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The Airbus SafetyMagazine

Edition January 2011

Safety

Issue11

CONTENT:qWhat is stall?

How a pilot should react

in ront o a stall situation

qMinimum control speed tests

on A380

q Radio Altimeter erroneous values

q Automatic NAV engagement

at Go Around


2/26

Safety FirstThe Airs Saety Magazine

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Saety First, #11 January 2011. Saety First

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A380Water pool test

2 Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011 Safety


3/26

Editorial

ContentsFor those o you who knew Yves Benoist, it is my sadduty to inorm you that Yves passed away suddenly,at the end o December.

Yves held the position o Vice-President Flight Saety

at Airbus or 16 years, beore retiring in 2004.

Throughout my time working with him, he passed on

three main lessons: investigations require rigor, thoroughtechnical understanding and patience. These lessons

remain valid today, despite the greater challenge imposed

by todays environment.

In addition to this, Yves stressed the importance o the

dissemination o inormation and sharing o lessons

learnt. This led him, in 1994, to launch the annual Airbus

Flight Saety Conerence as well as the Airbus Saety

Magazine, Hangar Flying (now Saety First), which are

still today the most visible part o Yves heritage.

Our thoughts at this time are with Yves amily. I have no

doubt you will join me in appreciation o his remarkable

achievements.

Today, our challenge is to build upon Yves legacy.

Let me wish you a happy new year, to you and your

amily.

Yannick MALINGE

Chie Product Saety Ofcer

The Airbus Saety Magazine

Inormation ........................................................ 4

What is stall?How a pilot should reactin ront o a stall situation. ................................ 5

Jcq Rosay

Minimum control speed tests on A380 ............ 11

Cld LeLaie

Radio Altimeter erroneous values .................... 15

Mrc BaiLLion / Lrr De BauDus

Automatic NAV engagement at Go Around ...... 19

sth GRanGeR / erc JeanpieRRe

Yannik MALINGECh prdct st ocr

3Issue 11 | JANUARY 2011The Airbus SafetyMagazine


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News



5/26


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3. The stallphenomenm

The linear part o the curve corre-

sponds to a steady airow aroundthe wing.

When the AoA reaches the value o

the maximum Cl, the airow starts

to separate.

CI

AoA

Lift

Angle of Attack

Critical Angleof Attack

Maximumlift

StalledNot stalled

6, steady flow

Lift

Angle of Attack


Maximumlift

StalledNot stalled

separated pointstall point, maximum lift

CI

AoA

Lift

Angle of Attack


Maximumlift

StalledNot stalled

separatedflow

CI

AoA

Beyond this point, the lit decreasesas the ow is separated rom the wing

profle. The wing is stalled.

On this picture (extracted rom a

video ootage), the erratic positions o

the ow cones on this A380 wing

during a stall test show that the ow is

separated.



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4. Some importantthings to rememeraot the stallq For a given confguration and at

a given Mach number, a wing stalls

at a given Angle o Attack (AoA)

called AoA STALL. When the

Mach number increases, the value

o the AoA STALL decreases.

qWhen approaching the AoA

STALL, the wing generates a cer-

tain level o bueting, which tends

to increase in level at high Mach

number.qWhen the AoA increases and ap-

proaches the AoA STALL, in cer-

tain cases, a phenomenon o pitch

up occurs as a result o a change

in the distribution o the lit along

the wingspan. The eect o the

pitch up is a sel-tendency o the

aircrat to increase its Angle o At-

tack without urther inputs on the

elevators. Generally, or a given

wing, this phenomenon occurs at a

lower Angle o Attack and is more

prominent when the Mach numberis higher.

qThe only mean to counter the

pitch up is to apply a nose down

elevator input.

qWhen the aerodynamic ow on

the wing is stalled, the only possi-

ble mean to recover a normal ow

regime is to decrease the AoA at a

value lower than the AoA STALL.

q Stall is an AoA problem only. It

is NOT directly a speed issue.

Knowing those two last character-

istics is absolutely paramount, as

they dictate the only possible way

to get out of a stall.

5. Protetionsagainst the stall inNORMAL LAw onFbw airrat

In NORMAL LAW, the Electronic

Flight Controls System (EFCS)

takes into account the actual AoA

and limits it to a value (AoA MAX)

lower than AoA STALL (fg. 1).

The EFCS adjusts the AoA MAX

limitation to account or the

reduction o the AoA STALL with

increasing Mach number.

Equally, or a given Mach number

and a given AoA, the EFCS takes

into account the natural pitch

up eect o the wing or this

Mach number and this AoA, and

applies on the elevators the appro-

priate longitudinal pre-command

to counter its eect.

6. Protetionsagainst the stall inALTERNATE andIREcT LAw onFbw an onven-tional airrat

On FBW aircrat, ollowing cer-

tain malunctions, in particular in

case o sensor or computer ailure,

the ight controls cannot ensure

the protections against the stall.

Depending on the nature o the ail-

ure, they revert to ALTERNATE

LAW or to DIRECT LAW.

In both cases, the pilot has to en-

sure the protection against the stall,

based upon the aural Stall Warning

(SW), or a strong bueting which,

i encountered, is an indication o

an incipient stall condition.

The conventional aircrat are

permanently in DIRECT LAW, and

regarding the stall protection, they

are in the same situation as the

FBW aircrat in DIRECT LAW.

In both ALTERNATE and

DIRECT LAW, the aural SW is set

at a value called AoA Stall Warn-

ing (AoA SW), which is lower than

the AoA STALL (fg. 2).

The triggering o the Stall Warn-

ing just means that the AoA has

reached the AoA SW, which is

by defnition lower than the AoA

STALL, and that the AoA has to be

reduced.

CI

AoA

Lift

Angle of Attack


Maximumlift

StalledNot stalled

AoA

MAX

Lift

Angle of Attack


Maximumlift

StalledNot stalled

AoA

Stall Warning

CI

AoA

Figure 1In NORMAL LAW,the EFCS limits the

AoA to a value lower

than AoA STALL

Figure 2In ALTERNATE andDIRECT LAW, the auralStall Warning is setat a value lower than

AoA STALL



8/26

Knowing what the SW is, there is

no reason to overreact to its trigger-

ing. It is absolutely essential or the

pilots to know that the onset o theaural Stall Warning does not mean

that the aircrat is stalling, that

there is no reason to be scared, and

that just a gentle and smooth reac-

tion is needed.

