become self-sufficient to plant the island’ on Rabi.611
Furthermore, the lack of medical and educational facilities added uncertainties to the existing
arrangements.612 As noted by Green, ‘[t]he experience of the Banabans provides a warning
about the sense of injustice that can endure when people are resettled without being involved
or in control.’613 The centrality of resettlement suggests that a strong link needs to be
established between the relocatees and proponents to ensure proper and full consideration of
the relocatees in decision-making in all phases of resettlement occurs. Studies have also
revealed that over time, conditions improved with the establishment of the Rabi Council of
Leaders (Rabi Council), which represented the village governance of the Banabans.614 Whilst
the ‘Rabi Council is subject to the ultimate control of the Fijian Government, it maintains a
large degree of autonomy and has acquired freedom from supervision in [its] affairs.’615 This
605 McAdam, above n 87, 301–14; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–7; see also Connell, above n 75, 131–2. 606 McAdam, above n 87, 308, 311. See also above n 605 and accompanying text. 607 McAdam, above n 87, 313; see also Campbell, above n 75, 74; see also Connell, above n 75, 132. 608 McAdam, above n 87, 311. 609 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–7; see also Connell, above n 75, 127–42; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–34. 610 McAdam, above n 87, 319. 611 Ibid 312. 612 Ibid. 613 Michael Green, ‘Contested Territory’ (2016) 6 Nature Climate Change 817, 819. 614 McAdam, above n 87, 324. 615 Ibid.
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suggests that the Banabans now have the agency to make decisions on behalf of the Banaban
population on Rabi.
A further drawback is the distribution of proceeds generated from the decommissioned
phosphate operations, including consideration of the rights of the Banabans to control
resources on Ocean Island, present-day Kiribati.616 The entitlements commissioned by the
colonial administration to phosphate profits provided Kiribati with 85 per cent, leaving the
Banabans with only 15 per cent.617 The investigations further highlight that ‘[m]ost Banabans
do not regard themselves as I-Kiribati and regard that country (Kiribati) as having wrongfully
profited from “their” island.’618 The findings suggest that the resentment of relocatees towards
their original homeland is less likely to occur if consideration is given to relocatees to benefit
equitably from resources in their homeland.619 Adopting a consistent and accountable
compensation payment strategy by the country of origin can be one of the ways of ensuring
the equitable benefit sharing of resources.
The ‘loss of homeland’ (Ocean Island) is not limited to the ‘loss of place and personality’ but
extends to encapsulate ‘loss of self-determination’, which traverses ‘land, rights, sovereignty
and the power to shape one’s destiny.’620 Some contributors to the literature on the relocation
of Pacific islanders, particularly with regard to the Banaban resettlement, frequently cite the
notion of ‘mixed blood and mud’ delineated by Martin Silverman to demonstrate the veracity
of the connection and interplay between the Banaban people and land.’621 The expression has
come to be used to refer to the ‘[P]eople and the land as mutually constituted: blood mixed
with the land and the mud of Banaba retained its primacy in the identity of the people.’622 The
investigations reveal that the resettlement to Rabi inhibited the advancement of land claims by
the Banabans on Ocean Island, including the ‘sovereign rights to the island’ under the colonial
administration.623 However, this was short-lived and safeguards were incorporated into, and
facilitated by, the ‘1947 Statement of Intentions’ (Statement) for the Banabans.624 The
Statement identified the need ‘to provide a specially privileged constitutional status for Banaba
and the Banabans, within a sovereign independent Gilbert Islands State.’625 The statement
further permeated ‘[c]hapter IX of the Constitution of Kiribati, which ‘establishes a special
616 Ibid 318, 320, 326–7. 617 Ibid 320. 618 Ibid. 619 Ibid 311; see also Campbell, above n 75, 77; see also Connell, above n 75, 132. 620 McAdam, above n 87, 319; see also Campbell, above n 75, 75. 621 Campbell, above n 75, 75–6. 622 Ibid; see also McAdam, above n 87, 319–25. 623 Campbell, above n 75, 75; see also Connell, above n 75, 132. 624 McAdam, above n 87, 314, 322. 625 Ibid.
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status for the Banabans. It secures their land rights and interests on Ocean Island and preserves
their right to enter and reside in Kiribati.’626 Similarly, security of land tenure for the Banabans
on Rabi is addressed under the 1997 Fiji constitution (section 178), which entrenches the
Banaban Lands Act and the Banaban Settlement Act.’627 This is re-defined by section 28(5) of
the 2013 Fiji constitution.628 The section accords ‘ownership of all Banaban land with the
customary owners of that land’ and extends to avert permanent alienation of existing Banaban
land.629 However, section 28(5) is limited by the ‘compulsory acquisition of land by the State
for a public purpose’ as underscored in sections 27 and 28 (6).’630 Scholars such as McAdam
and Donner have been interested in questions concerning the interpretation of customary
owners, as far too little attention has been directed in the constitution to define them, and
potentially reversing the status of the Banabans as ‘tenants-at-will of the state’ is subject to
debate.631 The findings suggest that rights of ownership to existing land are secured by the
constitution in the country of origin and the host country.632 While this is a positive feature, a
greater degree of accuracy needs to be exercised by decision-makers and legal drafters of the
arrangements for land tenure recognition, particularly in the host country.633
The investigations also reveal additional considerations for the rights of the Banabans in the
country of origin and the host country. Pursuant to the Kiribati constitution, these include the
allocation of ‘two positions in the Kiribati parliament.’634 One member representing ‘the
electoral district comprising or including Banaba’ as an ‘elected member.’635 And, ‘the other
member representing the Banaban community’ as a ‘nominated representative selected by the
Rabi Council.’636 The ‘members have a power of veto over any proposed amendments to the
Banaban provisions in the constitution.’637 In addition, they ‘do not have to be citizens of
Kiribati.’638 Moreover, the ‘Banabans are entitled to acquire citizenship by registration and are
626 Ibid; see also The Constitution of Kiribati 1995, c IX, s 119(4) (‘Constitution of Kiribati 1995’). 627 McAdam, above n 87, 322–3. 628 Ibid; see also Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013 c 2, s 28 (‘Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013’). 629 McAdam, above n 627. See also ‘Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013’, above n 628, s 27–28. 630 See above n 629 and accompanying text. 631 McAdam, above n 87, 323–4; see also Donner, above n 35, 199. 632 McAdam, above n 87, 322–3; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Campbell, above n 75, 7–79; see also ‘Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013’, above n 626, s 28–30. 633 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326–7; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141, 144–5, 152, 154, 162–3. 634 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also Connell, above n 75, 132; see also Constitution of Kiribati 1995, above n 626, c IX, s 117–119; see also McAdam, above n 13, 316–317. 635 See above n 634 and accompanying text. 636 See above nn 634–5. 637 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also Connell, above n 66, 132; see also Constitution of Kiribati 1995, above n 604, c IX, s 117–119; see also McAdam, above n 13, 282, 315–317, 325–327. 638 See above n 637 and accompanying text.
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permitted to hold dual nationality.’639 Similarly, representation of the Banabans in the Fijian
parliament, including dual citizenship status and the retention of Kiribati passports, are
supported by the constitution and the laws of Fiji.640
The combination of findings on the Banaban resettlement provides some support for the
deepened areas of concern that can be drawn upon to inform relocation of communities across
sovereign borders in the context of climate change. These relate to security of land tenure;
collective consensus; ‘authority and participation in planning processes; right to self-
determination and self-governance; preservation of identity and culture; right to control
resources’ including constitutional protections spanning political representation, nationality
and citizenship status in the original homeland and the host country.641
Kioa Island
The community-led decision of the Vaitupuans on the island of Vaitupu, present day Tuvalu,
to purchase and relocate to the uninhabited island of Kioa in northern Fiji occurred between
1947 and the end of the twentieth century.642 The purchase, made between the Vaitupuans and
the colonial Fiji Government was finalised in 1946 for £3 015.643 The future-focused relocation
decision by the Vaitupuans was an ‘insurance policy against overpopulation and land
scarcity.’644
In 1947, 35 Vaitupuans journeyed to Kioa where ‘they had to clear the land, construct houses
for each family group one by one, and eventually plant crops.’645 The testimony of one of the
participants in the field research conducted by Green recorded that ‘[w]e pulled together as a
639 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also ‘Constitution of Kiribati 1995, above n 626, c III, s 23, c V, s 56. 640 McAdam, above n 87, 322; see also Constitution of the Republic of Fiji 2013, above n 628, c 1, s 5; see also Citizenship Decree 2009 (Fiji) s 6– (‘Citizenship Decree 2009’). 641 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 140. 642 Jane McAdam, Relocation Across Borders: A Prescient Warning in the Pacific (15 March 2013) Brookings <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/relocation-across-borders-a-prescient-warning-in-the-pacific/>; see also Julia Edwards, A Polynesian Pearl in Fiji: Kioa Island (August - September 2012) The Methodist Church <https://www.methodist.org.uk/media/5864/wcr-julia-edwards-newsletter-augsept-2012.pdf>; see also McAdam, above n 4, 31; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71; see also Connell, above n 75, 128, 135. 643 McAdam, above n 642. See also Edwards, above n 642. 644 See above n 643 and accompanying text; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71; see also Connell, above n 75, 128. 645 McAdam, above n 642; see also Edwards, above n 642.
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community, we were pioneers, we really built something. It wasn’t always rosy, but certainly
the idea of relocation came from within the community.’646 Koch, in his book Logs in the
Current of the Sea, highlights some of the challenges which initially inhibited the ‘settlers of
Kioa to clear the land, plant and develop the island’ in anticipation for long-term habitation on
the island.647 These entailed: ‘registration of title of Kioa Island’ which was registered with
‘the people of Vaitupu (natives of Vaitupu)’ by the administration in Fiji; ‘the transfer of title
to Kioa settlers and succession to ensure that their land and crops pass to their children on their
death; survey and subdivision of the land; assessment and collection of rent; formation of a
landholding cooperative society; and the legal status of the council of matai (headman) in
Vaitupu’ synonymous with ‘the Island Council of Vaitupu’ which managed the ‘affairs of the
Kioa community.’648 Two decades later since the arrival of the Kioa settlers, ‘the Resolution
Regarding Kioa Island’ was reached by the matai for ‘the transfer of the title to Kioa to the
Public Trustee of Fiji to hold the island as the Custodian Trustee for registered owners.’649
Five years later in 1972, the ‘Instrument of Tenancy’ was issued to ‘grant tenure to individual
settlers by a lease agreement under Fijian law (Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance,
for example).’650 This was followed by issuing ‘a certificate of Fiji citizenship’ to the Kioa
settlers.651 Koch further highlights that the ‘legal and administrative problems occupied the
governments of Fiji and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands disturbed relations between Vaitupu and
its Kioa settlers, retarding the development of the island for half a generation.’652 The
“arrangements” for the resettlement of the Kioa settlers suggests that well-rounded planning,
and extensive participation and consultation between national governments, including the
communities are key markers for implementing future resettlement.
By 2012, approximately three hundred Vaitupuans had settled in Kioa and the population has
continued to grow.653 The field research by McAdam recorded that the descendants of Vaitupu
‘acknowledge that Kioa, the homeland, presents adequate provision for abundant food and
water, including sustaining far larger populations than Vaitupu ever could. Moreover, young
people have access to better educational and economic opportunities.’654 Additionally, the
decision-making and conduct of their community affairs is represented through their
646 Green, above n 613, 819. 647 Klaus-Friedrich Koch, Logs in the Current of the Sea: Neil Lifuka’s Story of Kioa and the Vaitupu Colonists (Australian National University Press, 1978) 93 648 Ibid 89–100. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid. 651 Koch, above n 647, 100. 652 Ibid 91, 100. 653 Edwards, above n 642. 654 McAdam, above n 642; see also McAdam, above n 87, 319.
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governance structure identifiable as the Kioa Island Council.655 While the ‘Council has no
elevated status in Fiji’, it functions to represent the interests of the Kioans with the Fiji
Government.656 The findings suggests that a strong link may exist between autonomy and
ownership in relocation decision-making when it is decisively carved out by communities
without potential interference by actors, such as governments and proponents driven by
commercial interests. This creates the agency anchored in the governance structures of
communities to reach decisions about their existing and future human security in the
destination country.
It is well established in the Pacific literature, particularly by scholars such as McAdam,
Campbell, Connell and Edwards, that the Vaitupuan relocation was a partial, as opposed to a
whole-population, resettlement of communities across sovereign borders.657 As noted by
Campbell and McAdam, ‘a substantial and sustainable population remain settled in Vaitupu
with more openness among the Kioans towards adopting two identities.’658 While the ‘Kioans
remain citizens of Fiji, their special constitutional status in the country of origin, Tuvalu’
remains undetermined and is open to debate.659 The findings suggests resonance with the sense
of identity, belonging and connection to the homeland in the destination country when
relocation is inclusive and coupled with legal support from the host country government.
It is recognised that much of the research on the Vaitupuan relocation to Kioa has been
descriptive in nature and restricted to limited comparisons with the Banaban population
resettlement. This is because the relocation of these island communities across sovereign
borders was to the uninhabited islands of Rabi (Banabans) and Kioa (Vaitupuans) to the host
country Fiji.660 Despite its exploratory nature, the Vaitupuan relocation to Kioa offers some
insight into areas such as creating the agency for communities to make decisions in all phases
of relocation—which encapsulates and re-establishes their security, spanning livelihoods
arrangements, maintenance of culture and identity, establishing village governance systems—
to ensure future economic growth.661 These issues can be drawn upon to inform relocation
across sovereign borders in the context of climate change.
655 Edwards, above n 642; see also McAdam, n 87, 325. 656 See above n 655 and accompanying text. 657 McAdam, above n 642; see also Edwards, above n 642; McAdam, above n 4, 31; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71; see also Connell, above n 75, 128, 135. 658 McAdam, above n 642; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71. 659 McAdam, above n 87, 319. 660 McAdam, above n 642; see also Edwards, above n 642; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30–2; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 128, 135. 661 McAdam, above n 642; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 127, 133, 135–40.
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Phoenix and Ghizo Islands
The resettlement of the Gilbert Islanders (Gilbertese) in present-day Kiribati during the period
of colonisation by Britain in the South Pacific Ocean in the second half of the nineteenth
century and into the twentieth century is threefold. The first entails resettlement of the
Gilbertese on the Phoenix Islands, which occurred under the ‘Phoenix Islands resettlement
scheme (Phoenix scheme)’ in the early twentieth century.662 The second relates to the
compounded resettlement of the Gilbertese from the Phoenix Islands to Ghizo Island and
Wagina Islands in the Solomon Islands. This was underpinned by the ‘Gilbertese internal
resettlement scheme (Gilbertese scheme)’ in the second half of the twentieth century.663 The
third resettlement of the Gilbertese from the coastlines of Ghizo to higher ground in Ghizo
followed the devastating tsunami that caused several deaths among the Gilbertese in 2007.664
There is widespread consensus in the literature by scholars such as Donner, McAdam, and
Burson and Bedford, for example, that the resettlement of the Gilbertese to the Phoenix Islands
was a pre-emptive strategy to manage population growth, and that the further resettlement
from the Phoenix Islands to the Solomon Islands was triggered by periods of drought triggering
significant strain on food security for the Gilbertese.665 The Phoenix Islands resettlement
scheme comprised of land allocated to every adult, including further land containing 25
coconut trees.666 In addition, wasteland was allocated to families with children on the condition
that they tilled the land and planted copra within five years.’667 The long-term habitability of
the Gilbertese on Phoenix Islands was not possible due to extreme weather events, which
caused the further resettlement of 2 300 Gilbertese to the coastlines of the Solomon Islands.668
The Gilbertese were granted title to ‘four acres of freehold land and the right to acquire further
land’ in Ghizo under the Gilbertese internal resettlement scheme.669 The scheme also made
provision for the resettlement of the Gilbertese to the neighbouring uninhabited islands of
662 Donner, above n 35, 194–5. 663 Ibid 195–6; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30. 664 Donner, above n 35, 191, 197, 199; see also Rachel Nowak and Reuters, Ten-Metre-High Tsunami Strikes Solomon Islands (2 April 2007) New Scientist <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11514-ten-metre-high-tsunami-strikes-solomon-islands/>. 665 Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30; see also Bruce Burson and Richard Bedford, ‘Clusters and Hubs: Toward a Regional Architecture for Voluntary Adaptive Migration in the Pacific’ (Discussion Paper, The Nansen Initiative, 9 December 2013) 22. 666 Donner, above n 35, 195. 667 Ibid. 668 Ibid. 669 Ibid 195–6.
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Choiseul.670 Other provisions of the scheme included receiving citizenship, ‘access to marine
resources; building materials, social services and restoration of livelihoods’ of the
Gilbertese.671
The Gilbertese settlements in Ghizo were subsequently decimated by the tsunami in 2007, as
indicated earlier. With the assistance of the Solomon Islands Government, the displaced
Gilbertese were relocated to ‘unoccupied government forest land.’672 The local customary
owners remained the custodians of the forest land.673 This type of land was not amenable for
pastoral and farming activities.674 The discussion that follows draws on the empirical evidence
reported by Donner and assists in our understanding of the issues and challenges arising from
the resettlement of the Gilbertese.675
The uncertainty surrounding land rights was one of the key issues under the Gilbertese scheme
and extended beyond the post 2007 tsunami.676 The rights of the Gilbertese to freehold land
was short-lived with new laws enacted following the independence of the Solomon Islands in
1978.677 The new laws aimed to ‘restrict automatic entry rights for children of settlers.’678
Moreover, assigning land to respond to the growing Gilbertese population in Ghizo remained
perfunctory by the government, which led to the Gilbertese women marrying local Melanesian
men.679 This facilitated children of the marriage access to secure local customary land, and
ameliorated the Gilbertese population pressures.680 Disputes ‘over title to a series of small
offshore islands’ allotted under the scheme spawned insecurity for the settlements established
by the Gilbertese settlers.681
Further insecurity in relation to land rights related to the relocation of the Gilbertese to forest
land post-tsunami. The deterioration of the ‘traditionally communal subsistence culture’ of the
Gilbertese was one of the issues closely connected to land tenure insecurity, post-tsunami.682
The traumatic nature of the devastation caused to the established coastline settlements,
670 Ibid. 671 Ibid. 672 Ibid 197. 673 Ibid. 674 Ibid. 675 Ibid 193–4. 676 Ibid 196. 677 Ibid. 678 Ibid 195. 679 Ibid 196. 680 Ibid. 681 Ibid. 682 Ibid 197.
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mortality, and the relocation and re-establishment of the Gilbertese decimated their tight-knit
community.683 The decline in Gilbertese elders passing on the traditional knowledge and skills
underpinning the maintenance of their culture and identity to the younger generation were key
concerns documented. The skills and knowledge took the form of: dance performances and
costumes; Gilbertese language over Pidgin; and conducting communal meetings and decision-
making in the traditional ‘maneaba (community meeting house)’ facilitated by the ‘unimane
(old men)’, which represented the ‘old system of village governance.’684 Moreover, food
security was an additional issue arising from the relocation of the Gilbertese to forest land
post-tsunami. The reliance on ‘fishing and other marine resources’ embedded within
Gilbertese maritime culture diminished.685 The Gilbertese turned to vegetables and fruits and
purchased imported food items due to ‘nutrient-poor soils’ in the forest land.686 This was a
significant shift and ‘decline from their traditional practices’ of planting ‘traditional crops such
as babai (swamp taro), pandanus, breadfruit and coconut trees.’687 Other issues related to the
recognition of land tenure; culture and identity; and food security of the Gilbertese. The
opportunities to: seek ‘government and business jobs’; secure educational scholarships; and
participate in government politics were further issues that indicate that the Gilbertese were
viewed as ‘second-class citizens.’688
Drawing on the extensive range of issues emerging from the field research into the ‘Gilbertese
resettlement in Ghizo’, Donner recognises and reminds us that tensions and resentment are
prominent indicators because of competing interests ‘over resources, rights to land, economic
opportunities’ of the host communities with the communities resettled.689 He further reminds
us that to ‘maintain a sense of community’ is a challenge.690 He suggests that ongoing
community integration programs aligned with all phases of resettlement are a useful tool to
manage the echelons of cultural traditions and customs of the host communities and the
communities resettled.691 Moreover, he points out that that in addition to natural disasters,
‘large-scale political events’ can seriously affect those who are resettled.692 This was evident
when the Solomon Islands gained independence and there was the subsequent relocation of
the Gilbertese to forest land post-tsunami. Furthermore, Donner points out that the resettlement
683 Ibid 197, 199. 684 Ibid 193, 197–8. 685 Ibid 195, 197–8. 686 Ibid. 687 Ibid. 688 Ibid 196, 198–9. 689 Ibid 199. 690 Ibid. 691 Ibid. 692 Ibid.
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experiences of the Gilbertese offer some insight into the future resettlement of communities
necessitated by the debilitating impacts of climate change. These include:
1) developing ‘robust and long-term land or resource agreements between the relocating
communities and present-day government’ to curb any future political interference to
reverse existing arrangements;
2) undertaking vulnerability and risk-informed assessments in parallel with future climatic
projections to avert ‘poor assessment of the social and financial costs of resettlement;’
3) introducing effective resettlement programs that embody ‘land audits, customary rights
assessments, and ongoing monitoring and assessments;’ and
4) designing programs ‘to establish and finance permanent mechanisms for dealing with land
and resource disputes.’693
The empirical findings of the Gilbertese experience identify issues that can be drawn upon in
the context of climate change for future community resettlement. These relate to: certainty of
land rights for the resettling community irrespective of changes to political leadership in the
future; suitability of land to sustain potential population growth and provide food security;
autonomy to exercise cultural traditions and customs in the host community; recognition as
citizens and equitable entitlement to access and secure employment, education, public services
and political participation.694 The lessons from the Gilbertese experience enhance our
understanding of the approaches that can be adopted for well-thought-out resettlement
processes, such as articulating comprehensive resettlement programs that entail vulnerability
assessments, mechanisms to respond to disputes and provision of resettlement costs in all
stages of the community resettlement processes.695 The findings provide some information that
can be adopted for use in future climate change community resettlement.
Carteret Islands
The government-led relocation of the Carteret communities as a result of famine and the
adverse impacts of slow-onset environmental change in the low-lying Carteret Islands in Papua
New Guinea (PNG) is two pronged.696 The initial relocation occurred in the second half of the
693 Ibid 198–9. 694 Ibid 191–201. 695 See above nn 666–94. 696 Edwards, above n 35, 59, 63–7, 77; see also Campbell, above n 75, 57–9.
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twentieth century.697 The relocation is ongoing however, has continued from 1997 and is
expected to conclude by 2020.698 Both relocations are to Bougainville and other parts of
mainland PNG.699 The past century resettlement scheme articulated as the Atolls Resettlement
Scheme (AR Scheme) was poorly implemented, which resulted in the majority of the Carteret
communities retreating to their atoll islands.700 The AR Scheme suffered from several major
drawbacks. These included resettling the Carteret communities to alienated land and to
locations with close proximity to the correctional institutions of the provinces, not allowing
resettlers to undertake commercial fishing activities, poorly coordinated and fragmented
implementation interventions by the government and the lack of community integration
programs and mechanisms to resolve disputes.701
The past century resettlement experiences of the Carteret communities provided the impetus
to the Tulele Peisa, a non-profit organisation, and the Autonomous Bougainville Government
(ABG), a ‘governing entity within the Autonomous Region of Bougainville’ to independently
articulate in parallel, future resettlement schemes for the Carteret communities in conjunction
with the assistance extended by the national government.702 The schemes are identified as the
Tulele Peisa scheme, and the ABG scheme and they are buttressed by the ‘atolls integrated
development policy.’703 These schemes provide for the resettlement of 300 Carteret families
and an estimated land allocation of 1,500 hectares.704 The Tulele Peisa scheme aims to resettle
a total of 83 families, equating to approximately 2 700 Carteret Islanders in five separate
islands of PNG by 2020.705 The Roman Catholic Church of Bougainville has gifted
approximately ‘71 hectares of their land’ and will gift further land under the Tulele Peisa
scheme.706 Moreover, the estimated resettlement costs are calculated to include (among other
costs): household construction to ‘25 000 kina (AuD $10 000)’ per house, and compensation
to host communities of approximately to ‘6 000 kina (AuD $2 400)’ per host household under
the Tulele Peisa scheme.707 Similarly, the ABG scheme aims to resettle ‘forty families per year
on an individual-clan basis’ across ‘600 hectares of land’ with a ‘2 million kina (AuD
697 Edwards, above n 35, 63–7. 698 Ibid; see also Connell, above n 583, 10. 699 Edwards, above n 35, 60, 62. 700 Ibid 57, 63. 701 Ibid 63–5. 702 Ibid 57, 65–7; see also Autonomous Bougainville Government, How ABG Works < http://www.abg.gov.pg/government/how-abg-works>. 703 Edwards, above n 35, 64–7. 704 Ibid 68. 705 Ibid 66–7. 706 Ibid. 707 Ibid 71.
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$800,000) advance extended by the national government.’708 The reference to clan is
understood as the internal governance structure underpinned by the powers and functions of a
head clansman.709 Both organisations recognise the lessons learned under the AR scheme. That
is, that the availability of land, acquisition of land and a suitable resettlement site ought to be
at the heart of future resettlement of the Carteret communities.710 Moreover, ‘landownership
issues such as resettlers rights to land title’ and allocation of finances in all phases of the
resettlement schemes are additional considerations that the Tulele Peisa and the ABG
recognise to be integral to articulating resettlement schemes.711
In her case study-designed field research, which determines the issues relocation presents for
the Carteret Islanders, Edwards highlights approaches to respond to an array of issues and
offers important insights for the future climate-induced relocation of communities.712 To assist
her investigation, Edwards engages ‘Cernea’s impoverishment, risks and reconstruction (IRR)
model.’713 The well-established IRR model is a conceptual tool used in the context of
development-induced displacement and resettlement consisting of ‘interrelated risk factors of:
landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, increased morbidity
and mortality, loss of access to common property, and social disintegration.’714 The IRR model
was highlighted earlier in chapter two.
Edwards found first, that customary land rules govern 96 per cent of Bougainville Island,
which precludes ‘individuals and clans’ from giving away land on an ad-hoc basis.715 She
argues that land tenure recognition and access to land present challenges to relocation.716 She
suggests that ‘culturally appropriate compensation for both host communities and those
displaced’ may serve as a pragmatic option considering the power relation levels of individual
clans and governance structures in customary and communal land tenure-ships.717 Second, the
Carteret Islanders would arrive at the new relocation site with expectations of adequate
housing and access to public health services, employment opportunities—such as operating
micro-businesses, farming and fishing—and autonomy and integration with the host
708 Ibid 64, 66. 709 Ibid 70, 76. 710 Ibid 57, 63–5. 711 Ibid 58, 68. 712 Ibid 67. 713 Ibid 52, 54–5, 57–8, 67–76. 714 Ibid. See also Ferris, above n 12, 33. 715 Edwards, above n 35, 68. 716 Ibid. 717 Ibid 68, 78.
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community.718 Edwards argues that the majority of the Carteret Islanders would be unfamiliar
with their new surroundings and might be ‘enclosed by high ground and vegetation’,
decimating their food security.719 Third, relocating communities might potentially ‘experience
general low levels of energy’, and the zest at the initial stages of their ‘arrival at a resettlement
site’ might dissipate, ‘ill-feeling among relocating and host communities’ might develop, and
the relocating communities might be susceptible to psychological and traumatic
experiences.720
Edwards suggests that ‘much thought and consideration has to go into the process for site-
selection’ to offer opportunities and restore livelihoods of relocating communities.721 Edwards
adds that concerted, purposeful and on-going involvement of communities extending to
vulnerable and marginalised groups, the ‘Church, and other community organisations’ by the
government in relocation decision-making, plans and policy formulation is one of the key
considerations.722 ‘Better planning and regulation in neighbouring urban centres to off-set any
population growth pressures’, the right to unrestricted movement, the right to ‘physical, mental
and moral integrity’ of the relocating communities, and designing strategies for ‘trust building
and awareness raising among resettlers and host communities’ are additional considerations
that ought to be integrated into all phases of relocation planning.723 Last of all, Edwards
maintains that ‘[s]uccesful resettlements can only be achieved with land security, the creation
of livelihoods, and support from host communities.’724
Some of the issues emerging from the findings of the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders
include:
a) recognition of the type of land, such as customary tenure; site of the land, such as proximity
to ‘local correctional institutions’ or ‘unfamiliar dense vegetation;’ and the access to land;
b) the costs related to the ‘planning, negotiations and execution’ stages of the relocation; and
c) the recognition of the rights of resettlers such as land title, commercial fishing; employment
opportunities and health services at the host communities.725
718 Ibid 68–70. 719 Ibid 68–70, 77. 720 Ibid 69, 74–5. 721 Ibid 68–9, 77–8. 722 Ibid 58, 64, 75, 76–8. 723 Ibid 72, 77–8. 724 Ibid 52, 78. 725 Ibid 58, 63, 70. See also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4.
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Considerations in planning the resettlement of communities include allocating finance to
compensate landowners and resettlers and the participation of resettlers actively and
consistently in resettlement decision-making in all phases of resettlement. Other
considerations include the provision of support services to minimise psychological risks
extended by the church and non-governmental organisations, proactive planning and
regulation of urban population growth and identifying the costs of infrastructure and the
number of resettlers relocating.726
4.3 Lessons Learned about Mobility of Pacific Islanders
This chapter has sought to examine Pacific Islanders’ circumstances and experiences of
mobility within and across sovereign borders primarily during the colonial administration of
territories in the Pacific Islands region.727 The usefulness of the lessons learned from the case
studies of the historical mobility of Pacific Islanders to inform future mobility of Pacific
Islanders in the context of climate change needs to be considered both from the perspective of
communities of origin and the host communities. The case studies show that these perspectives
cannot be considered in isolation. Furthermore, the intersection of these perspectives needs to
be anchored in culturally sensitive arrangements and decisions negotiated between the Pacific
Island governments of both the sending and receiving states.728 As this chapter shows, the
considerations in the case of communities of origin from the case studies relate to:
1) meaningful consultation extended by proponents of relocation and the inclusiveness of all
community members including community and religious organisations in all phases of
relocation decision-making;729
2) land with regard to its suitability—such as wasteland, forest land or coastlines to provide
food security and restore the livelihoods of relocating communities through micro-
businesses, farming, and fishing—choice land site—which is accessible to public services
and employment and education opportunities as opposed to penal institutions or dense
vegetation—recognition of land tenure ownership, for example, customary, state or church
land and certainty of land rights facilitated through grant of land title, including the right
to buy further land;’730
726 Edwards, above n 35, 52–78. 727 Ibid; see also McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, n 75, 128. 728 McAdam, above n 10, 11; see also McAdam, above n 354, 5; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 96. 729 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 64, 68, 75, 76–8. 730 Ibid 58, 63–70. See also Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4.
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3) financing sufficient for all phases of relocation spanning social costs, for example,
intangible heritage, culture, traditions and identity, psychological trauma, and physical
costs, for example, transportation, housing, food and water;731
4) ‘control and access to common resources’, including equitable entitlement to benefits from
the resources at the origin and/or homeland.732 The resettlement experience of the
Banabans shows that the socio-economic gains of past mining operations on Ocean Island
(now Kiribati) lurk in the far distant future for the Banabans on Rabi.733
5) ‘maintenance of identity and cultural ties’, including the legal status recognition for
citizenship and political representation at the origin and/or homeland.734 For example,
seeking citizenship and political participation status in Tuvalu by the Vaitupuans of Kioa
is untenable.735
This chapter has also shown that some of the considerations of the host communities presented
by the case studies mirror those of the communities of origin. These relate to:
1) meaningful consultation conducted by the host state with local host communities,
landowners and marginalised groups as a pre-emptive measure to curb tensions and
conflicts triggered potentially through: ‘cultural and community cohesion’; equal access
to economic opportunities, public services, and resources such as fishing.736 The
resettlement experience of the Gilbertese to Ghizo shows that the ‘Gilbertese were
considered as second-class citizens’, decimating opportunities to seek ‘government and
business jobs, including educational scholarships;’737
2) suitability and site of the land, including the availability of land. For example, freehold
land with the option to acquire further land and seek legal title to land was made available
to the Gilbertese pre-2007 tsunami;738
3) costs of relocation, for example, the physical infrastructure construction and livelihood
restoration of communities of origin post relocation.739 The resettlement of the Carteret
731 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 319; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also McAdam, above n 642; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Edwards, above n 35, 69, 74–5. 732 McAdam, above n 87, 326, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 140; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Carol Farbotko, No Retreat: Climate Change and Voluntary Immobility in the Pacific Islands (13 June 2018) Migration Policy Institute <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/no-retreat-climate-change-and-voluntary-immobility-pacific-islands>. 733 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 145. 734 Ibid 163; see also McAdam, above n 13, 284. 735 McAdam, above n 87, 319. 736 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 20; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 737 Donner, above n 35, 196, 198–9. 738 Ibid 195–6. 739 Edwards, above n 35, 68–9, 77–8.
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Islanders shows that costs are not limited to household construction but extend to
‘culturally appropriate compensation’ to entail customary landowners and communities of
origin per household for the initial re-adjustment at the new host location;740
4) certainty around the ‘maintenance of the host community’s culture and identity and social
practices’ such as traditional, linguistic and artistic expressions and religion, including the
retention of host community’s governance arrangements.741 The relocation of the
Vaitupuans to Kioa shows that the Vaitupuans have the agency to make decisions related
to the affairs of the Vaitupuans through the establishment of the Kioa Island Council.742
Additionally, the case studies have shown that the security of the communities of origin in
terms of their access to ‘economic opportunities; education, health care and social services;
political participation; entitlement to land ownership; nationality and citizenship; and the
enjoyment of cultural practices and traditions’ needs to be established through laws and
buttressed by institutions of the host state.743 For example, the citizenship status and political
participation of the Banabans and Vaitupuans is enshrined in the constitution and laws of the
host country, Fiji. However, as highlighted earlier, in the case of the resettlement of the
Gilbertese to Ghizo, new laws following the independence of the Solomon Islands ‘restricted
automatic entry rights for children of settlers.’744 Moreover, this chapter acknowledges and
echoes sentiments of seminal authors presented by the case studies that the human mobility
arrangements of Pacific Islanders during the colonial administration may no longer appeal to
national governments of the Pacific as a mechanism by which to respond to the relocation of
Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders in contemporary times. This is because there is a
political dimension that embodies ‘political commitment, financial and resource capacities’,
primarily of the host state and extending to the sending state ‘with weak economies of scale
and diverse cultures.’745 These considerations suggest the need for an extensive role of the
governments of both the sending and receiving states to provide a more solid framework on
which to make policy to avoid decimating the livelihoods of relocating communities in the
future. Chapter four has gone some way to present a gamut of considerations from the
historical case studies to advance our understanding to consider more in-depth into responding
to future mobility of Pacific Islanders from slow-onset environmental change. The researcher
740 Ibid 66, 70–1, 78. 741 McAdam, above n 10, 11, 148–9; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 742 McAdam, above n 87, 325; see also Edwards, above n 642. 743 McAdam, above n 10, 11, 148–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–5; see also Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–9; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 99–100; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48–9. 744 Donner, above n 35, 195. 745 Ferris, above n 12, 34–5; see also Leckie, above n 16, 29; see also Connell, above n 75, 135, 138, 140.
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recognises that caution needs to be applied as the accounts of past decades administration and
experiences might not be transferable in contemporary times in its entirety.746 The researcher
further recognises that there are emerging empirical studies by scholars Piggott-McKellar et
al, McNamara and Combes, Klepp and Herbeck, and Bertana, especially in the Fiji context of
the internal relocation of communities which can also be drawn upon to supplement the inquiry
into relocation of Pacific Island communities across sovereign borders in the future.747
4.4 Conclusion
The experiences and lessons learned from the case studies have contributed towards our
understanding of the considerations that can be drawn upon from the perspectives of
communities of origin and the host communities to inform the criteria of readiness for the
climate-induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign states in the future.
These findings correspond to RQ 1(a). The next chapter explores readiness across a range of
disciplines. It extrapolates the determinants of readiness to be discussed further in chapter
seven.
746 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 151; See also Corendea, above n 170, 13. 747 Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54, 1-17; see also McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54, 70; see also Bertana, above n 54.
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Chapter 5: Readiness–A Multidisciplinary Perspective
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter uncovered an array of considerations learned from the experiences of
human mobility of Pacific Islanders during the colonial administration of territories in the
Pacific Islands region.748 These considerations provide insights to inform the future relocation
of Pacific Islanders across sovereign borders in the context of climate change and draw upon
the criteria of readiness, which is the key investigation of the study. This chapter examines the
phenomenon of readiness in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives. The purpose of
this chapter is to unpack what might be learned from the considerable body of experience of
the phenomenon of readiness in the literature, which corresponds to RQ (1) (c). RQ 1 (c) asks:
what can we learn from the literature on other forms of mobility or other contexts of readiness?
This chapter also unpacks the elements of readiness and identifies considerations across a
range of disciplines to provide insights into framing readiness for climate-induced human
mobility. This chapter, in conjunction with chapters four and six, presents building blocks to
inform the criteria of readiness as presented in chapter seven.
The researcher argues that most studies in the field of human mobility have tended to focus on
the future relocation of populations yet to be planned. Researchers have not considered in as
much detail what it means to be ready for climate change-induced human mobility across
levels for action by the sending and receiving states. This constitutes a significant gap in the
literature. Given the lack of a single and coherent study, the researcher draws on relevant
elements of readiness from other sources to identify elements of climate migration readiness.
This study aims to contribute to this growing area of research and therefore the investigation
of the study provides a new and more holistic understanding of what is required to build
readiness.
748 McAdam, above n 87, 301–27; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Connell, above n 75, 128; see also Edwards, above n 35, 52–78.
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This chapter acknowledges that the review of the phenomenon of readiness in the literature is
far from exhaustive. It contains a comprehensive review of the literature pertinent to the
research questions posed in this study drawn from literature on:
1) disaster preparedness;
2) climate finance readiness;
3) international humanitarian assistance preparedness;
4) public health preparedness; and
5) REDD+ readiness (readiness literature).
This chapter begins by reviewing disaster preparedness and climate finance readiness literature
because of the frequently cited references to human mobility from sudden- and slow-onset
environmental change. It is acknowledged that the term readiness is not used uniformly across
the full spectrum of disciplines and is sometimes equated with preparedness. The reference to
readiness is used in its broadest sense in this chapter. A synopsis to review the body of
experience on the phenomenon of readiness in this chapter is presented firstly by identifying
the elements of the definition of preparedness, or readiness, specific to the discipline. It then
considers barriers to achieving readiness, before considering implementation measures to
achieve readiness (where applicable). Finally, a brief summary of the elements and
considerations emerging from the phenomenon of readiness specific to the discipline is
provided.
5.2 Disaster Preparedness
A large body of scholarly work, including various reports originating from UN agencies such
as the Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC) and the Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative (CADRI), has been published on
disaster preparedness.749 Preparedness is important for sudden-onset disasters because
749 Guadagno, above n 8, 30–1; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2–3; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1518–46; see also Lilian Yamamoto, Diogo Andreola Serraglio and Fernanda de Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, ‘Human Mobility in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters: A South American Approach’ (2018) 10(1) International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management 65, 67–9. See also United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction Cancun, Mexico’ (Proceedings Report, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 22–26 May 2017) 3 (Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017) <https://www.preventionweb.net/files/55465_globalplatform2017proceedings.pdf>; see also Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, UN Doc A/CN.206/6 (22 January 2005) (‘Hyogo Framework’); see also Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, GA, 9th plen mtg, UN Doc A/1361 (18 March 2015) (‘Sendai Framework’).
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disasters require coordinated responses and the deployment of comprehensive strategies and
emergency plans by government institutions at the community and national levels.750 In
addition to the operational dimensions, preparedness also requires well-articulated national
policies and programs and a legal and regulatory framework at the national level to enable
officials to exercise functions in preparation and immediately in the aftermath of disasters.751
Moreover, strengthening the capacity of government institutions, especially those of
developing countries which have acute economies of scale relative to developed nations to
access disaster-relief assistance and finance from donor agencies, is a further reason
preparedness is important in the disaster context.752 The determinants outlined below are
indicative of the arrangements and measures needed to equip the government at community
and national levels before the onset of sudden-onset disasters as well as during, and in the post-
disaster phase. The discussion that follows expands on the determinants to offer some
important insights needed to frame readiness in the context of climate-induced human
mobility.
