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Strengthening Developing Country Governments’ Engagement with Corporate Social Responsibility:
Conclusions and Recommendations from
Technical Assistance in Vietnam
FINAL REPORT Nigel Twose and Tara Rao December 2003
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Table of contents
1. Executive summary and recommendations 1 2. Summary report of global findings from the World Bank CSR program 4 3. The CSR program in Vietnam 9 The research framework 9 Background of the two sectors 13 Textile sector status 13 Footwear sector status 14 4. Research findings; recommendations for public sector roles 16 Recommendations 17 Appendices Appendix A: CSR implementation matrix for Vietnam Appendix B: Stakeholder driver matrix for CSR in Vietnam Appendix C: Government Role Matrix: Strengthening CSR in Vietnam References
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1. Executive summary and recommendations The World Bank’s program Strengthening developing country governments’ engagement with Corporate Social Responsibility was set up to explore the potential roles of the public sector within developing countries to encourage and strengthen corporate social responsibility, or CSR. It has been based on activities and dialogue on specific sectoral or thematic issues in four countries (Angola, El Salvador, The Philippines and Vietnam), plus commissioned research on cross-cutting themes. It began in April 2002 and concluded with an international conference in November 2003. The concept of CSR is based on the recognition that businesses are part of society, and that they have the potential to make a positive contribution to societal goals and aspirations in ways that are both god for business and good for development. But why should a government engage with the CSR agenda? Four arguments have emerged: To enhance international competitiveness; To address current gaps in government capacity; To create synergies that use the complementary competencies of government,
private and civil society actors to achieve common goals; To ensure that CSR practice is in line with national policy goals.
In Vietnam, the technical assistance aimed to build CSR awareness among key stakeholders and government officials, to engage and stimulate broader stakeholder dialogue on government roles in strengthening CSR. It focused on labor standards in the footwear and textile industry. The supporting research analyzed barriers to CSR awareness and implementation within a sample of enterprises (based on ownership, scale and location) and amongst key stakeholders. The research revealed the following barriers and challenges: There are wide variations in awareness and understanding of CSR among and
within Vietnamese firms. Implementation of multiple buyers’ CSR Codes of Conduct, or CoCs, by one
Vietnamese supplier of is creating inefficiencies. Differences between the national Labor Code and CoCs are resulting in firm-level
confusion, e.g. freedom of association and overtime. Inconsistencies in national regulations create inefficiencies in CoC implementation,
e.g. wage rate, benefits and employment conditions. Unequal access to financial and technical resources is creating CSR disparities at
enterprise level, especially for SMEs. Shifting, anonymous, complex supply chains inhibit longer-term commitment to
CSR. The lack of transparency over current CSR practices is hindering potential market
reward.
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The research also revealed advantages and opportunities: A section of Vietnamese firms have gained clear market benefits from their CSR
practices: new and expanded contracts from international buyers. The same section of Vietnamese firms say that they have experienced productivity
gains from more contented and healthier workers. CSR implementation has the potential to facilitate law enforcement at enterprise
level. Buyers are looking for collaborative solutions that would allow cost sharing and
greater impact, in areas such as capacity building. Based on the research findings in Vietnam, and comparable work in other countries in this program, the World Bank makes the following six sets of recommendations to the Government of Vietnam: #1. MOLISA should continue its work of the last 12 months in providing factual information on CSR codes to Vietnamese enterprises and their stakeholders. This should involve continued data gathering to enhance information dissemination approaches; a website and written materials, perhaps in collaboration with the business associations. #2. MOLISA should encourage collaborative approaches amongst buyers towards monitoring and agreement on one single audit for multiple buyers from the same factory, focused on the high percentage of shared CSR code content #3. MOLISA should lead a process to get CSR capacity-building undertaken collaboratively, in a manner that pools the complementary competencies of buyers and other stakeholders, and reaches a larger group of Vietnamese suppliers and potential suppliers. This should have a particular focus on SMEs. #4. MOLISA should build on its comparison of CSR code content and Vietnamese national law, to determine shared content, and to advise on areas of discrepancy. This should include discussion with buyers and CSR standards agencies about those areas where harmonization appears possible, such as freedom of association. It should also include discussion with buyers on a common strategy to reach consensus, for example on overtime. This work should be led by MOLISA’s Legal Department. #5. MOLISA should seek learning opportunities for its labor inspectorate through improved collaboration with the private sector monitors and auditors associated with CSR codes, both for-profit and not-for-profit. This could include data sharing, with buyers providing aggregated data from their CoC monitoring, that would reveal useful patterns of violation patterns and trends. It could also include information sharing on inspection techniques. The Labor Inspectorate should be fully briefed on the comparative analysis of the national labor code and CSR codes, and able to offer advice and support to Vietnamese firms in dealing with these matters, maintaining the sanctioning power of inspectorates, but shifting the focus to technical assistance for
those firms that are developing their own CSR benchmarks and improvement plans. MOLISA should pilot joint visits for its inspectors with those of CoC inspectors, to reduce the time burden on enterprises of multiple visits, and to increase learning opportunities for MOLISA inspectors and for the private inspectors. MOLISA should re-prioritize the workload of its inspectorate, with less emphasis on those enterprises that are subject to regular robust monitoring and inspection through CoCs, and more on those enterprises that are not involved with any CoC and typically have far lower labor standards. #6. MOLISA should encourage increased transparency and reporting on labor standards, including firm-level reporting on core data. This would help individual firms distinguish themselves in a highly competitive marketplace, and the data could also be aggregated anonymously at national level to show how seriously the country takes this issue. MOLISA should work with MPI on the new Trade Promotion Agency which the Government has decided to create, since labor standards data generated by firms would be directly helpful to this promotional effort. Vietnam needs to compete internationally on the basis on cost + quality + demonstrated standards.
2. Summary report of global findings from the World Bank CSR program
About this section This section summarizes findings from the World Bank’s program Strengthening developing country governments’ engagement with Corporate Social Responsibility. Through activities and dialogue on specific sectoral or thematic issues in four countries (listed below), and a series of commissioned research projects on cross-cutting themes, the program explored the potential roles of the public sector within developing countries in relation to CSR.
Country Sector Issues
Vietnam El Salvador The Philippines Angola
Footwear General Mining Oil
Labor Business and education Socio-economic and environmental impacts Local content, transparency and social development
The concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is based on the recognition that businesses are part of society, and that they have the potential to make a positive contribution to societal goals and aspirations. The CSR agenda places significant emphasis on relationships between enterprises and their stakeholders, both internal (e.g. workers, shareholders and investors) and external (e.g. customers, suppliers, civil society and community groups). Yet one set of key actors is often omitted from this conversation – the government. This is despite the overarching role of the government in setting the framework within which businesses operate, and the potential for aligning the outcomes of business activity to public policy goals. To some extent, the absence of attention to the role of the government is a reflection of the immaturity of the CSR agenda, and that the term “CSR” has not yet taken hold within many government agencies. Yet there already is a wealth of examples of government actions that can and do promote corporate social responsibility, many of which have not been undertaken explicitly as CSR initiatives. These include traditional activities of labor and environmental regulators and inspectorates, and elements of the work of investment and export promotion agencies. Government agencies that do not use the term CSR are not necessarily doing any less than those that do. Indeed, they may prefer to deal with the challenges brought by the CSR agenda through more established terminology and approaches, in order to focus on the necessary responses and to communicate these to other actors. Just as the significance of the government is often underplayed within the CSR agenda, so the link between public governance and CSR is seldom given due attention. But governance is an overriding factor in defining the type and trajectory of CSR that will emerge, and the respective roles of different stakeholders. Where the state provides a transparent and predictable business environment, with clear signals for business and enforcement of the law, not only are minimum standards more likely to be upheld, but also the efforts of private sector and civil society actors to promote better social and environmental practices through voluntary measures will be
supported. In Angola, companies investing in the oil sector are realizing that if they are to respond to civil society demands that the revenues they generate are harnessed in support of public good such as poverty reduction, they need government support in ensuring transparency. The extent to which the government can underpin CSR through good governance has a strong bearing on the necessary roles of other actors. But why should the government engage with the CSR agenda at all? The first reason is the desire to maintain and enhance international competitiveness. In El Salvador, the Government sees CSR as a route to long-term national competitiveness, by capitalizing on the willingness of employers to invest in education and their desire for an educated workforce. There are indications that CSR issues are increasingly influencing the investment and purchasing decisions of some multinational enterprises.1 This survey of 107 MNEs in the extractive, agriculture and manufacturing sectors found that over 80% of respondents consider the CSR performance of potential partners and locations before they enter into a new venture, with just under half choosing one host or source country over another on the basis of CSR issues. Indeed, the most striking link between CSR and competitiveness is made through codes of conduct, developed by buyers to manage social and environmental issues within their supply chains. These have become among the most widespread tools of the existing CSR agenda, alongside the compliance or monitoring schemes that are used to ensure that suppliers implement the codes. In Vietnam, the direct benefit of helping the domestic footwear sector to understand and adhere to labor codes of conduct is securing international contracts that would otherwise be awarded elsewhere. There may also be indirect benefits for individual enterprises in terms of productivity and quality improvements2, and for the sector as a whole in attracting other buyers and investors. Cambodia accepts that its textile industry cannot compete with China simply on the basis of low input costs, and instead is seeking to position itself as a location for ‘responsible’ purchasing by building the capacity of suppliers to implement labor codes of conduct. If codes of conduct can lead to the exclusion of enterprises (particularly SMEs) from international supply chains, there is a clear rationale for government support to help enterprises respond to them; we discuss possible interventions below. Having said this, it is important not to overstate the significance of codes of conduct. It is clear that they are being applied within the supply chains of a core of multinational enterprises in certain industrial sectors, notably garments and footwear, and to some extent agribusiness.3 For enterprises aiming to supply these sectors, there is increasing
