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The Evil Inside

Analysis on the jihadist threat in Europe

Edited By Giacomo Morabito

December 2015

Special Issue

2015

Copyright© 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs

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Updated at December 21, 2015

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Summary

Introduction .............................................................................. 5

The origins of radicalization. The fascination of the jihad

and the Caliphate for young European Muslims ..................... 8

Does the radical milieu catalyze radicalization? Evidences

from the Paris attacks ................................................................ 20

Radical milieu ........................................................................20

Marginalization. Saint Denis and Molenbeek ..................23

The 11/13 jihadist cell...........................................................27

Final assessments ..................................................................30

The adopted measures after Paris attacks ........................... 32

Daesh terror warning. What are the real risks of Italy’s

homeland security? .................................................................... 40

Rome armed to the teeth. The Italian response to the

jihadist attacks in Europe .....................................................40

Counterterrorism measures in Italy ...................................42

Italian targets .........................................................................43

Conclusions ............................................................................. 47

References ............................................................................... 51

About the Authors .................................................................. 57

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Introduction

We have to fear both terrorism and insurgency. Even tough in terms

of distance terrorism is the one closer to us, also from a psychological

perspective, and that it can easily strike almost anywhere and thus even

our country, it must also be said that insurgency is the one thing that

foments terrorism.

As the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya post 9/11 have

demonstrated, winning a war does not imply the erasing of the threat.

The kind of terrorism that rightly scares us is deeply embedded with

political motives. It is such an easy assumption and yet this is always

seen a second order issue. We hide behind Salafi radicalism so as not to

admit that insurgencies and thus terrorism thrive among people without

any hope in the development of their own condition. Among Muslims

40% of people live below the poverty line, meaning they live with less

than $2.00 a day.

Daesh contrary to al-Qaeda has set up a centripetal formula thus

transforming the system into a network, as some extremist intellectuals

of jihad have wished for a long time, by focusing on the territory. Or

better, territories, by entitling every mujahidin to activate a focoan

embryonic form of insurgency which relies upon the penetration of

society through the building of consensus through legit and non-legit

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means including terrorist attacks. The idea is to exploit legitimate

instances of X populations in order to weaken the institution of the

state. Nothing would be easier in areas where the concept of state is

already aleatory so that it is equal to that of regime or sectarian state like

the Iraqi one. In addition, if we reflect upon the current international

scenario that is indeed looking for a new world order it is easy to

understand how successful Daesh is.

Daesh has been building its power for some time now, more or less

since 2006, waiting for the right opportunity to come along. When the

war broke out in Syria it presented itself as being the key actor in the

pursuing of interests of local, regional and global powers. Daesh exists

and even if it were to be defeated militarily, there would still be groups

ready to bring its legacy forward.

The general framework can be summed up according to three

different levels of analysis:

pursuing of a new world order;

fitnah within the Islamic world that is not only related to religion

but also to more pragmatic terms of gaining and maintenance of

local power and regional influence;

local and localist instances gaining ground thanks to the all-

aforementioned dynamics.

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This is the international background in which our country is deeply

involved. Within this geopolitical context for what concerns us the

most, a few considerations must be made:

Italy is clearly subjected to the repercussions of what is happening

in the Middle East and Northern Africa; Italy is undergoing a

reshaping of its international role due to the loss of the support of

the United States.

Italy in order to prevent terrorist attacks on its soil cannot count

any longer on interests-based friendships with some radical, even

terrorist groups such as the times of the so-called Lodo Moro.

Italy has been living in a protracted economic crisis together with

the subsequent weakening of its institutions.

Italy must reconsider its international role.

That being said we will now continue on reading the following paper

in order to define the roots, dynamics and the best possible solutions in

order to contain the phenomenon of radical terrorism with which we

will be dealing with for a long time seeing that in a multipolar world the

game will never be a zero sum one.

Antonio De Bonis

Director and Founder of GEA Geocrime

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The origins of radicalization

The fascination of the jihad and the Caliphate for young

European Muslims

Stefano Lupo and Alessandro Pastore

Radicalism is what attracts these young people, and

annihilating ISIL won’t eliminate the terrorist threat-

because the new jihadis are opportunistic and will find

another banner under which to fight.

(Olivier Roy)

Looking at the biographies of the terrorists of the November 13 Paris

attacks, certain common traits emerge: Belgian or French citizens, born

in the Eighties by families of North African origin and living in the

suburbs of their respective capitals1. Unlike their peers, neighbors,

former classmates, and study matesat the mosque they have killed 130

and injured more than 350 people. What prompted them to do

something so radical and without any possibility of return? Were to

grow up in the suburbs and to have lost their jobs strong enough

reasons? Was it decisive coming from immigrant families? What role

1 Borger, Julian, Paul Scruton, Cath Levett, Paul Torpey, and Simon Jeffery. “The men who attacked Paris: profile of a terror cell.” The Guardian. November 27, 2015. http://bit.ly/1SxTRVe.

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did the school and the mosque have in the lack of integration? It is

necessary to ask these questions if we want to understand the acts

behind the closed doors of the apartments of Molenbeek, in order to

defuse the causes of the homegrown jihadist violence made in Europe,

and to look for a solution beyond air strikes on the Caliphate territories.

One of the first points on which we must reflect is that all the

terrorists of the November 13 Paris attacks, were European citizens.

This fact frightens us doubly because it makes it impossible to mark a

clear separation between us and them, to determine a line in defense of

the values in which we recognize ourselves. Pushed to explain the fact

that individuals have decided to revolt with such violence against our

common values, the concept of radicalization2 is often employed.

However, radicalization - a term used to describe the process by which

individuals adopt extremist positions, especially in the socio-political or

religious domains - does not necessarily involve the passage to

terrorism. Not all individuals who have radical or extremist opinions

decide to engage in violence. Analysts William McCants and Clint Watts

say that: “anyone can potentially sympathize with a terrorist

organization if the conditions are right.”3

2 Radicalisation Research aims to provide policymakers, journalists, and anyone whose work utilizes concepts such as radicalization, fundamentalism or extremism, with easy access to high-quality academic research on these controversial issues (http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/). See: VV.AA. “Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism.” Security Studies Program – National Security Critical Issue Task Force. June 27, 2015. http://bit.ly/1ZAVPsh. 3 Mc Cants, William, and Clint Watts. “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. November 2012. http://bit.ly/1Okc7lw.

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If radicalization and becoming terrorists are not the same thing,

however, fighting radicalization is the first line of the war on terror.

Here cultural studies provide us with the tools to understand the causes

and provide an answer.4 These areas of research have allowed us to

describe the causes of the phenomenon as composed of a dense

network between the social and the individual spheres. Among the

major social factors that increase the risk of radicalization, are the

presence of a large ethnic minority that is socially, politically, and

economically marginalized; the treatment of some social groups as

‘suspect community’ by law enforcement agencies and the media;

cultural or political hostility towards Islam; aggressive and unpopular

foreign policies towards certain countries, such as support to repressive

regimes or involvement in a military campaign; the active presence of

entrenched networks of recruitment. While these contextual factors can

provide grounds for concern, the individual must also have the

characteristics to be considered at risk: personal or family ties with

someone already radicalized; a sense of individual bankruptcy, often

combined with an hope of

doing something important

and meaningful; a desire for

adventure; the need to

overcome isolation and to

belong to a group; the

presence of feelings of

4 Gurski, Phil. The Threat From Within Recognizing Al Qaeda-Inspired Radicalization and Terrorism in the West. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015.

