1349323703 Mayors Discussion Paper

8/12/2019 1349323703 Mayors Discussion Paper

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AUSTRALIAN MAYORS:

What Can and Should They Do?A Discussion Paper

Graham Sansom

September 2012

Citingthisreport

Sansom,G.AustralianMayors:WhatCanandShouldTheyDo?,UTS:

Centrefor LocalGovernment,UniversityofTechnology,Sydney,

September2012

Forfurtherinformation,pleasecontact:

UTS:Centrefor LocalGovernment

POBOX123

BroadwayNSW2007

Australia

Email:[email protected]


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AUSTRALIANMAYORS:WHATCANANDSHOULDTHEYDO?

3

Contents

Preface 4

ExecutiveSummary 5

1. Introduction 7

2. Governance,PlanningandLeadership 8

3. Australiancontextandpractice 12

ElectionandRoleofMayors 13

4. DevelopmentsinEnglandandNewZealand 20

England 20

NewZealand

22

5. TowardsamodelforAustralianmayors 24

Themeritsofpopularelection 24

Theneedforstrongercommunityleadership 25

Ensuringeffectivestrategicandcorporateplanning 26

Enhancingpoliticalgovernance 27

Therespectiverolesofmayorsandchiefexecutives 27

Intergovernment

relations

28

6. Conclusion:aframeworkforlegislation 30

References 33

Attachment:ElectionandRolesofAustralianMayors 35


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4

Preface

OneofthemostimportantobjectivesoftheAustralianCentreofExcellenceforLocalGovernment

(ACELG)istosupportinformeddebateonkeypolicyissues. Werecognisethatmanycouncilsand

otherlocalgovernmentorganisationsarenotalwaysabletoundertakesufficientbackground

researchto

underpin

develop

sound,

evidence

based

policy.

ACELGs

working

paper

series

seeks

to

addressthisdeficit.

Thispaperonthechangingroleofmayors,andhowthatrolemightbestrengthened,seekstofill

oneofseveralsignificantgapsinresearchanddiscussionofpoliticalgovernanceinAustralianlocal

government. ItreviewsrelevantliteratureandrecentdevelopmentsinAustralia,NewZealandand

theUK,andconcludesthatiflocalgovernmentistoperformeffectivelyandmeetgrowing

communityexpectations,thecapacityofitspoliticalarmneedstobeenhanced.Inthatregard,the

officeofmayorseemsagoodplacetostart.Thefinalsectionofthepaperthussetsoutasuggested

frameworkofmayoralfunctionsandassociatedlegislativeprovisionstosupportanenhancedrole.

ThispapercomplementstherecentACELGpaperPoliticalManagementinAustralianLocal

Government:ExploringRolesandRelationshipsbetweenMayorsandCEOswrittenbyChrisAulich

andJohnMartin,aswellasnewresearchbeingledbytheUTSCentreofLocalGovernment(CLG)

whichcoversdifferentdimensionsofpoliticalgovernance.

Researchforthispaperinvolvedwideranginginterviewsandconsultationswithmayors,chief

executives,governmentofficialsandstakeholderrepresentativesinallthreecountries.The

contributionsofallthoseinvolvedaregratefullyacknowledged.ThanksarealsoduetoSuFeiTanof

theUTSCentreforLocalGovernment,whoundertooksomeofthebackgroundresearch;andto

NancyLy,

also

of

UTS:CLG,

who

formatted

the

final

report.

Specialmentionmustalsobemadeofthetwopartnerorganisationsthatsupportedtheproject:

TheCommonwealthSecretariatwhichprovidedtravelfundsfortwovisitstotheUK

TheVictoriaUniversityofWellington,NewZealand,whichawardedmethe201112DonTrow

FellowshipintheCentreforAccounting,GovernanceandTaxationResearchmuchofthe

researchandwritingofthispaperwascompletedduringvisitstoVUW.

Asalways,ACELGwelcomescommentonthispaper.Wewouldalsoappreciateinputfromlocal

governmentpractitionersandotherstakeholdersregardingpolicyareasthatshouldberesearched

inthe

future.

In

both

cases,

please

contact

our

Research

Program

Manager:

[email protected]

GrahamSansom

ProfessorandDirector

AustraliaCentreforExcellenceinLocalGovernment


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5

Executive Summary

Recentdecadeshaveseensignificantdevelopmentsintheroleofmayorsacrosstheworld.These

developmentshavemirroredthewideninginternationaldiscourseonlocalgovernanceandcivic

leadership,andarepartofbroaderchangessweepingthroughlocalgovernment.

Australianlocalgovernmentshavebeensubjecttowiderangingreformsthathaveaddressed

structureandefficiency,strategicplanning,assetandfinancialmanagement,community

engagementandaccountability,andcorporategovernance.However,littleattentionhasbeengiven

tohowtheintendeddirectionofsuchreformsinteractswithframeworksforpoliticaland

communitygovernance.Thiscontrastsmarkedlywiththeconsistentfocusontrendsinlocalpolitics

evidentintheUnitedStates,UnitedKingdomandEurope.Inthosecountriesparticularattentionhas

beengiventotheimportanceofmayorsascivicleaders,andtherehasbeenextensivedebateabout,

amongstotherthings,howtheroleofmayorsshouldbestructuredandevolve,aswellasthe

relativemeritsofdifferentmodelsofgovernance.

Thispaperseekstofillthatgapatleastinpart.ItbuildsonrecentpracticeanddebateinAustralia,

NewZealandandEnglandtoexploreapossibleAustralianmodelforwhatmightbedescribedasa

semiexecutivemayor:onewithmoreresponsibilitiesandgreaterauthoritythanisgenerallythe

caseatpresent,butwhoremainssubjecttoaseparationofpowersbetweenthepoliticalrealmof

policyandstrategyontheonehand,andthemanagementrealmofadministrationandprogram

implementationontheother.

Whatemergesstronglyfromboththeliteratureandinternationaldiscourseisaperceivedneedfor

whathasbeendescribedaslocalfacilitativeleadershiporplacebasedleadershipgroundedin

localgovernment

and,

in

particular,

the

office

of

mayor.

It

is

argued

that

more

effective

civic

leaders

arerequiredinorderto,amongotherthings:

Engagethecommunityandotherlocalstakeholdersinformulatingastrategicvisionand

supportingplans

Securepoliticalsupportwithinthebodypoliticfortheadoptionandconcerted,consistent

implementationofstrategicplansandassociatedbudgets

Maintainongoingpartnershipswithothersinvolvedinimplementation,especiallysoundinter

governmentrelationsinwhichthelocalvoiceisheardandrespected.

InAustralia,

specification

of

the

responsibilities

and

authority

of

mayors

varies

greatly

both

within

andbetweenthestatesandNorthernTerritory,butapartfromQueensland,attitudestotheroleof

mayorscouldfairlybedescribedasambivalent.Thereisanapparentreluctancetoinstitutionalise

stronglocalleadershipthroughtheofficeofmayor,andonlyinTasmania,WesternAustraliaandthe

CityofAdelaidearemayorsspecificallytaskedwiththatresponsibility.However,recentlegislationto

furtherenhancetheroleandauthorityofQueenslandmayors,andtointroduceadirectly(popularly)

electedmayorfortheCityofGeelonginVictoria,appeartoreflectagrowingbeliefthatmore

effectivecivicleadershipisneeded,andcanbeseenasemblematicofabroadershiftinthat

direction.

Suchdevelopments

echo

moves

in

New

Zealand

and

the

UK,

where

popularly

elected

mayors

with

significantlyincreasedresponsibilitieshavebeenintroducedinAucklandandanumberofEnglish


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6

cities.TheNewZealandgovernmenthasannouncedplanstoextendtheAucklandmodeltoall

mayorsacrossthecountry,givingthemtheauthoritytoappointdeputymayors,toestablish

committeesandtoapprovecommitteechairpersons,andtoexerciseleadershipoverthe

developmentofplans,policiesandbudgets.

Thefinal

section

of

this

paper

outlines

alegislative

framework

that

might

be

applied

in

Australia

to

enablemayorstoexercisefacilitative,placebasedleadership.Itsuggestsasetofprincipalmayoral

functionsandprerogatives,andlegislativeprovisionsthatwouldgiveeffecttothem.Where

possible,thoseprovisionsdrawonanexistingAustralianlocalgovernmentAct.

Theindicativeframeworkreflectsaconclusionthatthefunctionsofmayorswhoarealready

generallyacknowledgedastheprincipalmemberoftheircouncilsshouldbeupdatedandre

codifiedtomatchotherchangesthathaveoccurredinAustralianlocalgovernment.Exceptin

Queensland,thestructuresandnormsofpoliticalgovernancehavelargelyfailedtokeeppacewith

theexpandedfunctionsoflocalgovernment,andespeciallythegrowingexpectationthatcouncils

willact

more

strategically

to

reflect

and

represent

the

needs

and

aspirations

of

their

communities,

andtoensuresoundmanagementofcommunityassets.Thesegoalscannotbeachievedunlessthe

politicalarmoflocalgovernmenthasthecapacitytodischargeitsresponsibilitieseffectively

alongsidethoseofmanagement.Tobuildthatcapacity,theofficeofmayorseemsagoodplaceto

start.


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7

1. Introduction

Recentdecadeshaveseensignificantdevelopmentsintheroleofmayorsacrosstheworld.For

example,legislationhasprovidedformayorswithsubstantialexecutivepowersinbothEnglandand

SouthAfrica;inNewZealand,themayorofthenewAucklandsupercityhasbeengiven

considerablyincreased

responsibilities

and

authority

than

his

counterparts

across

the

rest

of

the

country;whilstinAustraliathereissomeevidenceofatrendtowardsstrongermayorsandthere

havebeenspecificlegislativeamendmentsintwostatesthatreflectemergingideasonthisissue.

Thispaperexploresapossiblemodelforwhatmightbedescribedasasemiexecutivemayor:one

withmoreresponsibilitiesandgreaterauthoritythanisgenerallythecaseatpresent,butwho

remainssubjecttoaseparationofpowersbetweenthepoliticalrealmofpolicyandstrategyonthe

onehand,andthemanagementrealmofadministrationandprogramimplementationontheother.

ItfocusesprimarilyontheAustraliancontext,butwithreferencealsotorecentpracticeanddebates

inEnglandandNewZealand.Itdrawsonliterature,casestudiesandinterviewswithmayors1,senior

localgovernment

managers

and

commentators

in

each

of

the

three

countries.

