Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570171

Volume 11, No.1 January-June 2009

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570171

Human Security and the Responsibility toProtect: A Holistic Approach to Dealing withViolent Conflict in Southeast Asia

Otto E Von Feigenblutt"

Abstract : Mediation is mostly treated apartfrom other approaches to dealingwith violent conflicts, especially when dealing with conflict in which one or bothparties deny the legitimacy ofan overarching sovereign authority. This is the casein most viole,nt conflicts in southeast Asia which are ovetwhelmingly ethnic innature and usually pit a group fighting against the central government. Thispaper treats mediation as just one tool in a wider set of approaches to dealingwith so called "intractable-conflicts" and shows how mediation can and shouldbe integrated so as to achieve the synergy and momentum necessary to deal withthe many obstacles to a long term settlement of a dispute. The concept of HumanSecurity as well as of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are used as overarchingtheoretical frameworks necessary in order to achieve not only negative but alsopositive peace. An approach to mediation resembling Lederach b " elicitive model "and Burton's problem solving workshops are recommended as important tools ina concerted and holistic effort to move an intractable conflict towards settlementand sustainable peace. Examples are used throughdut the pape'r:from SoutheastAsia's many intractable conflicts such as the one,in Indonesia between thegovernment and the pan-Islamic movement Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the Muslimnationalist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighting for independenee inthe Philippines, and the Southern Muslim insurgency in Thailand fighting for anIndenendent Greater Patani.

Conflict, Southeast Asia, human security, peace

Introduction - , ;

Mediation has been traditionally treated as a separate and distinct processwith respect to humanitarian and development efforts forpeace building. Thisreflects the historical association ofmediation to high politics and the diplomatic

'Fellow of the Royal Asiatic SocieQ of Great Britain and lreland; Editor in Chief, Journelof Alternative P ers p ectives on Social Scienc es

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Journal ofSocial Sciences, VoL 11, No. I

realm (Kissinger, 1994).However recent theoretical developments in the fieids

of development studies and international security have attempted to bridge the

gap between different approaches used to deal with similar conflict situations.

Intuitively, it is easy to see the connection between short term humanitarianassistance, mid and long term development aid, and security in dealing withhumanitarian emergencies which tend to be caused by infactable conflicts @runnee& Toope, 2006;Wjlliams, 2009). Galtung and other scholars from the Peace

Studies tradition have stressed the importance of striving for positive peace rather

than limiting the effort to searching for a more limited negative peace (Galtung,

1969; Jeong,2000). This early articulation of amoreholistic view of conflict

resolution distinguishesbetween anegativepeacebroadly defined as the absence

of violence to a more holistic view ofpeace which includes both the absence ofviolence and also the presence of socialjustice (Galtung, 1969). Galtung's positive

peace can be interpreted to mean that for peace to be sustainable it must he

based on a just and stable social system. Burton added another piece to the

puzzle with his stress on the importance of dealing with basic human needs as a

prerequisite for achieving peace (ISiesberg, 1997). Thus, peace requires dealing

with the root causes, usually a deprivation in terms of one of the basic human

needs, before a sustainable resolution to a conflict can be achieved.

At a global level, two recent theoretical developments have attempted to

integrate the previously mentioned holistic tradition in peacemaking and

peacebuilding. Human security and the responsibility to protect came to the fore

inthe last decade ofthe 20'h century as overarchingparadigms linkingpreviously

isolated fields such as security studies, development studies, and conflict analysis

and resolution (Be1lamy,2009;Brunnee & Toope, 2006; Khong, 2006; Mack,

200 5 ;Patcharawalai Wongboonsin, 2006 ; P eng-Er, 2 006). Human S ecurity,

broadly defined as "freedom fromwanf 'and "freedom from fear" encompasses

humanitarian, development, and security assistance in a single theoretical paradigm

(Von Feigenblatt, 2007). The importance of the concept lies in the fact that itsuccessfully shows the connection between "want" and "fear" and how the two

areas ofhuman security are interdependent, It follows that in orderto strive for

greater human security, it is necessary to deal with both "freedom from want"

and"freedom from fear".Asecond andequallyimportanttheoretical developrnent

brought aboutbythe concept ofhuman securityis the emphasis on the individual

human as the referent of security (VonFeigenblatt,2}}9).Thus, the goal shifted

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Otto F. Von Feigenblatt Human Security and the Responsibitie to protect

from securing a territorial entity or a state to securing the individual. This theoreticalshift has the direct consequence of increasing the number of concernedstakeholders in conflict situations. In brief, it legitimized intervention by a widearray ofnon-state actors in an effort to secure the "human".

