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    February 2, 2011

    Hon. Catherine OHagan Wolfe

    Clerk of the CourtUnited States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit40 Foley Square

    New York, New York 10007

    Re: Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County,

    Docket Nos. 05-6408-cv(L), 06-5168-cv(CON), 06-5515-cv(CON)

    Dear Ms. Wolfe:

    The Oneida Indian Nation of New York (Nation) submits this letter-brief pursuant to the

    Courts orders of January 11 and January 18, 2011, to address: (1) the effect of the Nations

    waiver of sovereign immunity; and (2) its position on whatever further action by this Court or

    the District Court may be appropriate.

    The Nation respectfully submits that the issue of sovereign immunity is now moot and

    that the Court should proceed to address the remaining grounds for the district courts

    injunctions. The Nation suggests that, in doing so, the Court should begin with the question of

    whether the Nations land is tax-exempt under New York law. Affirming the district courts

    ruling on that issue would make it unnecessary to address any of the other issues on appeal. The

    Court may do so by following the guidance of the New York Court of Appeals intervening

    decision in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 251 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.

    353 (2010), which addresses a parallel state tax exemption for cigarette sales on federal

    reservation lands, or it may certify the issue for that court to resolve as a controlling question of

    New York law. As explained below, this Court may affirm on other grounds as well.

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    BACKGROUND

    In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005), the

    Supreme Court held that lands the Nation reacquired on the open market after a long period of

    dispossession were not immune from state and local taxation as a matter offederal law. The

    Court instructed that the Secretary of the Interiors authority to hold land in trust for Indians

    provides the proper avenue for [the Nation] to reestablish sovereign authority over the

    reacquired lands, rendering them exempt from State and local taxation. Id. at 220-221

    (quoting 25 U.S.C. 465).

    Within a week of the Supreme Courts decision, the Nation applied to have its lands

    taken into trust. As part of the trust process, the Nation committed to pay Madison and Oneida

    Counties anyand all property taxes, penalties, and interest that are held to be lawfully due on the

    properties at issue here, and it posted irrevocable letters of credit to secure that commitment.1 In

    May 2008, the Secretary of the Interior, exercising his statutory trust authority over lands within

    the boundaries of an Indian reservation, granted the Nations request as to approximately 13,000

    acres. The State and Counties promptly sued on a multitude of grounds. As a result of that

    litigation, the Nation has been unable to finalize the transfer of its lands to the United States,

    resulting in escalating taxes, penalties, and interest on land that the federal government has

    approved for trust status.

    Despite the letters of credit securing tax payments (including penalties and interest),

    Madison and Oneida Counties remain steadfast in their efforts to foreclose on the Nations

    1 Separately, the Nation and the City of Sherrill signed a compact that settles prior tax disputes,

    commits the Nation to pay future City tax bills, allows enforcement of municipal regulations, and waives

    the Nations sovereign immunity to enforcement. The Nation signed a similar agreement with the City of

    Oneida. There has been no post-Sherrill litigation with either city.

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    property. In the proceedings below, the district court enjoined the foreclosures on four separate

    grounds: (i) the Nation has sovereign immunity from suit; (ii) foreclosure would violate the

    Nonintercourse Acts restrictions on alienation of Indian land; (iii) the Counties failed to give the

    notice required under New York law in violation of due process; and, critically, (iv) the land in

    question falls within New Yorks statutory tax exemptions for tribally owned land within an

    Indian reservation. 401 F. Supp. 2d 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); 432 F. Supp. 2d 285 (N.D.N.Y.

    2006).2 This Court affirmed on the sole ground that the Nation is immune from suit; the Court

    did not address the other bases for the district courts injunctions. Oneida Indian Nation of New

    York v. Madison County, Oneida County, N.Y., 605 F.3d 149, 159-160 (2d Cir. 2010). The

    Supreme Court granted certiorari. 131 S. Ct. 459 (2010).

    On November 29, 2010, the Nations lawmaking body duly enacted a tribal declaration

    and ordinance waiv[ing], irrevocably and perpetually, its sovereign immunity to enforcement of

    real property taxation through foreclosure by state, county and local governments within and

    throughout the United States. JA5. The Nation notified the Supreme Court of this development

    by letter dated November 30. JA1-4. The Counties, in turn, questioned the validity, scope, and

    permanence of the waiver. JA6-9. The Nation responded to each of the Counties concerns

    (JA10-13), unequivocally representing to the Supreme Court that: (1) the waiver guaranteed

    payment of any taxes, interest, and penalties that were held to be lawfully due; (2) the waiver

    2 The district court also ruled that the Counties could not impose penalties and interest on taxes

    accruing prior to the Supreme Courts decision in Sherrill, because the law prior to Sherrill fully

    supported the Nations immunity to the Counties taxes. See 401 F. Supp. 2d at 230; 432 F. Supp. 2d at

    290-291. The Counties did not challenge the district courts orders in that regard on appeal; those rulings

    are therefore final and binding.