1 J. E. Berman and T. Webb 2003 Race to the Top: Attracting and Enabling Global Sustainable Business: Business Survey Report, Washington, D.C., World Bank. 2 Jørgensen et al. (2003) note that there is currently little understanding of the indirect business benefits of adhering to codes of conduct, such as improved productivity and lower staff turnover. 3 For detailed information and analysis of codes of conduct applied to five sectors (apparel; footwear and light manufacturing; agribusiness; tourism; mining; oil and gas), see G. Smith and D. Feldman 2003
pressure to implement codes of conduct. But this is often not the case for enterprises in other sectors or for those supplying domestic markets. A second reason for government engagement with CSR is to address current gaps in government capacity. This is a pragmatic response to situations where government agencies lack capacity to secure enforcement of legislation (for example in countries where codes of conduct are seen as a good tool to enforce implementation of the law) or resources for government expenditure (for example in El Salvador, where the fiscal gap undermines government investment in education). The idea of CSR filling temporary gaps also extends to the global regulatory context – CSR may prove to be a symptom of the current lack of a mature global governance framework, and developments in global governance may eventually reduce the need for codes of conduct and other CSR tools.4 Thirdly, the government can apply CSR to facilitate partnerships and create synergies that use the complementary skills of government, private and civil society actors to achieve public policy goals. Even where there are fully functioning and well-resourced regulatory structures, it still makes sense to make the most of what different stakeholders can offer. For example, in El Salvador, the business community is able to provide financial expertise and mentoring for school managers, while in the Philippines, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources sees communities as “active partners, not beneficiaries” in the context of the mining sector.5 A fourth rationale for government engagement with the CSR agenda is to ensure that it is in line with the interests of local stakeholders and with national policy goals. The current CSR agenda, and its emphasis on top-down codes of conduct, reflects its primary association with large multinational companies and their stakeholders, particularly consumers, investors and international civil society organizations. As discussed above, government interventions may be necessary to ensure that domestic companies (particularly SMEs) are able to meet the supply chain requirements imposed by foreign buyers. But there is also a need to support the positive practices of domestic companies, including those operating outside international supply chains. Local visions of what it means to be socially responsible may well be quite different to those of international buyers. In Vietnam, some invitees to a conference on CSR assumed that the topics to be discussed would be assistance for flood victims and other needy people, rather than labor codes of conduct. In the Philippines, there is a need for mechanisms that involve and engage local stakeholders
Company Codes of Conduct and International Standards: An Analytical Comparison (Parts I and II), Washington D.C., World Bank. 4 Michael Klein, Vice President Private Sector Development: The World Bank, and Chief Economist, International Finance Corporation, addressing the International Conference on Public Policy and CSR, Washington, D.C. 8-9 November 2003. 5 Edwin G. Domingo, Assistant Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, addressing the International Conference on Public Policy and CSR, Washington, D.C. 8-9 November 2003.
in planning a sustainable future for the mining sector. Workers and their representatives, the perceived beneficiaries of codes of conduct, are not often involved in their development or even in the implementation. The government has an interest in promoting worker involvement in CSR and, more generally, in promoting stable and effective systems of industrial relations. Given the complexity of these drivers for government engagement, it may be useful to take a systematic approach to deciding on the most appropriate responses. The range of roles that government agencies might play can be situated within an overarching framework under four broad categories: mandating, facilitating, partnering and endorsing.6 The aim should be to map the overlaps between the CSR agenda and existing government activities, and to identify interventions that align business activities with public policy goals.7 For example, the Government of El Salvador is seeking to integrate CSR into a national plan for education, and sees its roles as, firstly, to establish clear policies in relation to CSR, and secondly, to facilitate partnerships between the private sector and educational institutions.8 The Government of Angola has passed legislation to set targets for hiring of local labor by foreign oil companies, in order to develop local skills and training. There is clearly a range of activities that the government could play with respect to codes of conduct and other supply chain requirements. Ensuring consistent and transparent enforcement of the law is fundamental to supporting responsible business activity. A logical next step is providing information, training and other capacity building for local enterprises, both in terms of what standards are required and how they relate to national legislation. This could involve key stakeholders such as trade unions, industry associations and civil society groups. By coordinating the different actors, the government may be able to encourage collaborative capacity building that pools resources and expertise. But a more dynamic response would be to attempt to shape the codes of conduct and their implementation processes, both in the interests of domestic enterprises and the economy as a whole, and to maximize the benefits in terms of higher standards. For example, stakeholders in Vietnam have discussed the notion of a national framework for codes of conduct, which might form a basis to encourage coherence between different buyers’ codes and national legislation, and may even facilitate joint audits of factories.9
6 See Fox, Ward and Howard (2002) for a discussion of this framework and examples of public sector action under each of the categories. 7 See the Diagnostic and Appraisal Tool developed by Michael Warner for the CSR Practice, which takes users through a series of steps, helping them form recommendations on appropriate public sector interventions and instruments. 8 H. E. Rolando Ernesto Marin Coto, Minister of Education, El Salvador, addressing the International Conference on Public Policy and CSR, Washington, D.C. 8-9 November 2003. 9 Jørgensen et al. (2003) note that one of the main barriers to implementation of codes of conduct by suppliers is the fact that different buyers interpret even identical provisions in codes of conduct in different ways. This appears to be a greater barrier than the absolute number of different codes.
But there remains a need to explore how auditors inspecting against private codes of conduct, and the information gathered by them on standards within individual enterprises, could usefully complement and built the capacity of government inspectorates. By doing so, there may be scope to raise standards not only in export sectors, but also in enterprises producing for the domestic sector and in industries beyond those touched directly by codes of conduct. And questions remain about the limits to the implementation of codes of conduct in sectors characterized by short-term contracts and complex supply chains. While the case of Angola demonstrates how the CSR agenda relies on transparency with regard to the activities of the government, government also has a role to play in ensuring the provision of transparent and reliable information on the activities and impacts of enterprises. It is in the interests of individual companies to differentiate themselves within a market in which discerning buyers (and increasingly, investors10) favor high standards. There may be a role for the government in establishing a comparative framework to allow this, possibly linking higher standards to incentives such as tax concessions or export licenses.11 In addition to these enterprise-level effects, data collected could be aggregated and used at a national level in positioning the country as a location for responsible sourcing or investment. To make the most of the leverage that transparency can bring to bear on corporate performance, it may also be necessary for the public sector to support the capacity of civil society to demand and make use of this information, thus creating additional local pressure for better practice. Providing balanced information on the positive and negative impacts of business activity also has the potential to bring stakeholders into constructive debates. For example, in the Philippines, there is a clear need for broad civil society engagement and a mechanism that builds mutual trust and informed choices between stakeholders, as well as expanding each stakeholder’s awareness of the possibilities presented by the mining sector.12 In exploring and performing its potential roles, the government can play an important function in shaping a national CSR agenda not only responds to external pressures such as codes of conduct, but is also in line with local needs. In assessing the opportunities that CSR provides, the challenge is for governments to identify priorities and incentives that are meaningful in the national context, building on the strengths of local enterprises as well as those of foreign multinationals. By doing so, there is a
10 For example, ten leading banks recently adopted the Equator Principles, a voluntary set of guidelines for managing the social and environmental issues related to the financing of development projects. 11 For example, the Government of Cambodia has linked the granting of export licenses to garment manufacturers to their engagement in an ILO standards scheme. 12 C. L. Hubo (2003) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Public Policy in the Philippine Mining Sector, paper presented to the International Conference on Public Policy and CSR, Washington, D.C. 8-9 November 2003.
significant opportunity for the government to harness current enthusiasm for CSR to delivery against public policy goals and priorities. 3. The CSR program in Vietnam
About this section This section summarizes the objectives and activities of the CSR program in Vietnam and the research framework.
Strengthening CSR is seen as an important mechanism for building Vietnam’s comparative advantage as a responsible sourcing location for global companies. The goal of the technical assistance to the Government of Vietnam has been to identify potential government roles in strengthening CSR, to build agreement around that analysis and to develop a subsequent implementation plan to serve as a roadmap for future action by the government. The objectives of this technical assistance were:
1. To build awareness about CSR among key government officials (representing government ministries and agencies concerned with social and economic policies), to engage in a discussion about government roles in strengthening CSR;
2. To identify realistic and appropriate government roles for strengthening CSR in Vietnam using labor standards and the footwear industry as a case study;
3. To support government in stimulating broad dialogue with key stakeholders in key export sectors about proposed government roles in strengthening CSR.
In partnership with the Institute for Labor Sciences and Social Affairs (ILSSA) and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) the key activities implemented under this Program of Technical Assistance included: • Multi-stakeholders’ Seminars on CSR (HCMC and Hanoi) • Establishment of a multi-sectoral Advisory Group • Research to support further study of proposed public sector roles to strengthen
CSR The research framework The research was undertaken by a team from ILSSA, coordinated with the Advisory Group as stakeholder representatives, to ensure common understanding and enhanced ownership of the research process and outcomes.
Goal of the research To strengthen CSR by providing input to a dialogue on stakeholder roles with specific focuson government roles, to strengthen corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Vietnam and feedinto the government’s strategic planning on Vietnamese business competitiveness within aglobalizing economy. Objective of the research To identify the challenges/barriers and opportunities in the existing CSR environment inVietnam, with a focus on identifying government roles in addressing the challenges/barriersand extending the opportunities with respect to CSR implementation, and policy dialogue. Intermediate objectives 1. To provide viable options for addressing challenges to information dissemination among the
various CSR stakeholder groups; 2. To identify the challenges/barriers and opportunities and prioritize viable options for
addressing challenges to CSR implementation by identifying the − comparative impact in improving working conditions through various CSR practices; − −
comparative costs vs. benefits, and associated tradeoffs of the various initiatives; sustainability of the comparative approaches and the associated assumptions ofstakeholder roles and capacity in ensuring the sustainability of the approach or incompelling companies to undertake CSR.
