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Law 126 Evidence Prof. Avena 31. GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURE Page 2 of 57

name. Whereupon, they secured a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale

dated December 7, 1970 which bore the signatures of their parents and

had it examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The

result of the examination revealed that the signatures of their parents,

Julian and Guillerma, were forged.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

Thus, on April 13, 1993, the respondents, together with their mother

Guillerma, filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and

Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14204 with Damages

and Writ of Preliminary Injunction7 against herein petitioners. They

alleged that in spite of the forged signature of their parents, the

petitioners were able to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the

Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City and secure TCT No. T-

142048 on March 8, 1972. They prayed for an injunctive relief in order to

prevent the petitioners from selling, disposing, or mortgaging said

property. They further prayed that (i) the Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT

No. T-14204 be annulled; (ii) they be declared the absolute owners of

the property; (iii) all documents executed, made and entered into

relative to the said title be declared void; and, (iv) the petitioners be

ordered to pay them P300,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,

and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees plusP1,000.00 as appearance fee.

On May 6, 1992, petitioners filed their Answer,9 alleging that the subject

property (Lot No. 5947-A) used to be a portion of Lot No. 5947, which

was originally owned by Clodualdo Sambaan (Clodualdo) and Gliceria

Dacer (Gliceria). Lot No. 5947 is more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot No. 5947 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan)

situated at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No.

5984 and 5948; E., by Lot Nos. 5948 and 5946, SW., by Lot No. 5946; and

on the NW., by Lot No. 5984, containing an area of 7,286 square meters,

more or less, under Tax Declaration No. 21421 and covered by Original

Certificate of Title No. 7921 issued on September 23, 1940.

After the death of Clodualdo and Gliceria in 1949, their heirs, namely,

Alicia Lago, wife of Pedro Gacusan; Bernardo Lago (single); Gloria Lago,wife of Jimmy Angco; Dionesia Lago, married to Paulino Unat;

Prysbetero Sambaan, married to Rosario Zaragosa; Juanito Sambaan,

married to Renerio Galos; Leo Sambaan, married to Adeloisa Tambulian;

Renato Sambaan, married to Adelina Ablon; Aida Sambaan (single);

Julian Sambaan, married to Guillerma Saarenas; Paz Sambaan, wife of

Rufinito Lago; and, Bernie Sambaan, married to Alicia Sabuero, executed

an Extra Judicial Settlement and Sale10 dated April 10, 1970 involving the

abovementioned land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.

7921.

It appears, however, that Juanito, Aida and Renato sold their share to a

certain Domingo Ebarrat (Ebarrat). Hence, a portion of the property

belonged to Julian while another portion belonged to Ebarrat. In view of

the co-ownership between Ebarrat and Julian, the former and the latter

executed a Deed of Partition11 dated September 8, 1970 whereby Lot No.

5947 was divided. The eastern half with an area of 3,643 square meters

was assigned to Julian, while the western half with the same area went

to Ebarrat.

Petitioners claimed that Julian subsequently sold his share to them by

virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 12 dated December 7, 1970. The said

property is

described as follows:

A Parcel of land (Lot No. 5947-A, being a portion of Lot No. 5947,

Cadastral Survey of Cagayan) situated at Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City.

Bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 5947-B and 5948, Cad. 237; South by

Lot Nos. 5946, Cad-237; East by Lot Nos. 5948 and 5946, Cad. 237; and

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West by Lot No. 5947-B, containing an area of 3643 square meters, more

or less, covered by OCT No. 7921 (now TCT No. T-14202) of the Registry

of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thereafter, on December 10, 1970, Ebarrat and Patricio executed anAgreement 13 wherein Ebarrat acknowledged that petitioners are the

owners of the 18 coconut trees planted in Ebarrat’s property and even

made Julian as a witness to the said Agreement.

In addition, petitioners alleged that the imputation of falsification of the

signatures of Julian and Guillerma is a product of respondents’ inflamed

imagination because the latter envy them for they have been successful

in managing their properties. Petitioners thus prayed that judgment be

rendered dismissing the complaint; affirming their title over the

controverted property and ordering respondents to pay

them P500,000.00 as moral damages;P300,000.00 as exemplary

damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of litigation.

On July 27, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion for Production and

Inspection of Document 14 to compel respondents to produce and permit

them to inspect and to copy or photograph the Deed of Absolute Sale

subject matter of said examination. Thereafter, the trial court issued an

Order15 dated August 14, 1992 granting the motion and directing the

Regional Office of the NBI to bring the document to court so that thesame may be properly examined.

On August 11, 1992, Guillerma died in Cagayan de Oro City and was

accordingly dropped as co-plaintiff.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its Decision16 dated

August 2, 2001 ruling in favor of the respondents, the dispositive portion

of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the plaintiffs were able to

establish a strong preponderance of evidence in their favor. Accordingly,

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14204 is hereby declared NULL AND

VOID, and is hereby CANCELLED. Let another title be issued in the name

of the late Julian Sambaan. The defendants are jointly and severallydirected to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as moral

damages, P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,671.00 representing

actual expenses.17

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Petitioners, alleging among others that the trial court erred in finding

that the signature of Julian on the assailed document was a forgery, went

to the CA by way of ordinary appeal. On August 20, 2003, the CA

rendered a Decision affirming the findings of the trial court, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated August

2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, in

Civil Case no. 92-179 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against

appellants.18

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 which was denied by the

CA in its Resolution20 dated March 17, 2004.

Issues

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners assail the Decision of

the CA on the following grounds:

A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

PRESCRIPTION DID NOT BAR RESPONDENTS’ ACTION TO

RECOVER OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.






























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B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

SETTLED PRINCIPLES ON THE ADMISSIBILITY AND

APPRECIATION OF OPINIONS OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN ITS

BLANKET ACCEPTANCE OF THE INADEQUATE TESTIMONY OF

THE DOCUMENT EXAMINER WHO WAS COMMISSIONED BYRESPONDENTS PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL CASE

NO. 92-179.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION

THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WAS A FORGED

DOCUMENT ON THE BASIS OF SPECIMEN SIGNATURES THE

GENUINENESS OF WHICH WERE NEVER ESTABLISHED.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON HANDWRITING COMPARISON IN USING

SPECIMEN SIGNATURES OF GUILLERMA SAMBAAN THAT WERE

MADE AT THE TIME AND FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE

HANDWRITING ANALYSIS OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.

E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH

FORGERY IN ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE

SIGNATURE OF JULIAN SAMBAAN ON THE DEED OF ABSOLUTESALE WAS FORGED BECAUSE IT BELIEVED THAT GUILLERMA

SAMBAAN’S SIGNATURE WAS ALSO FORGED.

F. THE COURT OF APPEALS CONTRAVENED THE LEGAL RULES

GOVERNING THE APPRECIATION OF DOCUMENTS IN RULING

AGAINST THE VALIDITY OF JULIAN SAMBAAN’S SALE OF THE

SUBJECT PROPERTY TO PETITIONERS DESPITE THE EXISTENCE

OF THE AGREEMENT DATED 10 DECEMBER 1970 CONFIRMING

THE SALE.

G. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL

COURT’S AWARD OF DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS

AND IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS’ COUNTERCLAIMS FOR

DAMAGES.

Our Ruling

The core issue to be resolved in the present controversy is the

authenticity of the Deed of Absolute Sale which is a question of fact

rather than of law. In Manila Bay Club Corporation v . Court of

Appeals,21 we held that for a question to be one of law, it must involve no

examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the

litigants or any of them. There is a question of law when the doubt or

difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state of

facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt arises

as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.22

In the case at bench, the issues raised by the petitioners are essentially

factual matters, the determination of which are best left to the courts

below. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of

facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight

and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by

substantial evidence on the record.23 Substantial evidence is more than a

mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that areasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion,24 even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably

opine otherwise.25 But to erase any doubt on the correctness of the

assailed ruling, we have carefully perused the records and, nonetheless,

arrived at the same conclusion. We find that there is substantial

evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial court’s

conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of

Absolute Sale were forged.





















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The examination conducted by the NBI disclosed that Julian and

Guillerma’s signatures were forged.

We find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly gave

probative value to the testimony of the NBI Senior Document ExaminerCaroline Moldez Pitoy, who categorically testified that the signatures of

Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were forged, viz :26

Atty. Dalisay: As Senior Document Examiner of the National Bureau of

Investigation, do [sic] you have [the] occasion of examining [sic] the

signatures of Julian Sambaan and Guillerma Saarenas by virtue of the

case of the Regional Director, Regional Office of the National Bureau of

Investigation, Cagayan de Oro City?

A: Yes sir.

x x x x

Q: What was the result of the findings on the signatures of Julian

Sambaan and Guillerma Saarenas Sambaan appearing on the Deed of

Sale dated December 12, 1990.

A: After [conducting] comparative examinations x x x on the standard

specimen signatures of Julian Sambaan [and Guillerma Sambaan] as well

as the x x x questioned x x x signatures x x x we found out that [they

were] not written by one and the same person.27

x x x x

Q: What was the procedure which you have taken x x x in examining the

authenticity of the signatures of Guillerma Saarenas Sambaan?

A: Per Standard Operating Procedures, the first thing we did upon

receipt of the documents submitted to us is to check x x x the documents

attached to the basic letter-request and then the questioned and

standard documents were classified as to the sufficiency and

appropriateness of the standards, and then these were evaluated, after

which, they were marked accordingly, then we go to examining all the

standard/specimens first, to determine whether the handwriting is doneby one and the same person before comparing with the questioned and

standard signatures. x x x After they were found to be written by one and

the same person, before comparing with the questioned documents, the

handwriting characteristics were properly observed in these two (2)

sheets of photographs, then, the final evaluation is made, after which, a

written report is made as a result of the examination, then the same is

forwarded to the Document Examiner for re-examination and this

Examiner affixes his signature and submits the same to the Chief of the

Division for approval and the said report passes to the office of the

Regional Director for final approval.

Petitioners failed to present any evidence to rebut the findings of the NBI

handwriting expert.

Moreover, the findings of the NBI document examiner were

corroborated by the trial court’s own observation, as affirmed by the CA,

that "even a cursory examination of Guillerma’s questioned signature

from her specimen signatures in the enlarged photographs (Exhibits ‘F’

and ‘F-1’) would show that it needs no expert witness to notice the widedifference in stroke, as well as the writing style in capital ‘G’."28 What is

more, Emma S. Felicilda, the daughter of then deceased Guillerma,

likewise testified that "in fact my mother was the one who filed the

complaint in this instant case because according to her, she did not sign

the said document".29

The fact that the examination was commissioned by the respondents did

not make said examination null and void.

















