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Secretary of Justice vs hon. Ralph C Lantian

Facts: 

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign

Affairs U.S. Note No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent

Mark Jimenez. Secretary of Justice then ordered a technical evaluation and assessment of

the extradition request.

Mark Jimenez through counsel wrote a letter addressed to herein petitioner requesting

copies of official extradition request from the US Government. He requested ample time to

comment and for the matter to be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Secretary of Justice denied the said request specifically invoking our country’s responsibility

to the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties that “every treaty in force is binding upon

parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Extradition is a toll of criminal law

enforcement and to be effective must be processed expeditiously.

Issue: 

Whether or not respondent Judge Lantion acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the temporary

restraining order to herein petitioner in performing his legal duties as Secretary of Justice.

Held: 

The Extradition Law provides Rules of Court shall apply, thus extradite has the basic right of

notice and hearing. The RP-US Extradition Treaty under the Incorporation Clause in case of

conflict is not superior over a national law.

International law is given equal standing but not superior to national legislative enactment.

The principle lex posterior degoratoriori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a

statute may repeal a treaty. In States where the constitution is the highest law of the land,

such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they

are in conflict with the constitution.

Thus, petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request

and its supporting papers and to grant him (Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file

his comment and supporting evidence.

There was only a void on some provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty as regards to the

basic due process right of a prospective extradite at the evaluation stage of the extradition

proceeding.

RTC’s decision is rendered moot and academic and herein petition is DISMISSED.

In RE: Arturo Garcia

Facts:

Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without

submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a

Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage.

He had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved,

selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central

University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as

“Licenciado en derecho”.

Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the

provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the

Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law

profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar

Held: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic

Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the

Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern

Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to

practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to

practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own

country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to

practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are

made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose

territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh75 PHIL 131

Facts: 

Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus which prays that the respondent judge be ordered to

continue the proceeding which was initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of

the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation. It is based on the

proclamation issued by Gen. Douglas McArthur which had the effect of invalidating and

nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines.

Furthermore, it was contended that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance

of and continue judicial proceedings pending the court of the defunct republic in the absence

of enabling law.

Issue: 

Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto

government.

Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the

Philippine Executive Commission were good and valid even after the liberation or

reoccupation of the Philippines by the US Forces.

Held: In political and international law, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive

and judicial department of a de facto government is valid. Being a de facto government,

judicial acts done under its control, when they are not political in nature, to the extent that

they effect during the continuance and control of said government remain good.

All judgment and judicial proceedings which are not of political complexion were good and

valid before and remained as such even after the occupied territory had come again into the

power of true and original sovereign.

Wherefore, the respondent judge is directed to take cognizance of the civil case (3012) and

continue the proceedings.

LAWYERS FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO

(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986) 

Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing

that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. 

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino

government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed

through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New

Armed Forces of the Philippines." 

Issue: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate. 

Held: 

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the

realm of politics where only the people are the judge. 

The Court further held that: 

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire

country; 

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and 

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

Tanada v. Angara

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the

Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government

to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization)

Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was

adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.

This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19,

Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy,

and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

Issue:

Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the

constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at

the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on

the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against

foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did

not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-

reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of

foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor

“mendicancy in the international community.”

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby

making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal

department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless

there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the

ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A

treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the

parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its

legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the

obligations undertaken.

The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.G.R. No. 101949  

Facts:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square

meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque.  Said lot was contiguous with two other

lots.  These lots were sold to Ramon Licup.  In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate

the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and

clearing the land of squatters.  Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by

petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

Issue:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding

selling a lot to a private entity

Held:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the

generally accepted principles of International Law.  Even without this affirmation, such

principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a

condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.  In the present case,

if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely

the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.  However, petitioner has

denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but

claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature

in the Philippines. 

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary

in nature.  The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of

Manila.  The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to

construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.  The decision to

transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a

governmental character.  Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.  It merely wanted to

dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for

petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.  

People v. PerfectoG.R. No. L-18463

Facts:This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of

testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies.

The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to

the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the

Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their

election through fraud and robbery."

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the

Court of First Instance of Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change

from Spanish to American sovereignty.

Held:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political

relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate

the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were

the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and

a new theory of government, was set up in thePhilippines. No longer is there a Minister of

the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of

him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles

of the American character and system of

government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its

authority in the PhilippineIslands.

Vilas v. City of Manila

Facts:

Vilas, Trigas, and aguado are creditors of Manila as it existedbefore the cession of the

Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by thetreaty of Paris. According to them, under its present

charter from the Government of the PI is the same juristic person and liableupon the

obligations of the old city. PI SC: different entity.

Issue:

Whether or not notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the US followed by a

reincorporation of the city, present municipality liable forobligations of old city.

Held:

YES. The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of theproperty rights of the old city

and to the right to enforceall its causes of action. There is identity of purposebetween

Spanish and American charters and substantial identity of municipal powers, area, and

inhabitants.Argument against liability: ayuntamiento of Manila was acorporation entity

created by the Spanish government. Whenthe sovereignty of Spanish ceased, municipality,

ceased aswell.