The value o the AoA SW depends

on the Mach number. At high Mach

number, the AoA SW is set at a

value such that the warning occurs

just beore encountering the pitch

up eect and the bueting.

I the anemometric inormationused to set the AoA SW is erro-

neous, the SW will not sound at

the proper AoA. In that case, as

mentioned above, the clue indicat-

ing the approach o the stall is the

strong bueting. In the remainder

o this document, or this situa-

tion, SW must be read as strong

bueting.

7. Margin to the

Stall warning inrise at highMah nmer anhigh altite

Typically, in cruise at high Mach

number and high altitude, at or

close to the maximum recom-

mended FL, there is a small mar-

gin between the actual cruise AoA

and the AoA STALL. Hence, in

ALTERNATE or DIRECT LAW,

the margin with the AoA SW iseven smaller.

The encounter o turbulence in-

duces quick variations o the AoA.

As a consequence, when the air-

crat is ying close to the maxi-

mum recommended altitude, it is

not unlikely that turbulence might

induce temporary peaks o AoA

going beyond the value o the AoA

SW leading to intermittent onsets

o aural SW.

Equally, in similar high FL cruise

conditions, in particular at turbulence

speed, i the pilot makes signifcant

longitudinal inputs, it is not unlikely

that it reaches the AoA SW value.

For those reasons, when in ALTER-

NATE or DIRECT LAW, it is rec-

ommended to y at a cruise ight

level lower than the maximum rec-ommended. A 4,000 t margin is to

be considered. Then, or the same

cruise Mach number, the IAS will

be higher, the AoA will be lower,

and thereore the AoA margin

towards AoA SW will be signif-

cantly increased.

In addition, as in RVSM space the

use o the AP is mandatory, any

ailures leading to the loss o the

AP mandates to descend below the

RVSM vertical limit.

8. Stall warningan stall

The traditional approach to stall

training consisted in a controlled

deceleration to the Stall Warning,

ollowed by a power recovery with

minimum altitude loss.

Experience shows that i the pilot

is determined to maintain the alti-

tude, this procedure may lead to thestall.

A practical exercise done in ight

in DIRECT LAW on an A340-600

and well reproduced in the simula-

tor consists in perorming a low alti-

tude level ight deceleration at idle

until the SW is triggered, and then to

push the THR levers to TOGA while

continuing to pull on the stick in or-

der to maintain the altitude.

The results o such a manoeuvre

are:

q In clean confguration, even i

the pilot reacts immediately to the

SW by commanding TOGA, when

the thrust actually reaches TOGA

(20 seconds later), the aircrat

stalls.

q In approach confguration, i the

pilot reacts immediately to the SW,

the aircrat reaches AoA stall -2.

q In approach confguration, i the

pilot reacts with a delay o 2 sec-

onds to the SW, the aircrat stalls.

This shows that increasing the

thrust at the SW in order to increase

the speed and hence to decrease the

AOA is not the proper reaction in

many cases (this will be developed

in the ollowing chapter).

In addition, it is to be noticed that,at high altitude, the eect o the

thrust increase on the speed rise is

very slow, so that the phenomenom

described above or the clean con-

fguration is exacerbated.

Obviously, such a procedure leads

to potentially unrecoverable situ-

ations i it is applied once the air-

crat has reached the aerodynamic

stall (see next chapter).

Even i the traditional procedure

can work in certain conditions i

the pilot reacts immediately to theSW, or i he is not too adamant on

keeping the altitude, the major is-

sue comes rom the act that once

the Stall Warning threshold has

been crossed, it is difcult to know

i the aircrat is still approaching to

stall or already stalled. Dierence

between an approach to stall and an

actual stall is not easy to determine,

even or specialists.

Several accidents happened where

the approach to stall procedure

was applied when the aircrat wasactually stalled.

For those reasons, the pilots should

react the same way or both ap-

proach to stall and stall situations.

9. Ho to reat

What is paramount is to decrease

the AoA. This is obtained directly

by decreasing the pitch order.

The pitch control is a direct AoAcommand(fg. 3).

The AoA decrease may be obtained

indirectly by increasing the speed,

but adding thrust in order to increase

the speed leads to an initial adverse

longitudinal eect, which trends to

increase urther the AoA (fg. 4).

It is important to know that i such

a thrust increase was applied when

the aircrat is already stalled, the

longitudinal eect would bring the

aircrat urther into the stall, to a

situation possibly unrecoverable.

Conversely, the frst eect o re-

ducing the thrust is to reduce the

AoA (fg. 5).



9/26

In summary:

FIRST: The AoA MUST BE RE-

DUCED. I anything, release the

back pressure on stick or column

and apply a nose down pitch input

until out o stall (no longer have

stall indications). In certain cases,

an action in the same direction on

the longitudinal trim may be need-

ed. Dont orget that thrust has an

adverse eect on AoA or aircrat

with engines below the wings.

SECOND: When the stall clues

have disappeared, increase the

speed i needed. Progressively

increase the thrust with care, due to

the thrust pitch eect.

In practice, in straight ight with-

out stick input, the frst reaction

when the SW is triggered should be

Relativeairflow

RelativeairflowThrustincreas

e

RelativeairflowThrust reduction

Figure 3Pitch controlis a direct

AoA command

Figure 4Adding thrust

leads to anincrease in AoA

Figure 5Reducing thrustleads to a

decrease in AoA

to gently push on the stick so as to

decrease the pitch attitude by about

two or three degrees in order to de-

crease the AoA below the AoA SW.

During manoeuvres, the reduction

o the AoA is generally obtained just by releasing the backpressure

on the stick; applying a progres-

sive orward stick inputs ensures a

quicker reduction o the AoA.

I the SW situation occurs with

high thrust, in addition to the stick

reaction, reducing the thrust maybe necessary.

10. Proere

As an answer to the stall situation,

a working group gathering the FAA

and the main aircrat manuactur-

ers, including Airbus, ATR, Boeing,

Bombardier and Embraer, have es-

tablished a new generic procedure

titled Stall Warning or Aerody-

namic Stall Recovery Procedure

applicable to all aircrat types.