Elements of Disaster Preparedness
The broad use of the term disaster preparedness is equated with ‘disaster preparedness,
response, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.’753 Disaster preparedness is underscored
in ‘international instruments on disaster risk reduction and disaster resilience particularly, the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which is the successor
framework to the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA)’ under the aegis of the
Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.754 Moreover, a generally accepted definition of
750 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, ‘Words into Action Guidelines: Disaster Displacement: How to Reduce Risk, Address Impacts and Strengthen Resilience – A Companion for Implementing the Sendai Framework Target E’ (Consultation Paper, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2018) 26, 52–3 (‘Sendai Framework Target E 2018’). 751 Ibid 23–5, 40, 49, 52. 752 Protection Agenda Volume 1, above n 14, 6–10; see also United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, ‘Words into Action Guidelines: Introductory Capstone Enhancing Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response’ (Consultation Paper, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, May 2017) 5, 13, 57 (‘DR IntroCapstone 2017’). 753 Sendai Framework, above n 749, paras 2, 14, 17, 24 (l), 33(h); see also Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 3; see also Andrew Collins et al, ‘The 3rd Global Summit of Research Institutes for Disaster Risk Reduction: Expanding the Platform for Bridging Science and Policy Making’ (2017) 8(2) International Journal of Disaster Risk Science 224, 240; see also Guadagno, above n 8, 31; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1527–28. 754 Sendai Framework, above n 749 and accompanying text.
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preparedness and preparedness action cited frequently in the disaster preparedness literature is
important to note, as there are parallels that can be drawn from the standpoint of human
mobility from sudden- and-slow onset environmental change.
The term ‘‘preparedness’’ is commonly used to refer to ‘[t]he capacities and knowledge
developed by governments, professional response organisations, communities and individuals
to anticipate and respond effectively to the impact of likely, imminent or current hazard events
or conditions.’755 In the same vein, preparedness action is based on ‘a sound analysis of disaster
risks and good linkages with early warning systems, and includes such activities as
contingency planning…the development of arrangements for coordination, evacuation and
public information…It must be supported by formal institutional, legal and budgetary
capacities.’756 The term “readiness” has not been used in the disaster preparedness literature
and remains underexplored. However, the disaster preparedness literature acknowledges
readiness succinctly as the ‘ability to quickly and appropriately respond when required.’757
Collectively, the engagement by a full spectrum of actors, the development of regulatory
frameworks, enhancing institutional capacities and arrangements to set aside emergency
financial resources—including accessing financial assistance—are elements drawn from the
definition of disaster preparedness.758 The researcher recognises that attaining consensus at
various levels for action may present potential challenges which ought to be acknowledged as
part of preparedness. The plurality of elements provide rich perspectives to frame readiness
for human mobility in the context of climate change.
Disaster Preparedness and Build Back Better
The SFDRR encompasses ‘four policy-oriented priorities for action in the main body of the
text.’759 These aim to ‘address displacement risk and minimise its negative consequences,
including facilitating human mobility as a voluntary or protective measure to strengthen
resilience.’760 Moreover, the SFDRR consists of ‘guiding principles to frame a variety of key
activities relevant to reducing, preparing for and responding to disaster displacement under the
755 United Nations, Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008) 3 (‘Hyogo, Priority Five-2008’); see also DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71. 756 See above n 755 and accompanying text. 757 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71. 758 See above n 757; see also Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1524–25. 759 Sendai Framework, above n 749; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 3. 760 Yonetani, above n 59, 3.
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priorities for action at global to national levels.’761 Discussion on all the priorities for action
and guiding principles of the SFDRR is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, two
categories conspicuously aligned to priority four of the SFDRR include: ‘enhancing disaster
preparedness for effective response, and to “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and
reconstruction.’762 The discussion that follows examines both categories to supplement and
extend the elements of preparedness, which can be drawn upon to frame readiness for human
mobility in the context of climate change.763
Disaster Preparedness
‘Community preparedness such as evacuation drills, training and area-based support systems,
and the preparedness of local authorities, through measures to strengthen their capacity to
manage evacuations’ are strands that correlate with the first category of ‘enhancing disaster
preparedness for effective response.’ 764 Other strands include ‘strengthening risk knowledge
and timely delivery of early warning systems.’765 Expanding on the first category, disaster
preparedness and planning (preparedness) traverses local, national, regional and global levels
to address disaster-induced human mobility.766 Enhancing the capacity of local authorities is
instructive in building an understanding of readiness in the context of cross-border climate-
induced mobility.
Disaster preparedness involves ‘adopting and implementing national and local disaster risk
reduction strategies and plans’ to reduce disaster displacement risk.767 The strategies and plans
entail ‘strengthening local authorities’ capacity to evacuate people from disaster-prone areas;
ensuring assistance programmes and mechanisms account for the specific needs of particular
groups within the displaced population; and engaging in meaningful participation of people
displaced by disasters.’768 The legal dimension of disaster preparedness entails using ‘national
and local laws, regulations and policies’ essential for ‘protecting land, property and other
761 Ibid 2–3; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 8–9, 17–18. 762 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 15, 18, 39, 52; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 5; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4. 763 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 10; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2. 764 Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4, paras 28(d), 33(h), 33(m); see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 39; See also Yonetani, above n 59, 7–8. 765 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 39; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 7–8. 766 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 48–54; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, art 30(l). 767 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 26, 48–52; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, para 27(b); see Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 26, 48–52. 768 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 26, 52–3.
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productive assets during displacement.’769 Additionally, making land available for either
temporary or permanent relocation forms part of the policy and legal arrangements.770 Further
considerations integral to the legal and policy dimensions at the local and national levels
include ‘institutional leadership, development and reconstruction of budgetary allocations,
designating roles, responsibilities, legal and administrative authority, including aligning
domestic, regional and international instruments such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement’ with existing frameworks.771
In addition to strategies and plans to develop capacity of responders at a national level, the
resilience of communities to respond to sudden-onset disasters also needs to be recognised.772
Corendea points out that ‘it is important not to lose sight of the realities within the islands and
the culture and traditions of communities’ which is integral to disaster preparedness and
resilience.773 Some notable examples include ‘traditional coping strategies in rural indigenous
communities in the South Pacific’ such as ‘land use planning, building methods, food
resilience (leaves of cassava plants, and cutting banana leaves, coconuts and other root
crops)…to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters.’774 A further example includes the ‘role of
traditional ecological knowledge…practiced by indigenous communities…to predict
environmental changes, including changes in weather and climate…’ such as ‘reading the sky
and clouds’, observing the ‘types of wind’, and monitoring seasons and recording and updating
them in their ‘seasonal calendar.’775 Other examples extend to ‘practical strategies’ such as
‘traditional warning signs (nesting behaviour of bees and hornets, ocean current and tides, fruit
growth, rainbows) and oral histories of previous disasters.’776 The host of coping and
adaptation strategies are notable in demonstrating resilience at a community level for
preparedness.
Likewise, the SFDRR has been broadened in recognition of the ‘potential for cross-border
disaster displacement covering both outflows to a neighbouring country and influxes of people
769 Ibid 23–5, 40, 49, 52. 770 Ibid 23–6, 40. 771 Ibid 24–6; see also Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3. 772 Corendea, above n 170, 15-16; 773 Ibid. 774 Ingrid Johnston, ‘Disaster management and climate change adaptation: a remote island perspective’ (2014) 23(2) Disaster Prevention and Management 123, 124, 127. 775 Penehuro Fatu Lefale, ‘Ua ‘afa le Aso Stormy weather today: traditional ecological knowledge of weather and climate. The Samoa experience’ (2010) 100 Climate Change 317, 323-332; 776 Ingrid Johnston, ‘Traditional warnings signs of cyclones on remote islands in Fiji and Tonga’ (2015) 14(3) Environmental Hazards 210, 211, 214-221.
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fleeing disasters abroad’ as part of disaster preparedness and response.777 At the regional and
global levels, strategies and plans include ‘baseline data on displacement, bilateral or regional
contingency and response plans, operational guides, budgetary allocations for development,
service provision and land-use management as part of larger investments.’778 The legal and
policy perspectives encompass the ‘inclusion of specific plans, laws and policies aligned with
broader instruments and tools, such as regional policies and agreements on free movement,
displaced people’s rights, sustainable development, DRR, climate change and humanitarian
action.’779 The ‘seasonal labour migration opportunities for Pacific island nations through
well-managed schemes’ underscored in bilateral agreements, and the ‘voluntary guidelines to
enhance resilience to climate change and disasters through the Framework for Resilient
Development in the Pacific’ are some notable examples.780 Moreover, other complementary
components include sharing information about good practices, thus ensuring that cooperative
systems are established.781 This can be illustrated briefly by the Protection for Persons Moving
Across Borders in the Context of Disasters: A Guide to Effective Practices for RCM Member
Countries, which was developed under the auspices of the Regional Conference on Migration
(RCM). This guide facilitates ‘trans-boundary simulation exercises among Member States of
RCM to prepare for potential cross-border disaster-displacement and agree upon ways of
cooperation during any response.’782 The array of considerations at regional and global levels
provides useful insights into the legal, policy and operational aspects of readiness, which can
be built around in the context of cross-border climate-induced mobility.
Build Back Better
The ‘build back better’ principle is characterised by ‘a whole of-society approach, including
the engagement of all stakeholders, strong partnerships to support scientific and technical
research and its applications, and clear political commitment before and after disasters.’783 The
strands of ‘build back better’ are anchored across the full spectrum of ‘risk-informed
preparedness and recovery plans, multi-stakeholder engagements at both national and local
777 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 40, 53. 778 Ibid 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54. 779 Ibid. 780 Ibid 35, 37. 781 Ibid 51. 782 Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 45; see also Regional Conference on Migration, Fostering and Strengthening Regional Dialogue and Cooperation <http://www.crmsv.org/en>. 783 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 10; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2.
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levels, tailored policy and legal frameworks for reconstruction to facilitate disaster recovery
process, including community capacity development and local ownership.’784
Building and strengthening institutional and political capacities at the national level and
developing the capacities of communities at the local level, the protection of property, the
availability of land and access to land, crafting disaster risk reduction strategies, plans, guides,
laws and policies; stakeholder engagements and budgetary allocations are all key determinants
from the array of strands associated with both categories under priority four to address disaster
displacement pre- and post-disaster phases.785 These determinants offer important insights to
guide the framing of the criteria for climate-induced cross-border mobility.
Platform on Disaster Displacement
A parallel initiative widely acknowledged in the disaster preparedness literature, including at
global policy fora, is the ‘Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), the successor to the
Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda.’786 The central goal underpinning the PDD is to ‘manage
disaster displacement risks in the country of origin to prevent cross-border disaster
displacement.’787 Moreover, the PDD embodies a multitude of action areas. Some of these
include the development of law and policy at the domestic and regional levels; the creation of
bi-lateral/regional frameworks on admission, stay and non-return of cross-border disaster-
displaced persons; and ensuring that relevant research and analysis is conveyed to policy and
decision makers’ to respond to cross-border disaster displacement.788
The PDD underpins both the Nansen Initiative and the SFDRR position, which is ‘to create
global legal norms and standards’ exclusively for disaster-displaced persons.789 The synergy
between the PDD and global cooperation initiatives can be exemplified by the action areas
indicated above and the strategic priorities. The strategic priorities involve: ‘consolidating and
784 Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4; see also Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 10. 785 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 7–54. 786 McAdam, above n 14, 1532–4. 787 See above n 786; see also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction: UNHCR Statement: From Commitment to Action’ (Speech delivered at the 2017 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, Cancun, 22-26 May) (‘Cancun Speech DRR’) <https://www.unisdr.org/files/globalplatform/UNHCR%20Statement%20to%20DRR%20GP%20_%2018%20May%202017.pdf>. 788 McAdam, above n 14, 1533. 789 See above n 788, 1532–4; see also Protection Agenda Volume 1, above n 14, 7–8.
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enhancing the use of effective practices, promoting policy coherence by linking into existing
initiatives, coordinating, complementing, and/or feeding into existing activities and processes,
and extending technical support to states to translate their commitments and aspirations’ under
the initiatives and agreements.790 The PDD offers some important insights to be considered in
informing the definition of readiness from the legal, policy, operational and practice
perspectives at both domestic and regional levels in the context of cross-border climate-
induced mobility. Taken together, the PDD, initiatives and agreements are indicative of
noteworthy contributions that can be used to underpin the definition of readiness.
Determinants Drawing on Disaster Preparedness
The engagement of state and non-state actors—including communities at risk of disaster
displacement, the capacity development of government institutions, the allocation of finance
in national budgets for disasters and domestic regulatory arrangements—are all elements
drawn from the definition of disaster preparedness.791 Moreover, the ability to respond quickly
and appropriately in sudden-onset disaster context underscores the elements of readiness.792
Together, the definition of preparedness from the analysis entails five salient elements, which
constitute quick and appropriate action, engagement, capacity, finance and regulation. These
elements assist in our understanding of how to frame readiness in the context of climate-
induced human mobility.
Furthermore, the notion of disaster preparedness is harnessed through the initiatives and policy
agendas at the global level from the standpoint of global initiatives and policy agendas such
as the Nansen Initiative, SFDRR and the PDD. Disaster preparedness at the national level has
identified the need for community preparedness and whole-of-society participation in the
formulation of strategies, plans, programs and policy measures in all stages of sudden-onset
disasters. Disaster preparedness at the national level also requires the development of laws and
regulations to facilitate and manage sudden-onset disasters, to ensure the protection of and
respect for the human rights of disaster displaced populations, budgetary allocations and the
institutional capacity development of government authorities and officials.793 The
790 See above n 789 and accompanying text; see also Cancun Speech DRR, above n 787; see Yonetani, above n 59, 9. 791 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54. 792 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752. 793 Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22-26 May 2017, above n 749, 10; see also Sendai Framework, above n 749, Priority 4; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54.
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arrangements at regional and global levels include the formulation of laws, strategies, plans
and policies on disaster preparedness aligned to practice standards outlined in international
operational guidelines, human rights principles and instruments, as well as the technical
assistance extended and future research conducted by regional agencies. The elements and
considerations drawn from the disaster preparedness literature have gone some way to enhance
our understanding of the building blocks to frame readiness for climate-induced human
mobility.
5.3 Climate Finance Readiness
Global climate policies under the aegis of the UNFCCC, such as the Copenhagen Accord,
Cancun Adaptation Framework—including other ‘international financial mechanisms’ outside
the UNFCCC process such as the ‘Official Development Assistance (ODA)’, among others—
are potential sources of climate finance.794 Much of the literature spanning economics, finance,
environmental and development dimensions pays particular attention to the readiness of
‘countries vulnerable to climate change such as Least Developing Countries (LDCs), Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) and Africa to maximise access to, leverage from, and to make
effective use of, international climate finance.’795 Readiness is important for climate finance
because it supports and facilitates nations with acute and vulnerable economies of scale to
achieve the commitments under the Paris Agreement.796 Climate finance involves advancing
global financial assistance to nations to ‘promote low-emission and climate-resilient
development’ as underscored in the Paris Agreement.797 The premise of readiness straddles
the institutional, regulatory, policy and planning dimensions of countries seeking to access
794 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192; see also Lianbiao Cui and Yuran Huang, ‘Exploring the Schemes for Green Climate Fund Financing: International Lessons’ (2018) 101 World Development 173, 173–4; see also Walid Ali and Fuad Al-Kadasi, ‘A Framework to Strengthen National Climate Finance Readiness in Yemen: An Interim Mechanism Under the Social Fund for Development (SFD)’ (Policy Concept Note) 3 <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/search.html?q=readiness+>. See also Veerle Vandeweerd, Yannick Glemarec and Simon Billett, ‘Readiness for Climate Finance: A Framework for Understanding What it Means to be Ready to Use Climate Finance’ (Research Paper, United Nations Development Programme, 16 April 2012) 1 (‘UNDP Readiness Paper 2012’). 795 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 123–4; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. See also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Climate Finance Readiness Programme (CF Ready), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (‘GIZ CF Ready Programme’) <https://www.giz.de/expertise/html/19694.html>. 796 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14. 797 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–3, 1203; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 123–4, 131.
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financial assistance to implement climate change mitigation projects.798 Collectively, the
climate finance readiness literature (CFR literature) provides an important opportunity to
advance our understanding to frame readiness for human mobility in the context of climate
change.
Elements of Climate Finance Readiness and Green Climate Fund
Capacity is at the heart of climate finance readiness (CFR), which traverses an array of strands
to access and allocate climate finance effectively.799 The reference to CFR in the CFR literature
usually refers to ‘the capacities of countries to plan for, access, deliver, and monitor and report
on climate finance, both international and domestic, in ways that are catalytic and fully
integrated with national development priorities and achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs).’800 The four key elements that underpin capacity, as identified
by Vandeweerd, Glemarec and Billett, are ‘1) financial planning, 2) accessing different forms
and types of finance, 3) delivering finance and implementing and executing projects and
programmes, and 4) monitoring, reporting and verifying on financial expenditures and
associated results/transformative impacts.’801
Furthermore, the interplay between the definition of CFR and the legal dimension of CFR
underpinned by an enabling environment is also a central feature reflected across the CFR
literature.802 For ‘developing countries to attract public or private investments, a robust
enabling environment based on predictable, transparent and enforceable legal and regulatory
framework’ is pivotal.803 From a legal perspective, Morita and Pak identify the ‘barriers to
access public and private international climate finance in the Asia-Pacific region.’804 They
argue that ‘passing new laws and regulations or adjusting existing laws and regulations to
ensure that climate change considerations are fully incorporated into the applicable legal and
regulatory framework for low carbon and climate resilient pathways’ is required.805 Morita
798 Smita Nakhooda et al, ‘Understanding Readiness to Access and Use Climate Finance Effectively – Insights from Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia’ (Synthesis Brief, Overseas Development Institute and African Climate Finance Hub, October 2013) 3 <https://www.odi.org/projects/2735-climate-finance-readiness>. 799 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–7, 23; see also Cui and Huang, above n 794, 174–5. 800 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, ii. 801 Ibid 4–5, 23. 802 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13. 803 Ibid. 804 Ibid 11. 805 Ibid.
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and Pak argue that the laws and regulations need to be ‘based on comprehensive assessment,
analysis and consultations to create the enabling environment for renewable energy uptake.’806
Moreover, there is growing recognition in the CFR literature of the need to situate the ‘role of
private-sector finance in funding climate related activities’ within the tenets of international
public finance to enhance ambition towards low-carbon development.807 Finance flows from
the private sector are recognised as able to ‘catalyse public climate finance alongside much
larger capital flows.’808 Private sector finance readiness is described as the ‘readying phase,
which involves activities such as strengthening of regulatory frameworks, institution building,
capacity building, and provision of incentives to attract private sector investments towards
climate change initiatives.’809 Private sector finance readiness is also integral to establishing
an ‘enabling/investment environment’, as highlighted above.810 The strands of both public and
private international climate finance offer rich perspectives in framing readiness for human
mobility in the context of climate change.811
Similarly, in considering capacity as a central feature underlying CFR, the activities woven
into readiness can be enabled by the Green Climate Fund (GCF).812 The GCF is the ‘principal
financial resource’, among other climate funds (REDD+), ‘for financing climate change
mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.’813 In their recent case study assessing
climate finance readiness in ‘twelve countries in the Asian sub-region and the Pacific sub-
region’, Samuwai and Hills argue that to date, ‘USD 39.5 million has been mobilised for
readiness to increase the support that will ready countries to access this (GCF) finance.’814 By
way of illustration, ‘123 readiness projects covering 88 developing countries have been
806 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 7, 9, 11, 13. 807 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193, 1203; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1. 808 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 2. 809 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193, 1203. 810 Ibid. 811 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 7–8, 11. 812 Nakhooda, above n 798; see also GIZ CF Ready Programme, above n 795; see also United Nations Environment, United Nations Development Programme and World Resources Institute, What Is Climate Finance Readiness, GCF Readiness Programme (‘UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme’) <http://www.gcfreadinessprogramme.org/what-climate-finance-readiness>; see also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Climate Finance Readiness Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57753.html>. 813 Nakhooda, above n 798; see also GIZ CF Ready Programme, above n 795; see also UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812; see also Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH, Climate Finance Readiness Programme, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/57753.html>. 814 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1201.
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approved by the GCF.’815 The definition of GCF readiness, as described by Samuwai and Hills,
‘relates to the preparation of a national accredited entity (NAE) of a developing country to
directly access finance from the Fund.’816 The building blocks to ‘get ready for GCF financing’
are twofold.817 First, the institutional mechanisms at a national level need to be developed with
regard to ‘planning, budgeting, programming and monitoring procedures and systems.’818
Second, the ‘mechanisms need to be compatible with existing and future planning and
budgeting systems and integrated with the country’s national plans, policies, and sustainable
development priorities.’819 Samuwai and Hills point out the ‘GCF readiness approach tends to
adopt a narrow scope of readiness by assessing institutions’ relative to a broader perspective
of readiness in the context of global climate finance which, ‘adopts a country-wide approach.’
820
The capacity of local authorities to access and use international climate finance traversing the
planning, accessing, delivering and monitoring, reporting and verifying phases for climate
change mitigation activities are elements drawn from the definitions of CFR and GCF. Other
elements include the alignment of capacities principally present in national development plans,
priorities and budgets, the alignment of the legal and regulatory framework for climate change
mitigation activities through the formulation of laws and regulations, or the strengthening of
existing laws and regulation through revision. The inclusion of consultations and participatory
approaches to inform the legal and regulatory framework to establish an enabling environment
as well as seeking accreditation for tailored entities for climate investment through national
laws, policies and plans are additional elements drawn from the definition of CFR and GCF.821
Barriers to Accessing Climate Finance
There is a considerable body of experience in the CFR literature that has enhanced
consideration of the challenges in accessing climate finance. For example, ‘economic strength,
public opinion, government intention, and international peer pressure’ are barriers to attracting
815 Ibid 1193. 816 Ibid. 817 UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812. 818 Ibid. 819 Ibid. 820 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193. 821 Ibid 1192–1209; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14.
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new investments or using finance for climate-related activity.822 Samuwai and Hills argue that
the rigorous conditions for accessing climate finance are inevitable.823 Identifying barriers
within the context of CFR assists in developing an understanding of future-focused
considerations necessary for relocation projects in the context of climate investment. It also
provides an opportunity to advance knowledge to frame readiness human mobility in the
context of climate change in the future. It is acknowledged that the parameters to access
climate finance are situated within adaptation and low-carbon development programs, which
dismiss funding for relocation projects.824 This warrants substantial attention in international
climate policy fora to ‘simplify and to enhance direct access to multilateral funds’, which is
currently the subject of debate.825
Adenle, Manning and Arbiol’s empirical study investigating the constraints of obtaining
finance for climate mitigation projects in Africa reveals the ‘lack of institutional capacity and
clear legal frameworks, including weak institutions’ as key barriers to project financing and
implementation.’826 Furthermore, they draw attention to approaches that can strengthen
institutions, which include: ‘1) capacity building, 2) research and development, 3) partnership
development, and 4) disbursement of financial resources.’827 Commenting on the barriers
identified by Adenle, Manning and Arbiol in relation to capacity, Morita and Pak outline seven
capacity challenges for climate investment which involve:
(i) inadequate legal and regulatory framework and limited enforcement capacity; (ii) weak organisational capacity, leadership and governance; (iii) weak research capacity and lack of access to systematic climate data; (iv) delays in budgetary prioritisation for climate actions; (v) limited capacity to identify, develop and process climate change projects and programs; (vi) a lack of access to expertise and international good practice for climate change mitigation and adaptation; (vii) lengthy technical and administrative processes involved in issuing permits and licenses for climate change activities.828
In the same vein, the contribution by Dean, in the book The Routledge Handbook of Disaster
Risk Reduction Including Climate Change Adaptation details some of the barriers to access
finance which encompasses:
(i) misalignment between institutional arrangements for DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA), and the budgetary systems in place to allocate, categorise and track resources at the
822 Cui and Huang, above n 794, 185; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, ii, 1; see also Annika Dean, ‘Funding and Financing for Disaster Risk Reduction including Climate Change Adaptation’ in Ilan Kelman, Jessica Mercer and JC Gillard (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Disaster Risk Reduction Including Climate Change Adaptation (Routledge, 2017) 393, 393–406. 823 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193, 1203. 824 Katrina Miriam Wyman, ‘Responses to Climate Migration’ (2013) 37(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review 167, 181–5; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 138. 825 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1201, 1203. 826 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124–5, 131. 827 Ibid 124. 828 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 7–9.
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national level; (ii) capacity constraints of countries most vulnerable to disaster risks, including climate change, which have the least capacity to access, use, report and acquit funding; (iii) inappropriate modalities as finance is delivered on a project-by-project basis via multilateral implementing agencies that hamper use of national systems.829
Collectively, the general lack of capacity of institutions, technical skills, climate mitigation
projects and programs—as well as research and data inventories—inhibit developing countries
from being able to access finance flows for climate investment.830 The lack of adequacy
spanning the legal and regulatory framework and policy dimensions and poorly defined
climate mitigation activities in budgets are additional barriers to gaining access to finance
flows.831
The Outlook for Vulnerable Pacific Island Countries
The multilateral and private finance flows have important implications for building readiness,
particularly for climate vulnerable countries with potentially acute economies of scale.832 The
reason for drawing attention to Pacific Island countries (PICs) within the broader scope of
CFR is twofold. First, an absence of adequate support to PICs in the form of capacity
development, technical assistance, skills and knowledge may mean that the readiness of PICs
for climate investment could be sporadic and difficult to establish.833 This may mean that the
ability to participate in climate change mitigation activities and access international climate
finance may be substantially delayed as PICs continue to cope and build resilience to the
adverse effects of sudden- and slow-onset environmental change through adaptation
activities.834 Secondly, for PICs, readiness for future human mobility in the context of climate
change may potentially present additional challenges.
The CFR literature pays particular attention to ‘developing countries that lack the financial
resources necessary or the institutional, policy, and skills system to access and use climate
finance effectively’, relative to ‘developed countries which have internal capacities to generate
829 Dean, above n 822, 393, 397–402, 404 –5. 830 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 123–32; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 831 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–1209; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 832 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–3, 1203; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–2. 833 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192–1209; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 834 See above n 833 and accompanying text; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6–14.
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and use climate finance.’835 The CFR literature has tended to focus on financial resources as a
factor for consideration towards readiness for the PICs.836 Nunn and Kumar point out that ‘[I]t
seems unlikely…developed-country governments…will be able to sustain their present level
of adaptation funding to developing countries in the face rising costs…as they (developed
countries) endeavor to climate proof their vulnerable regions.’837 They assert that ‘…reviving
cashless (or cash-minimized) adaptation…by communal construction of stone-built from
seawalls to artificial islands; communal planning and labour (local materials), and re-discovery
of traditional Pacific ways…from food preservation…use of traditional pharmacopoeias’ may
need to be considered by PICs as part of readiness.838
Echoing similar sentiments, the study by Samuwai and Hills discussed earlier reveals a
‘massive readiness gap between the Asian sub-region and the Pacific sub-region.’839 The study
records that the Asian countries’ readiness performance was progressive.840 This was reflected
by the ‘variety of financial instruments issued such as green bonds, tax-free infrastructure
bonds for renewable energy projects, and the establishment of National Climate Funds (NCF)
to mobilise domestic and international climate finance.’841 Based on these accounts, among
others, they found that these financial instruments enabled Asian countries to attract diverse
funding and to be able to comply with the required financial mechanisms.842 In the case of
PICs, Samuwai and Hills found that the readiness progress was not uniformly defined and was
less well established.843 They recorded that ‘access to climate finance was primarily limited to
bilateral sources and multinational entities, with grants being the main instruments geared
towards adaptation activities instead of mitigation finance.’844 The ‘lack of knowledge-based
capacities to implement innovative financial instruments, underdeveloped or non-existent
financial sector due to their very small and largely undiversified economies’ were other key
reasons recorded as barriers to their readiness progress.845 Samuwai and Hills concluded that
the current readiness approach designed for the Pacific sub-region ‘provides little assurance
that it will improve their access to climate finance conundrum and the impact of on-going and
835 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1, 23. 836 Patrick D Nunn and Roselyn Kumar, ‘Cashless Adaptation to Climate Change: Unwelcome yet Unavoidable?’ (2019) 1(1) One Earth 31, 31–34. 837 Ibid 31, 33. 838 Ibid. 839 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1192, 1200, 1203. 840 Ibid 1200, 1203. 841 Ibid. 842 Ibid. 843 Ibid. 844 Ibid. 845 Ibid.
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prolonged inaccessibility of multilateral funds, as well as private finance will be severe, and
existential for some.’846 They suggest that for Pacific nations in particular, ‘readiness needs to
be viewed as a nationwide phenomenon rather than a mere institutional issue.’847 Furthermore,
they identified ‘strengthening national policy, effective longitudinal monitoring of readiness
progress, and a better understanding of the magnitude of risks posed by climate change in
relation to a country’s abilities’ as focal points to inform readiness progress of the Pacific sub-
region.848
Determinants drawing on CFR
Salient elements conceptualised from the definition of CFR include the presence of capacity
development, a robust enabling environment, laws and regulations, consultations, incentives,
budgets and institutional mechanisms in a number of administrative and operational
components, principally plans, policies, strategies and priorities. 849 These offer valuable
insights in framing readiness for future human mobility in the context of climate change. In
addition, the CFR literature has broadened understanding of the barriers to accessing
multilateral and private finance flows, which include ‘limited capacity, weak institutions, and
a lack of clear legal frameworks.’850 The CFR literature also identifies potential measures that
can be adopted to respond to these barriers by national and sectoral levels. These include
‘capacity building, research and development, partnership development, and disbursement of
financial resources.’851 Similarly, there is widespread consensus in the CFR literature that PIC
will always be on the ‘‘back foot’’ in seeking to access international climate finance. One of
the approaches suggested in the CRR literature to address this issue is to frame the response
to—and integrate readiness from—a broader frame of reference of a nation, relative to the
narrow framing around institutional capacity.852
The constituent elements and considerations drawn from the CFR literature provide
considerable insights to frame readiness for human mobility in the context of climate change
846 Ibid 1203. 847 Ibid 1193. 848 Ibid 1193–4. 849 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27. 850 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124. 851 Ibid. 852 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1193.
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as well as to develop targeted interventions as a basis to access international climate finance
for future relocation projects.
5.4 International Humanitarian Assistance Preparedness
There is a considerable body of experience documented in the international humanitarian
assistance [IHA] literature that acknowledges considerations spanning legal, practical and
operational dimensions to extend international humanitarian relief across international
borders, also commonly cited as ‘cross-border disaster assistance in the immediate aftermath
of a rapid-onset disaster.’853 The central features underlying transnational relief advanced by
‘international responders such as humanitarian NGOs or UN agencies’ from a broader
perspective entail ‘goods and materials (material convergence), informational inquiries and
offers of assistance (informational convergence), and a significant influx of people (physical
convergence).’854 It is widely recognised in the IHA literature that disaster relief, search and
rescue, and the deployment of ‘emergency medical care providers’, including military
personnel, are well-known sources of immediate emergency assistance in response to a
disaster.855
Preparedness is important for cross-border humanitarian assistance because it requires
comprehensive coordination between the government of the disaster-affected state and
international responders. Moreover, preparedness requires a well-articulated legal and
regulatory framework to underscore the processes, functions, responsibilities and authority of
local government bodies to effectively facilitate, manage and execute international disaster
assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster.856 Furthermore, preparedness identifies the
need for the sovereignty of the disaster-affected state to be acknowledged with the advent of
853 Bookmiller, above n 8, 957–84; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208; see also Barber, above n 160, 144; see also Cohen and Bradley, above n 435, 95–142; see also Tessa Kelly and Lucio Cipullo, ‘Typhoon Haiyan: Shaping the Future of Legal Preparedness for International Disaster Relief’ (2014) 23(1) Human Rights Defender 11, 11–13; see also Takashi Nagata et al, ‘Successful Hospital Evacuation After the Kumamoto Earthquakes, Japan, 2016’ (2017) 11(5) Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 517, 520. 854 Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 961–2; see also Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Stellina Jolly, ‘Interrogating the Pedagogy of State Responsibility and Individual Rights in Disaster Law’ in Amita Singh (ed), Disaster Law Emerging Thresholds (Routledge, 2017) 146. 855 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958–9, 966; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9; see also Aahna Srikanth, ‘Letter to the Editor’ (2010) 25(6) Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 604. 856 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12; see also Barber, above n 160, 143–165.
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international assistance and international personnel and volunteers deployed to disaster-
affected areas of the state.857 The integration of effective monitoring mechanisms and controls
into the domestic regulatory framework for the overall transition of cross-border humanitarian
assistance is also part of preparedness.858 These are considerations that the government of a
disaster-affected state needs to have established to procure international humanitarian
assistance. Together, the IHA literature provides important insights into building an
understanding of the focus areas of readiness in the context of climate-induced human
mobility.
Elements of IHA Preparedness
The IHA literature confirms that a formal convention or legal instrument exclusively for cross-
border humanitarian assistance is not well supported under international law.859 The broad use
of the term IHA preparedness is underscored in soft-law instruments, or as Bookmiller states
‘soft-law oriented technical guidelines’ established by institutions of the UN agencies such as
the ‘International Law Commission [ILC] and the United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA]’, to cite a few.860 Other institutions include ‘major non-
governmental relief organisations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC), CARE and OXFAM.’861 Some notable examples include the
‘Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and
Initial Recovery Assistance [IDRL Guidelines 2007]’, which articulate to the ‘Model Act for
the Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance
[Model Act 2013], the ‘Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters
[Draft Articles 2014]’ and the ‘Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
2014’, among others.862 In addition, soft law instruments are non-obligatory, which suggests
that governments of states are not compelled to embed them into their domestic legal
framework.863
857 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11, 13; see also Barber, above n 160, 149–50. 858 See above n 856 and accompanying text. 859 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958–9; see also Jolly, above n 812, 146; see also Barber, above n 139, 147. 860 Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 961, 965; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146, 151; see also Barber, above n 160, 144, 147–8; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 861 See above n 860 and accompanying text. 862 Barber, above n 160, 147–8, 150; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 211; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 965–6. 863 Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146.
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It is acknowledged that a multitude of interconnected elements present in soft law instruments
embody the definition of IHA preparedness. Due to practical constraints, this thesis cannot
provide a comprehensive review of all these elements. The discussion drawing on soft law
instruments that follows, outlines the building blocks for preparedness of countries for IHA.
For example, the IDRL Guidelines serve to ‘assist governments in strengthening its domestic
legal arrangements for managing international disaster.’864 Moreover, the guidelines
recommend ‘that governments provide certain legal facilities’, for example ‘visas, customs,
and taxes, among others to international disaster responders to allow them to efficiently assist
communities in need and that governments hold international actors to minimum humanitarian
quality standards.’865 Another example, is the Model Act, which ‘supports the implementation
of the Guidelines and is intended as a reference tool for law-makers of governments of the
states as they develop national legislation on managing and strengthening the legal
preparedness of international aid in a manner appropriate to their national circumstances.’866
In addition, the Draft Articles contribute to ‘clarify the roles, rights, and duties of the affected
state in disaster response vis-à-vis the duties and rights of states providing international
assistance.’867 This list is far from exhaustive, but it is representative of the minimum ‘practice
standards, guidelines and procedures’ present in soft law instruments to inform
preparedness.868 Soft law instruments underpin the legal, operational and logistical aspects of
‘large scale disasters requiring international assistance’ at a national level, which provides an
opportunity to advance the understanding of readiness in the context of climate change-
induced mobility.869
Similarly, soft law instruments are ‘based on existing international instruments’, such as
‘international human rights law and international humanitarian law where applicable.’870 They
embody a multitude of ‘legal norms and principles.’871 For example, the ‘ILC draft principles
on the protection of individuals’ underscore the ‘right to protection, safety and security, right
to disaster relief and basic needs of economic and social rights.’872 This suggests that the scope
864 Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, ‘Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance’ (Programme Report, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2011) 6 (‘IFRC Guidelines 2011’). 865 See above n 864 and accompanying text. 866 Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 867 Barber, above n 160, 147–8. 868 Ibid 150; see also Jolly, above n 854, 144; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 869 See above n 868 and accompanying text. 870 Jolly, above n 854, 151–2; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210. 871 Jolly above n 854, 143; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11. 872 See above n 871 and accompanying text.
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of IHA preparedness amongst the considerations highlighted above straddles a human-rights
based approach. According to Jolly, the purpose of a human rights approach is twofold.873 The
first purpose is to scale-up ‘efforts at both national and international levels to establish state
responsibilities towards its people for international relief and humanitarian relief during
disasters.’874 The second is to accelerate action ‘to promote people-oriented, human-rights
based disaster relief plans and strategies’ within ‘social, economic and cultural’ dimensions.875
The IHA literature, in adopting a rights-based approach offers insights to draw upon to frame
readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility from a protection standpoint.876
The usefulness and effectiveness of soft law instruments to inform preparedness for cross-
border humanitarian assistance can be illustrated by the preliminary study conducted by Kelly
and Cipullo into the national legal and operational arrangements following Typhoon Haiyan
in the Philippines in 2013.877 The results of their analysis reveal that all ‘relevant government
departments spanning registration, customs, immigration, quarantine and taxation’ centralised
their administration and functions at a single location to inspect, assess and process the
‘passage of international relief goods.’878 The approach to this initiative was recorded by Kelly
and Cipullo as a ‘One-Stop-Shop.’879 For example, ‘customs excise duty and taxes were
exempt on the entry of foreign goods and prior visa applications’ suspended temporarily for
international responders.880 Moreover, access for, and transition of, ‘humanitarian personnel
working in the field’ proved efficient and effective with the establishment of a ‘taskforce
deployed to disaster-affected locations.’881 The approach adopted is consistent with the IDRL
Guidelines, which serve legal facilities as indicated earlier. Kelly and Cipullo argue that the
IDRL Guidelines underscore the importance of such facilities if international responders
‘comply with fundamental humanitarian principles, the national laws of the affected state and
minimum standards of quality and accountability.’882
Moreover, Kelly and Cipullo argue that the domestic legal framework to respond to cross-
border disaster assistance by international responders remains poorly defined.883 Their
873 Jolly, above n 854, 152–4. 874 Ibid 154. 875 Ibid 151–2. 876 Ibid; see also Betts, above n 533, 72. 877 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13. 878 Ibid 12. 879 Ibid. 880 Ibid. 881 Ibid. 882 Ibid. 883 Ibid 11–13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208.
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investigation also revealed that the Government of the Philippines expedited regulatory
arrangements to ‘improve the legal preparedness for international disaster response’ from the
experiences and lessons learned in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan.884 The Model
Act underpins the legislative framework of the Philippines’ regulatory preparedness for cross-
border humanitarian aid in future.885 The analysis undertaken by Kelly and Cipullo is useful
as it demonstrates the legal dimension for preparedness of the Government of the Philippines
by integrating soft law instruments, such as legal facilities and the Model Act, in its operational
functions and the national legal framework for cross-border humanitarian assistance.886 The
explicit integration of global ‘practice standards, guidelines and systems into domestic law and
policy’ from Kelly and Cipullo’s study extends our understanding of the role soft law
instruments play in underscoring preparedness from a legal perspective.887 Their study
provides rich perspectives that can be advanced to develop readiness in the context of climate-
induced human mobility. Another example of what is meant by preparedness from a legal
dimension is detailed in the discussion that follows.
It is widely acknowledged in the IHA literature that ‘global humanitarian needs are increasing
and the international humanitarian system is becoming more stretched.’888 This indicates that
governments of states need to legally prepare, or as Jolly describes, ‘strengthen their legal
preparedness’ to ‘manage disasters within their own borders.’889 The integration of soft
instruments, as indicated earlier, into the ‘domestic legal framework of national governments’
for the ‘facilitation and regulation of international disaster assistance’ is a strand of
preparedness from a legal perspective.890 A broader perspective adopted by ‘international
responders to reduce legal uncertainties’ is anchored in ‘bilateral and/or regional disaster
agreements with governments on international co-operation in disaster response’, which
constitutes a further strand.891
The focus areas drawn from the IHA literature to inform preparedness encompass the explicit
inclusion of soft law instruments and their integration into domestic legal and regulatory
884 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12. 885 Ibid; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959. 886 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13. 887 Ibid; see also Barber, above n 160, 144, 147. 888 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13; see also Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12. 889 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11; see also Barber, above n 160, 148; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146. 890 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11. 891 Barber, above n 160, 147; see also Fisher, above n 13, 209, 211; see also Jolly, above n 854, 145.