Source: Rand Corporation

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compassion and concern for the suffering of others to whom you feel

bound, often but not necessarily from the same religion or ethnic group;

and finally generational dissatisfaction towards their parents due to their

passive acceptance of social and political reality and their silent

adaptation to western standards.

Certainly, this is not a comprehensive blueprint, rather a tool that

allows us to restrict our search to the main areas with a high rate of

radicalization, as some parts of Europe.5 The fact is that, despite

numerous attempts to build it, there is no standard model for effectively

outlining the process of radicalization, similar to the case of profiling

serial killers. Phil Gurski, a former intelligence analyst with the Canadian

Security Intelligence Service has reflected: “Throughout my career at

CSIS and looking at a lot of these things, we simply found that there

were no useful elements in terms of profiles, whether it was age or

ethnicity or employment status or education or psychological or

criminal background.” Amarnath Amarasingam of Halifax’s Dalhousie

University says “we have had people - poor, rich, married, unmarried,

mental illness, converts, not-converts - and so there’s nothing really

there in terms of profile.”6 For radicalization, the variables are too

complex to fit standard models. That is why Daesh recruiters

simultaneously use different means to spread their message and begin

the process of radicalization in Europe: the live videos from the

5 Clerix, Kristof. “Why are terrorists drawn to Belgium?.” The Guardian. November 17, 2015. http://bit.ly/1X4u7RD. 6 Goodyear, Sheena. “Paris attacks show how hard it is to profile ISIS recruits.” CBC. November 21, 2015. http://bit.ly/1YNMbpf.

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battlefield, the triumphal march of the fighters of the Caliphate,

sophisticated movies, executions, the destruction of archaeological

sites, video games, and individual recruitment.7

The second important reason of concern is the young age of the

terrorists. One of the reasons why radicalization is so successful on the

young generation is because it relies on a utopian spirit: something that,

as we shall see below, we can imagine as an aspiration to future

redemption and social justice for those who live in the shadows. A

design that finds its best ally in the positions of right-wing populists

who, with their polemic, only increase the risk of radicalization of young

people living on the edge. The populists’ aim is in fact “to create anger

and resentment. It wants to create Islamophobia. It wants to create

racism. Because if it does that, it makes the lives of individual Muslims

more uncomfortable, and it wants to say, ‘You cannot be at home in the

West’.”8 In this sense, Daesh, with its idea of the Islamic state, is a

representation of the place that can be home to all the people that the

West has not been able to accept. “ISIS is unique among Islamic

extremist organizations in selling this utopian vision of a Caliphate, or

Islamic state, where people can find a sense of belonging.”9

7 Shefte, Whitney. “How the Islamic State uses video games to recruit.” The Washington Post. November 20, 2015. http://wapo.st/1NhbNWe. 8 Goodyear, Sheena. “Paris attacks show how hard it is to profile ISIS recruits.” CBC. November 21, 2015. http://bit.ly/1YNMbpf. 9 Ibid.

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The relationship between

radicalized young people and

places of worship is complex.

Contrary to what the populist

reactionary may think, mosques

are not the incubator of young

terrorists for the simple reason

that often those who radicalize then stop going to the mosque. This is

probably because, as demonstrated by Paul Berman, radicalization and

the jihad are a kind of nihilism.10 The role of religion is reduced to an

area almost exclusively ideological. Citing Zizek, which in turn takes up

Lacan, Dostoevskij was wrong when he wrote that without God

everything is permitted: it is because of God that terrorists can

legitimize their killings, and perpetrate them in his name.11 As we will

see below, the seed of radicalization is an ethical void, even before the

social and economic, filled by the primacy of the purpose for which

“everything is permitted in the no man’s land that forms the boundary

between the old world and the new.”12

The main aspects to be considered in our analysis are the young age

of the attackers, their being second-generation Europeans, and their

rapid radicalization. However, there is a crucial issue to be pointed out:

in light of what has been mentioned above, the common explanation of

the economic marginalization of a small group of people being the main

10 Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. 11 Zizek, Slavoj. Living in the End Times. New York: Verso, 2011. 12 Vercellone, Federico. Introduzione a: Il nichilismo. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1992.

Source: Breitbart News Network

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engine of the radicalization process is not credible in this case. In the

case of the Paris attackers, their resounding protest actions (killing the

enemy and themselves too) can be rather explained with frustration and

hidden unease for their social position.13

Princeton Professor Alan Krueger speaks of “frustration and socio-

political decay,” quite the opposite from many scholars and analysts,

including, by way of example, Thomas Piketty: The French economist

points out that the self-proclaimed Islamic state’s recruitment

‘campaigns’ exploit the worsening economic inequalities in the most

developed capitalist systems14. As in the case of the family background

of the Paris attackers, this is not actually true. They were not desperate

or poor, nor were their lives so harsh not to be worth living, but they

firmly believed in a cause and were ready to die for it. Criticism of

Piketty and those who support his position comes not only from

Kruger, who had already proved Piketty’s assumptions untrue in 2007

with the book entitled What makes a Terrorist. There, Kruger analyzes the

socio-cultural origin of a wide range of suicide bombers in various

international attacks. As Rosamaria Bitetti has recalled in Il Sole 24 Ore15,

the key point is that the cause of terrorist/radical groups is more and

more embraced by people who are not financially driven out of their

social systems, people that do not only have to provide for their very

13 Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, No. 4 (2003): 119-144. 14 Piketty, Thomas. “Le tout-sécuritaire ne suffira pas.” Le Monde. November 24, 2015. http://bit.ly/1Xo6gMX. 15 Bitetti, Rosamaria. “No, non è per disperazione e povertà. L’analisi quantitativa applicata al terrorismo.” Il Sole 24 Ore. November 26, 2015. http://bit.ly/1NQcqmF.

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survival. Bitetti then takes another leap forward, introducing the idea of

“rational choice theory”: so, taking it to the extreme, education and

economic opportunities do not put social problems aside, but make

social alienation and discrimination (actual or presumed so) more visible

and intolerable in these people’s eyes.

The most complete and convincing explanation of the radicalization

of people living in the same social context as the Paris attackers, which

is a major Daesh area of interest for propaganda, is given by Olivier

Roy, a renowned expert on Middle Eastern geopolitical issues and the

Islamic world. Roy identifies the generational gap as the main reason

for the spread of international jihadism in the Old Continent. The

author of Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (2006) believes

that the generational gap between the first and the second generation

(which is more prone to radicalization) is the centerpiece of the rapid

spread of the Daesh nihilistic deadly teaching. The religious fascination

of radical Islam is secondary to the cultural, sociological and, therefore,

political rift dividing older generations from the new ones. Youngsters

blame their parents for unconditionally surrendering to the Western

culture: second-generation people have found themselves in a social

context, which they do not feel they belong to completely. The

fascination of belonging to a group of men of faith (in this case Islam)

then becomes basically a ploy to regain possession of a set of values that

young jihadists feel they have lost or never been taught because of their

parents. Parents’ plans for their children to become fully integrated into

the new environment, in this case France and Belgium, has broken the

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chain of transmission of historical, cultural and, also, religious values.

