20.34.59_Brasil HM

Historical Materialism volume 131 (3ndash32)copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2005Also available online ndash wwwbrillnl

1 The history of the PT is reviewed by Branford and Kucinski 1995 and 2003

Lecio Morais and Alfredo Saad-Filho

Lula and the Continuity of Neoliberalism in BrazilStrategic Choice Economic Imperative or PoliticalSchizophrenia

Introduction

This article offers a political-economy interpretationof Lularsquos election to the Brazilian presidency in 2002and an assessment of his administration Lularsquoselection in October 2002 was greeted with delight by his left-wing supporters in Brazil and abroad For them Lularsquos remarkable trajectory includingchildhood poverty and hard work as a lathe operatorin Satildeo Paulorsquos industrial belt his contribution to therenewal of Brazilrsquos trade unions and his leadershiprole in the Workersrsquo Party (PT) his principledopposition to the eacutelite pacts that have always shapedBrazilian political life and his unquestionableintegrity showed that his election would open a newstage in the history of Latin Americarsquos largest country1

Paradoxically however his new allies on the politicalRight also warmly greeted Lularsquos victory For themthe PT seemed to have finally achieved politicallsquomaturityrsquo which is always deserving of applause

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 3

4 bull Lecio Morais and Alfredo Saad-Filho

2 This period encompasses the administrations of Joseacute Sarney (1985ndash90) FernandoCollor (1990ndash2) Itamar Franco (1992ndash4) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994ndash2002)

3 See Morais and Saad-Filho 2003 and Saad-Filho 2003

More importantly they expected the new administration to join the neoliberalconsensus that has ruled Brazil since the early 1990s2 dealing a terminal blowto the powerful Brazilian Left

It is important to address this paradox in order to understand the currentgovernmentrsquos power base objectives and margin for manoeuvre Even if the new administration fails to deliver the policy changes and welfareimprovements originally expected by many of Lularsquos supporters it isworthwhile assessing what has been achieved why and how and whateconomic and social improvements are realistically possible in one of theworldrsquos most unequal societies Brazil has a vast territory and abundantnatural resources a developed industrial base enormous productive potentialand a relatively organised and experienced working class if significantimprovements in social welfare cannot be achieved there it would be difficultto claim that they are feasible in other poor countries

It is impossible to assess the new administration from all of these anglesin a short essay This article reviews the social political and economic processesunderpinning Lularsquos election and the strategic choices of his administrationin six sections The first reviews the social forces supporting the newadministration summarised under the term lsquolosersrsquo alliancersquo The secondexplains the political and economic rationale of Lularsquos commitment toneoliberalism The third analyses the trajectory of the Brazilian economyduring the last fifteen years in order to assess the material basis of theneoliberal transition the economic constraints faced by the new governmentand the scope for alternative policies The fourth and fifth review theadministrationrsquos record in 2003ndash4 and its economic and political achievementsThe sixth section summarises the article and briefly outlines the most likelyscenarios for the second half of Lularsquos administration

I The losersrsquo alliance

Lula was elected by a losersrsquo alliance a loose coalition of social groups havingin common only the experience of losses under neoliberalism3 This was nota Gramscian historical bloc The lsquolosersrsquo alliancersquo was not a strategic allianceit did not have a hegemonic power project and it never challenged the state

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 4

Lula and the Continuity of Neoliberalism in Brazil bull 5

(see below) The alliance was purely tactical these groups were essentiallyattempting to limit the costs of neoliberalism either by marginally changingthe priorities of economic policy or by simply shifting its costs onto othersHowever there was no agreement about how this should be done or whatalternative policies should be implemented The lsquolosersrsquo had very modest andpossibly mutually incompatible objectives centred on a relative improvementof their economic and social position and an increase of their political influence

The loserrsquos alliance included four main groups First the unionised urbanand rural working class especially the skilled and semi-skilled manual andoffice workers the lower ranks of the civil service sections of the professionalmiddle class and many informal workers These groups have been the backboneof the Brazilian Left (and the main source of support for the PT) since thedisintegration of the military reacutegime in the early 1980s They have also lostout most heavily under neoliberalism They were penalised by heavy job cutsthe stagnation or decline of real wages the dilution of employment rightsand the contraction of public and social services that accompanied the neoliberaltransition

Second Lula was supported by large segments of the unorganised andunskilled working class including many informal and unemployed workersof the metropolitan peripheries Some of these groups had been reluctant toengage with the PT partly for ideological reasons (especially their attachmentto clientelistic and populist political practices) and partly because of therelative scarcity of channels connecting them to the PT (In contrast multipleand overlapping channels linked the PT to the formal-sector workers forexample trade unions community associations social movements and thelsquobase communitiesrsquo of the Catholic church) In 2002 these large but mainlyunorganised groups supported Lula because of his perceived rejection ofneoliberalism and because of the PTrsquos political pact with several evangelicalchurches which are increasingly influential among this segment of the working class

Third several prominent capitalists also supported Lula especially amongthe traditional manufacturing eacutelite of the Southeast They were disappointedby the failure of the neoliberal growth strategy associated with PresidentFernando Henrique Cardoso Many of these capitalists were exhausted bythe long stagnation of the Brazilian economy the onslaught of transnationalfirms and the relentless pressure of cheap imports especially after the hastytrade liberalisation in the early 1990s Some magnates were also concerned

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 5


4 In March 2002 Maranhatildeo state governor Roseana Sarney (daughter of formerpresident Joseacute Sarney and supported by oligarchic interests of Centre and Northeast)was far ahead of Joseacute Serra in the opinion polls She was disgraced when FederalPolice broke into her husbandrsquos office and found a large hoard of cash that wouldallegedly be used in her campaign Her downfall turned Serra into the only viableright-of-centre candidate However the use of the Federal Police and live mediacoverage of the search pointed to the governmentrsquos hand behind the affair

with the negative social implications of neoliberalism especially the perceiveddeterioration of the distribution of income and its presumed securityimplications violent crime random shootings kidnappings the growingpower of heavily armed drug-trafficking gangs and so on These capitalistshoped that Lula would combine economic lsquoresponsibilityrsquo with a more pro-active strategy to tackle Brazilrsquos social problems Their preferred economicpolicy was nationalist and expansionary It was based on the reduction of thedebt burden of productive capital minimisation of exchange-rate volatilityrationalisation of the tax system expansion of state procurement anddevelopment finance and marginal income distribution Typically Globo areactionary and heavily indebted media empire ditched the official presidentialcandidate early on and supported Lula hoping that his lsquonationalistrsquoadministration would help the corporation to stave off bankruptcy

Fourth several notorious right-wing oligarchs landowners and influentiallocal politicians from the poorest regions of Brazil also supported Lula Theirunexpected political conversion was not due to pressure from below ratherit was the outcome of a shrewd political calculation Since the early 1990sthese oligarchs and their proteacutegeacutes were being squeezed out of their influentialpositions in Brasiacutelia by the encroachment of a new cohort of upper- andmiddle-managers of state institutions appointed by the financial interestsassociated with neoliberalism In contrast with the previous generation oflawyers engineers and talentless political appointees from the poorest regionsof the country the new managers are economists financiers and professionaladministrators mainly from the rich Southeast and carefully trained in theneoliberal arts in the best international universities The traditional oligarchyalso resented the rationing of lsquodevelopmentrsquo funds imposed by the fiscalausterity measures in place since 1990 which badly eroded their politicalinfluence Finally they felt betrayed by a lsquodirty tricksrsquo campaign allegedlyinspired by president Cardoso and his partyrsquos presidential candidate JoseacuteSerra4 By switching their support to the PT these oligarchs attempted todefeat the neoliberal interests associated with Cardoso They also anticipated

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 6


Unsurprisingly Roseanarsquos vengeful father supported Lula In turn the PT helped himto be elected Speaker of the Senate

5 In 1999 just after the devaluation of the real (see Morais Coelho and Saad-Filho1999 and Saad-Filho and Morais 2002) the president of the Central Bank FranciscoLopes defended in the Brazilian Congress the liberalisation of the capital account ofthe balance of payments and rejected demands for emergency controls on capitalflows He claimed that controls

that Lula would depend heavily on their support in Congress and in the stategovernments and that the PT would be more sensitive than the neoliberalswould to the plight of poorer regions ndash both of which would maximise theoligarchsrsquo political power and influence

Two important groups resisted Lularsquos advances in spite of the PTrsquos effort tobroaden the coalition as much as possible Unsurprisingly most of the eacutelite ndashincluding the large and medium capitalists financiers exporters traders themedia most big landowners and local political chiefs their intellectual andpolitical proxies and the top civil servants ndash refused to support Lula underany circumstances However their resistance against the PT was much lessvociferous in 2002 than in previous elections especially in 1989 when Lulawas narrowly defeated by a brutal campaign of intimidation coercion andsheer economic pressure