Ichongvs Hernandez 101 PHIL 155

FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its purpose

was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from having a stranglehold upon

the people’s economic life. 

a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the

capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the

retail trade 

aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to continue their

business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or

voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval of the Act or

until the expiration of term. 

Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act. 

provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for violation of the

laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor and other laws

relating to trade, commerce and industry. 

provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail

business of additional stores or branches of retail business 

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and

partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:

reasons: 

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their

liberty and property without due process the subject of the Act is not expressed in the

title the Act violates international and treaty obligations the provisions of the Act against the

transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws. 

Held:

The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens the equal

protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental differences

between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative classification adopted

US vs. Look Chaw

Facts:

Several persons (including the internal-revenue agent ofCebu) went aboard the steamship

Erroll to inspect and search its cargo. Note that steamship Erroll is of English nationality

and it came from HongKong bound for Mexico via the call ports of Manilaand Cebu. These

persons found sacks of opium (exhibits A, B, and C.) 

The complaint filed against defendant stated that defendant “carried, kept, possessed, and

had in his possession and control 96 kg of opium” and that he “he had been surprised in

the act of selling P1,000 worth prepared opium.” However, since there was more than 1

crime charged, the fiscal just filed for “unlawful possession of opium” 

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue, the opium seized in the vessel had been

bought by the defendant in HongKong, at P3.00 for each round can and P5.00 for each of

the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz;

that the vessel arrived at Cebu and on the same day he sold opium. 

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction 

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction. Mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in

the PhilippineIslands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a

general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of thePhilippines. However, in the case

at bar, a can of opium is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an

open violation of the Philippine laws. 

The People of the Phil. Island, plaintiff-appellant vs Wong Cheng (alias Wong Chun),defendant-appellee

Facts: 

The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General filed an appeal thaturges the

revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manilapresented by the

defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smokedopium, aboard the

merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the saidvessel was anchored in

Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.In the said demurrer the

defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lowercourt of the said crime, which

resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the crime committedby Wong

Cheng aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters?

Held: 

Yes. The crime on the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thushaving our

court the right of jurisdiction over the offense committed. The court said“Having the opium

smoked within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreignmerchant ship, is a breach

of the public order, because it causes such drugs toproduce pernicious effects within

our territory”. 

Rosalinda Santos vs Exec Secretary Macaraig&Manglapus

Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought

a discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought

with her her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought

that Santos used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that

the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to

be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear

before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the

Office of the President and after review, Cory issued AO 122 which declared Santos guilty

of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced.

Issue: 

Whether or not Santos was rightfully removed from her post.

Held: 

Evidence showed that Santos is not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty. In fact what she did

was beneficial to the government for she helped save and lessen the expenses. However,

the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done toSantos. She cannot be

reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her

prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts

upon the pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not

actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also,

her position involves foreign relations which are vested solely in the executive. The SC

cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the

assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for

her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may

from time to time dictate.

Reyes vs. Bagatsing 

Facts:

Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on

October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of

the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short

program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants

of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the

resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an

assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and

assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and

rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence

reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any

assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend.

Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum

or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general

public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was

granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present

danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino

dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting

the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or

chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.

Issue: 

Whether or not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated. 

Held: 

Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the

implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that

as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is

their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a

substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.

Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts

between citizens, and discussing public questions. 

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO

Facts:

KhosrowMinucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in

Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as

head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement.

In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No.

6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation”

conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin

was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private

respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.

In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for

damages on the ‘trumped-up’ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

Issue:

Whetheror not private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic

immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Held:

Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve,

the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with

the receiving state. Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity

from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a

diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of

diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and

interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit

reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally

regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption

that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his

person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be

sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If

the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,

although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the

complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its

consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.

The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose

service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are

sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if

the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to

satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages

decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it

has not been formally impleaded.  

Shaufvs CA

Facts:

LoidaShauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air

Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at

Clark Air Base. She boasts of related working experience and being a qualified dependent

locally available.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment

opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer)

and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex

(female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a

180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected

to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be

selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time,

Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment

was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the

Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the

complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint

decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. 

Issue:

Whetheror not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed

Forces.

Held:

No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or

the acts of its agents in the Phils. Private respondents are personally liable in indemnifying

petitioner Shauf.

While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it

only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to

law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or

violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official &

such suit will not be a suit against the state. (Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications

vs. Aligaen) The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is

being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. 

The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was

previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an

interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person

kept the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal.

Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials

found her highly qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service

Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that

discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations. 

US vs Ruiz

Facts:

TheUSA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the

military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it

won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of wharves in said base that

was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was

filed by him against the US.

Issue:

Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to

be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of

another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the

principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are

not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have

multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental

acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now

extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of

commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic

affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to

have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does

not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the

project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and

Philippines, indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized

for, nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

United States of America vs. Guinto

Facts:

These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state

immunity. In GR No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air

Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for

contracts for barbering services in the said base.

In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners

Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force

Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained

after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had

poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club

customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to

a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the

center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his

dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners.

