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Review: [untitled]Author(s): B. F. SkinnerReviewed work(s):

Principles of Behavior by Clark L. HullSource: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Apr., 1944), pp. 276-281Published by: University of Illinois PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1416955

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BOOK REVIEWSEdited by GEORGEL. KREEZER,Cornell University

Principlesof Behavior.By CLARKL. HULL. New York, D. Appleton-CenturyCompany,1943. Pp. vi, 422.When ProfessorHull firstapproachedbehaviortheoryin earnest,morethan a decade ago, the science of behavior was in a difficultposition.Twenty years of the 'naturalscience method' heralded by Behaviorismhad failed to providea consistentand useful systematic ormulation.Thecommonestlaboratory nstrumentswere still the maze and the discrimi-nation box, and experimentaldata reflectedmany arbitrarypropertiesofthe apparatus.Acceptableconclusionsof any degreeof generalityreferredto aspects, characteristics, r limiting capacities.While many of thesewere valid enough, few were logically compelling, and individualpref-erences had led to manyindividual'sciences'of behavior.ProfessorHullsaw the need for a logical analysisof the vocabularyof behavior,for anexplicit definition of fundamentalterms and an unambiguousstatementof principles. He adopted the rather extreme proceduresof 'postu-late theory,'and proposedto put order into the science of behaviorbycarefully defining certain primitive terms and setting up a (necessarilyratherlarge) numberof postulates', rom which thousands of theoremscould be deduced and experimentally ested. It is clear from his earlymemoranda hat he first regardedhis postulatesas in generalnot directlytestable,a condition which gives point to the postulatemethod.Deducedtheorems were to be checked against the facts, but the validity of apostulatewas to be establishedby the successof the theorems o which itgave rise.The cogencyof the postulatemethodmaybe said to varyinverselywiththe accessibilityof a subjectmatter. When a process cannot be directlyinvestigated, ts propertiesmay often be inferred from a study of conse-quences.This conditionprevailed n the field of behavior n the early30s,and Hull's proposalwas thereforejustified.The situationwas, however,changing. The growing influence of Pavlov and other developmentsinthe field at this time revealed he possibilityof a directattackupon funda-mental processeswhich would lead to a different sort of analysis.Hullwas one of the first to recognizethis possibilityand to encouragerelevantresearch.Moreover,he was not insensitive to its bearingupon postula-

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BOOK REVIEWStional procedures. n a memorandum f November28, 1936, he confessesthat "the 'geometrical' ype of deductiondoes not permit the readyuseof the calculusand thus has limitationsnot characteristic f the higherforms of scientifictheory."Insteadof abandoning he postulatemethod and turningto the higherforms of theory appropriate o a functional analysis,ProfessorHull at-temptedto salvagehis programby combiningthe two methods.In 1937he wrote that "the postulatesof the theoreticalconstructsare to be thebasic laws or principlesof humanbehavior.These laws are to be deter-mineddirectlyby experiment, o far as feasible,in advanceof theiruse intheoreticalconstructs.. The experimentaldeterminationswill be quan-titative,designedto revealfunctionalcurvesof basicrelationships.Mathe-maticalequationswill be fitted to . .. these curves; such equationswillconstitutethe postulatesof the system."This program,which he called'logical empiricism,'proved to be an unstableblend of two widely dif-ferent principles of analysis. Any demonstrated unctional relation be-tween behaviorand its controllingvariables s not a postulatebut a law,and there is little reason to continue with the ritual of postulates.Theresultingsplit in ProfessorHull's thinkinghas left its mark on the presentvolume. At one time the authorappearsto be working within a formalpostulate system; at anotherhe is consideringbehavior as a dependentvariableand relatingit to controllingvariables n the environment.Theseactivities are not always supplementary;on the contrary hey are oftenmutuallyharmful.The transition rom 'principle' o 'process,'or from aspectto functionalrelation,may be tracedin the changingpostulatesystemswhich Hull hassponsored.He began, in the case of rote learning,with a selectedset ofcurrent hypotheses, assembled for purposes of clarificationand heldtogether by a common relationto a field of research.By 1939 a roughprecursorof the present set had been constructed.It revealed the newinterest in functionalanalysis by referringto a group of basic processes(e.g., stimulus excitation, conditioning, motivation) in presumablyanexhaustiveway (the currentPostulate16 is said to complete the statementof primaryprinciples'). Some of these postulateswere in effect inverteddefinitions;others describedquantitativeprocesses.The method was nowbeing used, not merely for the logical rectificationof existing principles,but for the isolationof a systemof variables.The new postulates proved embarrassinglyun-hypothetical,however,and sometime after 1939 Hull retreatedto a more speculativelevel ofanalysis-the neurological.This is a surprisingchange, for we are told

