Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in

the Islamic Republic of Iran

Mr. Yukiya AmanoReed College

March 30, 2012

Outline• Paths to the Bomb• Iran’s Nuclear Facilities• Recent Failures• Recent Progress• Outstanding Issues• Further Reading• Conclusions

Paths to the Bomb

FEP(5%) + PFEP (20%)54000 SWU planned9156 SWU installed8808 SWU operating4500 kg LEU (3.5%)100 kg HEU (20%)

FFEP3000 SWU planned600 SWU installed14 kg HEU (20%)

HWR40 MWth

LWR1000 MWe

LWR360 MWe

Recent Failures• Qom Enrichment

Facility– Work apparent 2002,

2004, 2006– Iran claim allocated to

AEOI in second half of 2007

– 3000 IR-1 Centrifuges– Iran in violation of

Code 3.1 of safeguards agreements

Recent Progress• September 2011

– Ahmadinejad offers to stop producing 20%

• February 15, 2012– Iran agreed to take

part in six-party talks (France, Germany, UK, China, Russia, US)

• March 6, 2012– Conditional visit to

Parchin

Outstanding Issues• Iranian safeguards 1976

– Suspended Code 3.1 (DIV)

– Need Additional Protocol• Clarify

– Uranium metal document– Procurement and

production by military-related industries

– Weaponization and delivery systems studies

• Compliance– Suspend enrichment– Suspend construction of

HWR, FFEP– Access to HW plant– Access to Parchin site

Further Reading

Conclusions