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involved her husband. Yet, she joined herein respondents in filing an

action for the Annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of

forgery.

Lastly, the trial court and the CA were one in proclaiming thatconsidering that the subject property belongs to Julian’s capital, the

execution of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale could be validly made by

Julian even without his wife’s signature.37 As a matter of fact, the wife’s

name was not typed in the assailed deed and her purported signature

merely appears next to the supposed signature of Julian. This only

confirms that the person who prepared the deed knew that her

signature was unnecessary for the assailed document.

The trial court and the CA further concluded:

x x x If such was the case, we are in a query why the signature of

GUILLERMA must have to be forged when her consent, as spouse of

JULIAN, is not necessary to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale?

The answer to this is simple: JULIAN never executed the assailed Deed of

Absolute Sale in favor of MYRNA and such deed conveys no ownership in

favor of the appellants.38

Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great

weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong andcogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine

real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while

testifying in the case.39 The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact

of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court .40 In Philippine

Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 41 we held that factual findings of the CA

which are supported by substantial evidence are binding, final and

conclusive upon the Supreme Court. A departure from this rule may be

warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the

findings and conclusions of the trial court ,42 or when the same is

unsupported by the evidence on record.43 There is no ground to apply

the exception in the instant case, however, because the findings and

conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court.

The forged Deed of Absolute Sale is null and conveys no title.

Having affirmed the findings of fact of both the CA and the trial court

that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma are forgeries, we now come to

the question of the validity of the transfer of title to the petitioners.

In Sps. Solivel v. Judge Francisco,44 we held that:

x x x in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of

the registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in

good faith for value, the instrument registered should not be forged.

When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the

owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not

thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed

acquire any right or title to the property.

x x x The innocent purchaser for value protected by law is one who

purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered

owner himself, not by a forged deed, as the law expressly states. x x x

In Instrade, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,45

we reiterated the said rulingmaintaining that "[A]s early as Joaquin v. Madrid, x x x, we said that in

order that the holder of a certificate for value issued by virtue of the

registration of a voluntary instrument may be considered a holder in

good faith and for value, the instrument registered should not be

forged". Indubitably, therefore, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale did

not convey any title to herein petitioners. Consequently, they cannot

take refuge in the protection accorded by the Torrens system on titled

lands.





































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Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if

accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered

owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the

forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property. The CA has

aptly arrived at the same conclusion in its August 20, 2003 Decisionaffirming in toto the August 2, 2001 Decision of the RTC of Cagayan de

Oro City ratiocinating that:

It is significant to stress that the main thrust in the case at bench is the

regularity and validity of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale dated

December 7, 1970 (Record p. 374, Exhibit "3") allegedly executed by

JULIAN in favor of the appellants. As such, we must not confuse the issue

at hand by averring that other documents should be considered in

determining the validity of the deed of absolute sale. The reason is

simple: the valid execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale will convey and

transfer ownership in favor of appellants title based on the rule that by

the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to

transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other

to pay therefor a sum certain in money or its equivalent (Coronel vs.

Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 15). The fact that the assailed Deed was not

signed by JULIAN and the signatures of JULIAN and GUILLERMA were

forged per findings of the NBI Senior Document Examiner, it can

therefore be inferred that the subsequent issuance of Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-14204 has no basis at all since ownership wasnot conveyed to appellants by reason of the forged Deed.1avvphi1

In addition, as to the issue that the Agreement dated December 10, 1970

(Record p. 375, Exhibit "4") executed between DOMINGO and PATRICIO

were excluded, we believe there is no need to delve on the said

Agreement since the same will not in any way give justification to the

forgery committed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. As explained by the

court a quo, to which we concur, appellees should not be faulted because

they are not lawyers, and as such they may not be able to appreciate thelegal logic between Exhibits "3" and "4".46

Prescription did not bar respondents’ action to recover ownership of the

subject property.

Citing Article 145447 of the Civil Code, petitioners assert that since the

respondents admit that there was a mortgage transaction between Julianand herein petitioners involving the subject property there is no dispute

that an implied trust was created by operation of law. In which case,

respondents’ right to reconveyance had already prescribed when they

filed the annulment case on April 3, 1992, or more than 10 years after

petitioners’ repudiated such implied trust.

On the other hand, respondents assert that the element of consent is

totally wanting in the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale because the

signatures of Julian and Guillerma, which is equivalent to their consent,

were forged by the petitioners.48 They maintain that the absence of

consent made the said document null and void.49 Hence, this case falls

under the purview of Article 1410 of the Civil Code which provides that

an action to declare the inexistence of void contracts does not

prescribe.50

We agree with the respondents. The supposed vendor's signature having

been proved to be a forgery, the instrument is totally void or inexistent

as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil

Code.51According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for thedeclaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe". The

inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable which cannot be

cured either by ratification or by prescription.52

The award of moral damages and attorney’s fees is proper.

On this aspect, we must consider the blood relations among the parties.

One of the respondents, Emma S. Felicilda, testified on cross examination

that they had high regard for Myrna, their eldest sister.53 The same was

echoed by respondent Anita Sambaan on cross examination.54 They




































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could not believe that Myrna would keep and appropriate the land for

herself and transfer the title exclusively to her name.55 On direct

examination, respondent Emma S. Felicilda likewise testified that the

forgery caused them anger and bad emotions.56

Moreover, it was Julian’s dying wish for the property to be redeemed

from the petitioners.57 Hence, it is not unexpected that the sentimental

significance of the property and the anger and emotions caused by the

unlawful transfer of the same have moved the respondents to recover

the same through the instant action. We therefore hold that the award

of P20,000.00 as moral damages is proper.

In addition, in view of the complexity of the instant case and the multiple

levels of appeal that this case had gone through, we also affirm the

award of attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 as well as the actual damages

of P1,671.00 incurred by the prevailing party which was substantiated

during trial.

On a final note, it bears stressing that the arguments raised by the

petitioners are essentially the same issues they put forward before the

CA which have been duly passed upon and considered by the appellate

court in affirming the RTC Decision in toto.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of

the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that theconclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

Footnotes













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1 Records, p. 374.

2 Penned by Judge Edgardo T. Lloren.

3

Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole andconcurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis

and Rosmari D. Carandang.

4 Rollo, pp. 45-64.

5 Id. at 10-43.

6 Records, pp. 5-6.

7 Id. at 1-4.

8 Id. at 7.

9 Id. at 34-40.

10 Id. at 41-42.

11 Id. at 372-373.

12 Id. at 374.

13 Id. at 375.

14 Id. at 73-74.

15 Id. at 84.

16 Id. at 538-547.

17 Rollo, pp. 265-266.

18 Id. at 64.

19 CA rollo, pp. 144-155.

20

Id. at 186.

21 315 Phil. 805, 820 (1995).

22 Id.

23 Xentrex Motors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 258, 262

(1998).

24 Judge Español v. Judge Mupas, 484 Phil. 636, 657 (2004).

25 Bascos, Jr. v. Tagahanan, G.R. No. 180666, February 18,

2009.

26 Rollo, pp. 369-372.

27 Emphasis supplied.

28 Rollo, p. 53.

29 TSN, April 13, 1994, p. 7.

30 124 Phil. 444, 447-448 (1966).

31 Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The

handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who

believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he

has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to

be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,

and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such

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person. Evidence [in respect to] the handwriting may also be

given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,

with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party

against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be

genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

32 Rollo, p. 47.

33 TSN, February 11, 1997, p. 33.

34 Rollo, p. 362.

35 TSN, July 5, 1996, p. 20 reads on cross-examination:

Q: But you were not present when the alleged

signature was affixed. Is that correct?

A: I was not present.

36 TSN, August 21, 1995, p. 16 reads on direct examination:

Q: Did you know who were the witnesses to the

signing of this document?

A: No, sir.

37 Records, p. 59.

38 Id.

39 Chase v. Buencamino, Sr., 221 Phil. 65, 78 (1985).

40 395 Phil 791, 801 (2000).

41 341 Phil. 624, 633 (1997).

42 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 1, 13 (1999).

43

Alba Vda. De Raz v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 710, 725(1999).

44 252 Phil. 223, 231 (1989).

45 395 Phil 791, 801 (2000).

46 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

47 Article 1454. If an absolute conveyance of property is

made in order to secure the performance of an obligation ofthe grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is

established. If the fulfilment of the obligation is offered by

the grantor when it becomes due, he may demand

reconveyance of the property to him.

48 Rollo, p. 425.

49 Id. at 427.

50 Id. at 425.

51 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84464, June 21,

1991, 198 SCRA 472, 479.

52 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on

the Civil Code of the Philippines Volume IV, p. 633.

53 TSN, April 13, 1994, p. 26.



































































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54 TSN, March 28, 1995, p. 13.

55 TSN, April 13, 1994, p.26; March 28, 1995, p. 13.

56

Id at 8.

57 Id. at 47.













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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 187752 November 23, 2010

IRENE K. NACU, substituted by BENJAMIN M. NACU, ERVIN K. NACU,

and NEJIE N. DE SAGUN, Petitioners,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE

AUTHORITY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking the

reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated December 24, 2008

and Resolution2 dated May 6, 2009. The assailed Decision held that Irene

K. Nacu (Nacu), Enterprise Service Officer III at the Philippine Economic

Zone Authority (PEZA), assigned at the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ),

was guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial tothe best interest of the service, and imposed upon her the penalty of

dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties.

The case arose from the following facts:

On December 17, 1999, PEZA issued Memorandum Order No. 99-003,

prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees

from PEZA-registered enterprises. The pertinent portions of the said

regulation read:

Effective immediately, PEZA shall provide processing/documentation

services required by economic zone export-producers for incoming and

outgoing shipments x x x FREE OF OVERTIME FEES/CHARGES x x x.

x x x x

Economic zone export producers, customs brokers, freight forwarders,

truckers and other service providers and enterprises are strictly

prohibited from offering financial and/or non-financial tokens,

compensation, etc. to any PEZA official and/or personnel, in connection

with PEZA overtime services rendered and/or other transactions.

In addition, economic zone export-producers, customs brokers, freight

forwarders, truckers and other service providers and enterprises are

enjoined to notify ranking PEZA officials (Administrator, Manager,

Officer-in-Charge, Deputy Director Generals and the Director General) on

any difficulties or problems they encounter, particularly those

pertaining to lack of service-orientation or improper behavior of any

PEZA officer and/or personnel.3

Sometime in September 2001, Edison (Bataan) Cogeneration

Corporation (EBCC) filed a complaint against Nacu for allegedly charging

it overtime fees, despite Memorandum Order No. 99-003.

