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Off-the-record comments onOpen Source and

US Transitions to and from Hostilities

In Relation to Information Sharing with non-DoD and

Foreign Parties

Subject of the Defense Science Board Summer Study 2004

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-01-DSB_SS_Transition_SupportingPapers.pdf

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-09-Stability_Final.pdf

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Most Relevant

• Ch. 4

– Strategic Communication

•Get thee a message !

• Ch. 5

– Knowledge, Understanding and Intelligence for the 21st Century

•Get thee a plan !

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The Bottom Line

“Finally, open sources of information can provide much of the information needed to support peacetime needs and stabilization and reconstruction. Open source information can be used to develop a broad range of products needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations—such as genealogical trees, electricity generation and grids, cultural materials in support of strategic communication plans, and background information for noncombatant evacuation operations. To establish and sustain a robust and coherent open source program, the under secretary of defense for intelligence should appoint the Defense Intelligence Agency as executive agent. In addition, the enterprise-wide data architecture for the intelligence community needs to be designed to support and exploit linkages provided by open source information.”

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Defense Science Board Summer Study 2004 on Transitions to and from Hostilities, p. xv <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf >

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Context of the Study• Iraq

– Brief, successful combat phase

– Subsequent realization that transition into combat was not as well informed as we would have liked

– Apparently-unanticipated difficulties in post-combat phase

• Traditional DoD reluctance to use resources for “ancillary” missions—OOTW …not “manly”

– e.g., peacekeeping, nation-building, humanitarian assistance, etc.

• SECDEF guidance to “plan for strategic success,” henceforth [A “sea change”]

• Role of DoD vis à vis other departments and agencies

• Then-pending legislation/appropriations to make Department of State “operationally capable” (Lugar-Biden bill)

• Recurrent efforts to “reform the intelligence community

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DoD “Management Discipline”

• The military planning process

– Deliberative and Contingency Planning

– Unapproached by other departments and agencies

• DoD Planning traditionally focused on combat “phase”

– Must be extended to peacetime activities, to stabilization and reconstruction activities, and to intelligence

– Must be extended to (include) other departments and agencies

– Easier said than done!

– Who else is provided “contingency” resources?

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The Vision• Standing Task Forces

– Contingency planning and integration

– Full-time, Multi-Agency

– Area and functional expertise

– One Task Force per likely conflict area

• Regional Combatant Commanders

– Portfolio of contingency plans that span peacetime, war, stabilization and reconstruction

– Complementary portfolio of intelligence campaign plans

– Readiness reporting on each

• National Center for Contingency Support

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The Focus

Importance

Likelihood

Humanitarian MissionsPromote DemocracyAttack the Drug Trade

Support threatened Allied RegimesRemove Hostile RegimesAttack Nests of TerrorismArrest Collapse of Failing States

Intervene in Middle East ConflictIntervene in Southeast AsiaConfront re-emergent nuclear threat

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Why is the Combat PhaseRelatively More Successful ?

• Military management discipline for combat—Planning, Jointness, Clarity of Command—not embraced by:– “Peacetime” organs of government essential to political and

diplomatic success

– Intelligence Community

– Stabilization and Reconstruction Organs

• “Unity of command” easier to achieve in combat phase—other phases involve multiple agencies and missions– DoD primacy in Iraq beyond the combat phase is/was an oddity

• Willingness to fully resource combat phase—”what it takes”—but not other phases

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Personnel Required

Peacetime Hostilities Stabilization & Reconstruction

……10 5 1 0 1 5 10 ……

Years

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Personnel Required

Peacetime Hostilities Stabilization & Reconstruction

……10 5 1 0 1 5 10 ……

Years

Personnel needsoffset by technology ??

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Cumulative Personnel Debt

Years 2 4 6 8 ……

Combat Personnel

Stabilization & Reconstruction Personnel

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Implications for Force Structure

• The force sizing construct used since WWII needs to be changed

– A smaller combat force may be needed for combat than for stabilization and reconstruction

– Technology has not been leveraged for S&R as it has been for combat

– Warfighting transformation is not likely to save manpower to offset S&R needs

• The implication for force structure is significant

– Tomorrow’s force (active and reserve) needs a stronger set of S&R capabilities and better cultural knowledge

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Effective Government-wide Direction

• Coherent direction needed to deal with “ripe and important” countries/regions

• Overall direction/coordination by President and National Security Council

– Would trigger aggressive interagency process

– National Security Directive to define roles and missions for State, Defense and NSC

– Permanent cadre in NSC for continuity within administration

– “Standing” task forces orchestrate the planning of extended campaigns utilizing all instruments of national power

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National Center for Contingency Support

• FFRDC dedicated to provide broad expertise and support– Continuity across administrations– Jump start and sustain Task forces– Core staff who are respected– Standing consultative arrangements

• Will provide– Cultural and regional expertise– Functional knowledge of, say, infrastructure– Administration, communication and logistic support– Deployable personnel– Red teaming and exercise scenarios– Technological expertise

• Also would provide planning support for Regional Combatant Commanders and (other) Departments

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Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities

• DoD & DoS must make stabilization and reconstruction a core competency– Requires a strong partnership with strong partners — DoD must

help its partners arq– DoD must embrace S&R as an explicit mission — helps define

the future force– Army as Executive Agent for S&R– S&R Plans must be fully integrated with combat plans — not an

afterthought/annex– Army should restructure Guard and Reserve forces accordingly– S&R should be core competency of GP forces, taught in the

schoolhouses, and exercised in the field– USJFCOM should develop, refine and publish joint doctrine for

S&R operations– DDR&E should ensure that technology is brought to bear– Money is ammunition—must be available and dispensable at

field level, with accountability

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Critical Capabilities for DoD Stability Operations

• Security– Robust ISR and ability to manage HUMINT operations– Adequate security force to ensure stability and safety– Military police trained to maintain order and ensure security– Ability to train constabulary forces and indigenous police

• Communication– Strategic Communication– Robust IO capability

• Humanitarian– Civil Affairs capability– Robust Engineering/Civil Engineer capability– Humanitarian Assistance– Authority and Capability to disburse funds locally

• Area Expertise– Language capability– Cultural awareness adequate to deal with indigenous population

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Strategic Communication• Strategic Communication (no “s”) includes

– Public Affairs

– Public Diplomacy

– International Broadcasting

– Information Operations (DoD def.)