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    was perpetual and irrevocable; and (3) the waiver was duly enacted by the tribal council and was

    not subject to invalidation.

    Acting upon the Nations waiver, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded this Courts

    judgment. 2011 WL 55360 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2011) (per curiam). In doing so, the Court declined

    the Counties requests to refashion federal Indian law in a case where the Nation has removed

    tribal sovereign immunity as an obstacle to foreclosure. There is no reason for this Court to

    adopt a different approach; instead, the Court should resolve this tax dispute by applying New

    Yorks statutory exemptions for reservation land in tribal possession.

    I. The Issue Of Sovereign Immunity Is MootThe issue of sovereign immunity is now moot in light of the Nations waiver. That

    waiver is expressly perpetual and irrevocable; covers all taxes, interest, and penalties held to be

    lawfully due; and was relied upon by the Supreme Court in its disposition of the case. The

    Nation represented to the Supreme Court that it will not raise its sovereign immunity as a

    barrier to enforcement through foreclosure, and that it consider[s] itself judicially estopped

    from raising sovereign immunity as a defense to foreclosure actions to enforce state, county, or

    local real property taxes. JA11-12. Accordingly, sovereign immunity is no longer an

    impediment to the Counties enforcement of taxes through foreclosure. The issue is therefore

    moot. Jennifer Matthew Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dept of Health & Hum. Servs., 607 F.3d

    951, 956 (2d Cir. 2010) (question on appeal becomes moot when the issues presented are no

    longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome (internal quotation

    marks omitted)). If there had been any doubt about the validity, scope, or irrevocability of the

    waiver before the Supreme Courts decision, there can be none now, as the Nation is judicially

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    estopped from invoking sovereign immunity as a defense to tax foreclosure, because the

    Supreme Court has relied on [the Nations] factual representations and rendered a favorable

    decision. Adlerv. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 41 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999).3

    II. The District Courts Injunction Should Be Affirmed On Other GroundsThere remain three independent bases for the district courts injunctions: the taxability of

    the Nations land under New York law, due process, and the Nonintercourse Act. The Nation

    respectfully suggests that this Court address the taxability issue first, as it has the potential fully

    and finally to dispose of the case, either through payment under the Nations letters of credit or

    by confirming the district courts ruling that no taxes are, in fact, due.4

    A. This Court Should Address The Taxability Of The Nations Land UnderNew York Law, In Light Of The New York Court Of Appeals Decision In

    Cayuga

    The district court held that the Nations lands are exempt under state law from ad

    valorem property taxes under statutes exempting tribally owned reservation lands from such

    taxation. N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 454, N.Y. Indian Law 6; see 401 F. Supp. 2d at 231; 432

    3 The fact that the Nations waiver is expressly irrevocable and the application of judicial estoppel

    distinguish the present case from the voluntary-cessation line of authority upon which the Counties rely.

    The Counties hypothetical suggestions as to why sovereign immunity remains a live issue are also

    without merit. First, the Nation has committed to pay any taxes that are determined to be due on the

    properties at issue and posted letters of credit to secure that commitment; those letters obviate the need forforeclosure, much less eviction. In any event, there is no basis to distinguish tax eviction actions from tax

    foreclosure actions; the Nations representation (JA11) that its waiver provides the Counties with the

    assurance of payment under penalty of foreclosure necessarily includes any eviction required to effectuate

    such foreclosure. Second, whether the Nation might retain sovereign immunity in contexts other than tax

    foreclosures is not even remotely presented by the injunctions before the Court.

    4Upon invitation of this Court, the United States has previously suggested the same course of

    action. See U.S. Amicus Br., No. 05-6408-cv, 3-9 (2d Cir. July 25, 2008).

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    F. Supp. 2d at 290.5 This issue was fully briefed before this Court, but the Court declined to

    reach it in its April 2010 decision. The Nation respectfully suggests that the Court decide this

    issue on the briefs previously submitted, or that it invite further briefing in light of the New York

    Court of Appeals decision in Cayuga. That decision was issued two weeks after this Court

    ruled in this case, andby addressing a parallel tax exemption under New York cigarette law

    provides recent, intervening authority that should guide any future ruling on the Nations claim.

    Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the New York tax exemption for on-reservation

    cigarette sales applied to two parcels of land situated in the Cayuga reservation, even though the

    land had been alienated from the tribe for roughly two hundred years and recently reacquired by

    the Cayugas in open-market transactions. 930 N.E.2d at 247. Although the Court declined to

    decide the scope of New Yorks parallel property-tax exemptions, id. at 251-252, its reasoning

    supports a similar conclusion regarding their application to lands the Nation reacquired within its

    federally recognized reservation.

    1. The Oneida Reservation Was Not Disestablished Or DiminishedThe Nation contends that the parcels at issue in this case are not taxable under State law

    because (a) State law exempts reservation lands from taxation, and (b) the Nations property is

    part of the federally recognized Oneida reservation. See N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law 454

    (exempting tribally owned reservation lands); N.Y. Indian Law 6 (same). This Court has

    already held that the Oneidas reservation was not disestablished. Oneida Indian Nation of

    5 New York Real Property Tax Law 454 states that [t]he real property in any Indian reservation

    owned by the Indian nation, tribe or band occupying them shall be exempt from taxation[.] New York

    Indian Law 6 provides that [n]o taxes shall be assessed, for any purpose whatever, upon any Indian

    reservation in this state, so long as the land of such reservation shall remain the property of the nation,

    tribe, or band occupying the same.

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    N.Y. v. City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 167 (2d Cir. 2003). The Counties seek to relitigate that

    question (see Ltr. 6-9), but in its April 2010 decision, this Court expressly rejected the Counties

    contention that the Supreme Courts decision in Sherrill required (or even permitted) this Court

    to revisit its 2003 resolution of the issue. This Court observed that the Supreme Court in

    Sherrill explicitly declined to resolve the question of whether the Oneida reservation had been

    disestablished, and, accordingly, its prior holding on this questionthat the Oneidas

    reservation was not disestablishedtherefore remains the controlling law of this Circuit.

    Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 605 F.3d at 158 n.6 (quoting City of Sherrill, 337 F.3d at

    167). That conclusion was not altered by the Supreme Courts order remanding the case, and,

    contrary to the Counties position (Ltr. 6), the grant of certiorari alone is not enough to change

    the law of this circuit. Robinson v. Crosby, 358 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2004); see also

    Wickerv. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-158 (5th Cir. 1986) (same). Moreover, the law-of-the-

    case doctrine precludes the Counties from relitigating this Courts prior holding on the issue;

    whether Sherrill might have supported a different result is now settled. See Johnson v. Holder,

    564 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2009) (The doctrine commands that when a court has ruled on an

    issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same

    case unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise. (internal quotation marks

    omitted)).6

    6It also bears noting that the United States has repeatedly affirmed the existence of the Oneida

    reservation in New York. See, e.g., U.S. Amicus Br., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New

    York, 2004 WL 2246334, at *13-24 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2004); Department of the Interior,Record of Decision,

    Oneida Indian Nation of New York Fee-to-Trust Request 32-33 (May 2008), available at

    http://www.oneidanationlegal.com/images/news/7.pdf. Although the Interior Department noted that it

    would acquire the subject lands into trust even under its off-reservation criteria, a conclusion by this

    Court that the reservation had been disestablished would re-open an entirely new set of litigation on

    matters relating to the reservation status which already have been resolved by the courts, further delay the

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    2. Under Cayuga, The Nations Reacquired Lands Are Not TaxableIn Cayuga, the New York Court of Appeals held that New Yorks cigarette-tax

    exemption for sales on reservation land applied to lands thatlike the lands at issue here

    were reacquired on the open market within the boundaries of a federally recognized reservation

    after a long period of dispossession, despite the tribes lack of sovereign authority over the land

    under Sherrill. 930 N.E.2d at 245, 248-250. The Court reserved whether it would reach the

    same conclusion under the statutory provisions applicable to real property taxes. Id. at 251-252.

    Nonetheless, Cayugas analysis of provisions of state law that parallel the property-tax statutes

    provides a clear basis for this Court to conclude, as a matter of New York law, that the Nations

    property is exempt from such taxation within its federal reservation. Moreover, the plain

    language of N.Y. Real Property Tax Law 454 and N.Y. Indian Law 6 fully support that

    conclusion, and the New York legislature has not acted to amend either statute in the five years

    since the district courts rulings on their application here.