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frameworks, developing targeted interventions to extend legal facilities by the government of
the affected disaster state, as well as examining guidelines to inform policymakers in
formulating national laws to manage and execute cross-border humanitarian assistance.
Another focus area includes demarcating the roles, responsibilities and duties of local
authorities and articulating them into the domestic regulatory framework to implement cross-
border humanitarian relief. The integration of a human rights approach to formulate disaster
relief plans, strategies, programs and policies, and arrangements facilitated by bilateral and
international cooperation is an additional focus area.892 These focus areas provide rich
perspectives to conceptualise readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Barriers to Cross-border Humanitarian Assistance
There is widespread consensus among scholars such as Barber, Fisher, Bookmiller, and Kelly
and Cipullo, that barriers spanning legal, political, administrative and logistical dimensions
lead ‘to the detriment of an effective, efficient response to the needs of the disaster affected
population.’893 The purpose of acknowledging barriers identified from the experiences and
lessons learned from cross-border humanitarian assistance is twofold. First, it better enables
policymakers to plan, manage, coordinate and facilitate relocation of communities across
international borders to the host country in the areas of policy, institutional and regulatory
dimensions at the domestic level. Second, it identifies approaches that underscore concerted
cooperation with the host country and countries of origin, including the international
community.
As noted by Bookmiller, in the ‘wake of natural disasters, many governments are not in a
position to appropriately manage a significant flow of external actors, in such circumstances,
states may not consistently enforce or may waive their rules altogether to open their doors
without any control over the assistance that comes in.’894 This can be illustrated briefly from
the global study carried out by the IFRC, which investigated ‘law(s) and legal issues, including
legal challenges in cross-border disaster operations’ at a global level.895 The analysis revealed
that bureaucratic processes relating to ‘delays due to ambiguous domestic procedures for
892 Barber, above n 160, 143–65; see also Jolly, above n 854, 143–58; Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13. 893 Barber, above n 160, 147, 150, 161; see also Jolly, above n 854, 149; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 958. 894 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958, 966; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210–11. 895 Fisher, above n 13, 208–9.
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making an appeal for international relief; and difficulties in legal registration for foreign
humanitarian organisations’ because of poorly defined regulations contributed to a host of
issues. These included, among others, the ‘importation of unneeded or inappropriate relief
items, poorly trained staff, failures to consult with beneficiaries’ and the insensitivity of
international responders to ‘culturally appropriate behaviours’ towards host communities.’896
There is a growing recognition in the IHA literature of the need for regulation within the ‘field
of cross-border [international] disaster medicine’, which presents an array of challenges linked
to cross-border humanitarian assistance.897 These challenges traverse two categories:
‘practitioners of disaster medicine’ and volunteers.898 The desk-based analysis conducted by
Fisher into IFRC’s qualitative and quantitative study above revealed that much uncertainty
still exists around the regulatory arrangements for cross-border disaster medicine that involve:
‘1) foreign credentials and competence of medical staff; 2) professional liability and insurance;
and 3) importation of medications and medical equipment.’899
Similarly, Bookmiller points out that ‘spontaneous or unaffiliated volunteers lacking
international experience arrive without self-sufficiency, proper vaccinations for endemic
diseases, language skills or any familiarity with the country’s culture and may be imposters
who falsely indicate they are professionally credentialed.’900 Bookmiller further points out that
these factors raise a series of issues and challenges that include ‘creating an immense
bottleneck at border entry points of affected states; burdening an already stressed local
response capacity; draining supplies from international providers meant for the local victims
of the crisis; and causing additional suffering and physical harm to the victims.’901 In
acknowledging ongoing global initiatives in relation to ‘professional quality standard-setting
among established networks of humanitarian providers’, Bookmiller maintains that far too
little attention has been paid to ‘converging unaffiliated volunteers and the quality challenges
they may pose.’902
896 Ibid 209. 897 Ibid 208; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959; see also Srikanth, above n 855. 898 Fisher, above n 13, 209; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 958, 959, 962. 899 Fisher above n 13, 209; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 964–5. 900 Bookmiller, above n 8, 958, 959, 962, 964; see also Jolly, above n 854, 153; see also ‘[i]nternational help must be sensitive to the local practices and cultural sensitivities in accordance with the needs of those affected and strike a balance between excessive regulatory laws and lack of any regulation’ as cited in Srikanth, above n 855, 604. 901 Bookmiller, above n 8, 962, 964. 902 Ibid 959, 965–6.
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Taken together, the bureaucratic structure that may exist at the domestic level, and the seldom
clear-cut regulatory arrangements—specifically those of professionals from the medical field
and volunteers—present a host of challenges that offers useful insights to inform readiness in
the context of cross-border relocation.903 Furthermore, the consideration to establish and
maintain professional standards for the regulation of the medical profession deployed in the
disaster-affected state, including establishing similar standards to uniformly regulate the
conduct and practices of volunteers, is part of preparedness. These considerations offer
insights into the legal dimensions to draw upon in framing readiness in the context of climate-
induced human mobility.
Future Efforts to Cross-border Humanitarian Assistance
The IHA literature recognises that extending humanitarian assistance across borders is
sporadic.904 This is because at one end of the spectrum ‘international humanitarian responders
are more familiar with their own humanitarian procedures, toolkits, and guidelines than they
are with legal frameworks.’905 The other end of the spectrum consists of national responders
acclimating to the ‘large influx of international aid and all of the associated co-ordination and
information management tasks’, because of the seldom clear–cut ‘national laws and policies
and structures.’906 In these circumstances, the underlying humanitarian imperative to ‘prevent
and alleviate human suffering at a pace that is not possible without international actors playing
a strong role to manage and coordinate relief response’, sever skeleton arrangements and
efforts on the ground of disaster-affected states.907 To address the dichotomy between
international and national responders, the IHA literature identifies the need for a ‘sustained
programme of awareness raising and capacity building to support national actors to better
prepare for and manage international humanitarian assistance.’908
Similarly, in acknowledging the host of regulatory challenges identified in the study by IFRC
cited above, Bookmiller argues that ‘cross-border humanitarian relief will only be improved
if governments of disaster-impacted countries, the UN agencies and the major relief sectors
themselves strongly work in tandem to enforce standards and guidelines in the wake of a
903 Ibid 959, 961–2; see also Jolly, above n 854, 153–4; see also Barber, above n 160, 143–65. 904 Barber, above n 160, 149–51; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12. 905 Barber, above n 160, 149. 906 Ibid 150. 907 Ibid 150–1. 908 Ibid 149–50.
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sudden-onset disaster.’909 Echoing similar sentiments, Barber points out that it is ‘incumbent
on domestic law-makers and disaster management authorities more so even than international
law-makers to ensure that domestic legislation regulates and facilities the well-meaning efforts
of international actors so that these efforts support, rather than undermine, the efforts of
national actors.’910
The approach to established programs, capacity building at the institutional level and the
collaborative efforts of a full spectrum of actors from national to international responders are
added layers to inform preparedness. These strands provide important insights into building
readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Determinants drawing on IHA
Salient elements present in soft instruments to inform preparedness for cross-border
humanitarian assistance include the international minimum ‘practice standards, guidelines and
procedures’ related to the demarcation of roles, functions and duties of national and
international responders to receive and advance cross-border humanitarian assistance.911 Other
elements include the need for developing an effective legislative framework at the domestic
level, the arrangements for legal facilities ‘(registration, customs, immigration and taxation)’
for the inflow of humanitarian assistance, enhancement of existing national laws, the
integration of a human rights-based approach in the design of plans, programs and strategies
and the need for ‘multi-sectoral consultations.’912 The alignment of regulatory, administrative
and operational arrangements at the national level starting from the very beginning with
practice standards, guidelines and procedures present in IHA soft law instruments provides a
basis to conceptualise readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
The IHA literature has enhanced consideration of the barriers to accessing cross-border
humanitarian assistance, which primarily involves ‘bureaucratic processes and the lack of
regulation (delays, ambiguous procedures, inappropriate relief items, for example).’913 The
IHA literature draws attention to the importance of well-established regulatory frameworks
909 Bookmiller, above n 8, 983–4. 910 Barber, above n 160, 148–9. 911 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–12; Barber, above n 160, 150; see also Jolly, above n 854, 143–4. 912 See above n 911 and accompanying text. 913 Fisher, above n 13, 209.
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and uniform standards related to medical professionals and volunteers. It provides rich
perspectives to frame readiness, and more specifically, to conceptualise the legal dimension
of readiness. Furthermore, the IHA literature identifies potential approaches that can be
adopted to respond to the barriers. These include well-articulated programs, building the
capacity of local government bodies and the holistic partnership and cooperation arrangements
facilitated through bilateral agreements across the full spectrum of responders of IHA.914 The
elements and focus areas drawn from the IHA literature assist in providing the building blocks
for readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
5.5 Public Health Preparedness
Over the past two decades, a large and growing body of literature has been published about
public health preparedness (PHP), which is interchangeably cited as public health emergency
preparedness (PHEP), to address the health and safety insecurities of the public from
widespread global threats.915 Within the broad framing of public health emergency, the first
category of threats includes ‘infectious disease epidemics, natural disasters and terrorism.’916
The second category of threats comprises ‘all other types of dangers to the health of the public’,
such as ‘tobacco use, HIV/AIDS, and food and water contamination’, to cite a few.917
Preparedness is important for the public’s health because it requires a well-coordinated and
comprehensive emergency response ‘through the health system (medical care and public
health)’ of the state.918 Moreover, preparedness requires well-articulated policies, plans,
strategies and programs by local government bodies and medical care facilities to maintain,
control and safeguard the health of the public in emergencies and potential pandemics.919
914 Ibid 208–12; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 983–4. 915 McGinty et al, above n 160, 79, 83; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also Maxim Gakh and Lainie Rutkow, ‘Lessons from Public Health Legal Preparedness to Operationalise Health in All Policies’ (2017) 45(3) Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 392, 392–401; see also James G Hodge, Lexi C White and Sarah A Wetter, ‘From [A]nthrax to Zika: Key Lessons in Public Health Legal Preparedness’ (2018) 15(1) Indiana Health Law Review 23, 23–42. 916 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672, 677; see also Hodge, White and Wetter, above n 915, 23. 917 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79, 83. 918 Belinda Bennett et al, ‘Health Governance: Law, Regulation and Policy’ (2009) 123(3) Public Health 207, 207. 919 Ibid 207; see also ‘Introducing the Major Concepts of Public Health Act 2005’, (Linda Selvey) <https://www.health.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/146326/32042.pdf >; see also Belinda Bennett and Terry Carney, ‘Pandemic Preparedness in Asia: A Role for Law and Ethics?’ (2011) 23(3) Asia-Pacific Journal of Public Health 419, 421–3. See ‘…regional capacity building and information sharing programs’ as cited in Bennett and Carney, 419, 422; see also “programs” entails ‘continuing education programmes for public health practitioners and policy makers’…in the context
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Similarly, the legal dimension of preparedness in the context of public health emergencies
requires a well-articulated public health regulatory framework and updated public health laws
consistent with emerging public health threats and outbreaks, including public health
requirements and standards in contemporary health practice.920 To effectively manage and
execute public health emergency services to members of the public, it is important to delineate
the exercise of authority, functions and responsibilities of local authorities, public health
professionals and medical care facilities in emergencies underpinned by legal arrangements at
the domestic level.921 The determinants present in the PHP literature are indicative of the
extensive requirements and measures that are needed by the public health system of the state
to cohesively and effectively respond to public health emergencies. Collectively, the PHP
literature provides a basis to develop an understanding to frame readiness in the context of
climate-induced human mobility.
Elements of Public Health Preparedness
Public health preparedness (PHP) as defined by seminal authors Moulton et al, is the ‘readiness
of a public health system (of a community, a state, the nation, the world community) to respond
to specified health threats.’922 Similarly, Gakh and Rutkow in their comparative study of
‘health in all policies (HiAP) and PHP’ argue that ‘PHP refers to a community’s collective
capability to prevent, protect against, quickly respond to, and recover from health emergencies,
particularly those whose scale, timing, or unpredictability threatens to overwhelm routine
capabilities.’923 They also point out that ‘concerted collaboration and data sharing’, including
articulating appropriate ‘systems and networks’ within ‘government agencies at multiple
levels, the private sector, and communities’ are key features of PHP.924 Collectively, the
capacity of the public health system to respond effectively to the various phases of public
health emergencies, the engagement and inclusivity of local government bodies, agencies,
communities—including the private sector—to inform decision-making on effective public
health emergency response, as well as approaches to data sharing are elements drawn from the
of ‘public health tabacco programmes includes use of smokeless tabacco as an option in smoking cessation’ as cited in Bennett et al, above n 918, 207, 208, 211; 920 McGinty et al, above n 160, 84, 79; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 673–4; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393. 921 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83. 922 Ibid 673; see also Botoseneanu et al, ‘Achieving Public Health Legal Preparedness: How Dissonant Views on Public Health Law Threaten Emergency Preparedness and Response’ (2011) 33(3) Journal of Public Health 361, 361–8. 923 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 394. 924 Ibid 394–5.
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definition of PHP.925 These elements provide building blocks to conceptualise readiness for
climate-induced human mobility.
Legal Dimension of Public Health Preparedness
There is a considerable body of experience in public health practice that acknowledges that
public health legal preparedness (PHLP) is pivotal to ‘enable the government to fulfil its duty
to safeguard public health and the responsibility to ensure appropriate protection action is
taken to respond to threats.’926 Legal preparedness (LP) is described as the ‘contribution legal
tools make to assuring safe and healthy conditions of a society along with public health
tools.’927 The legal tools encompass ‘public health statutes, ordinances, regulations and legal
authorities.’928 The underlying purpose of the tools draws attention to levels for protective
action by ‘prioritisation through planning; allocation of responsibility; collaboration and
coordination; responsive funding; and the emphasis on vulnerable populations.’929 An example
of what the phrase ‘emphasise the needs of vulnerable populations’ means is the development
of ‘[s]pecific policies and plans to acclimate vulnerable populations into preparedness
planning and response, including paying greater attention to culture, language, and trust
through mapping, community engagement, emergency planning, and appropriate information
dissemination.’930 In addition to law as a component in the development of tools, policies and
plans, including approaches to craft the legal and regulatory framework for PHP, the
‘competencies (i.e. abilities, skills) of those responsible for applying the law; coordination of
legally based interventions across sectors and jurisdictions; and the access to information
resources on the content and interpretation of law by multidisciplinary practitioners’ are
strands oriented towards the legal dimension of PHP.931 A brief overview of these strands is
examined respectively.
The reference to competencies relates to public health officials and practitioners (health
officials) being knowledgeable with appropriate skills to access, ‘understand, interpret and
apply public health laws’ in times of public health emergencies as part of public health
925 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–7, 681–2. 926 Ibid 673–4; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 84, 78–9; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361. 927 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 422–3. 928 Moulton et al, above n 8, 675, 681; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–9; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361. 929 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393, 395–8; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361. 930 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393, 397–8. 931 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 676–7, 681.
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practice.932 These tasks cannot be considered in isolation and require joint efforts from a host
of members drawn from the public and private sector to orient health officials such as ‘law
enforcement officials, advocacy organisations, academics, etc.’933 Likewise, coordination
requires congruent engagement by health officials with respect to ‘public health practice,
policy, guidelines and resources’ because they encompass all jurisdictions, including
international.934 Lastly, information focuses on the procurement of ‘public health emergency
statutes and regulations, judicial rulings, reports on innovations and public health law best
practices and practice guidelines’, which presents a catalogue streamlined for public officials
to address and respond to emergencies.935 One of the aspects of information sharing can be
clearly seen in the case of the role courts play during public health emergencies.936 For
example, under the ‘US system of justice’ at the federal and state levels, courts recognise that
‘public health officials may subject individuals or groups to involuntary civil confinement,
such as isolation, quarantine, or other compulsory social distancing measures.’937 LP
‘necessitates courts to provide procedural due process protections such as access to legal
counsel to ensure that those measures do not unduly interfere with the rights of individuals or
groups.’938
The legal dimension of preparedness in the public health emergency context is exhibited by
the development of tools, policies and plans with the explicit integration of legal authority,
responsibilities and functions of public health officials and personnel, and public health bodies
and facilities to respond to public health emergencies.939 Other key factors include the
inclusivity, engagement, collaboration and coordination by the ‘public health and population
health system’ (communities, agencies, private sectors, and the state) to inform legal tools, the
knowledge of legal tools and the competency to effectively interpret them by public health
officials and personnel in public health emergencies, access to information (practices,
guidelines, reports, rulings) and the explicit inclusion of the role of courts to safeguard the
comprehensive rights of the members of the public and medical professionals, including
individuals in health emergencies.940
932 Ibid 674. 933 Ibid. 934 Ibid. 935 Ibid. 936 Daniel D Stier, Diane Nicks and Gregory J Cowan, ‘The Courts, Public Health, and Legal Preparedness’ (2007) 97(S1) American Journal of Public Health S69, S69–3. 937 Ibid S69, S71. 938 Ibid S71. 939 Moulton et al, above n 8, 682; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–401; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 419–30. 940 See above n 939 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, an added complication with LP is how legal tools are ‘actually understood,
perceived, and implemented (de facto law), including differences in interpretation.’941 As
Moulton et al, cite, implementation approaches include ‘evacuation orders, administrative
rules and regulations, memoranda of understanding, and mutual aid agreements among
localities, states or nations.’942 For example, the ‘legal powers and responsibilities’ from the
standpoint of government administration during ‘public health emergencies enables
governments to declare emergencies that may temporarily expand government powers and
suspend certain requirements, provide legal immunity to responders and even encourage
response.’943
The importance of clarifying the division of powers and responsibilities of local government
bodies and health officials to respond consistently to public health emergencies is illustrated
by the empirical investigation of McGinty et al, into a host of ‘emergency preparedness laws
in 4 contiguous mid-Atlantic states’ following Hurricane Sandy in 2012.944 The findings
revealed that ‘all 4 states had enacted laws enabling the government to order evacuation of the
public from an area when safety is imperiled or to order evacuation of a specific facility such
as a hospital, when conditions at that facility pose a threat.’945 The second major finding
revealed that ‘[n]one of the 4 states had enacted statutes or regulations explicitly granting the
government the authority to order people to seek immediate refuge wherever they were (i.e.
“shelter-in-pace”) at the time of Hurricane Sandy.’946 McGinty et al, argue that the lack of a
comprehensive legal framework inhibits the government administration and public healthcare
facilities (officials) to be ready to response to public health emergencies during natural
disasters.947 This is because it officials have competing priorities, including encountering the
‘complex decision of whether to evacuate, shelter-in-place, or do nothing.’948 McGinty et al,
suggest that ‘[s]tates can improve their readiness for catastrophic disasters by ensuring the
explicit statutory authority where it does not already exist.’949
941 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393, 395–8. 942 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 676–7, 681–2; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361, 366. 943 Moulton et al, above n 8, 678–9; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 395. 944 McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–9, 80, 84. 945 Ibid. 946 Ibid 78, 83. 947 Ibid 78, 82–3. 948 Ibid 78–9, 82. 949 Ibid 78–9, 84.
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A further illustration of the inconsistent approaches to implementing and interpreting legal
tools across public health organisational structures can be illustrated briefly by the qualitative
case study conducted by Botoseneanu et al, with ‘144 public health and emergency officials
at state level and local jurisdictions in the US region.’950 In acknowledging that some research
has been carried out to identify ‘gaps in the existing laws hindering cross-sectoral (e.g. public
health, emergency management, law enforcement, health-care providers) and cross-
jurisdictional (local, state, federal) cooperation and coordination of emergency preparedness’,
Botoseneanu et al, confirm that no single study exists that has reported on ‘how differences in
organisational culture shape the interpretation of the law and further shape collaboration across
sectors.’951 One of the more significant findings to emerge from their empirical research is that
‘organisational culture and discourse, derived from public health [PH] and emergency
management [EM] practitioners’ interpretations of and expectations from the legal
environment, influence their approach to preparedness work and to collaboration with other
stakeholders.’952 They recorded ‘wide variation in how local preparedness law defines
emergencies, liability protection and the role of authorities in emergency response
situations.’953 Their findings further reveal that the ‘PH and EM organisational culture differed
significantly’ with respect to ‘PHP initiatives in their organisation, administration, work-force
and funding sources.’954 They noted the lack of synergy in the ‘interpretation of the law’, which
presented as operational and practical indicators to instigate potential friction and conflict
among ‘PH-EM organisational cultures.’955 Botoseneanu et al, argue that ‘collaborative
processes are essential to achieving the mission of public health.’956 They suggest a subjective
process be adopted by ‘exposing and addressing the reasons behind ineffective collaboration
and better guidance and transparent inter-agency communication for the application of laws’
as a course of action for consideration towards emergency preparedness in the future.957 A
further suggestion advanced by Botoseneanu et al, correlates with undertaking ‘legal
amendments to clarify the extent, scope and context of legal authority of multi-agency and
multi-jurisdictional response for routine and exigent circumstances.’958
950 Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361–2. 951 Ibid 362, 366. 952 Ibid 366. 953 Ibid. 954 Ibid. 955 Ibid. 956 Ibid. 957 Ibid. 958 Ibid.
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Likewise, the quantitative study conducted by Nagata et al, into inpatient hospital evacuation
following the 2016 Kumamoto earthquakes in Japan is also notable.959 The study is indicative
of the legal dimension of preparedness outlining effective implementation approaches to
public evacuation emergency. The significant finding to emerge from the data reveals that
‘more than 700 patients were transferred to other facilities’ of the Kumamoto Prefecture within
a span of 24 hours.960 Nagata et al, recorded that ‘[f]our doctors, 80 hospital staff, and an
additional 100 off-duty staff members joined to the triage, assessment, and hospital reception’,
which were in addition to the existing medical staff at various medical facilities.961 They
further recorded that the ‘overall medical response in the immediate aftermath of the
Kumamoto earthquakes’ was successful.962 The success of the emergency response and
operation is attributed in part to the lessons learned from the ‘Great East Japan Earthquake and
hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant’ in 2011.963 Nagata et al,
document that the ‘lack of information, lack of coordination among agencies, lack of
leadership’ and the poorly defined emergency laws for instance, the ‘Disaster Countermeasure
Basic Act [DCBA]’ were key impediments to a comprehensive medical response to the
devastation.964 Against this background, key changes included the revision of the DCBA,
‘including the availability of shelters, and multi-agency coordination and collaboration to
enable sharing of information.’965 Furthermore, the Disaster Medical Assistant Team [DMAT],
which consists of teams spanning ‘fireman, police, Japan Self-Defense Forces, and the local
population’ was subsequently reviewed with respect to communication plans, functions,
activities (training and drills) and guidelines to operationalise the DMAT system effectively
in times of natural disaster.966
The implementation approaches exemplified by the extensive body of experience presented in
studies by McGinty et al, Botoseneanu et al, and Nagata et al include the explicit inclusion and
articulation of authority, powers and responsibilities of public health officials, facilities and
personnel integrated and reflected in public health statutes and the revision of existing laws,
regulations and policies to reflect contemporary public health emergency standards, guidelines
959 Nagata et al, above n 853, 517. 960 Ibid 517–18, 520. 961 Ibid 519. 962 Ibid 517, 520. 963 Ibid 518–19, 520. 964 Ibid 520. 965 Ibid. 966 Ibid 517, 520.
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and practice.967 Other implementation approaches from these studies include the integration
and alignment of effective multiagency coordination and inter-agency communication and
coordination in policies, plans, strategies and in public health statutes as well as information
sharing and communication plans across the full spectrum of public health emergency
channels ‘(cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional)’, including administrative, operational and
organisational structures. These studies go some way towards demonstrating how
implementation approaches interact with the law as a component in the PHP context.968
Similarly, a parallel body of research anchored in influenza pandemic preparedness to ‘detect
emerging pandemic and to respond to public health emergencies’ is notable in supplementing
the legal dimension of preparedness in the context of public health emergencies.969 Bennett
and Carney, in their comprehensive review and analysis of scholarly articles from the legal,
socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of pandemic preparedness in the Asia region note three
key features underlying the legislative framework.970 These are the formulation of an: ‘1)
influenza national preparedness plan, 2) assessment of the legal basis for public health tools
(quarantine, isolation, etc.), and the 3) review of existing public health emergency laws and
policies relating to vaccination of health care workers, and the liability and licensing of retired
health care workers and volunteers who may assist during a pandemic.’971 To complement the
legal framework with respect to pandemic planning they also highlight the consideration of
‘ethical principles for the allocation of scarce resources such as access to antivirals and
vaccines particularly in resource-poor countries.’972 The ‘principles of utility (saving the most
lives) and fair innings (fairness)’ focused on the allocation of resources, which is based on the
criteria of priority setting.973 The non-discriminatory aspects of ‘race, gender, class or national
origin and vulnerable populations most at risk’, to cite a few, are equated with the criteria for
priority setting for pandemic preparedness.974 The consideration of ‘local conditions,
indigenous cultural and religious perspectives’ are other ethical aspects that embody pandemic
planning as part of the legal framework for pandemic preparedness.975
967 Ibid 517–21; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–85; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361–8; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–3. 968 See above n 967 and accompanying text. 969 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420–2. 970 Ibid 421–3. 971 Ibid; see also Hodge, White and Wetter, above n 915, 23. 972 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 424–5. 973 Ibid 421, 424. 974 Ibid. 975 Ibid 421, 422, 424–5.
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The revision of existing laws and policies intrinsic to the liability and licensing of registered
and retired medical personnel, including volunteers, the legal implications of constraint and
confinement of a section or majority of the population; and the development of national
preparedness plans are elements of pandemic preparedness from a legal perspective. The
development of preparedness planning underpinned by ethical considerations, such as the
inclusiveness of vulnerable communities, their religious, cultural and social (gender, race, for
example) backgrounds and the principles of utility and fairness in the allocation of resources
and medical supplies in less privileged states are added strands that traverse pandemic
preparedness.976
Determinants from PHP
The capacity development of the public health system across the various phases of public
health emergencies; the engagement and inclusivity by the spectrum of public health officials,
medical personnel, private sector and communities on effective approaches to emergency
response; and adopting measures to share data are elements drawn from the definition of
PHP.977 Taken together, capacity development, engagement and inclusivity, and data sharing
are salient elements of preparedness in public health emergencies which assist in our
understanding of framing readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Moreover, salient elements of preparedness from a legal dimension in the public health
emergency context include the coordinated approach of the ‘public health and population
health system’ at the levels for action (communities, agencies, private sectors and the state) to
articulate the legal tools, policies and preparedness plans, the knowledge and competency of
public health officials and personnel
to effectively interpret legal tools, access to information (practices, guidelines, reports, rulings,
etc.) and the role of courts (which touch on individual rights in emergencies).978 These
elements provide useful insights to frame readiness in the context of climate-induced human
mobility.
976 Ibid 419–30; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 210; see also Belinda Bennett and Terry Carney, ‘Law, Ethics and Pandemic Preparedness: The Importance of Cross-jurisdictional and Cross-cultural Perspectives’ (2010) 34(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 106, 111. 977 Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–85. 978 Moulton et al, above n 8, 682; see also McGinty et al, above n 160, 79; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–401; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 419–30.
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Furthermore, the levels of implementation of legal tools include combined cooperation,
collaboration, coordination, communication plans and information sharing spanning cross-
sectoral and cross-jurisdictional fields, operational, administrative and procedural channels,
and organisational structures between the public health system and the private sector and
communities.979 Additionally, the demarcation of authority, roles, functions and
responsibilities present in legal tools, and the alignment of organisational arrangements,
emergency budgets and human resource personnel all encompass the implementation of the
legal tools.980 These implementation approaches provide some important insights to draw upon
in framing readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Similarly, the development of national preparedness plans underpinned by cultural and ethical
perspectives, including the principles of utility and fairness, as well as the revision of laws and
policies related to the liability and licensing of medical personnel and volunteers are
considerations present in pandemic preparedness from a legal perspective that also provide a
basis to frame readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Overall, the comprehensive elements and considerations from the PHP literature provide rich
perspectives to conceptualise readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
5.6 REDD+ Readiness
Over the past decade a considerable amount of forest conservation, management and
governance literature on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation has
been published.981 This is cited in the literature with the abbreviation REDD.982 The literature
979 McGinty et al, above n 160, 78–85; see also Botoseneanu et al, above n 922, 361–8; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also Nagata et al, above n 853, 517–21. 980 See above n 979 and accompanying text. 981 Adelman, above n 178, 17–36; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–11; see also Annalisa Savaresi, ‘REDD+ and Human Rights: Addressing Synergies between International Regimes’ (Art 5) (2013) 18(3) Ecology and Society 1, 1–9; see also Christoph Aicher, ‘Discourse Practices in Environmental Governance: Social and Ecological Safeguards of REDD’ (2014) 23(14) Biodiversity and Conservation 3543, 3544; see also Sabine Reinecke, Till Pistorius and Michael Pregernig, ‘UNFCCC and the REDD+ Partnership from a Network Governance Perspective’ (2014) 35 Environmental Science and Policy 30, 31. See also Achu Samndong and Glenn K Bush, ‘Governance Structures Established for REDD+ Implementation and Their Adaptation to the Institutional and Ecological Conditions in Equateur Province of the DRC’ (Research Report, No 81, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, March 2017) 1–59; see also Center for International Forestry Research <https://www.cifor.org/>; see also Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research on Forests, Trees and Agroforestry <https://www.cgiar.org/>. 982 Aicher, above n 981, 3544.
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also frequently cites the abbreviation REDD-plus (REDD+) to emulate the language employed
in the international climate change and policy fora under the auspices of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).983 The ‘unsustainable use of forests
and land use change in most developing countries’ for instance, ‘deforestation, forest
degradation, forest fires and slash and burn practices’ reduces the ability to draw carbon out
the atmosphere and contributes to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.984 The issue of
global deforestation has grown in relative importance because global GHG emissions from the
forestry sector constitute ‘approximately eighteen to twenty-five percent’ in addition to the
energy and transport sectors.985
The REDD+ scheme traverses three interconnected phases, with the “readiness phase”
followed by the “implementation phase” and finally, the “accounting phase”.986 The key
funding vehicles for REDD+ countries to access and participate under the REDD+ scheme
include: global public finance for REDD+ investment, ‘voluntary donations through the
official development assistance (ODA)’, the ‘performance-based or results based payments
for reducing emission from deforestation, degradation, and forest conservation (REDD+), and
clean energy.’987 Briefly, the REDD+ scheme requires developing countries to prepare and
submit ‘Project Information Notes (R-PINs); full project proposals (R-PP) consisting of
detailed plans; and identification of key legal reforms’ as part of the readiness phase, among
other requirements.988
Readiness is important for REDD+ because it engages a full spectrum of actors to implement
REDD+ projects at the national level. These include state actors, local government bodies and
officials, and non-state actors such as civil society organisations, local, forest-based and
Indigenous communities, and private actors such as commercial investors and project
983 Ibid; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 2–3. 984 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 509; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 104–5; see also CDKN Report above n 4, 27; see also ‘…underlying causes of forest destruction, such as poor forest governance, disregard for ecosystems and lack of clarity around land tenure rights is essential first step to reducing forest loss’ as cited in Kate Dooley and Nils Hermann Ranum, ‘REDD+: An Incentive Structure for Long-term Performance’ (Discussion Paper, Ateneo School of Government, September 2012) 4. 985 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 509; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 104; see also CDKN Report above n 4, 27; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31. 986 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12. 987 Ibid 511, 513; See also Adelman, above n 178, 32; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1. 988 Lesniewska, above n 56, 111; see also Global Canopy Programme, REDD in Fiji (January 2014) REDD Desk <http://theredddesk.org/countries/fiji/>.
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proponents.989 Readiness involves multiple power relations and potential conflicting interests
at various governance levels and phases of REDD+ projects, which resonates with ensuring
and safeguarding forest-dependent and Indigenous communities’ rights and interests.990
Moreover, strengthening the capacity of local government bodies to access funding
mechanisms at the global level for REDD+ projects, and developing the legal and regulatory
framework to implement REDD+ projects built around community-centred safeguards,
standards and guidelines such as land tenure security, meaningful participation and equitable
sharing of benefits, to cite a few, present in soft law principles and human rights instruments
is a further reason readiness is important for REDD+ projects.991 The determinants present in
the REDD+ literature are indicative of the extensive planning processes, policy measures and
the role of law needed by the forestry sector and the government to effectively implement
REDD+ projects. The researcher recognises that the circumstances for REDD+ are remote to
the context of climate change human mobility. However, the REDD+ literature is instructive
to advance our understanding of the determinants of readiness and offers building blocks to
conceptualise readiness in the context of climate change human mobility.
Elements of REDD+ Readiness
The broad use of term REDD+ readiness in the REDD+ literature is characterised as ‘the phase
in REDD+ when a country is able to operate a market-based REDD+ system.’992 A further
definition provided by REDD+ practitioners under the Global Forest Atlas project, drawing
on experiences of the Amazon and the Congo tropical rainforest basin, refers to ‘preparing a
country for participation in carbon markets, where countries demonstrate reductions in
deforestation and are compensated according to the associated reduction in carbon
emissions.’993 The explicit reference to carbon markets present in the definition of REDD+
readiness can be described as developing countries reducing carbon emissions through
sustainable forest management practices that are ‘calculated, monitored, and monetized for
989 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510–11, 516; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35. 990 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 5–8; see also Terminski, ‘Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement: Causes’, above n 58, 15, 49–50, 51, 90. 991 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 2; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Mary Elizabeth Felker et al, ‘Considering Land Tenure in REDD+ Participatory Measurement Reporting, and Verification: A Case Study from Indonesia’ (Research Report, PLOS ONE, 13 April 2017) 2. 992 Lesniewska, above n 56, 111. 993 Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, REDD+ Initiatives in the Congo Basin Global Forest Atlas <https://globalforestatlas.yale.edu/congo/conservation-initiatives/redd>; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 524.
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global exchange.’994 Furthermore, the interpretation of REDD+ readiness cited by Raftopoulos
encompasses framing ‘national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity
building for the implementation of the REDD+ activities.’995 Raftopoulos draws attention to,
among other issues, the development of national strategies in parallel with other elements,
which embody an array of considerations.996 These include the: ‘design of pilot projects, land
tenure rights, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, governance arrangements
(including benefit sharing), gender considerations and safeguards that ensure the full and
effective participation of indigenous peoples’ are centred to the construction of a national
strategy.997 The inclusion of grievance mechanisms to address competing interests and power
relations among multiple parties ‘as well as reports of noncompliance with policies and
guidelines’ represent additional considerations to complement a national strategy.998 Due to
practical constraints, a full discussion of the host of elements and considerations lies beyond
the scope of the REDD+ readiness phase.
The field research conducted by Apriwan and Afriani, which employed qualitative modes of
enquiry to investigate the ‘local readiness of the REDD+ scheme in three regencies in West
Sumatera Indonesia’, is notable in illustrating the readiness phase.999 As recorded by Apriwan
and Afriani, the readiness level encompasses ‘arranging strategies, group formations and
trainings to facilitate local community participation in terms of their duties and
responsibilities’ by the West Sumatera sub-national government.1000 Moreover, at the local
level of the West Sumatera Government, readiness is developed by formulating policies and
regulations to establish institutions such as the Local Government Unit and the Regional
Forestry Agency, to cite a few, and to further demarcate the respective functions, roles, duties
and powers of institutions to conduct the REDD+ scheme.1001
The technical assistance resources exhibiting elements of the readiness phase include the
development of a national strategy, a national readiness policy, the formulation of project
994 Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510; see also ‘…policies include governments strengthening law enforcement or changing the law to stop large-scale logging and forest conservation activities like establishing protected areas or increasing tree plantations’ as cited in Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510. 995 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12. 996 Ibid. 997 Ibid 512; see also Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, above n 993. 998 See above n 997 and accompanying text; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3547, 3550, 3555. 999 Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 649–56. 1000 Ibid 654. 1001 Ibid 652, 653, 655; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11.
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proposals with the explicit inclusion of plans and legislative and regulatory reforms and the
capacity development support to implement REDD+ activities ‘(agroforestry, enrichment tree
planting, etc.)’ and access to finance flows.1002 Moreover, the development of a national
strategy embodies a range of considerations that underpin designing pilot projects, inclusion
of gendered dimensions and operational guidelines, as well as establishing grievance
mechanisms to address incursions on landowners’ land and rights in addition to the interests
of others, which are part of the readiness phase elements. Taken together, crafting an array of
approaches such as community participation, policy measures and regulatory responses, and
establishing institutions among others at national and local levels are significant considerations
that enable a country to engage with the REDD+ scheme.
REDD Safeguards
The integration of monitoring and information systems also forms part of the readiness
phase.1003 The ‘implementation of a national forest monitoring system and a safeguards
information system inform how safeguards are addressed and respected in all REDD+
activities.’1004 Briefly, the Cancun safeguards, which stem from the COP-16 under the
UNFCCC and are commonly cited as ‘REDD safeguards’ or sometimes equated with
community-centred safeguards, have been broadened in recognition of the ‘principle of free,
prior and informed consent (FPIC) for indigenous peoples’ and the ‘principle of equitable
sharing of benefits (ESB).’1005 The FPIC and ESB are strands intrinsic to readiness and are
addressed later.
The REDD safeguards embody aspects of ‘tenure security, stakeholder participation’ and the
recognition of Indigenous rights.1006 As Aicher outlines, ‘REDD related safeguards’ entail
‘policies, measures or procedures to protect and respect cultural settings, capabilities and
categories of forest dependent communities and indigenous peoples.’1007 The REDD
safeguards, including standards, are non-mandatory and originate from norms and principles
in ‘international law instruments in particular, human rights instruments’ including ‘regional
1002 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46. 1003 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 512; see also Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, above n 993. 1004 See above n 1003 and accompanying text. 1005 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1006 Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3551. 1007 Aicher, above n 981, 3543, 3546.
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human rights treaties.’1008 The integration of a human rights frame of reference is pivotal
because ‘[h]uman rights concerns associated with REDD+ activities are particularly
conspicuous with regard to matters concerning access to land and forest resources’, as
identified by Savaresi.1009 A human rights frame of reference encompasses the ‘rights and
interests of local forest communities’ and duties of stakeholders towards communities within
various governance levels of REDD+ projects.1010 The interplay of a rights-based approach
between the REDD safeguards and standards primarily takes account of due process
protections and procedural fairness measures for Indigenous and forest-dependent
communities in all phases of REDD+.1011
Much of the literature on REDD+ acknowledges that the safeguards and standards, in real
terms, are still in their infancy.1012 A broader perspective has been adopted by Raftopoulos,
who points out that ‘considerable work is needed to translate these non-binding principles into
practice’ for REDD+ countries.1013 This is because of the competing interests and incentives
that straddle local forest communities, governments and international commercial parties.1014
The explicit integration of forest monitoring and information systems at a national level is an
area of focus in the readiness phase.1015 In addition, the inclusion of Indigenous and forest-
dependent communities, cultural and Indigenous rights, due process protections of Indigenous
and forest- dependent communities present in safeguards and standards and aligned with
policy measures and tools through collaboration and participation between a host of
stakeholders and communities are elements of the readiness phase of REDD+ projects.1016
REDD Soft Law Principles
The REDD+ literature confirms that a formal convention or legal instrument exclusively for
1008 Lesniewska, above n 56, 120; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 6; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 1, 3. 1009 Savaresi, above n 981, 1. 1010 Ibid; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3551; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511. 1011 See above n 1010 and accompanying text. 1012 Savaresi, above n 981; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511. 1013 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510–11, 516; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35. 1014 See above n 1013 and accompanying text. 1015 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 512; see also Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, above n 993. 1016 Felker et al, above n 991, 1–22; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3543–60.