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BOOK REVIEWS

that the Prirnciples ill remainat the molarlevel, as that termis used byTolman."Theobjectof the presentwork,"writes ProfessorHull (p. 17),"is the elaboration f the basicmolar behavioral aws underlying he socialsciences."Yet Postulate1 begins, "Whena stimulusenergy mpingesupona suitablereceptororgan, an afferentimpulseis generated ... ," and theotherpostulateshold essentially o the samelevel. Ourauthor s not alwaysat home in writing of neurology (as, for example, in the carelessstate-ment (page 54) that in reciprocalinnervationone muscle receives aneural dischargewhich is inhibitoryrather than excitatoryin nature),and we can scarcelyexplain the maneuverexcept by assumingthat theauthoris determined o keep his postulateshypotheticalat any cost. Theexigenciesof his method have led him to abandonthe productive (andat least equallyvalid) formulationof behaviorat the molar level and toalign himself with the semi-neurologists.The samepressurehas led to a misrepresentationf manyof his scien-tificprocedures.His 'deductions'are often concernedmerelywith showingthat complicated nstances of behaviormay be analyzedinto simpler in-stanceswhich have been, or are at least capableof being, studiedexperi-mentally. This is an unavoidabletask in a science of behavior,but toregardthe simple case as postulateand the complicatedas theoremis toextend the postulationalframeworkbeyond its sphere of usefulness. Inthe case of the postulateswhich are merely quantitativepredictionsofprocessesyet to be studied,'deduction'often turnsout to referto a directexperimentaldetermination,but this should not be confused with thetesting of postulatesvia deducedtheorems.To force simple scientificin-ferences into the postulative mold does not contributeto clarity, butrather o awkwardness ndconfusion.

Becauseof the unsuccessfulattemptto embracea functional analysis,the book will hardly stand as an example of postulate method. Sincethe book is likely to be receivedprimarilyas an example of method, afew defects from a more strictly ogical point of view may be listed. (1)There areno formaldefinitions,althoughProfessorHull originallyrecog-nized this responsibility. (2) Some postulatescontain as many as fiveseparatestatements, o that references o a postulateduringthe courseofa proof are ambiguous. (3) The symbolsnever 'pay off' in convenienceor progress.Six and one-half pages are needed to define them, but theyare used only to paraphrasewhat has alreadybeen said in words. Thereis apparentlyno instance, n the book of a productivemanipulationofsymbols. (4) Although the distinction between primary and derivedprinciplesis frequentlyinvoked, there is no adequatediscussionof the

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BOOK REVIEWScriteriaof primacyor of the level of analysisof the languageof the postu-lates. (5) The grounds for admission of a new postulateare not stated.Postulates are generally brought in when facts cannot otherwise be ac-countedfor, but this is not alwaysthe case. The tendency s now towarda minimalset, but this is not explicitlydiscussed.(At least two postulates,which refer to 'inhibition,'could be dispensedwith on logical grounds.Althoughthey are carefullyevaluatedwith respectto the statusof inhibi-tion as an 'unobservable,' o question is raised as to whether they areneededat all. Inhibition,as the obverseof excitation,requiresno separatereference,and none of the facts in Hull's chapterdemands the term inanyothersense.)Two postulatesmust be objectedto on more thangeneralgrounds.ThePostulateof Afferent Neural Interactionasserts that the impulses gen-erated by a stimulus energy are changed by each other into 'somethingdifferent.' Since no provision is made for determiningwhat this some-thing is, the postulatemay be adequatelyparaphrased y sayingthat it isimpossibleto predictbehaviorfrom the physicalstimulus.This is a well-known difficulty n behaviortheory, but we have come to expect fromthis writersomethingmore than an explanatory iction. Until the proper-ties of the resultingpsychologicalor behavioralstimulusare at least sug-gested, the postulate serves merely to account for failure to achieve arigorous analysisand makesno positive contribution.The same objectionappliesto the Postulate of BehavioralOscillation,which assertsthe pres-ence of an oscillatory inhibitorypotentiality'(it might as well have been'excitatory')which blurs 'the concrete manifestationof empiricallaws.'This is anotherneural fiction, with the single negative function of ac-countingfor failure to predict.In his introductory hapterHull inveighsagainstcertaintraditionalpsychologicalghosts, but it is doubtfulwhetherany of them is quite so ghostlike in function as AfferentNeural Inter-actionor BehavioralOscillation.

