Post on 12-Jul-2020
transcript
PuttingPoliticsFirst:
TheImpactofPoliticsonAmericanReligiousandSecularOrientations
DavidE.Campbell
UniversityofNotreDame
GeoffreyC.LaymanUniversityofNotreDame
JohnC.Green
UniversityofAkron
NathanaelG.SumaktoyoUniversityofNotreDame
Abstract
NearlyallresearchonthepoliticalimpactofAmericans’religiousandsecularorientationsassumesthatsuchorientationsareexogenoustopolitics.Usingmulti-wavepanelandexperimentaldata,wefindthatreligiousandsecularorientationsareendogenoustopoliticalorientations.Inotherwords,religionandsecularismareaconsequenceaswellasacauseofpolitics.Inshowingthis,wemakethreemajorcontributions.First,weconceptualizeandmeasuresecularorientationsinanewway—notjustastheabsenceofreligion,butasanaffirmativesecularidentityandpositivecommitmenttosecularprinciples.Second,ourpanelandexperimentaldataallowforthemostdefinitivetesttodateofwhetherpoliticalorientationsexertacausaleffectonreligiousandsecularorientations.Third,weisolatetheconditionsunderwhichpoliticsaffectsreligious-secularperspectives,thusidentifyingthemechanismthatunderliespoliticalorientations.WordCount:9070_________________________________________________________________________________________________Thedata,code,andanyadditionalmaterialsrequiredtoreplicateallanalysesinthisarticleareavailableontheAmericanJournalofPoliticalScienceDataversewithintheHarvardDataverseNetwork,athttp://dox.doi.org/doi:10.7910/DVN/YM4LDGThisresearchwassupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationunderGrantNo.SES-0961700.Anyopinions,findings,andconclusionsorrecommendationsexpressedinthismaterialarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheNationalScienceFoundation.WearegratefulfortheresearchassistanceofPatrickSchoettmerandJeremyCastle.ThanksalsotoChristtheKingLutheranChurchofSouthBend,Indianafortheuseoftheirfacilities,aswellasToddAdkinsandDanHubertforappearingintheexperiment’snewsstories.
1
TheincreasingpolarizationofAmericanpoliticshasbeenaccompaniedby
increasingsociodemographicdifferencesbetweenpartisanandideologicalcamps
(Mason2016).Asthelinkbetweensociodemographicorientationsandpoliticshas
grown,scholarshavetheorizedthatcausalityrunsinbothdirections.Peoplenot
onlychoosepoliticalsidesbasedontheirsociodemographicprofiles,butalsomay
basesomesocialpreferences—includingtheirfeelingsaboutnon-politicalsocial
groups(IyengarandWestwood2015),wheretheywanttolive(Bishop2009),and
evenwhotheywanttodateormarry(Iyengar,Sood,andLelkes2012)—ontheir
politicalprofiles.
AttheforefrontofsuchspeculationhavebeenAmericans’religiousand
secularorientations.Partycoalitionshavegrownincreasinglydividedalong
religiouslines,withtheGOPbecomingmorereligiousandtheDemocratsgrowing
moresecularandnon-religious(D’Antonio,Tuch,andBaker2013).Scholars
typicallyhaveassumedthatthisexpandingdividehasresultedfromindividuals
choosingapartisansidebasedontheirreligiousandsecularorientations(e.g.
Layman2001).However,recentworksuggeststhatpeoplealsoabandonreligionor
becomemorereligiouslydevoutbasedontheirpartisanandideologicaltendencies
(Patrikios2008;PutnamandCampbell2010).Infact,aleadingexplanationforthe
recentsurgeinthepercentageofAmericansclaimingnoreligiousaffiliationis
politics:liberalsandDemocratsrejectingorganizedreligionastraditionalist
religionbecomesincreasinglyassociatedwithconservatismandtheRepublican
Party(HoutandFischer2002,2014).
2
Here,weprovidethemostthoroughexaminationtodateofthedegreeto
whichsecularandreligiousorientationsareendogenoustopoliticalorientations.In
doingso,wemakethreeadvancesinthestudyofhowpoliticsisrelatedtoreligion
andsecularism.First,weprovideanewwayofconceptualizingandmeasuring
secularism.Werecognizethatsecularismisnotsimplytheabsenceofreligion,but
alsoentails“activesecularism”—anaffirmativesecularidentityandcommitmentto
secularprinciples.Second,mostresearchreliesoncross-sectionaldata,makingit
impossibletoassesscausaldirection.Otherworkhasemployedtwo-wavepanels
thatallowevaluationofcausalclaims,butcannotdistinguish“true”changein
religiousproclivitiesfromchangeduetosurveymeasurementerror.Byemploying
bothanoriginalsurveyexperimentandamulti-wavepanelsurvey,weprovidea
moredefinitivetestofwhethercitizens’politicaltendencieseffectchangeintheir
religiousandseculartendencies.Third,weisolatetheconditionsunderwhich
politicalidentitiesaremostlikelytoaffectreligiousandsecularorientations,thus
providingadirecttestofthecausalmechanismunderpinningthelinksbetween
politicsandbothreligionandsecularism.
Ouranalysisrevealsaclearreciprocalrelationshipbetweenpoliticaland
religious-secularorientationsandshowsthattheimpactofpoliticsisstrongest
whencitizensperceiveaninfusionofreligionintopoliticsgenerally,andthe
RepublicanPartyspecifically.Strikingly,theeffectofpoliticalorientationson
religiousandsecularcharacteristicsisoftenstrongerthanthereverseeffect.This
lendscredencetothe“politicizedreligion”explanationforgrowingsecularism.It
3
alsoofferssupportfortheideathatpoliticalidentitiesandattitudesarethemselves
importantsocialidentities,capableofshapingandchangingothersocialidentities.
ReligiousandSecularOrientationsinAmericanPolitics
Overthelastfortyyears,thereligiousdividebetweentheDemocraticand
Republicanpartieshasexpanded.Religiouspeople,especiallytraditionalists,have
becomemoreRepublicanwhiletheDemocraticcoalitionhasgrownlessreligious
andmoresecular(Layman2001;Green2007;Claassen2015)Importantly,the
masspublicrecognizesthispattern.Campbell,Green,andLayman(2011)report
thatAmericansstronglyassociateevangelicalChristianswiththeGOP,tendtosee
“religiouspeople”asmostlyRepublicans,andview“non-religiouspeople”asmainly
Democrats.
Followingtheconventionalassumptionthatcitizens’religiousorientations
aremoredeep-rootedthantheirpoliticalpreferences,virtuallyallworkonthis
developmentassumesthatreligiousandsecularorientationsarethecausal
mover—peoplechooseorchangetheirpoliticalattitudesbasedontheirreligionor
secularism.
However,afewstudiessuggestthereverse—thatpoliticscanaffectreligion.
HoutandFischer(2002)firstproposedthisreversalastheysoughtanexplanation
forthegrowthofthereligiouslynon-affiliatedpopulation(the“Nones”).Notingthat
theriseoftheNonescoincideswiththeburgeoninginfluenceoftraditionalist
ChristiansinconservativeandRepublicanpolitics,theyarguedthattheriseresulted
primarilyfrompoliticalmoderatesandliberalsrejectingreligiousidentityasa
4
negativereactiontothemixtureofreligionandconservativepolitics.Thisproposed
malleabilityofreligiousidentificationisconsistentwithresearchshowingthat
manyNonesfluctuatebetweenclaimingandnotclaimingareligiousaffiliation(Lim,
MacGregor,andPutnam2010).Otherworkconfirmsthatreligionisendogenousto
politics(HoutandFischer2014;PutnamandCampbell2010)andshowsthat,
besidesDemocratsandliberalsbecomingmoresecular,Republicansand
conservativesaregrowingmorereligious(Patrikios2008).
Whilethesestudiesdemonstratethatpoliticscanaffectreligious
characteristics,theyhavenotdirectlytestedtheproposedcausalmechanism—that
religion’sinjectionintoAmericanpoliticsanditsassociationwiththeRepublican
Partyhaveledcitizenstobasetheirreligiousandsecularorientationsontheir
politicalorientations.Here,wespecifyandtestatheoreticalexplanationforwhy
politicalidentitiesaffectreligious-secularorientations.Becausepolitical
orientationssuchaspartisanship,ideology,andculturalattitudesserveas
importantsocialidentities,theymayshapenotonlypoliticalpreferences,butalso
socialandreligiousperspectives.Thismayproducecognitivedissonanceamong
Democratsandliberalswithareligiousidentity,leadingthemtobecomeNones.It
alsomayspuran“increasingreturns”processinwhichRepublicansand
conservativesgrowmoredeeplyreligiousandDemocratsandliberalsbecomemore
committedtosecularism.