The other reluctant group was the urban middle class Although it isrelatively small internally divided and politically unstable this group is alsohighly influential because of its ideological ascendancy over the working classand its privileged access to the media and the organised social movementsAlthough there is a significant left-wing constituency among the urban middleclass important segments remain attached to clientelistic politics right-wingideology and landowner interests (especially the rapidly growing agribusinessinterests in Satildeo Paulo the South and the Centre-West) This class sufferedbadly under neoliberalism lsquoGood jobsrsquo in the private and public sectorscontracted drastically higher education no longer guarantees sufficient incometo satisfy their aspirations and young adults can rarely replicate the socialand economic achievements of their parents This group as a whole yearnedfor expansionary economic policies however many were reluctant to ditchthe neoliberal-globalist ideology that they had fully incorporated only recentlyThey were proud of their new international credit cards glad to have accessto imported consumer goods and full of memories of recent trips abroad(which until the 1980s were possible only for a tiny minority) They werealso frightened by the lsquoradicalrsquo image of the PT5 Their dilemma was exacerbatedby the continuing turmoil in neighbouring Argentina and Venezuela ndash the

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 7


would have negative consequences they would deny any possibility ofBrazil becoming a first-class nation in the world economy They would alsomean in practice that one would no longer have an international creditcard Any foreign payment would require the purchase of dollars in theparallel market it would involve arbitrary decisions by state authoritiesdeciding who could have dollars and who could not We already had thisexperience in Brazil The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would provide a specialpassport giving that individual the right to purchase dollars for a tripabroad If your passport did not have the right colour no dollars would beavailable [in the official currency market] This is a reacutegime of completearbitrariness (Senado Federal 1999)

Lopesrsquos discourse targeted the Brazilian upper and middle classes that would be mostdirectly affected by any restrictions on capital flows

6 This was not the only worry of the financial market operators The politicalbankruptcy of neoliberalism in Brazil was so profound that all other presidentialcandidates ndash including Serra ndash were studiously ambiguous about their preferredeconomic strategy

7 The open market trades long-term Treasury and Central Bank securities held bythe Central Bank and the private financial institutions These securities are traded

former collapsing because of the dismal failure of its extreme neoliberalexperience while the latter was forever unable to achieve political stabilityas it charted new political waters Under intense pressure from all sides theurban middle class splintered across the political spectrum

II Lularsquos neoliberal shift

The social political and economic features of Lularsquos administration weredetermined by the alliances underpinning his election described in the previoussection the material changes imposed by neoliberalism reviewed in SectionIII and the PTrsquos reaction to the 2002 exchange rate crisis explained below

In mid-2002 the emerging losersrsquo alliance was already sufficiently strongto give Lula a comfortable lead in the opinion polls However Lularsquos radicalimage deeply worried the Brazilian and international financiers and theneoliberal eacutelite They feared the loss of political and economic leverage in anadministration led by the PT and they were especially concerned that thenew administration might default or compulsorily reschedule the domesticpublic debt and Brazilrsquos foreign debt Because of these concerns severalfinancial institutions refused to buy government securities maturing after 31December 2002 (the last day of Cardosorsquos presidency)6

The resources released by the brokersrsquo refusal to purchase governmentsecurities were transferred either to the foreign-exchange market (devaluingthe real) or to the open market7 In 2002 US$91 billion were transferred abroad

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 8


though contracts to repurchase them by a certain date usually within one month Themacro-economic function of the open market is to allow the Central Bank to fine-tunethe liquidity of the economy The number of transactions in the open market is highbut the volume of securities in this market is usually tiny ndash only a small fraction ofthe stock held by the financial system

8 Left critics of Lularsquos pact with finance have claimed that the Brazilian economywas in relatively good shape in 2002 and the PTrsquos conversion to neoliberalism couldnot be blamed on the economic crisis (see Borges Neto 2004 and Paulani 2003 and2004) This criticism is misguided It is surely right to claim that the neoliberal shiftof the PT predated the crisis and was largely independent from it It is however aserious mistake to conclude that the crisis itself was entirely irrelevant ndash as if it hadbeen merely a smokescreen

in this way devaluing the real from R$232 to the dollar in March to R$342in July and R$380 in October (inflation was only 4 per cent during the entireperiod) The countryrsquos net international reserves tumbled from US$288 billionin March to only US$163 billion in December The devaluation of the currencyand the brokersrsquo loud complaints about the lsquolack of policy clarityrsquo after theelections led to the downgrading of Brazilian bonds and foreign-debt certificatesabroad which in turn triggered the recall of short-term loans and commercialcredit lines by foreign banks Half of the countryrsquos commercial credit lineswere lost in a few weeks The Brazilian balance of payments was on the vergeof collapse

At the same time the proportion of the stock of public securities traded inthe open market increased from 07 per cent in February to 25 per cent inApril 53 per cent in July and 124 per cent in December The Central Bankincreased its open market operations to try to prevent these funds reachingthe foreign exchange market leading to a catastrophic devaluation of the realIn September the stock of highly liquid securities in the open market reached53 per cent of GDP exceeding the monetary base and the Central Bankrsquosinternational reserves

There is no question that the Cardoso administration was complicit in the meltdown of the Brazilian balance of payments the evaporation of thegovernmentrsquos capacity to sell medium- and long-term securities and theCentral Bankrsquos loss of control over the open market In mid-2002 the Brazilianeconomy tottered on the brink of collapse8 Media pressure on the governmentand the presidential candidates was intense fuelling speculation even furtherLularsquos poll leadership wobbled badly and his competitors sensed anopportunity It was claimed that whoever managed to overtake Lula at thiscritical juncture would have strong chances of being elected because he (there

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9


9 The conversion of Lula and the PT to neoliberalism did not begin in 2002 It startedafter Lularsquos defeat in 1989 with the subsequent decision of the party leadership toshift the PT to the lsquomiddle groundrsquo The transformation of the PT into a mainstreampolitical party is reviewed in Saad-Filho and Morais 2005

were no female candidates) would secure the growing anti-Lula vote and theaccompanying campaign funds just as Fernando Collor did in 1989 HoweverLula was determined to stabilise his position and win his fourth presidentialelection On 22 June he issued a lsquoLetter to the Brazilian Peoplersquo stating thathis government would respect contracts (that is service the domestic andforeign debts on schedule) and enforce the economic programme agreed withthe IMF

This shrewd move was sufficient to disarm the media prevent a furtherdeterioration of the economy and secure Lularsquos leadership in the opinionpolls but it was not enough for the neoliberal coalition Realising that Lulawas poised to win the neoliberal camp now demanded institutional guaranteesof the continuity of neoliberalism especially an independent Central Bankcommitted to a lsquoresponsiblersquo monetary policy and a new IMF agreementspanning well into the new administration Lula acquiesced and the wheelsturned extraordinarily rapidly in Brasiacutelia and Washington The new IMFagreement was signed in record time on 4 September 2002 It involved a loanof US$30 billion of which only US$6 billion would be available immediatelyThe rest would be available to the new government if its policies wereapproved by the Fund Lularsquos consent opened to the PT the doors of financialinstitutions and conservative governments around the world

Lularsquos pact with neoliberalism virtually ensured his election and he dulywon both rounds of the vote by a large margin However his concessionsimposed narrow limits for the new administration They implied that hisgovernment would follow Cardosorsquos neoliberal economic policies ndash but itwas promised with more competence honesty creativity and sensitivity tothe need for compensatory (targeted) social policies During the campaignlittle was said about the blatant contradiction between Lularsquos commitmentto the neoliberal agenda and the expectations of most of his voters Most ofthe lsquolosersrsquo were bound to be disappointed

The 2002 economic crisis and its political resolution ndash Lularsquos completecapitulation to neoliberalism ndash illustrate the growing power of finance inBrazil9 Finance can influence decisively not only economic policy but alsothe democratic process in the country The outcome of the crisis also implies

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10


10 Lula received 40m votes (464 per cent) in the first round of the elections and53m (613 per cent) in the second round Serra his nearest rival was beaten by 20mvotes in both rounds

