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Navy in JIAMD Programs – The Way AheadSea-Based Terminal Working Group Update to NDIA
RDML Brad HicksDeputy Surface Warfare for Combat Systems/Weapons (N76F)
April 7, 2005
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Sea Power 21 Missile Defense Operations
Sea StrikeSea StrikeFORCEnet
Sea BasingSea Basing
Sea ShieldSea Shield
Missile defense is a key capability in executing
Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy
Missile defense is a key capability in executing
Sea Power 21 and the National Strategy
Maintaining the Joint Sea Base sanctuary is the Navy’s highest operational level missile defense priority
Provide regional defense for allies and expeditionary forces where land based missile defenses are denied, as well as critical air and seaports
Active missile defenses augmented by advances in ISR and INFO OPS (IO) provide high leverage offensive defensive integration in missile defense
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
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The Challenge
• Analysis defines clear capability gap– 2012 MCO-3 (POM 06)
– 2020 MCO-1 & MCO-2 (PR07)
• COCOM Priority
• A potential Navy contribution to a joint BMD solution
Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM
Defense of the Joint Sea Base, APODs, and SPODs from SRBM & MRBM
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The Joint Missile Defense Vision
Reduction in threat TBMs
D-DAY D+1 D+2 D+3 D+4 D+5
Navy
Army USMC
AF
EngagementEngagement
InformationOperations
InformationOperations
TimeCriticalStrike
TimeCriticalStrike
To address…
Number of threat TBMs
IO Assessment
% TBMs reduced
Assess R
isk
Assess R
isk
Assess R
isk
TCS Assessment
% TBMs reduced
Offensive IOTCS for TELsMissile engagement
Tier 2 Missile Engagement
SBT PAC-3
% TBMs reduced
Assess R
isk
Tier 1 Missile Engagement
SM-3 ABL THAAD
% TBMs reducedSea Based Terminal Defense Sea Based Terminal Defense
Contributes to Layered DefenseContributes to Layered Defense
Sea Based Terminal Defense Sea Based Terminal Defense Contributes to Layered DefenseContributes to Layered Defense
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Two Tier Sea Based Defense
BMDS
Exo-atmosphere
Endo-atmosphere
Layered Defense requires Midcourse and Terminal Engagement CapabilityDepth of fire needed to achieve desired Pn / Pra
SRBM / depressed trajectories may not allow engagement by exo-atmospheric systems
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SBT Assessment History
• FY03 SBT Study• Near term focus• SM-2 Block IV mod test
• POM 06 BUR• Netted TAMD assessment• Included assessment of SBT missile options
• PR07 Navy SBT way ahead effort • TF Missile Defense issue
• 14 Dec Navy-MDA BOD SBT Brief• Significant MDA interest
Result was joint Navy-MDA sponsorship of SBT BMD Assessment
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SBT Assessment Charter
• Examine a range of options for SBT systems development
• Consider ongoing MDA and service programs that could be leveraged for SBT
• Address need to ensure Joint Assured Access and Defense of Joint Sea Base
• Assess combat systems options / requirements
• Present options and assessment to MDA and Navy leadership
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Working Group Organization
Assessment Leads
Kevin Apel
CAPT(s) Bill McQuilkin
Threat Assessment
Steve Peduto
Capabilities-Gaps Analysis
Gary Schnurrpusch
Systems Architecture
Jerry Rogers
Options
CDR Gary May
Technical Leads
Mickey Skamangas
Bill Tropf
SBT Working GroupMDA (DT, AB, TR, SE, PI, BC) OPNAV (N76, N70, N81, N2)
PEO IWS (1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 6.0 7.0) PEO Ships JHU-APLNSWC-DDSEA 017
DIA MSIC SPAJ8 JTAMDOUSA USAF STRATCOM AMRDEC
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Analysis Team Approach
• Threat Assessment:– Define threat space – Characterize operational threat environment
• Capabilities-Gaps Analysis:– Quantify operational capabilities & gaps given
the BMDS program of record– Assess operational contribution of SBT options
• System Architecture:– Characterize Block 2010 BMDS baseline – Develop and characterize SBT options
• Options:– Characterize cost, schedule, and risk
of selected options
Performanceassessment of SBT options
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Option Assessment Criteria (U)
Sea-Based Terminal BMD options are assessed on ability to provide robust defense of the Sea Base and forces ashore.
• Development status
• Technical maturity and risk
• Conceptual Modifications
• Cost
• Schedule
• Engage targets
• Adequate fire power
• Defend assets or area (footprint)
• Maintain battle space
• Produce effective kill
• Ability to fill the gap
• Availability of assets
• Mission commonality
• Adequate number of engagements
• Complexity of BMC2, communications
• Risk to assets
ProgramPerformanceOperational
Assessment Criteria
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PLATFORMSCG / DDGDDXLarge ShipCVW TACAIR
SBT CapabilityFunctional Building Blocks
SENSORSModified SPY-1Modified DDX DBRPATRIOT RadarTHAAD RadarAircraft Organic RadarAircraft IRSTS
WEAPONSSM-6 ModSBMSEMSEMarinized THAADTHAAD
C2BMAegis BMD w/ SBT ModsOA Aegis w/ SBT ModsDDX w/ SBT ModsPATRIOT ECSTHAAD C2BMAirborne Organic C2BMAirborne Integrated C2BM
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SBT Option Candidate "ESG"s
Aegis/DDX with SM-6 Aegis/DDX with SBMSEAegis/DDX with Marinized THAAD
Large Ship Embarked PAC-3 Large Ship Embarked THAADLarge Ship PAC / THAAD Engage
on SPY Radar
TACAIR with MSE Engaging on own or Aegis Radar
Surface Combatant Options
TACAIR Options
Embarked System Options
BMDSBMDSBMDS
BMDSBMDSBMDS
BMDS
ECS
BMDS
ECS
BMDSBMDS
ECS
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Sea-Based Terminal BMD Assessment
Status / Group Schedule
Activity January February March April May June
TOR
Kick-off Meeting
Threat Assessment
Capability - Gap Analysis
System Architecture
Options
Overall Assessment & Recommendations
Major
In-Process Reviews
Final Report
Refinements
Refinements
Refinements
2/2
1/19
2/28 3/28
EXCOMM EXCOMM / BoD EXCOMM BoD