Becausethegrowthofsecularorientationsisanimportantresultofthis
process,itisimportantthatweaccuratelyconceptualizeandmeasuresecularism.
Socialscientistsgenerallytreatsecularismastheabsenceofreligiosity(Hansen
5
2011).1TherecentfocusontheriseoftheNonesisthequintessentialexample,as
Nonesaredefinedaspeoplewithoutareligiousaffiliation.Othermeasuresof
secularismincludedisbeliefinGod,lackofreligiousattendance,andthenon-
salienceofreligion.Becausethisdefinitionencompassesonlytheabsenceofreligion
andnotanactiveembraceofsecularperspectives,wecallit“passivesecularism,”
butwemeasureitastheinverseofatraditionalindexofreligiosity.While
identificationasaNoneisamanifestationofbeingpassivelysecular,asexplained
belowtheliteraturesuggestsadistincttheoreticalexpectationforit.Accordingly,
wetreatbeingaNoneseparatelyfromtheothermeasuresofpassivesecularism.
Wearguethatjustasreligionismulti-dimensional(Kellstedtetal.1996),so
issecularism.Manysecularistsdonotsimplyrejectreligion;theyactivelypromote
secularbeliefs,suchastheefficacyofreasonandscience,andhumanexperienceas
aproperbasisforethicaljudgments.Moreover,tobeactivelyseculardoesnot
precludealsobeingreligiousinsomeway.Thatis,someonecanembraceasecular
perspectivewhilemaintainingareligiousidentityandparticipatinginreligious
activities.2Thisisnotapossibilitywhensecularityisdefinedonlyasnon-religion,
1AnotableexceptionisBeardetal.(2013),whonotethatsecularismismorethan
theabsenceofreligion,althoughtheirarticledoesnotdirectlymeasuresecular
identifyorbelief.
2Inotherwork(Laymanetal.n.d.),wedeveloptheconceptofactivesecularism
morefullyandexamineitsrelationshipwithpassivesecularismandwithpolitical
orientations.Mostpeoplewhoarehighinactivesecularismarealsohighinpassive
6
makingitimportanttodistinguishpassivesecularism,ortheabsenceofreligiosity,
fromactivesecularism,ortheaffirmationofsecularidentityandbeliefs.
ATheoryofPoliticizedReligion
Wearguethatnotonlyarevoters’politicaloutlooksshapedbytheir
religious-secularworldview,buttheirreligious-secularorientationsalsoareshaped
bytheirpoliticalperspectives.Moreover,thereligiousimpactofpoliticalidentityis
notlimitedtoidentificationasaNone,butextendstoothercomponentsofpassive
andactivesecularism.
Ourstartingpointisasocialidentityconceptualizationofpolitical
identification.Ifpartisanshipisadeep-rootedsocialidentity—asalongstanding
perspectiveonpartyidentificationcontends(Campbell1960;Green,Palmquist,and
Schickler2002)—thenitmayshapesocialidentitiesandpreferences.Group
membershipencouragesindividualstoconformtogroupnormsandbehavior
patternsandtodifferentiatethemselvesfromopposinggroups.Sincethepublic
viewstheGOPasthepartyofreligionandtheDemocratsasthepartyofthesecular,
partisanshipmayspurRepublicanstogrowevenmorereligiousandDemocratsto
becomelessreligiousandmoreactivelysecular.
Wemightexpectasimilardynamicwithideologyandattitudesoncultural
issues.Whileideologyisthoughtofasanoverarchingjudgmentabouttheproper
roleofgovernment,ConoverandFeldman(1981)findthatideologicalidentificationsecularism,butnearly10percentofactivesecularistshavehighlevelsofreligiosity.
SeetheSupportingInformationformoredetails.
7
isbasedmoreonaffecttowardideologicalgroupsandthesocialgroupsassociated
withthem.Culturalattitudes,meanwhile,differfrommostpolicyopinions,which
typicallyareweakandunstable(e.g.Converse1964).Notonlyaretheyclosely
connectedtoreligionandsecularism,butattitudesonculturalissuessuchas
abortionandgayrightsaremoreemotionalandentrenchedthanotherissue
positions(ConverseandMarkus1979).Infact,GorenandChapp(forthcoming)
claimthatviewsonculturalissuesare“strongattitudes,”rivalingparty
identificationandreligionaslong-termpredispositionsandexertingacausal
influenceonbothpartisanshipandreligiosity.ThisisconsistentwithKillianand
Wilcox(2008),whoshowedthatabortionattitudescanleadpeopletochangetheir
partyID,aspro-lifeDemocratsandpro-choiceRepublicansswitchparties.Inshort,
ideologicalidentificationandculturalattitudesalsomayrepresentsocialidentities
capableofaffectingcitizens'religiousandsecularproclivities.
Howshouldpolitically-drivenchangeinreligiousandsecularorientations
occur?First,religion’sassociationwiththeGOPshouldcreatecognitivedissonance
(Festinger1957)amongreligiousDemocratsandliberals.Toresolvethe
dissonance,thesecitizensmightchangeeithertheirpoliticaltiesortheirreligious
identity(Margolisforthcoming).Theconventionalexpectationwouldbepolitical
change,shiftingpeopleinaconservative,Republicandirection.Incontrast,Hout
andFischer(2002)arguethatcognitivedissonancecanberesolvedbychanging
one’sreligiousidentity,or,specifically,abandoningreligiousidentity.
Wefurtherexpectthattheeffectofpoliticalidentitiesonreligiousand
secularorientationsisnotlimitedtoashiftinidentity,butextendstomembersof
8
opposingpoliticalcampsgrowingmorepolarizedintheirreligious-secular
proclivities.AstheimageoftheGOPasreligiousandtheDemocraticPartyasnon-
religiousandsecularsharpens,Republicansmayrespondbybecomingevenmore
religiousandDemocratsmaygrowmoreactivelysecular—deepeningthereligious
andsecularimagesofthepartiesandresultinginanincreasingreturnsprocess(e.g.
Pierson2000).More-religiouspeopleshouldbedrawntowardtheRepublican
Partyandmore-secularpeopleshouldbeattractedtotheDemocrats,further
increasingthepressureforRepublicanstobecomemoretraditionallyreligiousand
forDemocratstobemoreactivelysecular.Similarprocessesshouldtakeshapefor
ideologyandculturalattitudes.
Thesedissonanceandincreasingreturnsprocesseshavedevelopedbecause
ofaparticularsetofconditions:anincreasedinjectionofreligionintopoliticsand
especiallyagrowingconnectionbetweenreligiosityandtheGOP.Thus,theimpact
ofpoliticalidentitiesonsecularandreligiousorientationsshouldbestrongestfor
citizenswhoperceivehighlevelsofreligiousinfusioninAmericanpoliticsandseea
closeconnectionbetweenreligioustraditionalistsandtheRepublicanParty.
Thisdiscussionpointstothreehypotheses:
DissonanceHypothesis
TheassociationofreligionwiththeGOPshouldmakeDemocratsandliberals
morelikelytoidentifyasNones.
PolarizationHypothesis
Overtime,politicalidentitiesshouldhaveamutuallyreinforcingrelationship
withpassiveandactivesecularism.More-religiouspeopleshouldgrowmore
9
Republicanandconservativewhilemore-secularpeoplebecomemore
Democraticandliberal.Republicansandconservativesshouldgrowmore
religiouswhileDemocratsandliberalsbecomelessreligiousandmore
secular.
PerceptualHypothesis
Bothdissonanceandpolarizationshouldbemorepronouncedamongvoters
whoperceiveanassociationbetweenreligionandpoliticsingeneraland
betweenreligionandtheRepublicanPartyspecifically.