A second theoretical curent that arose in the late twentieth century was thatofR2P (responsibility to protect). This concept attempts to redefine sovereignryaway from its traditional inviolability and basis on right to one based onresponsibility @ellamy, 2009). The importance ofthis shift is that a new intemationalnolm was created establishing the duty and responsibility ofnational govemmentsto protect their citizens. HoweveE the concept went even further than that andassertedthe right and dutyofthe intemational communityto intervene in cases inwhich national governnients are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens(Brunnee & Toope, 2006).It is also important to note that the concept includesboth protections from "fear" and from 'kant". Therefore, R2P increased thetheoretical traction ofHuman Securityby appending an operational code forattempting to achieve human security.

Violent Conflicts in SoutheastAsia

SoutheastAsia is home to some ofthe most intractable conflicts in the world(Dupont, 2005). Several ofthe world's most feared rebel armies operate in theregion, as well as several terrorist groups (Hazen,2008). Most of the violentconflicts in the region involve disputes over sovereignty. That means that at leastone party to the conflict refuses to recognize a sovereign authority. Thus, anoverarching authority with the power to terminate the conflict is lacking. In additionto that the multiethnic nature ofthe region and the residual effects ofthe colonialexperience further exacerbate conflicts Q.{eher, 2002;Rolfe, 2008; Saul, 2006;Singh, 2008-2009). Three important regional conflicts will be discussed in thefollowing sections so as to show how human security and R2P provide anappropriate theoretical framework to analyze and possibly resolve them.

Indonesia and Global Terrorism

Indonesia is home to most infamous terrorist groups in SoutheastAsia,Jeehmah Islamiyah (n). As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia isknown for its moderate strand oflslam (lv{ulder, 1996). However, inroads madeby Wahabi teachings and neo-Salafism imported from the Middle East has

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radicalized an important sectorofthepopulation (Ramakrishna,2005). The late

1 990s and early years of the 21't century saw a sharp increase in the number ofpesantrenteaching a strict interpretation oflslam.' Concurrent economic woes

brought about by the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and the consequent fallfrom power ofthe Suharto regime opened up the necessary functional space for

radical groups such as JI to operate (Smith, 2005). Political space was also

available due to the increase inthenumber ofdisgruntledyouths without gainful

employnent who were increasingly exposed to fundamentalist strands oflslam.

Moreover, the global geopolitical context following the September 11 attacks

and the followingAmericanled war onterror supported radical arguments of an

American conspiracy against the global ummah (Barber, 1996).'?

JI's political ideology is based on a radical strand of neo-Salafism stressing

the importance ofthe strict interpretation of Islam and emphasizing a religious

identity over anational one (Liow,2006;Ramakrishna,2005). Thus, JI spouses

the goal of creating a Pan-Islamic Caliphate uniting the Muslims in Malaysia,

lndonesia, the SouthemPhilippines, and SouthemThailand. As an organization,

JI is thought to have around 1000 active members, some with considerable battle

experience inAfghanistan andMindanao (Haklai, 2009; Smith, 2005). Interms

of funding it receives considerable aid from the Middle East, especially Saudi

Arabia, through Islamic charities and front companies. Nevertheless, JI's power

is not only based on its individual capability but rather on its function as a node

between regional Radical Muslim groups and the global Islamic Terrorist

movement. Thus. JI has extensive links withAl-Qaeda and local groups such as

the MILF and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in southem

Thailand (1ory,2007). It has cooperated with the MILF in terms oftraining and

in conducting some terrorist attacks in the Philippines (Rodell, 2005).

In terms ofefforts to deal with the tenorist threat in lrdonesia, the govemment

first tried to avoid accepting that there was a terorist threat and later on accepted

to join theAmerican led war on terror. However, the support ofradical Islamic

Groups in Indonesia by some sectors of the armed forces has made the

implementation of a counter-terroristplanvery difficult (Ramakrishna,2005).

Weapons and protection are provided by the armed forces for some terrorist

groups. Moreover, the instability of the post-suharto democratic system in

Indonesia hampers the development of a unified approach to deal with terrorism

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Otto F. Von Feigenblatt Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect

(Neher, 2002). The Bali bombings, orchestrated by JI, led to a more activeparticipationby Indonesia in the war on terror. However, the govemment tried to

play down the terrorist threat due to fears of the effect it could have on the

tourism indushy. Westem nations such as Australia and the United States provided

technical and economic help to the Indonesian government and foreign security

specialist were deployed to the region. Nevertheless, most aid has been ear-

marked for the implementation of a traditional counter-terrorist strategy.