Acting on the complaint, PEZA immediately conducted a preliminary

investigation, during which Atty. Norma B. Cajulis, PEZA’s lawyer,

interviewed Rey Ligan (Ligan), a document processor at EBCC. Ligan

attested, among others, that the overtime fees went to Nacu’s group, and

that, during the time Nacu was confined in the hospital, she pre-signed

documents and gave them to him.

On November 21, 2001, Atty. Procolo Olaivar (Atty. Olaivar) of PEZA

Legal Services Group requested the National Bureau of Investigation

(NBI) to verify the genuineness of Nacu’s signatures appearing on the

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8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



Statements of Overtime Services (SOS).4 Original copies of 32 SOS and a

specimen of Nacu’s signature were then sent to the NBI for comparison.

On January 25, 2002, the NBI informed Atty. Olaivar that "no definite

opinion can be rendered on the matter" since "the standards/samplesignatures of the subject submitted [we]re not sufficient and appropriate

to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination." The NBI then

requested that, should PEZA still want it to conduct further examination,

it be furnished with additional standard/sample signatures, in the same

style and pattern as that of the questioned document, appearing in

official/legal documents on file, executed before, during, and after the

date of the questioned document .5

PEZA referred the 32 SOS, together with the same standard specimen of

Nacu’s signatures/initials, to the Philippine National Police Crime

Laboratory (PNP Crime Lab) for determination of the genuineness of

Nacu’s signature appearing therein.

In Questioned Document Report No. 052-02 dated May 3, 2002, Rosario

C. Perez, Document Examiner II of the PNP Crime Lab, stated her

findings, thus –

1. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the

questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19, Q-20, Q-21, Q-23, Q-24, Q-

25, Q-27 to Q-32" and the submitted standard initials/signatures

of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19" inclusive reveal significant

divergences in the matter of execution, line quality and stroke

structure.

2. Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the

questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU marked "Q-

7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" and the submitted

standard signatures/initials of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-

19" inclusive reveal significant similarities in the manner of

execution, line quality and stroke structure.

x x x x

CONCLUSION

1. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU

marked "Q-1 to Q-6, Q-11, Q-12, Q-13, Q-15, Q-19 to Q-21, Q-23

to Q-25, Q-27 to Q-32" appearing in the twenty-two (22) pieces

[of] Statement of Overtime Services and the submitted standard

initials/signatures of Irene K. Nacu marked "S-1 to S-19"

inclusive WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME

PERSON.

2. The questioned initials/signatures IRENE NACU/I. NACU

marked "Q-7 to Q-10, Q-14, Q-16 to Q-18; Q-22, Q-26" appearing

in the ten (10) pieces of Statement of Overtime Service and the

submitted standard initials/signatures [of] Irene K. Nacu marked

"S-1 to S-19" inclusive WERE WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME

PERSON.6

Finding a prima facie case against Nacu, PEZA Director General Lilia B.

de Lima (Director General De Lima) filed a Formal Charge against her forDishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best

Interest of the Service. It was alleged that Nacu unlawfully

charged P3,500.00 overtime fee from EBCC on ten occasions (covered by

the ten SOS which the PNP Crime Lab found to have been written by

Nacu), for a total amount ofP35,000.00.

Nacu denied that the signatures appearing on the ten overtime billing

statements were hers. She averred that it was impossible for her to

charge EBCC overtime fees as the latter was well aware that PEZA

employees may no longer charge for overtime services; that she had no













8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



actual notice of Memorandum Order No. 99-003; and that she caused no

damage and prejudice to PEZA and EBCC.

During the hearing, PEZA presented the following witnesses: Rosario

Perez, the document examiner who examined the SOS; Atty. DanteQuindoza, Zone Administrator of BEZ, who testified that Nacu was one of

the officials authorized to sign the documents; Romy Zaragosa,

Corporate Relations Manager of Covanta Energy, who attested that

meetings were held on November 17, 2001 and January 25, 2002,

wherein Ligan testified that he gave the payment for overtime fees to

Nacu; Roberto Margallo (Margallo), Enterprise Service Officer III of

PEZA, who testified that he knows Nacu’s signature and that he was

certain that the signatures appearing on the SOS were hers; Omar Dana,

EBCC plant chemist, who testified that EBCC paid, through Ligan,

overtime fees to Nacu and some other persons; Elma Bugho, PEZA

Records Officer, who testified on the issuance of PEZA Memorandum

Order No. 99-003;7 and Miguel Herrera, then Division Chief of PEZA at

the BEZ, who testified that he was responsible for the implementation of

PEZA rules and regulations and for assigning examiners upon the

request of zone enterprises and brokers.8

On February 8, 2005, the PEZA Central Board of Inquiry, Investigation,

and Discipline (CBIID), with the approval of Director General De Lima,

found Nacu guilty of the acts charged, thus:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the Central Board of Inquiry,

Investigation and Discipline (CBIID) –

1. resolves – that Irene K. Nacu committed an act which

constitutes a ground for disciplinary action and finds her guilty

of dishonesty, grave misconduct[, and conduct] prejudicial to the

best interest of service pursuant to Section 46(b)(1), (4) and

(27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and hereby

2. recommends that – respondent be dismissed from service

pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV, Revised Uniform Rules in

Administrative Cases in Philippine Civil Service with accessory

penalties of:

a) cancellation of eligibility;

b) forfeiture of retirement benefits; and

c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the

government service.9

Nacu moved for a reconsideration of the CBIID’s findings, but the motion

was denied. By way of appeal, Nacu elevated the case to the Civil Service

Commission (CSC).

On February 19, 2007, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 070327,

affirming the CBIID’s resolution, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Irene K. Nacu, former Enterprise Service

Officer III, Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), is hereby

DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 08, 2005 issued by

Director General Lilia B. de Lima finding Nacu guilty of Dishonesty, Grave

Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Serviceand imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service with the

accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement

benefits, and disqualification from being re-employed in the government

service is AFFIRMED.10

Nacu filed a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 070327,

but the motion was denied in Resolution No. 071489 dated August 1,

2007.11





















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Nacu forthwith filed a petition for review with the CA, assailing the CSC

resolutions. On September 17, 2007, while the case was pending

resolution, Nacu died and was substituted by her heirs, Benjamin Nacu

(husband), Nejie N. de Sagun (daughter), and Ervin K. Nacu (son), herein

petitioners.

The CA, in the assailed Decision dated December 24, 2008, affirmed the

CSC resolutions. The CA could not believe Nacu’s claim that she was not

aware of Memorandum Order No. 99-003, considering that the order

was issued almost two years earlier. According to the CA, as a PEZA

employee, Nacu had the obligation to keep herself abreast of everything

that transpires in her office and of developments that concern her

position. It stressed that even if Nacu had not actually received a copy of

the memorandum order, such circumstance will not foreclose the order’s

effectivity; and that it is merely an internal regulation which does not

require publication for its effectivity.12

The CA brushed aside Nacu’s objections to (a) Ligan’s written statement

because it was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as

witness during the hearing; (b) the PNP Crime Lab’s findings for being

unreliable in light of the NBI’s own finding that the samples were not

sufficient; and (c) Margallo’s testimony identifying Nacu’s signatures on

the SOS, on the ground that he was not presented as an expert witness.

The CA pointed out that proceedings in administrative cases are notstrictly governed by technical rules of procedure and evidence, as they

are required to be disposed of summarily.

In particular, the CA found pointless Nacu’s criticism of the PNP Crime

Lab’s findings based on the NBI’s opinion on the samples given. To

counter the same, the CA highlighted the fact t hat the NBI’s opinion did

not conclusively state that the signatures were not that of Nacu. It

stressed that Nacu failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to

contradict the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, relying merely on the NBI’s

opinion which, to the mind of the CA, did not actually absolve petitioner.

According to the CA, Memorandum Order No. 99-003, the PNP’s findings,

and the witnesses’ testimonies, taken together, were sufficient to hold

Nacu administratively liable for the acts complained of. Nacu was not

denied due process, considering that she was given the opportunity to

explain her side and present evidence, and that she had, in fact,participated in the hearing.

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.13

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners, but the CA deniedthe motion in its Resolution14 dated May 6, 2009. They then elevated the

case to this Court through this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners submit to this Court the issue of whether the finding that

Nacu is guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial

to the best interest of the service is supported by substantial evidence.

Petitioners’ arguments focus largely on the weight given by t he CA to the

PNP Crime Lab’s report, which, they insist, should not be given credenceas it is unreliable. Firstly, it was not shown that the questioned

document examiner who examined the SOS was a handwriting expert.

Secondly, the signature samples were, according to the NBI, insufficient

references for a comparative examination. Thirdly, the sample

signatures used were obtained in violation of Nacu’s right against self -

incrimination. And lastly, the report merely states that there were

similarities in the manner of execution, line quality, and stroke

structures of the signatures, and that such conclusion does not translate

to a finding that the signatures appearing on the SOS are genuine.












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Petitioners also object to the CA’s reliance on the statements made by

Ligan during the preliminary investigation, which were not given under

oath. They contend that Nacu was denied due process when Ligan was

not presented as witness during the trial, and that there were

inconsistencies in Ligan’s statements.

And finally, as an affirmative defense, they reiterate that Nacu was not

aware of the issuance and implementation of Memorandum Order No.

99-003. They point out that there was, in fact, no showing that the said

order had been published in a newspaper, posted at the BEZ, or a copy

thereof furnished to Nacu.

We find no merit in this petition.

Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in

administrative proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.15 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when

there is reasonable ground to believe that a person is responsible for the

misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be

overwhelming or even preponderant .16

Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by Ligan

during the preliminary investigation, and the findings of the PNP CrimeLab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS, amounted to

substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu

was guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners’ allegations of

unreliability, irregularities, and inconsistencies of the evidence neither

discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu.

For one, petitioners cite the PNP’s findings as unreliable in light of the

NBI’s opinion that the samples utilized by the PNP Crime Lab—the same

samples submitted to the NBI—were not sufficient to make a

comparative examination.

We do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the

findings of one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover,

as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, the

NBI’s finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the

NBI did not actually make a determination of the genuineness of thesignatures. While the NBI may have found the samples to be insufficient,

such finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime Lab’s own

findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the signatures

found on the overtime billings matched the sample signatures. The

difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples could

only mean that the PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from

that used by the NBI in the examination of handwriting.

Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, Nacu should

have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the

signatures appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all,

whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same by clear and

convincing evidence.17 Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged

weakness of the complainant’s evidence without offering stronger

evidence to contradict the former.

In any case, the CA did not rely solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in

concluding that the signatures appearing on the ten SOS were Nacu’s.

Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu, alsoidentified the latter’s signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves

credence. It has been held that an ordinary witness may testify on a

signature he is familiar with.18 Anyone who is familiar with a person’s

writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence

with him, or from having become familiar with his writing through

handling documents and papers known to have been signed by him may

give his opinion as to the genuineness of that person’s purported

signature when it becomes material in the case.19





















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Petitioners also posit that Nacu was denied her right against self-

incrimination when she was made to give samples of her signature. We

do not agree. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or

automatically operational. It must be claimed; otherwise, the protection

does not come into play. Moreover, the right must be claimed at theappropriate time, or else, it may be deemed waived.20 In the present

case, it does not appear that Nacu invoked her right against self-

incrimination at the appropriate time, that is, at the time she was asked

to provide samples of her signature. She is therefore deemed to have

waived her right against self-incrimination.

Next, petitioners assail the credibility of Ligan’s statement because it

was not made under oath and Ligan was not presented as witness during

the hearing. Nacu was allegedly denied due process when she was

deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Ligan.

It is settled that, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of

procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due

process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial

sense.21 In a recent case, a party likewise protested against the non-

presentation of a witness during trial and the lack of opportunity to

cross-examine the said witness. Addressing the issue, the Court held that

the contention was unavailing, stating that -

In another case, the Court addressed a similar contention by stating that

the petitioner therein could not argue that she had been deprived of due

process merely because no cross-examination took place. [Citing

Casimiro v. Tandog, 459 SCRA 624, 633 (2005)]. Indeed, in

administrative proceedings, due process is satisfied when the parties are

afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the

controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the

action or ruling complained of .22

The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals

allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not

compromised. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable or violative of

due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely

on position papers, affidavits, or documentary evidence submitted bythe parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct

testimonies.23

In addition, petitioners claim that there were inconsistencies in Ligan’s

statement. While Ligan allegedly stated that Nacu gave him pre-signed

documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that these

pre-signed documents referred to the ten overtime billings referred to in

the formal charge, the record does not show that Nacu was confined in

the hospital on the dates indicated in the said billings.

To set the record straight, Ligan did not specifically mention that the

dates indicated in the pre-signed documents were also the days when

Nacu was confined in the hospital. He merely said that Nacu pre-signed

some documents during the time that she was in the hospital, and that

she gave these documents to him. Neither did he state that these pre-

signed SOS were the same ten SOS cited in the formal charge against

Nacu. It was petitioners’ own assumption that led to this baseless

conclusion.1avvphi1

In Nacu’s defense, petitioners contend that she (Nacu) was not aware of

the existence of Memorandum Order No. 99-003. They aver that there

was no evidence showing that Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was

posted, published, and promulgated; hence, it cannot be said that the

order had already taken effect and was being implemented in the BEZ.

Petitioners claim that Nacu had, in fact, no actual knowledge of the said

order as she was not furnished with a copy thereof.

Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As

correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the

















8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not in any

way informed—by posting or personal notice—of the implementation of

the said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been

issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were

employees of PEZA and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident thatthe prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was

common knowledge to them.

At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect.

Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that clearly

falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the

publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case of Tañada v.

Hon. Tuvera:24

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,

regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the

public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-

called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors

concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates

in the performance of their duties.25

At the very least, Nacu should have been aware that collecting payments

directly from PEZA-registered enterprises was strictly prohibited.

Months before Memorandum Order No. 99-003 was promulgated, PEZAhad already put a stop to the practice of collecting direct payments for

overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises under Office Order No.

99-0002 dated March 8, 1999. The latter specifically provides that

"overtime shall be paid only through the regular payroll system," and

that overtime claims shall be supported by the required

documents.26 This was followed by PEZA General Circular No. 99-0001

(Prescribing New Rates of Overtime Pay Payable by Zone Enterprises,

Customs Brokers And Other Entities Concerned) dated August 10, 1999,

providing that –

4.5. All payments to be made by requesting parties shall be

covered by official receipts. IN NO CASE SHALL PAYMENT BE

MADE DIRECTLY TO ZONE/PCDU PERSONNEL.

4.6 No additional charges or fees shall be paid by requestingparties, nor shall they offer gifts, "tips" and other

financial/material favors to PEZA employees rendering overtime

services.

4.7 At the end of the month, all claims of personnel for payment

of overtime services shall be supported by the following

documents:

4.7.1. Copies of written requests by enterprises and other

parties;

4.7.2. Certificate of service or DTR;

4.7.3. Authority to render overtime services; and

4.7.4. Certificate of accomplishment .27

Petitioners desperately argue that Nacu could not have charged and

collected overtime fees from EBCC as it was well aware of MemorandumOrder No. 99-003. The contention is puerile. Petitioners are, in effect,

saying that knowledge of the existence of a rule prohibiting a certain act

would absolutely prevent one from doing the prohibited act. This

premise is undeniably false, and, as a matter of fact, judicial institutions

have been founded based on the reality that not everyone abides by the

law.

All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave misconduct,

dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,

and penalized with dismissal from the service and its accessory

















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penalties. The general rule is that where the findings of the

administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such

findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding

on this Court. It is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting

evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substituteits own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency

of evidence.28

Nacu’s length of service or the fact that this was her first offense has not

been clearly established. We cannot reasonably take them into

consideration in reviewing the case. At any rate, these circumstances

cannot serve to mitigate the violation, considering the gravity of the

offense and the fact that Nacu’s act irreparably tarnished the integrity of

PEZA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated December 24, 2008 and its Resolution dated May

6, 2009 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO

MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in


the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice





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Footnotes

* On official leave.

1

Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with AssociateJustices Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) and

Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 55-71.

2 Id. at 72-74.

3 Id. at 118-119.

4 Id. at 78.

5 Id. at 83.

6 Id. at 89-90.

7 Id. at 121-122.

8 Id. at 19.

9 Id. at 60-61.

10 Id. at 61-62.

11 Id. at 62.

12 Id. at 65-66.

13 Supra note 1, at 71.

14 Supra note 2.

15 Dadulo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 175451, April 13, 2007,

521 SCRA 357, 362.

16 Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552

SCRA 589, 608.

17 Aznar Brothers Realty v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 95, 112

(2000).

18 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 50 provides:

SEC. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of

a witness for which proper basis is given, may be

received in evidence regarding —

x x x x

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient

familiarity.

19 FRANCISCO, R.J., Evidence, Rule of Court in the Philippines,

Rules 128-134 (1996 ed.), p. 366.

20 People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989, 175 SCRA 216,

228.

21 Ocampo v. Ombudsman, 379 Phil. 21, 28 (2000).

22 Donato, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 1,

G.R. No. 165788, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 48, 60.

23 Marcelo v. Bungubung, supra note 16, at 603-604.

24 230 Phil. 528 (1986).

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8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



25 Id. at 535.

26 Rollo, p. 98.

27

Id. at 94.

28 Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590, 601

(2001).













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Law 126 Evidence Prof. Avena 32. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS Page 23 of 57

32. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS


SUPREME COURT Baguio

EN BANC

A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-177-CA-J April 12, 2011

RE: COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MEMBERS OF CHINESE GROCERS

ASSOCIATION AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS

R E S O L U T I O N

We pass upon the unsigned letter complaint for administrative action

and disbarment sent by the Concerned Members of Chinese Grocers

Association (CGA) to the Office of Chief Justice Corona against Court of

Appeals Justice Socorro B. Inting on November 25, 2010 for gross

neglect of judicial duties in deciding Case No. P-08-132 GLRO CA.D

Record No. 84, entitled "In Re: Petition for Issuance of a New Owner’s

Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42417 of the Registryof Deeds of Manila" while she was still Presiding Judge of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch IV, Manila. Specifically, the complainants allege that

Justice Inting acted with gross negligence when she turned a blind eye to

the suspicious circumstances surrounding the petitioner in the case,

Romualdo dela Cruz, and granted the petition.

Factual Antecedents

The CGA is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 315 square

meters located in Manila, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title

(TCT) No. 42417.

Sometime in 2008, Romualdo dela Cruz (dela Cruz) filed a petition forthe issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417, claiming

that the old owner’s duplicate copy had been misplaced. This petition

was assigned to the sala of then Judge Inting, presiding Judge of Branch

IV, RTC Manila.

In the petition, dela Cruz claimed that: (a) the Office of the Register of

Deeds had already been notified of the loss through an Affidavit of Loss;

(b) TCT No. 42417 issued in the name of the CGA is still valid and

subsisting; (c) copies of the Notice of Hearing have been duly posted, as

evidenced by the Sheriff’s Certificate of Posting; and (d) dela Cruz’s

interest in filing this petition is based on his right as a vendee of the

property, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 19,

2008, allegedly executed between CGA, represented by Ang E. Bio, and

dela Cruz.1

On June 16, 2009, Justice Inting issued an order granting dela Cruz’s

petition. The dispositive portion of this Order stated:

WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby ordered uponpayment of the prescribed fees of his office to issue a new owner’s

duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42417 in lieu of the lost one

which is hereby cancelled and declared of no further force and effect and

to annotate on said title a memorandum of the issuance of a new owner’s

copy thereof in lieu of the lost one upon Order of the Court and to deliver

said new owner’s copy of the title to the petitioner or his counsel or duly

aut horized representative provided that such new owner’s copy of the

title to be issued shall be made subject to the same terms and conditions

as the original thereof and that no document or transaction registered or

pending registration in his office shall be adversely affected thereby.

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SO ORDERED.

Since no motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed

challenging Justice Inting’s June 16, 2009 Order within the reglementary

period provided by law, the order became final and executory, and thenew owner’s duplicate title was given to dela Cruz.

The Letter Complaint

In their letter complaint dated November 15, 2010, the Concerned

Members of CGA claimed that Justice Inting acted with gross neglect

when she granted dela Cruz’s petition for the issuance of a new owner’s

duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417. To recall, dela Cruz filed the petition as

the alleged vendee of the property. However, the complainants point out

that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 15, 2008, the basis fordela Cruz’s interest and right to file the petition, should have aroused

Justice Inting’s suspicion as it was allegedly signed on behalf of CGA

by Ang E. Bio, who died on August 28, 2001. The complainants also

found it suspicious that Justice Inting did not question dela Cruz on the

particulars of the sale – i.e, what the basis was of Bio’s authority to

represent CGA in the sale, whether dela Cruz had paid the applicable

taxes in relation to the alleged sale, and why the land was sold for

only P5,500,000.00 when it was worth at least P50 million –before

granting the petition. The complainants further faulted Justice Inting fornot asking dela Cruz why he, and not CGA, filed the petition.