DataandMeasures
Weemploytwooriginaldatasets.Oneisthe2010-2012SecularAmerica
Study(SAS),afour-wavepanelsurveyconductedonlinebyGfK(formerly
KnowledgeNetworks).Weconductedthefirstwaveofthestudyinthefallof2010,
interviewing2,635respondents;3thesecondwaveinthesummerof2011(1,909
3ToconstructthesamplefortheSASsurvey,4,450panelistswererandomlydrawn
fromtheGfKrespondentpanel.Atotalof2,635panelistsrespondedtothe
invitation,yieldingafinalstagecompletionrateof59.2%.Therecruitmentratefor
thisstudy,reportedbyGfK,was16.3%andtheprofileratewas64.3%,fora
cumulativeresponserateof6.2%.Whileregrettablyverylow,thisrateisconsistent
withotherstudiesusingonlinepanels.TheSASpanelincludedageneralpopulation
sample,anoversampleofindividualswithnoreligiousaffiliation,andanover-
sampleofpeopleaged18to29.Alloftheanalysespresentedhereareweightedto
10
panelrespondents);thethirdwaveinFebruaryandMarch2012,(1,541
respondents);andthefinalwaveinOctoberandNovember2012(1,412
respondents).4Becauseourcoreindicatorsofactivesecularismdidnotappear
untilthesecondwave,ouranalysisdrawsonwaves2-4.Ourseconddatasetisa
surveyexperimentadministeredbyGfKtoanationallyrepresentativesampleof
1,023subjectsinFebruaryof2012.
OurhypothesesrequiremeasuresofidentificationasaNone,otheraspectsof
passivesecularism(i.e.theinverseofreligiosity),andactivesecularism.We
operationalizeNonesasrespondentswhoidentifytheirreligiousaffiliationas
“nothinginparticular.”5Becausewedefinepassivesecularismastheabsenceof
religion,weemploystandardmeasuresofreligiosity:religiousserviceattendance,
accountfortheoversamples,aswellasanydemographicimbalanceinthegeneral
populationsample.
4Panelattritionbetweenwaves1and4is46percent.Becausethisattritionrateis
relativelyhigh,ourresultsshouldbeviewedwithcaution.However,wearegiven
moreconfidencebecausethedemographicprofileofthesampleremainsvirtually
unchangedacrosspanelwaves.TheSupportingInformationincludestheratesof
panelattritionandrespondents’demographicprofileineachpanelwave.
5Respondentswhorefusedtoanswerthereligiousaffiliationquestionineitherthe
pre-orpost-testwerecodedasmissing.Nonesdonotincluderespondentswho
identifiedasatheistoragnosticbecausetheseareincludedinthesecularidentity
measuredescribedbelow.
11
frequencyofprayer,religioussalience,strengthofbeliefinGod,andliteralbeliefin
theBible—allcodedsothathighervaluesreflectlessreligiosity.6
Justasreligiosityincludesreligiousbeliefs,devotion,andidentity,active
secularismencompassessecularbeliefs,secularidentity,andcommitmentto
secularperspectives.Wemeasuresecularbeliefswithabatteryofquestionswe
designedtogaugecommitmenttoasecularworldview.Respondentsindicatedhow
muchtheyagreewithfivestatementsaboutscientificevidenceandhumanreason
astheproperfoundationforexplainingnaturalphenomena,understandinghuman
behavior,anddefiningmoralparameters.Becauseactivesecularismisneitherthe
absenceofreligiositynorantagonismtowardreligion,noneofthestatements
explicitlyreferencereligionsothatsecularismandreligiosityarenotpittedagainst
eachother.
Threeofthestatementsarewordedinadirectionthataffirmssecular
perspectives:
(1) Factualevidencefromthenaturalworldisthesourceoftruebeliefs.
(2) Thegreatworksofphilosophyandsciencearethebestsourceoftruth,wisdom,
andethics.
(3)Tounderstandtheworld,wemustfreeourmindsfromoldtraditionsandbeliefs.
6TheSupportingInformationincludestheexactwordingofallquestionsusedin
thisanalysis.
12
Toguardagainstresponseacquiescence,theothertwostatementsarewordedina
non-seculardirection:
(4) Itishardtoliveagoodlifebasedonreasonandfactsalone.
(5) Valuesaremoreimportantthanfactualevidenceinmakingmoraldecisions.
Tocapturesecularism’ssalience,wecreateda“non-religiousguidance”
questionthatparallelsthestandardquestionaboutreligiousguidance.Itaskshow
muchguidancerespondentsreceivefrom“non-religiousbeliefs,suchasderived
fromscienceorphilosophy.”
Totapintosecularidentity,weaskedrespondentstoselectwhich(ifany)
termsfromalistofreligiousandsecularidentitiesdescribethem.Thetermswere
“ecumenical,mainline,charismatic/Pentecostal,humanist,non-traditionalbeliever,
secular,atheist,fundamentalist,bornagain/evangelical,agnostic,”and“spiritual,
butnotreligious.”Exploratoryfactoranalysesofidentificationwiththeselabelsfind
clearevidencethatthesecular,humanist,atheist,andagnosticlabelsformasingle
dimension.7Wemeasuresecularidentityasthenumberofthesesecularlabels
selected,whichrangesfromzerotothree.8
7SeetheSupportingInformationfortheresults.
8Respondentscouldidentifythemselvesasatheistsoragnosticsbothinthe
religiousorsecularlabelsandinthereligiousaffiliationquestion.Oursecular
identitycountvariableincludesrespondentsidentifyingasatheistoragnosticfor
13
Toseeifactivesecularismandpassivesecularismareindeeddistinct
dimensions,weundertakeaconfirmatoryfactoranalysisoftheirindicatorsinwave
2oftheSASpanel(thefirstwaveinwhichoursecularbeliefsitemsappear).We
showtheresultsinTable1.9
[Table1Here]
Wecomparethefittothedataoftwomodels—onewithalltheactiveand
passivesecularismvariablesloadingonasinglefactor,theotherwithouractive
secularismindicatorsloadingononefactorandourindicatorsofpassivesecularism
loadingonasecondfactor.10Bothmodelscorrectformeasurementerrorinthe
observedindicators.Theytreatnon-religiousguidance,secularidentity,andallof
eitherquestion.Asveryfewrespondentschoseallfoursecularlabels(lessthan10
perwave),wecombinedrespondentschoosingeitherthreeorfoursecularlabels.
9TheSupportingInformationincludestheresultsofanexploratoryfactoranalysis
oftheindicatorsofpassiveandactivesecularism,whichparalleltheresultsinTable
1.
10Allofourconfirmatoryfactorandstructuralequationmodelswereestimated
withMplus7.31,usingfullinformationmaximumlikelihoodestimationwithrobust
standarderrors(“MLR”estimationinMplus)andapplyingsamplingweights.This
producesestimatesforallobservationsinthesample,eventhosewithmissing
valuesonthevariablesinthemodel(unlessanobservationismissingonallofthe
observedendogenousvariables).
14
theindicatorsofpassivesecularismashavingrandommeasurementerror.11
However,followingGreenandCitrin(1994),whonotethatsurveybatteriesthat
includestatementswordedinoppositedirectionsmayproducenon-random
(correlated)measurementerror,weallowthemeasurementerrorsforeachofthe
secularbeliefindicatorstobecorrelatedwitheachother.12
Althoughallofthefactorloadingsarestatisticallysignificant,13theactive
secularismmeasuresloadfarmorestronglyontheirownfactorinthetwo-factor
modelthantheydointhesingle-factormodel.Thissuggeststhattheirunderlying
orientationisdistinctfrompassivesecularism.
11Theconfirmatoryfactormodelsfollowstandardassumptionsformeasurement
models(Bollen1989).Thecovariancesbetweenthemeasurementerrorsandthe
latentvariablesandbetweenthemeasurementerrorsandthestructural
disturbancetermsaresettozero,andthefactorloadingforoneobservedindicator
ofeachlatentvariableissettoone(worshipattendanceandthe“factualevidence”
statement).
12SeetheSupportingInformationforfurtherdetails.FollowingGreenandCitrin
(1994),weconstrainallofthecorrelationsbetweenmeasurementerrorstobe
equal,estimatingasingleerrorcovarianceparameterforallfiveofoursecularbelief
indicators.
13Throughoutthispaper,a“statisticallysignificant”effectorloadingisonefor
whichatwo-tailedtestofsignificancefallsatp=.05orbelow.