This generic procedure will be pub-

lished as an annex to the FAA AC 120.

This new procedure has been estab-

lished in the ollowing spirit:

q

One single procedure to coverALL stall conditions

q Get rid o TOGA as frst action

q Focus on AoA reduction.



10/26

Generi Stall warning orAeroynami Stall Reovery Proere

Immediately do the ollowing at the rst indication ostall (buet, stick shaker, stick pusher, or aural or visual

indication) during any fight phases except at lift off.

1. Autopilot and autothrottle .............................Disconnect

Rationale: While maintaining the attitude o the aircrat,

disconnect the autopilot and autothrottle. Ensure

the pitch attitude does not change adversely whendisconnecting the autopilot. This may be very im-

portant in mis-trim situations. Manual control is

essential to recovery in all situations. Leaving one

or the other connected may result in in-advertent

changes or adjustments that may not be easily

recognized or appropriate, especially during high

workload situations.

2. a) Nose down pitch control Apply until out o stall

(no longer have stall indications)

b) Nose down pitch trim .................................. As needed

Rationale: a) The priority is reducing the angle o attack.

There have been numerous situations where ight

crews did not prioritize this and instead prioritized

power and maintaining altitude. This will also

address autopilot induced ull back trim.

b) I the control column does not provide the

needed response, stabilizer trim may be necessary.

However, excessive use o trim can aggravate thecondition, or may result in loss o control or in high

structural loads.

3. Bank ...............................................................Wings Level

Rationale: This orientates the lit vector or recovery.

4. Thrust ...............................................................As Needed

Rationale: During a stall recovery, many times maximum

power is not needed. When stalling, the thrust canbe at idle or at high thrust, typically at high altitude.

Thereore, the thrust is to be adjusted accordingly

during the recovery. For engines installed below

the wing, applying maximum thrust can create astrong nose up pitching moment, i speed is low.

For aircrat with engines mounted above the wings,

thrust application creates a helpul pitch down

tendency. For propeller driven aircrat, thrustapplication energizes the air ow around the wing,

assisting in stall recovery.

5. Speed Brakes .........................................................Retract

Rationale: This will improve lit and stall margin.

6. Bank ...............................................................Wings Level

Rationale: Apply gentle action or recovery to avoid second-

ary stalls then return to desired ight path.

Revision o Airs Operational omentation

arb h dtd t rtl dcmtt rdr t rlct

th chg trdcd b th w grc tll rcvr rcdr.i rdr t llw mlt ltwd trdct, th rcdr

w rvdd v Tmrr Rv.

Th rmt w rvdd tgthr wth FCTM dt

dvc c d FoT 999 .0044/10, M 12, 2010.

A300:

a300 FCoM vlm 8Ge Tmrr Rv mbr 219-1

a300 FCoM vlm 8pW Tmrr Rv mbr 051-1

a300 QRH Tmrr Rv mbr 076-1

A300FFcc:

a300FFCC FCoM vlm 2 Tmrr Rv mbr 052-1

a300FFCC QRH Tmrr Rv mbr 025-1

A300-600/A300-600F:a300-600/a300-600F FCoM vlm 2 Tmrr Rv mbr 002-2

a300-600/a300-600F QRH Tmrr Rv mbr 217-1

A310:

a310 FCoM vlm 2 Tmrr Rv mbr 004-2

a310 QRH Tmrr Rv mbr 224-1

A318/319/320/321:

FCoM vlm 3 Tmrr Rv mbr 323-1

QRH Tmrr Rv mbr 727-1

A330:

FCoM vlm 3 Tmrr Rv mbr 552-1


A340:

FCoM vlm 3 Tmrr Rv mbr 512-1 (a340-200/-300)

FCoM vlm 3 Tmrr Rv mbr 513-1 (a340-500/-600)


A380:

FCoM prcdr / n-eCaM abrml d emrgc prcdr /

ortg Tchq



11/26

clae LELAIEscl advr t Ceo

Minimum controlspeed tests on A380When the aircrat has an engine

shut down with the 3 others atmaximum thrust, it has a tendency

to yaw toward the ailed engine.

The pilot can deect the rudder and

create a yaw moment in the other

direction in order to maintain the

heading. However, when the speed

is decreasing the engines create

more or less the same yaw, but the

aerodynamic efciency o the fn

and the rudder are reducing. At a

given speed, with wings level, the

rudder is on the stop and just able

to counter the eect o the engines.Then, we could say that we have

reached some kind o minimum

control speed as it is a limit o

manoeuvrability.

On any multi-engine aircrat,

below the Minimum Control

speeds (VMC), there is a risk o

losing the control o the plane in

the case o ailure o one engine

(outer or a quad) with the other(s)

at maximum thrust. There are

several VMC: or takeo confgu-

rations, it is called VMCA (A or

Airborne), or approach, VMCL (L

or Landing). On a quad, another

one, VMCL-2, is associated with

the ailure o 2 engines on the same

side, in the approach confguration.

It has to be demonstrated or certi-

fcation, although this last situation

is mainly considered when taking

o or a erry ight on 3 engines,

without passengers, and i unortu-

nately a ailure happens on the oth-

er engine o the same side. Finally,

there is a VMC covering the case o

the ground acceleration at takeo.

It is called VMCG (G or Ground).

Everything is not black and white

and it is not because the aircratis ying below a VMC that con-

trol will always be lost or that a

crash will inevitably occur. But

what is sure is that, when reach-

ing the VMC, the pilot is on a

limit o manoeuvrability and he

cannot do what he wants reely in

a manoeuvring sense. Some rules

o determination o the VMCs

are rather strange, and it is dif-

cult to understand which logic is

behind that. Nevertheless they

have been applied or a very long

time and their validity has been

proven by the long experience on

a huge number o ight hours on

all aircrat types. For all VMC air-

borne, there is frst a static demon-

stration o the value, ollowed by

dynamic tests to show that the ma-

noeuvrability remains sufcient

at this speed. VMCG is obtained

only by a dynamic exercise.

By nature, determinations o

VMCA and VMCL are risky ighttests, as one engine is shut down at

very low altitude. On a twin, the

ailure o the live engine gives

just enough time to relight the

other one. On a quad, the situation

is dierent, as in the event o the

loss o the other engine on the same

side as the ailed one, the thrust

on the remaining engines must be

reduced immediately to avoid a

loss o control.