11 Lularsquos centre-left alliance including PT PSB PL PCdoB PPS PV and PDT elected177 deputies (345 per cent of the house) and 25 senators (309 per cent) The centristand right-wing PMDB PTB and PP joined the coalition in 2003 while the PDT leftThe government can now count at least notionally on 368 deputies (717 per cent)and 48 senators (593 per cent)

that the Lula administration is limited in three important ways First Lulawas elected by an unstable coalition of incompatible social and political forcesattempting to shed the stagnationist bias of the neoliberal policies imposedin 1990 Beyond this the lsquolosersrsquo have only a limited range of short-termobjectives in common and their alliance is unable to offer consistent supportto the government Second the capitulation of the PT leadership to the powerof finance enserfed the government to the interests that the PT had hoped todefeat since its foundation more than two decades ago Finally the losersrsquoalliance ndash and the forces supporting the new administration in Congress andat State level ndash does not generally aim to shift policy away from neoliberalismThe disparity between Lularsquos impressive victory10 the distribution of seats inCongress where the PT and its dependable allies hold less than one-third of the seats11 and the Leftrsquos negligible influence on the judiciary shows that radical changes are not unambiguously popular and they may beunenforceable In sum although Lularsquos election created the expectation ofchanges the President does not have a mandate for radical change and hewas not unambiguously committed to specific outcomes or even processesof change

III The economic stranglehold of neoliberalism

Sections I and II explained the most important political constraints upon thenew Brazilian administration This section argues that the economic constraintsare no less binding For neoliberalism is neither simply an ideology nor oneviewpoint contending with others in a democratic debate The lsquoreformsrsquo havegiven rise to a material basis for the reproduction of neoliberalism through thetransformations that they have wrought on the Brazilian economy and societyThree aspects of these transformations are especially important

First the reforms dismantled the lsquodivision of labourrsquo between domesticforeign and state-owned capital established during the period of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI between 1930ndash80) and the corresponding

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11


12 The share of manufacturing in Brazilrsquos GDP has declined from 33 per cent in1980 to around 20 per cent In contrast in South Korea this share has remained around30 per cent during this entire period (see World Bank 2003)

13 Pochmann 1999 assesses the impact of the neoliberal reforms on the Brazilianlabour markets Privatisation is reviewed by Goncalves 1999 and the new relationshipbetween Brazilian and foreign capital is analysed by Coutinho et al 1999 Laplaneand Sarti 1999 and Saad-Filho and Morais 2002

social structures and patterns of employment During ISI domestic capitaltended to produce non-durable consumer goods and capital goods whiletransnational companies (TNCs) produced durable consumer goods State-owned enterprises (SOEs) provided infrastructure and basic goods and services(steel electricity telecommunications water and sanitation oil extraction andrefining air road rail and port links and so on) Finally state-owned banksplayed an essential role in the provision of long-term credit especially foreconomic diversification and industrial development The neoliberal reformsincluded the privatisation of most productive and financial SOEs and theypromoted the alliance between foreign and domestic capital at firm levelwithin most value chains (including the denationalisation of industry andinfrastructure) While ISI encouraged the diversification and domesticintegration of manufacturing production import liberalisation and the ongoingprocess of international integration of Brazilian capital have fostered theproduction of a narrower range of relatively unsophisticated goods Theyhave hollowed out the Brazilian manufacturing base and made the economystructurally more dependent on foreign trade investment and technology

The destruction of strategically important production chains establishedunder ISI was associated with the widespread use of subcontracting inmanufacturing and services and the sharp reduction of the number of stableand relatively well-paid blue-collar jobs Although the productivity of theremaining firms has increased industry has been starved of developmentfunds the manufacturing base has contracted12 unemployment has mountedand the informal economy has expanded significantly13 These were not simplythe inevitable outcomes of a technically neutral process of economiclsquorationalisationrsquo Quite the contrary they are the economic consequences ofa profound transformation in the Brazilian political economy The countryrsquosproductive structure has been converted in order to service the short-termimperatives of global accumulation rather than the short-term requirementsof national accumulation as was the case under ISI (the long-term interestsof the poor majority were neglected in both cases)

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12


14 Collorrsquos attempt to dismiss 100000 civil servants and close dozens of state agenciesand departments was never fully completed and it was partly reversed several yearslater However it disorganised the state apparatus demoralised the civil servants andgreatly facilitated the reorganisation of the state along neoliberal lines by the Cardosoadministration

15 See Paula 2002 Paula and Alves Jr 2002 and Studart 1999a and 1999b16 Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econocircmica Federal are the largest banks in the country

In 2001 they controlled respectively 274 and 166 per cent of the assets of the tenlargest banks in Brazil (Valor Econocircmico 2002 p 96)

Second the state has deliberately dismantled its institutional capacity for macro-economic planning and micro-economic intervention through mass privatisations downsizing SOE and agency closures and large-scalesubcontracting at ministerial level These processes were accelerated by abrutal staff cull imposed by president Collor in 199014 and two waves oflsquovoluntaryrsquo redundancies in 1998 and 2003 Lack of managerial and institutionalcapacity would make it very difficult for the Lula administration to implementalternative economic policies even were the necessary legal and financialresources available

Third Brazilian finance has been profoundly transformed in two importantrespects On the one hand the financial system has become closely boundup with global finance through extensive privatisations mergers acquisitionsand strategic alliances between domestic and foreign institutions15 On theother hand and even more significantly the institutional and regulatoryreforms imposed during the neoliberal transition have extended the controlby the financial system over the three main sources of money capital in theeconomy domestic credit the public debt and foreign capital This criticallyimportant aspect of neoliberalism has been largely neglected in the literatureHowever it has played a central role in the restructuring of Brazilian economyand society and it has severely limited the policy choices available to thenew administration In what follows the implications of the extension of thepower of finance are analysed in further detail

Financial-sector control over domestic credit has been extended throughthe privatisation of most of the Brazilian financial system except two federalcommercial banks Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econocircmica Federal and thestate development bank BNDES (Banco Nacional de DesenvolvimentoEconocircmico e Social) Although they are relatively large16 the state-ownedcommercial banks are legally required to operate under market rulesCompliance is carefully monitored by the Central Bank the media and thefinancial markets allegedly in order to avoid corruption or the populist use

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13


17 See Penido and Prates 2001 200318 Public investment declined from 111 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 092 per cent in

1998 and 075 per cent in 2003 Investment in 2002 was even lower (042 per cent ofGDP) because of the expenditure cuts due to the exchange rate crisis (Governo doBrasil Sistema Integrado de Administracao Financeira SIAFI)

19 Saad-Filho and Morais (2000) show that the growth of the domestic public debtbetween 1991ndash9 is mostly due to the accumulation of interest rather than primaryfiscal deficits

of their resources These are surely valid concerns However they imply thatthese institutions have been neutralised from the point of view of industrialand financial policy objectives and are effectively private rather than publicconcerns In addition to this in 1999 the government started implementingthe Basle rules as part of the IMF agreement Although these rules helped tostrengthen the financial system they have also induced the banks to increasetheir holdings of public securities potentially reducing the availability ofloans to the private sector These regulatory changes have also contributedto the concentration and centralisation of capital in the financial sector Thenumber of banks declined by more than half during the last decade and inthe late 1990s up to 40 per cent of the assets of the banking sector belongedto foreign institutions17

The leverage of the financial sector over the public finances has increasedsharply especially because of five policy and regulatory changes First the1988 Constitution bars the monetisation of primary fiscal deficits effectivelyallowing the financial institutions to limit the state expenditures unilaterallythrough their (un)willingness to purchase new public securities Second theFiscal Responsibility Act (2000) imposes stringent financial constraints uponall levels of the public administration For example the Act mandates thefederal state and municipal governments to pass annual budget laws includingprimary surpluses large enough to service their existing debt Failure toachieve these targets in any bi-monthly period triggers automatic expenditurecuts including the suspension of service provision and payments except debtservice and civil-service wages and pensions In practice the former havebeen protected more often than the latter In other words under the pretextof ensuring fiscal rectitude the financial institutions have been grantedprivileged access to the tax revenues at the expense of the users of publicservices civil servants pensioners and the non-financial creditors of the state18

Third permanently high interest rates since the 1992 liberalisation of thecapital account of the balance of payments have inflated dramatically thestock of public securities owned by private financial institutions19 Fourth

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14


20 See Saad-Filho and Morais 2002 p 4821 See Fiori 1992 Lessa and Fiori 1991 and Studart 199522 This period is reviewed by Amann and Baer 2000 Bresser-Pereira 2003 and Saad-

Filho and Mollo 2002

the exchange-rate risk has been nationalised through the sale of public securitiesindexed to the dollar especially in periods of exchange-rate instability Inparticular the state absorbed the cost of the January 1999 exchange-rate crisis(approximately 56 per cent of GDP)20 Although this helped to avoid aneconomic depression in the wake of the devaluation of the real it alsocontributed to the rapid growth of the public debt and the shortening of thematurity of this debt ndash most bills are very short-term normally maturing in24 to 36 months Later efforts to control this debt have contributed to thedestabilisation of the entire economy (see Section IV)