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REDD+ is not well established under international law.1017 It acknowledges that the series of
international climate policy deliberations by the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC
for ‘incentivising the reduction of emissions from deforestation, forest degradation and
enhancing forest carbon stocks to be included in a future carbon trading system as well as
sustainably managing forests’ is exhibited through the framing of the Bali Action Plan (COP-
13).1018 It was then developed in the Cancun Agreement (COP-16), which then accentuated
REDD+ in the operative part of the Paris Agreement (COP-21), as reflected in Article 5.1019
However, the protection and assistance arrangements to effectively operationalise REDD+
have not received sufficient attention at the global level. As maintained by Lesniewska, ‘the
normative development and law making for REDD+ is occurring across other forests related
legal processes.’1020 Some of these include international instruments and declarations, for
example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the UN Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
(Rio Declaration).1021 In reiterating that a comprehensive framework is lacking on REDD+, it
is important to highlight that there is emerging recognition of several soft law principles
embedded in forest-related law.1022 Some of these include the FPIC and ESB alluded to
earlier.1023 The FPIC and ESB present several layers of considerations across socio-cultural
and socio-environmental dimensions. These include the rights, interests, knowledge,
entitlements and the collective inclusion and participation of the Indigenous peoples and local
communities in REDD+ projects.1024 The soft law principles also extend to encompass
governance arrangements that interplay between forests policy and decision-making at
multifaceted levels (local community and national for example).1025 The FPIC and ESB exhibit
some of the areas of focus that are considered intrinsic to the readiness, implementation and
accounting phases of REDD+ and are discussed in turn.
1017 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510; see also Adelman, above n 178, 32; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 103. 1018 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 510; see also Adelman, above n 178, 31; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Aicher, above n 981, 3543–60; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–11; see also Global Canopy Programme, above n 988. 1019 See above n 1018 and accompanying text. 1020 Lesniewska, above n 56, 111–12. 1021 Ibid; see also ‘…Non-legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests (2007: Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (1917); the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972)…Rio Forest Principles (1992)…the International Tropical Timber Agreement (2006)’ as cited in Lesniewska, above n 56, 111–12. 1022 See above n 1021 and accompanying text. 1023 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1024 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 521, 524. 1025 Aicher, above n 981, 3546, 3555–6; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 3, 7.
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The FPIC present in the UNDRIP, as described by Felker et al, involves ‘fully informed, non-
coercive, and participatory community agreements.’1026 Felker et al, maintain that the FPIC is
promising; however, in practical terms it is not fully operational and should therefore be
implemented independently from isolated instances of consultations and collaboration by
multiple parties for REDD+ projects.1027 This is to curb any potential incidence of private
arrangements between forest-dwellers and other interested parties.1028 This view is supported
by Raftopoulos, who claims that the inclusiveness of the FPIC and the acclimation of
‘indigenous and forest-based communities’ interests, customary land rights and traditional
knowledge’ of Indigenous peoples are key determinants for the success of REDD+ projects
provided they are ‘integrated into policy deliberations and decision-making processes.’1029
Another prominent area where the FPIC is visible, as outlined in the REDD+ literature, is in
the area of ‘forest carbon accounting’, which involves ‘measurement, reporting and
verifications (MRV) systems.’1030 Felker et al, in acknowledging the works of Gupta et al, on
carbon accountability, point out that a ‘legitimate MRV includes respecting and engaging local
forest knowledge, local values and local needs and being responsive to cultural context and
diversity’ in the design and implementation of the MRV.1031 A legitimate MRV is sometimes
equated with “participatory” MRV (PMRV), which encompasses positive empowerment of
forest-based communities and sustainable REDD+ activities.1032
Similarly, the ESB present in the CBD is a further feature underlying REDD+ programs and
activities.1033 The ESB is interconnected with ‘property rights over forests and forestlands’ and
extends to carbon stocks, carbon rights and carbon credits.1034 As noted by Buizer, Humphreys
and Wil, the ‘notion of benefit-sharing implies that local communities and indigenous peoples
should receive a share of the money that governments receive from the REDD+ projects on
their lands.’1035 There is widespread agreement by scholars in REDD+ studies that the less
well established ‘nature of carbon rights in legal terms’ brings to the forefront pertinent areas
1026 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1027 Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1028 Ibid. 1029 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524. 1030 Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1031 Ibid. 1032 Ibid. 1033 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8. 1034 Ibid. 1035 Ibid.
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of concern that traverse the ownership of rights to carbon stocks stored in tropical forests and
‘management of land and forests upon which the carbon is situated.’1036
Guidelines and Safeguards
One of the prominent initiatives among others acknowledged widely in the REDD+ literature
relates to global programs developed by multilateral bodies within and outside the United
Nations system respectively by the ‘UN Collaborative Programme on REDD (UN-REDD
Programme).’1037 For example, ‘free, prior, and informed consent guidelines (FPIC
Guidelines)’ and the ‘World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility safeguard policies
(FCPF Safeguards)’ are considered to be particularly important during the readiness phase.1038
In the case of the FPIC Guidelines, this is because they take a ‘human rights-based approach’
centred on ‘principles and criteria under UN conventions, treaties and declarations’ into
account.1039 Similarly, the FCPF Safeguards take into account the notion of ‘meaningful
participation and consultation by all stakeholders’ spanning environmental and social impacts
and policy arrangements developed by the FCPF.1040
Strands intrinsic to the FPIC and ESB include explicit engagement and voluntary participation,
the integration and acceptability of cultural values, traditional knowledge, diversity, property
rights and interests in tropical forestlands of Indigenous peoples and the equitable distribution
of monetary benefits to forest-based and Indigenous communities.1041 In addition, the inclusion
of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ underscored in the FPIC Guidelines and the willingness
of the state, stakeholders and commercial entities to engage in meaningful dialogue and
collaboration with the forest-based and Indigenous communities underscored in the FCPF
Safeguards present as additional strands to be considered in REDD+ readiness.1042 The soft
law principles, guidelines and safeguards underpinned by a rights-based approach, including
1036 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516. 1037 Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11. 1038 See above n 1037 and accompanying text. 1039 Ibid; see also Smyth and Vanclay, above n 397, 70, 72; see also Frank Vanclay, ‘Project-induced Displacement and Resettlement: From Impoverishment Risks to an Opportunity for Development?’ (2017) 35(1) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 3, 3–21. 1040 See above n 1039 and accompanying text. 1041 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1042 Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2.
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international normative protections reflected in international law instruments to inform forests
policy and decision-making spanning various levels of governance, are key elements of the
readiness phase for REDD+ projects.1043
REDD+ Challenges
The purpose of detailing challenges in the implementation of REDD+ projects is to offer
important insights pertinent to designing comprehensive approaches and techniques by
policymakers to respond to potential issues and craft mitigation measures around access to,
and availability of, land from landowners. It is also to ensure the alignment of communication
plans, strategies and programs, including the integration of soft law principles, with policy
initiatives and the role of law for readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
The growing body of research drawing on the experiences of forest-based communities and
REDD+ projects in developing countries such as Peru, Mexico, Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea confirms that the lack of uniformity under international law renders ‘REDD+ more
susceptible to unfair practices, compounded by the fact that it operates in tropical forest areas
where land tenure systems tend to be unclear, contested or poorly enforced.’1044 There is
inherent recognition that the premise of developing countries to effectively achieve REDD+
presented by case studies is situated in ‘accommodating different interest groups, whose
interests are not only linked to the economy and the environment, but also to human rights and
social participation issues.’1045 This is certainly true in the case of ‘exploitative carbon
contracts and corruption, marginalisation of indigenous peoples and forest dwellers, and
increased poverty and disruption of traditional forest-based lifestyles.’1046 As Raftopoulos
claims, ‘indigenous communities are being convinced to sign away their rights to land and
carbon under terms highly favourable to commercial interests.’1047 Moreover, such
arrangements ‘offer little or no guarantee for the protection of their rights, including their right
to use and access natural resources.’1048
1043 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511, 516, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 120; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 6. 1044 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516–17, 524. 1045 Ibid 512. 1046 Ibid 515. 1047 Ibid 516. 1048 Ibid.
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Raftopoulos argues that it is imperative that the design of REDD+ programs is inclusive of
‘forest-based communities from the planning and implementation of the scheme’, including
the provision for, and access to, alternative avenues to resolve disputes and deadlocks in the
‘process of planning for REDD+.’1049 Moreover, she further argues that ‘[c]entral to achieving
an effective and equitable REDD+ mechanism is the clarification and strengthening of land
tenure rights’, which includes customary land rights.1050 Echoing similar sentiments, Aicher
suggests that ‘[a] balance is necessary where international actors have to tolerate, respect, or
even defer to many aspects of the local while crafting institutions that seek to avoid the risks
and errors of rampant localism.’1051
The variety in response to competing interests, claims and rights mediating the relationship
between multiple parties and customary landowners remains formidable.1052 However, lessons
can be learned and caution needs to be exercised with regard to normative policies, operational
aspects and best practices of REDD+, especially when legal arrangements remain inadequate
to almost non-existent.1053 These strands provide a basis to inform our understanding of
readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Determinants from REDD+ Readiness
Salient elements drawn from the definition of REDD+ readiness include the development of a
national strategy and national readiness policy, the integration of plans, legislative and
regulatory reforms within project proposals and the institutional capacity development and
competencies of local government bodies.1054 These elements provide a basis to frame
readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
Moreover, the smorgasbord of considerations spanning institutional, regulatory and policy
dimensions underpinning REDD+ readiness identifies the need for safeguards, standards and
operational guidelines underpinned by a rights-based approach as well as international
1049 Ibid 515. 1050 Ibid. 1051 Aicher, above n 981, 3544, 3545. 1052 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 8. 1053 Ibid; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11; see also Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 652. 1054 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46.
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instruments to inform the legal and normative framework.1055 Other requirements include
forests policy measures and decision-making at multifaceted levels and phases of the REDD+
projects, designing pilot projects, developing forest monitoring and information systems and
the inclusion of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities in all phases of REDD+
projects.1056 Establishing plans and programs through the collective collaboration, voluntary
participation, meaningful engagement between state actors, third parties (commercial,
investors, etc.) and Indigenous and forest-dependent communities to inform decisions on
REDD+ projects, the integration of cultural traditions, values, traditional knowledge, diversity,
property rights and land tenure interests of Indigenous and forest-dependent communities in
all phases of REDD+ projects are also important.1057 In addition, developing programs to
allocate monetary benefits generated from REDD+ projects equitably to forest-based and
Indigenous communities by the state are also key elements, all of which provide important
insights into readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.1058
Additionally, the REDD+ literature has been extended in recognition of the challenges to
achieving REDD+ readiness identified from the practical experiences of developing countries
engaged in REDD+ projects. These include seldom clear-cut tenure systems and land rights,
poorly defined policy and legal measures to prevent the rights and interests of Indigenous and
local communities forestlands and resources being usurped by the state and the non-disclosure
of—and lack of accessibility to—complete project information, including transparency of
benefits for the Indigenous and local communities.1059 Taken together, the elements and
considerations drawn from the REDD+ literature provide a rich variety of perspectives that
contribute to framing readiness in the context of climate-induced human mobility.
5.7 Readiness Literature Elements and Considerations
The plain reading of readiness from a multidisciplinary approach in this chapter can be
described in two layers. First, readiness means to equip a country ‘to quickly and appropriately
respond to and recover from’: 1) catastrophic events such as sudden-onset disasters and public
health emergencies, 2) policy initiatives and funding mechanisms mooted at the global level
for a country to participate and to access international finance for climate change adaptation
1055 Aicher, above n 981, 3543–60; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 1–11; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 1–22; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11. 1056 Ibid. 1057 Ibid. 1058 Ibid. 1059 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 509–30.
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and low-carbon development national projects as well as humanitarian relief in the aftermath
of sudden-onset disasters.1060 On a closer examination, capacity development support, the role
of law and a whole-of-society orientation are the three interdependent elements of readiness
conceptualised from the readiness literature.1061 These elements are underpinned by a host of
considerations. The discussion that follows expands on each element together with its
intersecting considerations.
The broad use of capacity from multidisciplinary perspectives is generally understood to be
the means by which the national ‘institutions, legal and the budgetary systems of a country is
developed and strengthened’ as a basis to effectively plan, respond to, participate in and deliver
a particular event or initiative across the ‘levels for action (local, national and
international).’1062 There are multiple layers to capacity conceptualised from the literature,
which identify the need for:
1) Plans–government at the national level to frame plans, such as ‘contingency and response
plans’—which have been applied in the context of disaster preparedness, financial plans
to ‘access different forms and types of finance’ in the case of climate finance readiness
and action plans associated with REDD+ activities.1063
2) Collaboration–government at the national level to engage in ‘concerted and purposeful
collaboration’ with ‘cross-sectoral bodies, private sector, communities and
stakeholders.’1064 For example, ‘sharing of data on public health practice and policy and
incorporating health concerns into all decisions’ spanning local government bodies and
agencies to ensure a uniform response and relief during emergencies to members of the
public has been applied in the context of public health preparedness.1065
3) Coordination–government at the national level to set up institutional structures and
administrative processes to underpin logistical and operational tasks, such as assigning
powers and duties to local authorities and agencies to carry out functions.1066 Other tasks,
such as ‘raising and management of international funds’ have been applied to situations to
prepare and respond to international humanitarian relief as well as accessing climate
1060 DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 393. 1061 UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 5; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 207; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 10; see also Yonetani, above n 59, 2. 1062 Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3; see also DR IntroCapstone 2017, above n 752, 71; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 23; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 138. 1063 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–5, 23; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12. 1064 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–5. 1065 Ibid; See also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5. 1066 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 14; see also Barber, above n 160, 150; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124.
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funding mechanisms underscoring ‘information management and partnership
development.’1067
4) Strategies–government to develop and integrate specific strategies at the national level to
enhance the capacity of local government bodies to access funding mechanisms, training,
programs, ‘monitoring procedures and verifications systems’ aligned with global policy
initiatives and instruments such as the PDD; UNDRIP; and GCF in the case of disaster
preparedness, REDD+ readiness and climate finance readiness.1068
5) Research–government at the national level to support institutions by identifying areas for
further ‘research and development, new technologies and practices to inform policy and
decision makers’ to facilitate and respond to a particular event or initiative in the future.1069
The second element conceptualised from the readiness literature is the role of law, which is
equated with ‘the enabling environment’ and interchangeably used with the term ‘the right
domestic environment.’1070 The enabling environment is generally understood to entail
‘national and local laws, regulations and policies’ that underpin the legal and regulatory
framework.1071 A further interpretation expands to include embodying ‘specific plans, laws
and policies aligned with broader instruments and tools, such as regional policies and
agreements on free movement, displaced people’s rights, sustainable development, disaster
risk reduction, climate change and humanitarian action.’1072 There are multiple layers to the
role of law that encompass an array of intersecting considerations to inform the enabling
environment and which is detailed as follows:
1) Review existing and formulate specific laws–government at the national level to ‘adjust
existing laws and regulations and pass new laws and regulations’ spanning vertical
(national-international government administration) and horizontal (national government
administration-multilevel sectors-local agencies) jurisdictional dimensions.1073 For
example, the ‘powers, authorities, and responsibilities of government administration to
make executive orders and declare emergencies when events overwhelm existing
1067 See above n 1066 and accompanying text. 1068 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12; see also Cancun Speech DRR, above n 787; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1532–4; see also Yamamoto, Serraglio and Cavedon-Capdeville, above n 749, 66–7, 72. See also Apriwan and Afriani, above 160, 654; see also UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1069 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124. 1070 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200. 1071 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 23–5, 40, 49, 52. 1072 Ibid 15, 19, 22–3, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–51, 54. 1073 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 11; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5.
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capabilities’ has been applied in the case of public health preparedness.1074 Another
example has been in the context of international disaster responders extending assistance
and humanitarian relief through legal facilities established by the local government
administration, such as ‘prior visa applications and exemptions on customs excise duty
and taxes on the entry of foreign goods.’1075
2) Ethical aspects–government at the national level to include equitable allocation of
resources irrespective of ‘race, gender, class or national origin and vulnerable populations’
as a basis to ‘minimise social disruption.’1076 For example, the principle of ESB traversing
the CBD has been applied in the context of REDD+ projects so that ‘forest-based and
indigenous communities receive a share of the money that governments receive from
trading carbon stocks stored on forestlands of indigenous peoples.’1077
3) Bilateral agreements–government at the national level to extend the scope of cooperation
with regional and international agencies and development partners facilitated through:
bilateral arrangements; ‘memoranda of understanding; and mutual aid agreements to
reduce legal uncertainties in the national laws’ as has been in applied in the context of
disaster preparedness, public health emergencies and international humanitarian relief
assistance.1078
4) Soft law principles–government at the national level to integrate soft law principles with
safeguards and guidelines underpinned by a rights-based approach.1079 For example, the
FPIC and the ESB have been applied in the context of REDD+ projects to protect the
security of ‘forest-based indigenous peoples rights and interests to customary land; forest
resources; local values and needs; and entitlements.’1080
The final element conceptualised from the readiness literature is the whole-of-society
orientation characterised by the non-coercive, explicit inclusion and participation of local
communities and marginalised groups in decisions traversing plans, policies and laws to
embody the ‘social, and economic dimensions, including the local conditions, indigenous
1074 See above n 1073 and accompanying text; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 395. 1075 Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also IFRC Guidelines 2011, above n 864, 6; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 108–9. 1076 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 424. 1077 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1078 Fisher, above n 13, 209; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674. 1079 See above n 1077 and accompanying text; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 1. 1080 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 524; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 1.
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cultural and religious perspectives’ of communities.1081 For example, global programs
buttressed by minimum ‘practice standards, guidelines, safeguards and systems’, such as the
UN-REDD Programme and the IDRL Guidelines 2007, which identify the need of the explicit
inclusion of local communities and meaningful consultation by government sectors in all
phases of initiatives and programs (REDD+, SFDRR, etc.) commissioned by the government
administration at the national level.1082
Taken together, the analysis of the phenomenon of readiness from multidisciplinary
perspectives has extended our knowledge of the three interdependent elements and intersecting
considerations to inform readiness. Capacity development support is premised on the
capability of national governments to develop plans and strategies, collaborate and coordinate
with sectors and agencies at both local and international levels, as well as cultivate
communities of research and practice towards a future event or initiative. The role of law
embodies processes, procedures and mechanisms underpinned by soft law principles in
international instruments integrated into existing laws and regulations and/or established
through new laws and regulations by the government at the national level. The whole-of-
society orientation requires national governments to extend agency to local and Indigenous
communities and marginalised groups to make decisions that affect them through meaningful
consultation and participation in the planning and implementation phases of a future event or
initiative.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter set out to uncover the phenomenon of readiness from the considerable body of
experience spanning other modes of human mobility and contexts of readiness to answer RQ
1 (c). This chapter has shown that capacity development support, the role of law and a whole-
of-society orientation are three interdependent elements of readiness conceptualised from the
readiness literature. This chapter has also identified an array of considerations interconnected
to the elements and this has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of what it
means to be ready. The findings of this chapter, in conjunction with the data presented in
1081 Jolly, above n 854, 145–6, 151–2; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 422, 424–5; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1082 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 11–13; see also Barber, above n 160, 144, 147; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also IFRC Guidelines 2011, above n 864, 6.
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chapters four and six provide the building blocks to inform the criteria of readiness presented
in chapter seven.
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Chapter 6: Readiness–Insights from Empirical Evidence
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the phenomenon of readiness examined in the literature from
multidisciplinary perspectives. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the interview data
gathered from the field research with a total of eighteen participants (n = 18). This chapter
corresponds to RQ (1) (b), which asks: What can we learn from the experiences and lessons
learned from the internal relocation of communities in Fiji? The interview data in this chapter
presents participants’ interpretations and understanding of what it means for the government
to be ready for the climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji. The
experiences and lessons from the internal relocation of communities, including the institutional
knowledge of participants beyond the state machinery, have been instructive in
conceptualising the considerations that need to be addressed to ensure the readiness of the
Fijian Government. As discussed in chapter two, a qualitative approach was adopted to gather
the interview data and the semi-structured field interviews were underpinned by a framework
of questions. The researcher acknowledges that a small pool of participants comprising of state
and non-state actors formed part of the field research to uncover the determinants of readiness.
This is a limitation highlighted earlier in chapters one and two. The researcher further
acknowledges that the empirical evidence can lend to one dimensional perspective of the
determinants of readiness. The researcher reiterates that caution must be applied, as the
empirical evidence is not representative in its entirety which suggests that further research is
needed to articulate well-rounded determinants of readiness. An extensive pool of participants
is suggested (Banaban and Vaitupuan communities, and relocatees within Fiji, for example)
to advance our understanding of readiness. 1083 The field evidence presented in this chapter is
supported by, and analysed in conjunction with, the literature and the empirical work by
scholars and migration practitioners in the field of environmental and migration studies. This
evidence and other evidence presented in chapters four and six provide the building blocks to
inform the criteria of readiness presented in chapter seven.
1083 Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54, 1-17; see also McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54, 70; see also Bertana, above n 54; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 86-104; see also Connell, above n 75, 127-142.
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6.2 Internal Relocation Experiences and Lessons
The purpose of outlining participants’ accounts of their internal relocation experiences and
lessons is twofold. First, it aims to identify the issues that emerged from internal relocation
projects implemented by the Fijian Government and draw out the key themes. Second, it
enables reflection on the experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation processes
and provides a basis to understand what it means to be ready for the cross-border relocation of
communities by the Fijian Government. The results of the first line of inquiry with all
participants (n = 18) reveal that they were relatively evenly distributed. The availability of
land (n = 15) was the major issue, followed by the inclusiveness of relocating communities in
relocation decisions and conducting meaningful consultation with the relocating communities
(n = 14).
Adequate Land Availability
The majority of the participants (n = 15) attributed the: 1) availability of land; 2) land tenure-
ship (type of land and ownership); 3) consent of landowners; and 4) land transfer/registration
as all intrinsic to the issue of land.1084 According to one state actor:
Land ownership is a very critical issue, because once we have identified communities to be relocated and once they agree, the next question is where? And that is where landownership issues come to the forefront. If they want to move to land that is owned by Mataqali land (Indigenous land owning unit), then they need to be convinced, they all have to agree and the process for this will be different to say for urban area/land. The processes, i.e. the authorities and mandates are different requiring various approvals, e.g. communities -iTaukei (Indigenous) Land Trust Board and informal settlements—Provincial council/local government, together with the different scenarios/circumstance (e.g. city, town, semi-urban or in a community) for relocation.1085
Land (vanua) is determined by ‘membership in a specific clan’ in Fiji, which for most iTaueki
(indigenous Fijians) is registered at birth.’1086 The ‘system of ownership of land is vested in
the mataqali (Fijian clan or landowning unit) which is linked by social groups and hierarchical
1084 Interview with state actor no.2 [SA#2] (Suva, 12 September 2017); interview with state actor no.3 [SA#3] (Suva, 13 September 2017); interview with state actor no.4 [SA#4] (Suva, 13 September 2017); interview with state actor no.5 [SA#5] (Suva, 15 September 2017); interview with state actor no.6 [SA#6] (Suva, 18 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.1 [NSA#1] (Suva, 8 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.3 [NSA#3] (Suva, 14 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.4 [NSA#4] (Suva, 15 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.5 [NSA#5] (Suva, 18 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.7 [NSA#7] (Suva, 20 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.8 [NSA#8] (Suva, 19 September 2017); interview with non-state actor no.11 [NSA#11] (Suva, 22 September 2017). 1085 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1086 Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 250; see also Campbell, above n 75, 57, 62; see also Charan, Kaur and Singh, above n 54, 19, 20.
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structures and codified as inalienable, communal property.’1087 The system of ownership for
the iTaueki is intact post-colonisation ‘as lawful owners and guardians of land of their
forebears.’1088 Additionally, ‘[t]he concept vakavanua (the way of the land)’ straddle the ‘land,
people, traditions and socioeconomic structures’ for the iTaueki.1089 The findings suggest that
relocation requires that the government of the day make adequate land available for relocation
and address any potential land disputes advanced by landowners before communities relocate.
Moreover, it is indicative that the government of the day should mobilise efforts to facilitate
the smooth transition for communities during all phases of relocation. This study utilises the
term communities in its broadest sense to refer to the ‘highly exposed populations whose
livelihoods are sensitive to the impacts of climate change and which have ostensibly low levels
of adaptive capacity, such as those living on low-lying atolls.’1090 The term communities is
interchangeably used with communities of origin (Kiribati and Tuvalu, for example). The term
communities have also come to be used to refer to the host communities that is, the settlement
or village where communities of origin will be relocated (Fiji, for example).
Inclusiveness and Meaningful Consultation
The second major issue identified by participants (n = 14), was the need for inclusiveness of
all people, and meaningful consultation with the relocating communities during the planning
and implementation phases of relocation. The central focus on people relocating (people),
obtaining broad consensus from the relocating people (consent), and developing capacity
across the full spectrum of state and non-state actors to implement relocation projects (capacity
building) were the strands closely linked to the issue of inclusiveness and meaningful
consultation. The interpretation of inclusiveness of people and meaningful consultation is the
means by which ‘individual people and communities’ have the agency in decision-making
which is equated with a bottom-up approach.1091 It entails ‘giving voice to the concerns and
opinions of vulnerable and marginalised groups, enhancing equity in decision-making and
encouraging effective, fair and sustainable outcomes through promotion of accountability and
participation in decision-making.’1092 Each of the strands is discussed next.
1087 See above n 1086 and accompanying text. 1088 Ibid. 1089 See above nn 1086–1088. 1090 Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 37, 53. 1091 McAdam, Limon, above n 82, 20; see also Corendea, above n 170, 15-17. 1092 See above n 1091 and accompanying text.
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A third of the participants (n = 6) reported that people are a primary concern in relocation.1093
They also agreed that: ‘children, youth, and mothers’, including the elderly physically
challenged, must be included in all the stages of relocation, especially during the preparatory
and planning phases.1094 According to one state actor:
The first thing you have to deal with…would be the people who are going to be resettled. That is one of the biggest lessons from these resettlements. All these resettlement work we are doing whether it is internal or external, who are you moving? It’s the people…we have to move them first and then develop them who are going to be resettled….When you resettle them, you have to continue to build their lives.1095
Consent was the next most important factor reported by participants (n = 8).1096 As one state
actor stated: ‘…for Fiji’s first internal resettlement of Vunidogoloa…The first task was to
obtain their consent...I have come across incidences where you want to relocate people, they
say “no”. The reason they provide is that “this is where our forefathers lived, we will not move
from our land regardless”…’1097 Close to half of the participants (n = 8) revealed that obtaining
consent from every member of the community presents a barrier to relocation. Participants
were asked to provide suggestions on some of the strategies to manage the issue of seeking
collective consensus from members of the communities. According to one state actor:
You need present them with facts…most effective strategy…the things (consent, facts, cost vs benefits)…put in very simple lay man’s terms/language to the local people….you have to understand how they think, and the emotions that comes with it… Give them adequate time. So that the decision is their own…once they all agree, they put that into paper…everyone signs…we can protect government as well.1098
One other state-actor reported:
‘…you have to speak their language…you cannot just go there and say “it’s part of climate adaptation”….We (National Disaster Management Office)…assist…translation of materials so that they can relate to it…communication strategy illustrates our role for the implementation in the relocation work, it is equally one of the challenges.1099
Another response by one state actor revealed that they were conflicted with respect to the
approaches deployed by the Fijian government for the Vunidogolo (first) relocation project.
The state actor admitted that: ‘I do not have access to that (meeting minutes)’ and reported
that:
1093 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1094 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084; interview with SA#3, above n 1084; interview with SA#5, above n 1084; interview with SA#6, above n 1084; interview with NSA#1, above n 1084; interview NSA#4, above n 1084; interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1095 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1096 Ibid; see also interviews with SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, NSA#1, NSA#3, NSA#4, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1097 Interview SA#3, above n 1084. 1098 Ibid. 1099 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084.
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‘…it may only be the Chief or a handful of people representing everyone as communal unit and…representing the “voices” of the villagers….Maybe, it was one-representative representing the interests…of the village…So, the inclusiveness and the decision-making to relocate to the site,…was something that was lacking…I do not have those facts.1100
A further suggestion extended by participants (n = 6) on strategies to seek collective consensus
from relocating communities was the intervention of faith-based organisations.1101 One non-
state actor admitted that: ‘[o]btaining consensus/consent of communities was one of the
challenges for the Narikoso relocation project. The role of faith-based organisation - Pacific
Conference of Churches [PCC] intervention enabled communities to reach consensus/consent
on relocating to the new site.’1102 Another non-state actor reported:
The Pacific Conference of Churches [PCC] played a significant role particularly with the …relocation of communities in Vunidogoloa…PCC, firstly facilitated discussions with communities and the government agencies…PCC helped to set the platform for both parties to come together in conversations with regard to resettlement. This was carried out because the communities requested it themselves…PCC took carriage of the initial discussions and did awareness with the communities on what they would expect at the old site and new relocation site…PCC was also instrumental in bringing all parties together such as the National Disaster Management Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Climate Change, Ministry of iTaukei (Indigenous) Affairs to name a few.1103
The intervention of institutions such as faith-based organisations may explain their substantial
influence in forging relationships between communities and government institutions,
including agencies. One non-state actor stated: ‘…the promise of Noah i.e. God’s promise to
Noah, i.e. “Rainbow as a Promise and Rainbow as a Hope”.’1104 One state actor reported that
‘…people hold their faith close to their heart.’1105 It may also explain the relatively good
cooperation between faith institutions and communities in reaching informed decisions to
relocate, particularly in light of the adverse impacts of climate change.
Consistent communication, engagement and the distribution of relevant printed material in the
vernacular with which potential relocating communities are familiar and can relate to,
education on the effects of climate change to underscore the human habitation of future
generations and allowing ample time for communities to comprehend the nature of the
relocation processes and overall project so that they take ownership of the decision to relocate
were suggested as strategies by participants. Other strategies suggested included facilitating
the collective decision of communities to relocate formally (i.e., as a written document) and
1100 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084. 1101 Interviews with SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, SA#6, NSA#3, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1102 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1103 Interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1104 Ibid. 1105 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084.
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the intervention of faith-based organisations to establish cooperation between potential
relocating communities and the Fijian Government and agencies.1106 The researcher recognises
that differences in cultural and religious practices of relocating communities may potentially
come into conflict with the host communities which ought to be integrated into the relocation
processes. In the case of Fiji, ‘Christianity was the first religious faith to be introduced, and
accepted by indigenous Fijians in 1835, with more than half of the population of Fiji Christians
now, making Christianity the largest religious faith.’1107 This is followed by ‘many other
religious faiths’ (Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism, for example).1108 This reinforces the inclusion
of faith-based organisations into the relocation processes.1109 These are some strategies that
can be deployed to overcome barriers associated with consensus and relocation decisions and
they provide useful insights that can be incorporated into readiness.
Having considered people to be a primary concern in relocation projects, and the importance
of the consensus of people in relocation decisions, capacity building was one other strand
participants (n = 8) reported as intrinsic to inclusiveness and consultations.1110
As one non-state actor stated: ‘[b]uilding capacity of government agencies/officers including
civil society organisation is a key outcome from the lessons learnt from the Vunidogoloa and
Narikoso relocation projects.’1111 Another non-state actor reported that:
Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC)’s support…included providing training to several government ministries on cost and benefit analysis (CBA)…The Climate Change Unit (CCU), applied the CBA in the Narikoso relocation project…SPC…with CCU also supported the development…of an integrated vulnerability assessment (IVA) tool…through a series of consultations with government officials.1112
1106 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19, 31–2; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 145–8; see also Hannah Fair, ‘Three stories of Noah: Navigating religious climate change narratives in the Pacific Island region’ (2018) 5(2) Geo: Geography and Environment 1–15; see also Piggott-McKellar et al, above n 54. 1107 John Cox et al, ‘Disaster, Divine Judgement, and Original Sin: Christian Interpretations of Tropical Cyclone Winston and Climate Change in Fiji’ (2018) 30(2) The Contemporary Pacific 380, 397; See also Matt Tomlinson, ‘Sacred Soil in Kadavu, Fiji’ (2002) 72(4) Oceania 237, 237–257. 1108 Cox et al, above n 1107, 380, 389; see also Tomlinson, above n 1107, 237-38. 1109 ‘Christian churches of Fiji…task is to meet fear of climate change with the promise of hope and healing. In this connection, climate-induced resettlement is associated with departing for Promised Land. Communities that are expected to make land available for relocation of others would have to accept the responsibility on the basis of the parable of the Good Samaritan’ as cited in Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 256. 1110 Interview with state actor no.1 [SA#1] (Suva, 12 September 2017); see also interview with non-state actor No.2 [NSA#2] (Suva, 14 September 2017); See also SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, SA#6, NSA#3, NSA#5, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1111 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1112 Interview with NSA#2, above n 1110.
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According to one state actor, ‘Some key considerations in planning and resettlement of
communities’ from the Narikoso relocation project included: ‘concerted efforts by multiple
agencies (national and other institutions).’1113 To ensure concerted efforts and coordinated
responses are executed effectively, one state actor reminded that: ‘It is important to ensure that
roles are clearly demarcated in driving efforts…I hope all agencies’ efforts are synchronised
rather than working independently…important that we understand each other’s work and that
is how you can do your work better.’1114
For two state actors, the findings on capacity building were interpreted in terms of restoring
the communities post-relocation.1115 One state actor reported: ‘When you resettle them, you
have to continue to build their lives. That includes the awareness, education…’1116 Another
state actor reported ‘...in Vunidogoloa…The women were sent to Barefoot College, India, to
undertake solar powered training program, when they returned they carried out solar
installation at their new relocation site.’1117
These findings are indicative of the extensive role cooperation plays in establishing
partnerships between the state actors, agencies and development partners to implement major
national projects such as the inland relocation of vulnerable communities. Moreover, the
experiences from the internal relocation of communities relating to access to and on-going
technical expertise, skills and knowledge to build capacity, provide useful insights into
advancing our understanding in the context of cross-border relocation.
The findings of this study are consistent with those observed by McNamara and Combes on
the internal relocation of Vunidogoloa village in Fiji.1118 Their field interviews with eight
representatives from the ‘governmental, intergovernmental and local nongovernmental
organisations’ examined measures undertaken by the Fijian Government to address subsequent
internal relocations planned for the future.1119 Their findings reveal three key requirements in
preparation by the Fijian Government.1120 First, ‘the need for communities to lead the
relocation decision-making process (in terms of when, how, where)…resources and human
1113 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1114 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1115 Interview with SA#3, SA#6, SA#4, above n 1084. 1116 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1117 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1118 McNamara and Combes, above n 54, 315–19. 1119 Ibid 315–16. 1120 Ibid 318.
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capital (where possible).’1121 Second, the intervention of ‘[i]nter-agency technical and
financial cooperation to ensure sustainable livelihood options (in the short- and long-term).’1122
And third, ‘issues related to the availability of land to relocate to, if communities cannot
relocate within their customary land boundaries.’1123 Unlike the first two requirements,
McNamara and Combes confirmed that issues pertaining to land were less straightforward.1124
McNamara and Combes also found that efforts made by the Fijian Government for future
internal relocations included the ‘development of national relocation guidelines (“draft
guidelines”).’1125 It is acknowledged that participants made references to the draft guidelines
during the field research in this study; however it remains an internal working document and
is not available to the public.1126 In like manner, the empirical study by Piggott-McKeller et
al, into the internal relocation of ‘Denimanu and Vunidogoloa villages’ in Fiji revealed that
‘there was an expressed lack of involvement in decision-making processes by the village
members themselves’ when considered against representations advanced by the Fijian
government ‘that the process was based on a consensual and participative decision-making
process.’1127 In their investigation for Denimanu village, Piggott-McKeller et al, report that
‘gendered cultural and societal norms and societal norms, which often exclude women from
decision-making processes, were not adequately addressed through the process of these
relocations, serving to perpetuate rather than alleviate inequalities.’1128 The empirical studies
suggest that state authorities and agencies ought to be on the back foot to allow ‘individual
people and communities, including those that normally do not have access to decision-making
fora’ to take ownership and have the agency in relocation decision processes.1129 The
authorities and agencies ought to develop and imbibe genuine ‘understanding of human
choice, volition and self-determination during relocation’ processes.1130
The finding that consent is one of the empirical strands of inclusiveness and consultation is
consistent with previous research conducted by McAdam. Her work examined past historical
relocation lessons and experiences of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities in the Pacific
to inform future relocation responses and policies.1131 McAdam suggested that ‘relocation
1121 Ibid; 1122 Ibid. 1123 Ibid. 1124 Ibid. 1125 Ibid 315. 1126 Interview with SA#4, SA#5, NSA#3, above n 1084. 1127 Piggott-McKeller et al, above n 54, 133, 139. 1128 Ibid 133, 140. 1129 Arnall, above n 75, 253, 255. 1130 Ibid 253, 255, 261; see also Piggott-McKeller et al, above n 54, 133-149; see also Charan, Kaur and Singh, above n 54, 19, 31. 1131 McAdam, above n 87, 317–18.
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should only occur with the free and informed consent of communities concerned. They should
be fully informed of the reasons and procedures of movement, be able to propose alternatives
to relocation that authorities “should duly consider” and be compensated for any losses.’1132
The availability of land as one of the key findings for relocation also corroborates the work of
Edwards. Her work examined the ‘practicalities of climate-induced relocation, based in the
experiences of the Carteret Islanders in Papua New Guinea (PNG).’1133 Edwards suggested
that ‘[t]o ease anxieties, likely issues must be pre-empted, and relocated families assured of
on-going support, shelter, and status at the resettlement location. Successful resettlements can
only be achieved with land security, the creation of livelihoods, and support from host
communities.’1134
Taken together, the empirical findings and the contributions in the literature by McAdam and
Edwards clearly demonstrate that the availability of, and access to, land, including consent by
landowners, engaging in meaningful consultation and participation of communities in
relocation decisions, and the collective collaboration of a host of agencies and organisations—
including the state— are key themes pivotal in the context of internal relocation of
communities. These provide significant insights to conceptualise readiness. The discussion
that follows responds to the second line of inquiry undertaken with all participants on cross-
border relocation.
6.3 Readiness of the Fijian Government
Participants (n = 18) were asked about the extent of the Fijian Government’s readiness for
cross-border community relocation. The most common issue that emerged was the discussion
about the purchase of ‘6 000 acres (approximately 24 kms) of forest land’ in Fiji by the then
Head of State of Kiribati on behalf of the people of Kiribati to guarantee food security and
resettlement of its people to Fiji.1135 Other responses to this question by state actors (n = 3)
reveal as follows: One state actor said that:
1132 Ibid 301, 318. 1133 Edwards, above n 35, 54. 1134 Ibid 78. 1135 Bainimarama, above n 7; see also Fiji Government, ‘Fiji’s Statement at the COP-21’, above n 36; see also McAdam, above n 87, 301, 302; see also Donner, above n 35, 191. See also Christopher Pala, ‘Kiribati President Purchases Worthless Resettlement Land as Precaution Against Rising Sea’, (Media Release, 9 June 2014) <http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/kiribati-president-purchases-worthless-resettlement-land-as-precaution-against-rising-sea/>. See also: ‘Kiribati, a nation of 100,000 people scattered over 32 Pacific atolls, completed a deal with Fiji this year to buy 6,000 acres (2,400
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It plants me to thinking about cross-border resettlement of communities... The issue…will have to be one of the mandates for my division to address, as the climate change unit expands its human resource personnel/capacity under the recent budgetary allocation…by the Fijian government… Fiji should be-ready-be-prepared in all aspects…it brings to the forefront the issue of two sovereign states. It raises pertinent legal questions about how does it affect our sovereignty and legal space and what is the legality around this issue? We need to start thinking about this in terms of: the legal space (constitution, legislation, and citizenship) and the socio-economic space… It will depend on the government of the day on how sorted/prepared the government is in terms of the policy space.1136
One other state actor commented that: ‘There has not been any discussions on policy. For that
to take place, there needs to be bi-lateral arrangements in place.’1137 Moreover, as another state
actor articulated ‘Government officials really need to work out the intricate details at micro
and macro levels. Whilst the announcement stands, there hasn’t been any work done. Probably,
Fiji would be better placed, if it was ready and then the announcement followed.’1138 In joining
the state actors (n = 3), one non-state actor when asked about “readiness”, said that: ‘We need
to be very serious about it…it is a matter of when the first boat to come…I hate the day when
that happens and for our Minister to say “Okay I need to go to Ministry of iTaukei Affairs”.
