403 NEG - Terrorism

8/20/2019 403 NEG - Terrorism

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My Life for Aiur- Terrorism Neg

You are here (Index)………………………………………………………………….1Stability doesn’t solve terrorism………………………………………………………2-9Terrorism now………………………………………………………………………...10

No WMDs…………………………………………………………………………….11-25


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Improvements and stabilizations in government do not decrease terrorism- terroristswould backlash.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005

But this begs a fundamental question: Is it true that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it i s to produce terrorists and t errorist groups? In other words, is thesecurity rationale for promoting democracy in the Arab world based on a sound premise? Unfortunately,the answer appears to be no. Although what is known about terrorism is admittedly incomplete, the dataavailable do not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction interrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely thatdemocratization would end the current campaign against the United States. Al Qaeda and like-mindedgroups are not fighting for democracy in the Muslim world; they are fighting to impose their vision of anIslamic state. Nor is there any evidence that democracy in the Arab world would "drain the swamp,"eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public and reducing the number of

potential recruits for them.

Even if democracy were achieved in the Middle East, what kind of governments would it produce? Would they cooperate with the Uni ted States on important policy obj ectives

besides curbing terrorism, such as advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process, maintaining security in the Persian Gulf, and ensuring steady supplies of oil? No one can predict the course a new democracy will take, but based on public opinion surveys and recent elections inthe Arab world, the advent of democracy there seems likely to produce new Islamist governments thatwould be much less willing to cooperate with the United States than are the current authoritarian rulers.

The answers to these questions should give Washington pause. The Bush administration's democracyinitiative can be defended as an effort to spread American democratic values at any cost, or as a long-termgamble that even if Islamists do come to power, the realities of governance will moderate them or the

public will grow disillusioned with them. The emphasis on electoral democracy will not, however , serveimmediate U.S. interests either in the war on terrorism or in other important Middle East policies.


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There are no credible studies that correlate socioeconomic indicators, such as failedstates, with an increase in terrorism.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005

Despite the wide acceptance of this connection, the academic literature on the relationship between

terrorism and other sociopolitical indicators, such as democracy, is surprisingly scant. There are good case studiesand general surveys of terrorists and terrorist organizations, but few that try to determine whether more

democracy leads to less terrorism. Part of the problem is the quality of the data available. The Western presstends to report terrorist incidents with a cross-border element more completely than homegrown terroristattacks. Moreover, most of the statistics identify the location of an incident, but not the identity of the perpetrators-- and much less whether they came from nondemocratic countries.

Given such incomplete information, only preliminary conclusions from the academic literature are possible.However, even these seem to discredit the supposedly close link between terrorism and authoritarianism

that underlies the Bush administration's logic. In a widely cited study of terrorist events in the 1980s, the politicalscientists William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg demonstrate that most terrorist incidents occur in

democracies and that generally both the victims and the perpetrators are citizens of democracies. Examiningincidents from 1975 to 1997, Pennsylvania State University's Quan Li has found that although terrorist attacks are less frequent when democratic political participation is high, the

kind of checks that liberal democracy typically pl aces on executive power seems to encourage terrorist actions. In his recent book, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of SuicideTerrorism, Robert Pape finds that the targets of suicide bombers are almost always democracies, but that t he motivation of the groups behind those bombings is to fight againstmilitary occupation and for self-determination. Terrorists are not driven by a desire for democracy but by their opposition to what they see as foreign domination.

The numbers published by the U.S. government do not bear out claims of a close link between terrorismand authoritarianism either. Between 2000 and 2003, according to the State Department's annual "Patternsof Global Terrorism" report, 269 major terrorist incidents around the world occurred in countries classifiedas "free" by Freedom House, 119 occurred in "partly free" countries, and 138 occurred in "not free"countries. (This count excludes both terrorist attacks by Palestinians on Israel, which would increase thenumber of attacks in democracies even more, and the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States,which originated in other countries.) This is not to argue t hat free countries are more likely to produce terrorists than other countries. Rather, thesenumbers simply indicate that there is no relationship between the incidence of terrorism in a given countryand the degree of freedom enjoyed by its citizens. They certainly do not indicate that democracies are

substantially less susceptible to terrorism than are other forms of government.


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Empirically proven: Democracy promotion causes terrorism. Our evidence is empirical,comparative, and even assumes its own research errors.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005

Comparing India, the world's most populous democracy, and China, the world's most populousauthoritarian state, highlights the difficulty of assuming that democracy can solve the terrorism problem.For 2000-2003, the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report indicates 203 international terrorist attacks inIndia and none in China. A list of terrorist incidents between 1976 and 2004, compiled by the NationalMemorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, shows more than 400 in India and only 18 in China.Even if China underreports such incidents by a factor of ten, it still endures substantially fewer terroristattacks than India. If the relationship between authoritarianism and terrorism were as strong as the Bushadministration implies, the discrepancy between the number of terrorist incidents in China and the numberin India would run the other way.