Roy has fully understood it on the basis of his experience as a teacher

in the French suburbs in the seventies. Daesh then becomes for

radicalized youth a means to realize lost or stolen hopes and, in the

words of Roy himself, to build up an ideal place and make up for the

loss of their family roots.

The ability, or maybe skill, of Daesh members in charge of

indoctrinating young Muslims in Europe has been to understand that

the radicalization of Islam is not the key issue, but that the main point

is instead the “Islamization of radicalization.” Through the call to arms

in Syria, Iraq, Libya and other war zones in which it is directly involved,

the call to union for a single all-encompassing goal and the annihilation

of the enemy without exception, Daesh has lead fully indoctrinated

young Europeans to return to their home countries and reverberate the

group’s message. Radical teaching is then aimed at other people, even

teenagers, who are family members or people known in social venues

or recreational centers, or people that recruiters have shared a prison

experience with (prison is where psychological systems are broken and

reshaped). These young people do not express socio-economic unrest,

but have grown apart from the society they live in (Belgium or France

in this case): they simply do not feel integrated into it, they feel

marginalized.16

16 Symons, Emma-Kate. “ISIL is really a revolt by young Muslims against their parents’ generation.” Quartz. December 3, 2015. http://bit.ly/1OBG3dr.

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This sense of loss, weakness, frustration, and lack of values that

radicalized young people blame on both society and, above all, their

families of origin, is made up with a new unique and eternal sense of

belonging. Roy refers to Daesh ability to understand the social crisis

which has been affecting Europe and is mainly reflecting on the most

“fragile” or alienated cultural contexts. Daesh message of unconditional

hatred becomes blurred and “adaptable” to all critical, unstable and

fragile contexts, and loses its purely Islamic feature (as mentioned,

almost all Paris bombers had a very poor religious background in terms

of actual contents), in which many young people can identify

themselves without even undergoing real indoctrination. For this

reason, Roy gets to define Daesh as “a careful observer of reality” and

its teaching as the “strongest on the market.” If Daesh did not exist, the

eschatological disillusionment of many young Muslims (in name only)

could be channeled into something else, not certainly al-Qaeda, whose

members have always shown a more intense acceptance of radical Islam

making it a religious sect, which young Belgian barkeepers – like some

of the Paris attackers – could find really difficult to penetrate. Daesh

needs both soldiers in the ‘physical places’ of confrontation and ‘agents

of terror’ in Europe and in the Western-like world (the enemy). Young

people without a structured ideological system and therefore more

inclined to look for a new sense of belonging, regardless of the actual

understanding of religious precepts, serve the purpose perfectly.17

17 Not to mention that almost all the Paris bombers were already known to the French and Belgian authorities. Moreover, the potential Daesh penetration among people that

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In our analysis, we should also include the issue of the conflict

between Islam and the West, two hostile and monolithic sides inevitably

inclined to conflict, which is more and more present in Daesh

propaganda but also, increasingly, in the speeches of European political

parties. In other words, can the closure of mosques, prayer and listening

centers, and the marginalization of Muslims in Europe be a useful

strategy for the European governments? According to Roy, of course

not. In this case because, as the author stresses, reducing the ‘Islamic’

European component would not necessarily mitigate the effects of

radicalization, because radicalization is not directly connected to that

component (remember the “Islamization of radicalization”). In

addition, as Issam Eido from the University of Chicago18 carefully

points out, we must keep in mind that Daesh reasoning rests almost

exclusively on the identification and perpetuation of an enemy to

destroy. We can almost say that Daesh and the need for a global

Caliphate exist almost entirely because there are enemies to fight. Based

on this idea, i.e. the logic of opposition, of the “either with us or against

us,” which is increasingly popular in the West, not only does not aim at

the core of the problem, but fuels that desperate search for a

purportedly hated and threatened community (in this case the Muslim

community) ensuring, on the one hand, a safe haven for uprooted

are wrongly considered not prone to radicalization makes it much harder for government authorities to monitor the security situation. 18 Eido, Issam. “ISIS: The Explosion of Narratives - The Land of the Revolution Between Political and Metaphysical Eternities.” Jadaliyya. October 3, 2014. http://bit.ly/1Nls8DV.

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young Muslims and, on the other hand, the main catchment area for

Daesh.

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Does the radical milieu catalyze

radicalization?

Evidences from the Paris attacks

Federico Solfrini

Assessing the effective role of the radical milieu in radicalization is still

a challenging topic, partly because the interest in radical milieu connected

to terrorism has emerged only in recent time in the academic debate,

partly because the European intelligence systems have underestimated

the gravity of this factor in shaping radicalization.

Using the Paris attacks as a case study, this article seeks to underline

the evidences of the importance of radical milieu in catalyzing the

radicalization process towards terrorism.

Radical milieu

In general, a social milieu can be understood as a “social formation, a

relational entity consisting of individuals, who interact and develop

common perspectives and notions of collective identity”19. A radical

milieu, as a particular form of social milieu, refers to the “relationship

19 Malthaner, Stefan, and Peter Waldmann. “The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, No. 12 (2014): 983.

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patterns and dynamics of interaction between terrorist groups and their

social environment”20.

Scholars generally agreed on the role of the radical milieu in foster

individuals to commit terroristic violence. For Ariel Merari, Palestinian

suicide bombers reinforce their believes in a public atmosphere that

encourages them to carry out actions; as he said: “member of these

groups have lived within the communities in which they grew up, have

shared the community’s hardships and joys, and have believed that the

community granted them the license to operate”21. Horgan and Taylor

have underlined the emotional dimension of radicalization and the

importance of the environmental support in giving a sense to violence.

Being involved in terrorism gives individuals benefits in term of “peer

or significant other approval, a sense of satisfaction, or a sense of

personal agency”22.

Why a potential terrorist needs a radical milieu to radicalize?

The reason may be found in the fact that a radical milieu contributes

to recreate a sense of community of like-minded individuals that share

a disorientation towards Western societies and cities. This sense of

community coincides with that of a sect.

20 Malthaner, Stefan, and Peter Waldmann. “The Radical Milieu: Conceptualizing the Supportive Social Environment of Terrorist Groups.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, No. 12 (2014): 983. 21 Merari, Ariel. Driven to Death: Psychological and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism. Oxford University Press, 2010, 173-174. 22 Taylor, Max, and John Horgan. “A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist.” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, No. 4 (2006): 588.

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The sociologist Maria L. Maniscalco has linked the emergence of a

“sectarian spirit”23 in the individuals’ need of a refuge from the

surrounding world24, while for Stefan Malthaner and Peter Waldmann

a radical milieu is one of three concentric social circles25. The first circle

is the terrorist group, the second is the radical milieu, and the last is the

political environment.