Improvements, in intelligence, surveillance, and military equipment have been

emphasized by the United States. In addition to that, better control over the flowof funds in order to disrupt the funding ofterrorist activities has been attempted.

The traditional counter-terrorist sfategy that has been pursued by the United

States and Indonesia in dealing with JI and extremism has not been effective indestroying JI for the simple reason that it has not reduced the political space forit to operate (Smith, 2005). Even ifthe functional space is reduced by traditional

counter-terrorist approaches, as long as there are a large number ofyouths ready

to join extremist groups, the ranks of JI will be replenished. In addition to that,

there is a large portion of the population that while not part of JI and not inagreement with some of its methods, is generally sl,rnpathetic to it. This is very

important in that they can provide safe-houses for its members and limit the

ability of the government to deal with the root causes of the struggle, namely,

fundamentalist Islam (Chalk, 2005).

In order to deal with radical Islam in Indonesia a more holistic approach

should be undertaken. Following the concept of human security and R2P, the

United States and the International community should undertake amultilevelapproach to deal with the root causes ofthe rise ofradical Islam in a historicallymoderate region. Development proj ects aiming at increasing gainful emplolnnent

could reduce the functional space of JI and related groups. An improvement inthe public education system would weaken the role of r adical p e s at ren in favor

of a more moderate version of Islam. Finally, a public relations campaign should

also be undertaken so as to stress the impoftance of tolerance for a peaceful

realm (Ramakrishna,2005). The previous possible activities would close the

political space available for the JI to operate as well as deal with some of the

most important grievances ofthe grassroots supporters ofradical groups. Without

new foot soldiers to replenish the ranks fallen due to the traditional counter-

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Journal ofSocial Sciences, Vol. I I, No. I

tenorist approach, JI and related radical organizations would be greatly weakened

and their abilrty to regroup would be limited. Thus, "fear" and'kant" should be

tackled concurrently by the International Community and the Indonesian

Govemment.

Mediation in the Indonesian context should be undertaken by moderate

academics and moderate religious scholars. Strengthening the position of those

moderate scholars would weaken radicals and allow them to mediate between

thepeople andthe govemment aswell as withthe International Community.Atack-2approachis the onlyrealistic possibility in Lrdonesia since JI is not seeking

to negotiate with any govemment. The same is not true for its grassroots supporters

and the communities that synrpathize with them. Furthermore, by having insider-

partial mediators who are part ofthe social system and who will have to live with

the consequences oftheirintervention, theywouldhavemore credibilitywiththepeople (Lederach, 1996).Moreover, regional culture stresses the importance ofhierarchy and favors a directive approach to mediation (Cohen, i 996; Mulder,

1996).Therefore, a concerted track-2 mediation approach by moderate scholars

and religious leaders supporled by the govemment and the intemational commrulty

would go a long way in closing the political space for radical Islam in addition to

providing a different image of international intervention as not only based on

taditional secwity but rather concentrating in finding long-term solutions to building

a sustainable peace.

The Philippines and Muslim Separatism

The main armed threat in the Philippines is the separatist insurgency inMindanao (Rolfe, 2008). Aviolent insurgency carried out by the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF) and other related groups in order to seek the

establishment of an independent Islamic State in the South has grown in intensity

and size in the last few decades (Mulder, 1996, Nehet,2002; Rodell, 2005).

The MILF is an organizationmainly devoted to nationalist goals rather than an

intemationalistpan-Islamic agenda. Nevertheless, ithas cooperatedwithJl and

other terrorist groups operating in the region. Several training camps in MILFcontrolled territory have been known to harbor members of JI and Al-Qaeda

(Abuza, 2005). ln terms of capability, the MILF is a formidable oppbnent for the

Filipino armed forces. Historically, itreceivedweapons fromthe SovietUnion

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Otto F. Von Feigenblatt Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect

and Libya and is thought to have a standing army of about 10,000 well armedand trained insurgents (Rodell, 2005; Singh, 2008-2009). In addition to that itenjoys the support of the population ofthe region and is not listed as a terroristor gatizationby the United Nations,