More anecdotal evidence also calls into question a necessary relationship between regime type andterrorism. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of brutal terrorist organizations arose in democratic countries:the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Ireland and the United Kingdom, theJapanese Red Army in Japan, and the Red Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhof Gang) in West Germany. Thetransition to democracy in Spain did not eliminate Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) Basque separatistterrorism. Turkish democracy suffered through a decade of mounting political violence that lasted until thelate 1970s. The strong and admirable democratic system in Israel has produced its own terrorists, includingthe assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It appears that at least three of the suicide bombers in theLondon attacks of July were born and raised in the democratic United Kingdom. Nearly every day brings a painful reminder that real democratization in Iraq has been accompanied by serious terrorism. And amemorial in Oklahoma City testifies to the fact that even U.S. democracy has not been free of terrorism ofdomestic origins.

There is, in other words, no solid empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or any otherregime type, and terrorism, in either a positive or a negative direction. In her highly praised post-September11 study of religious militants, Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stern argues that "democratization is notnecessarily the best way to fight Islamic extremism," because the transition to democracy "has been found

to be an especially vulnerable period for states across the board." Terrorism springs from sources other thanthe form of government of a state. There is no reason to believe that a more democratic Arab world will,simply by virtue of being more democratic, generate fewer terrorists.


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Stable governments do not solve terrorism.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005

There are also logical problems with t he argument supporting the U.S. push for democracy as part of the war on terrorism. Underlying the assertion thatdemocracy will reduce terrorism is the belief that, able to participate openly in competitive politics and

have their voices heard in the public square, potential terrorists and terrorist sympathizers would not needto resort to violence to achieve their goals. Even if they lost in one round of elections, the confidence thatthey could win in the future would inhibit the temptation to resort to extra-democratic means. The habits ofdemocracy would ameliorate extremism and focus the anger of the Arab publics at their own governments,not at the United States.

Well, maybe. But it is just as logical to assume that terrorists, who rarely represent political agendas thatcould mobilize electoral majorities, would reject the very principles of majority rule and minority rights onwhich liberal democracy is based. If they could not achieve their goals through democratic politics, whywould they privilege the democratic process over those goals? It seems more likely that, having beenmobilized to participate in the democratic process by a burning desire to achieve particular goals -- a desireso strong that they were willing to commit acts of violence against defenseless civilians to realize it --terrorists and potential terrorists would attack democracy if it did not produce their desired results. Respect

for the nascent Iraqi democracy, despite a very successful election in January 2005, has not stopped Iraqiand foreign terrorists from their campaign against the new political order.

Terrorist organizations are not mass-based organizations. They are small and secretive. They are notorganized or based on democratic principles. They revolve around strong leaders and a cluster ofcommitted followers who are willing to take actions from which the vast majority of people, even thosewho might support their political agenda, would rightly shrink. It seems unlikely that simply being outvotedwould deflect them from their path.

The United States' major foe in the war on terrorism, al Qaeda, certainly would not close up shop if everyMuslim country in the world were to become a democracy. Osama bin Laden has been very clear aboutdemocracy: he does not like it. His political model is the early Muslim caliphate. In his view, the Talibanregime in Afghanistan came the closest in modern times to that model. In an October 2003 "message to

Iraqis," bin Laden castigated those in the Arab world who are "calling for a peaceful democratic solution indealing with apostate governments or with Jewish and crusader invaders instead of fighting in the name ofGod." He referred to democracy as "this deviant and misleading practice" and "the faith of the ignorant."Bin Laden's ally in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, reacted to the January 2005 Iraqi election even moredirectly: "The legislator who must be obeyed in a democracy is man, and not God. ... That is the veryessence of heresy and polytheism and error, as it contradicts the bases of the faith and monotheism, and because it makes the weak, ignorant man God's partner in His most central divine prerogative -- namely,ruling and legislating."

Al Qaeda's leaders distrust democracy, and not just on ideological grounds: they know they could not cometo power through free elections. There is no reason to believe that a move toward more democracy in Arabstates would deflect them from their course. And there is no reason to believe that they could not recruitfollowers in more democratic Arab states -- especially if those states continued to have good relations with

the United States, made peace with Israel, and generally behaved in ways acceptable to Washington. AlQaeda objects to the U.S. agenda in the Middle East as much as, if not more than, democracy. If, asWashington hopes, a democratic Middle East continued to accept a major U.S. role in the region andcooperate with U.S. goals, it is foolish to think that democracy would end Arab anti-Americanism and dryup passive support, funding sources, and recruiting channels for al Qaeda.