The role of a radical milieu in a social environment

The most important thing of the radical milieu that emerges from

Malthaner-Waldmann scheme is its being halfway between social

environment and terrorist group. In other word, a radical milieu can be

understood as a boundary line between terrorists and the surrounding

world. A sort of lens through which watching the reality.

23 Maniscalco, Maria L. “Spirito di setta e società. Significato e dimensioni sociologiche delle forme settarie.” Milano: Franco Angeli, 1992, 161. 24 Ibid., 172. 25 Malthaner and Waldmann, 983.

TERRORIST GROUP

SOCIO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

RADICAL MILIEU

December 2015

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Marginalization. Saint Denis and Molenbeek

This reality is heavy especially for the Muslims who lives

problematically the Western society. In Oliver Roy’s words:

[…] predicators of the tabligh predicate door by door and refer to the

individuals whose community-membership has been broken.

Predicators don’t appeal to a consisting group (village, clan, district),

not because the community has disappeared, but mainly because

predications takes more and more the individual loneliness as a starting

point, in the prospective of creating a new sense of community. […]26

The loss of the community engagement can be conceptualized with

the notion of marginalization. According to the sociologist Alessandro

Orsini, marginalization “is a condition of objective deprivation” that

manifests itself as “a state of mind, which may also affect individuals of

high social status [and] it occurs when the individual feels that his role

in society is lower than his expectations”27.

Marginalization has a causal power in shaping radicalization

processes leading to terrorism. Indeed, a marginal individual has to

manage a huge loss of identity significance28, which reinforces his

26 Roy, Olivier. Global Muslim. Le radici occidentali del nuovo Islam. Milano: Feltrinelli, 2003, 78. 27 Orsini, Alessandro. Anatomia delle Brigate Rosse. Le radici ideologiche del terrorismo rivoluzionario. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009, 40. 28 Taylor, Donald M., and Winnifred Louis. “Terrorism and the quest for identity.” In Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots, Consequences, and Interventions, edited by Fathali M.

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relations with a radical milieu composed by like-minded individuals. In

the Western society, and in particular in the peripheries of some cities,

the Muslims way of live29 could favor the rise of a radical milieu.

This is the case of Molenbeek (Brussels) and Saint Denis (Paris)

districts. Molenbeek-Saint-Jean is a “densely-packed district, where

unemployment is high and disengagement rife”30. It was labelled a

“jihadist haven”31 also before the discover of several connections with

the 13/11 Paris attacks. Indeed, a suspect terrorist involved in the attack

on the speed train from Belgium to France has spent a few time in his

sister’s house in Molenbeek; and also the perpetrator of the attack in

the Brussels’s Jewish Museum was reported to have stayed in

Molenbeek before the plot.

According to Chams Eddine Zaougui,32 Molenbeek is the hotbed for

the Islamic radicalism for three reasons:

a) a huge division in Belgian society (Flemings and Walloons);

b) an “administrative dysfunction,” that leads to the fragmentation

of the political authority;

Moghaddam and Anthony J. Marsella, 169-185. Whashington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004. 29 According to Monica Massari Muslims live Western societies in a condition of “marginalization of their identity […] and consider their definition of minority as a real limitation to their aspirations to participate in the public sphere”. See: Massari, Monica. Islamofobia. La paura e l’Islam, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2006, 61. 30 Forsyth, Alex. “Paris attacks: Is Molenbeek a haven for Belgian jihadis?.” BBC. December 12, 2015. http://bbc.in/1N5sxJu. 31 Ibid. 32 Zaougui, Chams E. “Molenbeek, Belgium’s ‘Jihad Central’.” The New York Times. November 19, 2015. http://nyti.ms/1JIOZrn.

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c) a fragmentation of the political authority can be also seen at a

municipal level.

The Belgian intelligence community has been not able to prevent

radicalization in this district,

partly because almost nobody

among informers can speak

Arabic, but mainly because

Belgian authorities have

underestimated the

phenomenon. As an example

of that, particularly important are the word of the sociologist Johan

Leman: “When I warned police and security personnel in 1999 about

the danger of the radical sheikh Bassam Ayachi, they didn’t seem

alarmed.” At present, Bassam Ayachi is sadly known for having

recruited many young jihadists to fight in the Syrian powder keg.

Another important radical milieu relevant for the jihadist

radicalization is the district of Saint Denis, one of the numerous banlieu

surrounding Paris. These districts are basically “land without control

and completely hostages of ethno-nationalistic gangs.” The most

important factor that regulate the life in a banlieu is their sociological

organization: “they are organized in solidaristic communities,” able to

give to marginalized individuals a sense of membership. Inside these

communities, Muslims can manage the loss of significance given them

by the secularism and the individualism of the French society.

Source: Daily Mail

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With this in mind, the case of Saint Denis is one of those ones where

the intelligence system has not been able to prevent radicalization. Yet

efforts have shown many positive results: after the Charlie Hebdo plot,

the French intelligence system in cooperation with Europol have

thwarted 152 attacks.

According to Giuseppe Sacco33, there are three reasons that shape

the French radicalization process towards terrorism:

a) an incomplete socio-cultural rootedness;

b) a high unemployment rate;

c) the absence of the electoral vent valve;

Another aspect that arises from a radical milieu is also ideological.

Indeed, according to Lucio Caracciolo, director of the Italian journal of

geopolitics Limes, “the pseudo-Islam, deconstructed and adapted by

those who guide individuals in the radicalization process aims at turning

them into automatons exterminators, is a breviary of violence”34. In

other word, the thing that mostly fueled the process is not Islam but the

sense of community itself.

Practically, an ideology exists that coincides with the solidarity to the

community.

33 Sacco, Giuseppe “La Francia e i Suoi Figliastri.” In Dopo Parigi che Guerra Fa, edited by VV.AA. Roma: Limes – Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso, 2015. 34 Caracciolo, Lucio. “Guerrieri del nulla.” In La strategia della paura, Limes, edited by VV.AA. Roma: Limes – Gruppo Editoriale L’Espresso, 2015.

December 2015

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The community nourishes the Muslims worldview telling them a

peculiar narration that help to individuate an enemy to fight as the cause

of the loss of significance.

Sociologically, this coincides with the so-called sectarian culture,

meanwhile historically numerous examples are available of this

mentality development: i.e., the radical milieu of the SS personnel in

concentration camps was surprisingly less ideological than we have ever

thought. The words of the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky are particularly

clear: “The ideological education of the SS was a permanent and

irreplaceable ingredient. The aim of ideological education was not to

impart knowledges, but to instill a certain attitude and to strengthen the

sense of belonging to the organization”35.

This is – with a certain distance – exactly what happens in a radical

milieu.

The 11/13 jihadist cell

In the case of the 11/13 jihadist cell, it is possible to underline several

elements linked to the radical milieu in which the attackers have

radicalized.

Firstly, it is important reconstructing the cell’s structure.

35 Sofsky, Wolfgang. L’ordine del terrore. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2008, 164.

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The leader and the organizer of the attacks was Abelhamid Abaaoud,

a former “leader of a branch of Daesh in Syria called Khatibat al-Battar

al Libi”36. The Abdeslam brothers (Salah and Ibrahim) perfectly known

Abaaoud, because they have lived close to him in Molenbeek. Hasna

Aitboulahcen (Abaaoud’s cousin) and Jawad Bendaoud are suspected

for helping the organizer to seek refuge in a Paris suburb after the

attacks. Particularly important for our analysis is the so-called

‘Molenbeek Connection’37.