However, the risk o ailure o

another engine during these tests

has a very low probability. The

critical issue is the execution o the

dynamic tests, as it can lead very

quickly to a loss o control, due tothe rapid build up o side slip. Such

an event occurred a very long time

ago in a test ight, but ortunately

control was immediately recovered

and then modifcations were made

to the ight controls to reduce dras-

tically this risk. Anyway, we have

to be very cautious in the execu-

tion o these tests and they are only

perormed by well experienced test

pilots.

Measurement o VMCs is not a

key priority at the beginning o

the development o a long range

aircrat. The reason is that all

these speeds are rather low and

thereore do not aect takeo and

landing perormances, except or

operations at very low weights.

This is not penalizing or an air-

crat like the A380. However, it

is always useul to perorm some

measurements at an early stage o

the ight program to be sure thatwe will not have a bad surprise,

which might have an impact on

perormances at higher weight

than expected or could necessitate

a modifcation o the design o the

ight controls.

For the A380, we had an issue to

start these tests as, during the frst

month o ights, we discovered

that the vertical fn had to be modi-

fed. Due to the delay necessary or

this modifcation, it was decided to

postpone VMCs determination by

several weeks, until we receive the

improved fn.



12/26

1.VMcA, VMcL,VMcL-2

When engines and systems are

confgured, we start about 20 kt

above the predicted value, then, we

decelerate slowly keeping head-

ing constant. Necessary rudder

increases as the speed decreases,

eventually up to the stop. Further

deceleration will need some bank

to still keep the heading constant.The true VMCA is obtained

when the bank angle reaches 5 in

the opposite sense to the ailed

engine (fg. 1). This bank angle is

very important as it allows a urther

speed reduction o about 5 to 10

kt, compared to the same test per-

ormed with wings levelled. Where

is this strange rule coming rom?

It is a mystery! Maybe that, in the

old times, when reliable ight test

installations where not existing,

somebody had imagined to havesome tolerance on the bank angle,

because it is true that a perect sta-

bilization o the bank angle is dif-

cult when the rudder is on the stop.

In doing so, he put some knots in

his pocket! Then the tradition has

been kept and ofcialised. This hy-

pothesis could explain the choice

o this odd 5 value.

The tests to obtain VMCL and

VMCL-2 are similar.

But there is more to do. A demon-

stration that the roll manoeuvrabil-

ity at VMC is sufcient must be

perormed. The rules are slightly

dierent or VMCA and VMCL

5 bank angle

Figure 1VMCA determination

and here we will just show one ex-

ample or the VMCL. At this speed,

the rolling capacity is reduced on

the side o the deection o the rud-

der (at the opposite o the ailed

engine). The rule is that it must be

possible to go rom 5 bank angle

on the side o the rudder deection,

up to 25 in less than 5 seconds.

Whatever the type o aircrat, there

are risks in this test as the side slip

is building up very quickly, be-

cause it cannot be compensated bythe yaw damper, the rudder being

already on the stop. When passing

25 bank, the recovery must be im-

mediate and very smooth, with the

engines reduced to idle, the speed

increased and the side slip careully

minimized. At the very beginning

o the Fly By Wire programs, there

was plenty o roll capability at low

speed. But in order to avoid reach-

ing too high side slip, the roll rate

commanded by the pilot was divid-

ed by 2 to be limited at 7.5 deg/s atlow speed when the ight controls

computers detect a large asymme-

try in thrust. This roll rate allows

this test to be passed with almost

no margin. The available roll ef-

ciency to react to turbulence is not

modifed.

There are some other specifc dy-

namic tests at VMCA, but the dem-

onstration is straightorward or

our aircrat.

The frst VMCA and VMCL test

ight on A380 were perormed

at the end o May 2006, unortu-

nately in weather conditions not

ideal or these types o measure-

ments. Some days later, with better

weather, a second ight allowed us

to confrm the results and also to

perorm VMCL-2 tests. A third and

fnal ight was dedicated to certif-

cation. Usually, on other programs,

all these tests are perormed direct-

ly with the Authorities on board.

However, due to some particu-

larities o the aircrat, the decisionwas made to perorm preliminary

ights to be sure that there was no

issue with what was going to be

presented or certifcation.

There was no surprise coming

rom these ights and the VMCA,

VMCL and VMCL-2 values were

ound to be as expected.

2.VMcG

The VMCG is established with a

dynamic test. The aircrat is ac-

celerated with all engines at maxi-

mum thrust, with the nose wheel

steering disconnected to simulate

a wet or contaminated runway. At

a given speed, the outer engine is

shut down with the master lever.

The pilot must try to minimize the

lateral excursion, using the rudder

(fg. 2). As or the VMCA, at high

speed a small deection is needed.

But at low speed, even with ull

rudder, there could be a signif-

cant deviation. By defnition, the

VMCG is the shut down speed or

which the deviation is 30 t.



13/26

-30 -10 10 30Y (m)

x(m)

Figure 2VMCG test

This test must be perormed in per-

ect weather conditions, because

even a very light cross wind or

some small turbulence can have

an impact on the results. Generally

the ight test is planned at sunrise.

The frst test is usually not critical,

as the shut down speed is about 10

kt above the planned VMCG. Then

some more trials are perormed

with a progressive reduction o the

shut down speed, by steps o 3, 2 or

even 1 kt, depending on the results.

Most o the time, ater about 6

tests, the 30 t deviation is reached.

In act, we try to have at least one

result above 30 t to be able to in-

terpolate back to the VMCG, but

we have to be careul as around

VMCG, the lateral deviation is

very sensitive to the engine cut-o

speed.

During this series o tests, the pilot

in the let hand seat is in charge o

the trajectory. He tries to minimize

the deviation and then completes

the takeo when the maximum de-

viation has been reached. The pilot

in the right hand seat shuts down

the engine at the planned value.

It is important to have always the

same pilot doing the same action

as, i there is a bias in the shut

down speed, it is most probably go-ing to be the same or all tests and

the speed decrease is going to be

as progressive as planned. Data re-

duction will then allow the analysis

team to determine the right value.