3. To determine the government’s role in − −
supporting and strengthening existing initiatives/approaches and; stimulating broader implementation of particular models embodied in various initiatives for adoption/implementation by various scales and profiles of enterprise.
The research focused on the apparel and footwear sectors in Vietnam, given their importance to the national economy, their demonstrated susceptibility to market-based CSR pressures, and their urgent need to adapt to a quota-free world post 2005. Enterprises represented in the research were both from the north and south covering enterprises of varying scale and types, targeting both the suppliers and the buyers, surveying state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and national private enterprises, serving both national and international markets The sample was self-selected, with enterprises volunteering to share their experience on CSR implementation: this suggests caution in extrapolating conclusions for the sector as a whole. The researchers selected enterprises in three categories: 1) those undertaking CSR; 2) those initiating CSR and; 3) those presently not engaging in CSR. The research framework was based on why there is CSR engagement (i.e. the drivers); how enterprises engage in CSR (i.e. the profile of the CSR strategy); what is the content (i.e. the systems and mechanisms); and what next has been planned. This framework formed the basis for semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions.
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Enterprise
CSR implemented CSR initiated CSR detached
Enterprise profile
Scale/ ownership/ sector /
Reason for disengagement
How Approaches/ Strategies
- Nature/profile of CSR initiative
- Process of initiation; assistant & support
- Stakeholder engagement/capacity (union, community, etc.)
- Nature/profile of CSR initiative
- Process of initiation; assistance & support
- Stakeholder engagement/capacity (union, community, etc.)
- Status of implementation of labor legislation
- Level of awareness of CSR - Stakeholder
engagement/capacity (union, community, etc.)
What Systems/ Mechanisms
- Process and content of implementation
- On-going barriers/ challenges
- Auditing process - Costs and benefits (short
& long term) - Effect and impact (in &
outside the work place) - Reporting initiatives
- Process and content of implementation
- Initial barriers/ challenges
- Costs and benefits (short term – in & outside the work place)
- Reporting initiatives
- Working conditions/ outside the work place
- On-going barriers/ challenges
What next Further Approaches/ Systems
Time frames & targets Barriers and trade-offs
Time frames & targets Barriers and trade-offs
Time frames & targets Barriers and trade-offs
Background to the two sectors International economic integration for Vietnam takes an important step forward with the implementation of the bilateral trade agreement with the United States; application for WTO accession, and; the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which requires the reduction of tariffs and import barriers among all ASEAN member nations by 2006. This will further advance Vietnam’s process of integration, exposing domestic enterprises to expanded opportunity as well as fierce competition within the current export-led growth strategy of Vietnam. The labor-intensive apparel and footwear sector are important sectors for economic growth for Vietnam, accounting for approximately 23% of exports. The WTO Agreement on Textile and Clothing calls for the elimination of quotas by 2005 and is expected to cause major shifts in global production. This offers both an opportunity and a challenge for Vietnam: government allocated quotas will be replaced by market-based decisions. In a highly competitive marketplace with no quotas, most experts agree that Vietnam will be unable to compete on the basis of cost + quality alone. Building Vietnam’s comparative advantage will require an enhancement of Vietnam’s reputation on the basis of cost, quality and demonstrated standards.
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The implementation of CSR at enterprise level focuses mainly on labor and environment issues. Most individual buyers specify their requirements within a Code of Conduct (CoC). The research documenting enterprise level experience within Vietnam, shows many enterprises see benefit in raising their standards in this way, due to their improved reputation, better working conditions, increased productivity and quality. Vietnam is not alone in seeking to attract and retain buyers by emphasizing labor standards: the Government of Cambodia, for example, has pioneered a transparent factory monitoring and reporting initiative with its 200 garment factories, and is competing aggressively to retain CSR-sensitive buyers and investment post 2005. Textile sector status13 By December 2002, 1200 textile firms were operating in Vietnam, with 1 million workers. 65% are SMEs. By quantity, non state-owned enterprises constitute the highest proportion; by investment, foreign invested enterprises top the list. Table 1: Structure of Textile enterprises by investment rate and ownership (Unit: %)
State-owned enterprises
Non state-owned Foreign invested enterprises
By quantity 22 44 34 By proportion of investment to total investment in textile industry
28 32 40
Source: Vietnam Textile Association (VITAS)
In 2002, the textile sector stood second after petroleum and gas, responsible for 15% of national exports. Between 1995-2002, exports increased from US$850m to US$ 2750m. The Vietnam-United States Trade Agreement and the US Bilateral Agreement on Textiles and Garments generated favorable conditions for the export of Vietnamese textile and garment products, seen as a temporary period (2003-2004) for the Vietnamese sector to identify business partners and increase exports. The sector relies on cheap labor, overwhelmingly young female migrant workers. Productivity and quality are still low, prices are not competitive. Many firms have poor management and technology. Almost 80% of materials and accessories are imported: cotton, rush, thread, chemical, dye, accessories.
13 Based on Sub-segment Report on the Textile Sector, ILSSA-WB Initiative.
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Footwear sector status14 There has been rapid growth in the footwear industry in recent years, in terms of number of firms, output and export turnover. Table 2. Total of production and export turnover of Footwear Industry
Products Unit 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Production Mil. Pairs 212.65 240.82 302.80 320,01 360 Shoes
styles Export Mil. Pairs 333 Production mil.
Units 27 28.5 31.3 32 33.7
Hand bag Export mil.
Units 32
Production Mil. Sqft 10.75 12.57 15.1 17 25 Tanned Leather Export Mil. Sqft 12
Total export turnover mil. US$ 1.000,82 1.334,46 1468.12 1.575 1.846
Source: LEFASO Between 2000-2002, footwear exports increased from US$1,468 bn to US$1846bn. Table 3: Export turnover by ownership forms
1999 2000 2001 2002 Ownership mil. USD % mil. USD % mil. USD % mil. USD %
787,33 59 778,95 53,1 811,25 51,1 884,08 47,9 386,61 26,3 331,49 21,0 347,86 18,8 392,34 26,7 479,76 30,0 536,22 29,1
VN Enterprise State-owned Non state-owned 100% of foreign capital
471,58 35 838,65 45,4
Joint -venture 75,54 6 123,4 6,7 Total 1345,5 1468 100 1575 100 1846 100 Source: Report of LEFASO Main export markets are in the EU, with Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, and the UK accounting for nearly 80% of exports. Sport shoes and women’s shoes are on the increase, with fabric shoes getting a smaller share of exports, but a larger share of the domestic market. The output of leather products is increasing rapidly. Vietnam is among the 10 largest footwear producers and exporters worldwide, with 350 enterprises employing 450,000 workers in HCM City, Dong Nai, Binh Duong, Hanoi and Hai Phong. Many firms are boosting their investment and improving production capability, especially FDI and joint venture enterprises. Table 4. Development target of Footwear Industry to 2010
Products Unit 2002 2005 2010 Production 1000 pairs 360.000 470.000 720.000 All styles of
shoes Export 1000 pairs 333.150 427.700 655.200 Production 1000 units 33.700 51.700 80.700 Hand bags Export 1000 units 32.000 50.500 78.470 Production 1000sqft 25.000 40.000 80.000 Tanned Leather Export 1000sqft 12.000 25.000 65.000
14 Based on Sub-segment Report on the Footwear Sector, ILSSA-WB Initiative.
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Total of export turnover 1000 USD 1.846.000 3.100.000 6.200.000
Source: LEFASO. The sector has not been subject to an export quota regime, and is exposed to fierce competition, now increased by economic integration. As with textiles, Vietnamese production capacity lags behind regional competitors, with outdated technology insufficient high-skilled workers, and poor design. 4. Research findings; recommendations for public sector roles
About this section This section summarizes key findings of ILSSA’s research in the two sectors, and offers World Bank recommendations on appropriate public sector roles to help address identified challenges. The recommendations are in blue and bold.