Justice Inting’s Comment

On December 7, 2010, the Court en Banc issued a resolution requiring

Justice Inting to comment on the letter complaint within ten (10) days

from notice of the resolution.

Responding to our Order, Justice Inting filed a letter with the Court on

January 28, 2011 asking for an additional thirty (30) days to file her

comment. The Court en Banc resolved to grant this request in its

February 1, 2011 resolution.

In her comment filed on February 23, 2011, Justice Inting averred that

there was nothing suspicious in dela Cruz filing the petition as a vendeesince Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration

Decree) allows another person in interest to file a petition for the

issuance of a new owner’s duplicate title. She further explained that on

May 8, 2009, the Acting Chief of the Clerks of Court Division issued a

Notice of Hearing addressed to dela Cruz, the Register of Deeds of Manila

and the CGA, setting the case for hearing on June 3, 2009. The court’s

process server also posted this Notice of Hearing on May 13, 2009 at

three conspicuous public places in Manila. However, no representative

of CGA appeared to participate in the proceedings or oppose the petition

at the initial hearing on June 3, 2009. Accordingly, Justice Inting allowed

dela Cruz to present his evidenceex-parte before Atty. Cheryl Morales,

the Chief of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration

Authority. Based on the evidence presented, consisting of the notarized

Deed of Absolute Sale between CGA and dela Cruz, and the Affidavit of

Loss registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of

the original title in the possession of the Register of Deeds of Manila, and

given CGA’s lack of opposition, Justice Inting granted the petition.

Justice Inting further emphasized that she did not transfer title over theland to dela Cruz; rather, she merely issued an order granting the

issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417, with

the same terms and conditions as the original. She also denied the

complainants’ claim that she knew dela Cruz prior to this case, stressing

the fact that she only met dela Cruz when he appeared before her court

with his attorney to comply with the petition’s jurisdictional

requirements.

Justice Inting also questioned the complainants’ failure to take the

necessary remedial actions against the order, such as filing a petition for

8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



relief of judgment within the reglementary period, as well as their failure

to file any criminal action against dela Cruz, the instigator of the alleged

fraudulent sale.

OUR RULING

The only issue we have to resolve is whether Justice Inting, in granting

dela Cruz’s petition, is guilty of misconduct. To answer this question, we

examine the procedure in petitions for the issuance of new duplicate

certificates of title.

The applicable law is Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529

(Property Registration Decree), which states:

Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In caseof loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title, due notice

under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the

Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as

the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or

destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for the entry of a

new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn

statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the

registered owner or other person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the

court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new

duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that

it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all

respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and

shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.

The above-quoted provision clearly allows a person who is not the

owner of the property to file the petition for a new duplicate certificate,

provided the person has interest in the property.

The next logical question is – was dela Cruz a person in interest to the

subject property? We find that he was, given the fact that he had what

appeared to be a validly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject

property in his favor. As a public document, the subject Deed of Absolute

Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict it, onemust present evidence that is clear and convincing; otherwise, the

document should be upheld.2

In the present case, however, no one from CGA appeared during the

proceedings to oppose dela Cruz’s petition or to bring to Justice Inting’s

attention the fact that Ang Bio was already dead at the time the deed of

sale was allegedly executed. Given the lack of any evidence to assume

otherwise, Justice Inting correctly relied on the notarized Deed of Sale’s

presumption of regularity.

As for the complainants’ allegation that Justice Inting had the duty to

inquire into the details of the alleged sale, we reiterate that in a petition

for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of a certificate of title,

the RTC, acting only as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction,

has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership of the

land covered by the lost owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of

title.3 Questions involving the issue of ownership have to be threshed out

in a separate suit where the trial court will conduct a full-blown hearing

with the parties presenting their respective evidence to proveownership over the subject realty.4 After all, the objective of a petition

for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy is merely to determine

two things – (1) that the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title

was actually lost; and (2) that the person who filed the petition has

sufficient interest in the property covered by the title to acquire a copy

of the same. It was thus not for Justice Inting to question dela Cruz on the

specifics of the purported sale (i.e., why the land was sold to dela Cruz at

such a low price, whether dela Cruz paid the applicable taxes for the

transfer of the property, etc.) during these proceedings.













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In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of

proving the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence, i.e.,

that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to justify a conclusion.5 We set the applicable standard in

deciding cases involving accusations of misconduct leveled at judges inConcerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Villalon-Pornillos, where we said:

The burden of substantiating the charges in an administrative

proceeding against court officials and employees falls on the

complainant, who must be able to prove the allegations in the complaint

with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary,

the presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties

will prevail. Moreover, in the absence of cogent proof, bare allegations

of misconduct cannot prevail over the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official functions. In fact, an administrative complaint

leveled against a judge must always be examined with a discriminating

eye, for its consequential effects are, by their nature, highly penal, such

that the respondent stands to face the sanction of dismissal and/or

disbarment. The Court does not thus give credence to charges based on

mere suspicion and speculation.6

Apart from the questionable nature of the Deed of Absolute Sale in dela

Cruz’s favor, brought to light only now upon the presentation of the

Certificate of Death, the complainants have not presented any otherevidence to support the charge of misconduct leveled against Justice

Inting.

Significantly, however, the complainants attached a mere photocopy of

Ang Bio’s Certificate of Death to their letter complaint. While the

Certificate of Death is indeed a public document, to prove its contents,

there is a need to present a certified copy of this document, issued by the

public officer in custody of the original document .7 Since the Certificate

of Death is not a certified copy, it is inadmissible as proof, and is

considered a mere scrap of paper without any evidentiary

value.1avvphi1

Given the lack of any evidence to prove that Justice Inting acted with any

bad faith or ill-motive in acting on the petition, or even committed anyerror in issuing the assailed order, we dismiss the complaint against her.

As we stated in Tan Tiac Chiong v. Cosico:8

When an administrative charge against a Judge or court personnel has

no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to

protect them against any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial

processes. In short, this Court will not shirk from its responsibility of

imposing discipline upon all employees of the judiciary, but neither will

it hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt

rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint against

Justice Socorro B. Inting, Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu, for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

















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Law 126 Evidence Prof. Avena 33. OFFICIAL RECORD Page 27 of 57

33. OFFICIAL RECORD


SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY

OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners,

vs.

MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas

Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public

Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist

under a two-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.

Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary

period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board

Employment Contract No. 2.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated

from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed

the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she

returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air

fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC) a complaint 2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner

ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia

Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that

petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to warrant

respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular

employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly

ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for

the three months unexpired portion of her contract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor

Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’

motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution5 of April

22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their

principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune

from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that

respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the

performance rating within the one-year period as required underKuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal

should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI.

By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC

Resolution.

In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of

the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable

with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private

employment agency shall assume all responsibilities for the

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8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker,

hence, it can be sued jointly and severally with the foreign principal for

any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.

As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of

Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995,"

corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may

themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency

for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the

appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for

review on certiorari was filed.

Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable becauserespondent’s employment contract specifically stipulates that her

employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations

of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error for the labor

tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions

governing probationary employment in deciding the present case.

Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas

Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts

(Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the"customs, practices, company policies and labor laws and legislation of

the host country."

Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor

laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government

agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any

document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner

ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability

had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired over

it.

The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade

responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)

which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its

foreign principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from

suit, or that such foreign principal’s liability must first be established

before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment

agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely

affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and

sufficient payment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.

Maguad8 explains:

. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement

entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign

principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so

that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the

responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under

the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the

expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and

employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.Otherwise, this

will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governingthe employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted.

(emphasis supplied)

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of

the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.9 Verily,

to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its

foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign

principal’s liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law

on joint and solidary liability inutile.











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As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary

employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in

respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into,

that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing

Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accordrespect to such rules, customs and practices of the host country, the

same was not substantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the

parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as

they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to

govern their respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to

law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the applicationof a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of

processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to

discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v.

NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically

states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the

contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures,

etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to applyto the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to

the termination of the employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied

to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The

foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and

proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a

foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on

the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity

approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign

law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is

that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine laborlaws in determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they

must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law,

the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with

Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which

reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documentsreferred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any

purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy

attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his

deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,

with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which

the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by

a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice

consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the

Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a

document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the

attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the

original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation

must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or

if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.




8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA

between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which

provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1)

year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations

apply; a translated copy11

(Arabic to English) of the termination letter torespondent stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without

specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate

of termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr.

Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of

Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and

respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she

noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a

rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work

schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently

prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary

employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a

copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and

translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the

Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications

attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and

the termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil

service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under suchKuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject

certifications read:

x x x x

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to

English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for

review and certification and the same was/were found to be in

order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the

contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for

whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the

same is in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on

money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the

contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and

decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint,

the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue

of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas

deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other

forms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement

agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and

several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas

employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The

performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as

provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages

that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement

agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors andpartners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily

liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and

damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice













8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice


Associate Justice


Associate Justice


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in



CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the DivisionChairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above

decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned

to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Annex "C" of the petition, rollo, pp. 59-60.

2 CA rollo, p. 197.

3 Id at. 32-36. Penned by Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro Franco.

4 Id. at 26-29. Penned by Commissioner (now CA Associate

Justice) Angelita A. Gacutan and concurred in by Presiding

Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R.

Calaycay.

5 Id. at 30-31.

6 Id. at 95-104. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas

Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz

and Normandie B. Pizarro.

7 Id. at 137. Ibid.

8 G.R. No. 166363, August 15, 2006, 498 SCRA 639, 645 citing

Catan v. NLRC, 160 SCRA 691.

9 Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower And Promotion

Services, Inc., G.R. No. 156029, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 41,

42.

10 G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 409, 430.

11 Annex ‘D" of the petition, rollo, pp. 61-63.

12 Annex "D-1" of the petition, id. at 64-66

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13 Annex "E" of the petition, id. at 67.




8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence




SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)

Decision1 and Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of

administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly

obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas

Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of

administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate

estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec.

Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent

Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first

marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc.

No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground

of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same

estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not

considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support

of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamywas filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,

Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that

petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been

married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial

court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and

since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the

marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then

pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas

Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending

action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner

for the crime of bigamy.

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Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never

been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed

the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by

petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its

findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage

between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when

she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her

acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the

trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file

a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.4

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration,

petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via herPetition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of

the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of

administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent

should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also

insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have been

filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the

appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, todetermine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s

properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present

their evidence before it ruled on the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it

held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have

instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari.

Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the

fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under

Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on

the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For

litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must

be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same

interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed

for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the

two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in

one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res

judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special

proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to

establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in

contrast to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no

defendant or respondent. The only party in this kind of proceeding is thepetitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition

for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending

petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions

are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a

party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner

that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the former.

The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the

petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render

nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of

administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person, for

that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate

sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as

long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of

the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in

the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the

Revised Rules of Court, which provides:





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x x x x x x x x x

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for

letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been

preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a

marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie

evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had

been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed

by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by

contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage

has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared

presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper

proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the

petitioner in the said case negates the validity of her subsequent

marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her.There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the

findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a

contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to

the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters

of administration by the trial court is in place.

x x x x x x x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lackof merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that

the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she

was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her

marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of

the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to

appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that

petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court

concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows

that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing

to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage

between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner

was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim.

Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under theprinciples of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained

by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early

as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of

the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy

against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our

concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain

divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,

provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,

the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the

marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce

dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are

covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being

















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considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the

same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,

provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of

Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino

citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in

Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well

lose her right to inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the

respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we

stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the

Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the

nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals

must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.

Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this

jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have

enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,9 to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is

given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be

presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is

proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a

judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act

or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign

country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested

by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not

kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a

certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the

Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the

record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to

be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However,

appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules

on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,

1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to

its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the

Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it wasadmissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in

evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure

to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written

act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code

is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine

personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.

Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him withthe political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens,

freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of

their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed

his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him

to Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law

falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of





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a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the

original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of

Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a

long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by

Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in

the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who

alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or

defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving

the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the

answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material

allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the

divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the

pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged

and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that

judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The

power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every

reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

(Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the

validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the

marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to

remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of

evidence to establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent

marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of

administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may

be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin

of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules

of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we

said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree

allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to

remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file

the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the

records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the

validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the

marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the

U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for

pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held thatpresentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of

its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24

and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or

official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the

document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or

consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign

country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal ofhis office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized

in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage

Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California

which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance

with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take

judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.





8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for

further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by

Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of

the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of

administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution

dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to

Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further

proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice


I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in



ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division

Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above

Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was

assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with

Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and Ramon R. Garcia

concurring; rollo, pp. 20-30.

2 Id. at 49.

3 Id. at 38-45; penned by Judge Jules A. Mejia.

4 As narrated by the Court of Appeals on p. 3 of its Decision.

5

Rollo, pp. 26-29.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/feb2012/gr_183622_2012.html#rnt1















8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



6 Id. at 31-36.

7 223 Phil. 357, 362 (1985).

8 399 Phil. 342, 355-356 (2000).

9 418 Phil. 723, 723-735 (2001).

10 G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 294,

313-314.
















8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence




SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171136 October 23, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

LYDIA CAPCO DE TENSUAN, represented by CLAUDIA C.

ARUELO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the

Decision1 dated January 13 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 84125, which affirmed the Decision2 dated October 18, 2004 of the

Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case

No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-701 08). The MeTC confirmed the title of herein

respondent, Lydia Capco de Tensuan Tensuan), to the parcel of

agricultural land, designated as Lot 1109-A, located at Ibayo, Sta. Ana,

Taguig City, with an area of 4,006 square meters subject property), and

ordered the registration of said property in her name.

The following facts are culled from the records:

On August 11, 1998, Tensuan, represented by her sister, Claudia C.

Aruelo (Aruelo), filed with the MeTC an Application for Registration3 of

Lot Nos. 1109-A and 1109-B, docketed as LRC Case No. 172. In her

Application for Registration, Tensuan alleged that:

2. That Applicant is the absolute owner and possessor of those two (2)

paraphernal parcels of land situated at Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila,

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, bounded and described

as Lot 1109-A and 1109-B in Conversion Subdivision Plan Swo-00-

001456 as follows:

(a) Lot 1109-A, Swo-00-001456

"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-A of the Plan Swo-00-001456,

being a conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig,

[Cadastral] Mapping, L.R.C. Record No.), situated in Brgy. Sta.

Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.

x x x x"

(b) Lot 1109-B, Swo-00-001456

"A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot 1109-B, of plan Swo-00-001456, being a

conversion of Lot 1109, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping, L.R.C.

Record No.), situated in Sta. Ana, Mun. of Taguig, Metro Manila, Island of

Luzon.

x x x x"

3. That said two (2) parcels of land at the last assessment for taxation

were assessed at Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Pesos

(P60,820.00), Philippine currency, under Tax Declaration No. D-013-

01563 in the name of the Applicant;

4. That to the best of the knowledge and belief of Applicant, there is no

mortgage, encumbrance or transaction affecting said two (2) parcels of

land, nor is there any other person having any interest therein, legal or

equitable, or in adverse possession thereof;










8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



5. That Applicant has acquired said parcels of land by inheritance from

her deceased father, Felix Capco, by virtue of a "[Kasulatan] ng

Paghahati-hati at Pag-aayos ng Kabuhayan

" dated September 14, 1971, and Applicant specifically alleges that she

and her deceased father, as well as the lat ter’s predecessors-in-interest,

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of the said lands under a bonafide claim of ownership since

June 12, 1945, and many years earlier, as in fact since time immemorial,

as provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529;

6. That said parcels of land are and have been, since the inheritance

thereof, occupied by Applicant herself;

x x x x

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due notice, publication

and hearing, the paraphernal parcels of land hereinabove described be

brought under the operation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and the

same confirmed in the name of Applicant .4 (Emphasis ours.)

On August 20, 1998, Tensuan filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to

Withdraw Lot 1109-B from the Application for Registration and to

Amend the Application.5 According to Tensuan, she was withdrawing her

Application for Registration of Lot 1109-B because a review of Plan Swo-

00-001456 had revealed that said lot, with an area of 338 square meters,

was a legal easement. The MeTC, in its Order6 dated September 30, 1998,

granted Tensuan’s motion.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an

Opposition to Tensuan’s Application for Registration on December 28,

1998. The Republic argued that (1) neither Tensuan nor her

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June

12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniment/s of title and/or tax

declaration/s and tax payment receipt/s attached to the application

do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide

acquisition of the subject property or of Tensuan’s open, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject

property in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;

(3) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or

grant can no longer be availed of by Tensuan who failed to file an

appropriate application for registration within the period of six months

from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree No. 892; and

(4) the subject property forms part of the public domain not subject of

private appropriation.7

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) also filed its own

Opposition8 dated February 12, 1999 to Tensuan’s Application forRegistration, averring as follows:

2. That projection of the subject lot in our topographic map

based on the technical descriptions appearing in the Notice of

the Initial Hearing indicated that the lot subject of this

application for registration is located below the reglementary

lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to datum 10.00 meters

below mean lower water. Site is, therefore, part of the bed of

Laguna Lake considered as public land and is within thejurisdiction of Laguna Lake Development Authority pursuant to

its mandate under R.A. 4850, as amended. x x x;

3. That Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850, states that,

"whenever Laguna Lake or Lake is used in this Act, the same

shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the

lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level

of elevation of 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.0 meters

below mean lower low water (MLLW). Lands located at and




















8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed

of said lake (Section 14, R.A. 4850, as amended, x x x);

4. That on the strength of the oppositor’s finding and applying

the above-quoted provision of law, herein applicant’s application

for registration of the subject land has no leg to stand on, both in

fact and in law;

5. That unless the Honorable Court renders judgment to declare

the land as part of the Laguna Lake or that of the public domain,

the applicant will continue to unlawfully posses, occupy and

claim the land as their own to the damage and prejudice of the

Government in general and the Laguna Lake Development

Authority in particular;

6. That moreover, the land sought to be registered remains

inalienable and indisposable in the absence of declaration by the

Director of Lands as required by law.9

During the initial hearing on February 18, 1999, Tensuan marked in

evidence the exhibits proving her compliance with the jurisdictional

requirements for LRC Case No. 172. There being no private oppositor, a

general default against the whole world, except the government, was

declared.10

To prove possession, Tensuan presented two witnesses, namely, her

sister Aruelo and Remigio Marasigan (Marasigan).

Aruelo, who was then 68 years old, testified that Tensuan and her

predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property

even before the Second World War. The subject property was originally

owned by Candida de Borja, who passed on the same to her only child,

Socorro Reyes, and the latter’s husband, Felix Capco (spouses Capco).

The subject property became part of the spouses Capco’s conjugal

property. Aruelo and Tensuan are among the spouses Capco’s children.

During the settlement of Felix Capco’s estate, the subject property was

adjudicated to Tensuan, as evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Paghahati at

Pag-aayos ng Kabuhayan11 dated September 14, 1971.12

Marasigan claimed that he had been cultivating the subject property for

the last 15 years, and he personally knew Tensuan to be the owner of

said property.13 Marasigan’s father was the caretaker of the subject

property for the Capcos for more than 50 years, and Marasigan used to

help his father till the same. Marasigan merely inherited the job as

caretaker of the subject property from his father.

Among the evidence Tensuan presented during the trial were: (1) the

Kasulatan ng Paghahati-hati at Pagaayos ng Kabuhayan dated September

14, 1971;14 (2) Tax declarations, the earliest of which was for the year1948, in the name of Candida de Borja, Tensuan’s grandmother;15 (3)

Real property tax payment receipts issued to Tensuan for 1998;16 (3)

Blueprint copy of Plan Swo-00-001456 surveyed for Lydia Capco de

Tensuan;17 (4) Technical description of the subject property, duly

prepared by a licensed Geodetic Engineer and approved by the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);18 and (5)

Certification dated July 29, 1999 from the Community Environment and

Natural Resources Office of the DENR (CENRO-DENR) which states that

"said land falls within alienable and disposable land under Project No.27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1141

dated January 3, 1968."19

Engineer Ramon Magalona (Magalona) took the witness stand for

oppositor LLDA. He averred that based on the topographic map and

technical description of the subject property, the said property is located

below the prescribed lake elevation of 12.5 meters. Hence, the subject

property forms part of the Laguna Lake bed and, as such, is public land.