In the cockpit, on the jump seat,

a test ight engineer monitors the

engines and is in charge o the spe-

cifc relight procedures generally

given by the engine Manuacturers,

ollowing such shut downs at maxi-

mum thrust.

As or the VMCA, most o the

time, these tests are directly used

or certifcation, with an EASA

pilot in the let hand seat and an

Airbus pilot on the right. One o the

reasons or minimising the number

o times these tests are done, is

that repeating several shut downs

at maximum thrust is damaging

or an engine and we try to reduce

this risk. However, or the A380,

due to numerous new systems ea-

tures and some uncertainties on the

predictions, we decided to perorm

a frst evaluation ourselves. The

initial results demonstrated that we

were right.

The frst VMCG ight could only

be perormed ater the installa-

tion o the modifed fn and it took

place on March 30th 2006. Takeo

weight was 450 tons, confguration

3 and the predicted VMCG was

122 kt. As usual, we decided to per-

orm the frst test with the engine

shut down at 132 kt, 10 kt abovethe predicted value. It was planned

to ail the right outer engine,

thereore we lined up the aircrat

10 meters on the let o the centre

line. To help, we have on one o the

Toulouse runways, ull length blue

lines at 5 and 10 meters on each

side. This makes it easier or the

handling pilot to keep precisely the

distance rom the centre line during

the acceleration. The right engine

was shut down at 132 kt as planned.

At a speed about 10 kt above the

VMCG, the deviation should not

exceed 2 meters, but we had a sur-

prise as the aircrat started to skid

laterally and we eventually reached

Rotation

Maximum lateral deviation reached

Full left rudder pedal input

Engine # 4 shutdown

Brake release



14/26

a deviation o 15 meters and we

went on the other side o the cen-

tre line. A good demonstration that

it was a sound idea to take some

precautions and line up 10 meters

on the let, as i we were already at

the VMCG! An extrapolation let us

think that the VMCG was probably

at least 13 kt above the estimated

value, which would have had seri-

ous adverse consequences or air-

crat perormance.

We landed immediately and decid-

ed to redo the test at a slightly high-

er speed: 134 kt. A new surprise:

the deviation was almost the same,

just a bit smaller. The videos were

showing the tyres o the main land-

ing gears skidding on the runway.

A third test was perormed at 136

kt. The deviation was 18 meters.

It was increasing with the speed!

Clearly, something was abnormal.

The ollowing day, in order to un-

derstand the reasons o this strange

behaviour, we tried again, but this

time with a confguration 1+F in-

stead o 3. With a lower aps set-

ting, we were expecting higher

orces on the landing gears, which

should have improved riction and

thereore reduce skidding. We shut

down the engine at 135 kt and the

deviation reached 18 meters. Basi-

cally, no change! On top, we dis-

covered an anomaly: because o

a hidden ailure, the deection o

one o the 2 rudders was too slow.

Only one servo control o this rud-

der was active, instead o 2 in this

type o situation. This was not the

main reason or the huge deviation,

but the system was not robust. A

batch o modifcations was needed

beore continuing VMCG tests.

To improve the situation, it was

necessary to enhance the efciency

o the ight controls in yaw ater an

engine ailure. Thereore, in order

to create some additional yaw, the

solution was to increase the drag

on the wing which is on the side

o the deected rudders when theyare close to their stop. For that, one

spoiler and 2 o the 3 ailerons were

ully deected in the upper direc-

tion while the centre aileron was

put down (fg. 3). Having ailerons

in dierent directions permitted to

minimize the eect on the bank an-

gle. Some modifcations were also

made in the computers, allowing

aster deection o rudders in this

specifc situation.

Due to weather conditions, we

perormed the tests with all these

modifcations at Istres Air Base

on June 14th with excellent results:

the VMCG was now as planned,

around 122 kt. However the exact

value was fnally determined dur-

ing the certifcation ight at the be-

ginning o September. The reason

is that the value o the VMCG is

very sensitive to the pilot reaction

time. This one is around 0.6 sec-

onds, but 0.1 second more or less

can modiy the VMCG by 1 or 2 kt.

The ofcial value is given by the

tests perormed by the certifcation

pilot rom EASA. The fnal value

agreed ater data reduction or the

Rudders close to stop

Spoiler and ailerons deflection

Figure 3VMCG enhancedyaw control on ground

Rolls Royce engines is 119 or 121kt, depending upon the maximum

engine thrust (option chosen by the

Customers), which is slightly less

than the planned fgures.



15/26

Mar bAILLIONFlght st Drctr

Lorraine dE bAuduSGr Mgr a318/a319/a320/a321ortl stdrd, Ctmr srvc

Radio Altimetererroneous values

2. Systemarhitetre

All Airbus aircrat, except the

A380, are equipped with two RAs,

which provide height inormation

to several aircrat systems (fg. 1).

The A380 is ftted with three RAs,

which provide the aircrats sys-

tems with a single median height

value. As a result of this system ar-

chitecture, a single erroneous RA

height indication is not an issue for

the A380.

This article will thereore con-

centrate on the other members o

Airbus amily o aircrat, ftted

with two Radio Altimeters.

These two RAs provide height in-

ormation to the Auto Pilots (AP),

Auto Thrust (A/THR), Primary

1. Introtion

In-service events occurred where a

Radio Altimeter (RA) provided an er-

roneous height indication, which was

recognized as valid inormation by theaircrat systems. This resulted in an ear-

ly are activation during the approach.

In response to these events, Airbus

launched a series o investigation that

led to the ollowing conclusions:

in the most critical scenario, an early

activation o the are law may leadto an increase o the Angle o Attack

which, i not corrected, could reach

the stall value. All Airbus aircrat are

aected except the A380.

As a result o these investigations,

Airbus published:

qA set o Operator Inormation

Telex/Flight Operations Telex (OIT/

FOT) and Red Operations Engineering

Bulletins (OEB) describing the opera-

tional consequences, and containing

recommendations to ollow, should aRA provide erroneous height readings.

q New tasks in the Trouble Shooting

Manual (TSM) and Maintenance Plan-ning Document (MPD) related to the

RA antennas and coaxial cables.