The members of the cell linked to Molenbeek are several.

The factor that may have shaped the most their radicalization path is

friendship. Indeed, Abaaoud, the Abdeslam brothers, Hamza Attou and

Mohamed Amri have often met up in the same bar in Molenbeek.

Furthermore, Mr. Abaaoud and Ibrahim Abdeslam have been together

in the same prison. Finally, Mr. Amri, Ali O. and Abraimi Lazez, who

have been facilitators in helping Salah to flee after the attacks, were all

from Molenbeek.

36 Parlapiano, Alicia, Wilson Andrews, Haeyoun Park, and Larry Buchanan. “The Expanding Web of Connections Among the Paris Attackers.” The New York Times. November 15, 2015. http://nyti.ms/1Ln35OH. 37 Ibid.

December 2015

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In addition, the French branch of the cell is important, particularly

for the case of Mr. Abaaoud’s cousin, Hasna Aitboulahcen. In addition

to being the first woman kamikaze in Europe, she lived in Saint Denis.

Her socio-psychological profile can tell us many things connected to the

link between radicalization and radical milieu. Moroccan descent, Hasna

was born in Clichy-la-Garenne a suburb beside Saint Denis, she had

criminal records for petty crimes associated with drugs, and her

childhood is reported to have been really “sad,” with many “problems

in the family”38. She was also a “model kid” with “good grades at

school”39, nevertheless it still remains unclear the precise moment in

which she radicalized. Her brother said important things that help us to

understand something more

about her radical path: “I never

saw her open the Koran. She

was permanently on her phone,

looking at Facebook or

WhatsApp […] I told her to

stop all this, but she would not

listen. She told me I was not her dad or her husband”40. In other terms,

she was not a faith-blinded woman. Instead, she tried to recover a sense

of community dedicating herself to Islam.

38 “Paris attacks: Who was Hasna Ait Boulahcen?.” BBC. November 22, 2015. http://bbc.in/1STDUc4. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid.

Source: L’Avenir

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Her community was Saint Denis. The radical milieu in which she

became radical.

The 11/13 jihadist cell

Source: The New York Times

Final assessments

After the Paris 11/13 attacks, the French-Belgian security forces

began raids against suspected facilitators of the plot in Molenbeek and

in Paris’ suburbs. On Nov. 19, nine people linked to Bilal Hadfi (one of

the stadium bomber) have been arrested in Brussels area, and in the

same week French security forces carried out 414 raids. Over than a

hundred people were arrested and 75 weapons were seized. Despite the

December 2015

31

importance of these raids, their final outcome has been a failure. This

because Abdeslam Salah, the first wanted person, is still in liberty41.

Paris-11/13 can tell us many things about how to manage

radicalization path to terrorism. Since terrorism is a completely

unpredictable phenomenon, the only instrument to avoid bad surprise

is to try to prevent some socio-political catalysts for radicalization.

As I tried to show in this article, one of the most challenged topic for

the radicalization prevention is the dismantling of radical milieus that

have grown up in Western cities. The prevention would not only imply

raids and fights by the security forces, as these actions often contribute

to fuel even more the radicalization’s factors. As suggested by Claire

Spencer, analyst of the Chatham House, in the first edition Med 2015 –

Rome Mediterranean Dialogues (December 10-12, 2015), “integration

coincides with de-radicalization.”

If we will be able to prevent the creation of radical milieus, we can

live in more safe cities and more easily prevent radicalization.

41 “Paris attacks: Who was Hasna Ait Boulahcen?.” BBC. November 22, 2015. http://bbc.in/1STDUc4.

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The adopted measures after Paris attacks

Alessandra Vernile

The shooting in Paris represented an evolution in the way terrorists

choose to hit: First, they follow a more military approach. Second, they

choose different objectives: they rather target normal people over

strategic institutions. By doing so, the terrorists rebel against the

Western way of life, embodied by the victims, an interpretation of life

different from the one that Daesh militants want to pursue. Fighting

Daesh on the political and military level is not enough: the world leaders

are aware of this, and are taking measures aimed at protecting civilians.

This new threat represented by Daesh poses strong challenges to the

European counter-terrorism strategy: some of them regard foreign

policy and the urgent necessity of the definition of the role of European

countries in Northern Africa.

The lack of communication among European intelligence services

and with the international counterparts is a weakness that the terrorists

turn in their favour and make their own strength, just as the inefficient

controls of Europe’s borders. Stricter border controls remain the basis

from which it is necessary to start, as to obtain a real integrated,

effective, and coordinated response to the terroristic threat and the

linked phenomena. Therefore, the first step to take is to improve the

sharing of information among the European countries. The days after

the Paris attacks and Brussels lockdown, France and Belgium asked for

December 2015

33

an improvement of the intelligence information sharing systems

between the nine European nations most involved in the jihadist threats

after Paris attacks.42 The two Prime Ministers, Manuel Valls and Charles

Michel, called for a harmonization and a new way of systematizing the

collection of information about suspects within the European territory.

In particular, they asked for stronger border control and the registration

of incoming migrants in an official database. These requests coming

from two of the most terrorism-exposed countries in Europe, need a

consistent answer from European institutions.

Mistakenly, counter-terrorism is still considered an internal matter for

European Member States. This misleading idea has led so far to a weak

political answer. However, establishing a European intelligence agency

with a structure similar to that of American FBI would probably help.

The European Union already possesses such structures that can be used

as hubs to collect information coming from national intelligence

agencies. One of the new solutions announced by the EU

Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos few days after the attacks in

Paris, is the enhancing of the capacities of Europol, through the

creation of a European Counter-Terrorist Centre, already announced

on late April of this year as part of the European Agenda on Security

2015-202043 The task of this new branch, starting off on January 1,

2016, is to help the Agency to support for national law enforcement

42 France, Belgium, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and Sweden. 43 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. April 28, 2015. COM(2015) 185 final. http://bit.ly/1Ij2116.

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authorities’ actions to stop the phenomenon of foreign terrorist

fighters, terrorist financing, banning of online websites with extremist

content, trafficking of weapons. The Centre will make more efficient

the sharing of information among European agencies, will promote

operative cooperation, and will collect and cross-check information

from different European databases. Few years ago, the idea of creating

a European intelligence agency was developed from a military point of

view, with the proposal of the creation of an intelligence branch in the

European Military Staff, as well as a European Intelligence and Situation

Centre. This latter was actually created in 2011, in the framework of the

Lisbon Treaty, as part of the European External Action Service. Its

main aim is to provide intelligence analyses, early warnings, and

promote awareness.

Besides, in addition to the

creation of an intelligence

hub at a European level,

cooperation with the

international counterparts

should be strengthened. For

instance, the creation of a

‘Euro-Atlantic Task Force’ or a broader ‘Fusion Task Force’, would

help the sharing of information, data collection, and the ability to

develop joint analyses together with Interpol, which already offers its

logistical support in case of terrorist attack through its own Incident

Response Team (IRT).