It’s too late. That is where preparedness or readiness comes in…’1139
Anchored in contrast, one unanticipated finding reported by a minority of the participants (n
= 5) was that there is a general hesitation by communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to relocate
to Fiji.1140 One non-state actor stated that: ‘Fiji is open and willing to accept, but are people
willing to come?...What is underpinning Fiji’s position?...it is an interesting
contradiction…for Fiji to say…we will take you in…Tuvalu is not interested in moving and
not intending to go anywhere. So, you have contrasting positions.’1141 Another non-state actor
commented: ‘In Kiribati, the issue of resettlement is not popular…current leadership is not
willing to resettle its people to Fiji or elsewhere.’1142 Likewise, one state actor commented
hectares) of forest land for A$9.3 million ($8.3 million) on the island of Vanua Levu, he (Anote Tong) said’ as cited in Alister Doyle, ‘Kiribati President Favors Buying Land Elsewhere as Islands are Threatened by Rising Sea Levels’ (Media Release, 22 November 2014) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/entry/kiribati-president-buying-land_n_5860064>; see also Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231-405. 1136 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1137 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1138 Interview with state actor no.7 [SA#7] (Suva, 20 September 2017). 1139 Interview with NSA#5, above 1084. 1140 Interview with non-state actor no.10 [NSA#10] (Suva, 21 September 2017); see also SA#2, SA#4, NSA#11, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#1, above n 1110. 1141 Interview with NSA#11, above n 1084. 1142 Interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also The empirical study conducted by Hermann and Kempf in Kiribati and Fiji between 2012 and 2015 who point out that the ‘Kiribati President Maamau…has replaced the earlier focus on climate change policies (of former President Tong) with an emphasis on improving people’s living condition in the atoll state, it has also maintained many previous measures designed to reduce Kiribati’s vulnerability vis-à-vis climate change’ as cited in Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 236.
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that: ‘There are mixed feelings…Whether they take it up, is entirely up to those
countries…Tuvalu, because they believe this land was given to them by their ancestors…come
what may, they will not leave…their God-given island/land.’1143
The extent of readiness by the Fijian Government on a plain reading of the empirical findings
is fragmented and remote based on the small participant pool in this study. The data provided
by state and non-state participants on readiness are consistent with each other. The findings
confirm the undetermined standpoint of governments in pursuing cross-border relocation.
Moreover, the findings validate the investigation on readiness and the need for the Fijian
Government to undertake more in-depth consideration of legal and policy arrangements. This
is discussed further below.
6.4 Legal Readiness of the Fijian Government
Participants were asked to reflect on the existing legal, policy and institutional arrangements
in place to implement cross-border relocation schemes. The responses have been arranged
from the standpoint of the host state at the domestic level followed by the arrangements
between national governments of the host state and sending states.
Domestic Legal, Policy and Institutional Arrangements
Approximately half of the participants did not respond to the question on legal readiness.
According to one non-state actor:
…it could begin as “cross-border guideline for resettlement” which then…be developed into a legal policy for resettlement which can then further develop into a separate piece of Act for resettlement…because of my experience for the intra-resettlement…we nominate certain stakeholders…to facilitate…the communities because they have the legal basis or the Act that allows the community to approach them…the iTaukei affairs for instance, the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120), and for non-formal communities go to Rural and Maritime Development (Ministry for Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management) for instance the National Disaster Management Act that allows for those affected by disasters.1144
Another non-state actor reported that: ‘[I]n order to create enabling policies and…the legal
approach (existing legislative stipulations) it would be feasible to consider it from a bottom-
up approach…it cannot be imposed…important to consider the whole landscape of the
1143 Interview with SA#1, above n 1110. 1144 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084.
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legislature…the policy and the legislation, assess and synthesise and renovate…i.e. to renovate
a policy framework.’1145 One other non-state actor revealed that: ‘[A]s part of the legal
preparedness…we need to look at our: i) current laws, ii) land, iii) land use plans (when they
come out) under the national green growth framework (one of the goals-to identify how we
are going to use our land i.e. mapping/zoning, etc.)…’1146
Likewise, two state actors echoed similar sentiments. The findings revealed the need for re-
examination of the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji). One state actor reported that: ‘...the
Immigration Act is silent on cross-border resettlement except reference to Part 6, which makes
provision for refugee status determination… They will need to…re-define the term “refugee”
under the Immigration Act. If that definition includes “this” category of people, then it may
be settled.’1147 Another state actor reported:
There has to be review of our immigration legislation to see that there is something that is open, we have to be flexible if we are to allow it…also look at it from a human rights perspective in terms of some of the international conventions which we are a party to. Because the issue is if you had to change our laws only, then it leaves it open for anyone to claim “climate refugee”…Whether to have a stand-alone law or a Convention on it?1148
In terms of the domestic legal arrangements, the findings suggest that relocation can be
facilitated either one of two ways.: either by development of a national policy—followed by a
stand-alone law—or by a revision of the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji). These results confirm
that a whole-of-government response is lacking in terms of legal readiness. The Fijian
Government has yet to extend the boundaries of legal and policy deliberations and institutional
processes. It further confirms that there has been very little consideration by the Fijian
Government of the legal landscape with respect to cross-border relocation schemes. The
arrangements between the host country and sending countries are discussed next.
Host and Sending Countries Arrangements
Regional bi-lateral arrangements between the host country and country of origin were
identified as an important factor by a minority of participants (n = 5) to ensure legal readiness.
According to one state actor:
I would prefer to go by way of bi-lateral arrangements. It is neater, easy to control and manage... and it does not open up “door” for misinterpretation or misunderstanding…With bi-lateral arrangements, you can put in place all the conditions, all the processes that is to be criteria, all the factors one has to put in place and take into account all the different
1145 Interview with NSA#5, above n 1084. 1146 Interview with non-state actor no.9 [NSA#9] (Suva, 21 September 2017). 1147 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1148 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084.
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arrangements between the countries…arrangements are better if it is country to country (i.e. Pacific Island to island nations) and a bi-lateral one.1149
Another state actor, when asked about bi-lateral arrangements, revealed a divergent view,
stating: ‘…bi-lateral arrangements is between two countries. We have offered them to come
to Fiji…bi-lateral arrangements…a potential solution is questionable…Bi-lateral is a conduit
of providing some sort of assistance, training. Trans-border migration…all issues, will be
difficult to address through bi-lateral arrangements...’1150 One state actor remained ambivalent
in responding to the arrangements at a regional level, stating that: ‘It depends if it’s an
agreement or MOU? An agreement, treaty or a convention is legally binding.’1151 These are
the only notable variations in the responses concerning arrangements at the regional level.
The empirical findings demonstrate that cooperation between the sending and host countries
can be facilitated by way of bi-lateral arrangements. Additionally, aside from a single reference
to an ‘agreement, MOU, treaty or convention’, the findings do not reveal any further
suggestions to facilitate relocation between countries at a regional level.1152 The findings
confirm that arrangements at the regional level are poorly defined.
There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by the participants in this study and
those of previous empirical studies conducted by Allgood and McNamara, McAdam, and
Nunn and Kumar, who have examined approaches that can potentially support human mobility
triggered by the impacts of climate change.1153 For example, the work of Allgood and
McNamara on ‘exploring the local perspectives in Kiribati on the future impacts of climate
change’ found that the overall response to climate-induced migration can be facilitated by
‘engaging in bilateral and international discussions to secure support from other countries for
future adaptation funding and migration pathways.’1154
Likewise, the field research conducted by McAdam in Tuvalu and Kiribati, pointed out that
‘[i]n Tuvalu, the predominant official view is that climate change must remain the focal point
in any multilateral or bilateral discussions about development, assistance and migration.’1155
Similar findings on the effect of bilateral arrangements have been reported in a number of
1149 Ibid. 1150 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1151 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1152 Ibid. 1153 McAdam, above n 354, 1–26; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370–85; see also Nunn and Kumar, above n 35, 1–28. 1154 See also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370, 380. 1155 McAdam, above n 354, 10.
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research reports by international financial institutions and multilateral development banks.1156
The studies have found that ‘regional cooperation and migration channels may provide much
of the answer in addressing future climate-induced migration.’1157 The ‘existing geopolitical
bonds and economic relations’ amongst Pacific Island leaders have been cited as underlying
reasons to ‘promote regional cooperation through policy dialogue and deliberation’ on
potential cross-border relocation arrangements in the future.1158 Furthermore, the integration
of ‘islander values and aspirations, and culture attempts to incorporate not only physical but
also imagined movement as a constitutive element of place, culture and identity’ which have
also been cited as complementary factors to buttress regional fora decision making and
cooperation.1159
Moreover, the uncertainty in terms of an agreement, treaty or convention to facilitate
arrangements at a regional level is consistent with previous studies that have examined the
effect of a ‘new international treaty on climate change displacement to create a new class of
refugee-like protected persons’, or for the introduction of ‘new legal instruments to address
climate-related movement’ complemented by the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC).1160 Legal scholars remain divided as to whether adopting an
international treaty will offer an appropriate and lasting solution for population displacement
induced by climate change.1161
In contrast to a global treaty or convention, the idea of a treaty has received traction by Pacific
Island leaders with the formulation of a draft “Pacific Climate Treaty” (“model treaty”),
increasing the probability of Pacific Island nations responding to a host of climate change
issues within the South Pacific region.1162 Aside from noted references to the draft model treaty
1156 ADB Report, above n 10; see also Zara Sarzin, ‘Stocktaking of Global Forced Displacement Data’ (Policy Research Working Paper No 7985, World Bank Group, February 2017) 1-52. 1157 ADB Report, above n 10, 56. 1158 Ibid 1, 55. 1159 Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 234; see also Nunn and Kumar, above n 35, 245, 260. 1160 McAdam, above n 354, 1–2; see also McAdam, above n 10, 190; see also UNFCCC, above n 272. 1161 McAdam, above n 354, 1–26; see also McAdam, above n 14, 1518, 1542; see also Feijen, above n 441, 63; see also Zetter, above n 505, 62; see also Wyett, above n 379, 171, 179; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 10–11. See also Robyn Eckersley, ‘Soft Law, Hard Politics, and the Climate Change Treaty’ in Christian Reus-Smit (eds), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 80–90. See also: ‘The government of Kiribati…is keen to secure international agreements in which other States recognise that climate change has contributed to their predicament and acknowledge “relocation” as part of their obligations to assist (in a compensatory way)…In December 2009, the Tuvaluan Prime Minister reiterated that his government rejected resettlement: While Tuvalu faces an uncertain future because of climate change, it is our view that Tuvaluans will remain in Tuvalu…’ as citied in McAdam, above n 354, 8. 1162 Slezak, above n 41; see also Scoop Independent News, above n 42; see also PIDF 4 2016, above n 42.
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in Pacific Island nations regional forums and media reports, no studies exist that outline the
intricacies of the model treaty and its implementation.1163 The evidence presented thus far with
regard to the introduction and formalisation of a treaty at the regional level has received far
too little attention by Pacific Island nations, including the international community. Several
questions remain unanswered with regard to the operationalisation of the model treaty, which
is open to debate.
The findings suggest that bilateral approaches can be adopted as a starting point. However, far
too attention has been devoted by Pacific Island leaders to initiating and undertaking concrete
steps to formalise arrangements for cross-border relocation. Moreover, the issue of climate-
induced migration may not be considered a core priority agenda item for Pacific Island leaders
under the existing leadership of the countries involved. As McAdam outlines, ‘[t]he absence
of bilateral, regional or international migration frameworks means that it is unclear how many
Pacific Islanders will have the opportunity to move voluntarily in anticipation of longer-term
changes to their islands.’1164 In general, therefore, it seems that Pacific Island leaders’
respective national priorities at various global policy fora are possibly focused to scale-up
climate change mitigation efforts by accessing global climate finance for low carbon
development, which potentially shifts the focus of climate-induced cross-border relocation
within the realm of adaptation to climate change. The discussion that follows focuses on the
key themes drawn from the issues identified by participants from the experiences and lessons
of the internal relocation projects implemented by the Fijian Government.
6.5 Cross-border Relocation to Fiji
The perspectives of participants (n = 18) on cross-border relocation are based significantly
upon accounts of the internal relocation experiences and lessons learned from the internal
relocation projects implemented by the Fijian government as discussed above. The key themes
drawn from the issues participants identified in the context of cross-border relocation are
presented in Table 1. Table 1 is organised with the most frequent key themes (n = ) presented
in descending order together with the issues aligned to the key themes. Some of the issues that
interconnect have been arranged under a single key theme. For example, national flag,
exclusive economic zone and so on…are organised under the key theme “sovereignty”. In
addition, the issues identified in the context of cross-border relocation are analysed by
1163 See above n 1162 and accompanying text. 1164 Jane McAdam, ‘The High Price of Resettlement: The Proposed Environmental Relocation of Nauru to Australia’ (2017) 48(1) Australian Geographer 7, 13.
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examining the literature on human mobility from sudden- and slow-onset environmental
change, including published studies on resettlement from developmental projects to sharpen
our understanding of the criteria of readiness. An extended discussion of the key themes drawn
from the issues is explored below in Table 1.
Table 1. Key Themes by State and Non-state Actors with Issues
Issue(s) (n = ) Key Themes
Land tenure-ships. (n = 13) Land
Dual status is a limited response. (n = 10) Citizenship and Nationality
Operational/capital budgets vs onus for relocation costs. (n = 10) Funding
Dimensions of sovereignty include: identity, citizenship,
national flag, exclusive economic zone [EEZ] under United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS].
Negotiating sovereignty?
(n = 9)
Sovereignty
Integration of communities likely to heighten tensions and
conflicts.
(n = 4)
Culture and Identity
People must be at the centre of either a top-down or a bottom-up
approach in relocation regardless.
(n = 3)
Consultations
and
Inclusiveness
Faith-based institutions are well matched to shape perceptions
and relocation decisions. Caution must be applied in relocating
and receiving communities consisting of various religious
denominations.
(n = 3)
Faith-based Organisations
Likely to be misplaced if relocating communities are treated as
secondary citizens despite constitutional protection.
(n = 2)
Human Rights
Weak link may exist between countries in policy choices and
shifting priorities.
(n = 2)
Tertiary Education
Losing sight of people during all stages relocation poses
significant risks.
(n = 2)
People
Caution must be exercised with interpreting the notion of
regionalism.
(n = 2)
Regionalism
Land
Almost two-thirds of the participants (n = 13) indicated that access to land was a primary issue
for the readiness of the host country for cross-border relocation. These empirical findings are
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consistent with previous studies in which land has frequently been identified as the most
critical factor in the case of involuntary resettlement of communities from large-scale
development projects and ‘(voluntary or forced) planned relocation’ from climatic factors.1165
A study conducted by Campbell on the meaning and importance of land across Pacific Island
countries, found that ‘…the great majority of the land…is held under customary forms of
tenure and accounts for less than 90 per cent of the land…The forms of customary
tenure…range from arrangements for individual rights to land through communal
ownership.’1166 Campbell argues that ‘…it is unlikely that communities from one Pacific island
country will be happy to give up their land to newcomers in a way that enables the newcomers
to maintain their social, cultural, political and economic ways.’1167 The findings by Campbell
identify important implications with respect to the relocation of Pacific Island communities to
island countries that may potentially host communities in the future. It is evident that when
availability of land specific to relocation is exiguous, the government of the day may have to
turn to landowners to access communal land for communities of origin who may not have
‘traditional rights of access to that (resettlement) land.’1168 This may result in competing
interests and relations (“interests”). Concerted participation and consultation by an array of
state and non-state actors, including the landowners, may present a viable option to overcome
such interests.
Likewise, concerns revolving around land tenure-ship for cross-border relocation is consistent
with Donner’s empirical research conducted with a total of 45 participants, of which 32
represented descendants from three past generations of the Gilbertese Islands.1169 His study
focused on lessons learned and the ‘challenges faced by Gilbertese people resettled from
modern-day Kiribati to Ghizo in the Solomon Islands’ in the second half of the twentieth
century.1170 He argues that ‘land tenure will be the unifying challenge facing future
communities that relocate due to climate change.’1171 Donner’s empirical findings revealed
that ‘[u]ncertainty over rights to existing land and ability to procure further land for the
growing population was linked to almost all other community issues, including post-tsunami
recovery, political representation, education and employment opportunities, tensions with
1165 Tagliarino, above n 160, 1–44; see also Edwards, above n 35, 60–1; see also IDMC GRID 2015 Report, above n 39, 13–14. 1166 Campbell, above n 75, 60, 63–6. 1167 Ibid 67. 1168 Ibid 60, 62, 65, 67. 1169 Donner, above n 35, 193. 1170 Ibid 191–210. 1171 Ibid 199.
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other communities, and cultural changes.’1172 Based on the findings of Donner, it can be argued
that a whole host of considerations and priorities may need to be addressed by the host country
before making land available for cross-border relocation.
Similarly, the empirical findings support previous work in the ‘field of displacement and
resettlement studies.’1173 Vanclay argues that ‘large-scale development or infrastructure
projects require land…This need for land can result in the dislocation of the people (i.e.
physical displacement).’1174 Vanclay further argues that ‘given that “land is life” for many
people and that people everywhere have place attachment (a sense of place) to a varying extent,
project land acquisition and the consequent displacement and disruption can cause much hurt
and hardship.’1175 One of the key strategies to minimise the impact of projects on population
displacement, including significant risks like ‘land tenure security, human rights, and
livelihoods’, was the formulation of international safeguard policies, resettlement guidelines
and minimum standards by global lending institutions, for example, the development of
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standard 5 on Land Acquisition and
Involuntary Resettlement.1176 Primarily, the prescriptions of the international policies,
guidelines and standards (“standards”) demand that project proponents adhere to, and comply
with, the standards in every phase of project development (i.e. planning, preparation,
implementation, decommissioning).1177 In this study, the draft internal relocation guidelines
indicated earlier provide a useful tool. The guidelines could be enhanced and specifically
1172 Ibid. 1173 Vanclay, above n 1039, 3–21; see also Terminski, above n 58, 16, 50, 83, 87, 88, 89, 92, 94–5, 121, 144; see also Anthony Oliver-Smith, ‘Applied Anthropology and Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement’, in Satish Kedia and John van Willigen et al (eds), Applied Anthropology: Domains of Application (Praeger Publishers, 2005) 190–219, 193. See also Prabir Kumar Pattnaik, ‘Development Induced Displacement and Resettlement: Analysis of Judicial Policy’ (2017) 55(3) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 346, 350; see also Paul K Gellert and Barbara D Lynch, ‘Mega-projects as Displacements’ (2003) 55(175) International Social Science Journal 15, 16; see also Bogumil Terminski, ‘Development-induced Displacement and Human Security: A Very Short Introduction – A General Overview of Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement’ (Working Paper, 28 November 2012) 4. 1174 Vanclay, above n 1039, 3. 1175 Ibid. 1176 Ibid 5, 9–10; Tagliarino, above n 58, 7–8; see also Tagliarino, above n 160, 6–7; see also Ploeg and Vanclay, above n 397, 34–6; see also Terminski, DIDR: Causes, Consequences, above n 58, 17, 51; see also Terminski, DIDR: Theoretical Frameworks, above n 58, 162. See also The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The International Development Association, Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies: World Bank Board Approves New Environmental and Social Framework <https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies>; see also The World Bank ‘Review and Update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies < https://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/review-and-update-world-bank-safeguard-policies>. 1177 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 21–3; see also W. Courtland Robinson, ‘Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-induced Displacement’ (Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution, May 2003) 1–96.
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tailored to cross-border relocation by incorporating international minimum standards and best
practices on an array of focus areas, including land recognised in the context of development
resettlement.
Taken together, the explicit inclusion of land as a key issue is suggested in framing policies,
designing relocation programs, formulating guidelines, and establishing institutions to support
and facilitate the cross-border relocation of Pacific Island communities. Presumably, it is
highly unlikely that the government of the day will allocate freehold land for the purposes of
cross-border relocation.1178 Unless concerted efforts and action are extended by the
government of the day to obtain general consensus by the landowners to cede communal lands
for resettlement ‘within their own land boundaries’, relocation will be fraught.1179
Additionally, attempts to restore the livelihoods of relocating communities at the new location
may potentially turn out unfavourably as a result of tensions arising between the communities
of destination and origin.1180
Citizenship and Nationality
Just over half of the participants (n = 10) raised concerns about the legal status of relocating
communities, such as the citizenship and nationality arrangements of the Fijian Government
(Table 1). The reference to the historical migration of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities
to the islands of Rabi and Kioa of Fiji respectively was commonly cited by participants. One
of three non-state actors echoing similar sentiments commented that: ‘The model adopted for
the communities (Rabi/Kioa) could be a starting point to address these emerging issues…i.e.
to retain their identity…access resources, services and maintain their livelihoods…’1181 The
present research is limited by the lack of information on the type of “model” to which the
participants alluded in the interview data. The participants did not exhibit any clear-cut
dimensions of the model other than stating “dual citizenship”. Presumably, the model refers
to communities of origin acquiring dual citizenship and nationality in the host country.
The recognition and status of relocating communities from a legal perspective is also notable.
According to one state actor: ‘…Rabi, they are Fijians, but they still have Kiribati
1178 Campbell, above n 75, 57–79, 67. 1179 Ibid 65. 1180 Ibid 51–2. 1181 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146.
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citizenship.’1182 One other state actor commented that ‘[T]hey (Kiribati/Tuvalu) cannot be
resettled here (Fiji) and…still maintain their identity. They need to relinquish that. Which
system of government will support them?’1183 One non-state actor queried: ‘…do you issue
passports…citizenships to them or they are aliens? How do you demarcate “that” category of
people when they come here…? That will need to be translated into…the policy stance of
government...’1184
The present findings, are consistent with issues on citizenship and dual nationality documented
by McAdam in her archival research, which consisted of interviews conducted with 38
participants from the Banaban and Kioan communities in Fiji and government officials in
Kiribati between 2012 and 2013.1185 McAdam’s investigation was twofold. First, she sought
to explore the governance structures on Rabi to determine the extent of ‘local autonomy
granted to the Banabans within Fiji’.1186 For example, she investigated the formulation of a
local governance framework to account for a ‘system of land tenure and inheritance’ and the
Rabi Island Court facilitated through the Banaban Settlement Act 1978 ch 123 and Banaban
Lands Act 1985 ch 124.1187 Second, she sought to determine further the safeguards for dual
citizenship and dual nationality pursuant to the Fiji and Kiribati constitutions and statutes for
‘persons of I-Kiribati descent.’1188 It is well established that the Fiji Constitution 2013 s 5(4)
and Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s 14 permit dual citizenship and the Kiribati Constitution
1182 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1183 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1184 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1185 McAdam, above n 13, 283, 313; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305–6; see also Edwards, above n 35, 53–4; see also Shawn Shen and Francois Gemenne, ‘Contrasted Views on Environmental Change and Migration: The Case of Tuvaluan Migration to New Zealand’ (2011) 49 International Migration 224, 231. See also: ‘…people described having two homes-Kioa, the homeland, and Vaitupu the motherland. Many identify as both Fijians and Vaitupuan…today they refer to themselves as “Kioans” (after their “new” home)…’ as cited in McAdam, above n 87, 319. 1186 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 285, 296–303; see also: ‘…‘because it involved the movement of almost an entire Banaban population, to an uninhabited island in another country (which meant they did not have to integrate with a pre-existing community)’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 285. 1187 See ‘Banaban Settlement (Amendment) Ordinance No. 15/1951; Banaban Settlement Ordinance No. 38/1970 (October 8, 1970) (repealed the 1945 Ordinance: s8); Banaban Settlement (Amendment) Act No.12/1973 (June 28, 1973) (amended the 1970 Ordinance); Banaban Settlement Act, Cap 123 of 1978 (a consolidated version of the Banaban Settlement Ordinance 1970 and the Amendment Act 1973; Banaban Settlement (Amendment) Act No. 8/1996 (August 28, 1996). The current statute is the Banaban Settlement Act Cap 123 of 1978, as amended by the 1996 statute’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 297 (@ fn81). See also: ‘Banaban Lands Ordinance 1953 No. 30/1953 (November 26, 1953); Banaban Lands Ordinance 1965 No. 31/1965 (July 8, 1965) (repealed the 1953 Ordinance: s 20); Banaban Lands (Amendment) Ordinance No.37/1970 (October 8, 1970); and Banaban Lands Act Cap 124 of 1985 (which appears to consolidate the 1965 and 1970 Ordinances) and is the statute currently in force’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 301 (@ fn 102). 1188 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 285, 304–9, 313, 319, 323, see also McAdam, above n 87, 321–5; see also: ‘…constitutional safeguards that were created to entrench the Banabans’ rights of entry to stay and parliamentary representation in Kiribati, including a right to dual citizenship’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 286.
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ch I ss 23-4 and Kiribati Citizenship Act 1998 ch 8A s8 permit dual nationality.1189 McAdam
argues that dual citizenship was not recognised in Fiji until 2009, when the passage of the
Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 occurred.1190 With respect to the dual citizenship arrangements
for the Kioan community, McAdam found that they lack ‘any special constitutional status in
the country of origin, Tuvalu.’1191 McAdam acknowledges that although her study takes a
historical approach and her findings document past ‘legal solutions created for the Banaban
context’, it ‘enables a rethinking of the concepts of sovereignty, citizenship and minority
protection’ and the ‘maintenance of distinct, self-governing communities, if relocation across
international borders is ever to be considered as a possible adaptive response to the impacts of
climate change.’1192
One non-state actor, who was the only I-Kiribati national from the pool of participants, alluded
to the notion of “third class citizens” and stated:
…we (Hon. President and delegation) heard sentiments like our (Kiribati community in Solomon Islands) “treatment as third class citizens”. My analysis from the information of our diaspora is that they have been treated as “third level” citizens of the host country…President also went to Rabi…the President responded then to quote: “your issues are not new”, they are the same…1193
There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by the non-state actor and those
described in previous studies conducted by Donner, as highlighted earlier above.1194 The field
interviews recorded by Donner reveal that the ‘Gilbertese community in the Solomon Islands
had become recognised as “second-class” citizens’ and faced barriers in ‘securing educational
scholarships and government jobs’ despite their ‘higher literacy rate than the local
population.’1195
Against this background, the literature establishes that there is recognition of the issues around
citizenship and nationality within the legislative framework at a national level. Whether
reliance on the existing legislative arrangements will be adequate to respond to and address
the legal status of communities of origin to the host country on the grounds of climate change
1189 See ‘Fiji Constitution 1970 ss 19, 21, 25(e); Fiji Constitution 1990 s78(1); Fiji Constitution 1997 s185(1); Fiji Constitution 2013 s 5(4); Fiji Citizenship Act 1971 s16; Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s14; Kiribati Constitution chs III, IX ss23–4, 29(1)(a); Kiribati Citizenship Act 1998 ch 8A’ as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 302–3, 307, 313, 319, 321. See also Jane McAdam, above n 87, 301, 306–17. 1190 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 307; see also Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s14 as cited in McAdam, above n 13, 307. 1191 McAdam, above n 87, 301, 319; see also Tuvalu Constitution ch 1.02 pt III <http://www.tuvaluislands.com/const_tuvalu.htm>. 1192 McAdam, above n 13, 281, 283, 333. 1193 Interview with NSA#10, above n 1140. 1194 Donner, above n 35, 191–210. 1195 Ibid 198.
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is unclear. It may be a determination for the government of the day to make when cross-border
relocation is implemented. However, a revision in policy and legislation by policymakers for
the inclusion of “this” category of communities is suggested.
Funding
Just over half of the participants (n = 10) raised concerns about costs and the funding of cross-
border relocation. The divergent responses by participants on the issue comprised two focus
areas. Some participants proposed that the costs associated with the cross-border relocation of
communities is the responsibility of the international community.1196 A smaller number of
participants (n = 3) proposed that regional agencies play an important role in extending
technical assistance to Pacific Island countries to access global funds.1197 Both focus areas are
discussed respectively.
One state actor commented that: ‘…this (climate change) is not something Pacific Island
nations created…intervention of the international community is important and assist probably
through the climate funding or Global Climate Fund (GCF). Resettlement will amount to huge
funding. We just rely on the international community.’1198 These findings are consistent with
previous research undertaken by Adelman, who confirms that ‘[d]eveloped countries are
historically responsible for the majority of GHGs in the atmosphere and therefore bear the
greatest obligations for the distribution of the burdens of mitigation (distributive justice) and
adaptation (common but differentiated responsibilities).’1199 He argues that ‘[i]slanders face
the prospect of forcible relocation without protection under international law and with few
resources for resettlement.’1200 Adelman further argues that ‘[t]hey are entitled to
compensation for climate-related loss and damage in the interest of climate justice.’1201 He
suggests that the ethical obligation of developed countries to ‘compensate SIDS for climatic
loss and damage can be discharged through...compensation without admission of liability.’1202
He further suggests that ‘such compensation could take the form of resettlement or of monetary
compensation.’1203
1196 Interview with SA#3, SA#4, above n 1084. 1197 Interview with SA#5, NSA#3, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#2, above n 1110. 1198 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1199 Adelman, above n 103, 32–4, 36; see also Stephen Humphreys, ‘Editorial’ (2016) 7(1) Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 1, 2–3. 1200 See above n 1199 and accompanying text. 1201 Adelman above n 103, 32 and accompanying text. 1202 Adelman, above n 103 34 and accompanying text. 1203 Adelman, above n 103, 33, 38; see also Humphreys, above n 1199, 2.
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This suggestion may provide a feasible solution to funding large-scale relocation projects in
light of stringent compliance requirements to access global funds. However, it remains unclear
the degree to which there is consensus at global policy fora to make funding available for
relocation (inland and cross-border) from an ethical perspective and on equitable grounds. As
one non-state actor stated: ‘Money/funding for resettlement is quite a contentious agenda item.
People do not like to fund relocation. That is a big “no-no”...Because of its implications…’1204
Having considered funding for relocation projects from the standpoint of the international
community, including the key tenets of accessing global climate funds, the discussion that
follows highlights regional agencies as existing and possible intermediaries for Pacific Island
nations seeking global climate funding.
Similarly, the ADB, with its extensive experience and technical expertise in large-scale
resettlement of communities from development projects in the Asia-Pacific region, confirms
that financial resources and significant investment are key ingredients in international
resettlement.1205 The ADB reports that ‘resettling communities displaced by climate change
will be expensive and few countries in Asia and the Pacific will be able to fund sustainable
resettlement alone.’1206 The ADB admits that the intervention and support of the
international community is pivotal.1207 The ADB maintains that ‘international
institutional capacity, systems of governance, funding arrangements’ and ‘resettlement
programmes i.e. planned migration for vulnerable populations’ are key considerations
which underpin large-scale international relocation projects.1208
These empirical findings are consistent with previous studies conducted by Barnett and
Webber.1209 Their study focused on migration as a positive strategy and involuntary
resettlement ‘in anticipation of or in response to climate change.’1210 In tracing the global
trends of migrants who move permanently, Barnett and Webber found that migration is
generally ‘within their own country, or to a neighbouring country, rather than over vast
distances.’1211 They claim that people permanently displaced by climate change will generally
be forced to move to ‘developing countries whose ability to meet the needs of migrants is
1204 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1205 ADB Report, above n 10, 36–7. 1206 Ibid 37. 1207 Ibid. 1208 Ibid 36–7. 1209 Barnett and Webber, above n 35, 37. 1210 Ibid 38. 1211 Ibid 51.
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limited.’1212 They argue that this potentially fuels ‘conflict, poverty and environmental
degradation’ in the host country.1213 They contend that it is incumbent upon the international
community to provide for the ‘short-term humanitarian and longer-term settlement needs of
migrants.’1214 In addition, they emphasise that for permanent migration in response to climate
change to be tenable, it is necessary for international agencies to drive efforts in partnership
and collaboration with the organisations and agencies of the host country.1215 This is because
of cognisance of a host of local issues, including the socio-economic and environmental
dimensions in the host country of the communities in the host areas.1216 Research and studies
by Adelman, the ADB, and Barnett and Webber show that the large-scale relocation of Pacific
Island communities demands the intervention of the international community to fund the
associated costs. The studies by Barnett and Webber also show that the engagement of the
international community requires extensive engagement with a network of agencies in the host
country to implement larger-scale relocation projects.
Participants also indicated that access to funds under the global funding mechanisms (GCF,
Paris Agreement, and Warsaw Mechanism) does not feature prominently for cross-border
relocation, which brings us to the next focus area: the role of regional agencies.1217 According
to one state actor:
…we need relocation money…That task should be given to regional agencies…they have adequate resources…personnel and data…advocate to…donors… international community…on relocation for cross-border…Regional agencies will be able to represent the interest of the broader region… as opposed to individual governments…of Pacific Island nations…it demands the international community and the donors to give priority to the Region, especially of the testimonies globally delivered by atoll island nations such as Kiribati, Tuvalu, Marshall Islands and Nauru.1218
One non-state actor cautioned that efforts to access funding at a global level by Pacific Island
countries would be stymied and queried: ‘…what are the criteria for accessing the GCF? Will
we (Pacific) be able to meet those criteria (GCF)?1219 The non-state actor indicated that: ‘most
of the agencies will ask for evidence base…A lot of our countries do not have data (data gaps).
So they (global funding institutions) are putting in place a lot of criteria that are limiting our
1212 Ibid. 1213 Ibid. 1214 Ibid. 1215 Ibid. 1216 Ibid. 1217 Interview with NSA#1, SA#5, above n 1084. 1218 Interview with SA#5, NSA#3, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#2, above n 1110. 1219 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084.
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ability to access funding. They have changed the criteria to make it difficult for us to
access….’1220
There are similarities with the empirical findings in this study with the case study approach
adopted by Dean, Green and Nunn, who ‘analysed the first national adaptation project of
Kiribati (Kiribati Adaptation Project–KAP)’ which was supplemented by the empirical
evidence gathered from their field interviews with participants (n = 60) in Kiribati.1221 Briefly,
‘planning and policy; integrated coastal management; improved freshwater supply; capacity-
building and awareness-raising among communities; and project management’ were the
thematic areas of the KAP.1222 They recorded that the ‘continental expectations embedded in
donor procedures and requirements for the KAP hindered the project’s own outcomes from
being achieved and sustained.’1223 They assert that ‘donors impose procedures, policies,
requirements, and techniques based on continental thinking, perpetuate both real and perceived
lack of capacity’ which inhibit ‘geographies of development and adaptation that are
sustainable in island contexts.’1224 They further assert that ‘[c]apacity-building initiatives
(monitoring, reporting, and donor-stipulated formats) for procurement and financial
management often emphasise Western, top-down techniques.’1225 They point out that donors
need to recognise and ‘understand islands on their own terms as there is no official capacity to
respond to all questions and studies and requirements’ in seeking financial assistance for
development projects.1226
In like manner, the empirical findings are consistent with studies conducted by Adelman, who
points out that the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with
Climate Change Impacts (WIM) focuses ‘primarily on insurance (conventional insurance,
insurance-linked securities) rather than compensation at the behest of developed countries.’1227
He further points out that ‘insurance is problematic because premiums are likely to be
unaffordable for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and provide limited coverage that
may not include the costs of relocation and resettlement.’1228 He argues that ‘[t]he
disappearance of one’s homeland through the fault of others (developed countries) is an
1220 Ibid. 1221 Dean, Green, and Nunn, above n 822, 54, 55, 64. 1222 Ibid 54, 65. 1223 Ibid 54, 76. 1224 Ibid 54, 55. 1225 Ibid 54, 60. 1226 See above nn 1221-25, 54–5, 60. 1227 Adelman, above n 103, 48. 1228 Ibid 48–9.
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unavoidable and irrecoverable loss that constitutes an extreme climate injustice for which
islanders should be compensated.’1229 In the absence of adequate prescriptions in the WIM,
Adelman suggests climate justice principles, common but differentiated responsibilities, as a
basis to increase the probability of developed countries to compensate SIDS for climatic loss
and damage.1230
Likewise, further work by Adelman examining Article 5 (REDD+) and Article 8 loss and
damage of the operative text of the Paris Agreement, found that references to relocation and
resettlement remained exiguous in the Paris Agreement.1231 He claims that the omission
‘signifies a significant failure to protect human rights of the citizens of SIDS.’1232 He argues
that ‘[t]here is an urgent need to protect the human rights of climate-displaced persons under
international law, preferably within the UNFCCC.’1233
The empirical evidence in this study is consistent with studies by Adelman, who suggests that
access to existing funding vehicles is less well articulated at the global level for large-scale
relocation projects. The intervention of regional agencies to extend support and technical
assistance to Pacific Island nations to access global funding suggests a practical alternative.
However, global climate funding is non-existent for large-scale relocation (internal and cross-
border) on the grounds of climate change, which brings to the forefront funding as a key theme.
Sovereignty
Half of the participants (n = 9) highlighted the sovereignty of autonomous states as a
significant issue for large-scale cross-border relocation. Participants identified the key focus
areas linked to the issue of sovereignty as ‘1) exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Kiribati and
Tuvalu when these islands no longer exist, 2) EEZ provisions under United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 3) citizenship and identity of communities of
origin, and 4) the Pacific Island nations as regional partners under the notion of
regionalism.’1234 The first two focus areas are addressed below, with the remainder integrated
separately in this section (citizenship, nationality and regionalism). Overall, the participants’
1229 Ibid 35. 1230 Ibid 34–6. 1231 Adelman, above n 178, 17. 1232 Ibid 13. 1233 Ibid. 1234 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146; interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#7, NSA#11, SA#4, above n 1084.
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accounts of sovereignty were inquisitorial, which is reflected in the interview data detailed
next.
One state actor queried: ‘… So, who has right over that (Kiribati/Tuvalu basepoints) …is the
big legal question at the international level…if all our basepoints are there and it does not
sustain life, then under the strict legal interpretation of UNCLOS, it is disqualified…
Sovereignty is being challenged internally…geographically…at a regional level and…global
level…’1235 One non-state actor also queried: ‘If Fiji offers to take them, what happens…in
terms of their (Kiribati) ocean…claim…EEZ in return?...under UNCLOS?...become nomads
land or does it remain with Kiribati, because it will be under the ocean? What can be done at
that level for Fiji to benefit? Some sort of compensation? Or access rights to fishing?...’1236
Another non-state actor questioned: ‘…[w]hat level of autonomy you can provide to…Kiribati
and Tuvalu?...do they…become subservient…people would like to maintain their race,
ethnicity, cultural… Do you want a nation within a nation? Can that happen?’1237 One state
actor emphasised that: ‘…identity and sovereignty cannot be negotiated…They
(Kiribati/Tuvalu) cannot create another government…here (Fiji)…An island with two
governments…sovereignty issue is compromised…You will not be moving your territorial
sovereignty within Fiji.’1238
These empirical findings are similar to those in a large volume of published studies that
acknowledge statehood and sovereignty are issues open for debate and require in-depth
consideration in response to the large-scale relocation of Pacific Island communities due to
the adverse impacts of climate change.1239 The studies also acknowledge that ‘in some extreme
cases it is conceivable that land may even disappear’, which brings to the forefront
fundamental questions on ocean governance under the UNCLOS, or as Rayfuse points out, an
‘intriguing juridical dilemma.’1240 The reason for this, Rayfuse argues, is because the
‘discussions on the issue of disappearing states may be premature, an unhelpful diversion, or
1235 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1236 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1237 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1238 Interview with SA#7, above 1138. 1239 Rayfuse, above n 379, 167–91; see also McAdam, above n 13, 281–333; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 6–7; see also: ‘…statehood:…defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and a certain measure of independence…’ as cited in Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, ‘When Do States Disappear?’ in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 57. 1240 Campbell, above n 75, 57; see also Rayfuse, above n 379, 169; see also Gerrard and Wannier, above n 325, 6–7.