Erroneous RA occurrences should besystematically reported so as to allow

proper implementation o the recom-

mended maintenance tasks. These con-

sist in the inspection o the RA antennas

coaxial cables, cleaning o the antennas

and possibly replacement o the RA.

Design improvements are currently

under development on the Radio

Altimeter as well as on other aircratsystems, in order to better detect RA

errors and to avoid untimely are

engagement.

Figure 1RA1 and RA2 receiver(R) and transmitter (T)antennas location onan A320

Flight Displays (PFD)/ Navigation

Displays (ND), Weather Radar

(WXR), Flight Warning Comput-

ers (FWC), Trafc Alert and Col-lision Avoidance System (TCAS)

and all audio indicators.

Height inormation is received

rom one RA at a time. In case o

detected ailure, the remaining RA

is used as a back-up.

The ollowing systems are de-

signed to receive an RA signal

rom only a single source:

q On all aircrat models the

Terrain Awareness and Warning

System (TAWS) receives signals

rom RA1 only.

q On the A300B2/B4, A300-600

and A310, the Auto Pilot/ Flight

Director use only their on-side

RA.



16/26


17/26

q RA 2 provides height inorma-

tion to PFD 2 and to AP 2.

Thereore: TheRA readingonPFD 2 is

1 400 t AP 2 is still engaged in G/S

vertical mode and LOC lateral

mode. PFD 2 thereore displays

G/S and LOC on the FMA.

qAP 1 is engaged in FLARE mode

and one RA height goes below 200eet. In addition, the dierence

between both RA height indica-

tions is greater than 15 eet.

Thereore:

The AUTOLAND warning

lights are activated.

Figure 4Both RAs provide correct height of 1 960 ft

Figure 5Erroneous RA 1 reading is 6 ft, correct RA 2 reading is 1 400 ft. AP 1 and both FDs are engaged

b) Indication lower than real

height on RA1 during an ILS

approach, with AP 1 and both

FDs engaged:

q Figure 4 shows the crews PFDs

beore the RA1 issue. Both RAs

unction properly and provide thesame height o 1 960 t. The verti-

cal mode is on G/S, and the lateral

mode is on LOC. The A/THR is

engaged in SPEED.

q Figure 5 shows that RA 1 pro-

vides an erroneous height indica-

tion o 6 t, while RA 2 deliversthe correct height o 1 400 t.

Consequences on the aircratssystems:

q RA 1 provides height inorma-

tion to PFD 1, AP 1 and to theA/THR (the A/THR uses the same

RA as the master AP).

Thereore:

TheRA readingon PFD1 is

6 t

AP1engagesinFLAREmode

and displays FLARE on theFMAs o PFD 1 and PFD 2.

The A/THR engages in

RETARD mode and displays

THR IDLE on the FMAs o

PFD 1 and PFD 2.

q RA 2 provides height inorma-tion to PFD 2.

Thereore:

TheRA readingon PFD2 is

1 400 t.

qAP 1 is engaged in FLARE mode

and one RA height goes below 200eet. In addition, the dierence

between both RA height indica-

tions is greater than 15 eet.

Thereore:

The AUTOLAND warning

lights are activated.

1960

Captain F/O

Identical to

Captain side

AP1

Engaged

1400

Captain F/O

AP1

Engaged

Erroneous RA



18/26

In the examples above, the risk o

early are engagement due to the

too low height indication is com-

pounded by the possible impacton the aircrat protections. On the

A320 Family, or example, theCONF FULL High Angle o At-

tack Auto Pilot disconnection is not

available in the event o a very low

erroneous RA height indication.

Thereore, i a manual takeover is

not perormed when this early are

engagement occurs, the Angle OAttack will increase and may reach

the stall value.

The detailed eects on aircrat pro-tection on the A300/A310, A320

and A330/A340 amilies can be

ound in the OIT / FOT and OEBreerenced at the end o this arti-

cle. These documents include as

well the ollowing operational rec-

ommendations in the event o an

erroneous RA height reading:

q Drg ll h fght, th

fght crw mt mtr d

crchck ll rmr fght

rmtr d FMa dct.q Drg iLs (r MLs, GLs) -

rch wth ap ggd, th

vt xctd THR iDLe

d FLaRe md ggmt,

th fght crw mt mmdtl

rct llw:

Immediately perorm an

automatic Go Around (thrt

lvr t ToGa),

or

Immediatelydisconnect the

AP, th ct th ld-

g g rw dt r vlrrc (FD t t oFF) r,

rrm ml G ard

wth thrt lvr t t ToGa

(gct lgtdl d-

tck t m b rqrd).

See OEB for detailed procedures

Reerences:oiT/FoT se 999.0034/09 dtd 4th M 2009 r

a320/a330/a340 rtr

qa318/a319/a320/a321: ReD oeB 201/2

qa330: ReD oeB 076/2

qa340: ReD oeB 091/2

oiT/FoT se 999.0035/09 dtd 30th arl 2009 r

a300/a310 rtr ( ReD oeB th rtl

cqc r drt th r th a320/a330/

a340).

Th oiT/FoT d oeB r t lcbl t th

a380.

The Flight crews must report

any o the above symptoms in

the aircrat technical logbook, in

order to ensure no dispatch with

an erroneous RA.

Several symptoms may assist the

crew in identiying a potential

erroneous RA reading:

q Untimely ECAM L/G NOT

DOWN warningsqUntimely or no RETARD callout

q Interruption o, or no RA auto-

matic callout

q Untimely TAWS alert (PULL

UP or TERRAIN AHEAD)

q

Impossible NAV mode engage-ment ater takeo

q Pulsing Cabin Dierential

Pressure Advisory on ECAM CAB

PRESS page.

In addition to the above cockpit

indications, RA ault messages

rom the Electrical Flight Control

System (EFCS) may also berecorded in the Post Flight Record.

6. designImprovements

The ollowing improvements are

being implemented in the RA sys-tem as well as in the aircrat systems

which use the RA inormation:

q RA system:

A new gel gasket, between

the antenna and the aircrat

structure, will provide betterisolation against water ingress.

AdigitalRA,withselfmoni-

toring capability to eliminate

the erroneous heights, is under

certifcation.

qAircrat systems: Both the Auto Pilot and

ight control systems will be

enhanced to detect most RA

erroneous height values.