The research found that almost all suppliers, textile and footwear, first confront CSR through Codes of Conduct, or CoCs, developed by individual buyers. This relationship sees the buyer specifying social and environmental standards through the code, and acting as the monitoring partner (directly or through third-party involvement). Suppliers implement the buyer’s code, in the hope of improving their reputation and attracting larger and more stable contracts. Suppliers commonly work with more than one buyer, and therefore implement more than one code, with the number ranging between 2 -6 at any one time. Suppliers reported that the buyer is the primary source of information. The business associations (VITAS - textile or LEFASO – footwear) also play a role in basic information dissemination, but do not disseminated detailed information about CoC content or requirements. This relationship between supplier enterprises and buyers creates a top-down approach, with most Vietnamese firms passively implementing their buyers’ codes, rather than proactively seeking increased market share through CSR practices. However, the research found that some suppliers that were initially responding to their short-term buyer requirements now see CSR investments can help them win more stable and numerous contracts. A small number have also identified that CSR investments can increase worker satisfaction and hence factory production, with less worker turnover or ill health. Firms told the researchers that CSR implementation is contributing towards enterprises meeting their customer demands with regard to delivery time, improving-product quality, and noticeable reduction of defective products. For some firms, order quantity and customers are increasing, especially from those US buyers (export turnover into US market is up to 11% from 7%), with a high tendency to consider CSR
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considerations while engaging in production contracts overseas15. In some cases Vietnamese enterprises have built their reputation with clients, such that they not only purchase directly from enterprises but also choose enterprises as manufacturers when signing business contracts through intermediate partners. Further, enterprises implementing one CoC can provide other potential clients with confidence that requirements will be met. #1 Knowledge/Information disparity The CSR agenda is relatively new in the country, although safeguards for workers rights and working conditions are well articulated in national legislation. The term “CSR” is not widely used and often creates confusion when translated into Vietnamese due to its dual business and social agenda. The research revealed that knowledge and understanding of CSR varies between firms, and within them. The majority of Northern enterprises work mainly as subcontractors for mid-level or intermediary partners (Korea, Taiwan), who often focus only on quality, quantity, delivery time, monitoring and supervision as technical concerns, with third party assessment and monitoring, while consultancy, information provision on CSR for enterprises remain limited. Southern enterprises have more chances to promote enterprise development as they are often acting as subcontractors or producers for brands such as Nike, Adidas, Reebok, Timberland, Bata. These buyers inform and provide CSR advisory support to the suppliers. The consequence is that understanding and capacity within enterprises and their key stakeholders often varies, with senior management having the most knowledge and workers the least. Unsurprisingly, CSR and OSH staff have a greater awareness than finance staff. Managerial staff often lack CSR competence, restricting their ability to provide appropriate guidance: many managers have been promoted from the workers, and lack professional and management skills. This pervasive lack of awareness and capacity contributes to Vietnamese firms generally being “passive implementers” of CSR, reacting to buyer requirements, rather than proactive seekers of market gain through improved standards. Each Vietnamese firm has to analyze potential CSR costs and benefits, in the context of their own resources, competencies and business plan, but few have access to the information that would enable them to do so. Recommendation: MOLISA should continue its work of the last 12 months in providing factual information on CSR codes to Vietnamese enterprises and their stakeholders. This should involve continued data gathering to enhance information dissemination approaches; a website and written materials, perhaps in collaboration with the business associations. 15 For more data on US firms’ prioritization of CSR issues, see J. E. Berman and T. Webb 2003 Race to the Top: Attracting and Enabling Global Sustainable Business: Business Survey Report, Washington, D.C., World Bank.
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#2 Multiple code management All CSR codes cover the same broad areas, but implementation requirements vary widely. The research found suppliers adopting multiple CoCs, dealing with different implementation requirements for the same provision (e.g. fire extinguisher position and other health and safety specifications). This causes inefficiencies due to multiple audits, time and resources used to comply, and different management requirements, creating an unnecessary burden for suppliers. The extent to which suppliers comply is highly dependent on the supplier’s profit margin and capacity. The research found a lack of proactive and more sustainable engagement on the part of Vietnamese firms. This reactive approach contributes to the tendency of Vietnamese firms perceiving CSR-related improvements as a cost not as an investment. Recommendation: MOLISA should encourage collaborative approaches amongst buyers towards monitoring and agreement on one single audit for multiple buyers from the same factory, focused on the high percentage of shared CSR code content.
#3 Unequal access to capacity-building resources The multi-stakeholder Advisory Group for this program was intended to support and inform the research work; it also illustrated the need for partnerships that use the complementary competencies of government and the private sector to achieve common goals. The suppliers and buyers, the trade union responsible for protecting the rights of the worker, the business associations, NGOs – all of these actors have skills and resources that could be brought to bear on the capacity-building challenge. (Refer Stakeholder Driver Matrix: Appendix B) Enterprises expressed the lack of a level “playing field” to investment and capacity-building resources, based on ownership and scale. They argued for incentive systems, advisory services and revised policies on capital borrowing, with improved access for all types of enterprises, to encourage improved CSR-related standards. Recommendation: MOLISA should facilitate a process to get CSR capacity-building undertaken collaboratively, in a manner that pools the complementary competencies of buyers and other stakeholders, and reaches a larger group of Vietnamese suppliers and potential suppliers. This should include: data gathering on responsive capacity building packages and approaches; identifying relevant buyers to participate in capacity building activities; facilitating collaboration between buyers and business associations to develop capacity building packages for suppliers, sub-contractors and potential suppliers as well as other key stakeholders. This should have a particular focus on SMEs, and MPDF could play a useful role through their relationship with the business associations, helping achieve economies of scale in delivery of training and information, and in negotiating with buyers. #4 Differences between the Labor Code and CSR codes CSR codes generally refer to national legislation as the standard of reference, and state that national law must be respected. These statements are backed up by codes’
1
rigorous monitoring and inspection systems. The research confirmed that CSR implementation is therefore helping ensure law enforcement at the firm level. CoCs and their associated guidelines are also raising awareness on labor standards, and in some factories are facilitating continuous improvement, including to standards that exceed national law stipulations. However, a small number of elements of some CSR codes do not currently align with national legislation requirements. Critical elements include overtime and freedom association.
Overtime: Some CoCs allow a maximum that is higher than the maximum of 300 hours/person/year stipulated by the Labor Code. Research interviews with workers, particularly from rural areas, show that most want to work overtime to increase their income while also saving on subsistence expenditures, as they often have meals, bathe, wash at the enterprise premises. Interviews with enterprises’ senior management revealed that almost all are not currently complying with the Labor Code regulation, but were instead allowing 450 - 600 hours/person/year of overtime. The key objective in the overtime debate is not reducing worker's income, but instead is that the expected productivity gains from reducing overtime translate into higher wages or at least equal total income: the real issue is productivity, and has strong potential for a “win-win” outcome if framed as a multi-stakeholder dialogue with a focus on capacity building/productivity.
Freedom of association: Under Vietnamese law, workers are given the right to
have their own organization. However, this organization must be the Trade Union which is part of the Labor Federation system and must be approved by the same. Other forms of association are not legally recognized. Some CoCs, on the other hand, require that if freedom of association is restricted by law, the employer provides parallel means of independent and free association. This discrepancy is creating confusion for Vietnamese firms, and masking the real question - the capacity and genuine interest in defending worker's interests.
Recommendation: MOLISA should build on its comparison of CSR code content and Vietnamese national law, to determine shared content, and to advise on areas of discrepancy. This should include discussion with buyers and CSR standards agencies about those areas where harmonization appears possible. On overtime, robust evidence from other countries shows that a reduction in excessive overtime generates productivity gains for the enterprise, as well as improvements to worker health. On freedom of association, the fact that SAI, for example, is currently certifying Vietnamese firms suggests that harmonization is possible. MOLISA should include discussion with buyers on a common strategy to reach consensus, especially on overtime. This work should be led by MOLISA’s Legal Department, with input from industry, workers and outside experts.
1
#5 Parallel inspection systems of factory standards The research revealed parallel inspection and support systems. The national labor inspectorate has approximately 400 inspectors, seeking to ensure that the Labor Code in enforced in all workplaces in Vietnam. At the same time, an increasing number of Vietnamese firms are adopting CSR codes that involve regular and robust monitoring systems, and external audit of standards. The first of these two systems is regulatory, with the potential penalty of state sanction; the second is voluntary, with the potential penalty of market loss and the potential reward of increased business. The research revealed that the current disconnect between the two systems is imposing significant opportunity cost on the Vietnamese firms that ironically have the highest standards and least need of such scrutiny. This finding is consistent with other reports that enterprises throughout the country regularly complain about their production activities being hindered by repeated inspections from different State agencies. Recommendation: MOLISA should seek learning opportunities for its labor inspectorate through improved collaboration with the private sector monitors and auditors associated with CSR codes, both for-profit and not-for-profit. This could include data sharing, with buyers providing aggregated data from their CoC monitoring, that would reveal useful patterns of violation patterns and trends. It could also include information sharing on inspection techniques. The Labor Inspectorate should be fully briefed on the comparative analysis of the national labor code and CSR codes, and able to offer advice and support to Vietnamese firms in dealing with these matters, maintaining the sanctioning power of inspectorates, but shifting the focus to technical assistance for those firms that are developing their own CSR benchmarks and improvement plans. MOLISA should pilot joint visits for its inspectors with those of CoC inspectors, to reduce the time burden on enterprises of multiple visits, and to increase learning opportunities for MOLISA inspectors and for the private inspectors. MOLISA should re-prioritize the workload of its inspectorate, with less emphasis on those enterprises that are subject to regular robust monitoring and inspection through CoCs, and more on those enterprises that are not involved with any CoC and typically have far lower labor standards. These steps should be linked to the ILO project which is seeking to build capacity of the inspectorate and enhance efficiency by working toward integration of the various departments and ministries responsible for inspection. #6 Transparency As in any market-based system, CSR depends on accurate information flows in order for firms to receive a market reward for their CSR investments. Similarly, in Vietnam wishes to position itself internationally as a country that takes standards seriously and that CSR-sensitive buyers can source from with confidence, the country needs data to back up its claims of high standards. Other countries are experimenting with new information systems, but Vietnamese firms to date are highly secretive about the detail of their labor standards. Transparent, voluntary reporting on labor standards at
1
enterprise level will help individual firms distinguish themselves in the global marketplace, and will enhance Vietnam’s reputation as a place to do business. Recommendation: MOLISA should encourage increased transparency and reporting on labor standards, including firm-level reporting on core data. This would help individual firms distinguish themselves in a highly competitive marketplace, and the data could also be aggregated anonymously at national level to show how seriously the country takes this issue. MOLISA should work with MPI on the new Trade Promotion Agency which the Government has decided to create, since labor standards data generated by firms would be directly helpful to this promotional effort. Vietnam needs to compete internationally on the basis on cost + quality + demonstrated standards.