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’ Donnell,

an extension of Clark Air Bas, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the

individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air

Force Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them,

an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was

filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial.

Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the

individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.

Issue: 

Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts

done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Held: 

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted

principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even

without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of

international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the

majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized

state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states

are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is

also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed

by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials

will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be

regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of

the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied

consent. In the case o US, the customary law of international law on state immunity is

expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that the

US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has

entered into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. It is only when the contract

involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

SYQUIA VS. LOPEZ, ET AL.

Facts:

Plaintiffs, Pedro Syquia and LeopoldoSyquia are the undivided joint owners of three

apartment buildings situated in Manila. They executed three lease contracts ± one for each

of the three apartments. The period for the three leases was to be ³for the duration of the

war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the US.´The apartment

buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the US Armed Forces stationed in

Manila. Six months after September 2, 1945 ± when Japan surrendered ± plaintiffs

approached the defendants George Moore and Erland Tillman and requested the return of

the apartment buildings. Moore and Tillman expressed to plaintiffs that the US Army wanted

to continue occupying the premises. Plaintiffs requested to renegotiate said leases, to

execute a lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher

than those payable under the old contracts. Respondents sent a letter refusing to execute

new leases but advised that the US Army will vacate the apartments before February 1,

1947. Not being in conformity with the old lease agreements, plaintiffs formally requested

Tillman to cancel said leases and to release the apartments on June 28, 1946. Tillman

refused tocomply with the request. Because of the assurance that the US Government

would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to

secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by

respondents. On February 17, 1947, plaintiffs served a formal notice to the

occupantsdemanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 a

month; (c) execution of new leases (d)release of said apartment buildings within thirty days

of said notice in the event of failure to comply with said demands. The thirty-day period

lapsed without any of the respondents complying with the demand. Plaintiffs commenced an

action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for Unlawful Detainer against

respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court had

no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the

real party in interest was the US Government and not the individual

defendants. Furthermore, the respondent argued that the war between the US and her allies

on one side and Germany and Japan on the other had not yet been terminated and

consequently the period of the three leases has not yet expired. Also, a foreign government

like the US cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent. That even

though the US Government was not named as the defendant in the complaint, it is

nevertheless the real defendant as the parties named are officers of the US Government.

The Municipal Court dismissed the action. The CFI of Manila affirmed the order of the lower

court.

Issue:

Does the court have jurisdiction to hear and try the case?

Held:

It is clear that the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the present case for

Unlawful Detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very

beginning of the action. The US Government has not given its consent to the filing of the

suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of

a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of a

citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said governments consent,

which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of this country.

US vs. Guinto

Facts:

 In the 4 consolidated suits, the USA moves to dismiss the cases on the ground that they

are in effect suits against it which it has not consented

On the first suit:

On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US

Air Force, solicited bids for barber services contracts through its contracting officer James F.

Shaw

Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,

Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. delPilar

Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who

claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which

was not included in the invitation to bid

The Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX), through its representatives petitioners Yvonne

Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse, upon the private respondents' complaint, explained that

the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon

But Dizon was alreayd operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel

PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for

the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary

injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation

Respondent court directed the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo

On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for

preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which

had not waived its non-suability

On July 22, 1986, trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction

On Oct. 10, 1988, trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss

On the second suit:

 Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia,

WilfredoBelsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air

Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City

It had been ascertained that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking

the vegetables served to the club customers

His dismissal was effected on March 5, 1986 by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the

3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base.

Genove filed a complaint in the RTC of Baguio

The defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss the complaint,

alleging that Lamachia (the manager) as an officer of the US Air Force was immune from

suit for the acts done by him in his official capacity; they argued that the suit was in effect

against USA, which had not given its consent to be sued.

Issue:

Whether or not the suits above are in effect suits against United States of America without

its consent.

1stsuit: No. The barbershops concessions are commercial enterprises operated by private

persons. They are not agencies of the US Armed forces. Petitioners cannot plead immunity.

Case should be remanded to the lower court.

2nd suit: No. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity. The restaurants

are commercial enterprises. By entering into the employment contract with Genove, it

impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. (However, the petitioners are

only suable, not liable.)

3rd suit: Yes. It is clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official

functions. For discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be directly

impleaded for acts attributable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

4th suit: The contradictory factual allegations deserve a closer study. Inquiry must first be

made by the lower court. Only after can it be known in what capacity the petitioners were

acting at the time of the incident.

DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO

Facts:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner

Moreau was thecommanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is

an American citizen with permanent residence inthe Philippines.

 

Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the

special servicesdepartment of the NAVSTA.On October 3, 1975, the private respondents

were advised that their employment had been converted from permanentfull-

time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and

regulations of the U.S.Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for

reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.However, in a letter addressed to petitioner

Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The lettercontained the

statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b)

"Messrs. Rossi andWyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be

difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "eventhough the grievants were under oath not to

discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public placeswhere others not

involved in the case could hear." Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from

petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnelexplaining the change of the

private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages

allegingthat the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of

the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights.However,

petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of

their official dutiesand that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the

doctrine of state immunity. However, the motionwas denied on the main ground that the

petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?