Australianlocalgovernmentshavebeensubjecttowiderangingreforms,mostlyimposedorurged

bystategovernments,butalsoflowingfromfederalinitiativesandinseveralinstances,local

governmentitself.Reformshaveaddressedstructureandefficiency(amalgamations,regional

collaborationandresourcesharing);aspectsoftheNewPublicManagement(separationofpowers

betweenthebodypoliticandmanagement,councillorsasaboardofdirectors);strategicand

corporateplanning(preparationoflongtermstrategicplansanddeliveryprograms,improvedasset

andfinancialmanagement;workforceplans);greatercommunityengagementandaccountability(in

partthroughcommunityfocusedandplacebasedstrategicplanning);andcorporategovernance

(probity,riskmanagement).

However,littleattentionhasbeengiventohowtheintendeddirectionofthesereformsespecially

thepursuitofefficiency,effectivenessandcommunityengagementthroughstrategicandcorporate

planninginteractswithframeworksforpoliticalandcommunitygovernance.Changestolocal

governmentActsoverthepasttwodecadeshavelargelyadopted(andadapted)themanagerialist

provisionsofequivalentNewZealandlegislation.There,too,theissueofpoliticalgovernance

appearstohavereceivedscantattention,atleastuntiltherecentcreationoftheAucklandsuper

city(seebelow).

Thiscontrasts

markedly

with

the

consistent

focus

on

trends

in

local

politics

evident

in

the

United

States,UnitedKingdomandEurope.Inthosecountriesparticularattentionhasbeengiventothe

roleofdirectlyelectedmayors,andtherehasbeenextensivedebateabout,amongstotherthings,

howtheroleofmayorsshouldbestructuredandevolve,aswellastherelativemeritsofdifferent

modelsofgovernance(e.g.Svara2006,BorrazandJohn2004).

1Ninesemistructuredinterviewswereconductedwithmayorsandformermayors,alongwithnumerous

informaldiscussions.


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2. Governance, Planning and Leadership

Recenttrendsintheelectionandroleofmayorshavereflectedthewideninginternationaldiscourse

onlocalgovernanceandcivicleadership,andarepartofbroaderchangessweepingthroughlocal

government.Theseincludetheincreasingemphasisongovernanceasopposedtogovernment;

introductionof

new

forms

of

strategic

and

corporate

planning;

the

growing

importance

of

closer

engagementwithabroadrangeofstakeholdersnotablylocalcommunities,nearbycouncilsand

centralgovernments;andtheperceivedneedforstrongerpoliticalandcommunityleadership.There

isnowanextensiveliteratureontheseissues:whatfollowsisabriefsummaryofsomekeythemes

thataretakenupinthefollowingsectionofthischapter.

InAustralia,anearlydiscussionoflocalandcommunitygovernancewasprovidedbySproats(1997)

inapaperrespondingtoregionalplanningissuesininnerSydney.Sproatsarguedthatthelargely

instrumentalreformagendaofthetimefocusedonlocalgovernmentsroleasaservicedeliverer,

efficiencyandeffectivenessinachievingoutcomes,performanceexcellenceandvalueformoney

neededto

be

balanced

by

engagement

of

an

informed

citizenry

in

collectively

solving

community

problems(ibid:3).Betterlocalmanagementshouldthusbematchedbybetterlocalgovernance,

withgreateremphasisonlocalpeopleandsocialaswellasphysicalandfinancialcapital.Sproats

appliedOsborneandGaeblers(1993:24)definitionofcommunitygovernanceastheprocessby

whichwecollectivelysolveourproblemsandmeetoursocietysneeds.Hisideasaresummarizedin

Figure1.

Figure1:Sproatscomponentsoflocalgovernancereform

BetterLocalManagement

Corporategovernance +Communitygovernance

Customers/clients +Citizens

Management +Leadership

Publicopinion +Publicjudgement

Financialand

physical

capital +

Social

capital

=BetterLocalGovernance

Source:ModifiedfromSproats(1997:5)

Morerecentthinkingaboutgovernancehasfocusedontheincreasingfragmentationofpublicand

democraticinstitutionsthathasoccurredasaresultofmoredispersedandcompetitiveservice

delivery(BorrazandJohn2004:110);andonthefactthatgovernmentsnolongerpossessthe

authority,skillsandresourcesneededtoaddressallthecomplexissuesandproblemsfacingmodern

societies,especiallyinaglobalisedworld.Hambleton(2011:13)thusarguesthatgovernance:


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.involvesgovernmentplusthelooserprocessesofinfluencingandnegotiatingwitharangeof

publicandprivatesectoragenciestoachievedesiredoutcomes.Agovernanceperspective

encouragescollaborationbetweenthepublic,privateandnonprofitsectorsWhilstthe

hierarchicalpowerofthestatedoesnotvanish,theemphasisingovernanceisonsteering,

influencingandcoordinatingtheactionsofothers.

Thisviewofgovernanceinturnhighlightstheimportanceofpartnerships,planningandleadership.

Collaborationpartnershipsrequiresafoundation,abasisforagreementonwhatneedstobe

doneandhowtogoaboutachievingagreedobjectives:inotherwords,aplan.Atthelocallevel,the

tenetsofurbanandregionalplanning,environmentalconservationandtheNewPublicManagement

werealreadybeingappliedinthelatteryearsofthe20th

Centurytorequirecouncilstopreparea

rangeofstrategicandcorporateplans.Itwasashortsteptoapplysuchplanningconceptstoa

partnershipapproachtogovernance,thusgivingrisetomechanismssuchaslongtermwholeof

communityandwholeofgovernmentstrategicplans,andmultisectorpartnerships(e.g.New

ZealandsLongTermCouncilCommunityPlansandCommunityOutcomesprocess;SouthAfricas

IntegratedDevelopment

Plans;

Community

Strategic

Plans

in

New

South

Wales;

Local

Strategic

PartnershipsintheUK).

Whatemergesstronglyfromallthesemodelsistheneedforwhathasbeendescribedaslocal

facilitativeleadership(Stokeretal2008)inorderto:

Engagethecommunityandotherlocalstakeholdersintheplanningprocess

Negotiatewithcentralgovernmentagenciesandneighbouringlocalgovernments

Securepoliticalsupportwithinthecouncilfortheadoptionandconcerted,consistent

implementationofstrategicplansandassociatedbudgets

Maintainongoing

partnerships

with

others

involved

in

implementation,

especially

sound

inter

governmentrelationsinwhichthelocalvoiceisheardandrespected.

Box1:Indicatorsofgoodpoliticalleadership

Articulatingaclearvisionforthearea

Settingoutanagendaofwhatthefutureoftheareashouldbeanddevelopingstrategicpolicy

direction.Listeningtolocalpeopleandleadinginitiatives.

Promotingthequalitiesofthearea

Buildingcivicpride,promotingthebenefitsofthelocalityandattractinginwardinvestment.

Winningresources

Winningpowerandfundingfromhigherlevelsofgovernmentandmaximisingincomefroma

varietyofsources.

Developingpartnerships

Successfulleadershipischaracterisedbytheexistenceofarangeofpartnerships,bothinternal

andexternal,workingtoasharedviewoftheneedsofthelocalcommunity.

Addressingcomplexsocialissues

Theincreasingly fragmentednatureoflocalgovernmentandthegrowingnumberofservice

providersactiveinagivenlocalitymeansthatcomplexissuesthatcrossboundaries,orareseento

fallbetweenareasofinterest,needtobetakenupbyleadershipsthathaveanoverviewandcan

bringtogethertherightmixofagenciestotackleaparticularproblem.


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Maintainingsupportandcohesion

Managingdisparateinterestsandkeepingpeopleonboardareessentialiftheleadershipisto

maintainauthority.

AdaptedfromHambleton,R.andBullock,S.(1996),RevitalisingLocalDemocracyTheLeadershipOptions.

London:LocalGovernmentManagementBoard.

Hambleton(2011)hasaddedthenotionofplacebasedleadership.Thisreferstotheimportanceof

concertedactionbyarangeofplayersatthelocalleveltocounterbalancepotentialadverse

impactsofplacelessleadership:globalisedcorporationsandcentralgovernmentsthatmaycare

littleforcommunitywellbeingandthequalitiesoflocalplaces.Hehasalso(Hambleton2009:538)

setoutindicatorsofgoodpoliticalleadershipthatdrawtogetherthevariousconceptsofgovernance

andleadershipoutlinedabove(Box1).

Afurtherconsiderationishowthedifferentplayersinlocalgovernanceeachcontributetocivic

leadership.Hambleton(2009:522523)arguesthatcivicleadershipcomprisesthreeimportant

groups:political

(elected),

managerial,

and

community

(civil

society)

leaders.

Managerialist

approaches,suchasthoseunderlyingtheallocationofresponsibilitiestoelectedcouncillorsand

seniormanagersinmostAustralianlocalgovernmentActs,tendtounderplaytheimportanceof

politicalleadersandcastcivilsocietyastherecipientofservices,ratherthananimportant

contributortolocalleadership.However,asSproats(1997:89)makesclear,whilstmanagement

andleadershipshouldbecomplementary,thecentraltenetsofthetwoarequitedifferent.

Managersmaybegoodleaders,buttheskillsofcommunityleadershipevenwhenexercisedin

partbymanagersareinherentlypolitical(seeFigure2).

Figure2:

Comparing

management

and

leadership

Management Leadership

Plansandbudgets Visionandstrategy

Organisingandstaffing Communicatingandaligning

Controllingandproblemsolving Motivatingandinspiring

Minimisingrisk

Taking

risks

Source:basedonSproats(1997:9)

Thisleadstothequestionofwhetheraseparationofpowersbetweenelectedcouncillorsand

managersismeaningfulandappropriateinthelocalgovernmentcontext.Provisionstoenforcesuch

separationarealsoprevalentinrecentlegislationandagainflowfromNewPublicManagement

thinkingtheideathatelectedmembersshouldsetpolicyandstrategyandmonitorperformance,

whilstmanagementshouldbeotherwiseleftalonetodealwithimplementationofpolicyandplans

andservicedelivery.Itisdebatablewhethersuchanapproachiseitherworkableordesirablein

termsof

asubstantial

number

of

the

functions

of

local

government,

given

the

often

fine

line

betweenpolicyandpractice,thesmallscaleofmanyauthorities,therepresentativeroleofelected


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members,andthevaluableskillsatleastsomeofthemcanoffer(e.g.Munro2000,Sansom2001,

Svara2006a).Hambleton(2009:532533)providesabriefoverviewofrecentresearchonthisissue

anddescribestheideaofasharpseparationofrolesbetweenpoliticiansandofficersasa

longstandingmyth.FollowingPeters(1995),hesuggeststhatthedichotomyideashields

administratorsfromscrutinyandservestheinterestofpoliticianswhocanpassresponsibilityfor

unpopulardecisionstoadministrators.