During cross-examination, Magalona admitted that the topographic map

he was using as basis was made in the year 1967; that there had been













































8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



changes in the contour of the lake; and that his findings would have been

different if the topographic map was made at present time. He likewise

acknowledged that the subject property is an agricultural lot. When

Magalona conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property, said

property and other properties in the area were submerged in water as

the lake level was high following the recent heavy rains.20

On May 26, 2000, an Investigation Report was prepared, under oath, by

Cristeta R. Garcia (Garcia), DENR Land Investigator, stating, among other

things, that the subject property was covered by a duly approved survey

plan; that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable

zone classified under Project No. 27-B, L.C. Map No. 2623; that the

subject property is not reserved for military or naval purposes; that the

subject property was not covered by a previously issued patent; that the

subject property was declared for the first time in 1948 under TaxDeclaration No. 230 in the name of Candida de Borja;21 that the subject

property is now covered by Tax Declaration No. D-013-01408 in the

name of Lydia Capco de Tensuan; that the subject property is

agricultural in nature; and that the subject property is free from adverse

claims and conflicts. Yet, Garcia noted in the same report that the "the

applicant is not x x x in the actual occupation and possession of the land"

and "LLDA rep. by Atty. Joaquin G. Mendoza possesses the legal right to

file opposition against the application x x x."22 The Investigation Report

was submitted as evidence by the Republic.

In its Decision dated October 18, 2004, the MeTC granted Tensuan’s

Application for Registration, decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, from the evidences adduced and testimonies presented by

the parties, the Court is of the considered view that herein applicant has

proven by preponderance of evidence the allegations in the application,

hence, this Court hereby confirms the title of applicant LYDIA CAPCO DE

TENSUAN married to RODOLFO TENSUAN, of legal age, Filipino and a

resident of No. 43 Rizal Street, Poblacion, Muntinlupa City to the parcel

of agricultural land (Lot 1109-A, Mcadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral

Mapping) located at Ibayo-Sta. Ana, Taguig, Metro Manila containing an

area of Four Thousand Six (4,006) square meters; and order the

registration thereof in her name.

After the finality of this decision and upon payment of the corresponding

taxes due on said land subject matter of this application, let an order for

issuance of decree be issued.23

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, insisting that the MeTC

should not have granted Tensuan’s Application for Registration

considering that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed,

hence, is not alienable and disposable. The appeal was docketed as CA-

G.R. CV No. 84125.

In the herein assailed Decision of January 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the MeTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision

dated October 18, 2004 is AFFIRMED.24

Hence, the Republic filed the present Petition with the following

assignment of errors:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF

LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE

APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN]

DESPITE HER FAILURE TO PROVE OPEN, ADVERSE,

CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN

THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER OF THE SUBJECT LAND FOR

THIRTY YEARS.





















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II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF

LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE

APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF [TENSUAN]

BECAUSE THE SUBJECT LAND BEING PART OF THE LAGUNA

LAKE BED IS NOT ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.25

The Republic contends that Tensuan failed to present incontrovertible

evidence to warrant the registration of the property in the latter’s name

as owner. Aruelo’s testimony that her father possessed the land even

before the Second World War and Marasigan’s claim that he and his

father have been tilling the land for a total of more than 65 years are

doubtful considering that the subject property is located below the

reglementary lake elevation and is, thus, part of the Laguna Lake bed.Also, the CENRO Certification is not sufficient evidence to overcome the

presumption that the subject property still forms part of the public

domain, and is not alienable and disposable. On the other hand, Tensuan

asserts that the Petition should be dismissed outright for raising

questions of fact. The findings of the MeTC and the Court of Appeals that

the subject property is alienable and disposable, and that Tensuan and

her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, continuous,

exclusive, and notorious possession of the same for the period required

by law, are supported by preponderance of evidence.

We find the instant Petition meritorious.

The Republic asserts that the assigned errors in its Petition are on

questions of law, but in reality, these questions delve into the sufficiency

of evidence relied upon by the MeTC and the Court of Appeals in

granting Tensuan’s Application for Registration of the subject property.

It is basic that where it is the sufficiency of evidence that is being

questioned, it is a question of fact .26

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless

the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence

on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of

facts.27 In Reyes v. Montemayor,28 we did not hesitate to apply the

exception rather than the general rule, setting aside the findings of fact

of the trial and appellate courts and looking into the evidence on record

ourselves, in order to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the case,

to wit:

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law shall be

raised in a Petition for Review before this Court. This rule, however,

admits of certain exceptions, namely, (1) when the findings are

grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when

the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based

on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are

conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the

admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are

contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions

without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when

the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and

reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the

findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence andcontradicted by the evidence on record.

While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower

court’s findings of fact, unless said findings are not supported by or are

totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such

finding must of necessity be modified to conform with the evidence if the

reviewing tribunal were to arrive at the proper and just resolution of the

controversy. Thus, although the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals

are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts, if said

factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record, this Court will

















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not hesitate to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower

courts. In the instant case, the Court finds sufficient basis to deviate from

the rule since the extant evidence and prevailing law support a finding

different from the conclusion of the Court of Appeals and the RTC.

(Citations omitted.)

Tensuan anchors her right to registration of title on Section 14(1) of

Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property

Registration Decree, which reads:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper

Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,

whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interesthave been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and

occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under

a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The aforequoted provision authorizes the registration of title acquired in

accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise

known as the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.

1073, which provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying

lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an

interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,

may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is

located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate

of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession

and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,

under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,

except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be

conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to

a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the

provisions of this chapter.

The requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title

under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are: (1) that the

property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public

domain; and (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation; and that such possession is undera bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 In Heirs

of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,30 we affirmed our earlier ruling in

Republic v. Naguit ,31 that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration

Decree merely requires the property sought to be registered as already

alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of

title is filed.

We proceed to determine first whether it has been satisfactorily proven

herein that the subject property was already alienable and disposable

land of the public domain at the time Tensuan filed her Application for

Registration on August 11, 1998.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the

State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership

of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. The same

doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly

within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.

Consequently, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of

ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for













8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



registration. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified and

alienated by the State to a private person, it remains part of the

inalienable public domain.32

As to what constitutes alienable and disposable land of the public

domain, we turn to our pronouncements in Secretary of the Department

of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap33:

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into

agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution

provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial,

residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,

and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the

government great leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution

reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. x x x

x x x x

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In

keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time

and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the

government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable

public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In

fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to

those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership

of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for

registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land

subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this

presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the

land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as

alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application

for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of

a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or

an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of

Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The

applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the

land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is

alienable and disposable. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)

As proof that the subject property is alienable and disposable, Tensuan

presented a Certification dated July 29, 1999 issued by the CENRO-DENR

which verified that "said land falls within alienable and disposable land

under Project No. 27-B L.C. Map No. 2623 under Forestry Administrative

Order No. 4-1141 dated January 3, 1968." However, we have declared

unequivocally that a CENRO Certification, by itself, is insufficient proofthat a parcel of land is alienable and disposable. As we held in Republic

v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.34:

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is

alienable and disposable.

The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary

had approved the land classification and released the land of the public

domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the

application for registration falls within the approved area per

verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the

applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original

classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true

copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be

established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by

respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and

disposable.












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Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the

certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who

issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to

testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the

contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if

the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence,

they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable

and disposable.

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised

Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the

sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public

officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last

wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents

referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be

evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the

officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.

The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the

issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and

disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of

the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and

disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: "Sec. 23.

Public documents as evidence. — Documents consisting of entries in

public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are

prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public

documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which

gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications

do not fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first

sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect

"entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public

officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of

registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications

are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original

official records in the legal custody of a government office. The

certifications are not even records of public documents. Thecertifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus

have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be

considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications

do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable

land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary.

Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the

facts stated therein.1âwphi1 Such government certifications may fall

under the class of documents contemplated in the second sentence of

Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie

evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not

constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of

the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated

therein. Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s

representative, identified the certifications but the government officials

8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the

certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value.

The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was

incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the

certifications. Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an

officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification

survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR

Secretary as alienable and disposable. (Emphases ours, citations

omitted.)

While we may have been lenient in some cases35 and accepted

substantial compliance with the evidentiary requirements set forth in

T.A.N. Properties, we cannot do the same for Tensuan in the case at bar.

We cannot afford to be lenient in cases where the Land Registration

Authority (LRA) or the DENR oppose the application for registration onthe ground that the land subject thereof is inalienable. In the present

case, the DENR recognized the right of the LLDA to oppose Tensuan’s

Application for Registration; and the LLDA, in its Opposition, precisely

argued that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed and,

therefore, inalienable public land. We do not even have to evaluate the

evidence presented by the LLDA given the Regalian Doctrine. Since

Tensuan failed to present satisfactory proof that the subject property is

alienable and disposable, the burden of evidence did not even shift to the

LLDA to prove that the subject property is part of the Laguna Lake bed.

Given the lack of evidence that the subject property is alienable and

disposable, it becomes unnecessary for us to determine the other issue

in this case, i.e., whether Tensuan has been in open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and that such

possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945

or earlier. Regardless of the character and length of her possession of the

subject property, Tensuan cannot acquire registerable title to inalienable

public land.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84125 and

Decision dated October 18, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Taguig City, Branch 74 in LRC Case No. 172 LRA Rec. No. N-70 1 08) are

SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Lydia Capco de Tensuan

is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Chief Justice

Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice


Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice


Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the

conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s

Division.

MARIA LOURDES P A SERENO

Chief Justice




8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 27-36; penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso

with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Amelita

G. Tolentino, concurring.

2 Id. at 72-74.

3 Id. at 37-41

4 Id.

5 Records, pp. 29-30.

6 Id. at 38.

7 Id. at 39-41.

8 Id. at 229-233.

9 Id. at 229-230.

10 Id. at 223-224.

11 Id. at 16-22.

12 TSN, March 16, 1999, pp. 7-9.

13 Id. at 11-12.

14 Records, pp. 16-22.

15 Id. at 235-256.

16 Id. at 257-258.

17 Id. at 25-27.

18 Id. at 6.

19 Id. at 270.

20 TSN, September 5, 2001, pp. 5-6, 12-14.

21 An actual perusal of Tax Declaration No. 230 reveals that the

name appearing thereon is "Candida de Borja." (Records, p. 255.)

22 Records, p. 309.

23 Rollo, p. 74.

24 Id. at 36.

25 Id. at 18.

26 Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 179905, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA

481, 491.

27 Republic v. De la Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010,

634 SCRA 610, 618.

28 G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 61, 74-75.

29 Lim v. Republic, G.R. No. 158630, September 4, 2009, 598 SCRA

247, 257.
























































































8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



30 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, 203.

31 489 Phil. 405, 414 (2005).

32 Zarate v. Director of Lands, 478 Phil. 421, 433 (2004).

33 G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164,

184-192.