Held:

Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had

supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character

of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government

because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of their

authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible

for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government

functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the

protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By

the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from

suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in

excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of

the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of

a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved

that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be

satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States

government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative

act to satisfy the judgment,viz,theappropriation of the necessary amount to cover

the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its

consent.

World Health Organization v. Aquino

Facts:

Herein petitioner, in behalf of Dr. Verstuyft, was allegedly suspected by the Constabulary

Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers of carrying dutiable goods under the Customs and

Tariff Code of the Philippines. Respondent Judge then issued a search warrant at the

instance of the COSAC officers for the search and seizure of the personla effects of Dr.

Verstuyft notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by

the Executive branch of the government.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised the respondent judge that Dr.

Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as

accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further

requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined

the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless

summarily denied the quashal.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search

and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:

The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to

diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally

advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor

General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said

petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers

that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look

beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of

diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive branch of the government as in the case

at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate

suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case,

or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by

seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in

conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave

abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in

disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

Lascovs UNRFNRE

Facts:

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United

Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special

fund and subsidiary organ of theUnitedNations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project

of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in

DinagatIsland.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private

respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality

since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the

Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United

Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of

settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to

which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial

venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by

thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

ICMC VS CALLEJA

Facts:

ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in MorongBataan, is a non-profit agency

involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the

United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative status II. It

has the activities parallel to those of the International Committee for Migrtion (ICM) and the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the

then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank

and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that

it enjoys diplomatic immunity.

On Februaury 5, 1987 Med – Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed the

petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med – Arbiter’s

Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election.

Issue:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to

immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

HELD:

The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification

election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made

PERMANENT.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers

that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look

beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of

diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government

as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon

appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government . . . or other officer

acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not

so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in

conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial

department of (this) government follows the action of the political branch and will not

embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading

Facts:

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic

into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and

forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank

Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the

importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial

Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO

averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated

to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner

appealed.

Issue: 

Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

Held:

No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at

least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall

short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less

common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and

conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of

more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary

correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether

denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may

sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss

here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time.

Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-

agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be

sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not

anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in

our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the

Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of

vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft,

customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters,

the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by

specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of

Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others,

particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were

concluded independently of any legislation.

Agustin vsEdu

Facts:

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of

Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early

warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early

warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and

unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which

is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel

motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only

make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

Issue: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

Held:

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is

conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the

former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due

process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was

mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was

originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847

decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every

sovereignty”   was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice

Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v.

Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere

with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and

property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the

general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948,

Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the

power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order

or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by

Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the

State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of

society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v.

Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most

powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential,

insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to

all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,

even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient

and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be

interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes

with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from

precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing

upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to

enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of

such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and

welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the

particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It

would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act

of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-

existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector

Law,  an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found

nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon,

and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .”   As a matter of

fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the

National Defense Act,  with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the

imperative demands of public safety.

Tanada vs. Angara

Facts:

Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by

the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement

establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).  They argued that the WTO Agreement

violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent

national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified

Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and

locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity

provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on

the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First”

policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by

Filipinos.”

Issue:

Whether or not the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide

trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy

that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

Held:

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide

trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy

that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the

Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor

and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the

rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino

enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other

words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out

foreign investments, goofs, and services in the development of the Philippine economy.

While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services

and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an

exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that

is unfair.                                                                                          

The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not

necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services. It contemplates

neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. As explained by

Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of

overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean

autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international

community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national

economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources

and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without

discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality

and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based

on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are

“competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy

against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual

development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.

Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to

compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and

managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper

against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. S.C. JOHNSON AND SON, INC., and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:

 SC JOHNSON AND SON, USA  a domestic corporation organized and operating under the

Philippine laws, entered into a license agreement with SC Johnson and Son, United States

of America (USA), a non-resident foreign corporation based in the U.S.A. pursuant to which

the [respondent] was granted the right to use the trademark, patents and technology owned

by the latter including the right to manufacture, package and distribute the products covered

by the Agreement and secure assistance in management, marketing and production from

SC Johnson and Son, U. S. A.

The said License Agreement was duly registered with the Technology Transfer Board of the

Bureau of Patents, Trade Marks and Technology Transfer under Certificate of Registration

No. 8064 . For the use of the trademark or technology,SC JOHNSON AND SON, USA   was

obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son, USA royalties based on a percentage of net sales and

subjected the same to 25% withholding tax on royalty payments which respondent paid for

the period covering July 1992 to May 1993.00 On October 29, 1993, SC JOHNSON AND

SON, USA  filed with the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) of the BIR a claim for

refund of overpaid withholding tax on royalties arguing that, since the agreement was

approved by the Technology Transfer Board, the preferential tax rate of 10% should apply to

the respondent.  We therefore submit that royalties paid by the [respondent] to SC Johnson

and Son, USA is only subject to 10% withholding tax pursuant to the most-favored nation

clause of the RP-US Tax Treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty

Issue:

Whether or not SC Johnson and son, is USA entitled to the most favored national tax rate of

10% on royalties as provided in the RP-US tax treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany

tax treaty.

