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Making and breaking government
The Veto Player perspective
Camilla Mariotto 5th November 2009
Positive Political Theory Prof. Francesco Zucchini
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On stability (1)
Up to now we have discussed about policy stability and how it is affected by different institutional structures.
What consequences?• On the regime• On the government stability• On the independence of bureaucracies and
the judiciary
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Government stability (1)
Formation of government coalition
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Duration of corresponding government
Most prolific branches in the literature of politics
Lijphart (1999: 129):
“Cabinet durability is an indicator not just of the cabinet’s strength compared with that of the legislature but also of regime stability”
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Government stability (2)
No agreement on the conditions for what a government replacement is.
4 different criteria: • Change in the party composition of the government;
• Election;
• Formal government resignation;
• Change in prime minister.
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Different relations: Government duration:
VPs and Government duration
Agenda setting and executive dominance Executive dominance Agenda setting Agenda setting and executive dominance
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Government duration (1)
A) Parliamentary features
Theory of coalition – blindness of policy
1. Policy blind models MWC
2. Policy models MCWC
Under MCWC perspective, in 1-D space a connected coalition would not exclude a party located between coalition parties.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Riker
Axelrod, de Swaan
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Government duration (2)
A) Parliamentary features
• Size party
• Party position Party government
• Other parties position
• N° of parties
• Effective n° Government duration
• Extreme or anti-system party
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Government duration (3)
1. The deterministic approach (Laver&Schofield) introduced the “bargaining environment”. On an 1-D policy space (LR) different political systems are characterized as:
unipolar centrist unipolar off center bipolar multipolar
2. The events approach (Browne, Gleiber, Mashoba) did not focus on cause but on “randomness”. Conditional rate of termination – hazard rate
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Government duration (4)
3. King, Alt, Burns and Laver combined the 2 approaches:
“[…] governments fall as a result of random events, but the
capacity of different governments to survive was a function of different characteristics prevailing in the party system of the country. The results of this unified model indicate that fragmentation of the party system and polarization of the opposition are the regime attributes most strongly associated with cabinet duration.” (Tsebelis)
The probability of a party to be included in the new government depends on the characteristics of the party system.
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Government duration (5)
B) Government features
Warwick gave a different definition of: Polarization measures the proportion of parliamentary seats held by extremist parties (anti-system parties) noncoalitionable parties. High vulnerability to early collapse or termination.
Fractionalization variable should be measured regarding to the government Ideological heterogeneity or distance (more in minority governments).
The government survival depends on the bargaining within government
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VPs and government duration (1)
Focus on the status quo as essential element of multidimensional policy models.
Models assume 1) policy space,
2) complete information, and
3) stability of the status quo.
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VPs and government duration (2)
In order to understand mechanisms of government selection and duration, two uncertainties:
1. Uncertainty between policies and outcomes2. Uncertainty between current and future outcomes
Taking into account both uncertainties, how are parties going to address the situation when forming a government? Reduction of distance between coalition parties enables governments to produce a policy program before they form and respond to subsequent exogenous shocks.
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VPs and government duration (3)
3 VPs: A1, A2 and A3
If SQ then W(SQ),
if SQ1 then W(SQ1) The further away the
status quo is and the closer they are to each other, the more items are included by the VPs in the gov program.
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VPs and government duration (4)
What happens in case of an exogenous shock?
Replacement of an existing outcome, but for a government this can be:
o Manageableo Non-manageable
No direct correspondence between the size of the shock and the government termination.
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VPs and government duration (5)
o Implications on government formationo Majority government with close parties o Ideologically heterogeneous governmento Minority government
o Implication on government duration o Ideological distances o Fractionalization and polarization only in minority
government.
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VPs and government duration (6)
Government duration is proportional to the government’s ability to respond to unexpected shocks.
the size of the unanimity core of the veto players.
the closer the VPs, the more they are able to manage policy shocks, and consequently the longerthe duration of the government.
Moreover, the closer different VPs the higher probability that they will form a government
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Agenda setting and executive dominance Why do party positions matter?
A government has 2 distinct advantages (Tsebelis): positional advantages the centrality of its location
inside parliament, generated with the coalition formation process
institutional advantages the agenda setting rules, pre-existing the game
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Executive dominance
Lijphart:
Executive dominance measures the relative power of the executive and legislative branches of government, therefore its best indicator is cabinet durability.