7. conlsion

The aircrat systems may not

always detect an erroneous Radio

Altimeter value. Depending on the

ight phase and AP/FD and A/THRstatus, prompt action rom the crew

may be required to prevent theconsequences o such situation.

It is essential that the crew identifes

the symptoms o an erroneous RA

reading so as to:

qTake immediate actions.

q Report these symptoms to help

maintenance teams troubleshoot er-

roneous RA readings.

5. Maintenanereommenations

I the ight crews report symptoms

o an erroneous RA height indica-

tion, the ollowing maintenance

actions should be perormed:q Clean the RA antennas and the

adjacent area with cleaning agents

(Material N 11.010) and a lint ree

cloth

q I, during any subsequent ight,

the symptoms persist:

ReplacetheRAantennas

Inspect the RA antennas

coaxial cables. I they are not

in correct conditions, repair or

replace them.

These recommendations have beenadded in the ollowing new TSM

tasks:

q 34-42-00-810-844 (A320 Family)

q 34-42-00-810-862 (A330/A340)

q 34-42-00-006-00 (A300/A310).

In addition, scheduled maintenance

(MPD) include new tasks related to

the RA:

Every 6 months: RAantenna

surace cleaning

Every 12 years: replacement ofRA antennas and RA coaxial ca-

bles during the heavy maintenance

visit for the structure section.



19/26

Stphane GRANGERa320 Fml atfght stm MgrDg oc

Eri JEANPIERREstm Mgr

a320 Fml prgrm

Automatic NAVengagement

at Go Around

2. Operationalontext

2.1. Go Aron options

The crew must always be prepared

or a Go Around, even though it is an

inrequent occurrence.

Ater the initiation o a Go Around,there are two options:

q In the most probable one, the

crew ollows the published Missed

Approach procedure.

q Otherwise, i cleared by ATC, the

crew ollows a constant heading. Theheading target can be preset by the

crew during the approach.

1. Introtion

Whatever the reasons to perorma Go Around, the need has arisen

or an automatic engagement o

Navigation (NAV) mode.To meet this increasing interest,

an operational enhancement

called NAV in Go Around hasbeen developed by Airbus.

This article presents the opera-

tional context, and the solution

proposed with its advantages.

2.1. crrent Go Aron proere

The Go Around is systematically

initiated by pushing the thrust levers

to TOGA.

This ensures the engagement o the

Go Around Track (GA TRK) Auto

Pilot and/or Flight Director lateral

mode1.

The FMS entered published Missed

Approach procedure becomes part

o the ACTIVE F-PLN and the pre-

viously own approach is strung

back into the F-PLN at the end o the

Missed Approach procedure.

The GA TRK mode guides the air-

crat on a constant track (which is the

current track when the Go Around is

initiated with wings level).

Once the Go Around is initiated, the

crew will likely y the published

Missed Approach procedure: thePilot Flying (PF) or the Pilot Non

Flying (PNF) will have to engage

the NAV mode by pushing the HDG/

TRK selector on the Flight Control

Unit (FCU).Thereore, in the most probable Go

Around scenario, the crew will per-orm two main actions (as ar as the

Autoight system is concerned):

q Push the thrust levers to TOGA

q Push the HDG/TRK selector.

2.2. Ojetives o the moifation

The modifcation reduces the crew

workload, and limits the potential

deviations rom the required ightpath when perorming a Go Around.

It covers the most probable Go

Around scenario, where the crewhas to ollow the published Missed

Approach procedure. Moreover, it

makes the Go Around procedure as

similar as possible to the Take O

procedure.

Finally, in the context o RNP-ARoperations where the aircrat is more

likely to be in a turn, it will not inter-

rupt the turn in case o a Go Around.

1: As well as the Speed Reerence System (SRS)Auto Pilot and/or Flight Director longitudinalmode, i the aircrat is not in a clean confguration.



20/26

3. Priniple othe moifation

The principle is to keep the NAV

mode engaged or, i a valid ight

plan exists, to arm the NAV mode at

the initiation o the Go Around. The

pilot does not need to push the FCU

selector anymore: the new logics do

it automatically.

The Auto Flight System automati-

cally ollows the published Missed

Approach procedure.

The AP/FD modes engaged are iden-

tical to the modes that would havebeen engaged by pushing on the FCU

HGD-TRK selector immediately

ater the Go Around:

withotNAV in Go Aron moifation

TOGA thrust is appliedand the SRS / GA TRK modes are engaged.

The crew has to arm the NAV mode manuallyby pushing on the FCU HDG/TRK knob.

Then, the FMA displays the NAV mode.

withNAV in GO Aron moifation

When TOGA thrust is applied,the SRS / GA TRK modes are engaged.

In addition, the NAV mode is automatically armedwithout any crew action on the FCU.

The NAV mode engages immediately (or as soon as the aircratpasses above 100t i the Go Around has been initiated below 100 t).

The aircrat is guided along the Missed Approach procedure.

q In a non-precision approach with

managed lateral guidance (NAV, APP

NAV or FINAL APP), the NAV mode

is kept engaged.

q In a non-precision approach with

selected lateral guidance (HDG or

TRK), the HDG or TRK mode is

kept engaged and the NAV mode is

automatically armed (i a valid ight

plan exists).

q In a precision approach (ILS, MLS

or GLS) or in a FLS / Mixed LOC-

VNAV approach, the GA TRK mode

is initially engaged (as currently)

and the NAV mode is automaticallyarmed (i a valid ight plan exists and

i no heading preset has been selected

during the approach).

In other words, the AP/FD mode engage-

ment sequence is strictly the same as when

the pilot pushes the thrust levers to TOGA

and pushes the HDG/TRK FCU selector.

The NAV in Go Around modifcation

does not modiy the aircrat behaviour

on the longitudinal axis.

4. Typialoperational scenarios

Go Arounds during Precision Ap-

proaches are typically perormed when

visibility conditions are not met at the

Decision Altitude/Height (DA/DH).The Standard Operating Procedures

speciy that a Go Around is perormed

by setting both thrust levers to TOGA.

The olloing tale illstrates the retion in orkloa introe y the NAV in Go Aron moifation.