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3. Australian context and practice

Australiacurrentlyhasaround560localcouncils:thecountvariesslightlydependingonwhetheror

notsomenonelectedspecialpurposebodiesarealsoincluded.Overtimethetotalnumberof

councilshasfallendramaticallyduetoamalgamationand/orrestructuringoflocalgovernment

areas.

Thistrend

accelerated

over

the

past

two

decades,

as

shown

in

Table

1.

Table1:ChangingnumbersoflocalgovernmentsinAustralia

1910 1967 1982 1990 2000 2008

NewSouthWales

Victoria

Queensland

SouthAustralia

WesternAustralia

Tasmania

NorthernTerritory^

324

206

164

175

147

51

0

224

210

131

142

144

49

1

175

211

134

127

138

49

6

176

210

134

122

138

46

22

174

78

157

68

142

29

69

152

79*

73

68

142

29

16

Total 1,067 901 840 848 717 559

*Therehasbeenonedeamalgamationsince2000.

Queenslandnumbersbefore2000excludeIndigenouscommunitycouncilsestablishedunderseparatelegislation;by

2008thesehadbeenincludedinthemainstreamsystem.

Sincereducedto139throughvoluntaryamalgamations.

^Figuresto2000includeIndigenouscommunitycouncils;in2008mostofthesewereabolishedandreplacedwithlarge

shires,eachincorporatingseveralsmallcommunities.

Sources:Chapman,R(1997);DOTARS(2001);May,P(2003);Statelocalgovernmentdepartmentwebsites.

Untiltheturnofthe21stcentury,movestocreatelargerlocalgovernmentunitsweretypically

associatedwithafocusonefficiencyandasearchforeconomiesofscale.However,duringthepast

decadeincreasingemphasishasbeenplacedonthepotentialforlargerunitstoimprovethecapacity

andviabilityofcouncilsandtostrengthentheirroleinthewidersystemofgovernment.2Thiswas

themainjustificationforthewidespreadrestructuringthattookplaceinQueenslandinearly2008

(LocalGovernmentReformCommission2007).Itreflectsthedevelopmentalchallengesfacingall

governments,andagrowingexpectationthatlocalgovernmentwillcontributetotheachievement

ofnationalandstatelevelpolicygoals,suchasregionaldevelopment,addressingclimatechange,

reducingIndigenousdisadvantageetc.

Sincethelate1970sthefederalgovernmenthasbeenthelargestexternalprovideroffundingfor

localgovernment,andtherehasbeenprogressivelycloserengagementbetweenthetwo. Local

governmentisnowrepresentedonthepeakfederalforum,theCouncilofAustralianGovernments,

alongsidethefederalgovernment,statesandterritories.Italsohasaseatinanumberofinter

governmentministerialcouncilsdealingwithdifferentaspectsofpublicpolicy. Similarhighlevel

policyengagementwithlocalgovernmentcanalsobefoundinsomestates. Thisimpliesaneedfor

morecapablelocalgovernmentsthatcanmakeasubstantialcontributiontotacklingcomplexlocal,

regionalandintergovernmentagendas,andforpoliticalgovernancetounderpinthatcapacity.

2Foranoverviewoftheseissues,seeAulichetal(2011)


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Asnotedearlier,agreatdealofattentionhasbeengiventowhatthesechangingexpectationsof

localgovernmentmightmeanintermsofstructures,strategicplanningandvariousaspectsof

corporatemanagement,buttheneedfornewapproachestopoliticalgovernancehasreceivedlittle

consideration.Inthisrespect,asinmanyaspectsoflocalgovernment,theAustraliansceneis

markedbyenormousdiversity:ratiosofelectorstocouncillorsvarygreatly(andinmorepopulous

localgovernmentareasareoftenamongstthehighestintheworld);councillorsmaybeelectedat

largeorbywards(localelectoraldivisions);thenumberofcouncillorsperwardmaybeone,two,

threeormore;electionsmaybeconductedforthewholecouncileveryfouryears,orforhalfthe

councillorseverytwoyears;votingmaybecompulsoryoroptional,inpersonorbypost;mayorsand

deputymayorsmaybeelecteddirectlybyallvoters,orindirectlybyandfromthecouncillors;the

termofmayorsvariesfromonetofouryears;thelegislatedroleofamayormaybelargely

ceremonialorsemiexecutive;andsoon.

ElectionandRoleofMayors

The

Attachment

to

this

paper

provides

details

on

how

mayors

(and

their

equivalents)

are

elected

in

eachstateandtheNorthernTerritory,aswellastheirdesignatedrolesandresponsibilitiesandhow

theyrelatetothoseoftheothercouncillors.Table2presentsasummaryofkeypoints.

Substantialvariationsareevidentinthewaymayorsareelectedandtherolestheyareexpectedto

playbothbetweenandwithinstates.3 InQueenslandandTasmania,plusurbanareasofthe

NorthernTerritoryandmostofthecentralcapitalcities,mayorsmustbedirectlyelected.InNSW,

SouthAustralia,WesternAustraliaandtherestoftheNorthernTerritorylocalcouncilsortheir

electorscanchoosebetweenpopularandindirectelectionbutonlyinSouthAustraliahasalarge

proportionfavouredpopularelection.InVictorialegislationgenerallyspecifiesindirectelectionand

only

two

councils

the

central

capital

city

of

Melbourne

and

the

large

regional

centre

of

Geelong

havedirectlyelectedmayors.Thuspopularelectioniscompulsoryoravailablebychoiceinallstates

exceptVictoria,butoperatesinlessthan40%ofallAustraliancouncils.

Table2:ElectionandroleofAustralianmayors

Stateor

TerritoryMethodofElectionandTerm DesignatedRole

NewSouth

Wales

Mayorsmaybedirectlyorindirectly

elected(SydneyLordMayormustbe

directlyelected)

Localreferendum

required

to

introducepopularelection

Popularelectionisforthefull4year

termofthecouncil;indirectelection

takesplaceannually

Lessthan20%aredirectlyelected.

Principallythatofchairpersonplus

civic/ceremonialduties

Policyroleifrequiredbetweencouncilmeetings

Councillorscollectively

direct

council

affairs

and

providecivicleadership

Councilmaydelegateadditionalfunctions.

Northern

Territory

Mayorsofmunicipal(urban)councils

aredirectlyelected

Presidentsofruralshiresmaybeeither

directlyorindirectlyelected.

Chairpersonandcivic/ceremonialduties,plus

principalrepresentativeandspokesperson ofthe

council

Councillorscollectivelydirectcouncilaffairsand

providecivicleadership.

3HenceforthstatesshouldbereadtoincludetheNorthernTerritory


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14

Queens

land

AllMayorsaredirectlyelectedforthe

full4yeartermofthecouncil.

Semiexecutiverolepluscivicandceremonialduties:

leadingandmanagingmeetings.

proposingtheadoptionofthebudget

liaisingwiththechiefexecutiveofficeronbehalf

oftheothercouncillors

leading,

managing,

and

providing

strategic

directionto,thechiefexecutiveofficer

ensuringprovisionofinformationtotheMinister

aboutthelocalgovernmentarea

LordMayorofBrisbanehasadditionalexecutive

responsibilities.

South

Australia

Mayor/Chairperson eitherdirectly

electedforthefull4yeartermofthe

council,orindirectlyelectedforupto

4years

Councildecideswhichmethodto

adopt

Almostthree

quarters

are

directly

elected.

Presideatmeetings,principalspokesperson ofthe

council,civicandceremonialduties

Ifrequested,provideadvicetothechiefexecutive

officerontheimplementation ofcouncildecisions

Councillorscollectivelydirectcouncilaffairsand

providecivicleadership

Councilmay

delegate

additional

functions

LordMayorofAdelaidehasadditionalexecutive

responsibilities.

Tasmania AllMayorsandDeputyMayorsare

directlyelectedfor2yearterms(half

theCouncillorsareelectedevery2

years)

Ifnonomination,theCouncillorselect

oneoftheirnumber.

Substantialleadershiprole:

leaderofthecommunityofthemunicipalarea

chairpersonandspokespersonofthecouncil

liaisewiththegeneralmanagerontheactivitiesof

thecouncilanditsperformance

overseethecouncillorsintheirfunctions.

Victoria NearlyallMayorsareindirectlyelected

foratermofupto2years

Mayorsof

Melbourne

and

Geelong

are

directlyelectedfor4years.

Chairscouncilmeetingsandtakesprecedenceat

allmunicipalproceedingswithinthemunicipal

district

Nootherfunctionsarespecifiedforeitherthe

MayororCouncillors

MelbourneCityCouncilmaydelegatelimited

additionalpowerstotheLordMayor.

Western

Australia

MayororPresidentiseitherdirectlyor

indirectlyelected

Councilmaydecidetomovetopopular

election

Localreferendumrequiredtogoback

toindirectelection

Lord

Mayor

of

Perth

must

be

directly

elected.

Presidesatmeetingsandspeaksonbehalfofthe

localgovernment

LiaiseswiththeCEOonthelocalgovernments

affairsandtheperformanceofitsfunctions

Civicandceremonialduties

Councillorscollectivelyprovideleadershipand

guidance

to

the

community.

TheroleofmayorsasdefinedbylegislationisclearlystrongestinQueensland,whereallmayors

aredirectlyelectedandvotingiscompulsory.TheQueenslandlocalgovernmentActwasamendedin

2009,followingwidespreadamalgamationsoflocalgovernmentareas,toextendtoallmayorsa

modifiedversionoftheestablishedpowersandresponsibilitiesoftheLordMayorofBrisbane

(Australiaslargestcouncilwithapopulationinexcessof1million).TheLordMayorspowersare

trulyexecutiveinnature;theyinclude:

implementing

the

policies

adopted

by

the

council,

and

developing

and

implementing

other

policies


15/38


15

leadingandcontrolling(emphasisadded)thebusinessofthecouncil

preparingabudgettopresenttothecouncil

leading,managing,andprovidingstrategicdirectiontothechiefexecutiveofficerinorderto

achievehighqualityadministrationofthecouncil

directingthechiefexecutiveofficerandseniorcontractemployeesofthecouncil.