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both’ in global climate policy fora in contemporary times.1241 Rayfuse, in citing the work of
Khadem, further points out that ‘when a state loses its permanent population (i.e. population
having fled/relocation) and/or physical territory’ it potentially induces inter-state competing
relations, conflict and ‘disputes over navigation rights and, more particularly sovereignty
rights to living and non-living resources.’1242 However, she suggests the ‘juridical dilemmas
posed by sea level rise are necessary preparations that will assist coastal states and
disappearing states to establish the legal conditions necessary to maintain their maritime
jurisdictional interests and, potentially their existence as States.’1243
The findings in this study are consistent with the empirical studies conducted by McAdam,
who examined the incongruous exchange of proposals and demands advanced by both
Australia and Nauru to remedy the impact of their (and New Zealand’s) phosphate mining
during the twentieth century.1244 McAdam argues that the Australian Government proposed
the wholesale relocation of the Nauruan population to Curtis Island in Queensland. Briefly,
the terms of resettlement included restoring the livelihoods of the Nauruan population, fully
covering resettlement costs, granting citizenship, and the ‘right to manage their own local
administration and legislate for their own country.’1245 The Australian Government maintained
that ‘sovereignty will not by surrendered’ to the Nauruans.1246 The Nauruan representatives in
the first instance insisted on ‘rehabilitation of their land over relocation because it would
enable them to remain in their homes and preserve their identity.’1247 Alternatively, ‘Nauruans
proposed the creation of a sovereign Nauruan nation governed by Nauruans in their own
interest.’1248 McAdam points out that the deadlock between the two countries revolved mainly
around a sovereign state on Curtis Island to preserve their distinct identity and culture.1249
McAdam, claims that the dismissed proposal for wholesale relocation between Australia and
Nauru ‘provides a cautionary tale for perennial discussions about future relocation of Pacific
Island communities in the face of climate change.’1250 She identifies ‘the right to self-
determination, self-governance, the preservation of identity and culture, and the right to
1241 Rayfuse, above n 379, 169; see also Paul D’ Arcy, ‘The Lawless Sea? Policy Options for Voluntary Compliance Regimes in Offshore Resource Zones in the Pacific’ (2014) 1(2) Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies 297, 297, 304. 1242 Rayfuse, above n 379, 175, 177. 1243 Ibid 169. 1244 McAdam, above n 1164, 7–16. 1245 Ibid 10–11. 1246 Ibid. 1247 Ibid 9. 1248 Ibid 11. 1249 Ibid 7–8, 10–12. 1250 Ibid 7.
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control resources’ as key issues for consideration in planned relocation for ‘low-lying Pacific
island communities at risk from the impacts of climate change.’1251
The empirical findings in this study are also consistent with previous studies conducted by
Campbell and highlighted earlier. Campbell’s investigation into the ‘importance of land to
Pacific island communities’, and its implication ‘for those who may be forced to sever ties
with it (land)’ due to the likely effects of climate change is notable.1252 Campbell claims that
‘[i]t is unlikely that any country, including those in the Pacific, would cede sovereignty over
a part of their territory to a relocated group.’1253 He points out that ‘it is equally unlikely that
a relocated group could sustain its “way” in a foreign land that did not accept or understand
many of the cultural beliefs or practices, including their bond to the land.’1254 He further points
out that ‘if the land is to become uninhabited, uninhabitable, or at worst non-existent, the
critical people-land union may decline.’1255
Taken together, the focus areas (UNCLOS, EEZ and access to resources) linked to the issue
of sovereignty in the context of cross-border relocation presents multiple layers of contentious
and complex issues. Several questions remain unanswered at present as the issues remain
poorly defined under international law. One of the suggested approaches to advance the issue
of sovereignty at the global stage is for Pacific Islands leaders to exert pressure as a region on
the global stage to preserve its maritime boundaries and zones within the Pacific Island region.
Moreover, the international community could collectively participate and scale-up dialogue in
global policy fora to provide a way forward on potential emerging issues before relocation
across sovereign borders specific to Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji is implemented.
Culture and Identity
Culture and identity were identified as issues pertinent for readiness by a small number of
participants (n = 4). Identity here refers to a sense of belonging to a place and recognition as
opposed to the legal identity of a person. According to one non-state actor: ‘[i]t (culture)
is…connections with the ancestors of the land…burial sites…It is a huge trade-off and difficult
1251 Ibid 12; see also Stoutenburg, above n 1239, 77. 1252 Campbell, above n 75, 57. 1253 Ibid 67. 1254 Ibid. 1255 Ibid.
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to reconcile.’1256 There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that if large-scale
relocation is to take place because of the impacts of climate change then the preferred
destination would be to neighbouring Pacific Island nations over other global destinations.1257
The empirical investigation into climate change and migration issues in the Pacific by
Campbell and Warrick found that Pacific Island communities would be ideally positioned to
maintain and retain the cultural values and their identity because of the ‘environmental and
cultural similarities’ in the Pacific region relative to western countries.1258
Similarly, one state actor reflected on the internal relocation experiences recalling testimonies
such as ‘…“my soul is here”, “I and connected to my land”, “my ancestors are buried beside
my house”…“you are not just relocating one person but an entire village settlement”.’1259 The
state actor suggested ‘…do the cultural plan for them…you have to make them understand…it
is the mindset…they have…’1260 The design and particulars of the cultural plan are
undetermined. However, the cultural plan offers some insight into mapping out the issues
around culture and identity in the context of cross-border relocation. In addition, integrating
the cultural plan into all phases (preparation, design and implementation) of the cross-border
relocation project by the Fijian Government is suggested.
The findings observed in this study mirror those of previous studies reported by the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR 5)
Working Group II (IPCC AR 5, WG II), which examined the ‘effect of climate change on
culture.’1261 The report found that ‘climate change threatens human security because it
undermines livelihoods, compromises culture and individual identity, increases migration that
people would rather have avoided, and because it can undermine the ability of states to provide
the conditions necessary for human security.’1262
Additionally, the empirical findings in this study are consistent with Allgood and McNamara’s
field research conducted with 60 local residents situated in four villages in South Tarawa,
Kiribati.1263 Their investigation focused on the perspectives of residents on ‘climate change
impacts and adaptation strategies, and details about how households have used migration, if at
1256 Interview with NSA#11, above n 1084. 1257 Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 20. 1258 Ibid. 1259 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1260 Ibid. 1261 Adger et al, above n 37, 758, 762. 1262 Ibid. 1263 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370.
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all, as a livelihood strategy.’1264 The empirical evidence revealed that 74 per cent were in
agreement about the need to migrate when the question on ‘migration as part of a long term
strategy to respond to sudden or gradual impacts of climate change’ was directed to them.1265
Furthermore, Allgood and McNamara recorded that a small number of residents dismissed
‘leaving their homeland.’1266 The ‘strong connection to their land, way of life and the potential
loss of culture and traditions’ were the reasons recorded.1267 Other reasons that also surfaced
included: ‘(i) concern about a different way of life at the destination, (ii) climate change denial,
(iii) religious beliefs and (iv) potential loss of sovereignty and traditional skills.’1268 The
findings from Allgood and McNamara, while preliminary, suggest that for residents to be
uprooted from their land is non-negotiable.
Taken together, the findings in this study suggest that Pacific peoples are rooted in their land
and culture, and these uniquely identify them. In the literature on migration and relocation as
an adaptation strategy of last resort to respond to the impacts of climate change, the relative
importance of land to the Pacific peoples, their culture and identity remains the subject of
considerable debate.1269 Scholars such as Mortreux and Barnett, and Farbotko in
acknowledging land, ‘culture, identity and a sense of home’ of South Pacific peoples as being
important, point out that ‘migration and relocation should not be regarded as the only or most
important form of adaptation strategy.’1270 They point out that the ‘vulnerability of
ecosystems’ in the South Pacific has received considerable attention in the field of
environmental studies rather than on ‘the ways in which social and ecological systems can
avoid or adjust to actual or expected climate impacts (such as forced migration can be
avoided).’1271 They further point out that to date, little evidence has been found ‘about the
likelihood (and desirability) of migration as an adaptation strategy in the Pacific’ which
appears to support ‘the widely held assumption that climate change is, will, or should result in
migration and relocation of whole populations in the Pacific Islands.’1272 This suggests that
interventions into adaptation initiatives is a central feature underlying mobility decisions from
the impacts of climate change.
1264 Ibid 370, 373–4, 381–2. 1265 Ibid 381. 1266 Ibid 370, 379, 381. 1267 Ibid 381. 1268 Ibid 379. 1269 Ibid 381. 1270 Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 105, 111; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1271 Mortreux and Barnett, above n 1270 and accompanying text. 1272 Ibid. See also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137, 139-40.
218
In this study, several questions remain unanswered on arrangements to safeguard the culture
and identity of communities of origin in the host country, as these hinge on some key issues
indicated earlier, for instance, citizenship and nationality, and sovereignty. It can be argued
that the autonomy of communities of origin and host communities may potentially be
encroached.1273 A well-articulated program and congruous plan to operationalise cross-border
relocation is recommended in order to minimise the likelihood of potential emerging conflicts
and tensions amongst communities, post relocation.
Consultations and Inclusiveness
A small number of participants (n = 3) identified consultations with individual clans/heads in
a village as one of the issues of readiness.1274 As one non-state actor stated:
Inclusive approach by the government of the day…conduct consultation and inform the host communities about government’s plan to relocate new communities…let host communities know about the expectations…it is important that the government of the day fully inform host communities as the resettlement will be…indefinitely, which can lead to a number of social implications…government should be able to facilitate issues arising from resettlement… look after the welfare...1275
According to one state actor ‘Government will be the lead agency and we have the faith-based
organisations, local communities, everyone needs to take ownership of this process.’1276
Likewise, participants emphasised the inclusion of a wide range of communities and
vulnerable groups in the implementation of relocation projects.1277 One state actor commented:
‘…look at the gender groups…i.e. women need to be part of this big decision-making because
these are the people that will feel the burden of most relocations.’1278 The state actor reflected
on the first internal relocation experiences of communities in Vunidogoloa and provided an
account of women being divided with regard to: ‘…running the daily household chores and
going out to the sea with their fishing nets to collect fish, i.e. smaller things such as the
travelling time from the new site to the sea unlike a couple
1273 The Inspection Panel, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and The World Bank Group, ‘Involuntary Resettlement’ (Research Report No 1, The Inspection Panel and The World Bank, April 2016) 16 (‘Inspection Panel Report 2016’). 1274 Interview with NSA#1, NSA#4, NSA#5, SA#5, above n 1084. 1275 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084. 1276 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1277 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084; see also Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 22. 1278 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084.
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of steps at the old site. Psychologically it affects them.’1279 The state actor pointed out that one
common reason for the exclusion of gender groups in major national projects is because:
‘…gender decision-making is silenced in most Pacific island structures.’1280
The empirical findings of this study are also consistent with those of previous studies
conducted by the ADB into advancing technical assistance towards internal and international
migration.1281 The ADB found that ‘[i]n all cases, the participation of affected communities in
the decision-making process will be vital to limit the negative impact on culture and social
networks, and to ensure livelihood opportunities and social services after relocation.’1282 The
explicit inclusion, active participation and consultations by the government of the day with
mainstream and marginalised sections of the community of the host country across
implementation plans and programs for cross-border relocation is suggested.
Faith-based Organisations
The integration and engagement of faith-based organisations in relocation decision-making
was one of the issues identified by participants (n = 3). As identified previously, one non-state
actor alluded to the notion of ‘…the promise of Noah i.e. God’s promise to Noah i.e. “Rainbow
as a Promise and Rainbow as a Hope”’ and pointed out that ‘…some of our communities from
Tuvalu and Kiribati…still tightly gripped to that philosophy…’1283 The non-state actor
indicated that ‘…Churches go in…to give hope…about relocation focusing on opportunities
they could get at the new site which is deteriorating or not promised at the existing site. So
when there is still time to build and relocate is an opportunity. That’s…where the framing of
the Church messages to our communities is changed…’1284
The perspectives of participants in this study are consistent with previous studies conducted
by McAdam, John Connell, Shen and Gemenne, Kelly Wyett, Fair, and Allgood and
McNamara into understanding the role faith plays for Pacific peoples in responding to the
adverse effects of environmental events.1285 The empirical work of authors in the Pacific region
1279 Ibid. 1280 Ibid. 1281 ADB Report, above n 10, 55. 1282 Ibid. 1283 Interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1284 Ibid. 1285 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370–85; see also Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 224–42; see also Wyett, above n 379, 171–85; see also McAdam, above n 354, 1–26. See also Mortreux and
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suggests that the Pacific peoples are strongly rooted in their religious beliefs and that these
overshadow migration and relocation options to sustain their security and livelihoods in the
future.1286 This also accords with earlier observations described by McAdam, Allgood and
McNamara, Fair, and Shen and Gemenne about the ‘Bible story in which God makes a promise
to Noah to never flood the Earth again is often used by communities to justify their decision
to stay, despite the projected severity of conditions.’1287 Shen and Gemenne point out that the
‘Church is now considering the problem seriously, and has started raising awareness about the
problem, as well dismissing Noah’s story as a metaphorical legend, not to be taken
literally.’1288 Fair, in acknowledging the extensive role and inclusion of ‘religious
organisations in the Pacific region’ (Pacific Conferences of Churches, for example) to advance
‘climate advocacy’ points out that ‘Pacific Island churches do not prioritise climate change
due to budgetary restrictions, or shortages of technical knowledge.’1289 She asserts ‘that in
order for churches to be maximally engaged in climate communication, adaptation and
advocacy, there is a need to look beyond churches merely as convenient institutional
frameworks for information and community mobilisation and to consider the power and
potency of religious ideas.’1290 She argues that the interpretation of ‘the Noah story’ from the
standpoint of ‘different combination of knowledges (traditional knowledge and Western
science, for example)’ offers variable responses.1291 She suggests that a greater degree of
importance needs to be directed in ‘balancing multiple epistemologies of climate change and
navigating relationships between the combination of knowledges’ as a way forward to
harmonise ‘faith-based climate change denial.’1292
The intervention of faith-based organisations in reconciling misconceptions of the Pacific
peoples on migration and relocation decision-making and facilitating social cohesion of
communities of origin and communities of destination in all phases of the cross-border
relocation project is suggested.
Barnett, above n 379, 105–12; see also Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 65; see also John Connell, ‘Losing Ground? Tuvalu, the Greenhouse Effect and the Garbage Can’ (2003) 44(2) Asia Pacific Viewpoint 89, 89–107; see also Fair, above n 1106, 1–15. 1286 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370, 380; see also Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 224, 233; see also Wyett, above n 379, 171, 176; see also McAdam, above n 354, 1, 11; see also Connell, above n 1285, 89, 97. 1287 Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 370, 380; see also McAdam, above n 354, 1, 11. 1288 Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 233. 1289 Fair, above n 1106, 1, 3. 1290 Ibid. 1291 Ibid 1, 12. 1292 Ibid 1, 5, 12.
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Human Rights
Safeguarding the rights of relocating communities’ was one of the issues identified by
participants (n = 2) for readiness. One state actor indicated that: ‘…some parts of the guideline
(national relocation guideline) has been formulated through a human rights lens where
appropriate.’1293 The draft guidelines are publicly unavailable, as indicated earlier in this
chapter. However, it can be presumed that by recognising rights-based concerns in the draft
guidelines, policymakers can be future focused to integrate and establish measures to protect
and safeguard the rights of communities of origin in all phases of the cross-border relocation
process.
Previous work in the field of climate-induced migration and resettlement acknowledges that
the ‘rights to life, health, culture and property’ are likely to be undermined in the process of
relocation.1294 There is consensus among scholars that ‘[r]ights-based concerns are driven by
the need to offer protection to people whose livelihoods will be depleted or destroyed by the
climate-induced changes which impel them to migrate.’1295 The studies conducted by the ADB
indicated earlier confirm that ‘there are no international legal frameworks that specifically
target the people displaced by environmental disruption.’1296 While the ADB acknowledges
the existence of ‘instruments and mechanisms’, they also acknowledge that ‘they are little
known and inconsistently implemented.’1297 The ADB suggests that both regional and global
protection frameworks are required.1298 Several questions remain unanswered at present, as
arrangements negotiated at national and regional levels by Pacific Island governments to
support cross-border relocation are poorly defined and underdetermined. However, it is
suggested that the governments of Pacific Island countries do not lose sight of a rights-based
approach as a key determinant and priority agenda item in regional policy fora.
1293 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1294 Adelman, above n 178, 20–1; see also Kalin, above n 354, 83–4; see also Roger Zetter, ‘Protecting People Displaced by Climate Change: Some Conceptual Challenges’ in McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2012) 131–50. See also: ‘…[t]he resultant injustices will take many forms. It is unclear whether the right to self-determination of such island nations will lapse with the disappearance of their territory, and they have no entitlement to another territory. The rights to health, food and life are amongst those under threat, and affected communities will suffer cultural and spiritual losses when they are dispersed into diaspora communities…’ as cited in Adelman, Climate justice, loss and damage, above n 103, 43. 1295 Zetter, above n 1294, 132; see also McAdam, above n 354, 3. 1296 ADB Report, above n 10, 55. 1297 Ibid. 1298 Ibid.
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Tertiary Education
Introducing specific areas of study is one of the issues identified by participants (n = 2).
According to one non-state actor:
…what type of education program/strategy they (Kiribati/Tuvalu) have in place, what type of skill level they building their population to, in the event that they will have to migrate to allow countries (like Fiji) to absorb them. Have we in Fiji, looked at our needs in the areas that we can say, if we consider resettlement, we want your population (Kiribati/Tuvalu) to endeavour to fill in the gaps in e.g. medical field. So the aid and everything else these countries (Kiribati/Tuvalu) receives goes towards supporting the current population to educate themselves and their children to be able to assimilate into any host country. So they, don’t become a social burden to the rest of the problems of the host country. Maybe there can be a corresponding policy in Kiribati and Tuvalu for them to upgrade their skills in certain areas, before anything happens, they might have an opportunity to come and work over here…it will work for their advantage and get themselves established.1299
There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by participants in this study and those
described by McAdam, whose field research in Tuvalu and Kiribati examined mobility arising
as a result of environmental factors.1300 McAdam found that:
[w]hile people in Kiribati and Tuvalu are aware of climate change, for a variety of reasons they
are not necessarily worrying about it. Religion, lack of education and a culture of “living for
today and not planning for tomorrow” contribute to a certain degree of complacency about
environmental change.1301
This suggests a need for the education sector, the private sector and faith-based organisations
to collectively initiate strategies and programs and to educate and enhance the knowledge and
skills of communities of origin about the debilitating impacts of climate change and potential
migration in the future.
People
One of the issues participants (n = 2) identified was “people” who are at the heart of
relocation.1302 As one non state-actor stated: ‘Cross-border is a complicated issue… three
components are essential: 1) people—developing/building/enhancing the capacity of host
communities and receiving communities in of access to human rights and human security and
sovereignty, 2) land tenure, and 3)financial capital…’1303
1299 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1300 McAdam, above n 354, 1–2. 1301 Ibid 10. 1302 Interview with NSA#3, SA#6, above n 1084. 1303 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084.
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The World Bank, in conducting meaningful baseline studies in response to involuntary
resettlement points out that the explicit reference to “people” is defined as the ‘identification
of vulnerable groups that require special attention, including gender-and aged-based groups;
vulnerable groups (such as indigenous peoples, the disabled or those with special needs); and
the landless.’1304 The broad use of the term “peoples” is sometimes equated with Indigenous
peoples and communities.1305 Adelman, in citing the works of Krakoff, describes that
‘indigenous communities adopt the term “peoples” to reflect core concerns with group identity
and accompanying communal and collective self-determination.’1306 Similarly, McAdam
argues that ‘resettlement across borders must include - but also go beyond - the establishment
of formal institutions such as governance bodies and citizenship.’1307 She points out that
‘[s]afeguards must ensure that the group (relocated group) can carve out an identity in the new
environment (receiving country), have access to the same entitlements as others, and also
understand themselves as having dual identity that has political and cultural relevance in both
settings (both in the sending and receiving countries).’1308
A central issue underlying migration and relocation is the “people”. It is suggested that
policymakers need to examine more closely the interconnected links between “people” and
the economic, legal, social and political dimensions of relocation.1309
Notion of Regionalism
Some participants (n = 2) identified the issue of the intervention and cooperation of Pacific
Island countries to extend support for cross-border relocation under the notion of regionalism
‘(“for Pacific Islanders, by Pacific Islanders” or the “distinctive Pacific voice”) as
important.’1310 As one state actor articulated: ‘Government (Fiji) showing the world that we
1304 Emerging Lessons Series No.1: Involuntary Resettlement (The Inspection Panel – World Bank Group) 7, < http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/521101467989568006/pdf/105660-NWP-Box394887B-PUBLIC-PUBDATE-4-12-16.pdf >. 1305 Adelman, above n 178, 17–36. 1306 Ibid 20. 1307 McAdam, above n 87, 327. 1308 Ibid. 1309 Kalin, above n 354, 82–3. 1310 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#2, above n 1110; see also Joyetter Feagaimaali’i-Luamanu, ‘Why Regionalism Matters’ (Media Release, 2 September 2017) <http://www.samoaobserver.ws/en/03_09_2017/local/23870/Why-regionalism-matters.htm>. See also Sandra Tarte, ‘Regionalism and Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands’ (2014) 1(2) Asia and The Pacific Policy Studies 312, 312–324; see also: ‘…regionalism for Pacific islanders, by Pacific
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are committed to climate change to the extent of accommodating communities. This is part of
regionalism. Regionalism doesn’t recognise borders and sovereignty…’1311 The findings are
consistent with previous research highlighted earlier by the ADB.1312 The ADB reported that
‘regional cooperation which builds on existing geopolitical bonds and economic relations is
more likely to be effective in addressing the problem of climate change displacement.’1313
Another state actor provided a divergent view, pointing out that the notion of regionalism
needs to be interpreted with caution in connection with relocation, stating that: ‘…if you are
compromising everything in the name of regionalism, then you cannot exercise
autonomy…And that is the thing we are seeing now.’1314
There are similarities between the attitudes expressed by participants in this study and the
empirical studies conducted by Klepp and Herbeck.1315 Their field research consisted of
interviews with governmental and non-governmental organisations in Fiji and Kiribati
between 2011 and 2015, which was complemented by their previous empirical research
conducted in ‘2010 and 2011 in Vanuatu, Kiribati and New Zealand.’1316 The investigation by
Klepp and Herbeck focused on the ‘regional Pacific negotiation process on environmental and
climate change migration and the possibilities and limits of various strategies and
alliances.’1317 They recognised the significant role and contribution extended by the ‘Alliance
of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Small Island Developing States (SDIS)’ at global
policy fora under the UNFCCC.1318 They found that ‘island states are trying to develop
common policies to bolster their position at the UN and that many new forms of Pacific
solidarity and cooperation have recently emerged in the course of ongoing climate change
discussions.’1319 In like manner, the evidence of ‘the vision of Pacific governments to protect,
promote and fulfil human rights of all Pacific people’ is reflected in the ‘Framework for Pacific
islanders…’ as cited in Tarte, 322; see also: ‘…regionalism includes Pacific island state and non-state actors…institutional voice of Pacific Small Island Developing States at the global and wider regional levels…’ as cited in Tarte, 313. See also ‘…regionalism through partnerships approach’ as cited in Tarte, 312; see also ‘…Pacific regionalism as a foreign policy and development strategy…Pacific island states have recognised the need to become more active participants in global debates on sustainable development, climate change and ocean governance…(global and regional agendas)…’ as cited in Tarte, 322. 1311 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1312 ADB Report, above n 10, 56. 1313 Ibid. 1314 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1315 Klepp and Herbeck, above n 54, 54–73. 1316 Ibid 56–7. 1317 Ibid 56. 1318 Ibid 65. 1319 Ibid.
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Regionalism (Regionalism Framework) endorsed by Pacific Island Leaders.’1320 The
Regionalism Framework embodies a multitude of ‘regional collective action’ such as
‘coordinated application of shared, best practice, norms and standards; sustainably harnessing
the region’s physical, social and cultural assets for the benefit of the Pacific people; and
regional economic integration and equitable distribution of benefits and costs.’1321 In addition,
the Regionalism Framework has been bolstered by the ‘Denarau Declaration on Human Rights
and Good Governance to drawn upon international human rights treaties, conventions and laws
as tools for policy, legislative and normative change to enhance good governance and the
realisation of human rights for all Pacific peoples.’1322
The findings and the regional policy initiatives suggests that strong agreement exists between
Pacific Island countries on the need to garner support on a host of issues specific to the region.
It demonstrates the impetus of Pacific Island leaders in leading decisions collectively at a
regional level. It also demonstrates that leaders could potentially craft arrangements to
implement climate-induced cross-border relocation projects in the region in the future.
The issues identified by participants for the cross-border relocation of communities
corroborate the findings of many of the previous empirical studies conducted by scholars in
the displacement and migration field of studies, particularly those conducted on the Pacific.
The analysis of the issues undertaken in this study has gone some way towards enhancing our
knowledge to map out the key themes in response to cross-border relocation of communities
from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji.
The availability of, and access to, land for relocation (land); the legal status determination of
communities of origin anchored potentially by citizenship and nationality arrangements
(citizenship and nationality); access to funds specifically for relocation (funding) and the
controversial subject of sovereignty were key themes drawn from the issues and frequently
identified by over half of the participants. The remainder of the key themes presented less
uniformly by fewer than half of the participants related to:
1) maintaining the culture and identity of communities of origin in the host country (culture
and identity);
1320 Pacific Community, ‘Human Rights in the Pacific a situational analysis’ (Research Report, Pacific Community, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016) 1, 5, 7; see also Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, ‘The Framework for Pacific Regionalism’ (Research Report, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2014) 1-16 (‘Regionalism Framework’). 1321 Regionalism Framework, above n 1320, 4. 1322 Pacific Community, above n 1320, 1, 5, 7.
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2) the extensive inclusion and meaningful participation of authorities and agencies with all
members of the relocating communities in every phase of the relocation project
(consultations and inclusiveness);
3) extending to include the participation and inclusion of faith-based organisations assisting
with relocation decision-making by communities (faith-based organisations);
4) ensuring that all phases of the cross-border projects focus on communities (people); and
are implemented using a human-rights based approach;
5) strengthening the education sector to enhance the knowledge and skills of relocating
communities (tertiary education) and;
6) more information on the notion of regionalism in cross-border relocation at a regional
level.
The data dispersion represented by key themes in this study are widely distributed and should
not be interpreted so as to outweigh the less frequent themes. It is recommended that some of
the key themes may need to be positioned and addressed in initial policy-making discussions,
plans and design of cross-border relocation projects. Moreover, the key themes provide a new
understanding to conceptually analyse the criteria of readiness specific to cross-border
relocation projects. This will assist in the analysis of Fiji’s readiness for cross-border
relocation of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji, which is presented in chapter
seven.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to explore, through field research, the experiences and lessons learned by
participants from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government to answer
RQ 1(b). The field research laid the foundation to further investigate the issues responsive to
readiness in the context of cross-border relocation of communities. What is apparent from the
findings that emerged from the empirical evidence and the analysis of the literature and
published reports is that the availability of and access to land, including consent of landowners,
is pivotal to relocation.1323 The second major finding was the necessity of ensuring the
inclusiveness of all people and conducting meaningful consultation with relocating
communities during all phases of the relocation project.1324 This chapter has also shown that
the most important issue of all was the prioritisation of people: that is, their collective
1323 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; see also McAdam, above n 87, 301–27. 1324 Ibid.
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participation and consensus in relocation decisions. The other key area identified was the
capacity development of state and non-state actors to facilitate relocation projects, which
underscores inclusiveness and consultation in cross-border relocation projects.1325
The field research also set out to examine arrangements by the Fijian Government spanning
legal, regulatory, policy and institutional dimensions at local, national and regional levels as
part of readiness for large-scale climate-induced cross-border relocation of communities from
Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. The overall results of this investigation have shown that
arrangements are not well advanced by the Fijian Government to respond to cross-border
relocation at any of these levels. The findings from the interview data have shown that a
national policy, followed by a stand-alone policy on cross-border relocation, or alternatively,
the revision of the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji) are approaches that can be adopted across the
policy and regulatory dimensions at the national level to enhance readiness. Furthermore, the
interview data have shown that bi-lateral arrangements, a memorandum of understanding
between the host country and countries of origin or alternatively a treaty, are strategies that
could be adopted by the Fijian Government as part of ensuring readiness.
Moreover, it was apparent from the empirical evidence and the analysis of empirical studies
conducted in the Pacific that the relocation of the Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji,
including the dual citizenship and nationality arrangements, provided a basis for understanding
readiness.1326 Taken together, these results suggest several courses of action by the Fijian
Government as a starting point for ensuring readiness. The arrangements at local, national and
regional levels could be usefully explored in further research.
Finally, this chapter has identified the key themes to be citizenship and nationality, funding
and sovereignty, among others illustrated in Table 1. The data, which emerged from the
empirical evidence and the analysis of published studies on displacement and migration from
sudden- and slow-onset environmental events show that broad considerations must be taken
into account as part of ensuring readiness for large-scale cross border relocation.1327 This
chapter also shows that the issues of citizenship and nationality, culture and identity,
sovereignty and regionalism are subject to considerable debate.1328 This study also identifies
important focus areas for future research and potentially for deliberation and negotiation by
the host country and countries of origin in future regional policy fora. Further, analysis has
1325 Ibid. 1326 Ibid; see also Jane McAdam, above n 13, 281–333. 1327 See above n 1323 and accompanying text. 1328 Ibid.
228
shown that a human-rights based approach offers some insight into addressing potential
insecurities and inequalities in all phases of relocation as part of readiness.
Overall, the results from the empirical evidence and analysis have extended understanding of
the areas of inquiry into what it means to be ready for the cross-border relocation of
communities. The next chapter draws together the findings from this chapter with the host of
considerations presented by the case studies in chapter four and the multidisciplinary
perspectives on readiness in chapter five, to articulate the criteria for analysing readiness for
climate change-induced relocation of communities across sovereign borders.
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Chapter 7: Analysis of the Fijian Government’s Readiness
7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, it draws upon the multifaceted determinants of
the phenomenon of readiness conceptualised in chapters four, five and six to articulate the
criteria for assessing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility. This
answers R Q 1 of the study, which asks: What are the criteria for readiness in the context of
climate change-induced human mobility? To respond to RQ 1, this chapter synthesises and
analyses the findings uncovered from the sub-questions linked to RQ 1. These comprise the
experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific
Islanders (RQ 1a), the empirical findings of the experiences and lessons learned from the
internal relocation of communities initiated by the Fijian Government (RQ 1b) and the body
of experience of readiness documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives
(RQ 1c). Together, these provide the foundation to frame the criteria of readiness.
Second, this chapter analyses the current position, that is readiness, of the Fijian Government
to respond to the climate change-induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders across sovereign
borders to Fiji. This is evaluated against the criteria of readiness articulated from the
multifaceted analysis of data pertaining to RQ 1. Assessing the level of readiness of the Fijian
Government answers the second key research question (RQ 2) of the study, which asks: What
is the current state of Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale mobility of Pacific Islanders as a
result of climate change? This chapter will use data obtained from the field interviews as
evidence to support the findings of the analysis of the readiness of the Fijian Government.
Third, this chapter provides a brief overview of the key areas for possible reform within
existing laws. Moreover, this chapter identifies overarching determinants as a starting point to
guide and contribute to a legal framework for climate change-induced readiness. The reform
perspective answers the third research question of the study, which asks: What reforms are
necessary to ensure that Fiji is ready to receive Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change?
A comprehensive reform-oriented discussion of the required laws and the development of a
legal framework is beyond the scope of this study, as the core focus of the investigation is to
articulate the criteria for assessing readiness.
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7.2 Multifaceted Determinants
The sources of data to articulate the criteria of readiness are drawn from the considerable case
study literature documenting the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders presented in
chapter four and the phenomenon of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives presented
in chapter five. They also include the findings recorded in the field research conducted with
eighteen participants (n = 18) in Fiji presented in chapter six. What follows are the
determinants conceptualised from the sources of data arranged respectively.
The determinants presented in the case studies in chapter four showed the need for:
1) meaningful consultation by the government and project proponents in the receiving and
host communities with ‘all affected persons, including women, children and indigenous
peoples’, and the inclusiveness of all persons in relocation decision-making;1329
2) suitability and location of land for relocation by the government and project proponents,
including the availability of land to provide food security and restore the livelihoods of
communities of origin in the receiving state;1330
3) ‘sustained and sufficient financing to cover costs and investments of moving and
resettlement’ of communities of origin in the receiving state, ‘and to compensate for loss
of community ties, land and cultural assets’ integrated into relocation planning by the
government and project proponents;1331
4) recognising communities of origin decision to voluntary immobility as a basis to maintain
their deepened ‘ancestral ties to place, cultural identity, religion and indigenous
knowledge’ in the country of origin;1332
5) establishing communities of origin status from a legal standpoint in the receiving state to
tailor for dual citizenship, nationality and political participation and supported by the
domestic laws—including the legal recognition of ‘their descendants living outside their
1329 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 64, 68, 75, 76–8; see also Robinson, above n 1177, 40. 1330 Edwards, above n 35, 63–70; see also Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4; see also The broad use of the term land in the context of Pacific island nations, tends to be used to refer to ‘land held under customary forms of tenure…where customary tenure accounts for less than 90 per cent of the land, public forms of ownership make up the difference…freehold land makes up less than 10 percent of land in the region’ as cited in Campbell, above n 75, 60. 1331 Edwards, above n 35, 69, 74–5; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305, 319; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also McAdam, above n 642; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Cosmin Corendea, ‘Development Implications of Climate Change and Migration in the Pacific’ (Working Paper No 3, United Nations Development Program, University of Cambridge, University of Nairobi and Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 2016) 13-14. 1332 Farbotko, above n 732; See also Farbotko, Carol, ‘Voluntary Immobility: Indigenous Voices in the Pacific’ (2018) 57 Forced Migration Review 81, 81-83
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country of origin’ to citizenship and political participation at the origin and/or traditional
homeland;1333
6) ‘retaining control over land and marine resources’ by relocating communities at the origin
and/or traditional homeland—sometimes equated with ‘their original home island’—and
to derive equitable entitlements from resources, even if the relocating communities are no
longer living in those islands permanently;1334 and
7) opportunities for the communities of origin to ‘equal access to common resources and
services’ (fishing, land, health, education, social welfare) in the receiving state.1335
The determinants of readiness from multidisciplinary perspectives presented in chapter five
focused on three key needs: to build the capacity of local government administration and
bolster existing institutions, to ensure that the role of law is used in ‘the right domestic
environment’ and to ensure that there is a whole-of-society orientation underpinning the
process. There are a number of sub-requirements that need to underpin each of these needs:
Building the capacity of local government administration and bolstering existing institutions
needs to be underpinned by:
i) formulating national action plans;1336
ii) engaging in ‘concerted and purposeful collaboration’ with ‘cross-sectoral bodies,
private sector, communities and stakeholders;’1337
iii) coordinating responses and activities across local government sectors to leverage
uniformity with administrative processes;1338
iv) formulating national strategies aligned with global policy initiatives, instruments
and practices as a basis to inform government policy development and employ
concrete measures to implement government initiatives and projects;1339 and
1333 Connell, above n 75, 140; see also McAdam, above n 13, 283–4, 307, 319; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 20. 1334 See above n 1333 and accompanying text; see also McAdam, above n 87, 307, 319, 326, 305; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1335 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also Locke, above n 25, 178. 1336 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6; see also Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54. 1337 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–5. 1338 Ibid 395–6; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also Morita and Pak, above n 411, 14. 1339 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12; see also Cancun Speech DRR, above n 787.
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v) establishing communities of research to enhance development and technology
innovation capabilities.1340
The requirement that the role of law is used in ‘the right domestic environment’ means that it
must embody tools and mechanisms for the:1341
i) review of existing laws, formulation of specific laws and ‘how they are actually
understood, perceived, and implemented, including differences in
interpretation’;1342
ii) integration of ethical considerations ‘to maintain public trust, promote compliance,
and minimise social disruption and economic loss;’1343
iii) inherent recognition of soft law principles underpinned by a rights-based approach
underscored in international instruments, and operational guidelines and
safeguards developed by multilateral agencies and institutions to inform policy
development and the legal framework at the domestic level; and
iv) international cooperation support buttressed by multilateral or bilateral partnership
plans, programs and agreements between governments, agencies and development
partners.1344
A whole-of-society orientation requires that the entire process centre on the interests,
entitlements and rights (land tenure, compensation, access to resources) of local communities,
including women and marginalised groups, taking place through the explicit inclusion and
meaningful consultation in all the phases of initiatives and projects commissioned by the
government and proponents.1345 The researcher acknowledges that interventions through
whole of society orientation among other preparations (capacity, legal) may present scaling
challenges for national governments. These relate to ‘the operational complexities of
resettlement processes–both in terms of developing coherent policy and achieving effective
implementation on the ground.’1346 Additionally, ‘if adequate finance is available,
developmental relocations can be difficult to achieve in practice.’1347
1340 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 45, 50–1, 54; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 124. 1341 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200. 1342 Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 395. 1343 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 108–9. 1344 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200; see also McAdam, above n 354, 10. 1345 Jolly, above n 854, 151–2; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421, 422, 424–5; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Wil, above n 160, 5; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Arnall, above n 75, 253, 255. 1346 Ibid. 1347 Ibid.
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The data from the field research presented in chapter six identified the need for, and raised
inquiries relating to, the following determinants as:
1) availability of land, safeguards for customary landowners’ interests and rights, and
appropriate system of land tenure recognition in the receiving state to relocate
communities of origin;1348
2) legal status recognition of communities of origin to dual citizenship and nationality in the
receiving state supported by domestic laws;1349
3) retaining the sovereignty and self-governance of communities of origin in the receiving
state;1350
4) ‘maintenance and enjoyment of cultural and traditional rights, including social rights
taking place through work rights, access to health care and social security as nationals of
the receiving state’;1351
5) ‘preservation of the identity, social coherence and culture’ of the communities of origin in
the receiving community;1352
6) ensuring that people are at the fore of policy and decision-making underpinned by
‘applying a bottom-up approach’ by the receiving state administration in all stages of
planning, implementation and post resettlement facilitated by the explicit inclusion of and
consultation with the receiving community;1353
7) inclusion of faith-based organisations as intermediaries between the government
administration, proponents, agencies, and the receiving community—and particularly the
local host community—to inform decisions relating to relocation;
8) introducing programs at the tertiary level as a basis for researchers to build the capabilities
of local communities to consider relocation over voluntary immobility within and/or
across sovereign borders from the impacts of climate change;1354
9) determination of whether the sending or host state bears the costs of relocation; and the
10) interplay of the notion of regionalism as a durable response and solution to climate-
induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders in the Pacific region.
Together, the multitude of determinants generated from the case studies of the historical
resettlement of Pacific Islanders, the examination of readiness from multidisciplinary
1348 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326–7. 1349 McAdam, above n 10, 148–9. 1350 Ibid 147, 154. 1351 Ibid 148–9. 1352 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 163. 1353 McAdam, above n 87, 327; see also Corendea, above n 1331, 12, 15, 17. 1354 Farbotko, above n 732.
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perspectives and the empirical evidence from the field research conducted in Fiji are drawn
together holistically, synthesised and analysed to articulate the criteria for readiness in the
context of climate change-induced human mobility. The discussion that follows in informing
the criteria for analysing readiness is two pronged. It provides an overview of the approach
adopted to synthesise the multitude of determinants and shows where the determinants are
supported and presented in the sources of data.
7.3 Criteria for Analysing Readiness
The criteria for readiness are distilled from the synthesis and analysis of the determinants
stemming from the historical resettlement literature, multidisciplinary literature on readiness
and the field research (sources of data). The determinants that appeared significantly more
frequently across the sources of data are articulated as criteria. For example, references to
“explicit inclusion of local communities”, “meaningful consultation” and “people central to
decision-making” appeared uniformly across the sources of data and are represented as the
criterion: whole-of-community orientation at all phases. Furthermore, the determinants that
appeared consistently, while not explicit across all the sources of data, are also articulated as
criteria. For example, “management capacity”, “institutional leadership” and “policy space”
are supported across the sources of data and are interpreted and articulated as the criterion:
institutional capacity and coordination of local government. However, the determinants that
appear discretely and less frequently across the sources of data are considered in one of two
ways. The determinants are integrated with one of the existing criteria. For example, “faith-
based organisations” to facilitate relocation decisions appeared in the field research. This
determinant is aligned with the criterion: institutional capacity and coordination of local
government as part of enhancing community capacity through programs and activities
designed by local government bodies. Second, the determinants that are not well supported
and do not resonate with any of the existing criteria are not reflected as part of the analysis.
This is because the analysis may become too broad with baseless stand-alone criteria that are
beyond the scope of the study. For example, the conceptual notion of “regionalism” is not
reflected in the literature on the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders or the
multidisciplinary literature on readiness.
Having outlined the approach to articulate the criteria for readiness, the discussion that follows
presents each criterion, what it encompasses and pinpoints the determinants that have recurred
uniformly throughout the sources of data. The sources of data here are understood to mean the
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case studies presented in chapter four, the multidisciplinary perspectives presented in chapter
five and the field evidence presented in chapter six.