Finally financial-system control over the flow of foreign resources hasincreased significantly in recent years especially after the gradual liberalisationof foreign currency deposits and the capital account of the balance of paymentsA small number of banks control most of these transactions as well as foreigntrade credit (foreign institutions are allowed to offer trade credit only inpartnership with a domestic bank)

These regulatory and institutional changes were accompanied by fiscalmonetary and exchange-rate policy shifts towards a neoliberal policy compactUnder ISI (especially in its last period 1968ndash80) fiscal policies were generallyactivist while monetary and exchange-rate policies were accommodating21

After the neoliberal transition fiscal policy became increasingly contractionary(see above) while monetary policy developed a more activist role which wassometimes supported by the overvaluation of the currency This policycombination was especially prominent in 1994ndash8 during the real stabilisationprogramme22 Finally after the 1999 currency crisis a new policy frameworkwas imposed by the Cardoso administration (and continued by Lula) It wasbased on the managed fluctuation of the real large fiscal surpluses and highdomestic interest rates Essentially given the maximum fiscal surplus achievablethe interest rates were determined by the overlapping objectives of demandcontrol (to achieve the governmentrsquos inflation targets) exchange-rate stabilityattraction of foreign capital to finance the balance of payments and maintainingthe solvency of the state (generating sufficient demand for public securities)

The substitution of interest-rate manipulation for fiscal policy as the mostimportant macro-economic tool replicates in Brazil the shift in other neoliberal

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15


23 See Arestis and Sawyer 1998 and 200524 In 1990 the Collor administration partly froze financial assets including the

domestic debt in an attempt to eliminate high inflation The economy collapsed withGDP contracting 43 per cent during the year The stabilisation plan became economicallyand politically unsustainable and had to be abandoned High inflation rapidly resumed

economic areas especially the United Kingdom (since 1976) the United States(since 1979) and the Eurozone (since at least 1992)23 However monetarypolicy is critically important in Brazil for two additional reasons On the onehand most industrial and financial institutions including the pension fundshold vast quantities of public securities whose valorisation is determined bythe level of the interest rates Under normal circumstances lower interestrates should stimulate private consumption investment and economic growthHowever in Brazil this expansionary effect is partly offset by the contractionof the pool of investible funds due to the slower growth rate of the stock ofgovernment debt In extreme circumstances for example if the federalgovernment defaulted on its domestic debt the economy would face adevastating crisis ndash liquidity would disappear and a large part of the existingstock of money capital would be destroyed24 On the other hand if the holdersof public securities switch their assets into foreign currency (as some did in2002) the Brazilian real would collapse This risk must weigh heavily uponevery macro-economic policy decision and it compels the economic authoritiesto remain in the straight and narrow path of neoliberalism

Brazilian fiscal policy has been limited to accommodating throughadjustments in the fiscal surplus the macro-economic disequilibria createdby neoliberalism Alternatively it can be argued that the main objective offiscal policy is to fund the administration of neoliberal policies by the stateIn essence fiscal policy supports the transfer of tax revenues to the holdersof public securities and finances the compensatory social programmes that legitimate neoliberalism and limit some of its perverse effects Thedevelopmental role of fiscal policy which figured prominently during ISIhas been almost completely abandoned and the fiscal surpluses have becomepart and parcel of the reproduction of neoliberalism in Brazil For this reasonLula has been compelled to intensify the fiscal restrictions imposed by Cardosoeven though they have limited his capacity to deliver economic stability and sustained employment growth and welfare gains to the lsquolosersrsquo (seeSection IV)

Finally the floating exchange-rate reacutegime has minimised the Central Bankrsquosinfluence upon the value of the real in spite of its importance for the level

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16


25 The only exception is the foreign-exchange hedge contracts in which the state-owned banks play a key role

26 The significance of investment by Brazilian flight capital can be gauged by theshare of FDI originating in Caribbean tax havens which increased from 202 per centin 2000 to 295 per cent in 2003 (see Notas agrave Imprensa do Banco Central do Brasil ndash SetorExterno June 2001 June 2002 and March 2003) There is no similar data for portfolioinvestment but it is generally assumed that the participation of Brazilian capital iseven larger

of employment real wages industrial development and macroeconomicstability in Brazil The institutional and policy changes explained in thissection facilitated the transfer of control over the most important levers ofaccumulation in Brazil to a small number of unaccountable institutionscontrolled by domestic and international finance They control a large shareof the private-sector loans hold the vast majority of the public securitiescommand large amounts of foreign currency dominate the foreign-exchangeand foreign-assets markets25 and mediate the flows of foreign investment intothe country (especially investment by Brazilian flight capital)26 They haveamassed enormous political influence and they can determine (and potentiallydestabilise) state policy and social welfare as was demonstrated in thepolitically induced exchange-rate crisis in 2002 (see Section II)

IV lsquoLeft neoliberalrsquo economic policy

Although the PT presents itself as a left-wing party Lula leads a centre-leftadministration supported by a centrist coalition in Congress and answerableto a conservative judiciary and his government has been implementing a neoliberal programme normally associated with the political Right The fractured ndash one might even say schizophrenic ndash nature of the Lulaadministration is due to the political alliances underpinning his election(explained in Section I) the policy choices made at the highest level ofgovernment (described in Section II) and the constraints imposed by theneoliberal reforms (outlined in Section III) These political and economicconstraints have obliterated the social-democratic aspirations of the PTdestroyed the partyrsquos eacutelan and impaired its unity They have also createdsevere difficulties for the PTrsquos supporting mass organisations especially thelargest federation of trade unions in Brazil (Central Uacutenica dos TrabalhadoresCUT) and to a lesser extent the landless peasants movement (Movimentodos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra MST) Many members are finding it difficult to accept that their urgent needs and long-term aspirations

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17


27 Meirelles is a former president of the US-based BankBoston and had been electedFederal Deputy by FH Cardosorsquos party PSDB He is rumoured to have been numberseven in a list of financiers approached by the PT to take over the Central Bank Theothers had rejected the offer

should be contained in the name of political and economic lsquostabilityrsquo preciselywhen ndash they think ndash the PT and its allied organisations are finally in a positionto implement their historical programme

This section reviews the economic policies of the new administration in2003ndash4 and their outcomes It will be shown that while most financial andbalance of payments indicators have improved the production income andemployment data deteriorated in 2003 Their recovery in 2004 is likely to belimited and the prospects for the near future are not especially good

The first significant economic policy decision of the Lula administrationwas to increase unilaterally the primary fiscal surplus target agreed with theIMF from 375 per cent of GDP to 425 per cent The surplus actually achievedin 2003 was 432 per cent of GDP leading to complaints that the governmentlsquomust learn to spend moneyrsquo Subsequently the government increased thesurplus target further to 45 per cent in 2004 These initiatives served twopurposes On the one hand they signalled the governmentrsquos firm commitmentto neoliberalism On the other hand they reduce the pressure for politicallydamaging interest-rate increases in order to contain inflation especially thebubble induced by the 2002 currency crisis In spite of Finance MinisterAntonio Paloccirsquos supportive fiscal policy Central Bank chairman HenriqueMeirelles raised base rates from 250 to 265 per cent in the first three monthsof the new administration27 and only reduced them after inflation had beensubdued (see below)

In addition to its unambiguously neoliberal macro-economic managementthe new administration has implemented four important policy initiativesFirst it rammed through Congress a wide-ranging reform of public-sectorpensions that had eluded FH Cardoso for a whole decade The governmentrsquosbill was virtually undistinguishable from the one that the PT had previouslydefeated but this time it passed by a large majority The bill faced oppositionfrom three sources civil-service trade unions controlled by PT activists thatcalled a long but fruitless strike against the reform a small number of PTdeputies and senators that refused to support a bill that they had previouslydefeated (and were punished for echoing their partyrsquos criticisms of Cardosorsquosbill) and Cardoso supporters seeking to embarrass the government by rejecting

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18


28 This is only part of the truth the federal government also wanted to reduce thepolicy autonomy of the subnational levels of the public administration

29 In mid-2004 in response to a corruption scandal touching on the president ofthe Central Bank Lula upgraded this post to Minister of State ndash thus awarding Meirellesimmunity from prosecution This was not only in order to reward a new friend butalso to protect the government from politically-motivated police investigations thatthreatened to undermine the administration and destabilise the economy Convenientlythis measure has also removed another potential difficulty in the road to Central Bankindependence