Predilectionfor a given method is not in itself objectionable.In thepresentcase, however, it has unquestionablydiverted the authorfrom afrontal attack on crucial issues. The importanttask of formulatingbe-havior as a systemof variables s performedonly indirectly.The 'pivotaltheoretical construct' s Effective ReactionPotential,which is said to bemanifested by probabilityof reaction evocation, latency, resistance toextinction,and reactionamplitude.These measuresdo not, unfortunately,alwaysvarytogether,and in the face of this difficultyHull selects 'prob-ability' as the best single indicator.This notion appearsvery late in thebook, and almost as an afterthought.It is not included in an earlier list

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BOOK REVIEWSof the manifestationsof habit strength (where, incidentally,the lack ofcovariationof the other measures s dismissedas unimportant),yet thesemanifestations hould be identical with those of effectivereactionpoten-tial. Probability acks the physicaldimensions of latency,amplitude,etc.,and might betterbe describedas the thing manifested. Effectivereactionpotential could, in fact, be usefully defined as the probabilityof evoca-tion, althoughProfessorHull would doubtlesswish to retain some refer-ence to a physicalsubstratum,he conceptdoes little more than assertthatthe business of a scienceof behavior s to predict response.This predic-tion is to be achievedby evaluating he strengthof a response(the prob-abilitythat it will occur) and relatingthis to other variables,particularlyin the fields of reinforcementand motivation ('emotion'does not appearin the index). FollowingTolman, Hull prefersto fractionate his proba-bility, identifying one part with reinforcement (which is then called'habitstrength') and anotherwith motivation (called 'drive').A similarly glancing and ineffectivetreatmentof other currentprob-lems seems due to the samemethodologicaldifficulties.We expect some-thing new and helpful in the analysisof conditioning,but are presentedinsteadwith threedemonstrationalexperimentswhich are ntended o revealessential relations in learning.By using the complicatedand unexploredmotive of escape (which is likely to confuse eliciting and reinforcingstimuli), the book tries to steer a middle coursebetweenPavlovianandoperantconditioning.But his essential characteristicsre admittedlydiffi-cult to find in the Pavlovianexperiment,and the highly verbal resolutionof this difficulty s unsatisfactory.Similarlythe chapteron patterningisheavily methodological,but to no real effect, since the problemis virtu-ally disposedof in the original definition,which limits patterningto thecompoundingof stimuliin the Pavlovianmanner.Although the book is not intendedas a factualsurvey,the quantitativerelationswhich the authorwould like to see in a science of behaviorareextensivelyillustrated.Exceptfor a certainautistictendencyto createap-propriatedata (one-thirdof the graphs representhypotheticalcases), theauthorshows his characteristic illingness to abideby experimental acts.The presentvolume probablysets a record for the use of experimentalmaterial in a primarilytheoreticalwork. The heavy use of mathematicsdoes not imply, as one might suppose,a more rigorousinsistenceupon afactual correspondence, 6r Bengt Carlson,who is responsiblefor the'complicated quations'at the end of many chapters,has been given toomuch freedomin his curvefitting.The fact that he is able to find 'simplegrowth functions'which approximatea numberof selected sets of data

