Walkable development is not a drug

Talk at the Design for Health ConferenceMinneapolis, April 30, 2007

Jonathan LevineProfessor and ChairUrban and Regional Planning ProgramThe University of Michigan

Evaluative Framework for Walkable Development #1

Proveneffective

Marketinterventions

Market uninterested or incapable of providing

Market for walkable development

Essence of transportation/ land-use policy reform

What would justify transportation/land-use policyreform?

Evaluative Framework for Walkable Development #2

Choiceexpansion

Removal of obstacles

Municipal regulationconstrains market

Market for walkable development

Essence of transportation/ land-use policy reform

What would justify transportation/land-use policyreform?

Do Developers Want Greater Density than Regulations Allow?

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Central City Inner Suburb Outer Suburb Rural

All Respondents

Northeast

Mid-Atlantic

Southeast/Carribean

Midwest

South Central

Great Plains, RockyMountains

Pacific andNorthwest

Multi-RegionDevelopers

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40P

erce

nt

of

Sam

ple

Very StrongPedestrian-

NeighborhoodPreference

Mid-Range Very StrongAuto-

NeighborhoodPreference

Atlanta

Boston

Residential Neighborhood Preferences, Atlanta and Boston

The Gap Between Preferences and Choices in a Sprawling Environment

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Decile in Neighborhood Preference Scale

%

Liv

ing

in

Wal

kab

le/T

ran

sit-

Fri

end

ly Z

on

es

Atlanta

Boston

Strong Transit/Pedestrian Preferences

Strong Auto Preferences

Can walkable development be required (where the market isn’t interested)?

• Smart-growth codes

• Transfer of development rights

• Incentive zoning

• Inclusionary zoning

• Urban growth boundaries

The Development Request for Proposals

• Signal

• Market Facilitation vs. Market Forcing

You’ve selected a developer: What do you do now?

• Zoning code

• Other land-use regulations

• Variance – (and how to gauge success)

• Pragmatic Compromises

The Three Levels of Policy Reform

• Educate while leaving municipal prerogative in place

• Change incentive structure• Share land-use planning authority

between municipality and higher-level governments

Oregon Transportation Planning Rule

“…local governments shall adopt land use and subdivision regulations to reduce reliance on the automobile which … allow transit-oriented developments (TODs) on lands along transit routes…

Thank you!

Extras

Framework #1: Sprawl as Potential Market Failure (the drug model)• “[D]oes the invisible hand, which guides the

conversion of land to urban use, push too hard in the direction of bigger cities? Economists use the term market failure to describe a situation in which the invisible hand fails to allocate resources in a socially desirable manner so as to maximize aggregate economic well-being. Is a…market failure involved in the spatial expansion of cities? If so, the criticism of urban sprawl is justified, and measures are needed to restrict urban expansion.” (Brueckner 2000)

High-Density Requirements are Unenforcable because Capital is Mobile

Higher-density development offers…

Municipal land-use policy toward higher-density development

Development outcome

Greater profits than lower-density on-site and elsewhere

Prohibit Lower density

Allow Higher density

Require Higher density

Lesser profits than lower-density development on-site and elsewhere

Prohibit Lower density

Allow Lower density

Require Vacant

Framework #2: Sprawl as Potential Government Failure (the organic produce model)• “[T]he belief that sprawl is caused primarily by market

failures is based on the false assumption that there is a freely operating land use market in U.S. metropolitan areas. No metropolitan area has anything remotely approaching a free land use market because of local regulations adopted for parochial political, social and fiscal purposes. Most suburban land use markets are dominated by local zoning and other regulations that are aimed at excluding low-income households and that distort what would occur in a truly free market.” (Downs 1999)

Empirical Research on Land-use Regulation• White 1988• Moss 1977• Pasha 1996• Fischel 1999• Shay and Rossi 1981• McMillen and McDonald 1991• Thorson 1994• Thorson 1997• Peiser 1989

Zoning May Lower Densities and Accelerate Sprawl, but…Local Regulation is “the Free Market” (Political Version)

• “Smart growth is inconsistent with the American dream of a big home on a five-acre lot," said David Bliden, executive director of the Maryland Association of Counties, which opposed [former Maryland Governor] Glendening's effort as an unreasonable intrusion into counties' power to regulate building. "The concept of a higher authority, of a Big Brother, is inconsistent with the democratic principles that have to be intertwined with land use management." (Washington Post, August 10, 2004).