Government duration – executive dominance self evident
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COUNTRYAverage cabinet life I
Average cabinet life II
Gov DurationExecutive Dominance
Austria 8.42 2.53 5.47 5.47
Belgium 2.29 1.68 1.98 1.98
Denmark 2.81 1.75 2.28 2.28
Finland 1.31 1.18 1.24 1.24
France 2.88 2.08 2.48* 5.52*
Germany 3.60 2.03 2.82 2.82
Greece 3.60 2.16 2.88 2.88
Iceland 2.78 2.17 2.48 2.48
Ireland 3.72 2.42 3.07 3.07
Italy 1.28 0.99 1.14 1.14
Luxembourg 5.62 3.16 4.39 4.39
Netherlands 2.94 2.50 2.72 2.72
Norway 4.22 2.11 3.17 3.17
Portugal 2.32 1.86 2.09 2.09
Spain 6.35 2.38 4.36 4.36
Sweden 4.77 2.07 3.42 3.42
Switzerland 16.19 0.99 8.59* 1*
U. Kingdom 8.49 2.55 5.52 5.52
Lijphart: Government duration and executive dominance
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Agenda setting
Doering: Government dominates the policy-making
process because it holds the power of agenda setting 7 variables:1. Authority to determine the Plenary Agenda of Parliament
2. Money Bills as Government Prerogative
3. Is the Committee Stage of a Bill Restricted by a Preceding Plenary Decision?
4. Authority of Committees to Rewrite Government Bills
5. Control of the Timetable in Legislative Committees
6. Curtailing Debate before the Final Vote of a Bill in the Plenary
7. Maximum Lifespan of a Bill Pending Approval After Which It Lapses if not Adopted
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COUNTRYPlenary agenda
Financial Initiative
Committee Re-writeTime Table
Financial Voting
Lapse Bill
Agenda Control
Austria 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 -0.044
Belgium 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 -0.170
Denmark 5 3 2 1 4 2 1 -0.106
Finland 5 3 3 4 1 3 2 -0.148
France 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 0.333
Germany 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 -0.126
Greece 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 0.280
Iceland 5 3 3 1 4 2 1 -0.170
Ireland 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 0.519
Italy 6 3 3 4 2 2 2 -0.219
Luxembourg 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 -0.053
Netherlands 7 3 3 1 4 3 4 -0.527
Norway 4 3 3 4 2 2 2 -0.063
Portugal 3 1 3 3 2 2 3 0.147
Spain 4 1 1 4 2 2 2 0.221
Sweden 5 3 3 4 4 3 4 -0.427
Switzerland 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 -0.135
U. Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.690
Doering: Government Agenda Control
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Agenda setting and executive dominance (1)
Tsebelis:
The relevance of agenda setting for coalition formation.
Government formateurs are parties centrally located
The closer different potential veto players the higher
probability that they will form a government proximity of
other parties to the formateurs
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W (ABC)
Agenda setting and executive dominance (2)
A
B
CB1
C1
SQ
W (AB1C1)
Party “A” can form 2 potential coalition: ABC and AB1C1.
“A” chooses AB1C1 on the basis of both ideological (to implement more plans) and pragmatic (to respond to more shocks) criteria.
“Minimizing the distances between the coalition partners is the dominant solution in all cases […], the formateur should select parties closer to his preferences”.
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5 parties equal seats, 3 parties to form a majority
3 exclusive and exhaustive subsets of the policy space: 1. the points preferred to G by majority GG’ and GG”,2. the points for which a majority is indifferent to G the boarder of GG’ and GG”, 3. the points that are defeated by G by a majority.
GE
A
B C
D
Issue 1
Issue 2
G'
G''
X
X'X’
SQ
G is a very expensive partner, but a coalition without it has very little chance of policy success.
Agenda setting and executive dominance (3)
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GE
A
B C
D
Issue 1
Issue 2
G'
G''
X
X'X’
SQ
Institutional advantages
•Under closed rule:
G can have its own preference voted by a majority in Parliament since the SQ is not inside the lenses GG’ or GG’’ .
If the SQ is inside the shaded area of the lenses, the government leaves the SQ as is.
If the SQ is in the non-shaded area of the lenses, the government can propose something inside the shaded area that will prevail.
Agenda setting and executive dominance (4)
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GE
A
B C
D
Issue 1
Issue 2
G'
G''
X
X'X’
SQ
Institutional advantages
•Under open rule:
When the government proposes its own ideal point, anything inside the lenses GG’ and GG” can be proposed on the floor, and it will defeat G.
Agenda setting and executive dominance (5)
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GE
A
B C
D
Issue 1
Issue 2
G'
G''
X
X'X’
SQ
Institutional advantages
•Under fire by fire rule:
The amendment is proposed in X, the G is able to propose another one in X’.
Agenda setting and executive dominance (6)
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Agenda setting and executive dominance (7)
Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on formateur parties – EMP policy space
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Agenda setting and executive dominance (8)
Impact on agenda control and executive dominance on formateur parties – EMP policy space
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Agenda setting and executive dominance (9)
Impact on agenda control and executive
dominance on Government
membership – EMP policy space
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Agenda setting and executive dominance (10)
Impact on agenda control and executive
dominance on Government
membership – LR policy space
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Conclusions (1)
Governments with lots of agenda setting powers will not care very much about positional advantages,
governments with low agenda setting powers will focus on achieving positional advantages (central location of formateur, small number of parties in government, small ideological distance among parties).
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Politics will be more centrist in countries with low agenda setting powers, and there will be low levels of alternation.
Whether the centrist formateur parties will find other parties close to them in order to form coalitions or not, depends on the polarization of the country, not on the number of parties (extreme pluralism – Sartori) or consociationalism (Lijphart).
Conclusion (2)