15
Thatisconfirmedbythegoodness-of-fitstatisticsforthetwomodels.The
two-factormodelhasasmallervaluethantheone-factormodelofthechi-square
testofoverallmodelfit,asmallervalueoftherootmeansquareerrorof
approximation(RMSEA),andalargervalueofthecomparativefitindex(CFI).An
appropriatetestofwhetherthedifferenceinfitisstatisticallysignificantisthe
differenceinthechi-squarevaluesforthetwomodels—thisdifferenceis
overwhelminglysignificant(p<.0001).14Inshort,activeandpassivesecularism
representseparatedimensionsofsecularorientations.15
AssessingDissonance:TheCandidateReligionExperiment
Wefirsttestthedissonancehypothesiswithasurveyexperiment,conducted
onlineinFebruary2012.Anationallyrepresentativesamplewasadministereda
pre-testtomeasuretheirreligiousidentityandtheirdegreeofpassiveandactive
secularism.Roughlyoneweeklatertheyreadafictionalnewspaperstoryabouta
14Thechi-squarestatisticsforoverallmodelfitthattheMLRestimatorinMplus
producesarescaledtomakethemrobusttonon-normalityandnon-independence
ofobservations.Thismakesitnecessarytoconductthescaleddifferenceinchi-
squaretestsuggestedbySatorraandBentler(1994),asshowninTable1.
15Forourexperimentalanalysis,weconstructthemeasuresofactiveandpassive
secularismthroughfactoranalyseswiththesurveydatainwhichourexperiment
appeared(seetheSupportingInformation).Forourpanelanalysis,themeasures
arecreatedthroughtheconfirmatoryfactormodelsincludedinourstructural
equationmodels.
16
“congressionalraceinanearbystate.”Respondentswererandomlyassignedtoread
aversionofthestorythatvariedtheamountofreligiousrhetoric,endorsements,
andimageryassociatedwiththeDemocraticandRepublicancandidates—ranging
fromnonetomoderatetohighuseofreligion.Withtwocandidatesandthree
possibleconditionseach,therearenineversionsofthestory.16
Whilethecommunity,“Summerville,”andthenewspaper,TheSummerville
Gazette,arefictional,thearticlewasdesignedtolookasrealisticaspossible.Upon
readingthestory,subjectsansweredquestionstoreplicatethepre-test.Thisdesign
enablesacleantestofwhetherexposuretoreligiouspoliticsinthenewsstory
triggersachangeineitheridentityorattitudes.
Thearticlefeaturesanopen-seatcongressionalracebetweenDemocratic
andRepublicancandidateswhoaredemographicallysimilar.Thestoryisnon-
sensational,highlightingthecandidates’backgroundsandpositionsonkeyissues.In
thecontrolcondition,neithercandidatementionsreligion;thetreatmentsadd
religiousreferencestothetextusedinthecontrol.Toreflectthecurrentstateof
religion’sdeploymentinelectoralpolitics,thereligiousreferencesareChristianin
nature.Althoughneithercandidateisidentifiedasbelongingtoaparticularreligious
denomination,thereligiouscueshaveanevangelicalProtestanttinge—consistent
withthereligiousrhetorictypicalincontemporarypolitics.
Eachstorycontainsthreeessentialelementsthatvaryaccordingtothe
treatment’s“dose”ofreligiouspolitics:text,endorsements,andphotos.Table2
displaysthevariationacrosstreatments.
16TheSupportingInformationdisplaysallthetreatments.
17
[Table2Here]
Thearticlesthusprovidemultiplecuesthatoneorbothofthecandidatesare
engagedinreligiouspolitics.Theysimulatereligiousreferencesbycontemporary
politicians,whileholdingconstanteverythingelseaboutthecampaign.Giventhe
frequencyofreligiousreferencesinpolitics,weundoubtedlyarenotexposing
subjectstoreligiouspoliticsforthefirsttime.Rather,thestoriesreflectreligious
cuesthattheyhavelikelyencounteredbefore,bringingthemtothetopofsubjects’
heads.
Ifthedissonancehypothesisiscorrect,thenwhenDemocratsareexposedto
aRepublicancandidatewhoisassociatedwithreligion,theywillbecomemore
likelytoidentifyasNones.LestitseemthatidentificationasaNoneisunlikelyto
changeonthebasisofasinglenewsstory,previousresearchshowsself-
classificationasNonetobeunstable.Overthecourseofpanelsurveys,substantial
percentagesofpeople(aboutone-thirdoveraone-yearpanel,nearlyhalfoverfive
years)switchbackandforthbetweenidentifyingasNoneandclaimingareligious
affiliation(Lim,MacGregor,andPutnam2010;PutnamandCampbell2010).Many
Nonesarethus“liminals”whomayormaynotthinkofthemselvesashavinga
religiousidentitydependingonthecontext.Wedonotexpectthatonenewsstory
onacongressionalcampaignwillmovepeoplefromhighlyreligioustohighly
secular.Rather,inkeepingwithHoutandFischer’sconceptualizationofNonesason
theboundarybetweenreligiousaffiliationandnon-affiliation,itmightnudgesome
liminalsintoself-identificationasaNone.
18
Totestthedissonancehypothesis,weregressidentificationasNoneonaset
ofdichotomousvariablesrepresentingeachtreatment(thecontrolconditionisthe
baseline).SincethemodelcontrolsforidentificationasNoneinthepre-test,a
positivecoefficientreflectsatreatment’seffectontheincreaseintheincidenceof
identifyingasaNone.Becauserandomassignmenttothetreatmentswassuccessful,
nocontrolvariablesarenecessary.17Weuselogisticregression,asthedependent
variableisdichotomous.
ThefirstcolumnofTable3containstheresultsforallrespondents.As
expected,exposuretoareligiousDemocraticcandidateproducesnoeffects.
However,weuncovertheexpectedeffectsfortwotreatmentsinwhichthe
Republicanisheavilyassociatedwithreligion.Weseepositiveandstatistically
significantcoefficientsforthetreatmentswithhighreligionfortheRepublicanand
eithernoreligionoronlymoderatereligionfortheDemocrat.Therearenoeffects
fortheRepublican-moderatetreatments,orwhenbothcandidatesareheavily
associatedwithreligion.Thissuggeststhatdissonancemaybetriggeredonlyby
overtreferencestoreligionbyaRepublicanwhennotcounter-balancedbya
similarlystrongdoseofreligionfromtheDemocrat.
[Table3Here]
17WetestedtherandomizationwithTukey’sHonestlySignificantDifferencetests.
Acrossourtreatments,therearenodifferencesineducation,race(white,black,
Hispanic),gender,orpartyidentification.
19
Whilefindinganeffectinthewholesampleisinformative,thedissonance
hypothesiscentersoneffectsforDemocrats.Accordingly,thesecondandthird
columnsofthetabledisplaytheresultsforDemocratsandRepublicans.18
AmongDemocratsthereisalargeandsignificanteffectforexposuretothe
combinationofthehigh-religionRepublicanandtheno-religionDemocrat,anda
similarlysizedeffectforthehigh-religionRepublicanandthemoderate-religion
Democrat,althoughthelatterfailstoachieveconventionalsignificance(p=0.15).
DemocratsappeartoexperiencedissonancewhentheRepublican’sassociationwith
religionisnotoffsetbyreligiousreferencesontheDemocraticside.19Asexpected,
therearenoeffectsamongRepublicans.Whenthelogitcoefficientsareconvertedto
probabilities,wefindthatforthepopulationasawhole,thereisa.057increasein
theprobabilityofidentifyingasNone,whileforDemocratsonlyitisnearlytwiceas
large—ajumpof.106.Inbothcases,the95percentconfidenceintervaldoesnot
crosszero.20
Movementinreligiousself-identificationmerelyfromexposuretoasingle
newspaperstorynotonlysupportsthedissonancehypothesisbutconfirmsthat
18RepublicansandDemocratsincludeindependentswholeantowardonepartyor
theother.
19BecauseofthesmallcellsizesforIndependents(meanof19casespercell),we
onlypresenttheresultsintheSupportingInformation.
20ConfidenceintervalsareestimatedwiththemargincommandinStata.Seethe
SupportingInformationforafiguredisplayingtheexperimentalresults.