While the main goal of the MILF is the establishment of an independentstate for the Muslims in the Philippines, the insurgency is fueled by a vast array ofgrievances. The Muslim population has historically been discriminated in termsof government jobs and development programs organized by the centralgovemment. Thus, the region inhabited by the Muslim community is one ofthepoorest regions in the country (Neher, 2002).Infrastructure is lacking andunemployment is a serious problem. Furthermore, a population bulge amongyoung Muslims further exacerbates the situation. Historical grievances are alsopresent for, the rest of the country was successfully converted to Catholicismduring Spanish rule while most of the areas inhabited by Muslims were neversuccessfully subdued by the colonial government. During the colonial periodCatholic Filipinos from the central regions of the country were given mostopportunities in the local administration and this situation continued during theperiod underAmerican control. Therefore, the Muslim community has beenhistorically considered a frontier region.

In terms ofthe approach taken by the Philippine govemment to deal withthe insurgency, ithas closelyfollowedthe dictates oftheAmericanWar onTerror.However, even in terms of conventional weapons, the Philippine army isconsidered to be one ofthe weakest in SoutheastAsia (Emmers ,2001). Comrptionamong officers is common, and much of the weapons of the MILF and otherviolent groups comes from the govemment armory. Some attempts at mediationwere undertaken with the help of Libya and several ceas e-fi res have been signed,including fhe 1975 Tripoli agreement (Rodell,2005). However, none of theagreements have proven to be durable. The United States has provided trainingand weapons to the govemment forces but the army has been unable to make abreak in the stalemate with the MILF. Some ofthe difficulties in dealing with theMILF is that it enjoys the support ofmoderate andconservativeMuslimNations.In addition to that, the population is sympathetic to the cause and provides safehouses for MILF members in addition to a never endins flow of new recruits(Dupont,2005).

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Jottrnal ofSocial Sciences, Vol. 11, No l

The Muslim insurgency is a good example of how atraditional security

approach to deal with violent non-state gloups is not very effective by itself' A

multilayered approach to the insurgency would encompass, consultation,

development aid, efforts to increase the professionalism ofthe armed forces, and

finally mediation. Consultation refers to a medium to long term process of track-

2 dipiomacy resembling the workshops recommended by Scholar-practitioners

such as Burton (Kriesberg, 1997). Development projects would ease

unemplo)ment and improve the infrastructure ofthe region. This would deal with

some of the general grievances of the population and thus weaken the support

fortheMIlF. ConsultationwouldimprovemutLralunderstandingbetweenMuslim

and Catholic leaders, academics, and other such notables and thus reduce tensions

and avoidmisunderstandings. Concurrentlywiththetraditional security approach

so as to make continued conflict costly for the MILF and the Muslim population

all ofthepreviouslymentioned activitieswouldleadto theproper cornbinationof

factors to undertake a serious mediation process which would attempt to resolve

the entire dispute. It is evident that the Phiiippine govemment lacks the resources

for such a daunting task and most of the resources it receives from the United

States are ear-marked for traditional security (Rodell, 2005). Following the

concept of Human Security and R2D it is imperative that the international

community devote an equal share of resources to soft-security efforls which

encompasses development and consultations.

Unrest in the Deep South of Thailand

The insurgency in the Deep South of Thailand is difficult to characterize

because it lacks a clearly identifiable gloup leading the violence' Formerly the

Patani United Liberation Front (PULO) was lecognized as the principal group

fighting for the independence of the former sultanate of Patani (Jory,2007 ;Liow,

ZOOO;. llowever, the renewed insurgency that gained strength after the 2004

raid of a government armory is not under the control of PULO (Ungpakom,

z}}7).Bombings and attacks on Buddhist s1'nnbols such as temples and monks

happenregularly inthethree Southemmostprovinces ofThailand (Storey,2008)'

Historicaiy, an indep endent Malay Kingdom, the re gion was annexed by S iam

(former name ofThailand) in the early years of the 2011' century (Askew, 2007;

McCargo, 2008; wyatt, 2003). Most of the population ofthe region is ofMalay

ethnicity and Muslim. Historically, the region has been marginalized by the central

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Otto F. Von Feigenblatt Human Securifii and the Responsibility to Protect

government in terms of economic development and culture. Poverly and

unemployrnent are widespread and the educational system does not include the

predominant local language, Melayu P atani (Jory 2007 ; Liow, 200 6 ; McC argo,

2008). To complicate matters even more, the porous border with Malaysia is

home to several important organized criminal groups engaged in the drug trade,

weapons smuggling, and human trafficking (Askeq 2007). Thus, the rule of law

is virtually absentintheregion. Historically, theofficial govemmentpolicyto deal

with the insurgency was the same as the one used to deal with the Communistinsurgency of the 1970s and 80s and was overwhelmingly based on a militaryapproach (AHRC, 2009 ; Mc C argo, 2 00 8 ; Ungp akorn, 2007 ). Control over

the administrationofthe Southemprovinceswas givento the Military andmartial

law was declared in the area.