1
APPENDICES
2
App
endi
x A
: CSR
impl
emen
tatio
n m
atri
x fo
r Vie
tnam
It
em
Foot
wea
r Te
xtile
In
fras
truc
ture
im
prov
emen
t A
ll en
terp
rise
s und
erto
ok
All
ente
rpri
ses u
nder
took
Equi
pmen
t 40
% b
ough
t all
new
equ
ipm
ent;
80%
sup
plem
ente
d w
ith n
ew
equi
pmen
t; 40
% s
uppl
ied
by b
uyer
So
me
ente
rpri
ses
boug
ht a
ll ne
w; s
ome
supp
lem
ente
d; s
ome
upgr
aded
/rep
aire
d
Ove
rtim
e St
eady
rise
bet
wee
n 19
97-2
002
rang
ing
betw
een
200-
600
hour
s/pe
rson
/yea
r for
foot
wea
r, w
hile
text
ile se
ctor
mor
e st
retc
hed
than
any
oth
er s
ecto
r can
go
up to
13
hrs/
day
or 4
50-6
00 h
ours
/per
son/
year
. En
terp
rise
s in
the
Sout
h ha
ve h
ighe
r ove
rtim
e ho
urs c
ompa
red
to th
ose
in th
e N
orth
. 10
0% h
ave
over
time,
esp
ecia
lly
duri
ng p
eak
prod
uctio
n pe
riod
s. 1
00%
ent
erpr
ises
pro
duct
ivity
not
hig
h du
ring
ove
rtim
e w
ork
and
the
expe
nditu
res
on e
lect
rici
ty a
nd w
ater
incr
ease
con
side
rabl
y,
but t
hey
still
mob
ilize
wor
kers
to w
ork
over
time
to m
eet t
he c
ontr
actu
al ti
me
requ
irem
ents
, whi
ch a
re in
crea
sing
in te
rm o
f bot
h qu
antit
y an
d qu
ality
. Mos
t of
wor
kers
, par
ticul
arly
wor
kers
from
rura
l are
as w
ant t
o w
ork
over
time
for i
ncom
e. O
vert
ime
wor
king
hel
ps s
ave
on s
ubsi
sten
ce e
xpen
ditu
res,
as t
hey
ofte
n ha
ve
mea
ls, b
athe
, was
h at
the
ente
rpri
se.
W
ages
Sh
iftin
g to
a ti
me
rate
syst
em, w
ith w
age
leve
ls d
eter
min
ed b
y pr
oduc
tivity
, nat
ure
of c
ompl
exity
of w
ork,
ski
ll le
vel;
Ove
rtim
e pa
id
by la
w; A
ccor
ding
to s
ome
ente
rpri
se d
irec
tors
, in
situ
atio
ns o
f str
ong
com
petit
ion,
man
y bu
yers
inte
ntio
nally
cre
ate
the
fals
e pr
essu
res i
n te
rm o
f tim
e fo
r pro
duct
del
iver
y in
ord
er to
redu
ce th
e un
it co
st
with
in th
e co
ntra
ct.
Rate
syst
em b
ased
on
time
or b
y pr
oduc
t; Fo
reig
n-in
vest
ed u
se ti
me
rate
; Wag
e eq
ual t
o or
gr
eate
r tha
n th
e st
ipul
ated
min
imum
wag
e –
wag
e ra
nge
amon
g 30
% o
f ent
erpr
ises
300
,000
-40
0,00
0 V
ND
/mon
th; 7
0% 6
00,0
00-1
,000
,000
Soci
al &
M
edic
al
insu
ranc
e
Seen
a g
radu
al in
crea
se in
wor
kers
par
ticip
atin
g –
rang
ing
betw
een
35-8
3% o
f wor
kers
. But
not
hig
h du
e to
hig
h la
bor t
urno
ver (
mig
rant
la
bor)
; low
aw
aren
ess;
bad
impl
emen
tatio
n; w
orke
rs p
refe
r it a
s pa
rt
of th
e sa
lary
.
SOE
& fo
reig
n-in
vest
ed h
ighe
st p
ropo
rtio
n of
wor
kers
(70%
for s
ocia
l ins
uran
ce; 9
6% fo
r m
edic
al in
sura
nce)
. But
not
hig
h du
e to
hig
h la
bor t
urno
ver (
mig
rant
labo
r); l
ow
awar
enes
s; b
ad im
plem
enta
tion;
wor
kers
pre
fer i
t as p
art o
f the
sala
ry.
Labo
r or
gani
zatio
n &
m
anag
emen
t
Reor
gani
zatio
n in
crea
sed
prod
uctiv
ity; d
ecre
ase
in n
umbe
r of w
orke
rs in
eac
h pr
oduc
tion
line
Rear
rang
emen
t red
uced
pro
duct
ion
time;
few
er d
efec
tive
prod
ucts
Trai
ning
A
ll en
terp
rise
s ha
ve H
RD p
lans
; Ong
oing
pro
cess
due
to h
igh
labo
r tu
rnov
er; P
rovi
sion
of s
kill
trai
ning
, lite
racy
skill
s, O
SH, l
abor
le
gisl
atio
n; T
rain
ing
in th
e fo
otw
ear e
nter
pris
es v
arie
s bas
ed o
n fo
rms
of o
wne
rshi
p of
ent
erpr
ises
. The
diff
eren
ces a
re se
en in
cos
ts, f
orm
s an
d cu
rric
ula
for t
rain
ing.
Vie
tnam
ese
priv
ate
ente
rpri
ses
ofte
n pr
ovid
e on
ly s
kill
trai
ning
for n
ew w
orke
rs, n
o to
retr
aini
ng o
r up
grad
ing
skill
for m
anag
eria
l sta
ff, n
or to
impr
ovin
g le
gal
know
ledg
e, w
ith o
ften
no se
para
te b
udge
t for
trai
ning
. How
ever
, on
an a
vera
ge, a
pri
vate
ent
erpr
ise
who
has
a se
para
ted
trai
ning
acc
ount
in
vest
s app
rox.
45
mill
ions
VN
D p
er y
ear,
SOE
(trai
ning
and
re
trai
ning
for m
anag
eria
l sta
ff) 2
00 m
illio
n V
ND
/yea
r, fo
reig
n in
vest
ed e
nter
pris
es (m
ore
com
preh
ensi
ve a
ppro
ach)
with
an
aver
age
inve
stm
ent o
f 400
mill
ion
VN
D/y
ear.
Onl
y on
e en
terp
rise
had
form
al te
chni
cal t
rain
ing
unit,
whi
le o
ther
s pro
vide
on-
the-
job-
trai
ning
. The
wor
k fo
rce
prim
arily
con
sist
s of r
ural
mig
rant
s - n
ot v
ery
skill
ed o
r edu
cate
d.
Labo
r tur
nove
r hig
h, w
ith a
vera
ge s
enio
rity
onl
y 3.
5 ye
ars
ther
efor
e, tr
aini
ng a
n on
goin
g ac
tivity
; Mos
t wor
kers
trai
ned
at v
ocat
iona
l ins
titut
ions
not
abl
e to
imm
edia
tely
mee
t pr
oduc
tion
requ
irem
ents
and
requ
ired
furt
her s
kill
trai
ning
; Fre
sh g
radu
ates
form
vo
catio
nal t
rain
ing
inst
itutio
ns re
crui
ted
by fo
reig
n in
vest
ed e
nter
pris
es, f
or in
stan
ce,
unde
rtoo
k a
3 m
onth
tria
l per
iod
for u
pgra
ding
ski
lls; L
abor
saf
ety
and
hygi
ene
task
wer
e in
trod
uced
thro
ugh
trai
ning
- 92
% w
orke
rs re
spon
ded
they
had
bee
n tr
aine
d la
bor s
afet
y an
d hy
gien
e an
nual
ly.
Chi
ld la
bor
A m
inim
um a
ge o
f 18
is n
orm
ally
follo
wed
, how
ever
, som
e en
terp
rise
s do
em
ploy
dow
n to
15
year
old
s in
area
s of s
carc
ity o
f lab
or, o
ften
with
loca
l aut
hori
ties
cert
ifica
tion
Fo
rced
labo
r C
erta
in e
nter
pris
es ta
ke d
epos
its fr
om w
orke
rs w
hile
em
ploy
ing
them
; som
e re
stri
ct v
isits
/tim
e to
the
toile
t
Dis
crim
inat
ion
No
appa
rent
dis
crim
inat
ion
21
OSH
D
iffer
ed a
t ent
erpr
ise
leve
l by
qual
ity a
nd q
uant
ity w
ith fo
reig
n-in
vest
ed p
erfo
rmin
g w
ell a
nd d
omes
tic e
nter
pris
es n
ot fu
lly o
r wel
l equ
ippe
d; M
ost h
ave
inst
alle
d sa
fety
/hyg
iene
equ
ipm
ent l
ike
vent
ilato
rs, c
oolin
g sy
stem
s; O
SH is
add
ress
ed th
roug
h tr
aini
ng a
ctiv
ities
ofte
n la
unch
in c
ampa
igns
, or c
ompe
titio
ns o
n la
bor s
afet
y,
sani
tary
, fir
e pr
even
tion
and
envi
ronm
ent p
rote
ctio
n, d
urin
g th
e na
tiona
l wee
k on
labo
r saf
ety;
aw
aren
ess
low
am
ong
wor
kers
; 90%
of t
extil
e en
terp
rise
s in
volv
ed in
O
SH in
itiat
ive
- “in
itiat
ive
on c
oalit
ion
for a
pol
icy
on O
SH in
foot
wea
r sec
tor”
, whi
ch a
lso
aim
s to
pro
mot
e cl
eane
r pro
duct
ion,
eco
nom
izin
g on
mat
eria
l and
fuel
; 10
0%of
text
ile e
nter
pris
es se
tup
a La
bor P
rote
ctio
n Bo
ard
or T
ask
Forc
e fo
r CSR
with
a sp
ecia
lized
sect
ion
in c
harg
e of
tech
nica
l ope
ratio
nal t
asks
suc
h as
tech
nica
l sa
fety
, fir
e an
d ex
plos
ion
safe
ty, h
ealth
car
e, e
nvir
onm
ent.