Tiebout Modeland Exclusionary Zoning

• “Each community is authorized to enact a ‘zoning’ ordinance which states, ‘No household may reside in this community unless it consumes at least some minimum amount of housing.” (Hamilton 1975)

• Otherwise, risk a game of “musical suburbs,

with the poor following the rich in a never-ending quest for a tax base.”

The Costs of Exclusionand How to Assume them Away

• “Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered. It may be assumed that all persons are living on dividend income.” (Tiebout 1956)

Constructing the Myth of the Market

Provenbenefits

Marketinterventions

Market uninterested or incapable of providing

Framework #1

Choiceexpansion

Removal of obstacles

Municipal regulationconstrains market

Framework #2

Scientific

Evaluation of

Smart Growth

Assume proof of benefit of smart

growth is ambiguous

In Framework #1 In Framework #2

Refrain from intervention

into markets

Remove regulatoryobstaclesregardless

Conclusions

• Market failure vs. government failure

• Travel-behavior science and the “neutral default”

• Choice-based rationale

Metropolitan Accessibility and Transportation Sustainability:Comparative Indicators for Policy ReformFunding:

EPA-STAR, 2007-2010 Graham Environmental Sustainability Institute,

2007-2009

Mobility

Transportation Capacity Expansion

Land-Use

Planning

Travel Demand

Management

Accessibility

Mobility Proximity Connectivity

MEANS

ENDS

Job Accessibility by Car, Boston and Atlanta 1995

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Population Percentile

Acc

essi

bil

ity

Sco

re (

mil

lio

ns)

Atlanta

Boston

Hamilton’s Three-Way Classification of Municipalities

Westminster, Colorado

Can Increased Property Rights Lead to Increased Production of Multifamily Housing? (From Mitchell 2004)

New Jersey 1970

60.2%15.9%

22.8%

1.1%

New Jersey, New Units 1970-1990

53.0%

18.3%

26.7%

2.1%

Pennsylvania 1970

58.6%18.3%

21.9%

1.2%

Pennsylvania, New Units 1970-1990

47.2%

24.1%

25.6%

3.2%

Single FamilyTownhouseApartmentMobile Home

The Fiction of “Unzoned” Houston

• Subdivision regulations, transportation standards, parking requirements still in place

• Deed restrictions are municipally enforced

An R-1 Zone is (nearly) Forever

• State of Massachusetts, 1970-1999– Existing single-family areas

changing to other uses: between 0.003% and 0.3% of 1970 single-family acreage

How a Libertarian Could View Land-Use Policy Reform• In fact, the market’s delivery of private goods is not related at

all to the scientific validity of people’s preferences. Markets can and do supply organic lettuce regardless of whether it really is “better” for your health. The market’s ability to deliver Miller Lite is not at all contingent on the resolution of the “Great-Taste, Less-Filling” debate. European consumers do not want genetically modified food regardless of scientists’ arguments that consumer concerns about such food are without merit. And people pay good money for light trucks because they feel “safer” in the vehicles even though scientific evidence challenges that sentiment. (Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, 2003)

By contrast…

• “The New Urbanist fall-back position that ‘...people should be given a choice’ is not plausible; there is no acknowledgement of the fact that markets regularly generate the more feasible choices while discarding the infeasible ones, based on opportunity costs compared to consumers’ willingness to pay.” (Gordon and Richardson 2001)

Even though…

• “An interesting question, especially with regard to infill projects, is whether these alternatives are acceptable to the community at large, as opposed to the prospective purchasers. There are many examples of broader community objections to high-density projects, usually on traffic-generation grounds.” (Gordon and Richardson 2001)

Proactive roles for planning

• Foster high quality of life at a range of densities through:– Design– Connectivity– Proximity/agglomeration– Open space– Persuasion

Local Regulation is “the Free Market”(Academic Version)

A“household’s ability to select a place of residence from among a host of fully autonomous jurisdictions offering different amounts of public spending” is tantamount to “freedom of choice in the public sector.” (Brueckner 2000)