– Special Activities

• 21st Century

– New technologies

– Global transparency

– Savvy adversaries

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• Requires unifying presidential vision and broad bipartisan congressional support

• Permanent organization within the National Security Council– Deputy for strategic communications– Strategic Communication Committee

• Chaired by above deputy• Attended by Under-Secretary rank• Develops themes and brand image• Coordinates and maintains focus, consistency and continuity

• Independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for strategic communication– Independent expertise– Monitoring and evaluation– Bridge to the commercial sector

Strategic CommunicationNeeds Repair

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Theory vs. Practice

• We understand the need for, and benefits of, strategic communication

• Yet, we are shocked when favorable stories are “planted” in the foreign press by the US.

• Does this hurt or demean Open-Source?

• [Hint: did we enjoy the practice of policy trial balloons floated in “pseudo” by Chinese leaders ?]

• [But, let’s not fool ourselves!]

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Knowledge, Understanding & Intelligence

• Stabilization and Reconstruction operations have information needs that differ from those of combat operations– “Cultural” understanding– Language skills

• Requires long-lead time, and long attention span• Much available from “open sources,” but a new model for acquiring

and exploiting them is required• Combatant Commanders must develop knowledge acquisition plans

that an intelligence component can/will support– Test, exercise and report on readiness– If the knowledge plan is not “ready”, neither is the combat/S&R plan !

• Intelligence “Community” must increase its competence and its capacity– Redefine Defense HUMINT– Fix open source– Plug language gaps– Services must professionalize intelligence and foreign area personnel

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History suggests …

• Mastering the minutiae sufficiently in advance and compiling and sustaining cultural knowledge and linguistic competencies require an effort and an attention span that have heretofore eluded those who make US policy, those who plan and conduct military operations, and the Intelligence Community

• Stark choices:– Put in the effort and sustain it to ensure success

– Place oneself at the mercy of “rented” knowledge

– Fail in the attempted undertaking

– Undertake only operations in areas where one has sufficient knowledge

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Criticism from a British Officer?“The other widely held view, amongst non-U.S. participants in theatre, was that the U.S. Army was too often insensitive to the cultural nuances of the situation. In practical terms this amounts to a variation of the ‘too kinetic’ theme, since the effect was potentially the same—to undermine popular support for the Coalition campaign.

“However, to apply the judgement of cultural insensitivity universally would be similarly misleading. Troops could undoubtedly be damagingly heavy-handed, as they could in any army, but there were many reported instances of U.S. Army courtesy and empathy with the local population. As an illustration of the contrasts, one senior Iraqi official who worked closely with the Coalition had his house twice subjected to routine search by U.S. Army personnel. On one occasion the troops displayed exemplary awareness of cultural sensitivities, such as appropriate treatment of women in the household. On the other, the aggressive behaviour of troops from a battalion newly arrived in theatre led to his formal complaint, with consequent apology from a U.S. General Officer.”

Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army,Changing the Army Counterinsurgency Operations, published in the Army magazine Military Review

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Intelligence Reform—more than moving boxes

• Coordinate human resource planning enterprise-wide, including government, academe and business partners

• Adopt new counterintelligence and security strategy– Analyst’s role to determine balance between need-to-know and

need-to-share– Alternative to “circles of trust” based on a priori “suitability”

• Improve integration of networks and architectures to support enterprise-wide collaboration

• Harmonize special operations forces, covert action and intelligence

• Accelerate Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) reinvention – Deploy in sufficient numbers to “ripe” countries years in advance

of need

• Improve “Open Source”

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Language Skills—Key Enabler

• OSD to coordinate requirements

• Schoolhouses to expand output

• Work with commercial suppliers to expand overall supply

• Track language capabilities as a part of joint readiness reporting system

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Open Sources—Knowledge at the Ready

• Establish and maintain a robust, Defense-wide (if not Intelligence-Community-wide) program

• Develop and promulgate enterprise-wide data architecture

• Role of the CIO vis à vis data

• Define “Open Source” broadly as accessible media of all types, as well as consenting experts

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Create/Upgrade OS Clientele

DSB Recommendation: Increase Country/Area Expertise

• OSD should provide resources (~$10M/yr) to Regional Combatant Commanders to establish offices for regional expertise outreach to support country and regional planning and operations

[An educated consumer is the best customer]

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Sharing with “outsiders”• “Outsiders”—non DoD and Foreign Parties

—may include:– UN members, in the peace-making context– Allies and/or Coalition Partners, in the warfighting context– State, Local and Tribal authorities, in the homeland security

context– (But,) not the US Public

• Link (e.g., hyperlink) open source materials to classified intelligence

• Use open sources as a surrogate for more sensitive information– As an enabler for “write to release”– As an adjunct/alternative to “tear-line” reporting

• Beware:– the dilemma of “protected intellectual property”– the “confirm or deny” pitfall

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To do list …

Prove Fermat’s Last Conjecture

Transmute Lead to Gold

Fix Open Source

Perfect Perpetual Motion Machine

Develop Multi-Level Security