20
religiousaffiliationismoremalleablethantypicallyrecognized.Providinga
concentrateddoseofthesortofstimuliexperiencedbyvotersastheyobservethe
politicalprocessapparentlyhastriggeredthedissonancethatleadsDemocratsto
disclaimareligiousaffiliation.21
ReciprocalEffectsofSecularandPoliticalOrientationsintheSASPanel
Dopoliticalorientationsproducechangesinreligious-secularorientations—
orviceversa—inthe“realworld,”outsideofanexperimentalsetting?Toassessthis,
weturntotheSASpanel,firstasasecondtestofthedissonancehypothesis,and
thentotestthepolarizationandperceptualhypotheses.
Weuseasimilarmodeltotestallthreehypotheses.Thepoliticalvariablesin
themodelsarepartyidentification(aseven-pointscalerangingfromstrong
RepublicantostrongDemocrat),ideologicalidentification(aslidingscaleranging
from“extremelyconservative”to“extremelyliberal”),andculturalissueattitudes.
Ourmeasureofculturalattitudescombinesviewsonabortion(afour-pointscale
rangingfrom“neverallow”to“alwaysallow”)andviewsonhowthelawshould
definemarriage(aslidingscalerangingfrom“onlyasaunionbetweenonemanand
onewoman”to“asaunionbetweentwopeopleregardlessoftheirgender”).
21Giventhatthepolarizationhypothesisinvolveschangeinpassiveandactive
secularism,whichshouldbemoredeep-seatedorientationsthanself-identification
asNone,wewouldnotexpecttheexperimentaltreatmenttohaveaneffecton
either.Itdoesnot.SeetheSupportingInformationfordetails.
21
Weevaluatethereciprocalrelationshipbetweenpoliticalorientationsand
secularorientationsbyusingwaves2-4ofourSASpaneltoestimatestructural
equationmodelsofthefollowingform:
(1)SecularOrientationit=α1+λ1SecularOrientationi,t-1+β1PoliticalOrientationi,t-1+ε1,it
(2)PoliticalOrientationit=α2+λ2PoliticalOrientationi,t-1+β2SecularOrientationi,t-1+ε2,it
Thismodeltests“cross-lagged”effectsbetweenaparticularpoliticalorientationand
oneofoursecularorientations,withbothvariablesbeingshapedbytheirownpast
valuesandthepastvalueoftheothervariable.Theλparametersconnectingeach
factorattimettoitsownvalueattimet-1capturetheexpectedindividual-level
stabilityinsecularandpoliticalorientationsovertime.Theparameterβ1linking
politicaltendencyatt-1tosecularorientationattcapturesthepotentialinfluenceof
previouslyheldpoliticalperspectivesoncurrentsecularorientation.Because
equation(1)alreadycontrolsfortheeffectofpreviousseculardisposition,β1
measurestheimpactofpoliticalorientationonchangeinsecularorientationsfrom
t-1tot.Similarly,theparameterβ2inequation(2)capturestheinfluenceofsecular
orientationonchangeinpoliticalperspectives.
Toensurethatanyimpactofpoliticalorientationsandsecularorientations
oneachotherrepresenteffectsonactualchange,wecorrectformeasurementerror
intheobservedindicatorsofpoliticalandsecularorientations.Ourmodelscombine
thestructuralmodelofcross-laggedeffectswithameasurementmodel(i.e.a
confirmatoryfactormodel)inwhichobservedindicatorsarestructuredbyboth
22
latent“true”variables(e.g.activesecularism)andmeasurementerrors.Forthe
measurementmodelstobeidentified,weneedeithermultipleindicatorsofthe
latentvariableorthreeormorewavesofpaneldata(Bollen1989).Foractive
secularism,passivesecularism,andculturalissueattitudes,wehaveboththree
wavesandmultipleobservedindicators.Thethreewavesofdataalsoallowusto
correctformeasurementerrorinpartisanship,ideologicalidentification,and
identificationasNoneevenwithonlyoneobservedindicatorofeachvariable.
Inadditiontothestandardmeasurementmodelconstraints(seefootnote
11),thesesingle-indicatormeasurementmodelsrequireadditionalrestrictionsfor
identification(WileyandWiley1970).Weassumethatthemeasurementerrorsof
theobservedindicatorsareuncorrelatedacrosspanelwavesandthattheeffectsof
latentvariablesonthesingleobservedindicatorareequaltoone.Forthemultiple-
indicatorlatentvariables,weallowthemeasurementerrorstobecorrelatedacross
panelwavesandestimateallfactorloadingsexceptoneperlatentvariable.
Wealsoplaceconstraintsonsomeofthestructuralparameters.Weallow
severalsociodemographiccontrolvariables—education,income,sex,age,race(a
dummyvariableforWhites),region(adummyvariableforresidentsoftheSouth),
andreligiousaffiliation(dummyvariablesformembersofthethreelargestreligious
traditions:evangelicalProtestants,mainlineProtestants,andCatholics)—toaffect
latentsecularandpoliticalorientationsinwaves3and4.22Becausethereisno
22Wecategorizerespondents’religiousaffiliationsintoreligioustraditionsbasedon
themethoddescribedinGreen(2007).Wedonotincludethesereligiousdummies
23
theoreticalreasontoexpectsociodemographiceffectstovaryacrosspanelwaves,
weconstrainthemtobeequalacrossthetwowaves.
Wefurtherconstrainthecross-laggedeffectsbetweenpoliticalorientations
andsecularorientationsandthelaggedeffectsofeachvariableonitselftobeequal
acrosspanelwaves.If,asourmodelassumes,therelationshipbetweenvariablesis
continuousovertime,then,withrelativelyequalspacingbetweenpanelwaves,the
cross-laggedandlaggedeffectsshouldbeequalacrosswaves(Finkel1995).
Table4displaystheestimatesofallthestructuralparametersinour
models.23Notsurprisingly,whenwecorrectformeasurementerror,eachsecular
andpoliticalorientationishighlystableovertime;stabilitycoefficientsallare.86or
greater.
[Table4Here]
Despitethisimpressivestability,laggedpoliticalorientationshave
statisticallysignificanteffectsonchangeinallthreesecularorientations.First,as
confirmationofthedissonancehypothesis,strongeridentificationwiththe
DemocraticPartyandmore-liberalculturalattitudesarebothrelatedtoan
increasedlikelihoodofidentificationasNone.Liberalideologyhasasimilar,though
inthemodelofidentificationasNones.Allsociodemographicvariablesare
measuredinwave2ofthepanel.
23TheSupportingInformationincludesallmodelestimates,includingthe
confirmatoryfactorloadingsandeffectsofsociodemographicvariables,forthe
modelsshowninTables4and5.
24
notquitesignificant,effect.However,identificationasNonehasnoeffectonchange
overtimeinanyofourpoliticaldimensions.Thus,beingaNoneseemstobe
endogenoustopolitics,butnotamoverofpoliticalproclivities.
Next,wefindclearsupportforthepolarizationhypothesis.Democratic
partisanship,liberalideology,andliberalculturalattitudesallspurincreasesover
timeinpassiveandactivesecularism.UnlikeidentificationasaNone,passiveand
activesecularismsometimesreciprocateandspurincreasesinDemocratic
partisanshipandpoliticalliberalism.Passivesecularismcausesincreasesinliberal
ideologyandliberalculturalattitudes.Activesecularismhasaclearlysignificant
effectonculturalattitudesandeffectsonpartisanshipandideologythatapproach
statisticalsignificance.Whataboutthemagnitudeofourcross-laggedeffects?
Becausetheobservedindicatorsofpoliticalandsecularcharacteristicsarecodedto
rangefromzerotoone,theunstandardizedcoefficientsrepresenttheimpactofan
increaseinoneorientationfromitstheoreticalminimumtoitstheoreticalmaximum
onchangeintheotherorientationonthesamezero-to-onescale.Forexample,
movingfromstrongRepublicantostrongDemocratinpartyidentificationproduces
increasesof.02inbothpassivesecularismandactivesecularism.Inmore
substantiveterms,.02representsaboutone-sixthofthedistancebetween
categoriesonazero-to-onescaleofworshipattendance—e.g.,betweenattending
twoorthreetimesamonthversusonlyonceamonth.So,itwouldtakeaboutsix
panelwavesorapproximatelyfourandone-halfyears(giventheroughlynine-
monthaveragegapbetweenourpanelwaves)fortheaveragestrongDemocratto
25
becomeonecategorylesslikelythantheaveragestrongRepublicantoattend
worshipservices.