    Because the plain language of 454 and 6 and the Cayuga decision provide this Court

    with ample bases to predict how the Court of Appeals would resolve the taxability of the

    Nations reacquired reservation lands, this Court can and should resolve the issue. See Runner v.

    New York Stock Exch., Inc., 568 F.3d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that this Court resort[s] to

    certification sparingly, mindful that it is our job to predict how the New York Court of Appeals

    would decide the issues before us (internal quotation marks omitted)). But if this Court

    concludes otherwise, certification would be warranted. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 500.27(a); 2d Cir.

    trust process which the Supreme Court instructed is the proper avenue for resolving all of these disputes,

    544 U.S. at 220-221, and, in doing so, create enormous uncertainty and instability for the Nation, the

    community and the thousands of employees whose livelihoods depend on the continuity of its casino

    operations.

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    R. 27.2(a); see also Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. American Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 42 (2d Cir.

    2010) ([C]ertification may be appropriate if the New York Court of Appeals has not squarely

    addressed an issue and other decisions by New York courts are insufficient to predict how the

    Court of Appeals would resolve it.).7

    B. This Court Need Not Address The Due Process And Nonintercourse ActIssues

    Affirming the district courts ruling on the taxability of the Nations land under New

    York law would finally and fully resolve this dispute and would obviate the need to address the

    two remaining bases for the injunctions. Should the Court consider these issues, the Nation

    respectfully submits as follows:

    The district court properly held that the Counties failed to give the Nation adequate notice

    of the foreclosure redemption period and thereby violated the Nations due process rights.

    Relying on the New York Court of Appeals decision in McCann v. Scaduto, 519 N.E.2d 309

    (N.Y. 1987), the district court held that due process requires adequate notice of the statutory

    redemption period provided by State or local law, and that no such notice was provided in this

    case. See 432 F. Supp. 2d at 289-290; 401 F. Supp. 2d at 230-231. The States and the

    Counties contrary argument is unavailing, because it erroneously focuses on whether the Nation

    received adequate notice that the Counties intended toforeclose, not on the Nations affirmative

    right of redemption. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York Br. 90-101, Oneida Indian Nation

    of New Yorkv. Madison County and Oneida County, No. 05-6408(L) (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 2007).

    7 Should this Court seek guidance from the New York Court of Appeals, the Nation respectfully

    suggests the following question for certification: Whether land owned by the Oneida Nation of New

    York within its federally recognized reservation is exempt from taxation under New Yorks statutory

    exemptions for tribally owned reservation lands, N.Y. Real Property Tax Law 454 and N.Y. Indian

    Law 6.

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    The States arguments asserting the sufficiency of notice provided only at the end of a statutory

    redemption period fail for the reasons the Nation set forth in its prior briefing on the issue. Id.

    Likewise, the district court properly held that the Counties foreclosures would violate

    the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177. The Nation, however, represented to the Supreme

    Court that its waiver of sovereign immunity assure[d] the Counties payment of any taxes that

    are lawfully due, under penalty of foreclosure. JA11. In light of that representation, the Nation

    no longer invokes the Nonintercourse Acts statutory restrictions on the alienation of Indian land

    as a defense to tax foreclosures.8

    8New York suggests (Ltr. 3) that this Court remand the case to the district court to vacate its

    judgments to the extent they are based on tribal sovereign immunity. The Nation does not object to such

    a remand and limited vacatur at the appropriate time, but respectfully suggests that this Court should

    resolve the remaining issues now before it to avoid any unnecessary delay.

    New York also argues that, if the due process and Nonintercourse Act claims are dismissed, the

    state tax-law question should also be dismissed because the district court ought not to exercise pendent

    jurisdiction over that state-law claim. But the Nations state-law contention that its lands are not taxable

    is intertwined with the federal question (previously resolved by this Court) of reservationdisestablishment, over which this Court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and

    1362. See DAlessio v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 100-102 (2d Cir. 2001) (federal

    jurisdiction exists over state-law claims that depend on questions of federal law). Moreover, the Nations

    federal due process claims remain live, and the Counties point to no basis to dismiss them. And even if

    the Nations federal claims were dismissed, the Court should continue to exercise pendent jurisdiction, as

    this Court has long recognized that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is proper where state-law claims

    implicate important federal issues, or where the action has proceeded through significant motion practice

    in federal court. See Valencia v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305-306 (2d Cir. 2003) (collecting cases).

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