34 G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477, 489-491.

35 Republic v. Serrano, G.R. No. 183063, February 24, 2010, 613

SCRA 537; Republic v. Vega, G.R. No. 177790, January 17, 2011,

639 SCRA 541.



















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8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence


Law 126 Evidence Prof. Avena 34. ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE Page 52 of 57

of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated documents,

namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE

PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA",

respectively, and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation,

Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest,

succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name, to the

damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary

injunction was necessary to prevent the private respondents from

disposing of said property. 3

Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints

and alleged as special and affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause

of action, for the reason that Original Certificate of Title No. RO-1038

(11725) was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon

petitioners' expedient claim that the owner's duplicate copy thereof hadbeen missing when the truth of the matter was that OCT No. RO-1038

(11725) in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled and

superseded by TCT No. 794 in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan

Limpin by virtue of the document entitled "TRADUCCION AL

CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRA-JUDICIAL"

entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter TCT was in

turn superseded by TCT No. 929 issued in the name of Inocencio Songco

(father of private respondents) by virtue of a document entitled

"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" executed by spouses Juan Limpin

and Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo. 4

Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against

petitioners based on allegations that the latter headed by Carlito

Magpayo, by force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of the

fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private

respondents had 3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which

upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private respondents deprived and

damaged in the amount of P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal

occupancy caused private respondents to suffer unrealized income and

profits, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and serious anxiety which

entitled them to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as

attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance fee for every hearing. 5

On 20 January 1985, the parties assisted by their respective counsel filed

in Civil Case No. G-1332 a joint stipulation of facts, alleging:

1. That on June 9, 1982, the plaintiffs, being heirs of

Demetria Lacsa, filed Civil Case No. 1190;

2. That after the defendants filed their Answer in the said

Civil Case No. G-1190, and learning the land subject of the

two (2) abovementioned cases (sic), said plaintiffs filed a

Motion for Leave to Admit Amended and/or

Supplemental Complaint.

3. That the said motion was denied by the Honorable

Court, hence, said plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. G-1332,

the above-entitled case, with the same cause of action as

that of the proposed Amended and/or Supplemental

Complaint;

4. That the evidences of both parties in Civil Case No. G-

1190 and in the above-entitled case are practically and

literally the same;

5. That in view of the foregoing, and in order to avoid

duplicity of action by repeatedly presenting the same act

of evidences and same set of witnesses, the parties

mutually agreed as they hereby agree and stipulate that

any and all evidences presented under Civil Case No.

1190 shall be adopted as evidences for both parties in the

above-entitled case, and upon submission for resolution

of Civil Case No. G-1190, the above-entitled case shall

126 i f A 34 A C OC 3 f

8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



likewise be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis

of the evidence presented in the same Civil Case No. G-

1190. 6

On the basis of this joint stipulation of facts, the lower court held that:

. . . the fishpond in question was originally owned by

Demetria Lacsa under Original Certificate of Title No.

11725. After Demetria Lacsa died her two daughters

Alberta Guevarra and Ambrocia Guevarra with their

respective husbands Juan Limpin and Damaso Cabais

entered into an extrajudicial partition of the properties

left by Demetria Lacsa under the document "Traduccion

Al Castellano de la Escritura de Partition Extra-judicial"

dated April 7, 1923 (Exhibits "3","3-A" and "3-B")wherein the fishpond in question was adjudicated to

Alberta Guevarra and which deed was duly registered in

the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as

evidenced by the certification of the Deputy Register of

Deeds marked as Exhibit "3-C". Aside from the

"Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion

Extrajudicial" written in the Spanish language, the

spouses Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin and the

spouses Ambrosia Guevarra and Damaso Cabais executed

on April 7, 1923, another deed of partition in the

Pampango dialect marked as Exhibit "3-D" "wherein the

fishpond in question was adjudicated to Alberta

Guevarra. As a consequence, Original Certificate of Title

No. 794 (Exhibit "4") was issued to spouses Alberta

Guevarra and Juan Limpin. On January 20, 1924, the

spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra sold the

fishpond in question to Inocencio Songco under the deed

entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" (Exhibits "7" and

"7-A") which was duly registered in the Office of the

Registry of Deeds of Pampanga as evidenced by the

certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds marked

Exhibit "7-B". As a result of the sale, Transfer Certificate

of Title No. 794 (Exhibit "4") in the name of the spouses

Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin was cancelled by the

Office of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga and Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 929 was issued to Inocencio

Songco." 7

The lower court thus held that the fishpond in question belongs to the

private respondents, having been inherited by them from their deceased

father Inocencio Songco. 8

The dispositive portion of the judgment in favor of private respondents

reads:

WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered

In Civil Case No. G - 1190

(A) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case

No. G-1190;

In Civil Case No. G-1332

(B) Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case

No. G-1332;

In Both Civil Case No. G-1190 and Civil Case No. G-1332

(C) Ordering the cancellation of Original Certificate of

Title No. RO-1038 (11725) in the name of Demetria

Lacsa;

L 126 E id P f A 34 ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE P 54 f 57

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(D) Ordering the plaintiffs to restore possession of the

fishpond in question located in Bancal, Guagua,

Pampanga, to the defendants (sic);

(E) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally,

the defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand

(P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for

moral damages;

(F) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally, the

defendants the sum of Twenty Five Thousand

(P25,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, as and for

exemplary damages;

(G) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay jointly and severally,the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)

Pesos, Philippine Currency, as attorney's fees;

(H) Costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED. 9

Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent

Court of Appeals assigning the following errors allegedly committed by

the lower court:

I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PREPONDERANCE

OF EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-

APPELLANTS THAT THE TWO DOCUMENTS (EXHS. 3 & 7

AND THEIR SUB-MARKINGS) WERE FORGED AND

ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED DOCUMENTS. HENCE, NULL

AND VOID;

II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT

THE SIGNATURE OF JUAN LIMPIN AND THUMBMARK OF

ALBERTA GUEVARRA APPEARING ON THE EXCRITUA

DE VENTA ABSOLUTA (EXHS. 7 & 7-A) WERE FORGED;

III. IN APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES

THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY WITNESS JESUS CRUZ

WHEN THEIR SOURCES COULD NOT BE ACCOUNTED

FOR AND THEIR AUTHENTICITY IS IN QUESTION;

IV. IN HOLDING THAT INOCENCIO SONGCO, THE

PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE APPELLEES WAS

AN INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE;

V. IN HOLDING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLENO. 929 WAS ISSUED TO INOCENCIO SONGCO BY THE

REGISTERED TRY OF DEEDS OF PAMPANGA;

VI. IN HOLDING THAT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

NO. RO-1038 (11725) WAS ISSUED BY THE COURT (CFI-

III PAMPANGA) IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT

JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE NULL AND VOID;

VII. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE VOLUNTARY

ABANDONMENT OF THE FISHPOND IN QUESTION BY

THE APPELLEES WAS A RECOGNITION OF APPELLANTS'

TITLE TO IT;

VIII. IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE APPELLEES. 10

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in the appealed case, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

L 126 E id P f A 34 ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE P 55 f 57

8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with the modification that appellants are not

liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as

attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 11

Petitioners flied a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals

but the same was denied in its resolution dated 14 August

1987. 12 Hence, this petition.

Petitioners assign the following alleged errors to the Court of Appeals:

I. IN APPLYING THE "ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE" ON

THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT ENTITLED "ESCRITURADE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" AND "ESCRITURA DE

VENTA ABSOLUTA; AND MARKED DURING THE TRIAL

AS EXHIBITS "3" AND "7", RESPECTIVELY, FOR THE

RESPONDENT HEREIN;

II. IN DISREGARDING THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT

OF THE NOTARIAL LAW WHICH TOOK EFFECT AS

EARLY AS FEBRUARY 1, 1903;

III. IN DISREGARDING THE RULE ON PROOF OF PUBLIC

OR OFFICIAL RECORD, (SEC. 25, RULE 132, RULES OF

COURT) 13

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the

"ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of

Court. 14 The rule states that:

Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary .— Were a

private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced

from a custody in which it would naturally be found if

genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or

circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its

execution and authenticity need be given.

It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be

classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty

(30) years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is

unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from

suspicion. 15 Thus, according to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled

"Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and

"Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the

foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said

documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this

constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations. 16

We are not persuaded by the contention. Under the "ancient document

rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due

execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than thirty

(30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are

fulfilled; (1) that it is produced from a custody in which it would

naturally be found if genuine; and (2) that it is unblemished by any

alteration or circumstances of suspicion. 17

The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la

Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923

whereas the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de Venta

Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are,

therefore, more than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the

aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of the original

on file with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the

Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to

the Pampango translation of the document of extrajudicial partition

La 126 E idence Prof A ena 34 ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE Page 56 of 57

8/10/2019 31 34. Evidence



which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records

Management of the Department of General Services. 18

Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third

parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The

documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with

the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper

custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient

document rule" were met.

As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to

be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to

support their allegation of falsification of the said documents. They

merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2)

pages could have easily led to their substitution. We cannot uphold thissurmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract

apparently honest and lawful on its face must be treated as such and one

who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive

evidence of falsification. 19

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a

document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of

suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack

of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or

circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that

the documents in question, which were certified as copied of the

originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and

free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.

The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in

Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Further proof of their due

execution and authenticity is no longer required. Having held that the

documents in question are private writings which are more than thirty

(30) years old, come from the proper repository thereof, and are

unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion, there is no

further need for these documents to fulfill the requirements of the 1903

Notarial Law. Hence, the other contentions of the petitioners that the

documents do not fulfill the mandatory requirements of the Notarial

Law 20 and that the proper person or public official was not presented to

testify on his certification of the documents in question, 21 need not be

resolved as they would no longer serve any purpose.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court

of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Herrera, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., took no part.

Footnotes

* Penned by Justice Gloria C. Paras, with the concurrence

of Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Conrado T. Limcaoco.

1 Rollo, p. 57.

2 Rollo, p. 57.

3 Rollo, p. 58.

4 Rollo, pp. 57-58.

5 Rollo, p. 59.

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6 Rollo, p. 59.

7 Rollo, p. 60.

8 Ibid .

9 Rollo, pp. 60-61.

10 Rollo, pp. 61-62.

11 Rollo, p. 65.

12 Rollo, p. 8.

13 Rollo, p. 8.

14 Rollo, p. 8.

15 Rollo, pp. 8-9.

16 Rollo, p. 9.

17 Francisco, Vicente J ., The Revised Rules of Court in the

Philippines. Volume III, Part II, 1973 Edition, p. 432.

18 Exhibit "3-D", Original Folder of Exhibits for the

Plaintiffs and Defendants.

19 Dy vs. Sacay, G.R. Nos. 78535-36, September 19, 1988,

165 SCRA 473.

20 Rollo, p. 9.

21 Rollo, p. 10.

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