Held:

In the case at bar, the state of source is the Philippines because the royalties are paid for

the right to use property or rights, i.e. trademarks, patents and technology, located within the

Philippines. The United States is the state of residence since the taxpayer, S. C. Johnson

and Son, U. S. A., is based there.  Under the RP-US Tax Treaty, the state of residence and

the state of source are both permitted to tax the royalties, with a restraint on the tax that may

be collected by the state of source. Furthermore, the method employed to give relief from

double taxation is the allowance of a tax credit to citizens or residents of the United States

against the United States tax, but such amount shall not exceed the limitations provided by

United States law for the taxable year. The Philippines may impose one of three rates- 25

percent of the gross amount of the royalties; 15 percent when the royalties are paid by a

corporation registered with the Philippine Board of Investments and engaged in preferred

areas of activities; or the lowest rate of Philippine tax that may be imposed on royalties of

the same kind paid under similar circumstances to a resident of a third state.

Given the purpose underlying tax treaties and the rationale for the most favored nation

clause, the concessional tax rate of 10 percent provided for in the RP-Germany Tax Treaty

should apply only if the taxes imposed upon royalties in the RP-US Tax Treaty and in the

RP-Germany Tax Treaty are paid under similar circumstances.  This would mean that

private respondent must prove that the RP-US Tax Treaty grants similar tax reliefs to

residents of the United States in respect of the taxes imposable upon royalties earned from

sources within the Philippines as those allowed to their German counterparts under the RP-

Germany Tax Treaty.

The RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar provisions on tax

crediting.  Article 24 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, expressly allows crediting against

German income and corporation tax of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid under the

law of the Philippines.  On the other hand, Article 23 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, which is the

counterpart provision with respect to relief for double taxation, does not provide for similar

crediting of 20% of the gross amount of royalties paid

At the same time, the intention behind the adoption of the provision on “relief from

double taxation†in the two tax treaties in question should be considered in light of the�

purpose behind the most favored nation clause.

The purpose of a most favored nation clause is to grant to the contracting party treatment

not less favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the “mostfavored†�

among other countries. The most favored nation clause is intended to establish the principle

of equality of international treatment by providing that the citizens or subjects of the

contracting nations may enjoy the privileges accorded by either party to those of the most

favored nation. The essence of the principle is to allow the taxpayer in one state to avail of

more liberal provisions granted in another tax treaty to which the country of residence of

such taxpayer is also a party provided that the subject matter of taxation, in this case royalty

income, is the same as that in the tax treaty under which the taxpayer is liable.   The

similarity in the circumstances of payment of taxes is a condition for the enjoyment of most

favored nation treatment precisely to underscore the need for equality of treatment.

The RP-US Tax Treaty does not give a matching tax credit of 20 percent for the taxes paid

to the Philippines on royalties as allowed under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, private

respondent cannot be deemed entitled to the 10 percent rate granted under the latter treaty

for the reason that there is no payment of taxes on royalties under similar circumstances.

It bears stress that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions.  As such they are

regarded as in derogation of sovereign authority and to be construed strictissimijuris against

the person or entity claiming the exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims the

exemption in his favor and he must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant of

organic or statute law. Private respondent is claiming for a refund of the alleged

overpayment of tax on royalties; however, there is nothing on record to support a claim that

the tax on royalties under the RP-US Tax Treaty is paid under similar circumstances as the

tax on royalties under the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty.

KILOSBAYAN, et. al. vs. MANUEL L. MORATO, et. al.

Facts:

This is a petition seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the

same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No. 113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners

contended that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of PCSO’s charter

and the decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public

bidding of contracts as well as Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation

to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the petitioners standing to bring

this suit.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law

because some cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the

operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or

voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what

particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present

substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this suit.

Tecson vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of

and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under

Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and

exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have

jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

Held:

No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992

categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election,

returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not

of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally

defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or

exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-

election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either

the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again

presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,

paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it,

questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the

elections are held.

FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

Facts: 

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time.

The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s

election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been

naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and

affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of

survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad. 

Issue: 

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. 

Held:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be,

among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable

requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not

have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier

renounced. 

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only

at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire

tenure. 

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a

Governor of the Province of Sorsogon.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant, a temporary alien visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to

expire, claims herself to be lawfully naturalized by virtue of her marriage with co-plaintiff, a

Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes on the ground that the mere marriage of a Filipino

citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship, because

record shows that the same does not posses all the qualifications required of applicants for

naturalization (CA 473), even if she has proven that she does not suffer any disqualification

there under.

Issue:

Whether or not an alien who married a naturalized Filipino is lawfully naturalized.

Held:  Yes, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso

facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines (Sec. 15 and

4, CA 473).

Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 

Facts:

The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground

that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule

was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as

US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation

under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was

questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the

Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held:

YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to

perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand,

naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization,

generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised

Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by

Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all

the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the

manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three

modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by

naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a

mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by

Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for

reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this

law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess

certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their

citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the

allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any

other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of

the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath

in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a

naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a

naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen

before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-

born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the

Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine

citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the

same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited

provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-

born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears

stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status

before he lost his Philippine citizenship

AZNAR VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondent’s right to hold public office on the

ground that the latter was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was

a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a

registered voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registration

certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is an alien.