30 The relationship between the trade-union bureaucracy and the PT is perceptivelyexamined by Oliveira 2003

31 Inflation rates measured by IPCA see Conjuntura Econocircmica

a bill that was very similar to the one that they had failed to approve underthe previous administration These political gyrations created confusiondemoralised the PT and its left-wing activists and offered an excellentopportunity for political cartoonists to exercise their skills

Second the new administration approved in Congress a neoliberal taxreform also inspired by one of Cardosorsquos initiatives The reform preservedthe high taxation required to service the public-sector debt (Brazilian taxesare equivalent to 36 per cent of GDP which is unusually high for a middle-income country) but with higher indirect taxes and rebates for financialtransactions The reform also reduced the fiscal autonomy of the municipaland state governments allegedly in order to quell the expensive lsquotax warsrsquobetween them28

Third the government approved a constitutional amendment separatingthe regulation of the Central Bank from the regulation of the financial systemas a whole This may seem to be arcane but in fact it has simplified enormouslythe legal process of granting independence to the Central Bank29

Fourth the administration has proposed a reform of labour law that aimsto offset at least in part the high tax rates required by the public debt serviceUnder the guise of promoting free association and free negotiations betweenthe workers and their employers the reform bill will curtail existing rightsand undermine the financial position of many trade unions The governmentis probably also hoping that this will put pressure on the right-wing labourconfederations and facilitate the encroachment of unions linked to the PTinto these fiefdoms30

The governmentrsquos contractionary macro-economic policies were costlyPersistently high interest rates choked inflation (annual inflation rates peakedat 172 per cent in May 2003 fell to 51 per cent in May 2004 and tended torise slightly subsequently)31 Even though the base rates declined to 16 per

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19


32 The real interest rates are the base rates minus the financial marketsrsquo inflationexpectations (see BCB 2004)

33 Data source Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatiacutestica ltwwwsidraibgegovbrgt34 Satildeo Paulo Rio de Janeiro Belo Horizonte Porto Alegre Salvador and Fortaleza35 Some groups of unionised skilled workers were able to bypass this declining

trend of wages For example the heavily-unionised metal and bank workers wereable to negotiate real wage increases in 2003 Their success owes nothing to the federalgovernment it was entirely due to the strength of these categories of workers

cent in April 2004 (rising again to 1625 per cent per cent in September) realinterest rates continued to hover around 10 per cent ndash among the highestrates in the world32 Manufacturing output fell one per cent in 2003 and GDPdeclined 02 per cent during the year ndash the first economic contraction in elevenyears The recession was tempered only by the strong expansion of agriculturewhich grew 5 per cent

The income and employment results in 2003 were also disappointing33

Open unemployment in the six largest metropolitan areas in the country34

increased from 117 per cent of the labour force in December 2002 to an all-time high of 123 per cent one year later In the Satildeo Paulo metropolitanarea total unemployment (including open and hidden unemployment andthe discouraged workers) reached 20 per cent Labour income in the sixmetropolitan areas (including the earnings of the wage workers underemployedand informal sector workers) declined 99 per cent in 2003 (ndash184 per centsince 2001) while wage income fell 51 per cent (ndash137 per cent since 2001)35

The deterioration of the workersrsquo earnings while the financial and exportsectors reported rising profits probably implies that the concentration ofincome has increased in the first year of the PT administration

In 2004 the economy performed more strongly (see below) Incomesincreased and many jobs were created but the unemployment rate initiallyrose marginally ndash probably because of the return of many discouraged workersto the labour market ndash but it later declined to 112 per cent in July The mainsources of growth predicted to reach 40ndash45 per cent in December wereexports (especially agribusiness) and the mild recovery of the domestic marketfuelled by the export sector and the good performance of manufacturingStrong improvements in the formal labour market contributed to an increasein average worker income which has finally returned to the level of late 2002

The balance of payments and the financial indicators improved steadilyfor four reasons First the partial recovery of the world economy from thecollapse of the dotcom bubble increased the availability of capital in the

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20


36 Calvo et al 1993 argue that capital flows to Latin America are determined primarilyby the level of US interest rates rather than the domestic policies in the recipientcountries

37 This is not only a Brazilian phenomenon the currencies of other troubled middle-income countries such as Argentina Turkey and Venezuela also appreciated in 2003

38 However the revaluation may make it difficult to achieve further improvementsin the trade and current accounts in the medium term

international financial markets helping to relieve the Brazilian balance-of-payments constraint Second the new administration has established itslsquocredibilityrsquo with domestic and international finance that at least helped toavoid further turbulence Third inflation declined as was explained aboveFinally the cumulative devaluation of the Brazilian real from R$116 per dollarin January 1999 to a peak of R$380 in October 2002 helped to boost thecountryrsquos trade performance Exports increased 50 per cent between 1999 and2003 to US$73 billion while imports have remained stable around US$50billion In 2001 Brazil had its first trade surplus in seven years and in 2003the first current account surplus in eleven years The inflows of portfoliocapital increased strongly from minus US$47 billion in 2002 to plus US$51billion in 2003 (however the foreign direct investment inflows have declinedsteadily from a peak of US$328 billion in 2000 to only US$101 billion in2003) These improvements of the balance of payments supported a limitedrecovery of the foreign currency reserves (up US$87 billion since the 2002crisis to US$250 billion in mid-2004) and contributed to the decline of thedomestic real interest rates (see above) The Bovespa index of the Satildeo Paulostock exchange reacted strongly to these good news gaining 127 per cent in2003 (but remaining stable in 2004) and JP Morganrsquos EMBI+ Brazilian riskindex declined from over 2000 to only 480 points during 2003 but later roseto 600 points)

The steady hand of the Brazilian authorities may not have been the mostimportant reason for these performance improvements In 2003 the financialindicators performed strongly even in countries whose policies are presumablyundeserving of lsquocredibilityrsquo such as Venezuela (the Caracas stock exchangerose by 135 per cent)36 Moreover permanently high interest rates steadycapital inflows and the Central Bankrsquos relative neglect of the exchange ratecontributed to the appreciation (and subsequent stabilisation) of the real

around R$290 per dollar since late 200337 The revaluation of the real hascontributed not only to inflation control (as would be expected) but also tothe improvement of the public-sector accounts because it has reduced thedemand for public securities indexed to the dollar38 In spite of this and the

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21


record primary fiscal surplus achieved in 2003 high interest rates and thegrowing stock of the public debt (rising from 488 per cent of GDP in 2000to 555 per cent in 2002 and 582 per cent in 2003) led interest payments onthe domestic debt to reach and all-time high of 95 per cent of GDP in 2003

The growth spurt in 2004 has been presented as the lsquoproofrsquo that the neoliberalstrategy of the PT administration was fundamentally sound After the sacrificesof 2003 and with the lsquorecoveryrsquo of the fundamentals (inflation and exchange-rate stabilisation confidence in the government export growth and so on)the economy is allegedly poised for a recovery of investment and a longperiod of growth Maybe But another interpretation is possible The Brazilianeconomy may have simply rebounded from the recession of 2003 underrelatively favourable domestic and external circumstances There is no evidencethat this is the beginning of a cycle of prosperity The Brazilian economy hashad a disappointing performance for over twenty years with occasionalgrowth spurts (see Figure I) which were not sustained either because ofexternal constraints (as in 1986 1996 and 2000) or because of domestic instability(as in 2002) In the meantime the economic recovery has helped the PT inthe 2004 municipal elections (see below)

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

Figure I Brazil ndash GDP growth rates 1980ndash2004 ()

Source IBGE (GDP growth in 2004 estimated at 425 per cent)

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22


39 Brazilian social movements largely under PT control managed to frustrate manyneoliberal reform initiatives since the mid-1980s Lularsquos election and his determinationto follow neoliberal policies have thrown these movements into confusion In thewords of Oliveira 2004 p 7 the PT government has lsquoanesthesised the popular demandsand effectively kidnapped Brazilian civil societyrsquo

40 Gentili 2004 reviews the Brazilian strategy of confrontation followed by negotiationsat the WTO and the FTAA

V Policy schizophrenia

For all its weaknesses self-doubt and vulnerabilities ndash and perhaps because

of them ndash the current administration seems to be able to impose neoliberalpolicies more consistently and successfully than any other governmenthowever right-wing or ideologically committed to neoliberal interests It seemsthat Brazilian neoliberalism has achieved the perfect coup after the corruptmaverick (Fernando Collor) and the aristocratic ex-Marxist sociologist (FHCardoso) it is now the former trade-union leaderrsquos turn to impose the policiesfavoured by the financial interests and the new eacutelite consensus There really

seems to be no alternative to neoliberalismThe schizophrenic character of Lularsquos administration allows it to

systematically wrong-foot the opposition from the Left as well as the RightThe government has shown that it can incorporate virtually any policy initiativeof the right-wing opposition including fiscal orthodoxy privatisation theconcession of privileges for finance or the rich and neoliberal reform ofpensions labour law the financial system and social security At the sametime the administration has also been able to occupy the political space ofthe Left through its popular appeal the capture or paralysis of the mostimportant social movements in the country (including in particular CUTand to a lesser extent the MST)39 and through the governmentrsquos activistforeign policy