A p
erso
n in
cha
rge
of sa
fety
is a
ssig
ned
in e
ach
prod
uctio
n w
orks
hop.
H
ealth
90
% h
ad a
clin
ic w
ith m
edic
al o
ffice
rs; 3
fore
ign-
inve
sted
pro
vide
d do
ctor
s; 5
0% h
ad fi
rst-a
id fa
cilit
ies
in th
e w
orks
hops
; Ofte
n pr
ovis
ion
of se
rvic
es fo
r wom
en w
orke
rs. A
ll en
terp
rise
s ha
ve p
aid
grea
t at
tent
ion.
New
ly re
crui
ted
wor
kers
hav
e he
alth
cer
tific
ate
issu
ed b
y th
e cl
inic
sta
tion.
The
y ar
e ex
amin
ed b
y en
terp
rise
's he
alth
car
e se
ctio
n be
fore
bei
ng o
ffici
ally
em
ploy
ed b
y th
e en
terp
rise
, with
an
ongo
ing
mon
itori
ng o
f hea
lth d
ossi
ers f
or w
orke
rs.
Mos
t had
clin
ic fa
cilit
ies;
som
e pr
ovid
e se
rvic
es fo
r wom
en w
orke
rs
Haz
ardo
us
wor
k an
d pr
otec
tion
Diff
ered
at e
nter
pris
e le
vel b
y qu
ality
and
qua
ntity
with
fore
ign-
inve
sted
per
form
ing
wel
l and
dom
estic
ent
erpr
ises
not
fully
or w
ell e
quip
ped;
All
have
labo
r pr
otec
tion
equi
pmen
t, w
ith F
orei
gn-in
vest
ed m
ore
stri
ct a
bout
usa
ge o
f equ
ipm
ent;
still
low
aw
aren
ess
amon
g w
orke
rs, t
here
fore
, ent
erpr
ises
use
aw
aren
ess r
aisi
ng,
regu
lar s
uper
visi
on, w
ith a
num
ber o
f ent
erpr
ises
dev
elop
ing
regu
latio
ns
Com
puls
ory
prov
isio
n an
d us
e; c
ompe
nsat
ion
for h
azar
dous
wor
k ra
ngin
g be
twee
n 30
,000
-500
,000
VN
D/m
onth
in te
xtile
ent
erpr
ises
. Fi
re p
reve
ntio
n an
d sa
fety
A
ll en
terp
rise
s ha
ve b
ut q
ualit
y an
d qu
antit
y va
ry, w
ith d
omes
tic-o
wne
d en
terp
rise
s w
ith m
ore
limite
d ca
paci
ty; S
outh
ern
ente
rpri
ses
(mos
tly fo
reig
n-in
vest
ed)
bette
r tha
n th
e N
orth
ern;
90%
of w
orke
rs p
rovi
ded
trai
ning
ann
ually
Supe
rvis
ion
All
unde
rtak
en im
prov
emen
t act
iviti
es, i
ncre
asin
g re
spon
sibi
litie
s for
trad
e un
ion,
alth
ough
trad
e un
ion
have
lim
ited
know
ledg
e/ca
paci
ty
100%
hav
e in
trod
uced
sup
ervi
sing
and
man
agem
ent s
yste
ms,
thou
gh s
yste
m n
ot fu
nctio
ning
cur
rent
ly fu
nctio
ning
opt
imal
ly a
s ent
erpr
ises
are
stil
l in
the
proc
ess
of
esta
blis
hing
thei
r CSR
dep
artm
ent w
ith ta
sks l
ike
rece
ivin
g in
spec
tion
grou
ps; o
rgan
izin
g an
d ac
ting
on th
e re
med
ial m
easu
res
reco
mm
ende
d by
buy
ers/
aud
itors
; cu
rren
tly, s
uper
visi
on a
nd m
anag
emen
t act
iviti
es a
re p
rim
arily
und
erta
ken
by fu
nctio
nal s
taff,
who
hav
e to
com
bine
thes
e ne
w C
SR-im
plem
entin
g re
late
d re
spon
sibi
litie
s w
ith th
eir e
xist
ing
func
tiona
l one
s, w
hich
is p
rovi
ng to
be
a bu
rden
and
resu
lting
in in
adeq
uate
impl
emen
tatio
n, s
uper
visi
on a
nd re
port
ing.
M
onito
ring
D
irec
t buy
er o
r thi
rd p
arty
mon
itori
ng a
dopt
ed d
epen
ding
on
the
buye
r; as
sess
men
t rep
ort p
rovi
ded
to e
nter
pris
es li
stin
g re
quir
ed re
med
ial m
easu
res;
Mon
itori
ng
freq
uenc
y de
pend
s on
the
conc
erne
d cu
stom
er/b
uyer
with
buy
ers d
irec
tly o
r thr
ough
a th
ird
part
y m
onito
ring
. Som
e cu
stom
ers
like
Nik
e, A
dida
s m
onito
r eve
ry 6
m
onth
s or q
uart
er, w
ith so
me
rand
om c
heck
ing,
whi
le o
ther
s (C
olom
bia,
Hag
gar,
Jone
s) c
heck
onl
y on
ce a
t the
beg
inni
ng, w
ith n
o fu
rthe
r mon
itori
ng. S
ome
othe
rs
(Li &
Fun
g, Ji
axin
g an
d K
W) r
ely
on o
ther
cus
tom
er’s
ass
essm
ents
. A m
onito
ring
gro
up u
sual
ly in
clud
es 1
-2 p
eopl
e. T
hey
wor
k fo
r 1 o
r 2 d
ays,
with
the
cust
omer
pa
ying
all
cost
. Mul
tiple
CoC
ado
ptio
n in
crea
ses
the
burd
en (h
uman
and
fina
ncia
l) on
the
ente
rpri
se, a
ffect
ing
prod
uctio
n sc
hedu
les.
tim
e an
d re
sour
ce is
sues
due
to
mul
tiple
aud
its; l
ow g
over
nmen
t ins
pect
ion
Rep
ortin
g Re
form
in m
ost e
nter
pris
es in
term
s of
con
tent
, fre
quen
cy a
nd p
roce
dure
. No
sepa
rate
repo
rtin
g sy
stem
rela
ted
to C
SR im
plem
enta
tion
and
ther
e se
ems
to b
e no
ap
pare
nt c
hang
e in
the
repo
rtin
g pr
oces
s of e
nter
pris
es a
fter h
avin
g ad
opte
d C
SR im
plem
enta
tion.
How
ever
, the
freq
uenc
y of
repo
rtin
g ha
s in
crea
sed
afte
r CSR
im
plem
enta
tion
to m
eet a
ll re
quir
emen
ts o
f pro
duct
ion
as w
ell a
s C
oCs.
The
con
tent
s of t
he re
port
ing
syst
em, h
owev
er, h
ave
beco
me
mor
e de
taile
d an
d co
ver l
abor
pr
otec
tion,
fire
pre
vent
ion
and
safe
ty, h
ealth
, wor
king
hou
rs, r
est p
erio
ds, w
age/
sala
ry, l
abor
pro
duct
ivity
, pro
duct
qua
lity
and
labo
r saf
ety.
22
App
endi
x B:
Sta
keho
lder
dri
ver m
atri
x fo
r CSR
in V
ietn
am
Ope
ratio
nal
cond
ition
s So
urce
of
Dri
vers
Leve
l/typ
e of
in
dust
ry/s
take
hold
er m
ost
rele
vant
to
(A)
Stak
ehol
der
oppo
rtun
ity/
ince
ntiv
e (B
)
Stre
ngth
of
Dri
vers
(C
)
Proc
ess
of
resp
ondi
ng &
ca
paci
ty
(D)
Effe
ctiv
enes
s of
D
rive
r in
achi
evin
g go
als
(E)
Effe
ct/I
mpa
ct
(F)
Inte
rnat
iona
l po
licy
leve
l (I
LO
Con
vent
ions
; D
ecla
ratio
n on
Hum
an
Rig
hts;
etc
.)