AnumberofveryhighprofilepoliticianshaveoccupiedthepositionofLordMayor.Thestatureand

significanceoftheofficemaybejudgedbytherecentselectionofthethenincumbenttoleadthe

statesoppositionpartyevenwithoutfirstbecomingamemberofparliament.4Whilstthepowers

giventootherQueenslandmayorsaresignificantlyweaker,theydoprovideaplatformformuch

strongercivicleadershipthanappliesacrosstherestofAustralia.5Thisisreinforcedbythepopular

mandateenjoyedbyQueenslandmayors,andinmanycasestherelativelylargesizeandbudgetsof

thelocalgovernmentstheylead.

Tasmaniaistheonlyotherstatewherelegislationgivesallmayorsanaddeddegreeofauthority

withinthe

body

politic.

Again,

all

mayors

are

directly

elected,

but

voting

is

optional.

Section

27

of

the

LocalGovernmentActrequiresTasmanianmayors,amongstotherthings,to:

actasaleaderofthecommunityofthemunicipalarea

liaisewiththegeneralmanagerontheactivitiesofthecouncilandtheperformanceofits

functionsandexerciseofitspowers

overseethecouncillorsintheperformanceoftheirfunctionsandintheexerciseoftheirpowers.

AsinQueensland,theirpersonalmandateissignificant,althoughrestrictedbythegenerallysmall

scaleandlimitedresourcesoflocalgovernmentinTasmania.

ElsewhereinAustralia,localgovernmentActstypicallyconfinetheprerogativesofthemayorto

presidingatcouncilmeetings,havingtherighttositonanycommittee,andcarryingoutcivicand

ceremonialduties,suchascitizenshipceremonies.Thisapplieswhethermayorsaredirectlyor

indirectlyelected.Moreover,onlyinNSW,SouthAustraliaandtheCityofMelbournedocouncils

haveanexplicitpowertodelegateadditionalfunctionstothemayor.Inpractice,however,mayors

mayplayasignificantlygreaterrolethanthelegislationimplies.

Firstly,themayorsofthesevencapitalcitycouncils6inAustraliasmetropolitanregionsarewell

known,highprofilefiguresandtovaryingdegreesexercisepowerorinfluencesignificantlygreater

thanindicated

by

the

relevant

provisions

of

the

local

government

Act

even

in

the

case

of

Brisbane

wherethemayorslegalpowersarealreadyconsiderable.Thisreflectstheirpersonalmandatesall

aredirectlyelectedaswellastheimportanceoftheircouncilsashometothecountrysmajor

businesscentresandpublicfacilitiesofstateandsometimesnationalimportance.TheLordMayors

ofSydneyandMelbourneareespeciallyprominent,althoughlackingspecificpowersunderthe

relevantActs.TheNSWlocalgovernmentActdoesnotgivetheLordMayorofSydneyanyexecutive

authority,althoughasnotedabovethecouncilmaydelegatespecifiedfunctions.Current

4Subsequentlyheledtheoppositiontovictoryinthe2012Stateelectionandisnowpremier.

5AndtheQueenslandgovernmenthasindicatedthatitwillbringforwardlegislationtofurtherstrengthen

mayoral

powers.

6Brisbane,Sydney,Melbourne,Hobart,Adelaide,Perth,Darwin.ExceptforBrisbane,thesecouncilscoveronly

thecentralbusinessdistrictand,tovaryingdegrees,adjoininginnersuburbs.


16/38


16

delegationsarequiteextensiveandconferwhatmightbedescribedassemiexecutivestatus(see

Box2).Inaddition,theLordMayorisexofficiochairoftheCentralSydneyPlanningCommittee(a

jointcommitteeofthecouncilandthestategovernment).

Box2:Examplesofcouncildelegationstothe LordMayorofSydney

(tobe

exercised

in

amanner

consistent

with

Councils

policies

and

decisions

as

applicable

from

time

to

time)

Exercise,duringrecessesofcouncil,thepowers,authorities,dutiesandfunctionsofcouncilother

thanthosereservedtothecouncilitselfundertheLocalGovernmentActordelegatedtotheChief

ExecutiveOfficerbycouncilresolution

DirecttheChiefExecutiveOfficer,exceptasotherwiseprovidedbytheLocalGovernmentAct

NegotiateandsettletermsofacontractofemploymentwiththeChiefExecutiveOfficer

Review,approveandimplementgovernanceandaccountabilitystructuresandprocessesforthe

performanceoftheorganisation,andoverseetheperformanceoftheChiefExecutiveOfficer

Suspend

the

Chief

Executive

Officer

at

short

notice

and,

only

after

prior

consultation

with

councillors,terminatetheChiefExecutiveOfficersemployment

Makechangestotheorganisational structurewhichtheLordMayorreasonablyconsiderstobe

minorchanges

Approveallexpenditurefromcontingencyfunds(excludingtheChiefExecutiveOfficers

contingencyfund)provideditiswithinthetermsofthebudgetadoptedbycouncil,andafter

consultationwiththeChiefExecutiveOfficer

Callandschedulemeetingsofcouncilandcommittees

Approveallpressstatementsandpublicationsissuedonbehalfofcouncil,unlesscouncil

determinesotherwise

Determinewho

should

represent

council

on

external

organisations

and

committees

and

inter

agencyworkingparties,andatcivicceremonialandsocialfunctions

Determinetowhomcivicawardsandhonourssuchaskeystothecityandhonorarycitizenship

shouldbepresented

Directthatcouncilsinternalauditorcarryoutarevieworaudit

Obtaindirectandindependentadvice(includinglegaladvice)relevanttocouncilfunctions

InrespectoftheOfficeoftheLordMayor,determinethestructure,allocateexpenditure,and

directstaffandallocatetasksinconsultationwiththeChiefExecutiveOfficer.

Source:City

of

Sydney

Delegations

to

the

Lord

Mayor,

current

at

August

2012

InthecaseofMelbourne,thecouncilspowertodelegateadditionalresponsibilitiestotheLord

MayorislimitedbytheCityofMelbourneActto:

theappointmentofcouncillorstochaircommittees

theappointmentofcouncillorstorepresentthecouncilonexternalorganisations,committees

andworkingparties

councillorstravellingarrangementsandexpenses.


17/38


18/38


18

However,onerecentissuethatdidgenerateconsiderabledebatewasthemovebythestate

governmentofVictoriatolegislateforpopularelectionofthemayorofGeelong,Victoriaslargest

regionalcitywithapopulationofaround220,000.Thegovernmentissuedadiscussionpaperin

March2011proposingadirectlyelectedmayoronthegroundsthat(DPCD2011a:2):

Allowingthe

voters

of

Greater

Geelong

to

directly

elect

their

mayor

will

recognise

the

state

and

regionalsignificanceofthecity

Adirectlyelectedmayorwillhaveahighpublicprofileandclearpublicendorsement,andthis

allowshimorhertoprovidestrongleadershipforthecouncilandthecommunity

Amayorelectedforthefullfouryeartermofthecouncilcanalsocontributetoproviding

stabilityofgovernmentforthecity.

Theproposalattractedconsiderablepublicandmediainterest,and65writtensubmissionswere

madeinresponsetothediscussionpaper55fromindividualsand10fromorganisations.According

tothestategovernmentssummaryofsubmissions,45favouredadirectlyelectedmayorinsome

form,18

were

opposed

and

2did

not

express

aclear

view

(DPCD

2011b:

2).

However,

aclear

majorityopposeddirectelectionofthedeputymayor.

Businessgroupsstronglysupportedadirectlyelectedmayor.Initssubmission,theGeelong

ChamberofCommerce(2011:45)alsosetoutwhatitregardedasthekeyexpectationsofthe

mayorinoffice.Theseincluded:

settingupaneffectivegovernancestructureandpresidingoverdecisionmaking

managingthecouncillorsandbuildingacohesiveteam

providingmotivationandleadershiptotheadministrationtoconveyastrongsenseofwhatis

important(but

not

managing

the

staff

which

is

the

chief

executive

officers

role)

effectivelypositioningthecouncilinitsstrategicrelationshipswithfederalandstate

governments,keyagenciesandinstitutions,communityorganisationsandstakeholders

bringingpeopletogetheraroundaspecificvisionforthefutureandactingasacatalystfor

findingthebestsolutionstoissues

aidingcoordinationandcohesion

beingthespokespersonforthecouncil,thetalkinghead,makingpublicstatementswhich

projectapositiveimageofthecouncil(andhis/herownimage),whetherinthemediaor

speakingonpublicplatformsathomeorabroad.

TheCommittee

for

Geelong,

also

strongly

business

based,

argued

that

the

mayor

should

be

given

additionalpowers,atleastcommensuratewiththoseoftheLordMayorofMelbourne,but

preferablyalsoincludingthepowertoestablishasmalldecisionmakingexecutive,perhaps

comprisingthechairsofmajorcommittees.TheCommitteeforGeelongassertedthatthiswould

freeupothercouncillorstobecommunityrepresentatives,ratherthanbeingexpectedtofunction

asaboardofdirectors(CommitteeforGeelong2011:9).

Bycontrast,thetwomainrepresentativebodiesforlocalgovernment,theMunicipalAssociationof

Victoria(MAV)andtheVictorianLocalGovernanceAssociation(VLGA)adoptedaverycautious

approach,arguingthatthecaseforchangehadnotbeenmadeandthatfurtherresearchand/oran

inquirywas

required.

The

MAV

sought

a

clear

and

detailed

discussion

of

the

benefits

and

any

disbenefitsondemocracyandgovernance,andtheadditionalcosttothecommunityandcouncil...


19/38


19

(MAV2011:1).However,thestategovernmentannouncedinNovember2011thatitwouldbegoing

aheadwiththechange(DPCD2011c).

Insummary,andapartfromQueensland,approachestotheroleofmayorsacrossAustraliacould

bestbedescribedasambivalent.Thereisanevidentreluctancetoinstitutionalisestronglocal

leadershipthrough

the

office

of

mayor.