Whole-of-community Orientation at all Phases
The whole-of-community orientation is identified as a criterion because the determinants
equated with “explicit inclusion and meaningful consultation” and “people at the fore of policy
and decision-making” are cited consistently across the sources of data drawn from the analysis
of both the literature and field research. The sources of data underscore the whole-of-
community orientation approach. The approach is supported by the experiences and lessons
learned from the past human mobility of Pacific Islanders presented in chapter four, which
confirms the importance of whole-of-community inclusiveness and participation in relocation
decisions. For example, seminal authors McAdam, Connell and Campbell maintain that
‘relocation should only occur with the free and informed consent of communities concerned.
They should be fully informed of the reasons and procedures of movement, be able to propose
alternatives to relocation that authorities should duly consider and be compensated for any
losses.’1355 There is also inherent recognition of the explicit inclusion of communities in the
formulation of `national disaster plans and strategies as part of disaster preparedness, which
was discussed in chapter five.1356 Another example from the field interviews in chapter six
reveals that relocation decisions centre on people (n=2), buttressed by consultation and
inclusiveness of communities (n=3).1357 As one state actor articulated: ‘Look at the gender
groups that are there i.e. women need to be part of this big decision-making because these are
the people that will feel the burden of most relocations...’1358 The evidence across the sources
of data resonates closely with the inclusiveness and participation of affected communities in
relocation decisions as part of formulating plans and strategies at the domestic level. Together,
the analysis of the empirical findings from the small participant pool establishes the whole-of-
community orientation as a criterion. The discussion that follows clarifies what the criterion
encompasses for analysing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human
mobility.
1355 McAdam, above n 87, 318. 1356 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 26, 52–3. 1357 Interview with NSA#1, NSA#3, NSA#4, NSA#5, SA#5, SA#6, above n 1084. 1358 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084.
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Together, the analysis establishes the whole-of-community orientation as a criterion. The
discussion that follows clarifies what the criterion encompasses for analysing readiness in the
context of climate change-induced human mobility.
The whole of-community orientation is the means by which a variety of perspectives, such as
‘livelihood restoration, access to resources and public services’ of affected communities, is
recognised and embedded in the design, planning and implementation phases of relocation
schemes by the government administration and multiple proponents.1359 The criterion
identifies the ‘needs of vulnerable sectors of the population, such as indigenous peoples, the
elderly, and people with disabilities, including gender-and aged based groups’ in relocation
programs, policy and decision-making.1360 Moreover, the criterion encompasses the
dissemination of information on relocation in the vernacular of affected communities with
sufficient lead time by the government administration and proponents through ongoing
meaningful consultations.1361 This further encompasses engaging actively with affected
communities to underscore a two-way exchange and participation on the array of concerns
from relocation decisions.1362 Moreover, the whole-of-community orientation extends to entail
international safeguards, such as the principle of free, prior and informed consent of affected
communities in relocation decisions.1363 Taken together, the whole-of-community orientation
as a criterion is appropriate for assessing readiness in the context of climate-change-induced
human mobility.
Funding of all Phases
Funding all phases is identified as a criterion and is characterised by: adequate funding to
implement relocation schemes ‘to enable affected communities to restore their livelihoods’ in
the new host state’1364 allocating costs of relocation to plan and coordinate relocation of
affected communities during the pre-relocation, implementation and post relocation phases—
and strengthening government institutional capacities and capabilities to source finance from
a host of international funding mechanisms to support the relocation of affected communities
from the impacts of climate change. The criterion is cited fairly consistently across the sources
1359 Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 7; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–4. 1360 See above n 1359 and accompanying text. 1361 Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 8–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5. 1362 See above n 1361 and accompanying text. 1363 Ferris, above n 12, 32, 35. 1364 McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 130.
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of data drawn from the analysis of the literature and field research. The experiences and lessons
learned from the case studies of the Carteret Islanders presented in chapter four highlight the
need for: ‘culturally appropriate compensation’ to customary landowners and communities of
origin for the initial re-adjustment at the new host location, livelihood restoration of
communities, and the physical infrastructure construction costs as considerations intrinsic to
finance relocation schemes.1365
The climate finance readiness literature in chapter five identifies that building and
strengthening the institutional capacity of developing countries plays a pivotal role to ‘access
public and private international climate finance’ towards national projects.1366 Capacity is the
means by which the institutional mechanisms of local government bodies are developed with
respect to ‘planning, budgeting, programming and monitoring procedures and systems.’1367
Moreover, the ‘mechanisms need to be compatible with existing and future planning and
budgeting systems and integrated with the country’s national plans, policies, and sustainable
development priorities.’1368 The climate finance readiness literature further points out that the
economies of scale of developing countries taking place through their technical, financial and
resource capacities limit the ability of developing countries to access funding mechanisms at
the international level.1369 This suggests that deeper consideration for building and
strengthening the capacity of local government institutions as a basis to source funding to
support future relocation schemes is required. Furthermore, over half of the participants (n=10)
raised concerns in the field interviews about funding for relocation, as highlighted in chapter
six. One state actor pointed out (as reported in chapter six) that: ‘…finance is very critical for
us in the region…the intervention of the international community is important and
assist…through the climate funding or Global Climate Fund (GCF). Resettlement will amount
to huge funding. We just rely on the international community.’1370 The evidence across the
sources of data resonates closely with funding being synonymous with relocation costs and
financing for relocation schemes. Funding all phases of relocation requires developing
institutional capacities of government, harnessing national development plans, programs and
policies that are inclusive of the costs of relocation—such as infrastructure, compensation, and
livelihood restoration—and the allocation of adequate financial resources for the
1365 Edwards, above n 35, 66, 70–1, 77–8. 1366 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 11; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–7, 23. 1367 UN Environment/UNDP/WRI GCF Programme, above n 812. 1368 Ibid. 1369 Leckie, above n 16, 29; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 4–7, 23. 1370 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084.
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implementation of national projects in government budgets.1371 Taken together, the analysis
establishes funding all phases as a criterion for analysing readiness in the context of climate
change-induced human mobility.
Maintenance of Cultural Identity
The maintenance of culture and identity of communities of origin in the new host country is
identified as a criterion.1372 The sources of data underscore deep recognition of ‘identity,
language, religion, traditions and culture’ of communities of origin through practices and
traditional knowledge, such as ‘planting traditional crops, spiritual attachments to ancestral
homes and lands, dance performances and designing traditional costumes.’1373 For example,
the case study documenting the resettlement of the Gilbertese to Ghizo in chapter four reveals
a shift by the younger generation from the ‘traditional knowledge systems and adapting to new
cultures and ways of life’, such as speaking Pidgin over Gilbertese language and retreating
from traditional methods of conducting meetings by the ‘unimane (old men) in the traditional
maneaba (community meeting house).’1374 Moreover, there is also recognition in the REDD+
literature for the inclusion of ‘local forest knowledge, local values and being responsive to
cultural context and diversity’ in the formulation of ‘measurement, reporting and verifications
(MRV) systems’ as part of REDD+ readiness, which was discussed in chapter six.1375
Similarly, ‘indigenous cultural perspectives, religious and communal values, and
accommodation of local conditions’ were found to be essential ingredients to underpin public
health planning for influenza pandemic preparedness, as presented in chapter five.1376 A
minority of the participants (n=4) raised concerns surrounding culture and identity.1377 One
state actor commented that ‘Part of the agreement (Banabans to Rabi) was that they can stay
there, retain their culture, language and practices...They (incoming communities) cannot be
resettled here (Fiji) and they still maintain their identity. They need to relinquish that.’1378 The
evidence across the sources of data reinforces the need for retention of community-based
culture and identity, knowledge systems, traditional practices and local conditions of the
1371 McAdam, above n 75, 97, 100, 124, 130; Ferris, above n 12, 35. 1372 Jane McAdam, above n 354, 14; see also McAdam, above n 87, 326. 1373 Farbotko, above n 732; see also Jessie Connell and Sabrina Coelho, ‘Planned Relocation in Asia and the Pacific’ (2018) 59 Forced Migration Review 46, 46–7; see also Vaha, above n 25, 237–8. 1374 Donner, above n 35, 193, 197–8; see also McAdam, above n 354, 16–17; see also Farbotko, above n 1332, 81. 1375 Felker et al, above n 991, 2. 1376 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420–5. 1377 Interview with SA#6, NSA#11, above n 1084. 1378 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138.
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communities of origin as part of framing plans and programs for relocation schemes.1379
Together, the analysis establishes the maintenance of cultural identity as a criterion for
assessing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.
Identification of Suitable Land
The identification of suitable land for relocation of communities of origin is identified as a
criterion. The sources of data drawn from the analysis of the literature and field research show
multilayered considerations towards land for relocation, such as the relocation site, fertility of
land for sustained food security, recognition of land tenure system, compulsory acquisition of
land by the state, securing of property rights by relocating communities through legal
registration to land title and compensation arrangements with customary landowners by the
state—including compensation to communities of origin as re-establishment costs in the host
country.1380 The considerations to buttress land for relocation are cited consistently across the
sources of data. For example, the case study of the resettlement of the Carteret Islanders to
Bougainville Island presented in chapter four revealed that the Carteret Islanders were resettled
to alienated land and to locations with close proximity to correctional institutions under the
atolls resettlement scheme.1381 Similarly, the Gilbertese were granted title to ‘four acres of
freehold land and the right to acquire further land’ under the Gilbertese resettlement scheme
presented in chapter four.1382 The experiences and lessons from the REDD+ scheme presented
in chapter five demonstrate that the commercial interests of the state and project proponents
taking place through ‘exploitative carbon contracts’ for global trading of carbon stocks stored
in rainforests compromised ‘indigenous peoples and forest dwellers interests and customary
land rights.’1383 Additionally, it showed that the arrangements ‘offered little or no guarantee
for the protection of their rights, including their right to use and access natural resources.’1384
The REDD+ literature draws into sharp focus international safeguards as protection
mechanisms, such as the ‘principle of equitable sharing of benefits (ESB)’, which can be
1379 Farbotko, above n 732; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–7; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 419–30; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 1–22; see also Shen and Gemenne, above n 1185, 238–9. 1380 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48–9. 1381 Edwards, above n 35, 63–5. 1382 Donner, above n 35, 195–6. 1383 Raftopoulos, above n 8, 515–16, 524. 1384 Ibid 516.
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integrated into national programs and plans, including domestic laws, as part of REDD+
readiness.1385
A majority of participants (n=13) raised concerns about land for relocation, as highlighted in
chapter six. One non-state actor pointed out that: ‘…government will have to look into the
availability of land for resettlement. How we going to deal with the land issues? Fiji has got
its own issues with respect to trying to find resettlement areas…where will they be resettled
i.e. on one island?...’1386 Likewise, one state actor commented: ‘…for us locally (Fiji), the issue
really is the availability of land…means not that…one can just move to but it’s about
“availability” as in one has to look into land ownership issue and whether it is something
landowners can give…’1387 The evidence across the sources of data resonates closely with a
host of considerations intrinsic to land for relocation. These include the location, suitability,
protection arrangements and compensation for landowners and Indigenous peoples, land
tenure recognition, access to resources, and the inclusion of international safeguards in
domestic plans and laws. Taken together, the analysis establishes identification of suitable land
for relocation of communities as a criterion for analysing readiness in the context of climate
change-induced human mobility.
The Role of law in Relocation
Relocation schemes need to be effected through law for an array of reasons, such as ‘upholding
rights of relocating communities, developing safeguards and principles embodied in
international instruments’ into the domestic laws and the exercise of duties, powers and
functions of implementing authorities among others.1388 The development of ‘the right
domestic environment; to provide certain legal facilities and/or having the right laws’ is used
interchangeably to describe the role that law can play as a criterion for the facilitation and
implementation of relocation schemes.1389 The role of law encompasses appropriate
procedures, implementation measures and ‘transparent assessment and justification of the
measures’ established through statutes, regulations, administration rules and executive orders
1385 Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1386 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1387 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1388 Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 146; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 207–12; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 111. 1389 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 681.
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(to cite a few) at the domestic level.1390 It entails the formulation of new laws and regulations
and review of existing laws and regulations, including the integration of ethical considerations
such as the equitable ‘allocation of resources, access to services, and cultural values.’1391
Additionally, the role of law is leveraged by the inclusion of international principles,
safeguards and norms embodied in an array of soft law instruments, for example, the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and Guidelines for the Domestic
Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance,
among others.1392 The soft law instruments are underpinned by protection mechanisms taking
place through a rights-based approach to ensure that the rights of individuals and communities
are ‘fully respected and protected, such as access to resources, economic opportunities,
education, political participation, housing, land and property’, among others.1393 Likewise, the
formulation of ‘bilateral agreements, mutual aid agreements and goodwill agreements’, among
others, is also identified as part of the role of law in harnessing cooperation, protection and
assistance spanning national, regional and international levels.1394
The role of law is cited fairly consistently across the sources of data drawn from the analysis
of the literature and field research. For example, the case study presented by the resettlement
of the Banabans to Rabi shows that safeguards for dual citizenship were protected and
established through the ‘Fiji Constitution 2013 s 5(4) and Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s
14’ with the further protection of ‘persons of I-Kiribati descent’ to dual nationality taking place
through the ‘Kiribati Constitution ch I ss 23-4 and Kiribati Citizenship Act 1998 ch 8A s8.’1395
Similarly, the case study of the relocation of the Gilbertese to Ghizo reveals that new laws,
such as the ‘1977 Land and Title Amendment Ordinance, nationalised most alienated or
freehold land held by the Gilbertese’, restricting their claims to legal ownership following the
independence of the Solomon Islands.1396 Moreover, ‘automatic entry rights for children of
settlers’ discontinued with the governance structures of the incoming ‘Governing Council of
the Solomon Islands’ post-independence.1397 There is also recognition of the role of law in
responding to public health emergencies as part of public health preparedness, as highlighted
1390 Fisher, above n 13, 208–12; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 146; see also Bennett et al, above n 918, 207–12; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 111. 1391 Bennett et al, above n 918, 207, 210; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 108–9. 1392 Lesniewska, above n 56, 103–21; see also Barber, above n 160, 143–65. 1393 Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–28; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; See also ADB Report, above n 10, 47–9; see also Locke, above n 25, 178. 1394 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 48; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674; see also Fisher, above n 13, 209. 1395 McAdam, above n 87, 301–3, 306–7, 313, 317, 319, 321; see also Connell, above n 75, 139. 1396 Donner, above n 35, 196. 1397 Ibid 195.
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in chapter five. Examination of the legal aspects identifies the need for ‘competencies (i.e.
abilities, skills) of those responsible for applying the law; coordination of legally based
interventions across sectors and jurisdictions; and access to information resources on the
content and interpretation of law by multidisciplinary practitioners’ as part of preparedness.1398
Furthermore, there is also recognition of the need for the inclusion of ‘soft-law oriented
guidelines as a reference tool for law-makers of governments of the states to develop national
legislation for the management of international aid in a manner appropriate to their national
circumstances’ as presented in the international humanitarian assistance literature in chapter
five.1399 Over half of the participants (n=10) in this study raised concerns about the legal status
of incoming communities of origin to Fiji in the field interviews, as presented in chapter six.1400
The participants acknowledged the arrangements in place for the Banaban and the Vaitupuan
communities on Rabi and Kioa and pointed out that the existing arrangements present ‘a
starting point to address these emerging issues…i.e. to retain their identity… create a pathway
to access resources, services and maintain their livelihoods.’1401
The evidence across the sources of data consistently validates the veracity of the role of law
traversing procedures, processes and measures, new laws and review of existing laws,
protection mechanisms underpinned by soft law instruments; bilateral arrangements,
competencies, coordination, institution capacity and information resources to develop and
bolster laws and regulations at the domestic level. Taken together, the analysis establishes the
role of law for relocation as a criterion for analysing readiness in the context of climate change-
induced human mobility.
Institutional Capacity and Coordination of Local Government
The institutional capacity of local government bodies and coordination approaches for all
phases of relocation projects is identified as a criterion.1402 Strengthening the capacity of
1398 Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 676–7, 681. 1399 Barber, above n 160, 147–8; see also Jolly, above n 854, 146; see also Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Bookmiller, above n 8, 959, 961, 965. 1400 Interview with SA#4, NSA#7, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1401 See above n 1400 and accompanying text; see also interview with SA#1, above n 1110. 1402 Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 47; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 130; see also Inspection Panel Report 2016, above n 1273, 47, 71; see also Susanne Melde and Sieun Lee, ‘Emerging Technical Guidelines for Adaptation Planning and Human Mobility’ (Policy Brief Report No 9, United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, June 2014) 31–7.
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existing institutions and aligning coordination measures across sectors and agencies to inhibit
parallel processes, programs and activities in all phases of relocation is an additional layer to
this criterion.1403 Institutional capacity and coordination approaches identify the need for the
national government to formulate planning processes, design policies, integrate management
strategies, introduce programs and activities and support further research to ensure greater
degree of accuracy in facilitating and implementing relocation projects.
The criterion is cited fairly consistently across the sources of data drawn from the analysis of
the literature and field research.1404 For example, seminal authors McAdam and Connell, in
drawing on the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders presented in chapter four maintain
that ‘financial resources, management capacity and political commitment’ are key
impediments for Pacific Island governments to ‘negotiate, develop, legislate for and
administer effective resettlement schemes and policies.’1405 They point out that ‘local
anxieties, tensions and hegemony over land’ of Pacific Island communities are factors that
inhibit coherent and coordinated dialogue by Pacific island governments in responding to
climate change-induced human mobility across sovereign borders.1406 Similarly, there is
inherent recognition in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR), as part
of disaster preparedness discussed in chapter five, to ‘strengthen capacity of local authorities
to manage and evacuate people from disaster-prone areas; develop assistance programmes to
account for the specific needs of particular groups within the displaced population;
institutional leadership; and the development and reconstruction of budgetary allocations.’1407
Moreover, there is recognition in the SFDRR, as part of preparedness for cross-border disaster
displacement, for national governments to develop strategies and plans, for example, ‘baseline
data on displacement; bilateral contingency and response plans; operational guides; and
transboundary simulation exercises’, among others.1408
The REDD+ readiness literature in chapter five outlined the need for capacity development
support to implement REDD+ activities, national readiness policies and project proposals that
1403 See above n 1402 and accompanying text. 1404 Ibid. 1405 Connell, above n 75, 135, 138; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305, 327; see also McAdam, above n 75, 130; See also McAdam, above n 354, 4; see also Elizabeth Ferris, above n 12, 34, 35. 1406 See above n 1405 and accompanying text. 1407 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 24–6, 52–3; see also Hyogo, Priority Five-2008, above n 755, 3. 1408 Sendai Framework Target E 2018, above n 750, 15, 19, 22, 28–9, 33, 35, 40–5, 50–4; see also Global Platform DRR Proceedings 22–26 May 2017, above n 749, 45; see also Regional Conference on Migration, above n 782; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11; see also Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 652.
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embody concrete plans and regulatory reforms as part of the readiness phase.1409 Additionally,
a minority of participants (n=5) in the field interviews raised concerns about institutional
capacity. As previously reported in chapter six, one state actor commented that: ‘It plants me
to thinking about cross-border resettlement of communities...in terms of: the legal space
(constitution, legislation, and citizenship) and the socio-economic space…It will depend on
the government of the day on how…prepared the government is in terms of the policy
space.’1410 One non-state actor pointed out that: ‘…There has been nothing on resettlement. It
goes back to political will, what is the priority of the government of the day.’1411 Another non-
state actor stated that: ‘For any guideline or policy on cross-border…three components are
essential, people— developing/building/enhancing the capacity of host communities and
receiving communities…access to human rights and human security and sovereignty.’1412
The evidence across the sources of data resonates closely with a host of considerations intrinsic
to capacity and coordination for relocation taking place through political will, local institutions
and agencies, local communities and national policies and plans. This also includes their
impact at regional and international levels facilitated by flexible bilateral arrangements, among
others. The analysis establishes institutional capacity and coordination of local government
for planning and implementation as a criterion for analysing readiness.
Taken together, the set of criteria for analysing readiness comprises:
1) a whole-of-community orientation in all phases;
2) funding of all phases;
3) maintenance of cultural identity;
4) identification of suitable land;
5) the role of law in relocation; and
6) the institutional capacity and coordination of local government.
As discussed earlier, these criteria were uncovered through the synthesis and analysis of
different sources of data that have not been explained elsewhere in the literature. The criteria
presents first steps for analysing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human
mobility. Moreover, these criteria assist in aiding understanding of what it means to be
“ready”. These criteria also enable individual governments to respond to, plan and implement
1409 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46. 1410 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1411 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084. 1412 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084.
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relocation schemes in a risk-informed way. The reasons why these criteria are important for
analysing readiness are discussed next.
7.4 Importance of Criteria
Relocation involves affected communities consisting of men, women, children and
marginalised groups. This indicates the need to understand the various perceptions and needs
of affected community members in relocation decision-making, such as livelihood restoration,
protection of their rights relating to land tenure security, economic opportunities, preservation
of their culture and traditions and continuous assistance arrangements in all relocation
phases.1413 There is widespread consensus among scholars in the field of human mobility
studies that relocation is driven from the ‘top down with communities rarely involved in
making decisions which affect their future.’1414 It is important that affected communities have
agency to lead relocation decisions for all relocation phases, supported by local government
bodies through meaningful engagement, participation and consultation.1415 This establishes the
importance of a whole-of-community orientation in all phases as a criterion for climate
change-induced human mobility.
The relocation of affected communities also demands ‘sustained and sufficient financial and
technical resources, including concerted support by national governments to restore the
housing, assets, livelihoods, land, access to resources and services of communities in a way
that improves or at least restores their living standards.’1416 Furthermore, relocation schemes
require the integration of future-focused costs aligned with trends in population growth for
social and economic development by national governments.1417 The financial resources
required to implement relocation schemes are also compounded in the case of national
governments of ‘developing states with acute economies of scale and diverse cultures.’1418
This is because the early infusion of financial resources for relocation schemes will need to be
incorporated into the national budgets of governments against their national development
priorities.1419 This may potentially outweigh national priorities for the host communities and
continue to weaken the economies of scale of national governments for national sustainable
1413 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Melde and Lee, above n 1402, 31–7. 1414 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19. 1415 Farbotko, above n 732. 1416 Ferris, above n 12, 33; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 48; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above 75, 130. 1417 Connell, above n 75, 140. 1418 Ibid. 1419 Ferris, above n 12, 35.
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development. Additionally, national governments will need to develop and enhance the
capacity of national institutions across sectors to access international funding mechanisms to
implement relocation schemes ‘rather than utilise their own scarce financial resources.’1420
However, several questions remain unanswered with regards to international funding
mechanisms available for, and specifically tailored to, climate change-induced relocation
schemes. The onus of financial responsibility to implement relocation schemes is also open to
debate. The host of considerations to plan and implement relocation schemes from a funding
perspective plays a vital role as a criterion in the context of climate change-induced human
mobility.
Relocation also requires land to settle communities by national governments, which entails:
1) sufficient lead time to identify and select appropriate sites that are accessible for
communities to use public services such as roads, health, and education;
2) suitable land for the maintenance of traditional livelihoods, food security and housing; and
3) introducing mechanisms for land acquisition, such as engaging in sustained dialogue with
customary landowners, negotiations with, and extending adequate compensation to,
customary landowners for ‘land, housing and property’ because of the ‘cultural and
traditional ties to land and strong clan and kinship networks.’1421 These factors
demonstrate that land for relocation of communities as a criterion is appropriate in the
context of climate change-induced human mobility.1422
Relocation also requires national governments to recognise the sensitivity of communities of
origin deeply rooted in ‘ancestral ties of place, unique human cultures, collective identity, and
indigenous senses of belonging’ of their homeland in the host state with the local host
communities.1423 This cultural identity encompasses cultural values, intangible heritage,
religion, language, Indigenous knowledge systems, traditional, customary and spiritual
practices.1424 It is well established in the literature that ‘social disruption, conflict and violence’
is likely to occur in relocation with the convergence of communities of origin and host
communities.1425 Relocation requires national governments to develop plans and programs
1420 McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43, 50. 1421 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–7; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 96–7. 1422 See above n 1421 and accompanying text. 1423 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Kalin, above n 15, 27; see also Jane McAdam, above n 87, 326; see also Farbotko, above n 732; see also Farbotko, above n 1332, 81–3; see also Locke, above n 25, 178; see also Vaha, above n 25, 236–8; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89, 99. 1424 See above n 1423 and accompanying text. 1425 Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89, 99; see also Vaha, above n 25, 237–8; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–7; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 20.
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specifically tailored to strengthen the social cohesion of the communities and the integration
of cultural, social and Indigenous knowledge, which can potentially lead to diverse livelihoods
through fishing, farming, and toiling land and resources among the communities.1426 The
recognition and maintenance of the cultural identity of communities in relocation plays a vital
role as a criterion for analysing readiness.
Likewise, the role of law identifies the need for national governments to review existing laws,
frame new laws and regulations, and establish institutions to facilitate, coordinate and
implement all phases of relocation that ‘upholds and ensures the rights of communities is fully
respected and protected’,1427 for example, ‘social rights of citizenship, housing, land and
property rights.’1428 The role of law entails delineating the roles, functions, exercise of power
and duties of officials, implementing authorities, multiple sectors and agencies to effectively
coordinate and implement relocation schemes.1429 It encompasses well-defined processes,
procedures, dispute resolution mechanisms and implementing measures by local government
institutions.1430 Moreover, the role of law involves tailoring appropriate monitoring, evaluation
and reporting processes for transparency of, and accountability for, human and financial
resources.1431 Furthermore, the role of law identifies the need to integrate mechanisms
underpinned by a rights-based approach spanning soft law international instruments,
normative frameworks and global programs.1432 These mechanisms embody ethical
considerations—underscored by the principle of equitable sharing of benefits for example,
equal access to resources and services and compensation to communities.1433 These
mechanisms also embody community-centred safeguards and guidelines—‘meaningful
participation and consultation by all stakeholders’ with local communities and marginalised
groups for example, and cross-jurisdictional support and cooperation underpinned by bilateral
agreements to harness the domestic laws and regulations.1434 The array of considerations
1426 Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89. 1427 Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–9; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 110–11. 1428 See above n 1427 and accompanying text. 1429 Moulton et al, above n 8, 673–4; see also Gakh and Rutkow, above n 915, 392–401; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–12. 1430 See above n 1429 and accompanying text. 1431 Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 131; see also UNDP Readiness Paper 2012, above n 794, 1–27; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11. See also Thomas Baumgartner and Claudia Pahl-Wostl, ‘UN–Water and its Role in Global Water Governance’ (2013) 18(3) Ecology and Society 1, 1–9. 1432 Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 106–12; see also McAdam, above n 354, 24–5. 1433 McAdam, above n 87, 326–7; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 672–83; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 420–2; see also Bennett and Carney, above n 976, 106–12. See also Buizer, Humphreys and Jong, above n 160, 5, 8; see also Felker et al, above n 991, 2; see also Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 35; see also Dooley and Ranum, above n 984, 2. 1434 See above n 1433 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates the role of law to be appropriate as a criterion for analysing readiness in the
context of climate change-induced human mobility.
Lastly, relocation requires national governments to have the capacity to plan, facilitate,
coordinate and implement all phases of relocation through policies, plans and programs. There
are a number of considerations that are connected to the capacity of national governments and
local government institutions. These entail the political will of national governments to
recognise climate change-induced human mobility as a ‘significant policy concern’,
developing concrete measures to ‘integrate climate change-induced human mobility into
national plans and policies, including relocation and migration policies’, designing ‘specific
policy actions and implementation’ approaches and coordination by local government
institutions, multilevel sectors, agencies and jurisdictions.1435 Capacity and coordination
responses traverse national governments and local government bodies, including communities,
through programs and activities. Moreover, ‘regional capacity development and information
sharing’ presents an added dimension to the development of coherent policies, plans and
programs to plan, facilitate, coordinate and implement all phases of relocation.1436 The host of
considerations as part of institutional capacity development and coordination plays a vital role
as a criterion in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.
Taken together, the analysis establishes the need for a set of criteria spanning whole-of-
community orientation, funding, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable
land, the role that law can play and building the capacity and coordination of local government
institutions to be appropriate and interdependent for analysing readiness in the context of
climate change-induced human mobility.
7.5 Readiness of the Fijian Government
The discussion in this section presents the case study of Fiji and analyses the level of readiness
of its government to respond to the climate change-induced human mobility of Pacific
Islanders to Fiji. This section uses the set of criteria for readiness articulated in the previous
section as an analytical framework to determine the Fijian Government’s responsiveness to
readiness. The empirical evidence generated from the field research conducted with
1435 Locke, above n 25, 179; see Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 96, 99, 100; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674, 681. 1436 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 422.
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participants (n=18) in Fiji and the analysis of the literature and published reports in chapter
four are used to support the analysis and evaluate the Fijian Government’s readiness against
the set of criteria for readiness. The researcher acknowledges more research needs to be
undertaken before readiness is more clearly understood from the standpoint of the state
machinery. The researcher also acknowledges that the participant list for future research could
be widened to investigate the more nuanced arrangements of the state as highlighted earlier in
chapters one and two. The use of empirical data to analyse and evaluate readiness provides
first steps as a means of advancing the legal, policy and institutional discussion by the state
machinery.
Criterion: Whole-of-community Orientation at all Phases
Consultation by local government bodies and the inclusiveness of communities and
marginalised groups in all phases of relocation was recorded as a consideration by a minority
of participants (n=3) in the field interviews.1437 The participants recognised consultation and
active participation of communities as playing an important role in relocation schemes.1438 One
non-state actor pointed out:
…that (cross-border relocation)…demands very serious consultations. This is where the State comes in…it cannot…impose its position…the whole interconnectedness of all (Province, or Tikina or groups of communities i.e. iTaukei and other ethnic group)…needs to be fully assessed…the whole consultancy from the government level to substrata-to-district level-to-local level is so vital for this.1439
Similarly, the reference to “people” and their explicit inclusion in relocation decisions were
identified by a minority of participants (n= 2).1440 As one state actor articulated: ‘The first thing
you have to deal with…would be the people who are going to be resettled. That is one of the
biggest lessons from…resettlements…whether it is internal or external, who are you moving?
It’s the people…we have to move them first…then develop them…build their lives.’1441
The analysis suggests that concerted and meaningful consultation by local government bodies,
and the explicit inclusion of communities, needs to be embedded into all phases of the
1437 Interview with NSA#4, NSA#5, SA#5, above n 1084. 1438 Ibid. 1439 Interview with NSA#5, above n 1084. 1440 Interview with SA#6, NSA#3, above n 1084. 1441 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084.
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relocation plans, programs and policies by the host state.1442 In addition, relocation plans,
programs and policies also need to acknowledge whole-of-community perspectives, providing
communities with agency to reach informed decisions about, for example, the maintenance of
their traditional livelihoods and cultural identity, protection of their rights and the safeguarding
of their interests and needs for land and employment.1443 The evidence reveals the need for
more in-depth consideration for whole-of-community orientation in all relocation phases. The
evidence suggests that not enough attention to these matters has been paid by the Fijian
Government. The readiness of the Fijian Government is not established against the criterion
of whole-of-community orientation at all phases.
Criterion: Funding all Phases
There is widespread consensus among scholars that the experiences and lessons of human
mobility from non-climatic and climatic factors in the relocation of communities’ demands
substantial and sustained funding, for example, for ‘land acquisition, social, physical and legal
infrastructures’, and the restoration of livelihoods post relocation.1444 One of the significant
considerations among others recorded in the field interviews was the cost of relocation. This
was pointed out by over half the participants (n = 10). One state actor commented that:
‘…finance is very critical for us in the region…the intervention of the international community
is important…Resettlement will amount to huge funding. We just rely on the international
community.’1445 Another state actor pointed out that: ‘Donors do not fund relocation…’1446
Echoing similar sentiments, one non-state actor stated: ‘Money/funding for resettlement is
quite a contentious agenda item. People do not like to fund relocation. That is a big “no-no”
for donors.1447 Dean points that ‘[v]arious funds established under the UNFCCC’ (GCF and
GEF, for example), including funds advanced by donors ‘in the form of project-based grants’
lend to ‘promote impacts-driven climate change adaptation measures such as construction of
infrastructure, rather than measures that address risks or broad socio-economic drivers
underpinning vulnerability (healthcare, education and income poverty, for example).’1448 In
like manner, Adelman argues that ‘[a]id, private, social insurance, and payments from
1442 McAdam, above n 87, 326–7; see also Connell, above n 75, 140; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31–5; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9. 1443 See above n 1442 and accompanying text. 1444 McAdam, above n 75, 124, 130; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 138, 140; see also Ferris, above n 12, 35. 1445 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1446 Interview with SA#5, above n 1084. 1447 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084. 1448 Dean, above n 822, 393, 395, 399, 401, 403.
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adaptation funds are not sufficient to meet the needs of SIDS to withstand climate-related loss
and damage and, when necessary, the costs of relocation and resettlement.’1449
The analysis reveals that there has been very little consideration directed to finance relocation
schemes by the host state. The analysis further reveals that there is inherent recognition of the
need to access funding internationally through programs of donor agencies and funding
mechanisms developed internationally to facilitate all phases of relocation. The analysis
suggests that the small economies of scale of developing countries, including development
priorities of the government of the day, outweigh consideration of relocation schemes as a key
priority. It further suggests that appropriate institutional, human resource capacity and
accountability mechanisms need to be established with the support of the government of the
day to access or to be a recipient of funding for relocation schemes. The readiness of the Fijian
Government is insufficient and is not established against the criterion of funding all phases.
Criterion: Maintenance of Cultural Identity
A considerable literature has been published on the experiences and lessons of human mobility
from non-climatic and climatic factors that maintains that poorly designed plans, policies and
programs for relocation schemes compromise the ‘individual identity, language, religion,
culture, knowledge traditional and self-determination’ of communities.1450 A minority of
participants (n=4) indicated that relocation of communities of origin with local host
communities is ammunition to marshal social conflicts over access to local resources, services
and opportunities in the host state (cross-border).1451 As one non-state actor stated: ‘In the
Pacific, communities are linked to their land, heritage and culture… the culture and tradition
of the Fijian communities should not be compromised.’1452 Another non-state actor
commented: ‘While we may safely move people and give…access to resources, protect their
rights in their new place…what does it mean for their culture and what does it mean for their
psychological well-being? It is a huge trade-off and difficult to reconcile.’1453 Moreover, a
1449 Adelman, above n 103, 32, 52–3. 1450 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 47; see also Vaha, above n 25, 238; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 89; see also Adger et al, above n 37, 758, 762. 1451 Interview with non-state actor no.6 [NSA#6] (Suva, 19 September 2017); see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138; see also interview with NSA#11, NSA#4, above n 1084; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–4; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 42. 1452 Interview with NSA#6, above n 1451. 1453 Interview with NSA#11, above n 1084.
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non-state actor stated that: ‘It is all about identity. Sometimes you need to spend time to know
their culture…’1454
The analysis reveals that in all phases of relocation it needs to be recognised that more in-
depth consideration of the cultural identity and practices, traditional knowledge and the
traditional values of communities of origin in the host state are critical. The analysis also
reveals that relocation schemes need to recognise the cultural practices and traditional values
of the local host communities and ensure that the host communities are consulted and informed
about the incoming communities to be settled within their locality or village settlement. The
analysis suggests that relocation schemes need to be well planned to encompass programs and
activities for social cohesion and the diversification of social networks as well as to address
the local circumstances of the locality or village settlement. In addition, relocation schemes
also need to be tailored to resolve disputes between communities through dispute resolutions
mechanisms and domestic laws. The evidence suggests that there has been little consideration
of the need for recognition of cultural identity. This demonstrates that there is insufficient
readiness by the Fijian Government. The criterion for the preservation and maintenance of the
cultural identity is not established.
Criterion: Identification of Suitable Land
One of the significant considerations that recurred throughout the interview data and was
identified by two-thirds of the participants (n=13) related to land for relocation.1455 Some of
the interconnected concerns included issues around the consent of landowners, customary
landowners; rights, the type of land—for example, customary, state or freehold land— and the
availability of land, compensation and potential number of communities occupying land.1456
One state actor commented: ‘…the most important element in relocation is the consent of all
the members of the communities and the landowner at the new site…’1457 Similarly, one non-
state actor pointed out that: ‘…from experience with all other things going on relevant to our
resources…is land. First…government will have to look into the availability of land for
resettlement. How we going to deal with the land issues? Fiji has got its own issues with
respect to trying to find resettlement areas…’1458 Likewise, one non-state actor highlighted:
1454 Interview with NSA#4, above n 1084. 1455 See above n 1084 and accompanying text. 1456 Ibid. 1457 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1458 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146.
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‘…there is no land tenure for instance, if the squatter is on iTaukei (Indigenous) land, then
under iTaukei laws 60% consent of the landowning unit needs to be granted before you can
actually move on it. So, there are disagreements…’1459 Echoing similar sentiments, one state
actor pointed out that: ‘…for us locally, the issue really is the availability of land…means not
that we have something physical there that one can just move to but it’s about “availability”
as in one has to look into land ownership issue and whether it is something landowners can
give…we have seen in the internal relocation examples…’1460
The evidence reveals that the Fijian Government will have to manage a host of significant
issues relating to the availability of land for its internal relocation schemes. The evidence also
reveals that far too little attention has been directed by the government to land acquisition for
cross-border relocation schemes. The analysis suggests that the Fijian Government needs to
recognise that extensive collaboration and comprehensive arrangements will need to be
directed to identify and allocate land for cross-border relocation schemes relative to the issues
presented by the internal relocation schemes. The analysis further suggests that sufficient lead
time for identifying suitable relocation sites, proactively engaging in consistent dialogue and
negotiation with landowners, extending compensation to landowners and strengthening land
tenure systems as part of relocation plans, policies and laws needs to be provided to enable
cross-border relocation schemes in the future.1461 Many uncertainties in responding to the
criterion for land for cross-border relocation schemes still exist. The readiness of the Fijian
Government is not established against the criterion for the identification and acquisition of
land.
Criterion: The Role of Law in Relocation
The role that law can play in all phases of relocation schemes was recorded in the interview
data by a minority of participants (n=5). The participants recognised the development of laws
and regulations at the domestic level and cooperation between national governments facilitated
1459 Interview with NSA#4, above n 1084. 1460 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1461 Ferris, above n 12, 31, 35; see also ‘87% of the land is owned by traditional Fijian mataqali’s…this land is prohibited from being sold, exchanged or sub-let by the mataqali…the remainder being state and freehold...’ as cited in Charan, Kaur and Singh, above n 54, 19, 24; see also ‘purchase of the freehold land by Kiribati in Fiji was a current expression of the close historical ties linking the two countries together…to assist its neighbour with development opportunities, options for food security and the possibility to grant refuge to the inhabitants of Kiribati should the island ever be rendered uninhabitable’ as cited in Hermann and Kempf, above n 116, 231, 233, 248-9, 252.
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by bi-lateral arrangements as intrinsic to the role of law for relocation schemes. One state actor
pointed out:
… Fiji should be-ready-be-prepared in all aspects…it brings to the forefront the issue of two sovereign states. It raises pertinent legal questions about how does it affect our sovereignty and legal space and what is the legality around this issue? We need to start thinking about this in terms of: the legal space (constitution, legislation, and citizenship) and the socio-economic space… It will depend on the government of the day on how sorted/prepared the government is in terms of the policy space.1462
According to one non-state actor: ‘[A]s part of the legal preparedness…we need to look at our:
i) current laws, ii) land, iii) land use plans…’1463 One state actor commented that: ‘...the
Immigration Act is silent on cross-border resettlement…’1464 Another state actor highlighted
that: ‘For…cross-border resettlement, there has not been any discussions...there needs to be
bi-lateral arrangements in place…we have not been really engaged in any discussions at the
moment in terms of…bi-lateral arrangements that we need to put in place. But there is a need
for us to venture into that.’1465
Alongside the legal arrangements for communities of origin in the host state, a minority of
participants (n=3) referred to dual citizenship for the Banabans and Vaitupuans in Rabi and
Kioa respectively.1466 As one state actor pointed out: ‘…Rabi, they are Fijians, but they still
have Kiribati citizenship, so a lot we need to discuss and cross the bridge when we get
there.’1467 Similarly, one non-state actor commented: ‘Who do they become if they move here
(Fiji)?...They…retain their citizenships and identity.’1468
The evidence demonstrates that the role of law at the domestic level and between national
governments for relocation schemes has been insufficiently considered by the government of
the day. However, the evidence reveals that legal status determination specifically tailored to
dual citizenship is well established at the domestic level. The analysis reveals that relocation
schemes need to be underpinned by legal arrangements taking place through domestic laws,
regulations, and administrative rules, national relocation policies, the establishment of
institutions and agreements underscored by bi-lateral, memoranda of understating or goodwill
arrangements.1469 In addition, relocation schemes also need to embody protection mechanisms,
1462 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1463 Interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1464 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1465 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1466 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084; see also interview with NSA#10, above n 1140; see also interview with NSA#9, above n 1146. 1467 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1468 Interview with NSA#4, above n 1084. 1469 Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 48; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 674–5; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208.