BR:
CoC
s ar
e ba
sed
on In
tern
atio
nal
Con
vent
ions
G
ovt:
Sign
ator
y to
so
me
of th
e re
leva
nt
Con
vent
ions
SP
to d
eliv
er to
the
CoC
s fo
r win
ning
co
ntra
ct a
gree
men
ts
CF:
Con
sulti
ng/
busi
ness
opp
ortu
nity
IN
P: L
aw e
nfor
cem
ent
BR/
SP: T
he d
rive
r co
mpe
ls a
ctio
n, b
ut
base
d on
a m
ore
“top
-do
wn”
app
roac
h S
P: R
estr
icts
bot
tom
-up
initi
ativ
e fo
r SP
SP
impl
emen
t CoC
s in
or
der t
o w
in la
rger
an
d m
ore
num
erou
s co
ntra
cts
SP:
Cap
acity
to e
ngag
e di
ffers
with
in a
nd
betw
een
ente
rpri
ses
SP:
The
fina
ncia
l dep
t. of
ten
is n
ot a
ctiv
ely
enga
ged
SP:
The
sen
ior
man
agem
ent,
CSR
, O
SH o
ffici
als
mor
e ac
tive
SP:
For
eign
inve
sted
ar
e m
ost s
ucce
ssfu
l S
P: S
MEs
can
not
affo
rd to
eng
age
BR:
bra
nd v
alue
, re
venu
e ge
nera
tion,
cu
stom
er a
ttrac
tion,
lic
ense
to o
pera
te, r
isk
miti
gatio
n S
P: re
venu
e ge
nera
tion,
cus
tom
er
attr
actio
n (b
uyer
) W
K/TU
: Wor
ker w
ell-
bein
g
Gov
t: Tr
ade
&
inve
stm
ent,
natio
nal
law
com
plia
nce,
w
orke
r wel
l-bei
ng,
Trad
e &
In
vest
men
t Pr
omot
ion
(N
atio
nal a
nd
ente
rpri
se
leve
l)
Gov
t in
resp
onse
to
(exp
ortin
g an
d im
port
ing
coun
trie
s) b
ilate
ral
trad
e ag
reem
ents
S
P en
terp
rise
pr
omot
ion/
im
prov
emen
ts to
at
trac
t con
trac
ts
from
buy
ers
BA
pro
mot
ing
trad
e an
d in
vest
men
t
EN
T ar
e ex
pose
d to
co
mpe
titio
n an
d op
port
unity
W
K: Im
prov
emen
t in
wor
king
con
ditio
ns
EN
T pr
ovid
ed th
e op
tions
and
op
port
unity
to e
ngag
e
EN
T ca
n in
crea
se s
ize
and
num
ber o
f ord
ers
over
tim
e
SP/
BR: B
ut a
lso
tend
ency
for u
nsta
ble
cont
ract
ual
arra
ngem
ents
due
to
pric
e co
mpe
titio
n an
d la
ck o
f mai
nten
ance
of
stan
dard
s W
K: A
t tim
es p
iece
-m
eal/p
atch
y im
prov
emen
ts
BA
: Lac
k of
in
form
atio
n di
ssem
inat
ion
and
capa
city
rest
rict
s en
gage
men
t
TU
lack
cap
acity
to
enga
ge fu
lly
SP:
Une
ven
awar
enes
s le
vels
ham
per
impl
emen
tatio
n (w
ithin
an
ente
rpri
se)
and
enga
gem
ent
(am
ong
ente
rpri
ses)
SP:
For
eign
inve
sted
ar
e m
ost s
ucce
ssfu
l S
P: S
MEs
can
not
affo
rd to
eng
age
Gov
t: Ec
onom
ic
grow
th
SP:
Rep
utat
ion/
bra
nd
prot
ectio
n, re
venu
e ge
nera
tion
BA
: Inc
reas
ed in
tere
st
from
BA
mem
bers
; as
sist
ance
to p
rofil
e tr
ade
prom
otio
n st
rate
gy; i
ncre
ased
nu
mbe
r of c
ontr
acts
am
ong
mem
bers
23
Mai
ntai
ning
m
inim
um
stan
dard
s (W
eak
enfo
rcem
ent
of lo
cal l
aws)
Gov
t/IN
P: E
nsur
e th
e en
forc
emen
t of
the
Labo
r Cod
e T
U: S
afeg
uard
ing
the
righ
ts/b
enef
its
of th
e w
orke
rs
BR:
Ens
ure
impl
emen
tatio
n of
C
oC
SP:
Ens
ure
stab
le
cont
ract
s
BA
: Tra
de p
rom
otio
n C
F: C
onsu
ltanc
y op
port
unity
IN
P: L
aw e
nfor
cem
ent
WR/
TU/G
ovt:
Impr
oved
wor
king
co
nditi
ons
Gov
t/IN
P: W
eak
law
en
forc
emen
t T
U: L
ack
of h
uman
(C
SR a
war
enes
s &
ca
paci
ty) r
esou
rces
re
stri
cts
resp
onsi
vene
ss B
R: C
oC e
nfor
cem
ent
does
not
gua
rant
ee
impr
oved
sta
ndar
ds
SP:
Lac
k of
fina
ncia
l an
d hu
man
(C
SR
awar
enes
s &
cap
acity
) re
sour
ces h
ampe
r im
plem
enta
tion
SP/
BR: P
ossi
ble
incr
ease
in
prod
uctiv
ity
Gov
t/TU
: Wor
ker w
ell-
bein
g B
R/SP
: Wor
ker w
ell-
bein
g, b
rand
pr
otec
tion
Part
ners
hip/
st
akeh
olde
r/ci
vil s
ocie
ty
dem
ands
(N
atio
nal a
nd
inte
rnat
iona
l le
vel)
BR:
Res
pons
ive
to
cons
umer
and
civ
il ac
tion
grou
p de
man
ds
Gov
t: To
ens
ure
law
en
forc
emen
t W
K: P
rote
ctin
g w
orke
rs’ r
ight
s S
P: B
uild
ing
repu
tatio
n an
d co
ntra
ct s
tabi
lity
BA
: Tra
de p
rom
otio
n C
F: C
onsu
ltanc
y op
port
unity
BR/
SP: T
he d
rive
r co
mpe
ls a
ctio
n, b
ut
base
d on
a m
ore
“top
-do
wn”
app
roac
h S
P: R
estr
icts
bot
tom
-up
initi
ativ
e fo
r SP
SP/
TU/W
K/BA
: Lac
k of
aw
aren
ess/
un
ders
tand
ing/
ca
paci
ty re
stri
cts
resp
onsi
vene
ss
SP/
ENT:
Doe
s no
t re
late
to th
is d
rive
r. H
owev
er, e
nsur
es
bette
r wor
king
co
nditi
ons
thro
ugh
CoC
impl
emen
tatio
n
BR:
Bra
nd p
rote
ctio
n,
licen
se to
ope
rate
NO
TE: B
uyer
s: B
R; S
uppl
iers:
SP; W
orke
rs: W
K; T
rade
Uni
on: T
U; E
nter
prise
s: EN
T; B
usin
ess a
ssoc
iatio
ns: B
A; C
onsu
lting
firm
s: CF
; Ins
pect
orat
e :IN
P (A
): Le
vel/t
ype
of in
dust
ry/s
take
hold
er m
ost r
elev
ant t
o: N
ot a
ll dr
iver
s per
tain
to a
ll ty
pes o
r lev
el o
f ent
erpr
ises
/ sta
keho
lder
(B
): St
akeh
olde
r opp
ortu
nity
/ inc
entiv
e: W
hat d
rive
s ot
her s
take
hold
er in
cent
ive
and
wha
t is t
he e
xist
ing
oppo
rtun
ity to
eng
age?
(C
): St
reng
th o
f Dri
vers
: Whe
ther
the
driv
er is
suf
ficie
nt to
com
pel a
ctio
n (D
): Pr
oces
s of
resp
ondi
ng &
cap
acity
: Who
dec
ides
to re
spon
d or
igno
re a
dri
ver w
ithin
the
ente
rpri
se a
nd w
hat i
s th
eir l
evel
of c
apac
ity to
eng
age?
(E
): Ef
fect
iven
ess
of D
rive
r in
achi
evin
g go
als:
Wha
t are
the
leve
ls o
f ach
ieve
men
t at v
ario
us ty
pes/
leve
ls o
f ent
erpr
ise
(F):
Effe
ct/I
mpa
ct: e
.g. b
rand
val
ue, r
even
ue g
ener
atio
n, c
usto
mer
attr
actio
n, w
orke
r wel
l-bei
ng, l
icen
se to
ope
rate
, im
pact
on
natio
nal
legi
slat
ion
com
plia
nce
24
App
endi
x C
: Gov
ernm
ent R
ole
Mat
rix
- Str
engt
heni
ng C
SR in
Vie
tnam
G
over
nmen
t rol
e Sp
ecif
icat
ions
M
anda
ting
Defi
ning
min
imum
stan
dard
s fo
r bus
ines
s per
form
ance
, em
bedd
ed w
ithin
the l
egal
fra
mew
ork.
E.g
. set
ting
min
imum
stan
dard
s, th
e ac
tiviti
es o
f reg
ulat
ors a
nd
insp
ecto
rate
s, an
d leg
al a
nd
fisca
l pen
altie
s and
rew
ards
• Le
gally
cre
atin
g a
leve
l “pl
ayin
g fie
ld fo
r all
type
s of
ent
erpr
ises
- C
oncr
etiz
e, o
rgan
ize
and
mon
itor a
dequ
ate
and
com
preh
ensi
ve im
plem
enta
tion
of p
olic
ies
rela
ted
to la
nd u
se, i
nves
tmen
t, fin
ance
and
taxa
tion.
•
Def
inin
g m
inim
um s
tand
ards
for b
usin
ess p
erfo
rman
ce, e
mbe
dded
with
in th
e le
gal f
ram
ewor
k e.
g. s
ettin
g th
e ac
tiviti
es o
f re
gula
tors
and
insp
ecto
rate
s, an
d le
gal a
nd fi
scal
pen
altie
s and
rew
ards
. •
Build
com
preh
ensi
ve, a
dequ
ate
lega
l sys
tem
to h
arm
oniz
e em
ploy
ee a
nd e
nter
pris
e be
nefit
s, a
nd n
atio
nal b
enef
its, w
ith
rele
vanc
e to
the
inte
rnat
iona
l int
egra
tion
proc
ess
in o
rder
to fa
cilit
ate
and
enco
urag
e en
terp
rise
s to
enga
ge a
nd e
ffect
ivel
y im
plem
ent C
SR.
• M
odify
the
role
of t
he in
spec
tora
te in
ord
er to
pro
mot
e C
SR p
erfo
rman
ce in
ent
erpr
ises
. •
Ass
ess,
chec
k an
d m
odify
con
tent
s of
Vie
tnam
ese
law
that
are
not
rele
vant
to re
ality
, e.g
. leg
al m
axim
um le
vel o
f ove
rtim
e.