Only

in

Tasmania,

Western

Australia

and

the

City

of

Adelaide

aremayorsspecificallytaskedwithcommunityleadership.InNSW,Queensland,theNorthern

TerritoryandtherestofSouthAustralia,thatroleisgiventoallthecouncillorsindividuallyand

collectively.InVictoriaitisnotmentionedatall. Yetcallsformoreeffectivelocalleadership

abound.Latersectionsofthispaperconsiderhowtheymightbeanswered.


20/38


20

4. Developments in England and New Zealand

UnliketheAustralianstates(exceptQueensland)governmentsinbothEnglandandNewZealand

haverecentlyaddressedtherolethatmayorsshouldplayandamendedlegislationaccordingly.A

movetointroducedirectlyelectedmayorswithsemiexecutivepowerswaspartofbroaderreforms

ofEnglish

local

government

undertaken

by

the

Blair

Labour

government

around

the

turn

of

the

century.ThepromptforsimilaractioninNewZealandwasadecisionin2007bytheformerLabour

ledgovernmenttoholdaRoyalCommissionintothefuturegovernanceofAuckland.

England

InEngland,thedecisivesteptowardsnewformsofmayoralleadershipwastheestablishmentin

2000oftheGreaterLondonAuthority(GLA),headedbyadirectlyelectedMayorofLondon.TheGLA

isaregionalauthoritythatoperatesatastrategiclevelinconjunctionwiththe32Londonborough

councilsandtheCityofLondon.Themayorisanswerabletoanassemblyof25electedmembers

whichscrutinisestheAuthoritysactivities,spendingandperformance,andcanbyatwothirds

majorityamendthemayorsproposedbudget.

ThemayorisabletoexercisetheexecutivefunctionsoftheGLA.His/herroleencompasses:

Promotingavisionforeconomic,socialandenvironmentalimprovement

Formulatingplansandpoliciescoveringtransport,planninganddevelopment,housing,

economicdevelopmentandregeneration,culture,healthinequalities,andarangeof

environmentalissuesincludingclimatechange,biodiversityandenvironmentalquality

Ensuringthoseplansandpoliciescontributetosustainabledevelopmentandthehealthof

Londoners

Responsibilitiesfor

culture

and

tourism,

including

managing

Trafalgar

Square

and

Parliament

Square

SettingtheannualbudgetfortheGreaterLondonAuthorityandthewiderGLAgroup,which

includestheMetropolitanPolice,TransportforLondon,andtheLondonFireBrigade

AppointmentstotheboardsoftheMetropolitanPoliceAuthority,TransportforLondon,andthe

LondonFireandEmergencyPlanningAuthority,andchairingthoseboardsifs/hesochooses.8

Inexercisinghis/herpowersthemayorisrequiredtoconsultregularlywithLondoners.

Subsequently,theLocalGovernmentAct2000introducednewgovernanceoptionsforalllocal

authorities,including

one

of

adirectly

elected,

semi

executive

mayor

as

opposed

to

the

previously

universalmodelofaleaderelectedbyandfromthecouncillors,withdecisionmakinginthehands

ofaseriesofcommittees.Thepositionofmayorhadpreviouslybeenessentiallyceremonialand

subservienttothatoftheleader.Localauthoritieswererequiredtoholdalocalreferendum9ifthey

wishedtoadoptthenewmayoralmodel:only37outof353didso,andonly12succeeded.The

overwhelmingmajorityofauthoritiesselectedagovernanceoptionthatretained10

orwassimilarto

theestablishedapproach(Stevens2010).

8Seehttp://www.london.gov.uk/who runslondon/mayor/role

9

A

successful

referendum

had

been

held

to

endorse

the

establishment

of

the

GLA

and

Mayor

of

London

10Smallercouncilswith1999populationsoflessthan85,000weregiventheoptionofretainingthecommittee

system.


21/38


21

The2000Actdidnotdetailtheroleandpowersofelectedmayors,beyondthoseofappointinga

deputyandmembersofanexecutivegroupofcouncillorsthatwouldmanagethelocalauthorityin

conjunctionwiththemayor,chiefexecutiveandseniorofficers.Theunderlyingconceptherewas

thatofaministerialandcabinetsystem,withotherbackbenchcouncillorsactingascommunity

representativesandscrutinisingtheworkoftheexecutive(cabinet)amajordeparturefrom

previouspracticeandoneaimedatmoredecisive,innovativeandresponsivelocalleadership.

Thespecificfunctionsanddecisionmakingpowersofthemayorandexecutivearethesubjectof

ministerialregulationsand/orindividualcouncilconstitutions.Thustheycananddovary

considerablyfromoneauthoritytoanother.IntheLondonBoroughofLewisham,forexample,the

councilconstitutionsetsouttheroleofthemayorasfollows(LondonBoroughofLewisham2011:

47):

tobethecouncilsprincipalspokesperson

togiveoverallpoliticaldirectiontothecouncil

toappoint

(and

dismiss)

the

executive

todecideonascheduleofdelegationofexecutivefunctions

tochairmeetingsoftheexecutive

torepresentthecouncilonexternalbodiesthatdealwithexecutivefunctions

tobethecouncil'sleadmemberforchildren'sservices.

Thekeypointhereisthemayorspowertoallocateanddelegateexecutivefunctionsi.e.thewide

rangeofdecisionmakingpowersvestedinhimselfandtheexecutive.InLewisham,hemaydelegate

anyofthosepowersto:

theexecutive

as

awhole

or

acommittee

of

the

executive

anindividualmemberoftheexecutive

anofficer

anareacommittee

ajointcommittee

anindividualwardcouncillor,totheextentthefunctionisexercisablewithintheward

anotherlocalauthority.

Themayorisalsoresponsibleforleadingthepreparationofanumberofkeystrategicandcorporate

plans,andoftheannualbudget.Thecouncilasawholemayamendthebudgetsubmittedbythe

mayorand

executive,

but

requires

atwo

thirds

majority

to

do

so.

DebatecontinuesinEnglandoverthemeritsorotherwiseofelectedmayors:Stevens(2010)

providesapithysummary:

Dependingonyourpreferenceoraffiliation,electedmayorsare,likereformoflocalfinance,

destinedtoremaineitheradesirablepanaceafordecliningratesofparticipationand

underperformancebylocalcouncils,oranaspirininsearchofaheadache.Whathasbeenshownis

thatmayors,likecouncilleaderspossibly,havemostlybeencapableofputtingtheirlocalauthority

onanimprovementjourney,whichinsomecaseshasshowndramaticturnarounds(Hackney,

NorthTyneside)andinothercasessimplysteadyprogress(Lewisham).Whereassomemayorshave

providedstabilityafterconsiderablechaos(Hackney)orunderperformance(Torbay),othershave

simplygotonwiththejobandbeenrecognisedforit(Hartlepool,Middlesbrough).Andwherethey


22/38


22

havent,theelectoratehavehadtheirsay(Doncaster,StokeonTrent).Eitherway,theyvegot

peopletalkingaboutlocalgovernment,whichremainsinmostpeopleseyesamunicipaltheme

parkofmayorschainsofoffice,dullcommitteemeetingsbehindcloseddoorsandpossiblyeven

irrelevance.

Furtherfuel

was

added

to

the

debate

by

the

policy

of

the

Conservative

Liberal

Democrat

governmentelectedinMay2010toextendthesystemtoanother12majorcitycouncilsacrossthe

country.11

Attentionthusremainedfocusednotonthequiteradicalconceptofreplacingtheold

committeesystemwithastrongcouncilexecutive(cabinet),butratherwhethertheheadofthat

executiveshouldbeadirectlyelectedmayororanindirectlyelectedleader.Amendmentstothe

localgovernmentActsince2000havegivenleadersverysimilarrolesandpowerstothoseof

mayors,andthisisusedbysometoarguethatthereisnoneedforpopularelection.Thecentral

issuethusbecomesoneofwhetherthepresidingmemberofacouncilshouldenjoyapopular

mandate,andthevaluetoalocalityofhavingaclearlyidentifiedfirstcitizenwithsignificant

politicalandexecutiveauthority.

NewZealand

AllmayorsinNewZealandhavebeendirectlyelectedformanyyears,buttheyhavenospecific

powersbeyondchairingcouncilmeetings.EvenwhenthelocalgovernmentActwas

comprehensivelyreviewedandrewrittenin2002itseemsthatlittleornothoughtwasgivento

movingawayfromtheprevailingweakmayormodel.The2002Actdoescontainaprovision(s40)

forgovernancestatementsthat,togetherwiththeuseofdelegations,couldbeusedtocodifyand

extendthemayorsrole,buttheprovisiondoesnotappeartohavebeenusedinthatway(Local

GovernmentNewZealandundated:5152).AsinAustralia,lackofformalpowersdoesnot

necessarilyprecludetheemergenceofstrongmayors,andNewZealandprovidesmanyexamples

offorceful

and

effective

civic

leadership

based

on

the

mayors

popular

mandate

and

personal

qualities(RoyalCommissiononAucklandGovernance:423)

However,theRoyalCommissionestablishedinOctober2007toreviewthegovernanceofthe

Aucklandmetropolitanregionsawaneedforamuchmorestructuredapproach.Inrecommending

establishmentofasupercitycouncilcoveringtheentiremetropolitanareaandwithapopulation

ofaround1.4million,anddrawingtoasignificantextentontheEnglishmodelofelectedmayors,it

arguedasfollows(ibid:8):

Aucklandneedsaninspirational leader,inclusiveinapproachanddecisiveinaction.Auckland

needsaperson

who

is

able

to

articulate

and

deliver

on

ashared

vision,

and

who

can

speak

for

the

region,anddeliverregionalprioritiesdecisively.

TheAucklandCouncilwillbeledbyamayorwhoiselectedbyallAucklanders.TheMayorof

AucklandwillhavegreaterexecutivepowersthancurrentlyprovidedundertheLocalGovernment

Act2002,althoughtheseadditionalpowerswillstillbemoremodestthaninmanyinternational

modelsofmayoralty.Theadditionalpowerswillbelimitedtothreekeyabilities:

11Referendahavesincebeenheldinthosecities(exceptLiverpoolwhichmovedvoluntarilytoadirectly

elected

mayor)

but

only

one

(Bristol)

was

successful.

It

appears

that

the

principal

reasons

for

this

outcome

wereinstitutionalandpoliticalinertia,andthelackofasimple,readilyunderstoodandcompellingcasefor

change.