When it works, liberal democracy is the best form of government. But there is no evidence that it reducesor prevents terrorism. The fundamental assumption of the Bush administration's push for democracy in theArab world is seriously flawed.


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Stable democracies would not cooperate as well as current authoritarian governments.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

It is highly unlikely that democratically elected Arab governments would be as cooperative with the UnitedStates as the current authoritarian regimes. To the extent that public opinion can be measured in these

countries, research shows that Arabs strongly support democracy. When they have a chance to vote in realelections, they generally turn out in percentages far greater than Americans do in their elections. But manyArabs hold negative views of the United States. If Arab governments were democratically elected and morerepresentative of public opinion, they would thus be more anti-American. Further democratization in theMiddle East would, for the foreseeable future, most likely generate Islamist governments less inclined tocooperate with the United States on important U.S. policy goals, including military basing rights in theregion, peace with Israel, and the war on terrorism.

Turn: Even if the plan made perfect democracies of the whole world, the U.S. wouldintervene and depose the government.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

The problem with promoting democracy in the Arab world is not that Arabs do not like democracy; it is thatWashington probably would not like the governments Arab democracy would produce. Assuming thatdemocratic Arab governments would better represent the opinions of their people than do the current Arab regimes, democratization of the Arab world should produce more anti-U.S. foreign policies. In a February-March2003 poll conducted in si x Arab countries by Zogby International and the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, overwhelmingmajorities of those surveyed held either a very unfavorable or a somewhat unfavorable attitude toward theUnited States. The Lebanese viewed the United States most favorably, with 32 percent of respondentsholding a very favorable or a somewhat favorable view of the United States. Only 4 percent of Saudirespondents said the same.

The Iraq war destroys U.S. efforts at democracy promotion and soft power- we’re in the

hole now.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

The war in Iraq -- which was imminent or ongoing as the poll was conducted -- surely affected thesenumbers. But these statistics are not that different from those gathered by less comprehensive pollsconducted both before and after the war. In a Gallup poll in early 2002, strong majorities of those surveyedin Jordan (62 percent) and Saudi Arabia (64 percent) rated the United States unfavorably. Only in Lebanondid positive views of the United States roughly balance negative views. In a Zogby International pollconducted in seven Arab countries at about the same time, unfavorable ratings of the United States rangedfrom 48 percent in Kuwait to 61 percent in Jordan, 76 percent in Egypt, and 87 percent in Saudi Arabia andthe UAE. One year after the war began, a Pew Global Attitudes poll showed that 93 percent of Jordaniansand 68 percent of Moroccans had a negative attitude toward the United States.

Although it is not possible to pinpoint from poll data the precise reasons for anti-Americanism in the Arab world, there are indications that it is U.S. policy in the region, not a rejection of American ideals, thatdrives the sentiment. In the Zogby International-Sadat Chair poll of February-March 2003, respondents in five of six Arab countries said that their attitudestoward the United States were based more on U.S. policy than on U.S. values. Forty-six percent of Egyptians polled identifiedU.S. policy as the source of their feelings, compared with 43 percent who stressed American values. No fewer than 58 percent of respondents in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, andSaudi Arabia also emphasized their opposition to U.S. policy.


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Turn: Current U.S. efforts would inspire more terrorism because the population wouldsuspect our motives.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

In 2004, Arab publics were particularly cynical about Washington's policy of democracy promotion in theMiddle East. In a May 2004 Zogby International-Sadat Chair poll, only in Lebanon did a substantial segment of the population surveyed (44 percent) believe that promoting democracy was an important motive for the Iraq war -- compared with 25 percent of Jordanians and less than 10 percent of those in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and

the UAE. The majority of people polled in most of the countries thought the war was motivated byWashington's desire to control oil, protect Israel, and weaken the Muslim world. And in a less extensive Pew GlobalAttitudes survey, also conducted in 2004, only 17 percent of Moroccans and 11 percent of Jordaniansthought that the U.S. war on terrorism was a sincere effort, rather than a cover for other goals. And no pollis needed to show that U.S. policy on Arab-Israeli questions is very unpopular in the Arab world.

Turn: The plan would inspire more terrorism because the U.S. would give aid toauthoritarian governmets to temporary stabilize anCouncil on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

There is no doubt that public opinion can be a fickle thing. Anti-U.S. feelings in the Arab world could changemarkedly with events. But although it is possible that Arab anti-Americanism would decline if Washingtonno longer supported authoritarian Arab governments, there is little data to test the assertion, and anecdotalevidence suggests otherwise. Syrians, for example, do not hold strongly positive views of the United States, even though the Bush administration opposes thegovernment in Damascus. Apparently, the United States is unpopular in the Arab world because of the full range of its policies, not simply because it supports authoritariangovernments.