The administrationrsquos much-publicised foreign-policy successes werepredicated on its spotless track record in the domestic sphere In theirnegotiations at the WTO UNCTAD MERCOSUR and FTAA Braziliandiplomats have been instructed to defend the interests of the countryrsquos mainexporters (including obviously both domestic and foreign capitalists) ratherthan simply bowing to demands that the country should accept the tradebarriers currently imposed by the US and the EU40 The Brazilian negotiatorshave only been able to stand their ground because the governmentrsquos adherenceto neoliberalism at home has minimised the ability of the US and the EU toobject to Brazilrsquos foreign-policy stance In addition to these commercial-policy

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23


41 These demands and opportunities explain Brazilrsquos ready acceptance of a leadingrole in the UN military mission in Haiti in spite of the bitter experience of the Braziliancontribution to the US-led occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965

clashes with the worldrsquos most powerful economies Brazil has been garneringsupport for the holy grail of its diplomacy in the postwar era a permanentseat in the UN Security Council The country has also been pursuing South-South commercial deals with South Africa India China and other lsquonon-traditionalrsquo partners as part of Brazilrsquos export drive and simultaneously toenhance its international standing So far these initiatives have achieved onlylimited success (except in the case of China) but they offer a vast strategicpotential for Brazilian capital and for foreign firms based in Brazil Lula hasembraced these foreign-policy initiatives wholeheartedly In addition topromoting Brazilrsquos narrow commercial interests Lula has been seeking totake over Nelson Mandelarsquos mantle partly in order to enhance the profile ofBrazilrsquos aspirations and partly to offset his meagre achievements at homewith high-profile triumphs abroad41

The tensions between Brazilian foreign and domestic policy are part of theschizophrenic nature of the current administration They have in commonthe prominent role played by the President and his undeniable charm Thesetensions also imply that the Lula administration is fully committed to thelsquomarket mechanismsrsquo advocated by the neoliberal orthodoxy both at homeand abroad The governmentrsquos strategic option includes the attempt to gainlsquocredibilityrsquo by respecting the existing rules and contracts and reducing Brazilrsquosexternal vulnerability through structurally high trade surpluses This strategyavoids the difficult problems of confronting the US and the ruling internationalsystem on the domestic arena and it opens the possibility of increasing Brazilrsquosinternational influence and expanding its foreign markets This interpretationof the foreign-policy orientation of the Lula administration bypasses themisguided opposition between the claim that nothing has changed with Lulaand the opposing claim that Lularsquos foreign policy is inspired by genuinelyleftist principles In reality Brazilrsquos foreign policy is part of the overall strategyof the PT leadership that has avoided politically damaging confrontationswith neoliberalism and the US government both at home and abroad whileseeking to expand the spaces available to improve the outcomes of thegovernmentrsquos neoliberal policies

At home the PT has been attempting to stabilise its position by claimingto its disaffected left-wing supporters that it is the lesser evil and therefore

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24


42 For parallel examples in different contexts see Cockburnrsquos (2004) critique of theautomatic support of the Left for the Democratic Party in the United States andWatkinsrsquos (2004) rejection of the appeal of lsquoNew Labourrsquo to the Left in the UnitedKingdom

43 The wages of most civil servants have been virtually frozen since 1994 (exceptionsinclude the military the Inland Revenue and the Treasury Department)

that it must receive their support regardless of its actual record in office Afterall the PT is firmly established throughout the country electorally viableorganically connected to social movements and sensitive to the plight of thepoor in a way that no right-wing party could claim to be Moreover thePresident himself regularly rants against unemployment and touchinglydeplores the poverty of many Brazilians which once afflicted his own familyNo left-wing political party can hope to beat the PT at this game42

Under favourable economic circumstances the PTrsquos image as bothgovernment and opposition can confound the Left deprive the Right of acredible platform and ensure a comfortable majority coalition in Congressas well as Lularsquos re-election in 2006 However this strategy could also backfireFor example if the economy performs poorly during the next two years ifthe government is racked by scandals or if Lularsquos credibility wanes becausehe is unable to deliver the changes expected by most of his supporters theadministration could become paralysed by its internal contradictions Thelsquoloserrsquos alliancersquo would unravel and the PT could suffer a crushing defeat inthe next presidential elections

Securing support for the administration could also become difficult if theliving standards of the lsquolosersrsquo decline further ndash especially the formal andinformal workers (many lower-ranking civil servants may have already beenlost since they have been heavily penalised by the governmentrsquos pensionsreform and its unwillingness to offer them significant improvements in payand conditions)43 In spite of Brazilrsquos improving economic performanceespecially in the export sector the manufacturing eacutelite has also beendisappointed by the administrationrsquos failure to live up to its commitments tosupport domestic industry The government has produced an inane industrialpolicy review including few clear priorities no performance monitoringinstruments and insufficient funding High interest rates continue to hinderprivate investment and the stringent fiscal targets limit the scope for publicinvestment which is essential to relieve the severe infrastructure constraintsin Brazil especially in the areas of transport and electricity generation Althoughthe state development bank BNDES has extended additional loans to Brazilian

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25


44 The Meirelles scandal was outlined above Waldomiro Diniz a high-rankingadvisor of Lularsquos Chief of Staff Joseacute Dirceu has admitted taking bribes and channellingfunds from gambling mobs to PT candidates Although this is a relatively minorscandal by Brazilian standards press hostility public dejection (the lsquoincorruptiblersquoimage of the PT was shattered) and the governmentrsquos ineptitude handling the scandalturned lsquoWaldomirogatersquo into a defining moment for the administration Joseacute Dirceuhas not been accused of any wrongdoing however he is the leader of the governmentrsquoslsquoleft wingrsquo The damage to his reputation has increased the influence of the lsquorightwingrsquo Ministry of Finance (even though Diniz used to advise Finance Minister Paloccibefore the election)

45 Historically there is only a weak correlation between local and national election

firms the Ministry of Finance has challenged this lsquodiscriminationrsquo againstforeign companies The governmentrsquos most significant industrial-policy initiativeis the domestic production of two deep-water oil platforms for the state oilcompany Petrobras and the renewal of the companyrsquos tanker fleet This willhelp to revitalise the construction metal and shipbuilding industries especiallyin the politically important state of Rio de Janeiro

The conflicting expectations of the groups in the losersrsquo alliance as well asopposition pressure and the schizophrenic character of Lularsquos administrationhave created a state of permanent fluidity and political tension in BrazilThese conflicts boiled over for the first time in the so-called lsquoWaldomirogatersquoscandal in early 2004 and again when Central Bank chairman Meirelles wasaccused of tax evasion in the middle of the year44

These simmering tensions can also be explained in another way Lularsquoselection and the neoliberal about-turn of the PT have shown how difficult itis to lsquovote awayrsquo neoliberalism or more generally how difficult it is to shifteconomic policy by constitutional means The disconnection between politicaland economic democracy expressed by the inability of the majority to influenceeconomic policy to any significant degree is the most important challengeto the Brazilian constitutional order since the restoration of democracy in themid-1980s

The 2004 local elections

Brazilian mayors and local councillors are elected every four years half-waythrough the mandate of the President federal deputies and senators stategovernors and state representatives The outcome of these elections helps to assess the political strength of the federal and local governments and itsignals albeit imprecisely the prospects of the various contenders for thenext electoral cycle45 The 2004 elections took place on 3 October in Brazilrsquos

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26


results because of the different determinants of votersrsquo choices ndash local interests in theformer and broader political concerns in the latter

46 This does not of course imply that Lula is bound to lose the 2006 elections Theincumbent president is naturally the favourite and Lularsquos charisma has not dissipatedyet Moreover the right-wing opposition lacks any credible presidential candidateand it continues to suffer from political fragmentation and infighting The Left willprobably not play a significant role in these elections although the campaign maycontribute to the organisation of left-wing political movements

5600 municipalities There was also a second-round mayoral election on 31October in 44 municipalities with more than 200000 registered voters wherethe first-round winner failed to obtain 50 per cent of the valid votes

The first round results were presented by the PT as a vindication for theLula administration since the Party received 172 million votes (181 per cent)and for the first time the largest share of the national mayoral vote (up fromfourth place in 2000) However this triumphalist view is superficial and ithides the most important aspects of the picture

The PT elected 400 mayors in the first round well short of its target of 800and its performance in the larger cities was mostly disappointing ndash in otherwords the PT grew in small towns that are politically less influential andthat will play only a minor role in deciding the outcome of the 2006 presidentialelections

The second round of the local elections was especially unfavourable forthe PT The PT participated in 21 run-offs but it lost most of them The mostimportant defeats of the PT were first in Satildeo Paulo the largest city in Braziland where Lula campaigned so intensely that he was fined by the ElectoralCourt and second in Porto Alegre the base of the World Social Forum anda city administered by the PT for sixteen years In both cities the incumbentPT mayors lost badly The PT won only in one large city Fortaleza but thenew mayor is a left-wing dissident who ran against the wishes of the Partyleadership and criticised the federal administration heavily during hercampaign The PT won only in three other important cities (Nova IguaccediluNiteroacutei and Vitoacuteria) and it lost heavily throughout Satildeo Paulo state the richestand most populous state in Brazil and the cradle of the party Although PTallies obtained localised victories the outcome of the second round was clearlyunfavourable to the PT and the Lula administration The Party has spreaditself thinly and lost its most important strongholds This bodes ill for Lularsquosre-election bid in 2006 because the Party will lack strong and prestigious localadministrations supporting its national campaign46

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27


Finally the PT Left performed poorly in spite of its remarkable victory inFortaleza This is in part because of its reluctance to criticise the federalgovernment and in part because the PT leadership refused on principle tosupport all left-wing candidates and starved them of resources It is alsonoticeable that the lsquoprofessionalrsquo political campaigns currently favoured bythe PT have failed to enthuse the Party activists weakening significantly thecapacity of the PT to mobilise support among the working class This mayalso become a source of problems for Lula in 2006

VI Conclusion

Brazilrsquos economic performance in 2003ndash4 was mixed Employment and incomesfell and the domestic public debt increased but the financial and balance ofpayments indicators improved (nevertheless they remain highly vulnerableto adverse developments in the US Europe and Japan and to lsquomarketsentimentrsquo at home) Even under the best possible circumstances the prospectsfor Brazilrsquos long-term development remain poor The countryrsquos infrastructurebears the weight of two decades of underinvestment The privatisationdenationalisation and deregulation of infrastructure provision and of severalbasic industries including telecommunications rail and air transport thepetrochemical and steel industries mining (except Petrobras) finance (exceptBanco do Brasil Caixa Econocircmica Federal and BNDES) and large chunks ofthe electricity supply water sanitation and road networks limit the capacityof the state to lead a process of rapid and co-ordinated economic recoveryMoreover the statersquos industrial policy institutions have been largely disabledand the federal government is financially exhausted due to the costs of thedomestic debt widespread resistance against further tax increases and thecreeping informalisation of the economy The openness of the capital accounthas made the balance of payments structurally vulnerable and the prospectsfor the exchange rate are also uncertain

Neoliberalism has also transformed the Brazilian industrial base substantiallyBrazilian capital is much more closely integrated with foreign capital than atany time since 1930 and the manufacturing sector has been disarticulatedand largely integrated into competing transnational value chains (even wherethey serve primarily the domestic market) Finally the institutional and policychanges imposed by neoliberalism have transferred control of the mostimportant levers of accumulation to a relatively small number of financial

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28


47 Alternative economic strategies for Brazil are reviewed in the special issue ofAnaacutelise Econocircmica 2003 and by Sicsuacute Oreiro and Paula 2003

institutions They command most private-sector loans own the vast majorityof the public securities control large amounts of foreign currency and mediatethe flows of foreign investment into the country They have amassed enormouspolitical influence and can destabilise state policy and social welfare as wasshown in mid-2002

Balance of payments fragility and the fiscal crisis of the state are the mostimportant constraints to growth in Brazil but they cannot be addressedadequately through the neoliberal strategy adopted by the Lula administrationIn spite of this abandoning neoliberalism for an alternative (democratic)economic strategy including controls on international capital movementslimitations on the foreign and domestic public debt service and an aggressivepolicy of employment generation income distribution and integration of themanufacturing base would not be cheap simple or rapid47 Powerful economicinterests would flatly reject this policy shift and the strategy may founderbecause of administrative shortcomings or obstruction in Congress or in thecourts or it may be spurned by the voters because of short-term macro-economic instability or media pressure The domestic constraints to an economicpolicy shift will weaken significantly only if there is a significant deteriorationof the international economy If the grip of the international financial marketson the periphery weakens or if the Brazilian economy collapses because ofa balance of payments crisis capital controls may become inevitable andmass pressure could more easily force the redistribution of income and wealth(especially land) as part of a new development strategy centred on the domesticmarket

In the worst possible (lsquoArgentinianrsquo) scenario this policy shift would beimposed upon a reluctant government by a severe economic crisis afterincreasingly frantic attempts to lsquomake neoliberalism workrsquo This may yet cometo pass In the meantime the governmentrsquos faltering popularity has reducedits margin for manoeuvre and exhausted the lsquolosersrsquo tolerance with the PTrsquosamateurish handling of the state The decline of government capacity toaccommodate conflicting demands within the losersrsquo alliance increases thelikelihood of a complex political re-alignment taking place in the near futurepotentially affecting the administrationrsquos parliamentary base and its sourcesof mass support

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29


In this sense the outcome of the 2004 elections is worrying for theadministration The growth of the PT and its allied parties in the small andmiddle-sized cities was largely due to the advantages of power at the federallevel which is not unexpected in Brazil This has nothing to do with the riseof an autonomous working-class movement in the political sphere or evenwith the spread of lsquocitizenshiprsquo which is allegedly one of the PTrsquos key politicalobjectives The PT lost especially heavily in the large cities both in terms ofthe number of its elected mayors and councillors and in terms of the alarmingloss of the vote of the middle class In Satildeo Paulo the loss of this importantsocial group was not compensated by the spread of PT votes among the poorperiphery of the city The loss of support for the PT among the middle classmay indicate that the Party will have difficulties replicating the lsquolosersrsquo alliancersquoin 2006 It may also be symptomatic of the loss of a social group that hasbeen enormously influential in shaping the political ideology of the PT andthat plays a key role in the connection between the working-class poor thesocial movements and their political expression within the state

While the PT struggles to stabilise its sources of support and theadministration attempts to make neoliberalism deliver according to its promisesthe Brazilian Left has very different concerns building the foundations of anew political movement that will offer concrete and realistic alternatives forthe expansion of economic and political democracy in the country This willtake many years Neoliberalism has eroded the social economic and politicalroots of the working class and demolished its traditional forms of politicalexpression and organisation It is not yet possible to anticipate the preciseform of this new left movement or estimate its potential success but itsconstruction will be the most exciting political project in Brazil for a generation

References

Amann Edmund and Werner Baer 2000 lsquoThe Illusion of Stability The BrazilianEconomy under Cardosorsquo World Development 28 10 1805ndash19

Anaacutelise Econocircmica 2003 Special Issue on lsquoThe Lula Administrationrsquo 21 40

Arestis Philip and Malcolm C Sawyer 1998 lsquoNew Labour New Monetarismrsquo SoundingsA Journal of Politics and Culture 9 24ndash41

Arestis Philip and Malcolm C Sawyer 2005 lsquoNeoliberalism and the Third Wayrsquo inNeoliberalism A Critical Reader edited by Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah JohnstonLondon Pluto Press

BCB 2004 Boletim Mensal do Banco Central do Brasil 40 2 Brasiacutelia BCB

Benjamin Ceacutesar 1998 A Opccedilatildeo Brasileira Rio de Janeiro Contraponto

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30


Borges Neto Joatildeo M 2004 As Eleiccedilotildees de 2002 e o Significado do Governo Lula UmaContribuiccedilatildeo ao Debate dos Desafios Diante da Esquerda Brasileira unpublished manuscript

Branford Sue and Kucinski Bernardo 1995 Brazil Carnival of the Oppressed ndash Lula andthe Brazilian Workersrsquo Party London Latin America Bureau

Branford Sue and Bernardo Kucinski 2003 Politics Transformed ndash Lula and the WorkersrsquoParty in Brazil London Latin American Bureau

Bresser-Pereira Luiacutes C 2003 lsquoMacroeconomia do Brasil poacutes-1994rsquo Anaacutelise Econocircmica21 40 7ndash38

Calvo Guillermo Leonardo Leiderman and Carmen Reinhart 1993 lsquoCapital Inflowsand Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin Americarsquo IMF Staff Papers 40 1108ndash51

Cockburn Alexander 2004 lsquoThe Year of Surrendering Quietlyrsquo New Left Review II29 1ndash25

Coutinho Luciano Paulo Baltar and Fernando Camargo 1999 lsquoDesempenho Industriale do Emprego sob a Poliacutetica de Estabilizacaorsquo in Abertura e Ajuste do Mercado deTrabalho no Brasil edited by OIT Satildeo Paulo Editora 34

Fiori Joseacute L 1992 lsquoThe Political Economy of the Developmentalist State in BrazilrsquoCepal Review 47 173ndash86

Gentili Rafael 2004 lsquoSobre as Negociacoes da Alca e do Mercosulrsquo in Governo LulaDecifrando o Enigma edited by LT Soares et al Satildeo Paulo Viramundo

Goncalves Reinaldo 1999 Globalizaccedilatildeo e Desnacionalizaccedilatildeo Rio de Janeiro Paz e Terra

Laplane Mariano F and Fernando Sarti 1999 lsquoO Investimento Direto Estrangeiro noBrasil nos Anos 90 Determinantes e Estrateacutegiasrsquo in Investimentos Externos no Mercosuledited by Daniel Chudnovsky Campinas Papirus

Lessa Carlos and Joseacute L Fiori 1991 lsquoE Houve uma Poliacutetica Econocircmica Nacional-Populistarsquo Ensaios FEE 12 1 176ndash97

Morais Lecio Alfredo Saad-Filho and Walter Coelho 1999 lsquoFinancial LiberalizationCurrency Instability and Crisis in Brazil Another Plan Bites the Dustrsquo Capital andClass 68 9ndash14

Morais Lecio and Alfredo Saad-Filho 2003 lsquoSnatching Defeat from the Jaws of VictoryLula the Workersrsquo Party and the Prospects for Change in Brazilrsquo Capital amp Class81 17ndash23

Oliveira Francisco 2003 lsquoThe Duckbilled Platypusrsquo New Left Review II 24 40ndash57

Oliveira Francisco 2004 The Duckbilled Platypus in the Labyrinth or the EighteenthBrumaire of Luiz Inaacutecio unpublished manuscript

Paula Luiz F 2002 A Recente Onda de Bancos Europeus no Brasil Determinantes e Impactosunpublished manuscript

Paula Luiz F and Antonio J Alves Jr 2002 Banking Behavior and the Brazilian Economyafter the Real Plan A Minskian Approach unpublished manuscript

Paulani Leda M 2003 lsquoBrasil Delivery A Poliacutetica Econocircmica do Governo Lularsquo Revistade Economia Politica 23 4 ndash

Paulani Leda M 2004 lsquoQuando o Medo Vence a Esperanccedila Um Balanccedilo da PoliacuteticaEconocircmica do Governo Lularsquo Criacutetica Marxista 19 ndash

Penido Maria CF and Daniela M Prates 2001 As Restricoes das Novas Regras do Comitecircda Basileacuteia sobre as Condicoes de Financiamento dos Paiacuteses Perifeacutericos Satildeo PauloDIESPFundap

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31


Penido Maria CF and Daniela M Prates 2003 lsquoSistema Financeiro e DesenvolvimentoAs Restriccedilotildees das Novas Regras do Comitecirc da Basileacuteia sobre os Paiacuteses Perifeacutericosrsquoin Liberalizacao Econocircmica e Crescimento Modelos Poliacuteticas e Restricoes edited by JCFerraz M Crocco and A Elias Satildeo Paulo Futura

Pochmann Marcio 1999 O Trabalho sob Fogo Cruzado Exclusatildeo Desemprego e Precarizaccedilatildeono Final do Seacuteculo Sao Paulo Contexto

Saad-Filho Alfredo 2003 lsquoNew Dawn or False Start in Brazil The Political Economyof Lularsquos Electionrsquo Historical Materialism 11 1 3ndash21

Saad-Filho Alfredo and Maria Mollo 2002 lsquoInflation and Stabilization in Brazil APolitical Economy Analysisrsquo Review of Radical Political Economics 34 2 109ndash35

Saad-Filho Alfredo and Lecio Morais 2000 lsquoThe Costs of Neomonetarism The BrazilianEconomy in the 1990srsquo International Papers in Political Economy 7 3 1ndash39

Saad-Filho Alfredo and Lecio Morais 2002 lsquoNeomonetarist Dreams and Realities AReview of the Brazilian Experiencersquo in A Post Keynesian Perspective on 21st CenturyEconomic Problems edited by P Davidson Cheltenham Edward Elgar

Saad-Filho Alfredo and Lecio Morais 2005 lsquoShattered Dreams Lula Neoliberalismand the Twilight of the Brazilian Workersrsquo Partyrsquo in The New Latin American LeftOrigins and Futures edited by CR Garavito P Barrett and D Chaacutevez London ZedBooks

Senado Federal 1999 Ata da Terceira Reuniao da 7 (tm) Sessao Legislativa Extraordinariada 50 (tm) Legislatura 26 de janeiro Brasiacutelia Senado Federal

Sicsuacute Joatildeo Joseacute L Oreiro and Luiz F Paula (eds) 2003 Agenda Brasil PoliacuteticasEconocircmicas para o Crescimento com Estabilidade de Precos Rio de Janeiro Manole

Studart Rogeacuterio 1995 Investment Finance in Economic Development London Routledge

Studart Rogeacuterio 1999a Estrutura e Operaccedilatildeo dos Sistemas Financeiros no MercosulPerspectivas a Partir das Reformas Institucionais dos Anos 1990 e para a IntegracaoFinanceira das Economias do Bloco Rio de Janeiro CepalIPEAIE-UFRJ

Studart Rogeacuterio 1999b Financial Opening and Deregulation of Brazilrsquos Financial Systemsin the 1990s Possible Effects on its Pattern of Development Financing unpublishedmanuscript

Valor Econocircmico 2002 Valor 1000 2 (2) Satildeo Paulo Valor Econocircmico

Watkins Susan 2004 lsquoA Weightless Hegemony New Labourrsquos Role in the NeoliberalOrderrsquo New Left Review II 25 5ndash34

World Bank 2003 World Development Indicators CD Rom

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32


2 This period encompasses the administrations of Joseacute Sarney (1985ndash90) FernandoCollor (1990ndash2) Itamar Franco (1992ndash4) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994ndash2002)

3 See Morais and Saad-Filho 2003 and Saad-Filho 2003

More importantly they expected the new administration to join the neoliberalconsensus that has ruled Brazil since the early 1990s2 dealing a terminal blowto the powerful Brazilian Left

It is important to address this paradox in order to understand the currentgovernmentrsquos power base objectives and margin for manoeuvre Even if the new administration fails to deliver the policy changes and welfareimprovements originally expected by many of Lularsquos supporters it isworthwhile assessing what has been achieved why and how and whateconomic and social improvements are realistically possible in one of theworldrsquos most unequal societies Brazil has a vast territory and abundantnatural resources a developed industrial base enormous productive potentialand a relatively organised and experienced working class if significantimprovements in social welfare cannot be achieved there it would be difficultto claim that they are feasible in other poor countries

It is impossible to assess the new administration from all of these anglesin a short essay This article reviews the social political and economic processesunderpinning Lularsquos election and the strategic choices of his administrationin six sections The first reviews the social forces supporting the newadministration summarised under the term lsquolosersrsquo alliancersquo The secondexplains the political and economic rationale of Lularsquos commitment toneoliberalism The third analyses the trajectory of the Brazilian economyduring the last fifteen years in order to assess the material basis of theneoliberal transition the economic constraints faced by the new governmentand the scope for alternative policies The fourth and fifth review theadministrationrsquos record in 2003ndash4 and its economic and political achievementsThe sixth section summarises the article and briefly outlines the most likelyscenarios for the second half of Lularsquos administration

I The losersrsquo alliance

Lula was elected by a losersrsquo alliance a loose coalition of social groups havingin common only the experience of losses under neoliberalism3 This was nota Gramscian historical bloc The lsquolosersrsquo alliancersquo was not a strategic allianceit did not have a hegemonic power project and it never challenged the state

HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 4






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 5





HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 6







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 7











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 8







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 5





HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 6







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 7











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 8







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32





HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 6







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 7











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 8







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 7











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 8







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 8







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 9







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 10








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 11






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 12








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 13








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 14









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 15







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 16







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 17







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 18











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32











HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 19












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32












HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 20








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 21




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32




1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 22










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32










HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 23






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 24







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 25









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32









HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 26








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32








HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 27



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32



VI Conclusion



HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 28






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32






HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 29




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32




References







HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 30























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32























HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 31

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32

















HIMA 131_261_f2_3-32 31405 249 PM Page 32

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