23/38


23

appointmentofthedeputymayorandcommitteechairpersons

proposaloftheAucklandCouncilbudgetandinitiationofpolicy

establishmentandmaintenanceofanappropriately staffedMayoralOffice.

TheMayorwillbeexpectedtochartandleadanagendaforAuckland.ToensuretheMayor

remainsfullyaccountable,allpolicywillneedtobeapprovedbythefullAucklandCouncil.

Therewill

also

be

additional

obligations

on

the

Mayor

to

engage

with

the

people

of

Auckland

throughregularMayorsDaysandanannualStateoftheRegionaddress.

Thefunctionsofthemayorweresubsequentlyarticulatedinsection9oftheLocalGovernment

(AucklandCouncil)Act2009asfollows:

articulateandpromoteavisionforAuckland

provideleadershipforthepurposeofachievingobjectivesthatwillcontributetothatvision

leadthedevelopmentofcouncilplans(includingtheLTCCP12

andtheannualplan),policies,and

budgetsforconsiderationbythegoverningbody

establishprocessesandmechanismstoengagewiththepeopleofAuckland

appointthedeputymayor,establishcommitteesofthegoverningbodyandappointthe

chairpersonofeachcommittee

establishandmaintainanappropriatelystaffedofficeofthemayor,withanannualbudgetnot

lessthan0.2%ofthecouncil'stotalbudgetedoperatingexpenditureforthatyear.

Whilstthissetofpowersandfunctionsfallsshortofcreatinganexecutivemayor(McKinlay2011),it

clearlyestablishesanewbenchmarkforNewZealandlocalgovernment,inthesamewaythatthe

powersoftheLordMayorofBrisbanewereseenasapointofreferenceforotherQueensland

mayors.InMarch2012theNewZealandGovernmentlaunchedanewwaveoflocalgovernment

reformproposalsunderthebannerBetterLocalGovernment(NewZealandGovernment2012).

Thoseproposalsincludethefollowingstatementonmayoralpowers(ibid:8):

Mayorsarethepublicfaceofcouncilsandpubliclycarrytheresponsibility fortheirdecisions.The

problemisthatthereisamismatchinthecurrentlocalgovernmentframeworkbetweenthehigh

levelofpublicinterest,scrutinyandengagementinmayoralelections,wheretheyareelectedfor

anentirecityordistrict,andtheirlimitedformalpowersoverthegoverningbodyofacouncil.

Mayorsneedthecapacitytoprovideclearerandstrongerleadership.

ThiswasrecognisedwiththeAucklandCouncilreform.TheLocalGovernment(AucklandCouncil)

Act2009providesAucklandsmayorwithgovernancepowersnotavailabletoothermayors,

although

substantial

decision

making

remains

with

the

full

council.

It

makes

good

sense

for

mayors

acrossNewZealandtohavesimilargovernancepowers.

Allmayorswillbeempowered,fromthe2013localelections,toappointdeputymayors,to

establishcommitteesandtoapprovecommitteechairpersons.Theroleofthemayorwillexplicitly

includeleadershipoverthedevelopmentofplans,policiesandbudgets.

AsinQueensland,itappearsthattheperceivedsuccessofthebigcitymodelhaspersuadedcentral

governmentthatasimilarapproachcandeliverthebenefitsofstrongerpoliticalleadershipacross

thewholeoflocalgovernment.

12LongTermCouncilCommunityPlanawiderangingstrategicandfinancialplan


24/38


24

5. Towards a model for Australian mayors

Wenowreturntothecentralquestionoftherolethatmayorscouldandshouldplayinthe

Australiancontext.Basedontheliteratureoverviewandothermaterialpresentedabove,sixkey

dimensionshavebeenidentifiedforfurtherconsideration.Thesecomprise:

themeritsofpopularelection

theneedforstrongercommunityleadership

ensuringeffectivestrategicandcorporateplanning

enhancingpoliticalgovernance

therespectiverolesofmayorsandchiefexecutives

intergovernmentrelations.

Themeritsofpopularelection

InNewZealand,QueenslandandTasmaniathereisnoevidentdebateaboutwhethermayorsshould

bedirectly

elected,

and

all

the

mayors

interviewed

in

those

jurisdictions

affirmed

the

value

and

importanceofhavingapersonalmandate.Eventhoughmayorsmaynotenjoyspecificadditional

powers,andmaysometimesfindthemselvesinaminoritywithintheelectedcouncil,apersonal

mandatewasseentoenablethemtoappealdirectlytoconstituents,torepresentadiverserangeof

communityinterests,toworkmoreeffectivelywithcentralgovernments,businessandotherkey

partners,andtoexercisemoreinfluencewithinthecouncilorganisation,bothinnegotiationswith

othercouncillorsandwithseniormanagement.Similarargumentswereadvancedbyalltheother

directlyelectedmayorsinterviewed.

InEnglanddebatestillragesonthemeritsofpopularelection.Someclaimthatelectedmayorshave

providedmore

visible

and

accountable

facilitative

leadership,

improved

the

performance

of

their

councils,andestablishedaplatformfordevolutionofauthorityfromcentralgovernment(Kennyand

Lodge2008).Thecontraryviewisthatindirectlyelectedcouncilleaderscananddoachievesimilar

results,thatindirectelectionavoidspersonalitypoliticsandensuresleadershavesoundlocal

governmentexperience,andthateffectivedevolutionrequiresbroadersystemicchange(Kemp

2006).

SomeofthoseopposedtothepopularelectionoftheMayorofGeelongalsopointedtothedangers

ofpersonalitypoliticsandthepotentialforcandidateswithgreaterresourcestobuythemayoralty.

Therewerealsoconcernsthatthemayormightveeroutofcontrol,runningapurelypersonal

agenda,or

conversely

that

there

could

be

gridlock

between

the

mayor

and

an

opposing

majority

of

councillors. Concernsofthatnaturereflecttheneedtoensurethatthemayorspowersand

responsibilitiesarearticulatedinsufficientdetailtoestablishclearrulesofthegameeitherby

statuteorthroughamechanismsuchasacouncilconstitutionorspecificdelegationofdecision

makingauthority.ThisisrecognisedmostclearlyinBrisbane(andtoalesserextenttherestof

Queensland),Sydney(intermsofthedelegationfromthecouncil),andEngland(throughcouncil

constitutions).Also,inTasmaniasection27(1A)oftheLocalGovernmentActrequiresthemayorto

representaccuratelythepoliciesanddecisionsofthecouncilinperforminghisorherfunctions.

Whereapopularlyelectedmayorexercisesconsiderableexecutiveauthority,regularandeffective

scrutinyof

his

or

her

performance

is

also

essential:

this

is

normally

inherent

in

the

way

Australian


25/38


25

councilsoperate,butmorestructuredandrigorousprocessesmayneedtobeintroducedifthereisa

riskthattherepresentativeroleofothercouncillorscouldbeundulyimpaired.Opportunitiesfor

councillorstoscrutiniseandquestionmayoralstatementsanddecisionscouldbeincreased,and

theremightbeapowertovetosomeorallmayoraldecisionsbyatwothirdsmajority.Also,since

stategovernmentsalreadyexercisecloseoversightandsupervisionofcouncils,thoseprocesses

couldbeextendedtomonitoringtheperformanceofdirectlyelectedmayorsandinterveningwhen

necessary.Anotheroptionwouldbetointroducerecallprovisions,empoweringtheelectorsand/or

thecouncillorstoremovethemayorbyreferendumor,say,atwothirdsmajority,butsuch

provisionsmayintroduceunwarranteddisruptionandinstability.

Analternativeapproachfavouredbysomeisforthemayortobeindirectlyelectedbutwitha

guaranteedtermofnotlessthantwoyears,orpossiblythewholeofthecouncilsterm.Thiswould

amelioratetheproblemsinherentinmayorshavingtobereelectedevery12months,notably

inactionorinstabilityintheleaduptoeachannualelection,anddealsbeingdonetosharetherole

ofmayoramongstthreeorfourcouncillorsoverthelifeofthecouncil,diminishingtheauthorityand

effectivenessoftheposition.However,unlessthemayoristheunqualifiedleaderofadominant

politicalgroupingwithinthecouncil(asituationwhichoftenappliestocouncilleadersintheUK,

wherelocalgovernmentispartypolitical,butismuchlesscommoninAustralia),itisdifficulttosee

howindirectelectionforextendedperiodswouldbedemocraticallyjustifiedorhowitwouldmakea

significantdifferenceinpractice,sincethemayorwouldstilllackapersonalmandate.

Theneedforstrongercommunityleadership

Entwinedwiththeissueofpopularelectionisthecommonlyperceivedneedforstrongercommunity

leadership.Thereappearstobewidespreadagreementonthispoint:itwasanexplicitobjectiveof

government

moves

to

introduce

elected

mayors

in

England,

Auckland

and

Geelong,

and

is

supported

bytheliteratureonfacilitativeandplacebasedleadership.Thequestionthatarises,however,is

howbesttoconstructsuchleadership:towhatextentshouldthepowertoleadbevestedinthe

mayorasopposedtoabroadercollectiveofcouncillorsandindeedothernonelectedcommunity

representatives.ThiswasakeyissueraisedintheGeelongdebate.Certainly,theprovisionsof

AustralianlocalgovernmentActs,apartfromQueensland,suggestareluctancetomoveawayfrom

thecollectivecouncildecisionmakingmodel,eventhoughcouncilsarefrequentlycriticizedfor

indecisionandlackofstrategy.

Allthemayorsinterviewedforthisstudyemphasisedtheneedtobuildconsensusandnonesawany

valuein

operating

as

aone

man

band.

But

they

also

agreed

that

someone

had

to

be

responsible

for

takingthelead,bothinproposingactionandseekingconsensus.Allsawthemselvesasplayinga

leadershiproleinliaisingwithabroadrangeofgovernmentandnongovernmentstakeholdersto

promotetheinterestsoftheirlocalityanditscommunities.Again,fewAustralianlocalgovernment

Actsexplicitlyconfersuchresponsibilitiesonthemayor.

Ofparticularrelevancehereistheincreasingemphasisplacedoncommunityconsultationand

engagement.Thismaybelinkedspecificallytopreparationofplansandpolicies(discussedbelow)or

expressedmorebroadly.ThewordingoftheLocalGovernment(AucklandCouncil)Actisparticularly

interesting,requiringthemayorto:establishprocessesandmechanismstoengagewiththepeople

ofAuckland,

whether

generally

or

particularly.

