AREVA TA

Removal of VVR SNF from Gremikha: nuclear safety and technological approaches, feedback for Andreeva bay and other sites

Lucien Pillette-CousinIAEA CEG Workshop, The Hague, The Netherlands24-25 February 2010

RRC KI

AREVA TA

Contents

Spent VVR Fuel at Gremikha

Main Nuclear Safety and Technological Approaches

Technological solutions implemented at Gremikha for Evacuation of ‘damaged’ VVR SNF

Conclusions - Feedback for evacuation of SNF from Andreeva Bay

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

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1. Spent VVR fuel at Gremikha

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Spent VVR Fuel at Gremikha site (1)Type 6 and Type 11 containers on the open pad:� 29 type 6 containers: 198 SFAs of which 93 ‘damaged’� 7 type 11 containers: 65 SFAs of which 13 damaged

Figure of open pad in present situation

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VVR SNF stored in Building 1 (in type 22 baskets)� 3 pits containing 16 baskets (106 SFAs)� Pit n°1 (8 baskets) has contained water � Water could be present in these baskets (important safety issue)

Pit n°4 in building 1

Spent VVR Fuel at Gremikha site (2)

Pit n°1 in building 1

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2. Main Nuclear Safety and Technological Approaches

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Main Nuclear Safety and Technological Approaches (1)

Assessment of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection

� No Compromise

� Deterministic approach

� Realistic scenarios and accidental situations

� Consideration of work performed during OBIN for SAR and OVOS

� Technical meetings (every 1 – 2 months) up to common conclusions or decisions

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Main Technological and Nuclear Safety Approaches

Technological Approach

� Successive ‘small’ projects instead of global projects• Better control (for donor and for the Russian side) of ongoing actions (launched)

• More flexibility if changes occur

� Pragmatic approach• Limit new builts and equipement in favor to simple technologicalschemes

• Use whenever possible existing simple, reliable, proven equipment and technologies

� Technical discussions about Russian Engineered options, proposals from the French side

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Nuclear Safety ApproachFirst: address criticality issues� First data (2005-2006) pessimistic� Removal of water before moving type 6 and 11 casks

Assess realistic accidental situations� Deterministic approach� Fall from maximum height and in worst conditions related to the

technical option / handling scheme� Fire� Seism not considered for ‘intact’ VVR fuel evacuation (considered in the

OBIN)

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Nuclear Safety Approach (2)Criticality issue

Need for removing water before moving type 6 and 11 containers

New calculations: possible to move type 22 basketswithout removing water but fall consequences to be mitigated

Data from 2006 for type 11 casks

Type 22 baskets:

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Nuclear Safety Approach (3) Radiation Protection Assessment

� Potential consequences for each step of SFA inventory work during normal and abnormal conditions (source term definition, measurements, use of phantom, calculation of individual and collective doses) �ALARA implementation�Definition of collective measures and individual protective equipment�Experience feedback after operation

• Personal dosimetry• Review of operations based on pictures• Improvements for next steps

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3. Technological solutions implemented at Gremikha for Evacuation of ‘damaged’ VVRSNF

Feedback for evacuation of SNF from Andreeva Bay

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Need for Inventory of SNF conditions‘conditioned’ or ‘non-conditioned’

�First Inventory of SNF of the open pad (2007)• Made it possible two evacuations of ‘conditioned’SFAs�Second Inventory of Damaged Fuel (2009 – 2010)

»Intact SFA »damaged SFA

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Need for improvement of radiation protection situation for workers

Performed on the open pad between 2005 -2008

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Transportation and handling scheme for non-damaged fuel

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Implementation of the transportation and handling scheme for non-damaged fuel� New equipment developed and manufactured for water removal from

TK 6, 11 containers� Use of the OK-300 PB transfer container (proven and reliable)�Maintenance and use of existing cranes (MK-75-20, KP-10,30)�Refurbishment of the existing ‘caisson’�Purchase of Kamaz truck�Development and manufacturing of SIMPLE handling equipment• Gripping device• Holding structure in the truck (UTCD)�Use of a 10 t jib-crane to load type 6 containers onto the truck

⇒No major and expensive technical developments⇒Some of these practices are intended for Andreeva Bay

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

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CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

This document is the property of “Société Technique pour l’Énergie Atomique“and may not be reproduced or communicated to a third party without prior authorisation

Assessment of Nuclear Safety:Truck accident followed by fire

=> Assessment of dose to workers=> Radionuclide releases: assessment of environmental impact=> Technical mitigation dispositions (limitation of diesel in the truck tank, barriers on the road side, vehicle before the truck

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Assessment of Nuclear Safety:Fall of transfer container conatining SFA

=> Assessment of dose to workers=> Radionuclide releases: assessment of environmental impact⇒Technical mitigation dispositions: distance between operators and workplace,PPE

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FCNRS technical proposal for evacuation of damaged SFAs in Type 6 containers (1)

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FCNRS technical proposal for evacuation of damaged SFAs in Type 6 containers (2)

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

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Means and equipment for evacuation of damaged fuel from type 6 containers (3)

Existing means: same as for evacuation of non damaged SFAs and TUK-18

Additional means needed (will depend on the selected option):� Room arrangements in building 1A for type 6 cask preparation (power

supply,ventilation, sewerage)� New internals for TUK-18

• For internal baskets of type 6 containers• For type 22 baskets in building 1�New transfer container for internal baskets of type 6 container (and type 22 baskets), based on existing KB-651�Removable shielding barrel and tools for reconditioning and unloading damaged but extractible SFAs �Handling frames for type 6 and TUK-18

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

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New transfer cask KB-651 KNew transfer cask with larger internal diameter to load:� Internal cassettes of Type 6 container� Type 22 baskets from pits in Building one

� Good experience feedback from already used KB-651

� Weight < 9 t to cope with existing infrastructures in Building 1

� Issue of interfaces between type 6 container and transfer cask (crucial issue for extraction of type 22 baskets from pits in building 1)

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

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Conclusions

� No need for hot cells at Gremikha

� No need for 36 new containers TUK-127 (as presented in OBIN)

� New equipments to be developed (not very complicated, but need of good management of interfaces between equipment)

� But no compromise on nuclear safety and environmental protection

� Such approach likely to be applicable for evacuation of part ofSNF froml Andreeva Bay (meeting held in Murmansk 18-19 November 2009)

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

This document is the property of “Société Technique pour l’Énergie Atomique“and may not be reproduced or communicated to a third party without prior authorisation

Minutes of meeting 18_19 November 2009Evacuation of SNF from Andreeva Bay

Inventory in 20072nd inventory in 2010

Non-conditioned fuel should be identified

Inventory of SNF

GremikhaAndreeva Bay

Improvement of RP conditions on open pad

Horizontal shielding on 2A tank

Shielding of workplace

PerformedPerformedPreparatory activities: Truck delivery, commissioning of OK-300 PB,..

Design in courseScheduledUpgrade of transfer container KB-651 K

Refurbishment of emergency supply

ScheduledElectricity supply

SD-10 dry dock refurbishedRefurbishment of pierUse of Serebrianka

Assessments performedFall of a canister Fire safety

Safety studies

CEG Technical Meeting 24-254 February 2010, La Hague, The NetherlandsAREVA TA

This document is the property of “Société Technique pour l’Énergie Atomique“and may not be reproduced or communicated to a third party without prior authorisation

Special regards to the Russian Organizations we work with:

ROSATOMSevRAOFCNRSVNIPIETNIKIET

AndTHANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION