1. Csc vs Department of Budget

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

TITLE: Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management (Carpio Morales, J.)

FACTS: CSC seeks to compel DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. By CSC’s claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act of 2002, while the total allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount to P285,660,790.44. It complains, however, that the total fund releases by DBM to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. To CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of its “no report, no release” policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of the following documents mentioned in the National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of the FY 2002 Funds:1. Annual Cash Program2. Requests for the Release of Special Allotment Release Order and Notice of Cash Allocation3. Summary List of Checks Issued and Cancelled4. Statement of Allotment, Obligations and Balances 5. xxxCSC contends that the application of the “no report, no release” policy upon independent consti bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional. DBM denies having strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with fiscal autonomy. It proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of

CSC’s budget was not on account of any failure on CSC’s part to submit the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues.

ISSUE: Whether DBM’s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is constitutional

HELD: The “no report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Such policy cannot be enforced against CSC without violating Art IX (A), Sec 5 of the Consti which provides:Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to CSC, a consti commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. Respecting DBM’s justification for the withholding of funds from CSC as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with the mandate of Art IX (A), Sec 5 of the Consti. If DBM’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or even every month that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate. Furthermore, the Consti grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Consti

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Commissions and the Ombudsman. To hold that CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Consti. The agencies which the Consti has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

Finally, CSC’s claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be rejected. For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Sec 3 of the Consti explicitly provides:Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to Consti Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. The plain implication of the omission is that Congress is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Consti Commissions below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.



TITLE: CHREA vs. CHR, (GR No. 155336, 7/21/2006); J. Chico-Nazario

FACTS:In the General Appropriations Act of 1998 (RA 8522),

Congress authorized the Constitutional Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy to formulate and implement organizational structures, and to fix and determine the salaries of their personnel.

Based on said RA No. 8522, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) proposed through a resolution the creation of ten new plantilla positions, the upgrading or raising of salary of some positions and the reclassification of certain positions.

The CHR submitted its proposal to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for approval. DBM Secretary, Benjamin Diokno however disapproved the proposal. Diokno reasoned that the reclassification scheme elevated field units to regional offices without actual changes in functions.

On the strength of DBM’S disapproval, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)–Regional Office rejected CHR’s proposed upgrading and reclassification scheme.

However, the CSC–Central Office reversed the decision of its Regional Office, and approved the CHR’s proposal. It reasoned that CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy just like other Constitutional Commissions, and as such its upgrading or reclassification scheme need not first be approved by the DBM.

CHR’s Employees’ Association (CHREA) filed a petition against the said decision. CHREA is a group that consists of rank and file employees who stand to be prejudiced by the upgrading scheme. They claimed that the scheme benefited only a few employees in the upper level positions and if

approved would eat a big share in CHR’s Budget that should otherwise belong to them. Their main argument for the scheme’s disapproval is that under the Salary Standardization Law, only the DBM has the authority to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification, upgrading and creation of positions.

In 2004, the SC rendered a decision declaring that the CHR does not enjoy fiscal autonomy and thus, any upgrading or reclassification of its positions needs prior approval by the DBM.

The CHR filed a Motion for Reconsideration against the said SC decision.

ISSUES AND DECISION: (1) Does the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) enjoy fiscal autonomy?

No. The SC ruled that the CHR, unlike the three Constitutional Commissions, does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

The SC said that only the following departments or offices enjoy fiscal autonomy as mandated by the Constitution: the Constitutional Commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the Judiciary. The bases are in the Constitutional provisions themselves. In all of the said departments and commissions, there is a provision declaring: “The Commission/Judiciary/Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.*”

As to the CHR, there is no express provision stating that it shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Instead, Art. XIII, Sec. 7 merely states that “The approved annual appropriation of the Commission (on Human Rights) shall be automatically and regularly released.” The SC said that the omission of the



statement vesting fiscal autonomy to the CHR is an express proof that the CHR does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

So, although the CHR was created by the Constitution in Art. XIII, it does not enjoy fiscal autonomy unlike the three Constitutional Commissions (the Comelec, CSC and COA) created in Art. IX, and specifically given fiscal autonomy in Sec. 5. The SC ruled that the CHR has limited fiscal autonomy in the sense that its autonomy is limited to automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations. (2) Is CHR’s upgrading and reclassification scheme subject to review by the DBM?

Yes. Under the Salary Standardization Law, all upgrading and reclassification of government offices need prior approval of the DBM. Even the reorganization of the Judiciary required the prior approval of the DBM despite the fact that it enjoyed fiscal autonomy. More so the CHR, since as previously stated, it does not enjoy fiscal autonomy.

As to the privilege granted to the other Constitutional Commissions by RA 8522 to reorganize without prior DBM approval, the CHR cannot invoke the said privilege. The reason is only the three Constitutional Commissions created in Art. IX has fiscal autonomy. * Art. IX, Sec. 5; Art. VIII, Sec. 3 and Art. XI, Sec. 14.TITLE: GAMINDE VS COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:

The President appointed petitioner Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. According to her appointment paper her term expires on February 2,1999.

However, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter opined that petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.

Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. Chairman De Leon, questioned her stay. COA, issued an opinion that “the term of Commissioner Gaminde has already expired.

Consequently, a notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99) was made, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999.

On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc and was dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the term of office of Atty. Gaminde already prescribed.

HELD:

The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows:



“Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

It was held in Republic vs. Imperial that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms.

Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.

Given the foregoing common starting point, the history of the line of succession, terms of office and tenure of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission shows that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by Pres. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.

However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

NOTE:

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between “term” and “tenure.” “[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.”

TITLE: Estrella vs. Comelec

FACTS: Romeo M. Estrella (petitioner) and Rolando F. Salvador (respondent) were mayoralty candidates in Baliuag, Bulacan during the May 14, 2001 Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent as winner. Petitioner thereafter filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan an election protest. the RTC annulled respondent’s proclamation and declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Baliuag. Respondent appealed the RTC decision to the



COMELEC and was raffled to its second division. A motion of execution was granted pending appeal. Respondent assailed the order of the RTC via certiorari to the COMELEC which was also raffled to the second division. Commissioner Lantion inhibited himself and was replaced by Commissioner Borra. The COMELEC second division nullified the writ of execution. Respondent filed before the COMELEC Second Division a very urgent motion to consider the instant case certified to the Commission en banc. The COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of the respondent. Commissioner Lantion participated in the en banc decision. Of the 5 Commissioners, Borra dissented. Petitioner argues that Commissioner Lantion’s vote in the assailed order should be disregarded because of his previous inhibition in a similar case and in the same case in the Division level, thus making said assailed order null and void as it was not concurred by the required majority.

ISSUE: WON Lantion should be allowed to participate in the COMELEC en banc

HELD: Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and absurd. Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3) members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The order thus failed to comply

with the number of votes necessary for the pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under Rule 3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. – (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote from the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just three (3) votes out of “all” seven (7) members of the COMELEC. this Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought before it by a majority vote of “all its members,” and NOT majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon.

Sa CUA case pinayagan cinount na majority yung 3 votes

TITLE: Alvarez vs.COMELEC and La Rainne Abad-Sarmiento

(J. Quisumbing)



FACTS: Petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the MTC ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.

On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when:(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and (3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that "decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory and not appealable". (Issues nos. 2 and 3 are not in point, so disregard them.)

On the first issue, petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on "preferential disposition of election contests" as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out that the case was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 1999 but the COMELEC En Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000, four months and four days after November 14, 1999.

ISSUE: Did the COMELEC violate its mandate on “preferential disposition of election contests”?

HELD: The Court is not unaware of the Constitutional provision cited by petitioner. It agrees with him that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively. It is also not unaware of the requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of submission for decision. The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten (10) election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility, misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the tribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the



framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.

Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to treat the case preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. It will be noted that the "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show.

Further, it is noted that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time. As private respondent pointed out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC when the case was pending before it. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction. On the matter of the assailed resolution, therefore, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on this score by the COMELEC.

TITLE: General vs. Roco

FACTS: Ramon S. Roco was appointed by Fidel V. Ramos on August 26, 1996 as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank level V. At the time of respondent’s appointment, he was not a CES eligible. However, during his incumbency, or on August 13, 1999, he was conferred CES eligibility by the Career Executive Service Board. On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V. Aggrieved, respondent Roco filed before the CA a petition for quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. On March 10, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the appointment of respondent Roco to the Office of Regional Director of the LTO, Region V, and nullified the appointment of petitioner General and ordered him to vacate the post in favor of Roco. The respondent’s argument is that a career executive service (CES) eligibility is all that an employee needs to acquire security of tenure in the service; and that appointment to a CES rank is not necessary for the acquisition of such security of tenure. On the other hand, petitioners in, claim that CES eligibility alone will not suffice. Petitioners contended that unless and until an employee in the career executive service is appointed to the appropriate CES rank, he acquires no security of tenure.

ISSUE: WON Roco has acquired security of tenure



HELD: No. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Tittle I, Book V of E.O. No. 292), provides that two requisites must concur in order that an employee in the career executive service may attain security of tenure, to wit:

a) CES eligibility; and

b) Appointment to the appropriate CES rank.

In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies. There is no question that respondent Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other positions in the career executive service. Respondent capitalizes on the fact that petitioner Luis Mario M. General is not a CES eligible. The absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment. , the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the

obtention of said eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary capacity.

TITLE: UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO DE TORRES VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave, but was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work.After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may



report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI-UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres.The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that De Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service.The CA upheld the decision of the CSC.

ISSUE: WON the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is valid.

HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The provision states:

"Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in

writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service."

UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ.

Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the Respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have



done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.

Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.

TITLE: Del Castillo vs. CSC, G.R. No. 112513Kapunan, J.:

FACTS: On August 1, 1990, petitioner, an employee of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was placed under preventive suspension by the PRC for "grave misconduct" and "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service." After due investigation, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits. On appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), Del Castillo was exonerated the charge.

On appeal by the PRC, however, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, and imposed

upon him the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner's MR was denied. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition for certiorari which reinstated the decision of the MSPB. However, the decision of the MSPB was silent on the award of back salaries. Petitioner, through counsel, he wrote to PRC Chairman Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only reinstatement but payment of back salaries as well. Petitioner was eventually reinstated on July 17, 1995. However, his claim for backwages was in effect denied by Chairman Pobre in a Letter to petitioner dated November 28, 1995 allegedly for lack of legal basis. Hence, this Motion for Clarificatory Relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not Del Castillo, who is exonerated in the administrative case and later ordered reinstated, is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his preventive suspension up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

HELD: It is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified.

When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held

Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPB's decision notwithstanding. A judgment is not confined



to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used, govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Petitioner's motion for clarificatory relief is GRANTED.

TITLE: Philippine National Bank vs. Garcia Jr.

Panganiban

FACTS: This is a Petition fo Review under Rule 45. Private Respondent Ricardo Garcia Jr. was a check processor and cash representative of the PNB Buendia Branch. He was charged by the latter with Gross Negligence for the lost of the amount of Seven Million Pesos on August 5, 19994.

The PNB-Administrative Adjudication Office found Private Respondent guilty of the administrative charge against him and was meted with a forced resignation without prejudice to any liability the court may fin against him. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but to no avail thereby necessitating him to appeal with the Publi Respondent.

Petitioner was thereafter privatized pursuant to EO no.80. Public Respondent issued resolution No. 967612 granting private respondent’s appeal after finding that the evidence on

record failed to establish neglect of duty on the part of private respondent. PNB appealed the decision of the public respondent exonerating the private respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB can appeal the decision exonerating the Private Respondent of the administrative case against him.

HELD: Yes, the right to appeal is not anatural right or a part of due process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by law. Under PD 807, the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction over appeals of administrative disciplinary cases, in which penalty imposed is suspension for more than 30 days; a fine exceeding 30 days’ salary ; a demotionin rank or salary; or, transfer, removal, or dismissal from office. This should be read hand in hand with section 39 of the same law which provides:

Section 39. Appeals. Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any. The notice of appeal shall specifically state the date of the decision appealed from and the date of receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds relied upon for excepting from the decision.



In Mendez vs. CSC, the CA construed the phrase “party adverse;y affected” in the above-quoted provision to refer solely to the public officer or employee who was administratively charged, hence appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty.

The court however overturned this interpretation in Mendez case in the case of CSC vs. Dacoycoy, saying that what the law declared to be final were only those decisions of heads of agencies involving suspensions of not more than 30 days or fines not exceeding 30 days’ salary. These decisions involved minor and petty offenses and to allow multiple appeals in those would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery. Nothing in the provision indicates a legislative intent to bar appeals from decisions exonerating a government official or an employee from an administrative charge.

Administrative cases do not partake the nature of criminal actions in chich acquittals are final and unappealable based on proscription of double jeopardy. TITLE: BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT or BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC (GARCIA, J.)

Facts: On January 12, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these – and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the COMELEC to participate in the

2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4) AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY.

Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the COMELEC an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to Director Alioden Dalaig of the COMELEC’s Law Department requesting a list of the 14 groups’ nominees.

Neither the COMELEC Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales’ requests.

Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of COMELEC en banc Resolution 07-07249 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.

Finally, COMELEC Chairman Abalos Sr. said he and other five COMELEC Commissioners believe that the party list elections must not be personality oriented. Abalos also stated that the



people are to vote for sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees. He said that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the COMELEC to disclose the names of nominees.

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.

HELD:

1. Yes. In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions

As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.

The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the COMELEC to deny the requested disclosure.

To us, the prohibition imposed on the COMELEC under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day.

To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of the party-list nominees.

The COMELEC obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the COMELEC virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

The COMELEC’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.

TITLE: SANTOS v. CA22 November 2000 | Davide, Jr., C. J.;



FACTS: Antonio Santos was appointed judge of the MeTC of Quezon City. He optionally retired from the Judiciary under R.A. 910, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the govt. service; and 5 years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. Santos re-entered the govt. service and was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). Congress enacted R.A. 7924 which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Devt. Authority (MMDA). MMDA issued Resolution No. 16, which authorized the payment of separation benefits to the officials and employees of the former MMA who would be separated as a result of the implementation of R.A. 7924. MMDA issued a Memorandum to Santos informing him that in view of his voluntary option to be separated from the service, his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 Sept. 1996, and that he would be entitled to separation benefits equivalent to 1 ¼ monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Sec. 11 of the MMDA Law. Santos submitted to CSC-NCR a position paper wherein he asserted that since the retirement gratuity he received under R.A 910 is not an additional or double compensation, all the years of his govt. service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A 7924.

Director IV Acebedo of CSC-NCR, in his opinion, stated that while an employee who was paid separation/retirement benefits is not required to refund the same once re-employed in the govt. service, for reason of equity however, it would be proper and logical that said separation/retirements benefits

should nevertheless be deducted from the retirement/separation pay to be received by the employee concerned. CSC promulgated a Resolution affirming the opinion of Dir. Acebedo. In Chaves v. Mathay, it held that petitioner cannot be paid retirement benefits twice – one under R.A. 910 and another under R.A. 7924 – for the same services he rendered as MeTC Judge. He can only exercise one of the 2 options in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. 7924:

(1) to refund the gratuity he received under R.A. 910 after he retired from the MeTC and get the full separation pay for his entire years in the govt., that is 9 years and 2 mos. with the MeTC plus 2 years and 8 mos. for his services as Dir. III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of 1 ¼ monthly salary for every year of service pursuant to MMDA Memorandum; or

(2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for his services as MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be deducted from the separation benefits due from the former MMA for his entire govt. service.

CSC denied Santos’ MR. Santos appealed. CA held that CSC was correct in dismissing Santos’ appeal from the opinion of Dir. Acebedo. It is equitable to deny his claim for payment of separation pay at the rate of 1 ¼ salary for every year of his service in govt, that is, inclusive of the number of years he served as Judge of the MeTC of Manila. Santos already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a MeTC Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be



allowed to receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay.

Rewards – are given to an employee who has given up the best years of his life to the service of his country. (GSIS v. CSC).

‘Common sense consideration’ stated by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in Espejo v. Auditor General, that if a retiree is being credited with his years of service under his 1st retirement in computing his gratuity under his 2nd retirement, it is but just that the retirement gratuity received by him under his 1st retirement should also be charged to his account. It is in accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court (Anciano v. Otadoy and Borromeo v. GSIS) that the claims for double retirement or pension such as Santos’ would run roughshod over the well-settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any person from receiving double pension.

Sec. 11 of R.A. 7924, which awards separation pay to those govt. employees who were displaced by the reorganization of MMA into the MMDA, should be construed to preclude govt. employee from receiving double gratuity for the same years of service.

ISSUE: Whether his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded in the computation of his separation pay under Sec. 11 of R.A. 7924, and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA.

HELD: YES. The retirement benefits which Santos had received or has been receiving under R.A. 910 do not constitute double compensation. He could continue receiving the same even if after his retirement he had been receiving salary from the defunct MMA as Director III thereof. This is but just because said retirement benefits are rewards for his services as MeTC Judge, while his salary was his compensation for his services as Dir. III of the MMA. However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A 910, would be to allow double compensation for exactly the same services, that is his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same service. It would be in violation of the 1st par. of Sec. 8 of Art. 9-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation. Moreover, Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of govt. service outside of the MMA.

1. The last par. of Sec. 11 of R.A. 7924 on the grant of separation pay at the rate of 1 ¼ months of salary for every year of service cannot be interpreted to refer to the total length of service of an MMA employee in the govt., that is to include such service in the govt. outside the MMA. Since it allows the grant of separation pay to employees who were to be displaced thereby the separation pay can be based only on the length of service in the MMA. The displacement amounted



to an abolition of office or position of the displaced employees, such as that of Santos. The rule is settled that Congress may abolish offices. Such power is a consequent prerogative of its power to created public offices. However, the power to abolish is subject to the condition that it be exercised in good faith. The separation partook of the nature of a disturbance of compensation; hence, the separation pay must relate only to the employment thus affected.

2. Santos must realized that Sec. 11 does not allow the tacking in of his previous govt. service. If he were convinced that it does he could have instead applied for retirement benefits, since by adding his years of service in the MMA to his previous years of service in the govt. he could have retired under the 3 rd

par. of Sec. 11: provided, that, if qualified for retirement under existing retirement laws, said employee may opt to receive the benefits thereunder.

3. After the approval of his optional retirement, Santos was fully paid of his retirement gratuity under R.A. 910; and 5 years thereafter he has been receiving a monthly pension.

4. Santos cannot invoke the 2nd par. of Sec. 8, Art. 9-B of the Constitution which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. The provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another govt. position to which another compensation is attached.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

Paras, J:Facts: Respondent Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He took his oath of office and assumed the same as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Monsod is engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years and is thus qualified for the position.

Held. Yes. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in



Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction

intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Notes: 1. “Practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.2. there were various definitions of “practice of law” cited in the case3. Liberal interpretation of “practice of law” by the Committee n Constitutional Commissions and Agencies:

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

4. Substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in courtrooms.



5. (Long discussion on how corporate lawyers assume responsibility othere than legal affairs) Revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice – understanding the major emerging trends in corpo law is indispensable to intelligent decision making. A corpo lawyer may assume responsibilities other than legal affairs. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. Corpo law and managing the business go hand in hand or are intertwined.(still practice of law; moden view)6. Defined: appointment; the appointing process (all of which, we discussed under the “Executive Department”.7. Judgment/Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is beyond judicial interference except upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

TITLE: PENERA VS ANDANAR

FACTS:

Penera and Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 2007 elections. Andanar filed a Petition for Disqualification against Penera and the candidates for Vice-Mayor and SAngguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period.

Andanar claimed that a day before the start of the authorized campaigning period, Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica announcing their

candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections.

Penera filed an Answer averring that the charge of premature campaigning was not true. She explained that the motorcade that took place was simply in accordance with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces where the filing of COCs was preceded by a motorcade. She claimed that in the motorcade, no person made any speech and there was only marching music in the background and a grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates.

While the case was pending, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Sta.Monica.

The Comelec Second Division issued its resolution disqualifying Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta.Monica for engaging in premature campaigning in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. But the Comelec absolved the other candidates.

Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration but the Commission resolved to deny it.

Commissioner Sarmiento again dissented. He believed that Andanar was not able to adduce substantial evidence that would support the claim of violation of laws.Penera filed the instant petition. A Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) was issued on the condition that Penera post a bond in the amount of P5,000.00



ISSUE: Whether or not Penera has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period?

HELD:

SECTION 80. Election campaigning or a partisan political activity outside campaign period- It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: xxxxx

SECTION 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a complete court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having xxx e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,e,k,v and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.

In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanar’s evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs, participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers.

Motorcade

The conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code. The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public. It also makes them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the voters.

With vehicles, balloons and candies on hand, Penera can hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.

QUESTIONS OF LAW

The dissenting opinion raises the legal issue that Section 15 of republic Act No. 8436 as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides a new definition of the term “candidate,” as a result of which, premature campaigning may no longer be committed.

Under Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is "any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties."

In view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the Dissenting Opinion argues that Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code can not be applied to the present case since, as the Court held in Lanot v.



Commission on Elections, the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited premature campaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a person may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be considered a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate to public office because there is no candidate to speak of.

The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the prohibited act of premature campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically impossible to commit at any time.

We disagree. Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended.

A close reading of the entire Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, would readily reveal that that it did not contain an express repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal is one wherein a statute declares, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed. Absent this specific requirement, an express repeal may not be presumed.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, harmony in the provisions of Sections 80 and 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, as well as Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is not only very possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with the legislative intent and policy of the law.

The laudable and exemplary intention behind the prohibition against premature campaigning, as declared in Chavez v. Commission on Elections, is to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between the popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The intention for prohibiting premature campaigning, as explained in Chavez, could not have been significantly altered or affected by Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, the avowed purpose of which is to carry-on the automation of the election system. Whether the election would be held under the manual or the automated system, the need for prohibiting premature campaigning – to level the playing field between the popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and the lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by allowing them to campaign only within the same limited period – remains.

Verily, the consequences provided for in Section 6844 of the Omnibus Election Code for the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning are severe: the candidate who is declared guilty of committing the offense shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or, if he/she has been elected,


http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/sep2009/gr_181613_2009.html#fnt44


from holding office. Not to mention that said candidate also faces criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.

The Dissenting Opinion, therefore, should not be too quick to pronounce the ineffectiveness or repeal of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code just because of a change in the meaning of candidate by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, primarily, for administrative purposes. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory.45 Indeed, not only will the prohibited act of premature campaigning be officially decriminalized, the value and significance of having a campaign period before the conduct of elections would also be utterly negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead of everyone else. Such is the very evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an absurd situation.

This fear is utterly unfounded. It is the filing by the person of his/her COC through which he/she explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the coming elections. It is such declaration which would color the subsequent acts of said person to be election campaigning or partisan political activities as described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code. It bears to point out that, at this point, no politician has yet submitted his/her COC. Also, the plain

solution to this rather misplaced apprehension is for the politicians themselves to adhere to the letter and intent of the law and keep within the bounds of fair play in the pursuit of their candidacies. This would mean that after filing their COCs, the prudent and proper course for them to take is to wait for the designated start of the campaign period before they commence their election campaign or partisan political activities. Indeed, such is the only way for them to avoid disqualification on the ground of premature campaigning. It is not for us to carve out exceptions to the law, much more to decree away the repeal thereof, in order to accommodate any class of individuals, where no such exception or repeal is warranted.

Lastly, as we have observed at the beginning, Penera’s Petition is essentially grounded on questions of fact. Penera’s defense against her disqualification, before the COMELEC and this Court, rests on the arguments that she and her partymates did not actually hold a motorcade; that their supporters spontaneously accompanied Penera and the other candidates from her political party when they filed their certificates of candidacy; that the alleged motorcade was actually the dispersal of the supporters of Penera and the other candidates from her party as said supporters were dropped off at their respective barangays; and that Andanar was not able to present competent, admissible, and substantial evidence to prove that Penera committed premature campaigning. Penera herself never raised the argument that she can no longer be disqualified for premature campaigning under Section 80, in relation to Section 68, of the Omnibus Election Code, since the said provisions have already been, in the words of the


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Dissenting Opinion, rendered "inapplicable," "repealed," and "done away with" by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. This legal argument was wholly raised by the Dissenting Opinion.

Nonetheless, the questions of fact raised by Penera and questions of law raised by the Dissenting Opinion must all be resolved against Penera. Penera should be disqualified from holding office as Mayor of Sta. Monica for having committed premature campaigning when, right after she filed her COC, but still a day before the start of the campaign period, she took part in a motorcade, which consisted of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles laden with multi-colored balloons that went around several barangays of Sta. Monica, and gave away candies to the crowd.

TITLE: Quinto vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Undersecretary Eleazar Quinto and DENR Land Management Bureau Director Gerino Tolentino Jr. are intending to run in the 2010 elections. Quinto running for Pangasinan Congressman and Tolentino Jr. running for Manila Councilor filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify Sec. 4(a) of Resolution 8678. Petitioners argued that the automatic resignation against appointive officials who file their certificates of candidacy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and that it gives an undue advantage to elective officials who are allowed to remain in office despite the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

Sec. 4 (a) of Resolution 8678 provides:

Sec. 4. Effects of Filing of Certificates of Candidacy. (a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. (b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

The Courted decided in favor of the petitioners. It granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena. COMELEC then filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the decision of the Court.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause; and (2) Whether or not the exclusion of elective officials in the


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equal_protection_clause

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manila

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congressman


application of the disputed section is germane to the purposes of law.

HELD: (1) No. As held in the case of Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. the equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold

their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-à-vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.

(2)YES. In the assailed decision the Court had previously decided that there is no valid classification because it is not germane to the purposes of law. However, the Court reversed its decision and Justice Puno explained:

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit that there is.



An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

TITLE: JOSELITO R. MENDOZA vs. COMELEC AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN

FACTS: Petitioner Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan,

besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. Respondent filed the Election Protest, which anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner to the Second Division of the COMELEC. The latter annulled petitioner’s proclamation as governor and proclaimed respondent as Governor also issuing a writ of execution (The FEB 8 2010 Resolution) directing the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bulacan to implement the Resolution of the Commission ordering petitioner to cease and desist from exercising his office and to vacate said office in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner filed petition for Certiorari with TRO to recall the “FEB 8 Resolution”; the COMELEC on the other hand set a re-hearing on the FEB 8 Resolution due to its failure to reach a majority vote on said resolution. As it turned out, the deliberation, which ensued, again failed to muster the required majority vote since, with three (3) Commissioners not taking part in the voting, and only one dissent therefrom.

The COMELEC and the Solicitor General sharing the agreement that the petitioner’s second petition was premature and violated the rules against forum shopping, the latter’s Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) issued the corresponding Writ of by personal service to the parties. Hence this recourse by the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the election protest filed by Pagdanganan.



HELD: YES. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondent’s Election Protest.

Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondent’s Election Protest was filed with the Commission "at the first instance" and should be, accordingly, considered an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the Commission."

The reliance is on Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution which provides:

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission En Banc.

The dissent reasons that it would be absurd that for a lack of the necessary majority in the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, the original protest action

should be dismissed as this would render nugatory the constitutional mandate to authorize and empower a division of the COMELEC to decide election cases.

We cannot, in this case, get out of the square cover of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. The provision is not violative of the Constitution.

What is included in the phrase "all such election cases" may be seen in Section 2(2) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution which states:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal of officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Section 2(2) read in relation to Section 3 shows that however the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, either in the exercise of "exclusive original jurisdiction" or an "appellate jurisdiction," the COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en banc.



There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed.

It is easy to understand the reason for the difference in the result of the two protests, one as original action and the other as an appeal, if and when the protest process reaches the COMELEC En Banc. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision.

So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmedTITLE: Liberal Party vs. ComelecJ. BrionFACTS: Liberal Party filed with the Comelec a petition for accreditation as a dominant minority party, and at the same time Nacionalista Party and Nationalist People’s Coalition filed a petition for registration as a coalition and asked for accreditation as the dominant minority for purposes of May 10, 2010 elections, LP filed an opposition to the NP-NPC petition stating that it was not a duly registered coalition parties at the time of the filing of their petition for accreditation as dominant minority party and it was filed out of time. The Comelec en banc granted the NP-NPC’s petition for registration but deferred the resolution of the NP-NPC’s application for accreditation as dominant minority. Hence, this petition for certiorari with prohibition.

ISSUE: 1. W or N the Comelec en banc has jurisdiction to

entertain petitions for registrations of political coalition.2. W or N the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when

it allowed the registration despite the lapse of time.

HELD: 1. The supreme court did not rule on the issue because of

time constraints, and reserve for another case and another time the answers to these important questions,



however, our dearest professor Commissioner Sarmiento has this dissenting opinion; “the comelec en banc had no jurisdiction over NP-NPC’s petition for registration as a coalition and accreditation as a dominant minority party, according to Rule 32 section 3 of the Comelec rules, the commission sitting in two dvisions, shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases falling under special proceedings, with the exception of the accreditation of citizens arms of the comelec. The present petition is within the jurisdiction of he Comelec sitting in Division and not of the Comelec sitting en banc.” CAVEAT: only a dissenting opinion from a resolution by the Comelec en banc but he is our professor, ahihi.

2. Yes, it acted with grave abuse of discretion. According to Comelec resolution no.8646 Aug. 17, 2009 is the last filing for petition for registration of political parties without mentioning organizations and coalitions, however resolution 8646 is simply a listing of electoral activities and deadline for the may 10 elections, it is not in any way a resolution aimed to establish distinctions among political parties, organizations, and coalitions. Thus the rule is, in the absence of any note, explanations or reason why the deadline only mentions political parties, the term “political parties” should be understood in its generic sense that covers political organizations and political coalitions. Thus the petition by the NP-NPC was filed out of time.


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