HELD:

No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino

and remained Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his

Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of an alien registration certificate

unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been

lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.

LABO vs. COMELEC

Facts: 

Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He

was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in

the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.

According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. 

Issue: 

Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines. 

Held: 

The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not

automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding

that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen

of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,

simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for

such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of

Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the

petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO

Facts:

This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following:

American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van

Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam

Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration

and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences.

The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young

boys.Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den

Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been

under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. 

Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of

suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalousposes as well as boys and girls engaged in

sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. 

Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17

February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of

the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another

charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to

face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted

against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. 

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45

and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of

Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but

was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed

a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April

1988. 

Issues: 

(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending

determination of existence of probable cause.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents.

(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. 

Held: 

While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy

of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the

youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close

surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of

articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest;

therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal

Procedure). 

The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an

absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the

arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the

foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. 

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA

Facts:

Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a

Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance

with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted

by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States

notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the

Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving

retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates

Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue:

Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively? 

Held:

Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to

criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is

no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining

the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's

coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto

laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal

legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons

wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already

committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified.

Secretary of Justice vs Judge Lantion GR 139465 Jan 18 2000

Facts

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign

Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes

in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential

Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have

committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between

the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”, the

department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to

conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree

and the treaty. 

The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the

documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that

such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document

as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the

constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

IssueWhether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation

stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine

Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty

Held:The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition

request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which

to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict

between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the

treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process. 

The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an

impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is

not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting

due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.

The rule of pactasuntservanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of

international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good

faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted

with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and

the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to

harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice

has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates

that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation

decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to,

national legislative enactments.

In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United

States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment

of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due

process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition

Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

Filipinas Compania de Seguros v.ChristernHenefeld& Co.

FACTS:

October 1, 1941: ChristernHuenefeld and co., inc. (Christern), a company whose major

stockholders are German, paid P1M and obtained a fire policy fromFilipinasCia. deSeguros

(Filipinas)

December 10, 1941: U.S. declared a war against Germany

February 27, 1942 (during the japanese occupation): the building and insured merchandise

were burnedtheir claimed from Filipinas and the salvage goods were auctioned for P92,650

who refused since Christen was organized under the Philippine laws, it was under American

jurisdiction which is an enemy of the Germans.

April 9, 1943: The Director of Bureau of Financing ordered Filipinas to pay the P92,650 to

Christen and it did. 

Filipinas filed with the CFI the P92,650 paid to Christern

CA affirmed CFI: dismissed the action

Filed a petition for certiorari

Issue:

Whether or notChristern is a public enemy and therefore ceased to be insured

Held:

YES. Ordered to pay Filipinas P77,208.33, Philippine currency, less the amount of the

premium, in Philippine currency, that should be returned by the Filipinas  for the unexpired

term of the policy in question, beginning December 11, 1941

Philippine Insurance Law (Act No. 2427, as amended,) in section 8, provides that "anyone

except a public enemy may be insured

Effect of war, generally. — All intercourse between citizens of belligerent powers which is

inconsistent with a state of war is prohibited by the law of nations. Such prohibition includes

all negotiations, commerce, or trading with the enemy; all acts which will increase, or tend to

increase, its income or resources; all acts of voluntary submission to it; or receiving its

protection; also all acts concerning the transmission of money or goods; and all contracts

relating thereto are thereby nullified. It further prohibits insurance upon trade with or by the

enemy, upon the life or lives of aliens engaged in service with the enemy; this for the reason

that the subjects of one country cannot be permitted to lend their assistance to protect by

insurance the commerce or property of belligerent, alien subjects, or to do anything

detrimental too their country's interest. The purpose of war is to cripple the power and

exhaust the resources of the enemy, and it is inconsistent that one country should destroy

its enemy's property and repay in insurance the value of what has been so destroyed, or

that it should in such manner increase the resources of the enemy, or render it aid, and the

commencement of war determines, for like reasons, all trading intercourse with the enemy,

which prior thereto may have been lawful. All individuals therefore, who compose the

belligerent powers, exist, as to each other, in a state of utter exclusion, and are public

enemies

In the case of an ordinary fire policy, which grants insurance only from year, or for some

other specified term it is plain that when the parties become alien enemies, the contractual

tie is broken and the contractual rights of the parties, so far as not vested.

However, elementary rules of justice (in the absence of specific provision in the Insurance

Law) require that the premium paid by the respondent for the period covered by its policy

from December 11, 1941, should be returned by the petitioner.

Laurel vs. Misa

Facts:

The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused

adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried

for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he

claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts

were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not a Filipino citizen suspend allegiance to the Philippines.

Held: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to

his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed

that the Philippine government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot be

suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t

suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no

suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of government, there is no such change since

the sovereign – the Filipino people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change

of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts:

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the

Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American

occupation, Judge ArsenioDizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a

proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial

proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law,

lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings

pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government

under the Japanese).