The

Mayor

of

London

is

similarly

charged

with

consultingLondoners.Bycontrast,noAustralianlocalgovernmentActgivesmayorsanyspecialrole


26/38


26

incommunityengagement:wherecommunicationorconsultationwiththelocalcommunityis

mentioned,itislistedasoneoftheresponsibilitiesofallcouncillors.Theinherentriskofthisloose

approachisthatengagementbecomeslargelyadhoc,andthatwhatshouldbeseenasanongoing

politicalfunctionisinsteadtreatedasamatterofcompliancewhenspecifiedplansandpoliciesare

beingprepared,andconductedprincipallybymanagers.

Afurtherissueiswhethercentralgovernmentsareseriousaboutenablinglocalleadership.Oneof

theargumentsputforwardbythoseopposedtoelectedmayorsinEnglandisthattheycannotmake

anyrealdifferenceunlessthereisgenuinedevolutionofauthorityfromcentraltolocalgovernment

(Kemp2006).Toasignificantextent,thatmaybeachickenandeggissue:devolution(legislativeor

defacto)maybemorelikelyiflocalleadershipismoreeffectiveandbetterabletoexercisegreater

authority.TheexperienceofBrisbaneCityCouncilandmorerecentlytheGreaterLondonAuthority

andMayorofLondonappearstosupportsuchanargument.

Interestingly,theheadoftheUKsNewLocalGovernmentNetworkrecentlylinkedtheneedfor

devolutionto

acall

for

compulsory

voting

in

local

elections

(Parker

2012).

He

argued

that:

Thisisawaytosolvethelocalist'sdilemma:councilscomplainthatnobodyvotesforthembecause

theyhavenopower,butWhitehallrefusestopassdownmorepowerbecausecouncilsarenotfully

accountable.Compulsoryvotingwouldtransformthepracticeoflocalpolitics,forcingpartiesto

appealtoamuchwiderrangeofvoters.

InAustralia,votinginlocalelectionsisalreadycompulsoryinthethreelargeststates,andthereis

littledoubtthatthisaddssignificantlytotheauthorityofdirectlyelectedmayors.Arecentreviewof

localgovernmentinmetropolitanPerthproposedbothcompulsoryvotinganddirectelectionof

mayors(MetropolitanLocalGovernmentReview2012).

Ensuringeffectivestrategicandcorporateplanning

RecentamendmentstomostAustralianlocalgovernmentActshaveplacedconsiderableemphasis

ontheimportanceoflongtermstrategicplans,typicallylinkedtogoalsofwellbeingand

sustainability,andpreparedinconsultationwithabroadrangeofstakeholders.Thesestrategiesare

thentobetranslatedintoaseriesofshortertermcorporateplans:inNSWthetermdelivery

programisusedtomakethepurposeclear.Thepurposeofallthisistomakecouncilsmorepolicy

andfuturefocused,committedtotheongoingpursuitofagreedcommunityobjectivesandtosound

managementofassets,financesandhumanresources.

However,only

in

NSW

and

Tasmania

does

the

legislation

indicate

explicitly

that

one

of

the

functions

ofcouncillorsistoinvolvethemselvesinthepreparationofstrategicplans,andnoneoftheActs

suggestsleadershipbythemayorinthisregard.OnlytheQueenslandActgivesmayorsassociated

functions:togivestrategicdirectiontotheCEOandtopresentthebudget.InthecaseofBrisbane,

thesefunctionsareextendedtodevelopingpoliciesandpreparingthebudget.

ThissituationcontrastsmarkedlywithAucklandandEngland,wheremayors(andnowalsoindirectly

electedcouncilleaders)arechargedwithformulatingandpromotingavisionfortheircityorarea,

andwithleadingthepreparationofplansandbudgetsinparttogiveeffecttothatvision.Like

communityengagement,strategicplanningisfundamentallypoliticalratherthantechnical:itis

aboutcommunity

preferences

and

expectations,

setting

objectives,

and

balancing

competing

claims

onresources.Iflegislationrequiressuchplanningbutdoesnotrequireandenableelected


27/38


27

representativestoleadtheprocess,thenitisnotdifficulttounderstandwhyplanspreparedlargely

byofficialsareadoptedbycouncillorswithoutsufficientconsiderationoftheirimplicationsandwith

littlesolidcommitmenttotheirimplementation.Thesameappliestoannualormultiyearbudgets.

Enhancingpoliticalgovernance

Anunderlying

theme

in

the

evolving

role

of

mayors

is

the

need

for

enhanced

political

governance.

Thisrelatestothegoalofeffectiveleadershipdiscussedearlierandinvolvesissuesofgood

governancethewaythebodypoliticofthecouncilorganisesandconductsitselftoensuresound

decisionmaking.

Anumberofinterestingdevelopmentsareapparent.First,mayorsinEngland,Aucklandand(subject

tothenecessarydelegation)Melbournearevariouslyresponsibleforappointingtheirdeputy,the

cabinet(inEngland),delegatingdecisionmaking,determiningthecommitteestructure,and

appointingcouncillorstointernalcommittees(includingaschair)orasrepresentativesofthecouncil

onoutsidebodies.Inotherwords,themayorisempoweredtosetupthestructureofpolitical

governancein

such

away

as

to

reflect

his

or

her

vision

and

priorities

(and

potentially,

of

course,

to

rewardhisorhersupporters).

Frominterviewswithmayors,theselectionandroleofdeputiesemergedasparticularlyimportant.

Allemphasisedtheneedforacloseandtrustfulworkingrelationship:havingadeputytheycould

relyontofillinwherenecessaryand,importantly,toliaisewithothercouncillorsandhelpsecure

votesinthecouncilonkeyissues.Whilstsomethoughtremovingtherightofcouncillorstoelectthe

deputycouldprovecounterproductive,themajorityfeltthatthebenefitsofbeingabletoappointa

trustedcolleagueorstrategicallyoutweighedtherisk.InthecaseofMelbourne,therequirement

forcandidatesformayoranddeputytostandforelectiontogetherisdesignedtoensureaneffective

leadershipteam,althoughrelationshipsmaynotalwayslastthedistance.

Secondly,themayormaybeexpectedtotaketheleadinensuringprobityandappropriate

behaviouronthepartofallcouncillors.InTasmania,forexample,thelocalgovernmentActrequires

themayortooverseethecouncillorsintheirfunctions,andthemayorplaysakeyrolewhen

complaintsaremadeagainstcouncillors.Thiscanbeseenasanimportantelementofcivic

leadership:initssubmissionsupportingadirectlyelectedmayortheGeelongChamberofCommerce

identifiedaneedforthemayortomanagethecouncillorsandbuildacohesiveteam.

Therespectiverolesofmayorsandchiefexecutives

Therelationship

between

mayors

and

chief

executives

is

acomplex

and

often

vexed

issue:

it

lies

at

theheartofthedebateaboutwhetherandtowhatextentmayorsshouldexerciseexecutive

powers.ThisisaparticularlysensitivequestioninAustralia,wherethegeneraltrendoflocal

governmentlegislationoverthepasttwodecadeshasbeentoapplytheconceptofseparationof

powers.Theresponsibilitiesandprerogativesofchiefexecutivesaredescribedinasmuchormore

detailasthoseofmayorsandcouncillors,typicallysuchthattheyare(officiallyatleast)thesole

pointofcontactbetweenthebodypoliticandtheadministration,entrustedwithallaspectsofthe

daytodaymanagementoftheorganisation,includingappointmentofallstaff,andallowed

considerablediscretionintheimplementationofcouncilpolicies.


28/38


28

Inlegalterms,theonlysignificantdeparturesfromthismodelinAustraliaarethecitycouncilsof

Brisbane,wheretheActempowersthelordmayorunequivocallytodirectthechiefexecutive,and

Sydney,wherethatfunctionhasbeendelegatedtothelordmayorbythecouncil,togetherwiththe

powertomakeminoradjustmentstotheorganisationstructure.Elsewhere,legislationlimits

mayorstoprovidingstrategicdirectiontotheirchiefexecutives,oradvisingorliaisingwiththem.

However,thisdoesnotnecessarilypreventapoliticallypowerfulmayorfromexercisinga

considerablemeasureofdefactoexecutiveauthority,especiallywhenseniormanagersare

employedunderfixedterm,performancebasedcontracts.

ThesituationinNewZealandisgenerallysimilartothatinAustralia:eventhenewmayorof

Aucklandhasnotbeengivenexplicitexecutivepowers.However,asnotedearliers/hedoeslead

thedevelopmentofstrategicandcorporateplansand,perhapsmostimportantly,thebudget.

Moreover,themayorhasdedicatedsupportstaffandaguaranteedminimumbudgettomaintain

thatoffice.

InEngland,

elected

mayors

(and

indirectly

elected

council

leaders)

may

have

much

more

explicit

and

extensiveexecutiveauthority,dependingontheircouncilsconstitutionandschemeofdelegations.

TheLondonmayorisalsoabletoexercisepowerfulinfluence,ifnotexecutiveauthorityassuch,by

appointingandchairingtheboardsofkeyservicedeliveryorganisations,suchasTransportfor

London.

Noneofthemayorsinterviewedforthisstudyexpressedadesiretoadministerthedaytoday

operationsoftheircouncilorganisation:allsawtheirprimaryfocusasontheonehandoutward

looking:formulatingstrategy,engagingthecommunityandstakeholdersandworkingwithpartner

organisations;andontheotherpoliticalmanagement,creatinganenablingenvironmentwithinthe

councilso

that

agreed

objectives

are

achieved.

However,

in

most

cases

it

was

evident

that

this

handsoffapproachtoadministrationwasconditionalonhavingachiefexecutivewhoappreciated

themayoralroleandmandate,anddidnotseektoapplyseparationofpowersinaliteralandrigid

manner.Inthisregard,thereappearstobeconsiderablemeritintheEnglishconceptofacouncil

constitutionthatcanbenegotiatedandupdatedaftereachelection,andthatsetsouttheimportant

rulesgoverningoperationsandkeyrelationships.Thiswouldapplyequallytoissuesofpolitical

governancediscussedpreviously.