Source: Il Corriere della Sera

December 2015

35

Another relevant issue to solve is the existence of Foreign Fighters.

Experts estimate that during the last year, the numbers of foreign

fighters has doubled. Of the 27,000 fighters44 in Iraq and Syria, around

5,000 fighters made their way from Europe to Syria and Iraq and 20%

of them returned to their home countries. The existence of these new

figures, foreign fighters and lone wolves, posed important challenges to

the monitoring of the coastal borders and not only. As we know, many

of them are second or third generation young Muslims not well

integrated in the society in which they live, while others are new

converted to Islam who consider the participation to the activity of

Daesh a way to reach self-realization. Almost 5,000 foreign fighters

moved from Europe to Northern Africa and they are European citizens

born in the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Germany. A large

part of them has been trained in Syria and Iraq, then decided to go back

to Europe. They can freely move across Europe thanks to their

European passports. The European Union responded through the

adoption, at the beginning of December 2015, of a package of measures

to address the terrorist threat. It proposes a directive on terrorism that

focuses on foreign fighters, introducing the criminalisation of travelling

and training for terrorist purposes, as well as the implementation of

stricter control on arm trafficking through increased support and

collaboration from Europol. On December 15, 2015, the European

Commission decided to reallocate the financial resources for

FRONTEX, asking for a new system of borders control to guarantee a

44 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq.” The Soufan Group. December 8, 2015. http://bit.ly/1PwyKEc.

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new integrated approach to help the control of the documents at the

borders, repatriation of irregular migrants if the case, and the creation

of a joint Border Police as well as of a Monitoring and Risks Analysis

Centre.

If, on the one hand, a political solution seems to be the only way to

stop terrorism and fight Daesh, on the other hand, a military

intervention against the Caliphate looks increasingly incumbent. This

opened debates on what could happen next. These debates, in particular

at the national level, showed fractures on how the single countries

intend to react. France, two days after the attacks, invoked the

‘collective defence clause’ foreseen by the article 42.7 of the Treaty of

Lisbon.45 The article imposes to all Member States the duty to offer help

and assistance to a European State victim of an armed aggression on its

own territory. Thanks to this, France had the possibility to ask for

concrete support to the States that want to help the French army already

involved in missions in order to stem the overflow of Islamic militias in

countries in southern Libya. This led to bilateral meetings between

Hollande and Cameron, Obama, Merkel, Putin, and Renzi, as to

reaffirm their interest in helping France in its struggle to fight Daesh.

The words used by the French President the days after the attacks,

remembered to many the war on terror doctrine used by Bush in 2001.

France asked for support in the airstrikes against Daesh bases in Syria

and he obtained an immediate support from Russia, United Kingdom,

45 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of Lisbon on the Functioning of the European Union. October 26, 2012. 2012/C 326/47. http://bit.ly/PQhjlG.

December 2015

37

Germany, and the United States. However, a plausible military

intervention with armed forces on the ground, and not only with

airstrikes, probably will not lead to the final defeat of Daesh. Even if

now Saudi Arabia announced the creation of a new military alliance to

fight against jihadists46, which includes 34 Member States from the

Organization of the Islamic Cooperation, it is not enough. The military

intervention has to be considered part of a comprehensive approach to

develop, in order to defeat Daesh. This multilevel policy to be pursued

is to be found in a compromise among a more diplomatic approach, an

economical one, and a social one. Yet, this strategy will bear fruit only

if a new response structure will be created at the same time: this

response structure will have to be based on a common view and final

goal shared by the totality of the countries, considering a military

intervention as extrema ratio. It is necessary, at this point, to soften the

relations between Russia and Turkey and find a good national policy to

apply to the Islamic communities in Europe to mitigate the Foreign

Fighters phenomenon.

The risk that Syria became the new Libya is something that has been

discussed at national level, especially in Italy. The Italian Prime Minister

Matteo Renzi underlined that Italy will not give support to the French

airstrikes against Daesh in Syria. This decision complies anyway with

46 The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has announced the creation of a military alliance of 34 Islamist states to assure their support to combating terrorism both at international and regional level. The alliance finds its basis on the OIC Charter and other legal instruments to assure a joint cooperation among States to fight against this threat that affects the stability of the regional and that is creating an Islamophobic feeling all over the world. The aim is to fight terrorism not only through military actions, but even with economic and social measures.

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the above mentioned art. 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, since it does not

ask exclusively for military interventions, rather for interventions of

unspecified nature. Before starting a possible mission in Syria, it is

necessary to find a solution for the second phase, the one that will take

place after the war.

In the meantime, Italy is pursuing its own war against terrorism. New

measures to fight terrorism have been introduced with the Law No. 43,

which aims at strengthening the tools to guarantee the prevention and

repression of the new terrorist threats through the introduction of new

types of crime and harder sentencing thanks to the modification of

Penal Code47, the creation of a blacklist of websites praising the Jihad

and used to recruit European jihadists, the shutdown of these websites,

and the extension of preventive measures for suspected terrorists.

These newly introduced administrative measures comply with the

European and international norms, and give equivalent powers to the

law enforcement agencies and the Intelligence Services. On December

3, 2015, after the Paris attacks, the Legislative Decree No. 174 has been

approved. It introduces provisions to be extended until December 31,

2015, the participation of the armed forces and the police in

international missions. The aim is to participate in the effort of the

international community to stabilize crisis areas.

47 From 3 to 6 years of detention for foreign fighters and supporters of terroristic organizations; from 5 to 10 years for the lone wolves who are auto-trained to use weapons and explosives, with a strongest penalty if they autotrained online. See: Gazzetta Ufficiale, S.U. 91. April 20, 2015. http://bit.ly/1Zx7t7s.

December 2015

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Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil, the

Italian intelligence implemented its strategies and tools in order to

strengthen the protection of national interests. Following the attack in

Nasiriya in November 2003, it has been established the Anti-terrorism

Strategic Analysis Committee (CASA) which has proved very useful as

preventive mechanism and in the analysis of potential risks. The

outcomes of the effective action of the Services is well represented by

the monitoring of suspected terrorists and silent cells on the territory.

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Daesh terror warning

What are the real risks of Italy’s homeland security?

Giacomo Morabito

We are a country that is exposed to international

terrorism as we are part of the grand coalition against the

Caliphate, but up to now Italy has conducted preventative

action that has worked.