Issue:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation

were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;

2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared

that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than

that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the

Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts

and proceedings of the courts;

3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts

could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Held:

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto

government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of

the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments,

supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.

Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or

changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence

of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil

government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it

would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating

them.

The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes

of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and

judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.

IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de

facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been

liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes,

which would be in violation of international law.

It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until

changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY

CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates

a change.

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and

the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and

laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it

follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases

pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or

the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said

government.

Kuroda vsJalandoni

FactsShinegori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged

before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. As he was the commanding

general during such period of war, he was tried for failure to discharge his duties and

permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against

noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in violation of of the laws and

customs of war.

Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the

law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that

using as basis the Hague Convention’s Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for

the war crime committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such

rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of

interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines. 

Issue:

Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes

Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals, is constitutional as it is

aligned with Sec 3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that “The Philippines renounces

war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of

international law as part of the law of the nation.” The generally accepted principles of

international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva

Convention and other international jurisprudence established by United Nations. These

include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning,

preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in

violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of

incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try

persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its

citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere

incorporation of such principles in the constitution.

The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been

equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for.

By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal

and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but

by the very provisions of this special law.

Yamashita vs. Styer

Facts:

Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during

World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his

status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned

the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:

YES. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress

sanctioning the creation of such tribunals. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the

duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his

command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner

could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take

such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No.IV of 1907,

as well as Art.19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among

others.

LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC.

Facts:

On March 3, 1995, President Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7942.  Section 15 thereof

declares that the Act “shall govern the exploration, development, utilization, and processing

of all mineral resources.”  Such declaration notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7942 does not actually

cover all the modes through which the State may undertake the exploration, development,

and utilization of natural resources.

The State, being the owner of the natural resources, is accorded the primary power and

responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization thereof.  As such, it may

undertake these activities through four modes:

The State may directly undertake such activities.

(2) The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements

with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations.

(3) Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino

citizens.

(4) For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and

other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations

involving technical or financial assistance.

Issue:

Whether or notthe Republic Act No. 7942 known as Philippine Mining Act 1995

constitutional can allow foreign owned corporations into entering to agreements.

Held:

The court granted the petition, and that R.A. No. 7942 is unconstitutional in violation to

section 2, Article Xll of the Constitution (National Economy and Patrimony), wherein said

provision states that all other natural resources shall not be alienated, it is preserved for the

Filipino people.

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.

Facts:

The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a

petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease

and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license

agreements.  This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are

also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational

responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented

scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. 

One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise

known as the “greenhouse effect”. 

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest

stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.  Appellants have

exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to

cancel the said TLAs.  The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case

Held:

The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit. 

The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the

Philippines.  The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and

for others file a class suit.

International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja

FACTS:

GR # 85750- the Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) case.

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. That comes from an argument between the Philippine government and the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.

ICMC was duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys consultative status. As an international organization rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the Philippines, its activities are parallel to those of the international committee for migration and the international of the red cross.

On July 14,1986, Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied for certification with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.

The Med-Arbiter sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for each of jurisdiction. On appeal by TUPAS, Director Calleja, reversed the Med-arbiter’s decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS petition for certification election involving the immunity expressly granted but the same was denied. With intervention of department of foreign affairs who was legal interest in the outcome of this case, the second division gave due to the ICMC petition and required the submittal of memoranda by the parties.

GR # 89331- the IRRI case

The International Rice Research Institute was a fruit of memorandum of understanding between the Philippine government and the Ford and Rochefeller Foundations. It was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic tax-free, non-profit, non stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting “ basic research on the rice plant.”

It was organized and registered with the SEC as a private corporation subject to all laws and regulations. However, by virtue of P.D no. 1620, IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an international organization.

The Kapisanan filed a petition for direct certification election with regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment. IRRI opposed the petition invoking Pres. Decree no.1620 conferring upon it the status of an international organization and granting it immunity from all civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings under Philippine laws. The Med-Arbiter upheld the opposition on the basis of PD 1620 and dismissed the petition for direct certification.

On appeal by BLR Director, set aside the med-arbiter’s decision and contends that immunities and privileges granted to IRRI do not include exemption from coverage of our labor laws.

Issue:

GR # 85750- the ICMC case:

Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.

GR no. 89331- the IRRI case:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certification election filed by Kapisanan.

Held:

The grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws, because it is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes which is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings.

Employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled because each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of disputes out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Moreover, pursuant to article IV of memorandum of abuse of privilege by ICMC, the government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to respondent secretary of labor in his assumption of appelate jurisdiction, contrary to Kapisanan’s allegation, hence, any party to an election may appeal the order or results of the elections as determined by the med-arbiter directly to the secretary of labor and employment on the ground that the rules and regulations or parts thereof established by the secretary of labor and employment for the conduct of the election have been violated.

Wherefore, petition granted in ICMC case and in IRRI case, the petition was dismissed.

Akbayanvs Aquino – July 16 2008

Facts:Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates there right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and

reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.

Issue:Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot and academic because of the subsequent event that occurred?

Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive privilege?