21/26

The NAV in Go Aronmoifation oes not hangeoperational proeres in the

olloing senarios:

qGo Aron in Heaing moe ith

a heaing preset

When cleared by ATC to ollow aconstant heading in case o Missed

Approach, the crew may preset

the heading on the FCU. I a Go

Around is initiated, the NAV mode

is not automatically armed (prior-

ity is given to the preset). The crew

will then just have to pull the FCU

HDG/TRK knob to engage the

Heading mode.

qGo Aron in Heaing moe

ithot heaing preset

In case o a late clearance rom

ATC to ollow a constant heading

ater the Go Around (no heading

preset), the crew will have to turnthe FCU HDG/TRK knob to se-

lect the heading target then pull to

engage the Heading mode. In this

case, the NAV mode is automati-

cally armed then engaged at GoAround until the pull action on the

FCU.

5. cONcLuSION

With the NAV in Go Around

modifcation, the NAV mode is au-tomatically armed at the initiation

o the Go Around2. The mode will

then engage as soon as the capture

conditions are met.

This modifcation reduces the crew

workload, and limits the poten-

tial deviations rom the requiredight path, when perorming a Go

Around.

The new logics are consistent with

the most probable Missed Ap-

proach scenario and are essential

or specifc operations such as low

RNP.

Impat on airrat an assoiate MOd an Sb

For the A320 Family, A330/A340 and A380, the activation o the unction

requires the ollowing:

qThe hardware pin programming o each FMG(E)C or sotware pinprogramming o each PRIM computers, and i required, the upgrade o

the ight guidance or PRIM sotware.

qThe update o volumes: 1.22.30, 3.03.2, 4.05.80. o the Flight CrewOperating Manual (FCOM).

A320 Family

The NAV in Go Around modifcation will become the production

standard starting rom:

A318: MSN 4169

A319: MSN 4522

A320: MSN 4674

A321: MSN 4560

It will also be included in the low RNP modifcation packages

(MOD 38073 Low RNP step2+, MOD 150371 / 150372 / 150373 Low

RNP step 3 and MOD 151180 RNP 0.3 AR).

A330/A340

The NAV in Go Around modifcation will become the production

standard, MSN to be confrmed.

It will also be included in the low RNP modifcation packages

(MOD 200192 Low RNP step 2 or FMS R1A Thales on the A330 and

new MODS RNP step 2 or FMS R1A Honeywell on the A330 and

A340-500/600).

A380

The NAV in Go Around modifcation will become the production stan-dard, MSN to be confrmed.

2 : I no heading preset.

Aircrat

type

MOD

Number

SB

reerence

FMG(E)C or PRIM

minimum standards

a320

Fml38399 22-1296

p1i11 (MoD 37311) r s4i11 (MoD 37252)r a320 iae/pW Fml

p1C12 (MoD 37934) r s4C12 (MoD 37935)

r a320 CFM Fml

a330/

a340200383

pdg

FMGeC

crtc-

t

p4HJ1 (MoD 57545) r T4HJ1 (MoD 57547)

r a330 pW/RR

p4G1 (r 57544) r T4G1 (MoD 57548)

r a330 Ge

p4F1 (MoD 57546) r T4F1 (MoD 57549)

r a340-200/300

p4K2 r T4K2 (MoD T B Dd)

r a340-600

a380 udrdvlmt



22/26

Isse 10, Agst 2010

A380: Flutter tests

Operational Landing Distances:

A new standard or in-ight landing distance assessment

Go Around handling

A320: Landing gear downlock

Situation awareness and decision making

Isse 9, Ferary 2010

A320 Family: Evolution o ground spoiler logic

Incorrect pitch trim setting at takeo

Technical Flight Familiarization

Oxygen saety

Isse 8, Jly 2009

The Runway Overrun Prevention System

The Take O Securing unction

Computer mixability: An important unction

Fuel spills during reueling operations

Isse 7, Ferary 2009

Airbus AP/FD TCAS mode:

A new step towards saety improvement

Braking system cross connections

Upset Recovery Training Aid, Revision 2

Fuel pumps let in OFF position

A320: Avoiding dual bleed loss

Isse 6, Jly 2008

A320: Runway overrun

FCTL check ater EFCS reset on ground

A320: Possible consequence o VMO/MMO exceedance

A320: Prevention o tailstrikes

Low uel situation awareness

Rudder pedal jam

Why do certain AMM tasks require equipment resets ? Slide/rat improvement

Cabin attendant alling through the avionics

bay access panel in cockpit

Isse 5, deemer 2007

New CFIT event during Non Precision Approach

A320: Tail strike at takeo ?

Unreliable speed

Compliance to operational procedures The uture air navigation system FANS B

Isse 4, Jne 2007

Operations Engineering Bulletin reminder unction

Avoiding high speed rejected takeos

due to EGT limit exceedance

Do you know your ATC/TCAS panel ?

Managing hailstorms

Introducing the Maintenance Briefng Notes

A320: Dual hydraulic loss

Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems

operations based on GPS data

Isse 3, deemer 2006

Dual side stick inputs

Trimmable horizontal stabilizer damage

Pitot probes obstruction on ground

A340: Thrust reverser unlocked

Residual cabin pressure

Cabin Operations Briefng Notes

Hypoxia: An invisible enemy

Isse 2, Septemer 2005

Tailpipe or engine fre

Managing severe turbulence

Airbus Pilot Transition (ATP)

Runway excursions at takeo

Isse 1, Janary 2005

Go Arounds in Addis-Ababa due to VOR reception problems

The importance o the pre-ight ight control check

A320: In-ight thrust reverser deployment

Airbus Flight Saety Manager Handbook

Flight Operations Briefng Notes

Articles published

in previousSafety First issues



23/26

Subscription Form

Safety


24/26

The Airbus SafetyMagazine

Subscription FormT b t bck t

aiRBus FLiGHT saFeTy oFFiCe

Fx: 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29

Ml t:[email protected]

nm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

srm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Jb ttl/Fct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cm/orgzt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

addr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

pt/Z Cd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ctr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tlh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cll h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

e-ml . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .(Mdtr r bth dgtl d r c)

pl d m th dgtl c* P

pl d m th r c* P (pl t tht r cwll l b rwrddt rl ddr)

* pl tck th rrt c

Safety


25/26


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