Takinganotherexample,movingfromthelowestlevelofpassivesecularism
tothehighestlevelisassociatedwithanincreaseof.024inliberalidentification,
whilethesamechangeinactivesecularismisassociatedwithanincreaseof.038in
liberalism.Substantively,thatmeansthatitwouldtakeaboutfourpanelwaves(or
approximatelythreeyears)forthemostpassivelysecularrespondenttomoveone-
tenthoftheideologyscaleinamoreliberaldirectionthantheleastpassivelysecular
respondent.Meanwhile,itwouldtakejustunderthreepanelwaves(orabitmore
thantwoyears)forthemostactivelysecularrespondenttogrowmoreliberalthan
theleastactivelysecularrespondentbyone-tenthoftheideologyscale.
Theseeffectsareadmittedlymodest.However,withcorrectionsfor
measurementerrorandashortperiodbetweeneachpanelwave,wewouldnot
expectthemtobelarge.Overaperiodofyears,thecumulativechangesinpolitical
orientationsbasedonsecularismandinsecularismbasedonpoliticscouldbe
sizeable.24
Asafinalstep,weevaluatetheperceptualhypothesisthatbothdissonance
andpolarizationapplyprimarilytopeoplewhoperceivethatreligionhasinfused
Americanpolitics,particularlytheRepublicanParty.Ourtestemploystwoquestions
thatappearedinwave1oftheSASpanel.Onequestionasked“Ingeneral,how24IntheSupportingInformation,wealsocomparetheestimatedchangeinone
latentvariablewhenwemovetheotherlatentvariableacrosswhatMplusestimates
asitsfullempiricalrange.
26
muchtalkaboutreligionisthereinpoliticstoday?,”withthreeresponseoptions:“a
lot,”“alittle,”and“notalkaboutreligionatall.”Theotheraskedrespondentsto
assessthepartisantiesof“evangelicalChristians,”promptingthemtosaywhether
evangelicalsare“mainlyDemocrats,mainlyRepublicans,oraprettyevenmixof
both.”
Next,weestimatedourmodelsofcross-laggedeffectsbetweenparty
identificationandsecularorientationssimultaneouslyforthethreegroupsdefined
byeachofthesequestions,butallowingthestructuralparameterstovaryacrossthe
groups.25Weexpecttheeffectofpartisanshiponchangeinsecularismtobe
strongestforpeoplewhoseeevangelicalsas“mainlyRepublicans”andwhoperceive
alotoftalkaboutreligioninpolitics.26
25Thefactorloadingsforourlatentvariablesandtheeffectsofdemographic
variablesonthelatentvariablesareheldequalacrossthegroups.Onlythe
stabilitiesofsecularandpoliticalorientationsandthecross-laggedeffectsare
allowedtovaryacrossgroups.SeetheSupportingInformationforthefullsetof
estimates.
26Wefocusonlyonpartyidentificationbecauseitisthecentralvariableinour
hypothesesandtheevangelicalpartisanshipvariablepertainsspecificallytoparty
ties.
27
Table5presentsthestabilitiesandcross-laggedeffectsseparatelyforeach
dimensionofsecularismandforeachcategoryofourtwoconditionalvariables.27
Theresultssupporttheperceptualhypothesis.Theimpactofpartyidentificationon
changeinidentificationasaNone,passivesecularism,oractivesecularismisnever
statisticallysignificantunlessindividualsbelievethatevangelicalChristiansare
“mainlyRepublicans”orperceive“alot”oftalkaboutreligioninpolitics.However,
amongindividualswhoseeevangelicalsasprimarilyRepublicanandperceivealot
ofreligioustalkinthepoliticalenvironment,theeffectsofpartisanshiponsecular
changearenearlyalwaysstatisticallysignificant.28WhenAmericansperceivea
closeconnectionbetweenreligionandpoliticsandrecognizeclosetiesbetween
traditionalistreligionandtheGOP,DemocraticPartyidentificationspursincreases
insecularism.29
27FortheanalysisinwhichthedependentvariableisidentificationasNoneandthe
conditionalvariableisperceivedevangelicalpartisanship,ourlatentvariablemodel
producesanon-positivedefinitematrix.So,weestimatedthemodelwithobserved
partisanshipandobservedidentificationasNone.Allotheranalysesinthetable
involvelatentvariables,accountingformeasurementerror.
28TheonlyexceptioniswhenthedependentvariableisidentificationasNoneand
respondentsperceivealotoftalkaboutreligioninpolitics.
29Toassesswhetherthedifferencesineffectsacrossperceptionsofevangelical
partisanshipandreligioustalkinpoliticsarestatisticallysignificant,wecomputed
Satorra-Bentlerscaledtestsofthedifferenceinchi-squarebetweenthemodelsin
28
[Table5Here]
Conclusion
OuranalysisofreligionandsecularisminAmericanpoliticsoffersempirical,
theoretical,andsubstantiveinnovations.Empirically,wedifferentiatebetweenthe
absenceofreligionandactivesecularismbyintroducinganindexofactive
secularism,ortheaffirmativeembraceofasecularidentityandworldview.We
assessthemeasurementpropertiesofactivesecularisminotherwork(Laymanet
al.n.d.),whereweestimatethatjustunderninepercentofAmericansareactive
secularists(whilenearlyaquarterarepassivesecularists).30Here,wedemonstrate
itsimportanceforcontemporarypolitics.
Theoretically,ourfindingthatpoliticalorientationscanshapereligiousand
secularorientationshasbroaderimplications.InanincreasinglypolarizedAmerica,
politicalidentitiesstructureawiderangeofnon-politicalsocialchoices.
thetableandmodelsthatconstrainthestabilitiesandcross-laggedeffectstobe
equalacrossgroups.Thoughmostofthetestsdonotreachstandardlevelsof
statisticalsignificance,theygenerallysuggestthattheformersetofmodelsfitthe
databetterthanthelatter.Whentheconditionalvariableisperceivedevangelical
partisanship,thevalueofthescaleddifferenceinchi-squareis9.74(p=.28)for
identificationasnone,5.94(p=.65)forpassivesecularism,and12.53(p=.13)for
activesecularism.Whentheconditionalvariableisperceivedlevelofreligioustalk
inpolitics,thevalueis12.95(p=.11)foridentificationasnone,12.20(p=.14)for
passivesecularism,and19.87(p=.01)foractivesecularism.
30Part1oftheSupportingInformationhasmoredetails.
29
Substantively,whilepastresearchinfersthattheintertwiningofreligionand
theGOPhastriggeredreligiousnon-affiliationamongDemocrats,weexplicitlytest
thecausalmechanismleadingtothiseffect.Intheexperimentalandpaneldata,the
closeassociationofreligionandtheRepublicanPartycreatescognitivedissonance
amongDemocrats.ManyDemocratsresolvethedissonancebybecomingNones.
Further,theminglingofreligionandpartisanpoliticsleadstopolarization,as
RepublicansandconservativesgrowincreasinglyreligiousandDemocratsand
liberalsbecomemorepassivelyandactivelysecular.Importantly,theseprocesses
takeshapeonlywhenvotersperceivethemixtureofreligionandpolitics,
particularlyintheGOP—thecausalmechanismproposed,buttodateuntested,in
theliterature.
Itisstrikingthatpoliticalorientationsstructureallthreeformsof
secularism:identificationasaNone,passivesecularismandactivesecularism.The
reciprocalrelationshipbetweensecularism,measuredindifferentways,and
politicalorientations,alsomeasuredindifferentways,affirmsthatthisisan
importantbutlargelyunrecognizedcleavageinAmericanpolitics.Itisparticularly
significantthatactivesecularismplaysaroleoftenattributedtoreligiosity—the
effectsizessuggestithasastrongereffectonpoliticalorientationsthantheyhave
onit.Thus,peoplewithanactivelysecularworldviewareincreasinglyfoundamong
Democraticidentifiers,ideologicalliberals,andthosewithleft-leaningcultural
attitudes.Otherresearchdemonstratesthatactivelysecularpeopleareoftenhighly
engagedinpoliticalactivityandthatmanyDemocraticPartyactivistsholdactively
secularviews(LaymanandWeaver2016).