Held:On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,” public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations. 

Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.

Sen. Pimentel vs Executive Secretary

Facts : This is a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit (even without the signature of the President) the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence or ratification - in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. That under the treaty law and customary international law, Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute.

Respondents on the other hand, questioned the legal standing of herein petitioners and argued that executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

Issues : Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit.

Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by the Philippine Member to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.

Held: Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power as member of Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct injury from the non-transmittal and that they can seek redress in our domestic courts.

Petitioners’ interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties does not belong to the Senate.

Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the ratification papers and forward the signed copy to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified it, DFA shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.

The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations.

It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the President subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.

The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds the state to the provisions of the treaty and renders it effective.

Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, concurrence to the ratification. It is within the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus,

Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary

Facts:

Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1″. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called “Balikatan 02-1″, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the “constitutional processes” of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.

Issue:

Whether or not the “Balikatan 02-1″ activities are covered by the VFA.

Held:

Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in “activities”, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel “must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.”

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that “Balikatan 02-1″ – a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities – as opposed to combat itself – such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.

FrivaldovsComelec

Facts:

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelecen banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelecen bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x xx." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x xx was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x xx." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor— not Lee — should occupy said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".

Issue:

Whether or not Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon

Held:

It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."

PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT vs. CA

Facts:

Australia and the Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied with. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue:

Can an extradition treaty be applied retroactively? 

Held:

Applying the constitutional principle, the Court has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty wasratified.

Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez

By virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and the Philippines, the US requested for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for violations of US tax and election laws.  Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the Philippine government, Jimenez requested for copies of the US’ extradition request.  The Secetary of Justice denied that request. 

Issue: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?

Held:

Private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  Extradition is a proceeding sui generis.  It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.  His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.

Dissent (original decision): Under the extradition treaty, the prospective extraditee may be provisionally arrested pending the submission of the request.  Because of this possible consequence, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, and partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation.  Thus, the basic due process rights of notice and hearing are indispensable.

Assuming that the extradition treaty does not allow for such rights, the Constitutional right to procedural due process must override treaty obligations.  When there is a conflict between international law obligations and the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail.

Government of HongkongvsOlalia

Facts:

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hongkong court with three counts of offense on accepting advantage as agent. In violation of Section 9 Prevention of bribery ordinance Cap 1 Hongkong. He also faces seven counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law on Hongkong.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in law granting bail on an extraditee.

Held:

No. Following the extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of an arrest warrant and the temporary detention is to possibility of flight of the potential extradite. This is based on the assumption that that such extradite is fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extradite thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

Case was dismissed.

Haw Piavs China Banking Corporation

Facts:

Haw Pia had previously contracted a loan from China Banking Corporation in the amount of P5,103.35, which, according to Haw Pia, had been completely paid, on different occasions from 1942 to 1944 through Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., which was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of China Banking Corp. With this, Haw Pia instituted an action against China Banking Corp. to compel the bank to execute a deed of cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security for the loan and to deliver its title.

However, upon service of summons, China Banking Corp. demanded from Haw

Pia for the payment of the sum of its indebtedness with interests, which also constituted its counter claim in its answer.RTC rendered a decision in favor of China Banking Corp. on the basis that there was no evidence to show that Bank of Taiwan was authorized by China Banking Corp. to accept Haw Pia's payment and that Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the business of China Banking Corp. As such, Haw Pia's payment to Bank of Taiwan has not extinguished his indebtedness to China Banking Corp.

Issue:

Whether the Japanese Military Administration had authority to order the liquidation of the business of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator authorized as such to accept payment

Held:

YES. Under international law, the Japanese Military authorities had power to order the liquidation of China Banking Corp. and to appoint and authorize Bank of Taiwan as liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of China Banking Corp., but a mere sequestration of its assets which required its liquidation.

Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the

marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the

Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase. Respondent Alberto

Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing on this

case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the power

to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the mostserious crimes of international concern

and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions

Theserious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law, such

as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.On December

28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d·AffairesEnrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute

which, by itsterms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.

As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to

have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not

among the 92.

Issue:

Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for contracting

obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized

principles of international law.

Held:

No. Petitioner urges that theAgreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing

immoral obligations

and/or being at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law.

The immoral aspect proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it,

leaves criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock

the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to

the ICC.

The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as already

discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually abdicated its

sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute,

contrary to international law principles.

The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender

agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the Philippines of

its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law.

The agreement is recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try

offenses under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously.

Petitioner, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos

and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and

punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized

under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or

with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all the formalities

necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. Perspective wise,

what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to

international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire

to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With this view, there is nothing immoral or

violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal

jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by

both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute

Baer vsTizon

Facts:

Respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for injunction against Donald Baer, a

commander of the United States Naval based in Olongapo. He alleged that Baer was

engaged in the business of the American Naval base authorities his logging operations.

Issue:

Whether or not the doctrine of immunity from suit without consent is applicable.

Held:

The action against petitioner Baer being against the United States government and

therefore covered by the principle of state immunity from suit. What was sought by private

respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with

the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers

possessed by him under the Philippine- American military bases agreement.