The actual number of armed insurgents in SouthemThailand isbelievedtobe of less than 1000 fighters divided among several small groups (McCargo,

2008; Ungpakorn ,2007). Nevertheless, there is a wider group of supporters

among the locai population which could include as much as one third of the

Malay community in the region. This explains the difficulties the military has had

inidentiffing insurgent groups andtheirmembers. Furthermore, amajority ofthepopulation is syrnpathetic to the cause ofthe insurgents even ifthey do not approve

of some oftheir methods. Thus, the popular support for the insurgency combined

with the porous nature of the border with Malaysia makes it very difficult for the

central govemmentto be able to dealwiththe insurgency effectively.

Thailand's southem insurgency is mostly an ethnonational liberation struggle

fighting to correct regional grievances such as underdevelopment compared to

the rest ofthe country assimilationist attempts by the cenhal govemment, and a

widespread feeling ofbeing treated as second class citizens in their own land

(Ungpakorn,2007). Military abuse has further aggravated the situation byreinforcing the ideology ofthe insurgency in the eyes ofthe population @ingwerth,2008). While the southem insurgency presents a difficult case for mediation since

there is no single leadership for the inswgency a prenegotiation approach such as

consultation and track-two diplomacy could be a very useful first step. Religious

leaders have tremendous power through their control of a parallel education

system in the three provinces. An improvement in mutual understanding between

local leaders and Bangkok notables such as leading academics and bureaucrats

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could have important effbcts on the ground in terms of direct effects on thefi.rnctional and political space available to the insurgents. As mentioned in previoussections ofthis paper, it is very important to deal with the political space availableto an insurgent movement because its naruowing would have a similar effect onthe functional space without the cost in lives and money of the traditionalcounterinsurgency approach. Moreover, an appro ach b as ed on human securityand R2P would involve local NGOs as well as the intemational community in aconcerted effort to deal with some ofthe structural violence behind the unrest.Participatory development projects, improvements in the local infrastructure, anda restructuring ofpublic education in the region would be more effective than amilitary approach fighting against a nonconventional threat, Thus, foreignconsultants could be hired to design an educational system that takes into accountthe cultural diversity ofthe region, and includes long term grievances such as theteaching ofMelayu Patani inpublic schools, as well as the religious componentwhich couldbe made optional so that Buddhist students could choose to takeBuddhism while Muslims take Islam. Cur:riculum design should be at the core ofdealing with identity needs long sought by the local population.

Conclusions

As shown by the three case studies, violent conflict can be a very complexprocess. Violent conflict is a social process that is just one part of the overallsocial system in which it operates and thus it is affected and at the same timesaffects its context. Since social conflict does not happen in a vacuum, it shouldnot be dealt with, as if, it were separate and distinct from its environment. Aholistic approachto overall securityanddevelopmentprovides themostpromisingtheoretical approach to building sustainable peace. Human security provides theneeded theoretical link between development and conflict and by addressingboth "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want", it provides a wider lensneeded to deal with'"intractable conflicts" such as the ones in southeastAsia.Complementing human security, responsibility to protect (R2P), operationalizesthe concept ofhuman securiff in terms of creating a pertinent norm of intemationallawtojustifythemeasuresnecessaryto achievehuman security. Finally, mediationand consultation were discussed as important tools that can be used in a holisticapproach to conflict resolution. It should be clear from the examples provided ofradical Islamic terrorism in Indonesia, Muslim nationalism and terrorism in the

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Otto F. Von Feigenblatt Human SecuriQ and the Responsibility to Protect

Philippines, and unrest in the South of Thailand, that violent conflict is affected bymany factors and its context and that a holistic approach to deal with theperpetrators ofthe violence, their supporters, their needs, inter alia, is morepromising interms ofattaining sustainablepeacethan either afaditional approach

or a counterinsurgency approach modeled after the "War on Teffor".

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tPesantren: Islamic religious schools and universities.

2Ummah: global body of Muslim believers.

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