(Angelino Alfano)

Rome armed to the teeth. The Italian response to the

jihadist attacks in Europe

The November 2015 Paris attacks have alarmed all the European

countries, especially Italy and the Holy See in view of the Extraordinary

Jubilee of Mercy (Iubilaeum Extraordinarium Misericordiae), which started

on December 8, 2015, and will end on November 20, 2016. Italian

authorities have expressed strong concern regarding the carrying out of

the event, as millions of pilgrims are expected in Rome; in this regard,

Father Federico Lombardi, the Director of the Holy See Press Office,

said: “We must be very careful not to let ourselves be overcome by fear,

December 2015

41

what these hate-possessed, foolish murderers want is to spread

terror.”48

Jihadist propaganda is

also addressed to Italy,

which was warned against

entering the war against

Daesh, under the menace to

see the Mediterranean

‘colored by the blood’ of

Italians. Italian medias have speculated that jihadists could hide among

migrants coming into the country from Libya, where radical militias are

active. Angelino Alfano, the Minister of the Interior of Italy, reassured

on the efficiency of Italian intelligence agencies in the fight against

jihadists, declaring: “In our country, we can be calm: the intelligence

system works.” He added that Italian armed forces have carried out

more than 56,000 personal checks since the start of the year; over 8,000

vehicles were searched, 160 ships controlled, and about 60 Islamic

fundamentalists expelled, including four imams.49

In addition, he explained: “Once a week, State Police, Arm of

Carabineers, and Italian intelligence agencies have a meeting at the

Ministry of Interior and share information, analyze and forward them

to the Judiciary. The coordination is absolute; if anything has been

48 Gualtieri, Andrea. “Parigi sotto attacco, allarme Giubileo. Il Vaticano: “Non domini la paura.” La Repubblica. November 14, 2015. http://bit.ly/1Zx7lF8. 49 “Terrorismo, Alfano: “Abbiamo espulso 4 imam predicatori di odio”.” La Repubblica. December 14, 2015. http://bit.ly/1P33YTh.

Source: The Telegraph

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missed, it was the sharing of information with other countries.

Therefore, we want to extend the Committee for Strategic Anti-

Terrorism Analysis at European level, not only Italian.”50 Following the

new decrees in the field of defense and homeland security, preventive

measures on suspected terrorists have been strengthened, and websites

that encourage violence have been obscured.

Counterterrorism measures in Italy

Italy has always been committed to the fight against terrorism,

especially in the 1970s. Thanks to the experience gained, in 2001 Italy

was able to modify anti-terrorist measures in response to the September

11 attacks. Before these attacks, several investigations confirmed the

presence of international terrorist groups in Italy suspected of planning

criminal actions in foreign countries. Therefore, the increasing threat

from international terrorism led Italy to take new legislative measures

against inciting, forming, organizing, leading, or financing terrorist

organizations. Later, another set of measures adopted just after the July

2005 London bombings. On August 1, 2005, the legislation was further

developed due to the issuance of Law No. 155 (‘Urgent measures to

fight international terrorism’), which improved the instruments to fight

the threat of terrorist organizations.51 In addition, Italy further enacted

strict immigration measures that permit the administrative detention

50 Rubino, Monica. “Alfano: “Giubileo, l’Italia è preparata. Serve più scambio tra le intelligence europee”.” La Repubblica. November 23, 2015. http://bit.ly/1NSyUkV. 51 Gazzetta Ufficiale, S.U. 177. August 1, 2005. http://bit.ly/1knCueb.

December 2015

43

and deportation of non-nationals if they appear to constitute a threat to

national security.

Ten years later, on April 17, 2015, in the aftermath of the Charlie

Hebdo shooting, a new anti-terrorism law was adopted (Law No. 43)

providing tougher measures against those considered dangerous for

national security and tougher jail terms for the so-called ‘foreign-

fighters’ and ‘lone wolves.’ Based on this new law, those found guilty of

trying to go abroad to join Daesh forces or recruiting other ‘foreign-

fighters’ would face a sentence up to eight years in jail which increases

to up to 10 years for ‘sole wolves’ who train in Italy with the goal to

carry out terror attacks on Italian soil. Tighter controls are implemented

on the web and police is allowed to use wiretapping to monitor the

exchanges of information and materials via phone or the Internet. In

addition, it is possible to make investigations inside the Italian jails to

impede the recruiting of terrorists.52 The Italian government announced

prevention measures to strengthen military personnel already deployed

throughout the country and to protect fishing boats and merchant

vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.

Italian targets

After the November 13 Paris attacks, Italy raised its security alert to

the highest level possible in the absence of a direct attack on the

country. Even if there is no direct sign of concrete threats, the United

52 Gazzetta Ufficiale, S.U. 91. April 20, 2015. http://bit.ly/1Zx7t7s.

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States warned Italy that Daesh could strike the Papal Basilica of St. Peter

in the Vatican, Milan Cathedral, La Scala opera house and other ‘general

venues,’ including churches, synagogues, restaurants, theaters, and

hotels.53

In the last decade, there have been almost 100 terrorist attacks in

Italy, over 7,000 authorized wiretaps for investigations of domestic and

international terrorism, while 179 Italian among civilians and military

lost their lives because involved in attacks in 12 foreign countries.54

According to the ‘Italian Terrorism Infiltration Index 2015,’ released by

the Italian Institute of Economic and Social Research Demoskopika, the

Italian regions of Lombardia and Lazio have the highest risk for

terrorism. Lombardia tops the classification (10.0 points), followed by

Lazio at (6.48), Emilia-Romagna (4.27), Piemonte (3.47), Veneto (2.67),

Campania and Toscana (2.40). The remaining regions are placed

recording a low potential risk of terrorist infiltration: Trentino-Alto

Adige (1.75), Liguria (1.64), Calabria (1.08), Marche (0.96), Sardegna

(0.87), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (0.81), Puglia (0.63), Sicilia (0.46), Umbria

(0.45), Abruzzo (0.18), Basilicata (0.02), and Molise (0.01).

Demoskopika has drawn a map of the regions that are most at risk of

potential terrorist infiltration. The Institute has used three criteria for

its ranking: authorized wiretaps, previous terrorist attacks on Italian soil,

and foreign residents in Italy from the top five countries for terror as

53 “Terrorismo, allarme FBI su Duomo e Scala: innalzato il livello di sicurezza.” La Repubblica. November 18, 2015. http://bit.ly/1QWEWqm. 54 “Terrorismo, Lombardia e Lazio le regioni più “esposte”. Liguria al nono posto.” Il Secolo XIX. October 30, 2015. http://bit.ly/1OuIS1o.

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classified by the Institute for Economics and Peace of the Global

Terrorism Index 2014, i.e. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and

Syria.55

To better estimate the potential risk of terrorist infiltration, it could

be included also socio-economic criteria that help partially to

understand the growing phenomenon of homegrown jihadism.

Homegrown jihadists are second-generation immigrants who were born

in the West and often live in conditions of economic and/or social

distress. They are not integrated into the Western society, but not

necessarily socially marginalized: even in case that they have a high level

of education and be apparently integrated, they reject any form of

integration and learn the jihadist ideology and technique on the

Internet.56

However, recently has been disputed the link between poverty, lack

of education and terrorism. It was disputed by some scholars, including

Alan B. Krueger (Princeton University) and Alessandro Orsini

(University of Rome Tor Vergata). According to them, the terrorists are

usually people who care about a cause and embrace fanatically to be

willing to die and kill in order to support it. Therefore, it is limited to

think that people who live in lower middle economic conditions can be

55 “Terrorismo, Lombardia e Lazio le regioni più “esposte”. Liguria al nono posto.” Il Secolo XIX. October 30, 2015. http://bit.ly/1OuIS1o. 56 Zamponi, Francesco. Il Terrorismo Globalizzato. Aspetti multidisciplinari. Ancona: Tecnoprint, 2010.