30
Thishistoricalmomentthusresemblestheemergenceofcultural
conservatives—ledbyevangelicalProtestants—asapoliticalforceinthe1970sand
1980s(Layman2001;WilcoxandRobinson2010).Whilesecularistsmayormay
notcreatethesamesortoforganizationalinfrastructureastheChristianRight,itis
likelythattheywillincreasinglymaketheirvoicesheardinthepoliticalarena.Given
theongoingpoliticizationofreligion—andsecularism—weanticipatea
continuationofculturalconflictinAmericanpolitics.
31
Bibliography
Beard,T.Randolphetal.2013.“Secularism,Religion,andPoliticalChoiceintheUnitedStates.”PoliticsandReligion6(4):753–77.
Bishop,Bill.2009.TheBigSort:WhytheClusteringofLike-MindedAmericaIsTearingUsApart.1stMarinerBooksed.Boston:MarinerBooks.
Bollen,KennethA.1989.StructuralEquationswithLatentVariables.NewYork,NY:Wiley.
Campbell,DavidE.,JohnC.Green,andGeoffreyC.Layman.2011.“ThePartyFaithful:PartisanImage,CandidateReligion,andtheElectoralImpactofPartyIdentification.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience55(1):42–58.
Conover,PamelaJohnston,andStanleyFeldman.1981.“TheOriginsandMeaningofLiberal/ConservativeSelf-Identifications.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience25(4):617–45.
Converse,PhilipE.1964.“TheNatureofBeliefSystemsinMassPublics.”InIdeologyandDiscontent,ed.DavidApter.NewYork:FreePress,206–61.
Converse,PhilipE.,andGregoryB.Markus.1979.“PlusÇaChange…:TheNewCPSElectionStudyPanel.”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview73(1):32–49.
D’Antonio,WilliamV,StevenA.Tuch,andJosiahR.Baker.2013.Religion,Politics,andPolarization:HowReligiopoliticalConflictIsChangingCongressandAmericanDemocracy.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.
Festinger,Leon.1957.ATheoryofCognitiveDissonance.Evanston,IL:Row,Peterson.
Finkel,StevenE.1995.CausalAnalysiswithPanelData.ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications.
Goren,Paul,andChristopherChapp.forthcoming.“MoralPower:HowPublicOpiniononCultureWarIssuesShapesPartisanPredispositionsandReligiousOrientations.”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview.
Green,JohnC.2007.TheFaithFactor:HowReligionInfluencesAmericanElections.Westport,CT:GreenwoodPublishingGroup.
Hansen,SusanB.2011.ReligionandReaction:TheSecularPoliticalChallengetotheReligiousRight.Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield.
Hout,Michael,andClaudeS.Fischer.2002.“WhyMoreAmericansHaveNoReligiousPreference:PoliticsandGenerations.”AmericanSociologicalReview67(2):165–90.
32
———.2014.“ExplainingWhyMoreAmericansHaveNoReligiousPreference:PoliticalBacklashandGenerationalSuccession,1987-2012.”SociologicalScience1(October):423–47.
Iyengar,Shanto,GauravSood,andYphtachLelkes.2012.“Affect,NotIdeology:ASocialIdentityPerspectiveonPolarization.”PublicOpinionQuarterly76(3):405–31.
Iyengar,Shanto,andSeanJ.Westwood.2015.“FearandLoathingacrossPartyLines:NewEvidenceonGroupPolarization.”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience59(3):690–707.
Kellstedt,LymanA.,JohnC.Green,JamesL.Guth,andCorwinE.Smidt.1996.“GraspingtheEssentials:TheSocialEmbodimentofReligionandPoliticalBehavior.”InReligionandtheCultureWars,Lanham,MD:Rowman&Littlefield,174–92.
Killan,Mitchell,andClydeWilcox.2008.“DoAbortionAttitudesLeadtoPartySwitching?”PoliticalResearchQuarterly61(4):561–73.
Kline,RexB.2015.PrinciplesandPracticeofStructuralEquationModeling.Fourthedition.NewYork,NY:TheGuilfordPress.
Layman,GeoffreyC.2001.TheGreatDivide:ReligiousandCulturalConflictinAmericanPartyPolitics.NewYork,NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
Layman,GeoffreyC.,DavidE.Campbell,JohnC.Green,andNathanaelSumaktoyo.n.d.“ActiveSecularismandthePoliticsofIrreligionintheUnitedStates.”
Layman,GeoffreyC.,andChristopherWeaver.2016.“ReligionandSecularismamongAmericanPartyActivists.”PoliticsandReligion9(2):271–95.
Leege,DavidC.,KennethD.Wald,BrianS.Krueger,andPaulD.Mueller.2002.ThePoliticsofCulturalDifferences:SocialChangeandVoterMobilizationStrategiesinthePost-NewDealPeriod.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Lim,Chaeyoon,CarolAnnMacGregor,andRobertD.Putnam.2010a.“SecularandLiminal:DiscoveringHeterogeneityAmongReligiousNones.”JournalfortheScientificStudyofReligion49(4):596–618.
———.2010b.“SecularandLiminal:DiscoveringHeterogeneityAmongReligiousNones.”JournalfortheScientificStudyofReligion49(4):596–618.
Margolis,Michele.forthcoming.“CognitiveDissonance,Elections,andReligion:HowPartisanshipandthePoliticalLandscapeShapeReligiousBehaviors.”PublicOpinionQuarterly.
33
Mason,Lilliana.2016.“ACross-CuttingCalm:HowSocialSortingDrivesAffectivePolarization.”PublicOpinionQuarterly80(S1):351–77.
Patrikios,Stratos.2008.“AmericanRepublicanReligion?”PoliticalBehavior30(3):367–89.
Pierson,Paul.2000.“IncreasingReturns,PathDependence,andtheStudyofPolitics.”TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview94(2):251–67.
Putnam,RobertD.,andDavidE.Campbell.2010.AmericanGrace:HowReligionDividesandUnitesUs.NewYork,NY:SimonandSchuster.
Satorra,Albert,andPeterM.Bentler.1994.“CorrectionstoTestStatisticsandStandardErrorsinCovarianceStructureAnalysis.”InLatentVariablesAnalysis:ApplicationstoDevelopmentalResearch,ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications,399–419.
Wilcox,Clyde,andCarinRobinson.2010.OnwardChristianSoldiers?:TheReligiousRightinAmericanPolitics.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress.
Wiley,DavidE.,andJamesA.Wiley.1970.“TheEstimationofMeasurementErrorinPanelData.”AmericanSociologicalReview35(1):112–17.
34
Table1:ConfirmatoryFactorAnalysesofPassiveandActiveSecularism
Two-FactorModel
One-FactorModel PassiveFactor ActiveFactor
Indicators Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error Coefficient Std.Error
PassiveSecularismReligiousattendanceReligiousguidanceFrequencyofprayerBeliefinGodViewoftheBible
1.001.301.15.92.85
—.04.05.05.04
1.001.301.15.89.83
—.04.05.05.04
_______________
_______________
ActiveSecularismFactualevidencesourceoftruebeliefsGreatworksbestsourceoftruthHardtolivebasedonreasonaloneFreemindsfromoldtraditions/beliefsValuesmoreimportantthanevidenceNon-religiousguidanceSecularidentity
.35.55-.34.42-.29.27.32
.03.03.04.03.03.04.03
_____________________
_____________________
1.001.39-.94.99-.84.84.75
—.11.10.09.09.10.08
Correlationbetweenlatentfactors ___ ___ .74
GoodnessofFitχ2(df)χ2scalingcorrectionfactorCFIRMSEA
476.25(53)
2.32.86.06
336.32(52)
2.29.90.05
Satorra-Bentlerdifferenceinχ2(df) ___ 86.94(1)
N=1,909
Note:Coefficientsareunstandardizedmaximumlikelihoodcoefficients.
35
Table2.VariationsintheExperimentalTreatments
NoReligion ModerateReligion HighReligion PersonalStatement
Republican
Mydeeprootsintheareawillhelpmerepresentthevaluesofthiscommunity.
Mydeeprootsintheareaandmyreligiousfaithwillhelpmerepresentthevaluesofthiscommunity.
MydeeprootsintheareaandmycommitmenttoChristwillhelpmerepresentthevaluesofthiscommunity.
Democrat
BeingalifelongresidentofMartinCountywillhelpmetodorightbythepeopleofthisdistrict.
BeingalifelongresidentofMartinCountyandamanofreligiousfaithwillhelpmetodorightbythepeopleofthisdistrict.