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such as rights of communities to ‘health care, education, political participation, service
schemes, housing, land, resources’ and assistance arrangements such as compensation and
livelihoods restoration as part of the role law can play.1470 Likewise, relocation schemes need
to further integrate soft law principles, normative frameworks and international safeguards
embedded in international soft law instruments.1471 The analysis identifies support for legal
arrangements specific to dual citizenship. However, the analysis suggests that the state
machinery of the government of the day at the domestic and regional levels from the standpoint
of the role of law has so far been insufficiently considered.1472 For example, laws of Fiji such
as the Immigration Act 2003 and the iTaukei (indigenous) Affairs Act (Cap 120), to cite a few,
do not address migration and land issues emerging from cross-border relocation in the future.
This suggests that the criterion for the role of law for relocation schemes is not established.
Criterion: Institutional Capacity and Coordination of Local Government
There is widespread consensus among scholars in the field of development projects and studies
exploring sudden- and slow-onset environmental change that the relocation of communities
requires developing institutional support, harnessing and strengthening existing institutions
and the coordination and cooperation of national governments.1473 Capacity building was
recorded as an important issue by nearly half of the participants (n=8).1474 As one non-state
articulated: ‘[b]uilding capacity of government agencies/officers…civil society organisation
is a key outcome from the lessons learnt from the Vunidogoloa and Narikoso relocation
projects.’1475 Another non-state actor highlighted that: ‘Secretariat for the Pacific Community
(SPC)’s support…included providing training to…government ministries on cost and benefit
analysis…SPC…with CCU (Climate Change Unit) also supported the development…of an
integrated vulnerability assessment tool…through a series of consultations with government
officials.’1476 Likewise, another non-state actor reported that the ‘…Pacific Conference of
1470 Ferris, above n 12, 33, 35; see also Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 99; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48–9. 1471 See above n 1470 and accompanying text. See also ADB Report, above n 10, 55–9. 1472 See also The future dynamics of political leadership of Kiribati and Tuvalu to respond to climate change-induced migration as cited in KV20, above n 20 and accompanying text. See also Sopoanga, above n 22 and accompanying text. 1473 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 149, 151, 153; see also Connell and Coelho, above n 1373, 46–8; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 130–1. 1474 Interview with SA#1, NSA#2, above n 1110; see also interview with SA#3, SA#4, SA#5, SA#6, NSA#3, NSA#5, NSA#8, above n 1084. 1475 Interview with NSA#3, above n 1084. 1476 Interview with NSA#2, above n 1110.
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Churches [PCC] played a significant role particularly with…relocation of communities in
Vunidogoloa…PCC…facilitated discussions with communities…government
agencies…PCC was…instrumental in bringing all parties…National Disaster Management
Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs-Climate Change, Ministry of iTaukei (Indigenous)
Affairs…’1477
Similarly, one state actor pointed out that: ‘…key considerations in planning and resettlement
of communities requires concerted efforts by multiple agencies (national and other
institutions)…’ are one of the key considerations…’1478 Another state actor commented that:
‘It is important to ensure that roles are clearly demarcated in driving efforts…I hope all
agencies efforts are synchronised rather than working independently…important that we
understand each other’s work and that is how you can do your work better.’1479 Similarly,
another state actor reported that: ‘...in Vunidogoloa…The women were sent to Barefoot
College, India to undertake solar powered training program, when they returned they carried
out solar installation at their new relocation site.’1480
The evidence reveals that the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government
to resettle communities in Fiji have provided local government institutions with the tools to
build and strengthen institutional capacity and harness coordination efforts stemming from
these relocation experiences and lessons. The analysis suggests that the established capacity
and coordination strategies of existing local government institutions provide the first steps for
the Fijian Government to plan, design and implement relocation schemes for cross-border
relocation of communities to Fiji. The analysis also suggests that cross-border relocation
schemes may present a unique set of considerations, such as information and data exchange,
financing, infrastructure and legal facilities, which need to be acknowledged and integrated in
planning by the Fijian Government and between national governments. This further suggests
that the demands in terms of the context and scope of institutional support, cooperation and
technical assistance will be manifold. In acknowledging that the institutional capacity and
coordination for the internal relocation schemes is well supported, the relocation schemes for
cross-border of communities have not received substantial attention by the Fijian Government.
The readiness of the Fijian Government is not established against the criterion for the
institutional capacity and coordination.
1477 Interview with NSA#8, above n 1084. 1478 Interview with SA#2, above n 1084. 1479 Interview with SA#6, above n 1084. 1480 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084.
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Together, the analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the criterion for the role of law in relocation
shows that attention has been directed by the Fijian Government to dual citizenship
arrangements supported by domestic laws. The interview data relating to the relocation of the
Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji demonstrates the role that law can play relating
to citizenship rights. Moreover, further analysis shows the well supported capacity and
coordination arrangements of local government institutions underscored by the experiences
and lessons learned from the internal relocation schemes. The analysis for the set of criteria,
while preliminary, suggests the partially substantiated readiness of the Fijian Government for
cross-border relocation. However, the analysis also suggests that much uncertainty still exists
as the dimensions of the set of criteria have not been fully uncovered in the context of cross-
border relocation. Overall, the analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the set of criteria traversing
whole-of-community orientation at all phases, funding all phases, maintenance of cultural
identity, identification of suitable land, the role of law for relocation and the institutional
capacity and coordination of local government confirms that far too little attention has been
directed by the Fijian Government to be ready for climate change-induced human mobility.
The analysis further confirms that significant work lies ahead to achieve readiness against this
set of criteria.
7.6 Reform Perspective and Direction for Framework
The sources of data drawn from the analysis of the literature and field research are used to
guide the direction of reform spanning legal and policy dimensions. The reform perspective
offers insights that can provide the impetus for the Fijian Government to inform readiness for
climate change-induced human mobility of Pacific Islanders to Fiji.
The existing arrangements traversing the legal, policy and institutional arrangements have not
received substantial attention from the Fijian Government, as detailed in the literature and field
interviews.1481 The case studies of the Banabans and Vaitupuans to Fiji show that the legal
status determination taking place through multiple citizenship and dual nationality is protected
by the ‘Citizenship of Fiji Decree 2009 s 14 and complemented by the Fiji Constitution 2013
s 5(4).’1482 The provisions demonstrate that the identity of communities of origin from a legal
perspective relocating in the future is protected by Fiji. The arrangements for citizenship and
1481 McAdam, above n 10, 266–70. 1482 McAdam, above n 87, 301–3, 306–7, 313, 317, 319, 321; see also Connell, above n 75, 139.
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nationality provide the only detailed consideration by the Fijian Government of readiness to
date.
However, the areas where reform is necessary relate to the review of existing statutes to
underpin legal entry into Fiji on the grounds of climate change. For example, the Immigration
Act 2003 (Fiji); and the recognition of land ownership and rights such as the iTaukei
(indigenous) Affairs Act (Cap 120) (Fiji) can be used to settle communities on customary land,
or other types of land such as state or freehold land.1483 As recorded in the interview data, one
state actor reported that: ‘...the Immigration Act is silent on cross-border resettlement except
reference to Part 6, which makes provision for refugee status determination…re-define the
term “refugee” under the Immigration Act.’1484 One other state actor indicated that: ‘There has
to be review of our immigration legislation…we have to be flexible if we are to allow it (cross-
border)…also look at it from a human rights perspective in terms of some of the international
conventions…’1485 Moreover, the case study of the Gilbertese resettlement to Ghizo shows
that the Gilbertese were granted title to ‘four acres of freehold land and the right to acquire
further land.’1486 The sources of data highlight some of the areas for consideration as part of
readiness to respond to future relocation of communities. These include the revision of existing
laws pertaining to the Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji) and the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120) (Fiji)
together with other laws related to land on land tenure and land acquisition by the state.
The formulation of new laws can be tailored to underscore specific arrangements for
communities of origin in the host state that embody ‘land acquisition and rights, preservation
of cultural identity, economic opportunities, and the maintenance of distinct, self-governing
communities.’1487 These areas of focus for reform ought to be considered as part of readiness
of the Fijian Government. For example, as recorded in the interview data, one non-state actor
pointed out:
…develop…a separate piece of Act for resettlement…because of my experience for the intra-resettlement,…we nominate certain stakeholders…to facilitate…the communities because they have the legal basis or the Act that allows the community to approach them…the iTaukei affairs for instance, the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap 120)…non-formal communities go to…Ministry for Agriculture, Rural and Maritime Development and National Disaster Management…the National Disaster Management Act…1488
1483 Interview with NSA#1, SA#4, above n 1084; see also interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1484 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1485 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1486 Donner, above n 35, 195–6. 1487 McAdam, above n 13, 281–333; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35. 1488 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084.
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Likewise, the literature in the context of climate finance readiness presented by the case studies
of the ‘Asian sub-region and the Pacific sub-region’ reveals that the Asian countries’ readiness
performance was progressive.1489 This was achieved by establishing the ‘right domestic
environment’ through a ‘variety of financial instruments issued such as tax-free infrastructure
bonds for renewable energy projects, and the establishment of National Climate Funds (NCF)
to mobilise domestic and international climate finance.’1490 The case studies identify the need
for the role of law to underpin readiness. The sources of data offer insights to establish the
right domestic environment taking place through developing new laws and the capacity of
local government bodies.
The legal dimension of reform can also be extended to include arrangements between national
governments facilitated by bi-lateral agreements. As one state actor stated:
…go by way of bi-lateral arrangements. It is neater, easy to control and manage... and it does not open up “door” for misinterpretation or misunderstanding…With bi-lateral arrangements, you can put in place all the: i) conditions; ii) all the process that is to be criteria, all the factors one has to put in place; and iii) take into account all the different arrangements between the two countries…bi-lateral arrangements…is tight…it will acknowledge and make provision for the different situations and different circumstances…1491
The interview data identify the need for bi-lateral arrangements to curb potential uncertainties
emerging from future relocation schemes between the sending and host states. This approach
can also be considered to supplement the review of existing laws, or the formulation of new
laws as part of reform from a legal perspective.
Similarly, policy reform is an additional dimension by which to examine the readiness of the
Fijian Government. As recorded in the interview data, one non-state actor pointed out that:
‘...it (cross-border relocation) could begin as “cross-border guideline for resettlement” which
then…be developed into a legal policy for resettlement…’1492 One other non-state actor
reported that: ‘[I]n order to create enabling policies and…the legal approach (existing
legislative stipulations)…important to consider the whole landscape of the legislature…the
policy and the legislation, assess and synthesise and renovate…i.e. to renovate a policy
framework.’1493 Likewise, the readiness phase, as highlighted in the REDD+ literature for
developing countries to be able to participate in the REDD+ scheme, requires the development
of a national strategy, a national readiness policy, the formulation of project proposals with
1489 Samuwai and Hills, above n 8, 1200, 1203. 1490 Ibid. 1491 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1492 Interview with NSA#1, above n 1084. 1493 Interview with NSA#5, above n 1084; see also Savaresi, above n 981, 4–5; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 110–11; see also Apriwan and Afriani, above n 160, 652.
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the explicit inclusion of plans and legislative and regulatory reforms and the capacity
development support to implement REDD+ activities.1494 The sources of data demonstrate the
importance of the policy dimension for reform through the development of national policies
and strategies, which can be aligned with the national development plans and priorities of the
Fijian Government as part of readiness.
It is acknowledged that the sources of data provide first steps into areas of reform spanning
legal and policy dimensions as part of readiness by the host state for climate change-induced
human mobility. Against this background, national laws and policies, including agreements
and cooperation between national governments facilitated by bi-lateral agreements, underscore
the legal dimension that can be integrated into the framework for readiness. Moreover, the
framework also needs to recognise interconnected issues spanning social, cultural, economic
and political dimensions anchored by the legal dimension to ensure a well-rounded response
by the Fijian Government. The array of determinants to guide decision makers, policymakers
and law drafters with the direction of the framework ought to encompass the following:
1) establishment of legal facilities relating to ‘simplified cross-border trade travel, customs
documents, prior visa applications, customs excise duty and taxes’;1495
2) integration of soft law principles and normative frameworks anchored in ‘international
human rights laws and instruments such as right to adequate housing; right to land and
rights in land; right to security of person; and right to security of tenure’ for the
development of policies, programs and activities at the domestic level for all phases of
relocation;1496
3) integration of international safeguards and guidelines anchored in international
instruments and declarations, for example, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), including those formulated by international financial institutions and
intergovernmental agencies such as ‘free, prior, and informed consent guidelines (FPIC
Guidelines);’1497
1494 Reinecke, Pistorius and Pregernig, above n 981, 31; see also Buizer, Humphreys and Wil, above n 160, 4–5, 8; see also Samndong and Bush, above n 981, 46. 1495 Kelly and Cipullo, above n 853, 12; see also Fisher, above n 13, 210; see also Kalin, above n 15, 28. 1496 Leckie, above n 348, 18; see also Leckie, above n 16, 26, 28–9. 1497 Savaresi, above n 981, 2, 4–5; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 511–12, 524; see also Lesniewska, above n 56, 109–11.
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4) introduction of mechanisms to resolve ‘disputes, conflict and violence between relocating
communities and host communities emerging from resources availability and unequal
access to services;’1498
5) integration of the ‘economic, social cultural, and spiritual costs’ of relocating communities
in all relocation phases;1499
6) ‘preservation of cultural identity of relocating communities with the host communities
through language, religion, collection of dances, indigenous knowledge, traditional crops,
dance performances and costumes;’1500
7) maintenance of the relocating community’s ‘system of governance taking place through
village council’s with host communities;1501
8) ‘re-establishment and the restoration of livelihoods, transfer of property and assets’ of
relocating communities;1502
9) ‘respect for, protection of, and fulfilment of the rights’ of relocating communities taking
place through ‘access to resources, health care, education, and political participation’ in
the host state;1503
10) recognition and integration of ethical considerations such as ‘allocation of scarce
resources; equitable benefit sharing; and compensation’ across communities, including
marginalised groups;1504
11) recognition of land rights of landowners, including customary land rights; and negotiation
and compensation to landowners for land for relocation;1505
12) explicit inclusion and integration of communities in the host state, extending to
‘marginalised groups including ethnic minorities, elderly, and children’ in all phases of
relocation decision-making taking place through meaningful participation and
consultation by the host state;1506
13) determination of relocation costs for all phases of relocation in national plans and
policies;1507
1498 Kalin, above n 15, 28; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 88–99; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also McAdam, above n 10, 256. 1499 McAdam, above n 10, 256; see also Locke, above n 25, 178; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 47–8. 1500 Donner, above n 35, 195, 197–8: see also Vaha, above n 25, 237–8; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 111. 1501 Donner, above n 35, 193, 197–8; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1502 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Ferris, Cernea and Petz, above n 247, 19–20; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124. 1503 Ferris, above n 12, 33–5; see also Locke, above n 25, 178; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 48. 1504 Bennett and Carney, above n 919, 421; see also Raftopoulos, above n 8, 516, 521, 524. 1505 McAdam, above n 87, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 140; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9. 1506 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 327; see also Leckie, above n 348, 19. 1507 Connell, above n 75, 140.
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14) establishment of local government bodies, developing the capacity of local government
institutions, and delineating coordination roles, exercise of powers and functions of
implementing institutions to implement all phases of relocation;1508
15) development of capacity of local government institutions to access finance; to plan and
design the technical, operational and logistical aspects of relocation through laws, policies
and plans at the domestic level;1509 and
16) building of partnerships through international cooperation; and strengthening political
capacity of national governments to support and implement relocation schemes.1510
It is acknowledged that this set of determinants is not exhaustive. The analysis of readiness
uncovered from the sources of data contributes knowledge to developing a framework. The
framework embodies a range of dimensions including legal, social, cultural, economic and
political perspectives. The study has demonstrated for the first time, the determinants for the
framework for readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.
7.7 Conclusion
This chapter set out to articulate the criteria for analysing readiness in the context of climate
change-induced human mobility. This chapter has shown that whole-of-community
orientation in phases for relocation, funding, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of
suitable land, the role that law can play and the development of institutional capacity and
coordination of local government bodies in all relocation phases are the set of criteria. The
criteria were uncovered by the synthesis and analysis of the different sources of data spanning
chapters four, five and six. The set of criteria for readiness in the context of climate change
induced human mobility answers the key research question (RQ1).
This chapter examines the level of readiness of the Fijian Government against the set of criteria
by using interview data to support the analysis. As this chapter shows, aside from the
constitutional and legislative provisions supporting multiple citizenship at the domestic level,
which partially suggests readiness against the criterion for the role of law, the remainder of the
criteria are not well advanced by the Fijian Government. Fiji’s readiness against the set of
criteria traversing whole- of-community orientation at all phases, funding all phases,
1508 Leckie, above n 16, 24–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 33–5; see also Adenle, Manning and Arbiol, above n 56, 130; see also Melde and Lee, above n 1402, 34. 1509 See above n 1508 and accompanying text. 1510 Ibid.
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maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land, the role of law for relocation
and the institutional capacity and coordination of local government is not established. Taken
together, the analysis has shown that much uncertainty still exists. This answers the second
research question (RQ 2), which enquires into the current state of readiness of the Fijian
Government to receive Pacific Islanders to Fiji as a result of climate change.
Finally, this chapter has identified some of the key areas within the existing laws and policy
where reform is needed. This chapter has also identified determinants spanning legal, social,
cultural, economic and political dimensions that guide the direction for decision makers,
policymakers and law drafters to carve the framework for readiness in the context of climate
change-induced human mobility. The next chapter delves into the conclusions and potential
directions for future from the in-depth analysis in this chapter. It also reiterates the significant
and original contribution to knowledge by the criteria articulated for analysing readiness for
change change-induced human mobility.
264
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Directions for Future
8.1 Introduction
This final chapter presents the major findings of this thesis. The significance of these findings
and the original contribution to the growing body of research on climate change-induced
human mobility is also addressed. This chapter then provides potential directions for future
and highlights areas for further research before detailing the limitations of the study and
providing an overall conclusion.
The thesis set out to identify the criteria for assessing readiness in the context of climate
change-induced human mobility to assess Fiji’s readiness using these criteria. It set out to
provide a reform perspective and identify key areas within existing laws where possible reform
is needed by the state machinery.1511 Additionally, the thesis set out to identify a set of
determinants to guide decision makers, policymakers and law drafters in developing a
framework to inform climate change-induced human mobility.
This chapter draws together the significant findings based on the comprehensive synthesis and
analysis of the experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of the historical
resettlement of Pacific Islanders, the body of experience on the phenomenon of readiness
documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives spanning disaster
preparedness, climate finance readiness, international humanitarian assistance preparedness,
public health preparedness, REDD+ readiness—and the empirical findings of the experiences
and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government.
Together, these provide the foundation to articulate the criteria of readiness.
8.2 Summary of Key Findings
The overall findings of this thesis confirm that a whole-of-government approach for the
climate change-induced mobility of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji spanning
1511 Hutchinson, above n 63, 23.
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legal, social, cultural, economic and political dimensions is not well advanced by the Fijian
Government. There are several possible explanations for this result.
The extensive body of research and various published reports demonstrate that the existing
international legal framework to respond to mobility dimensions from slow-onset
environmental change—and in particular, the movement of populations across international
borders in the context of climate change—has proved largely unsatisfactory in international
global policy fora and under international law, as indicated in chapter three.1512 Furthermore,
there is widespread consensus among scholars, migration practitioners and intergovernmental
agencies that reveals growing consideration and recognition of non-binding international legal
instruments underpinned by a human rights framework synonymous with a human rights-
based approach as means by which the assistance and protection of people facing mobility as
a result of climate change can be extended.1513 A major critique of much of the literature on a
protection framework is that far too little attention has been directed to uniformly and
consistently implementing protection measures (as was highlighted in chapter three).1514
Alongside the noted gap in protections at the international level, a closer examination of the
developments at the Pacific regional level reveals that regional cooperation and protection
arrangements of Pacific Island governments to facilitate and manage the relocation of Pacific
Island communities to neighbouring islands to protect against the debilitating risks of climate
change remain grim.1515 Moreover, numerous case studies documenting the relocation of the
Banaban and Vaitupuan communities to Fiji have provided a basis for understanding some of
the salient issues and challenges that large-scale population relocation of Pacific Island
communities may potentially present in future in the context of climate change (as outlined in
chapters three and four).1516
The main research question (RQ1) asked: What are the criteria for readiness in the context of
climate change-induced human mobility? This thesis has articulated the need for a whole-of-
community orientation in all phases of relocation, as well as adequate funding for all phases.
All phases includes planning, implementation and post-implementation. The set of criteria for
1512 Kalin, above n 178, 5–7; see also Zetter, above n 505, 62–3. 1513 See above n 1512 and accompanying text; see also McAdam and Limon, above n 82, 13–19; see also Ploeg and Vanclay, above n 397, 34–52. 1514 Ploeg and Vanclay, above n 397, 34–52; see also Smyth and Vanclay, above n 397, 65–80; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 55–9; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 4, 54–5; see also Burson and Bedford, above n 665, 1–55. 1515 Burson and Bedford, above n 665, 1–55; see also McAdam, above n 4, 30–2; see also McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 137–66; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 1–34. 1516 See above n 1515 and accompanying text; see also Donner, above n 35, 191–201.
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assessing readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility includes the
maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land, the role that law can play and
the development of institutional capacity and coordination of local government bodies in all
phases of relocation. These are key determinants gleaned from the experiences and lessons
learned from the case studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders and the body of
experience on readiness documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives.
Research Question 1(a) asked: What can we learn from the historical experiences of human
mobility across the Pacific Islands regions? The experiences and lessons learned from the
case studies from the perspective of both communities of origin and the host communities
inform the criteria of readiness for all phases of relocation to inform climate change-induced
human mobility. These include meaningful consultation and the inclusiveness of all
community members in all ‘planning, negotiations and execution’ phases of relocation
decision-making of communities of origin, including the receiving community,1517
identification of suitable land and the availability of land to provide food security and restore
livelihoods of communities of origin in the host state,1518 and ‘sustained and sufficient
financing’ of all phases of relocation (both social and physical costs) related to communities
of origin in the host state.1519 Other key determinants include the ‘maintenance of ancestral
ties to place, cultural identity, religion and indigenous knowledge’ of communities of origin
in the host state.1520 The legal status recognition of communities of origin in the host state
underpinned by the domestic laws that deal with dual citizenship, nationality and political
participation—including the legal recognition of the descendants to citizenship and political
participation at the origin and/or traditional homeland,1521 ‘retaining control over land and
marine resources’ by relocating communities at ‘their original home island (origin)’1522 and
‘equal access to common resources and services’ (fishing, land, health, education, social
welfare) at the host state are also key determinants.1523
1517 Edwards, above n 35, 58, 64, 68, 75, 76–8. 1518 Ibid 58, 63–70; see also Donner, above n 35, 195–6; see also Campbell, above n 75, 63–4. 1519 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 319; see also McAdam, above n 75, 124; see also McAdam, above n 642; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35; see also Edwards, above n 35, 69, 74–5; see also ADB Report above n 10, 61-2. 1520 Farbotko, above n 732; see also Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 3, 11, 23, 25; see also McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 43–55; see also ‘identity, culture, community and livelihoods are deeply interwoven in the historical and cultural fabric of communities’ as cited in Campbell and Warrick, above n 11, 23, 25 and McCubbin, Smit and Pearce, above n 278, 53. 1521 McAdam, above n 13, 283–4, 307, 319, 326, 305; see also Connell, above n 75, 140. 1522 See above n 1521 and accompanying text; see also Campbell, above n 75, 71–9; see also Donner, above n 35, 199; see also Farbotko, above n 732. 1523 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 141; see also Mortreux and Barnett, above n 379, 107; see also Locke, above n 25, 178.
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Research Question 1(b) asked: What can we learn from the experiences and lessons learned
from the internal relocation of communities in Fiji? The empirical findings identified through
the interview data of participants (n = 18) in chapter six showed key considerations in
relocation schemes to be the recognition of land tenure-ships, maintaining dual citizenship and
nationality, allocation of funding and accessing financial resources internationally—including
pragmatic responses to state sovereignty.1524 The interview data also showed that relocation
schemes should recognise a number of additional considerations. These include the cultural
identity of communities of origin in the host state, the explicit inclusion of host communities
in the levels of action and relocation phases, intervention of faith-based organisations as
intermediaries between communities and implementing authorities, respect for human rights,
the role of the education sector—particularly tertiary institutions to deliver programs oriented
to climate change—maintaining a people-centred approach and the consideration of the notion
of regionalism to garner support and cooperation between the host country and countries of
origin. The interview data, together with the analysis of the literature and published reports
have identified that issues around land, funding, sovereignty and regionalism present major
challenges for national governments. This thesis has identified proactive measures that could
be adopted to ameliorate these to some extent.
Research Question 1(c) asked: What can we learn from the literature on other forms of mobility
or other contexts of readiness? The analysis of readiness from the multidisciplinary literature
spanning disaster preparedness, climate finance readiness, international humanitarian
assistance preparedness, public health preparedness and REDD+ readiness shows that capacity
development support, the role of law and a whole-of-society orientation are three
interdependent elements central to what it means to be ready.
Research Question 2 asked: What is the current state of Fiji’s readiness to receive large-scale
mobility of Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change? The set of criteria articulated in
RQ 1 used to analyse Fiji’s overall readiness comprised a whole-of-community orientation at
all phases, funding of all phases, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable
land, the role of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and coordination of local
governments. The analysis of the Fijian Government’s position shows that far too little
attention has been directed towards addressing the challenges arising from the climate change-
1524 See above n 1523; see also ADB Report, above n 10, 60–2, 67, 70–1; see also Thomas and Benjamin, above n 52, 90, 95, 99; see also McAdam, above n 87, 305, 326–7; see also McAdam, 354, 10; see also Allgood and McNamara, above n 35, 380.
269
induced mobility of Pacific Island communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Fiji. However,
the analysis of Fiji’s readiness against the criterion for the role of law in relocation does show
that as first steps, the legal status recognition of individuals through dual citizenship
arrangements are well supported by domestic laws. Moreover, further analysis showed well-
supported capacity and coordination arrangements by local government institutions
underscored by the experiences and lessons learned from the previous internal relocation
schemes.
The set of criteria relating to the role of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and
coordination of local government, while preliminary, is shown to partially substantiate the
readiness of the Fijian Government for cross-border relocation. However, the analysis also
shows that much uncertainty still exists, as the dimensions of the set of criteria have not been
fully uncovered in the context of cross-border relocation. Overall, the analysis of Fiji’s
readiness against the set of criteria traversing whole-of-community orientation at all phases,
funding of all phases, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land, the role
of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and coordination of local government shows
that the readiness of the Fijian Government across the host of areas is lacking for climate
change-induced human mobility. It also demonstrates that significant and extensive work lies
ahead in order to achieve readiness against the set of criteria.
Research Question 3 asked: What reforms are necessary to ensure that Fiji is ready to receive
Pacific Islanders as a result of climate change? The reform perspective shows that the revision
of existing laws pertaining to the: Immigration Act 2003 (Fiji) and the iTaukei Affairs Act (Cap
120) (Fiji), together with other laws related to land such as land tenure and land acquisition by
the state provide a starting point. Moreover, the formulation of new laws tailored to underscore
specific arrangements for communities of origin in the host state that embody ‘land acquisition
and rights, preservation of cultural identity, economic opportunities, and the maintenance of
distinct, self-governing communities can be considered.’1525 Furthermore, arrangements
between national governments facilitated by bi-lateral agreements are additional
considerations. Similarly, the reform perspective highlights the importance of the policy
dimension through the development of national policies and strategies aligned with the
national development plans and priorities of the Fijian Government as part of readiness.
1525 McAdam, above n 13, 281–333; see also Leckie, above n 16, 28–9; see also Ferris, above n 12, 31, 33, 35.
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8.3 General and Specific Contribution
This study advances the understanding of readiness in the context of climate change-induced
human mobility. It identifies that while readiness has been explored throughout
multidisciplinary fields of study, as demonstrated by the review of multidisciplinary literature
in chapter five, no single study as yet exists that has specifically addressed the phenomenon
of readiness and conceptualised the criteria instructive for readiness in the context of climate
change. As discussed in chapter seven, the criteria for readiness was applied as an analytical
framework to gauge Fiji’s level of readiness. There are several important areas where the
analysis of readiness traversing the experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of
the historical resettlement of Pacific Islanders, the body of experience of readiness
documented in the literature from multidisciplinary perspectives and the empirical findings of
the experiences and lessons learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian
Government make a significant and original contribution to the body of knowledge. These can
be categorised as general and specific contributions.
The findings from this study make a general contribution to the large body of work on human
mobility from sudden- and slow-onset environmental change, including the substantial body
of relevant experience on relocation arising from non-climatic factors. Moreover, the findings
add to a growing body of research on climate displacement and migration in the Pacific region.
As highlighted by chapter three, the existing body of research on cross-border relocation in
the context of climate change under international law is less well established and perfunctory
in policy fora at both international and Pacific regional levels.1526
Likewise, the analysis undertaken in this thesis provides a new understanding to inform
readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility. The criteria for analysing
readiness articulated in chapter seven, that is, the whole-of-community orientation at all
phases, funding of all phases, maintenance of cultural identity, identification of suitable land,
the role of law in relocation and the institutional capacity and coordination of local government
provide a significant and original contribution to the growing body of existing readiness
literature. Similarly, the overarching determinants in chapter seven present as first steps to
guide the development of a framework spanning legal, social, cultural, economic and political
dimensions for climate change-induced human mobility provide a significant and original
contribution to the field of human mobility studies.
1526 McAdam, above n 10, 15, 237–266.
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The findings of this thesis also make a specific contribution via the research questions. The
findings arising from RQ 1 provide a new understanding to inform the criteria for analysing
readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility. More specifically, the findings
arising from RQ 1(b), which was directed towards participants’ experiences and lessons
learned from the internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government, provide useful
insights into the considerations that need to be addressed in cross-border relocation schemes
and what it means to be ready by the state machinery and the community sector. Both the
empirical findings from RQ 1(b) in this study and the empirical observations in the literature
by scholars into the internal relocation projects contribute additional evidence to enhance the
understanding of readiness for relocation schemes. In addition, this is the first empirical study,
underscored by RQ 2, that has appraised Fiji’s position in responding to climate-induced cross
relocation following the announcement delivered by the Fijian Government at the COP 21 in
2015. The findings provide the impetus for sustained dialogue, cooperation and the
development of arrangements at both the local government level and between national
governments to implement relocation schemes. Together, the contribution to knowledge and
the empirical findings add to the various considerations that need to be taken into account to
effect relocations schemes specific to the Fiji context.
8.4 Limitations of Study and Further Directions
A number of caveats need to be noted in terms of the data generated from the field research to
inform readiness and the application of the criteria as an analytical framework to appraise
Fiji’s position for readiness. First, participant recruitment was confined to senior state
representatives and non-governmental organisations and agencies, which excluded the private
sector in Fiji. Second, a randomised selection of community members relocated through the
internal relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government did not form part of the
recruitment process or participant list. Third, the communities of the Banaban and Vaitupuan
diasporas on the islands of Rabi and Kioa of Fiji respectively, could not be included as part of
the participant recruitment list. Finally, participant recruitment could not extend to include the
full suite of governmental and non-governmental authorities and agencies in Kiribati and
Tuvalu as the countries of origin for relocation to the host country Fiji. Moreover, the practical
resource constraints involved in traveling to the islands of Rabi, Kioa, Kiribati and Tuvalu to
undertake field research within the required timeframe of three years was a further limitation
in bolstering the empirical data of this study, as this is the first study representing targeted
research on readiness in the Fiji context.
272
Re-engaging the Qualitative Empirical Design to Widen Participant Pool
Further research by re-engaging and incorporating the qualitative empirical design adopted in
this study to gather perspectives and attitudes on cross-border relocation and what it means to
be ready is suggested. This research should span the legal, political and socio-economic
dimensions as identified by participants from the islands of Rabi and Kioa, and the island
nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu. Participant recruitment for the wider study could be extended
to include local communities in addition to local governmental bodies and non-governmental
institutions. Further research encompassing broader participation would be beneficial in
offering the full spectrum of perspectives on climate migration readiness across jurisdictions
and a whole-of-government approach by the host country and countries of origin.
Moreover, similar studies that replicate the methods employed in the present study should be
conducted for countries of origin to help establish a greater degree of accuracy on what it
means to be ready from a whole-of-government response encompassing all countries involved
in potential cross-border relocation of communities in the future. It is suggested that targeted
research on all countries involved will provide a strong foundation to articulate appropriate
policies, plans, programs to inform nuanced frameworks spanning legal and governance
arrangements to implement all phases of the cross-border climate change-induced relocation
schemes effectively.
Orienting towards a Cohesive Whole-of-Government Response
The analysis of Fiji’s position to respond to climate change-induced mobility of Pacific Island
communities across sovereign borders to Fiji presented in chapter seven confirms that Fiji is
insufficiently ready. At first glance, a holistic interpretation of the analysis suggests that the
set of criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-induced mobility needs to be
considered in its entirety so as to address intersecting considerations and issues to achieve a
whole-of-government response. Upon closer examination, as demonstrated through the
experiences and lessons learned from the case studies of the historical resettlement of Pacific
Islanders, the empirical findings of the experiences and lessons learned from the internal
relocation projects initiated by the Fijian Government, state sovereignty and the notion of
regionalism present complex and contentious dimensions at policy fora at both the Pacific
273
regional and international levels.1527 Evidence of the complex issues was clearly identified
from the testimonies of participants. For example, one state actor stated that: ‘…whole
discussions of…submerging of their (Kiribati and Tuvalu) basepoints is sovereignty… So,
who has right over that? So that is the big legal question at the international level… do we go
through…strict interpretation of a definition of an island in UNCLOS (United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea).’1528 One other state actor commented that: ‘Regionalism
doesn’t recognise borders and sovereignty…very soon we will lose our sovereignty…’1529
Similarly, sustained finance and the availability of, and access to, land for relocation also
present as significant areas of debate, encompassing issues such as landowners’ rights, local
government bodies, compensation and access to resources.1530 As noted by one state actor:
‘…they (Kiribati and Tuvalu) need to buy their piece of land and realise in their own
security…it is not our (Fiji) responsibility…’1531 Echoing similar sentiments, another state
actor stated that: ‘…for us (Fiji), the issue really is the availability of land…means not that we
have something physical there that one can just move to but it’s about “availability” as in one
has to look into land ownership issue and whether it is something landowners can give…’1532
With regards to finance, one state actor highlighted that: ‘…finance is very critical for us in
the region…Because this (climate change) is not something Pacific Island nations
created….Resettlement will amount to huge funding. We just rely on the international
community.’1533 According to one non-state actor: ‘Money/funding for resettlement is quite a
contentious agenda item. People do not like to fund relocation. That is a big “no-no” for
donors.’1534 As established in chapters three, four and six, issues surrounding: state
sovereignty, regionalism, availability of—and access to—land, and sustained finance present
layers of complex issues that require extensive sustained dialogue, cooperation and negotiation
between the host country and countries of origin, including interventions by the international
community. The complexity of the issues may further delay and potentially inhibit cross-
border relocation schemes because these issues traverse many levels and are interconnected
with a suite of areas of focus. Further research is needed to explore the policy deliberations
beginning with Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu as a starting point at the Pacific regional level. This
could be enhanced by extending to include the potential intervention of the international
1527 McAdam and Ferris, above n 4, 163. 1528 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1529 Interview with SA#7, above n 1138. 1530 McAdam, above n 87, 305, 327. 1531 Interview with SA#4, above n 1084. 1532 Ibid. 1533 Interview with SA#3, above n 1084. 1534 Interview with NSA#7, above n 1084.
274
community as a basis to uncover the support and assistance spanning financial, technical and
legal dimensions.
Moreover, domestic laws and policy need to be articulated in preparation for cross-border
relocation schemes. The domestic legal and policy arrangements could be tailored in one of
two ways. First, by the formulation of specific laws and regulations and the development of a
new policy on cross-border relocation—such as cross-border relocation guidelines and cultural
plans for example—as identified in chapter six. Second, domestic legal and policy
arrangements could be tailored by the revision of existing laws and regulations—such as the
immigration and citizenship laws—and the explicit inclusion of measures and mechanisms in
existing national policy documents, such as the national development plan, land use plan and
national green growth framework as discussed in chapters five, six and seven. More research
is needed to determine the legal and policy arrangements in all the phases for relocation, such
as respect for human rights and the protection of—and assistance to—communities,
recognition of land rights and tenure-ship, and rights and principles embedded in soft law
instruments such as (FPIC, ESB, for example).1535 Further research could access the due
process mechanisms to uncover the social integration, recognition of cultural identity,
livelihood restoration and access to services dimensions as detailed in chapters four, five and
six.
The operational and logistical aspects associated with relocation, such as consular services,
dual citizenship arrangements, infrastructure development and other issues identified in
chapters four, five and six must also form an integral part of the process.1536 It is incumbent on
the government of the day to establish an effective and enabling environment that is secure,
stable and sustainable in order to achieve readiness for all phases of the relocation schemes.1537
More broadly, research is also needed from the regional perspective to determine the policy
deliberations instigated by the governments of Fiji, Kiribati and Tuvalu to tailor flexible and
tenable arrangements through bi-lateral arrangements or memoranda of understanding, as
detailed in chapters four and six. The intricate details between the national governments on
access to land, sharing of natural resources, citizenship, rights and benefits, among others,
throw up many questions in need for further investigation.
1535 See above n 4 and accompanying text; see also above n 8 and accompanying text. 1536 Morita and Pak, above n 411, 6, 9, 13; see also Fisher, above n 13, 208–9, 210; see also Moulton et al, above n 8, 681; see also Barber, above n 160; see also above n 853 and accompanying text. 1537 See above n 1536 and accompanying text.
275
It is envisaged that the governments of the day of the host country and countries of origin
acknowledge the growing recognition of the need for consideration of the complex areas
pertaining to finance, sovereignty, regionalism and land availability before implementation
takes place. If cross-border relocation is to be effected between Pacific Island nations, a
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of readiness needs to be developed in order to
implement cross-border relocation projects successfully. Further research would therefore be
beneficial in significantly assisting policy makers by informing relocation policy decisions and
enabling the formulation of appropriate and effective regulatory measures and mechanisms to
implement cross-border relocation projects at both domestic and Pacific regional levels.
8.5 Overall Conclusion
The major objective of this thesis was to investigate the readiness of the Fijian Government to
respond to climate-induced cross-border relocation of communities from Kiribati and Tuvalu
to Fiji following the announcement delivered by the Fijian Government at the COP 21 in 2105.
The findings from this study demonstrate that Fiji is insufficiently ready on the whole gamut
of issues spanning legal, government policy, socio-economic, political and economic
dimensions. Further, the protection and assistance arrangements under international law on the
mobility of populations across international borders on grounds of climate change is not well
established, apart from the explicit references and usefulness of normative principles and
standards traversing non-binding soft-law instruments, as detailed in chapter three.1538 This
thesis has established that what it means to be ready for cross-border relocation of populations
in the context of climate change also remains underdetermined.
Moreover, this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by identifying and
articulating the criteria for readiness in the context of climate change-induced human mobility.
It is suggested that the government of the day of the host country and governments of countries
of origin collectively take proactive and pragmatic measures to address cross-border relocation
schemes that are underpinned by a balanced approach and responsive to communities and
people at the centre of all phases of relocation decision-making. Together, the findings of this
thesis identify what it means to be ready for climate change induced mobility, including a set
of criteria that provides the first step to articulating a framework for readiness. This thesis also
identifies the issues and methods by which further empirical investigation and robust policy
1538 McAdam, above n 10, 15, 237–66.
276
deliberations critical to successfully implementing relocation schemes across sovereign
borders.
277
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