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considered as potential terrorists: at least they have political opinions so

firm to want to impose them by force.57

57 “Povertà e terrorismo.” Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica. December 19, 2013. http://bit.ly/1meqPAn.

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Conclusions

This report aims at contributing to the debate on radicalization

affecting Muslim communities across Europe and on the risk

represented by the so-called foreign fighters. Additionally, it sheds lights

on the current level of effectiveness of counterterrorism policies as

developed within the European Union after the more recent attacks.

Three main questions are raised:

1) Who are the foreign fighters? Where do they live and why do they

need to express their needs and claims through violence?

2) Which are the social and political links with Daesh? How are they

practically and logistically recruited, how is their return back to

Europe driven and organized?

3) To what extent is the EU current counterterrorism strategy the

result of a factual comprehension of the phenomenon and a

subsequent coordination of competent actors?

As for the first question, several reports and academic publications

have tried to provide a potential definition. According to Bakker, for

example, foreign fighters are “those who regard their duty to participate

in what they believe to be a jihad of the sword, a holy war against the

regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and its Shiite allies, and who

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join local or foreign groups with a jihadist political agenda.”58 They are

European citizens, raised and educated in the European cities but, most

of the times, refused or rejected by European communities. They are

the children and grandchildren of those migrants who left Northern

Africa and Middle East for a better life and were strong enough to

survive the difficulties of integration. This brings us to two main

conclusions: firstly, the social models through which migrants have

been integrated/assimilated in the European countries in the last

decades are no more able to reply to current needs of people and should

be revised accordingly; secondly, the label radicalization is broad

enough to include several grades of commitment, both those extreme

thoughts, which remain active just on a social and/or political level and

those extreme ideas that turn into violence. Therefore, assuming that all

radical episodes of extremism produce the same result or concern all

Muslim communities settled in Europe constitutes a dangerous

oversimplification. Several analyses have demonstrated that the reality

in France, United Kingdom and Germany is much more diversified and

requires more attention.

A deeper comprehension would also help to understand the reasons

why some foreign fighters are connected to Syria. This brings to the

second question. Even though police investigations have revealed that

terrorists involved in both Paris attacks were connected to Daesh and

58 Bakker, Edwin. “Characteristics of Jihadi Terrorists in Europe (2001–2009).” In Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge. European and American Experiences, edited by Rik Coolsaet, 131-144. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011.

December 2015

49

have traveled to Syria, there is still a significant lack of knowledge on

the channels used to recruit people in Europe and organize their

connections to the cells in Syria. At present, there are only estimations

of foreign fighters actually gone to Syria and returned to Europe. More

and detailed investigations on their actual presence in the country, the

type of activities they undertook there and their accomplices and finally

the dynamics of their return are required and essential to demarcate

general trends of the phenomenon.

As the report clearly demonstrates, the fatal combination of the

perception of the ‘enemy’ and of the ‘otherness’ with the absence of

reliable data on foreign fighters can explain the unpreparedness of

intelligence and the fallacy of their capacity to prevent terrorist attacks.

It is true that terrorism is – by definition – usually unpredictable;

therefore, any prevention plan cannot be efficient in absolute terms.

However, the EU counterterrorism strategy still suffers the political

constraints due to member States’ preferences as well as the lack of

coordination among competent agencies.

Both factors are also due to the way the counterterrorism strategy has

been developed within the European Union over the last decades. Until

September 11, 2001, the security policies have been shaped by domestic

preferences, particularly by those countries provided with more

expertise in the fight against terrorism, like United Kingdom, Italy and

Germany. Then, the Twin Towers attacks led to the formal

development of a European Security Strategy, in which terrorism is

listed as one of the major threats, together with organized crime and

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failed states. The need to tackle recent trends, after Paris attacks, is now

animating the debates at the EU level, producing attempts to

reformulate policies and intelligence services.

The need to strengthen the daily life security of European citizens

without affecting their freedom of movement remains in the back,

coherently with the basic principle of EU democracy, and as a constant

and irredeemable dilemma.

Daniela Irrera

Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at

University of Catania

December 2015

51

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About the Authors

Antonio De Bonis

Director and Founder of GEA Geocrime and Senior Inspector at Arm of

Carabineers

He studies and analyzes criminal phenomena at the national and

international level. He also conducts academic research on transnational

crime and its various forms, its realities, potentials, and threats that

organized crime presents and will represent in the future. His research

is focused on terrorism and organized crime, especially Italian Mafia-

type organizations.

Daniela Irrera

Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at University

of Catania

She has been visiting fellow in several universities and institutes in

Europe, United States and Asia, and recently awarded with a DAAD

Fellowship at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. She is Member of

the executive committee of the ECPR Standing Group on Organised

Crime. She has published in the areas of International Relations and EU

politics, dealing with global terrorism, transnational organized crime,

civil society and humanitarian affairs.

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Stefano Lupo

Researcher at Wikistrat

Graduated with a Master’s degree in Politics and Economy of the

Mediterranean at University of Genoa, he attended a one-year course in

Political Sciences at University of Ottawa. After several seminary

courses organized by the European Space Agency and the European

Centre for Space Law, he specialized his researches on Space Law and

Policy. He got a Master in Diplomacy at ISPI (Milan) and a Master in

Economic Security, Geopolitics and Intelligence at SIOI (Rome), and

then he focused his analysis on Geopolitics and Persian Gulf issues.

Giacomo Morabito

Director and Founder of Mediterranean Affairs

Graduated with a Master’s degree in International Relations and

European Studies, now he is a Ph.D. student in Economics at the

University of Messina. He is Researcher on the Middle East, North

Africa and Macroeconomics Desks at Wikistrat and Reporter at

Termometro Politico. His main research topics are economics, politics

and security, with a focus on terrorism.

December 2015

59

Alessandro Pastore

Researcher in Philosophy and Cultural Studies

In July 2014, he got a Master in Economic Security, Geopolitics and

Intelligence at SIOI, in Rome. His work focuses the role of the ideology

in the political theory and the media theory in the late capitalism age.

Latest publications includes studies on Hannah Arendt and Carl

Schmitt and more articles about terrorism and culture wars.

Federico Solfrini

Master’s degree in Economics and Institutions in Islamic Countries at LUISS

Guido Carli (Rome)

From November 2015, he is a student of the Master course in

Economics and Institutions in Islamic Countries at LUISS Guido Carli

(Rome). He has been research fellow at the Radicalisation Awareness

Network (RAN) and visiting student at the Department of Political

Science of Boston College. His main research topics are strategic

studies, international politics, and terrorism.

Alessandra Vernile

Master’s degree in International Relations at LUMSA University (Rome)

In July 2014, she got a Master in Economic Security, Geopolitics and

Intelligence at SIOI, in Rome. Later, she worked as Assistant Program

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Manager at NATO Defense College Foundation, in Rome. In 2015, she

got as fellowship-student a Master in Institutions and Space Policy at

SIOI, in Rome. She currently works as intern at the European Space

Agency, in Paris.

December 2015

61

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

Cover image source: Mediterranean Affairs

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