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BOOK REVIEWSOOK REVIEWSoffers little assuranceof the ultimate usefulnessof that function,since hehas been allowed to use threeconstants o which fresh valuesare assignedat will. (In one instance (p. 276), Carlson describes hree experimentalpoints with an equationcontainingthree constants!) The mathematicssalso occasionallyratherwishful, as, for example, when detailed instruc-tions are given for 'calculatinghabit strength,' although no techniqueshave been discovered or makingthe necessarymeasurements.In spite of an extensiveperiod of development,the Principlesrevealsa programstill in transition.There is every evidence that the postulatemethodis being sloughedoff (compare he earlierMathematico-deductiveTheory), but Professor Hull has not yet made full use of an outrightfunctional analysis.The uncertain theoreticalposition of the book willnot lessen its stimulatingeffect in the field of behaviortheory.More im-portant,perhaps, is the researchwhich will certainlyfollow. The bookis wide open to experimentalattack,and it is only fair to add that theauthorplannedit that way.Universityof Minnesota B. F. SKINNER

Lewin's Topologicaland VectorPsychology:A Digest and a Critique.By ROBERTW. LEEPER,Eugene, Oregon. University of Oregon Pub-lications,Studies in Psychology,No. 1. 1943. Pp. ix, 218.The author of this acutemonographhas placed psychologistsunder avery considerableobligation. The growth of Lewin's topological andvectorpsychologyhas been so rapidand so productiveof intriguingexperi-mental work that serious and comprehensiveconceptual criticism haslagged. Perhapsit is fortunatethat the task is so formidable,since thiscircumstance as resulted n its electionby a reallycompetentand carefulcritic.There is such a thing as strategy n scienceand Lewin, with his long-standinginterestin what he calls the comparative cience of the sciences(vergleichende Wissenschaftslehre),has shown an incomparableappre-ciationof it. Indeed,his whole psychologicalproductionmight be regardedas a single experiment n that field. He has seen the utility for scientificinquiryof neglecting,temporarily, ertain stubbornand difficultproblemsin the conviction hat theymight yield morereadilyafter a certainamountof progress n other directions.To use a currentmilitarymetaphor,he has"flowed round" a number of "strong points" or "hedgehogs"in hiscampaignagainst the unknown with resultswhich his critic concedes tobe spectacular.But eventuallythese strong points must be reduced orthe attackbecome dangerouslyover-extendedand lose in solidity. Leeper

offers little assuranceof the ultimate usefulnessof that function,since hehas been allowed to use threeconstants o which fresh valuesare assignedat will. (In one instance (p. 276), Carlson describes hree experimentalpoints with an equationcontainingthree constants!) The mathematicssalso occasionallyratherwishful, as, for example, when detailed instruc-tions are given for 'calculatinghabit strength,' although no techniqueshave been discovered or makingthe necessarymeasurements.In spite of an extensiveperiod of development,the Principlesrevealsa programstill in transition.There is every evidence that the postulatemethodis being sloughedoff (compare he earlierMathematico-deductiveTheory), but Professor Hull has not yet made full use of an outrightfunctional analysis.The uncertain theoreticalposition of the book willnot lessen its stimulatingeffect in the field of behaviortheory.More im-portant,perhaps, is the researchwhich will certainlyfollow. The bookis wide open to experimentalattack,and it is only fair to add that theauthorplannedit that way.Universityof Minnesota B. F. SKINNER

Lewin's Topologicaland VectorPsychology:A Digest and a Critique.By ROBERTW. LEEPER,Eugene, Oregon. University of Oregon Pub-lications,Studies in Psychology,No. 1. 1943. Pp. ix, 218.The author of this acutemonographhas placed psychologistsunder avery considerableobligation. The growth of Lewin's topological andvectorpsychologyhas been so rapidand so productiveof intriguingexperi-mental work that serious and comprehensiveconceptual criticism haslagged. Perhapsit is fortunatethat the task is so formidable,since thiscircumstance as resulted n its electionby a reallycompetentand carefulcritic.There is such a thing as strategy n scienceand Lewin, with his long-standinginterestin what he calls the comparative cience of the sciences(vergleichende Wissenschaftslehre),has shown an incomparableappre-ciationof it. Indeed,his whole psychologicalproductionmight be regardedas a single experiment n that field. He has seen the utility for scientificinquiryof neglecting,temporarily, ertain stubbornand difficultproblemsin the conviction hat theymight yield morereadilyafter a certainamountof progress n other directions.To use a currentmilitarymetaphor,he has"flowed round" a number of "strong points" or "hedgehogs"in hiscampaignagainst the unknown with resultswhich his critic concedes tobe spectacular.But eventuallythese strong points must be reduced orthe attackbecome dangerouslyover-extendedand lose in solidity. Leeper

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