Faci
litat
ing
Enab
ling
or in
cent
iviz
ing
com
pani
es to
enga
ge w
ith th
e CS
R ag
enda
or t
o dr
ive s
ocia
l an
d en
viro
nmen
tal
impr
ovem
ents
. E.g
. ‘en
ablin
g’
legisl
atio
n; ra
ising
aw
aren
ess;
stim
ulat
ing
mar
kets
thro
ugh
publ
ic p
rocu
rem
ent;
fund
ing
rese
arch
; and
bui
ldin
g th
e ca
paci
ty o
f civ
il so
ciet
y or
gani
zatio
ns a
nd b
usin
esse
s to
enga
ge w
ith C
SR
Ince
ntiv
e cr
eatio
n
• En
ablin
g or
ince
ntiv
izin
g co
mpa
nies
to e
ngag
e w
ith th
e C
SR a
gend
a or
to d
rive
soci
al a
nd e
nvir
onm
enta
l im
prov
emen
ts e
.g.
thro
ugh
‘ena
blin
g’ le
gisl
atio
n.
• St
imul
atin
g m
arke
ts th
roug
h “r
espo
nsib
le”
gove
rnm
ent p
rocu
rem
ent.
•
To b
uild
up
a C
oC fr
amew
ork
whi
ch re
late
s to
the
mai
n co
nten
ts o
f CoC
s, w
hile
rela
ting
to n
atio
nal s
tand
ards
. •
Cre
ate
oppo
rtun
ity fo
r sm
all a
nd m
ediu
m s
ecto
r and
ent
erpr
ises
by
build
ing
a fu
nd to
supp
ort s
mal
l and
med
ium
ent
erpr
ises
in
garm
ent a
nd te
xtile
indu
stry
with
cle
ar ta
rget
s.
Rep
ortin
g an
d in
form
atio
n sy
stem
s dev
elop
men
t •
Enco
urag
ing
key
stak
ehol
ders
(ent
erpr
ises
, ins
pect
orat
e, b
uyer
s, e
tc.)
not o
nly
prov
ide,
col
lect
and
shar
e m
eani
ngfu
l and
ac
cura
te in
form
atio
n on
act
iviti
es a
nd im
pact
s, bu
t als
o fa
cilit
ate
supp
ortin
g th
e ca
paci
ty o
f civ
il so
ciet
y to
mak
e us
e of
this
in
form
atio
n, a
nd in
doi
ng s
o cr
eatin
g pr
essu
re fo
r bet
ter p
ract
ice
thro
ugh
volu
ntar
y re
port
ing,
whi
ch th
en c
an b
e us
ed fo
r tra
de
prom
otio
n ac
tiviti
es.
• Re
leva
nt g
over
nmen
t age
ncie
s as
wel
l as
unio
ns a
nd b
usin
ess
asso
ciat
ions
upd
ate
info
rmat
ion
rela
ted
to C
SR p
erfo
rman
ce a
t na
tiona
l and
glo
bal l
evel
in o
rder
to d
isse
min
ate,
adv
ise
and
guid
e do
mes
tic e
nter
pris
es to
effe
ctiv
ely
impl
emen
t CSR
’s c
onte
nts
as w
ell a
s V
ietn
ames
e la
w.
• C
onso
lidat
e em
ploy
men
t ser
vice
and
labo
r mar
ket i
nfor
mat
ion
syst
em.
• St
reng
then
ing
info
rmat
ion
dist
ribu
tion
thro
ugh
med
ia, r
adio
, new
spap
er, w
ebsi
te o
f CSR
con
tent
, ap
proa
ch, s
ucce
ssfu
l CSR
ap
proa
ches
and
exp
erie
nces
. T
rain
ing
and
capa
city
bui
ldin
g •
Dev
elop
CSR
trai
ning
pro
gram
in c
olla
bora
tion
with
rele
vant
sta
keho
lder
s lik
e bu
sine
ss a
ssoc
iatio
ns, b
uyer
s, fo
r inc
reas
ing
awar
enes
s of
man
agem
ent s
taff,
trad
e un
ion
staf
f and
wor
kers
abo
ut C
SR; t
he a
dvan
tage
s of
CSR
per
form
ance
, and
; abo
ut b
oth
impl
emen
ting
proc
ess
and
mea
sure
men
t, an
d us
ing
a co
st-b
enef
it an
alys
is fr
amew
ork.
•
Build
ing
the
capa
city
of t
he tr
ade
unio
n as
an
info
rmat
ion
prov
ider
to h
elp
wor
kers
und
erst
and
CSR
and
hel
p co
nnec
t em
ploy
ees’
ben
efit
and
ente
rpri
ses’
ben
efit;
to b
uild
cap
acity
in s
uper
visi
on; t
o co
mm
unic
ate
timel
y in
vent
ions
, ini
tiativ
es,
legi
timat
e re
quir
emen
ts o
f em
ploy
ees
to e
nter
pris
e’s
man
ager
s, k
ey s
take
hold
ers
25
Part
neri
ng
Act
ing
as p
artic
ipan
ts,
conv
ener
s, or
faci
litat
ors
with
in st
rate
gic p
artn
ersh
ips
and
in d
ialo
gue b
etw
een
stak
ehol
ders
• C
olla
bora
te w
ith b
usin
ess a
ssoc
iatio
ns fo
r the
m to
pro
vide
info
rmat
ion
rela
ted
to C
SR p
erfo
rman
ce o
f dom
estic
and
in
tern
atio
nal e
nter
pris
es; p
rovi
de in
form
atio
n re
late
d to
inte
rnat
iona
l im
port
mar
ket,
dem
and
and
requ
irem
ent o
f mar
ket;
orga
nize
sem
inar
s an
d w
orks
hops
in o
rder
to e
xcha
nge
info
rmat
ion
abou
t CSR
per
form
ance
am
ong
ente
rpri
ses.
• Ex
plor
e co
nsul
tanc
y se
rvic
e de
velo
pmen
t with
bus
ines
s as
soci
atio
ns, e
nter
pris
es, b
uyer
s, e
tc.
• C
olla
bora
ting
with
trad
e un
ions
on
rese
arch
pro
ject
s w
ith M
OLI
SA in
ord
er to
hel
p th
e G
over
nmen
t to
mod
ify th
e La
bor L
aw
and
rela
ted
mec
hani
sms
and
polic
ies
base
d on
ben
efit
harm
oniz
atio
n am
ong
part
ners
in la
bor r
elat
ions
hip
and
it re
leva
nce
to
the
inte
rnat
iona
l int
egra
tion
proc
ess.
• C
reat
e co
llabo
ratio
n be
twee
n en
terp
rise
s an
d M
OLI
SA a
nd o
ther
rele
vant
min
istr
ies
to re
view
rele
vant
voc
atio
nal t
rain
ing
curr
icul
a
• C
reat
e m
ulti-
stak
ehol
der c
onsu
ltativ
e gr
oups
with
par
ticip
atio
n of
rele
vant
min
istr
ies
like
Min
istr
y of
Tra
de, M
inis
try
of
Indu
stry
; MO
LISA
, etc
. and
oth
er k
ey s
take
hold
ers
to d
evel
op p
ublic
dia
logu
e an
d C
SR re
late
d st
akeh
olde
r con
sulta
tion,
ex
chan
ge b
est e
xper
ienc
es, s
olut
ions
or s
hort
com
ing
poin
ts b
etw
een
CoC
and
Vie
tnam
ese
legi
slat
ion
and
com
mon
con
stra
ints
fa
ced
in im
plem
entin
g C
SR; C
SR a
s par
t of t
rade
pro
mot
ion
activ
ities
. En
dors
ing
Prov
idin
g po
litic
al su
ppor
t an
d pu
blic
sect
or en
dors
emen
t of
the c
once
pt o
f CSR
and
pa
rtic
ular
CSR
-rela
ted
initi
ativ
es
• To
rew
ard
ente
rpri
ses i
mpl
emen
ting
CSR
effe
ctiv
ely:
est
ablis
h an
d en
dors
e a
“CSR
Bes
t Pra
ctic
e A
war
d” jo
intly
bet
wee
n M
inis
try
of T
rade
, Min
istr
y of
Indu
stry
, VC
CI a
nd th
e bu
sine
ss a
ssoc
iatio
ns
• To
ack
now
ledg
e th
at a
chie
ve C
SR g
ood
prac
tice
stan
dard
s with
in th
e do
mes
tic m
arke
t •
To la
unch
a C
SR w
eek
at e
nter
pris
e le
vel.
26
27
LIST OF REFERENCES Sub-segment Report: The Textile Sector, ILSSA-WB Initiative, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2003. Sub-segment Report: The Footwear Sector, ILSSA-WB Initiative, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2003. Segment III Report, ILSSA-WB Initiative, Hanoi, Vietnam, 2003. Codes of Conduct in Vietnam: Labor Content of CSR Codes of Conduct in the Footwear Industry in Vietnam, December 2003. Analysis undertaken for the World Bank by D. Feldman, G. Smith, F. Hoag, LLP, Washington DC and Bui Thi Phuong and F. Burke, Baker Mckenzie, LLP, HCMC, Vietnam. J. E. Berman and T. Webb 2003 Race to the Top: Attracting and Enabling Global Sustainable Business: Business Survey Report, Washington, D.C., World Bank. G. Smith and D. Feldman 2003 Company Codes of Conduct and International Standards: An Analytical Comparison (Parts I and II), Washington D.C., World Bank. T. Fox, H. Ward and B. Howard (2002), Baseline Study of Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility, IIED for the World Bank, October 2002. M. Warner, Diagnostic and Appraisal Tool, for the CSR Practice, World Bank. C. L. Hubo (2003) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Public Policy in the Philippine Mining Sector, paper presented to the International Conference on Public Policy and CSR, Washington, D.C. 8-9 November 2003. H.B. Joergensen, P.M. Pruzan-Joergensen, M. Jungk, A. Cramer, Strengthening Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chains, for CSR Practice, Investment Climate Department, World Bank, 2003. WB19080 N:\CSR\Vietnam\Final CSR Vietnam Report-Dec 2003.doc December 3, 2003 5:08 PM
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