BeingalifelongresidentofMartinCountyandadevotedChristianwillhelpmetodorightbythepeopleofthisdistrict.
Issues Republican Americansareafreepeople.Government
muststopover-spendingandthreateningthatfreedom.Societyhashistoricallysaidthatmarriageisbetweenonemanandonewoman.Tochangethatdefinitionputstheinstitutionofmarriageatrisk.
--sameasnoreligion ThemoreIprayandreadtheBible,themoreIknowthatGodhasmadeAmericansafreeandfaithfulpeople.Governmentmuststopover-spendingandthreateningthatfreedom.Godsaysmarriageshouldbebetweenonemanandonewoman.Tochangethatdefinitionputstheinstitutionofmarriageatrisk.
Democrat Governmentmustcontinuetoprovidecrucialhelpforthedisadvantaged.Weshouldalwayshelpthoseinneed.WeneedtostopdiscriminatingagainstgayandlesbianAmericansandgivethemtherighttomarrythepersontheylove.
--sameasnoreligion Governmentmustcontinuetoprovidecrucialhelpforthedisadvantaged.TheBiblesaysthatweshouldalwayshelpthoseinneed.WeareallGod’schildren.WeneedtostopdiscriminatingagainstgayandlesbianAmericansandgivethemtherighttomarrythepersontheylove.
36
Endorsements
Republican MartinCountyChamberofCommerce
SummervilleIndependentBusinessAssociationCentralStateTaxpayersAssociationMartinCountyRealtorsAssociation
MartinCountyChamberofCommerceSummervilleIndependentBusinessAssociationChristiansfortheTraditionalFamilyMartinCountyRealtorsAssociation
ChristianFreedomCouncilSummervilleIndependentBusinessAssociationChristiansfortheTraditionalFamilyMartinCountyRealtorsAssociation
Democrat CentralStateTeachersAssociationSummervilleFirefightersAssociationMartinCountySanitationWorkersMartinCountyHopeFoundation
CentralStateTeachersAssociationSummervilleFirefightersAssociationChristiansfortheCommonGoodMartinCountyHopeFoundation
FaithAllianceforEqualitySummervilleFirefightersAssociationChristiansfortheCommonGoodMartinCountyHopeFoundation
Memberships
Republican MartinCountyDevelopmentAssociation
SummervilleRotaryClubUnitedWaySummervilleJaycees
MartinCountyDevelopmentAssociationOakStreetChristianFellowshipSummervilleRotaryClubUnitedWay�
OakStreetChristianFellowshipBrothersoftheCrossChristianCommunitySummervilleRotaryClubUnitedWay�
Democrat SummervilleEducationFoundationSummervilleKiwanisClubMarchofDimesCentralStateAchievementSociety
SummervilleEducationFoundationEastSideChristianChurchSummervilleKiwanisClubMarchofDimes
EastSideChristianChurchChristianMeninMissionSummervilleKiwanisClubMarchofDimes
37
Photos Republican
Democrat
38
Table3.ExperimentalResults:IdentifyingasaNone(Logisticregression)
DegreeofReligioninTreatment All Democrats Republicans
Democrat Republican
None High 1.49(.57) 1.88(.82) 1.01(1.03)
Moderate High 1.35(.56) 1.20(.83) .65(1.08)
High High .30(.62) -.41(.94) --
None Moderate -.19(.71) -.11(.99) --
Moderate Moderate .66(.59) .31(.89) .98(1.02)
High Moderate .24(.60) -.64(.96) .73(1.15)
Moderate None .65(.59) .39(.90) -.04(1.15)
High None .52(.63) .10(1.04) 1.07(1.03) NoReligiousAffiliation(Pre-Test) 4.44(.31) 4.89(.50) 4.12(.62)
Constant -3.89(.45) -3.61(.65) -4.17(.86)
N 965 414 311
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
PseudoR2 .43 .51 .33
Note:Entriesarelogisticregressioncoefficients.Standarderrorsareinparentheses.
39
Table4:StructuralEquationModelsofCross-LaggedEffectsbetweenPoliticalOrientationsandSecularOrientations
PoliticalOrientations
SecularOrientationsandModel PartyIdentification IdeologicalIdentification CulturalAttitudes
IdentificationasNone
StabilitiesPoliticalt→Politicalt+1Nonet→Nonet+1
.98(.02).90(.10)
1.00(.04).89(.10)
.95(.02).88(.03)
Cross-LaggedEffectsNonet→Politicalt+1Politicalt→Nonet+1
-.008(.01).032(.016)
.004(.013).047(.031)
.009(.009).071(.034)
GoodnessofFitχ2(df)CFI/RMSEA
188.09(30).94/.067
90.85(30).95/.042
1140.93(69).65/.115
PassiveSecularism
StabilitiesPoliticalt→Politicalt+1Passivet→Passivet+1
.98(.02).98(.01)
.96(.04).97(.02)
.92(.03).96(.01)
Cross-LaggedEffectsPassivet→Politicalt+1Politicalt→Passivet+1
.009(.017).021(.007)
.049(.024).024(.012)
.049(.021).037(.015)
GoodnessofFitχ2(df)CFI/RMSEA
845.06(269).94/.043
763.54(269).94/.040
1221.45(347).92/.046
ActiveSecularism
StabilitiesPoliticalt→Politicalt+1Activet→Activet+1
.97(.02).93(.03)
.95(.05).91(.03)
.93(.02).86(.04)
Cross-LaggedEffectsActivet→Politicalt+1Politicalt→Activet+1
.058(.037).021(.008)
.084(.051).038(.016)
.099(.038).081(.016)
GoodnessofFitχ2(df)CFI/RMSEA
1049.58(437).902/.035
1028.30(437).880/.034
1293.82(533).892/.035
Note:Entriesareunstandardizedmaximumlikelihoodcoefficients.Robuststandarderrorsareinparentheses.Allmodelscontrolforeducation,income,sex,age,race,region,andreligiousaffiliation.Thenumberofobservationsisbetween1,166and1,170forallmodels.
40
Table5:Cross-LaggedEffectsbetweenPartyIdentificationandSecularOrientationbyPerceptionsofEvangelicalPartisanshipandoftheAmountofReligiousTalkinPolitics
PerceivedEvangelicalPartisanship HowMuchTalkaboutReligioninPolitics?
Mainly
Democrats(N=80)
EvenMixofBoth
(N=389)
MainlyRepublicans(N=657)
NoneatAll(N=143)
ALittle(N=576)
ALot
(N=420)
PassiveSecularism
StabilitiesPartyIDt→PartyIDt+1Passivet→Passivet+1
.95(.06).98(.03)
.98(.03).97(.01)
.98(.01).99(.01)
1.04(.03).98(.02)
.98(.02).98(.01)
.96(.02).98(.02)
Cross-LaggedEffectsPassivet→PartyIDt+1PartyIDt→Passivet+1
-.05(.05).02(.03)
-.01(.03).01(.01)
.01(.01).02(.009)
.03(.04).01(.02)
.01(.02).01(.007)
.03(.02).03(.01)
ActiveSecularism
StabilitiesPartyIDt→PartyIDt+1Activet→Activet+1
.96(.05).95(.07)
.97(.03).99(.08)
.98(.02).92(.03)
1.03(.03).86(.09)
.97(.02).92(.05)
.95(.02).90(.04)
Cross-LaggedEffectsActivet→PartyIDt+1PartyIDt→Activet+1
-.04(.08)-.001(.02)
.18(.09)-.001(.01)
.03(.03).04(.01)
.17(.11)-.02(.02)
.11(.06).01(.01)
.05(.03).05(.02)
IdentificationasNone
StabilitiesPartyIDt→PartyIDt+1Nonet→Nonet+1
.89(.06).55(.08)
.90(.02).53(.07)
.95(.01).58(.05)
1.04(.03).99(.15)
.98(.02).82(.12)
.96(.02).95(.09)
Cross-LaggedEffectsNonet→PartyIDt+1PartyIDt→Nonet+1
-.06(.04)-.001(.05)
-.01(.02).03(.03)
-.002(.01).08(.03)
-.02(.02).03(.03)
-.004(.01).03(.02)
-.01(.01).03(.02)
Note:Entriesareunstandardizedmaximumlikelihoodcoefficients.Robuststandarderrorsareinparentheses.Allmodelscontrolforeducation,income,sex,age,race,region,andreligiousaffiliation.