Whilsthavingaseparatechiefexecutiveremainsthenorm,someEnglishcouncilsarenow

experimentingwiththemayor(orleader)asCEOmodel(Stevens2011),anddowngradingthe

positionofchiefexecutivetochiefoperatingofficerorheadofpaidservice.Insomeinstancesthis

followstheadventofamayororcouncilleaderwhowishestobethedominantauthority,but

elsewhereitmayreflectaviewthattheheadofthebodypoliticoughttodealdirectlyasrequired

withalltheseniorofficers(asinthecaseofBrisbaneslordmayor)andthatgrantingthetitlechief

executiveofficertoanappointedofficialisinappropriate.Theneedtoreduceexpenditureisalsoa

significantfactor:eliminatingtheseparatepositionofCEOandmakingoneoftheseniorofficers

headofpaidservicemaybeseenasaworthwhilesaving.

Intergovernmentrelations

Anecessarycorollaryofcommunityleadershipandstrategicplanningisinvolvementininter

governmentrelations.Allthemayorsinterviewedspokeabouttheirroleindealingwithand


29/38


29

advocatingtocentralgovernmentsonbehalfoftheirlocalarea.Asnotedearlier,theAucklandRoyal

Commissionhighlightedtheneedforsomeonetospeakfortheregion.

OnlytwoAustralianlocalgovernmentActsspecificallymentionintergovernmentrelations.TheCity

ofAdelaideincludesthestrongestreference,makingitadutyofthemayortoparticipateinthe

maintenanceof

inter

governmental

relationships

at

regional,

state

and

national

levels.

The

QueenslandActincludesasomewhatoddrequirementforthemayortoprovideinformationtothe

ministeraboutthelocalgovernmentarea.Inaddition,theNorthernTerritoryActmakesthemayor

theprincipalrepresentativeofthecouncil,whileasnotedearlierSydneyslordmayorchairsthe

jointstatecouncilCentralSydneyPlanningCommittee,animportantintergovernmentmechanism.

Regardlessoflegislation,itisevidentthatAustralianmayorsaregenerallyexpectedtoplaya

significantroleinintergovernmentrelations.WhentheRuddfederalgovernmentestablishedthe

AustralianCouncilofLocalGovernmentin2008,itsnominalmembership(andannualplenary

gathering)consistedofallthecountrysmayors(orequivalents).ArecentmovebytheNSW

governmentto

launch

ongoing

reform

and

revitalization

of

local

government

(Destination

2036)

beganwithameetingofallthestatesmayorsandcouncilgeneralmanagers(chiefexecutives).This

suggeststhatsomecodificationofthemayorsintergovernmentrole,alongthelinesoftheAdelaide

Act,wouldbeappropriate.


30/38


30

6. Conclusion: a framework for legislation

Thisconcludingsectionbuildsonthelessonsdrawnearlieraboutkeyelementsoftheevolvingrole

ofmayors,tosuggestaframeworkoflegislativeprovisionsthatmightbeappliedinAustralia.Its

startingpointisthattheevidencereviewedpointsclearlytothevalueofmayorswhoareenabledto

exercisestrong,

facilitative

and

place

based

leadership.

Based

on

that

approach,

Table

3proposes

a

setofprincipalmayoralfunctionsandprerogatives,andlegislativeprovisionsthatwouldgiveeffect

tothem.Wherepossible,thesuggestedprovisionsdrawonanexistingAustralianlocalgovernment

Act.

Table3:Possiblemayoralrolesandlegislation

Functionorprerogative Legislativeprovision (andorigin)

Principalmemberofthe

council

Leadandcontrolthebusinessofthecouncil(Brisbane)

Chairandmanagemeetings(All/Qld)

Speakon

behalf

of

the

council

as

the

council's

principal

representative(NT)

Conductcivicandceremonialfunctions(All)

Communityleadershipand

engagement

Articulateandpromoteavisionforthearea(Auckland)

Provideleadershipandguidancetothecommunity(Adelaide)

Establishprocessesandmechanismstoengagewiththecommunity

(Auckland)

Selectionofdeputymayor Appointthedeputymayor(Auckland)OR

Mayoranddeputytostandforelectionasateam(Melbourne)

Effectivepolitical

governance

Establish

committees

of

the

governing

body

and

appoint

the

chairpersonofeachcommittee(Auckland)

Overseethecouncillorsintheperformanceoftheirfunctionsandin

theexerciseoftheirpowers(Tas)

Representaccuratelythepoliciesanddecisionsofthecouncil(Tas)

Strategicandcorporate

planning

Leadthedevelopmentandimplementationofcouncilplans,policies,

andbudgets(Auckland/Qld)

Proposetheadoptionofthebudget(Qld)

Guidingthechiefexecutive

Lead,manage,andprovideadviceandstrategicdirectiontothechief

executiveofficerontheimplementationofcouncilpolicies(Qld/SA)

Exercise,in

cases

of

necessity,

the

policy

making

functions

of

the

governingbodyofthecouncilbetweenmeetings(NSW)

Liaisewiththechiefexecutiveofficeronbehalfoftheother

councillors(Qld/Tas)

Directthechiefexecutiveofficerinaccordancewiththecouncils

policies(Qld)

Conductperformanceappraisalsofthechiefexecutiveofficer(Qld)

Intergovernmentrelations Participateinintergovernmentalrelationshipsatregional,Stateand

nationallevels(Adelaide)

Exercisedelegatedauthority Exercisesuchotherfunctionsasthecouncildetermines(NSW/SA).


31/38


31

WhilstthelegislativeprovisionssuggestedinTable3wouldconsiderablystrengthentheroleof

Australianmayors,theyarebynomeansradicalintheinternationalcontextandstopshortof

conferringexecutivepowersinthecommonlyacceptedsenseoftheterm.Indeed,itmaywellbe

thatgreaterexecutiveauthorityisseenasdesirableinsomecases,suchascurrentlyappliesin

BrisbaneandSydney(thelatterunderdelegation).Ontheotherhand,theremaybelittleneedfor

changeinmanyofAustraliasthinlypopulatedruralandremotelocalgovernmentsthatdischarge

onlylimitedfunctions.

Nevertheless,packagingexistingprovisionsofvariousAustralianlocalgovernmentActsandthe

AucklandCouncilActinthemannersuggestedwouldundoubtedlybeconsideredriskyordownright

dangerousinsomequarters,particularlypowerstoappointthedeputymayor,toestablish

committeesandappointchairs,andtodirectthechiefexecutivetogiveeffecttocouncilpolicies.As

discussedearlier,suchchangeswouldneedtobeaccompaniedbyarrangementstoensureeffective

scrutinyofthemayorsactionsbythecouncilasawhole,plusifnecessarystategovernment

oversight(perhapsviaanindependentlocalgovernmentboardorcommission).Thismightalso

involveintroducingaquestiontimeformayorsaspartofcouncilmeetings,andenablingcouncillors

tooverturnmayoralproposalsordecisionsbyatwothirdsmajority.

Ifmayorsaretodomore,theywillneedincreasedresourcesandsupport.TheAucklandmodel,

underwhichthereisalegislativeguaranteethatthemayorwillhaveanadequatelyresourced

personaloffice,appearsdesirableinthecaseoflargerurbancouncils.

Thisleavesthequestionofwhetherstrongermayorsshouldbedirectly(popularly)orindirectly

elected.AsinEngland,firmviewsareheldonbothsidesofthatdebate,althoughapartfromthe

recentdebateinGeelongthereisnoevidenceofwidespreaddissentinthosestatesorcitieswhere

mayorsare

required

to

be

directly

elected,

and

the

author

is

not

aware

of

any

instances

in

which

councilsorcommunitiesthatoptedfordirectelectionhavelaterreversedthatdecision.Atthesame

time,theredoesappeartobeanemergingconsensusthatevenindirectlymayorsshouldholdoffice

foratleasttwoyearssothattheycansettleintothepositionandmakeagreatercontributionto

strategicdirection,policyandprogramdevelopment,andascivicleaders.

Asdiscussedearlier,thereareofcourserisksassociatedwithdirectelectionofmayorspersonality

politicsmaythrowupunsuitableorinexperiencedcandidates,orperhapsenableacandidatewith

personalwealthorfinancialbackerstobuyelection.Themajorpartiesmaybecomemoreinvolved

inlocalgovernmentthantheyareatpresent,seekingtocapturefurtherglitteringprizes.However,

theresearchandinterviewsconductedinpreparingthispaperindicatedthatdirectelectionisno

morelikelytoproduceanincompetentoregotisticalmayorthanisindirectelectionbythe

councillors:itseemsthateithertheelectorateisabletodiscernthestrengthsandweaknessesof

candidates,orthatonceelectedandwiththerightsupport,thegreatmajorityofsuccessful

candidatesquicklycometotermswiththeroletheymustplayandrisetotheoccasion.Indeed,it

canreasonablybearguedthatindirectelection,involvingpoliticaldealsamongstcouncillorssothat

severalcantaketheirturnasmayorforayearortwo,carriesequalorgreaterrisks.

Onbalance,thecaseforpopularelectionandhenceasolidmandatetoexercisecivicleadership

seemsmorecompelling.Asnotedearlier,thiswasalsotheconclusionreachedbytherecentreview

ofmetropolitanlocalgovernmentinPerth,whichalsohighlightedtheimportanceofenhanced


32/38


32

strategicthinkingandleadership(MetropolitanLocalGovernmentReview2012:6,22).Whatthen

followsistheneedtoensurethattheresponsibilitiesandauthorityofmayorsaredefinedinsome

detailsothattheyarecleartoallandsuitablybalanced,andinorderformayorstobeheldto

accountbytheirfellowcouncillorsandconstituents.

Toconclude,

this

paper

has

argued

that

the

functions

of

mayors

who

are

already

generally

acknowledgedastheprincipalmemberoftheircouncilsshouldbeupdatedandrecodifiedto

matchotherchangesthathaveoccurredinAustralianlocalgovernment.ExceptinQueensland,the

structuresandnormsofpoliticalgovernancehavelargelyfailedtokeeppacewiththeexpanded

functionsoflocalgovernment,andespeciallythegrowingexpectationthatcouncilswillactmore

strategicallytoreflectandrepresenttheneedsandaspirationsoftheircommunities,andtoensure

soundmanagementofcommunityassets.Thesegoalscannotbeachievedunlessthepoliticalarmof

localgovernmenthasthecapacitytodischargeitsresponsibilitieseffectivelyalongsidethoseof

management.Tobuildthatcapacity,theofficeofmayorseemsagoodplacetostart.


33/38


33

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