Even if democratization could reduce anti-Americanism, there is no guarantee that such a reduction wouldyield pro-American governments. Anecdotal evidence certainly seems to indicate, for example, that the public in non-Arab Iran has a better impression of the United States than does the Iranian government. TheIranian public's more pro-American stance did not, however, translate into votes for the candidate favoring

rapprochement with the United States in the second round of the recent presidential election.


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Empirically proven: democracies and stable governments would be anti American. Thesegovernments would be overtly hostile.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

History also indicates that legitimate democratic elections in Arab states would most likely benefitIslamists. In all recent Arab elections, they have emerged as the government's leading political opposition,and in many of them they have done very well. In Morocco, the new Justice and Development Party, anovertly Islamist party, took 42 of the 325 seats in the parliamentary elections of 2002, its first contest.(Only two long-established parties, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces and the Independence Party, wonmore seats: 50 and 48, respectively.) The same year, in Bahrain, Islamist candidates took between 19 and21 of the 40 seats in parliament (depending on how observers classified some independent candidates).This success came even though the major Shia political group boycotted the elections, protesting changesin the constitution.

In the 2003 parliamentary election in Yemen, the Yemeni Reform Group (Islah), a combination of Islamistand tribal elements, won 46 of the 301 seats and now forms the opposition. That year, Islamists combinedto win 17 of the 50 seats in the Kuwaiti parliament, where they form the dominant ideological bloc. In the2003 parliamentary election in Jordan, held after three postponements and a change in the electoral laws to

benefit independent candidates, the Muslim Brotherhood's political party won 17 of 110 seats andindependent Islamists took another 3 seats, forming the major opposition bloc.

So far this year, the pattern has repeated itself. In the Saudi municipal elections, informal Islamist ticketswon 6 of the 7 seats in Riyadh and swept the elections in Jidda and Mecca. Candidates backed by SunniIslamists also won control of the municipal councils in a number of towns in the Eastern Province. In theIraqi parliamentary elections, the list backed by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani won 140 of the 275 seats,compared with 45 seats for the two more-secular Arab lists, headed by then Prime Minister Ayad Allawiand then President Ghazi al-Yawar, and 75 seats for the unified Kurdish list, which is not particularlyIslamist.

In the Palestinian territories, Mahmoud Abbas, of the nationalist Fatah Party, won a convincing victory inthe 2005 presidential elections, but that is partly because Hamas did not field a candidate. Hamas has,

however, performed strongly in recent municipal elections: in the West Bank in December 2004, it tookcontrol of 7 town councils compared with Fatah's 12, and earlier this year in Gaza, Hamas captured controlof 7 of the 10 town councils, as well as two-thirds of the seats. Some observers predict that Hamas willoutpoll Fatah in the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections, which could be one reason that Abbashas postponed them.

The trend is clear: Islamists of various hues score well in free elections. In countries where a governing party dominates or where the king opposes political Islam, Islamists run second and form the opposition.Only in Morocco, where more secular, leftist parties have a long history and an established presence, and inLebanon, where the Christian-Muslim dynamic determines electoral politics, did organized non-Islamist political blocs, independent of the government, compete with Islamist forces. The pattern does not look likeit is about to change. According to the 2004 Zogby International-Sadat Chair poll, pluralities of thosesurveyed in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE said the clergy should play a greater role in their political

systems. Fifty percent of Egyptians polled said the clerics should not dictate the political system, but asmany as 47 percent supported a greater role for them. Only in Morocco and Lebanon did anticlericalsentiment dominate pro-clerical feelings -- 51 percent to 33 percent in Morocco and 50 percent to 28 percent in Lebanon. The more democratic the Arab world gets, the more likely it is that Islamists will cometo power. Even if those Islamists come to accept the rules of democracy and reject political violence, theyare unlikely to support U.S. foreign policy goals in the region.


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Stable regimes do not necessarily solve terrorism. And pushing for stability turnssolvency, bringing up governments that are even worse than anarchy, which will givegovernment support to terrorists.Council on Foreign Relations, Inc 2005. Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b3a20fa5a94ffb64083d3ef8f613f58a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVb&_md5=2eed608548118e25f69ebb0f99f5c3e2 From ForeignAffairs, September/October 2005 December 13, 2005

The Bush administration's push for democracy in the Arab world is unlikely to have much effect on anti-American terrorism emanating from there; it could in fact help bring to power governments much less

cooperative on a whole range of issues -- including the war on terrorism -- than the current regimes.Unfortunately, there is no good alternative at this point to working with the authoritarian Arab governments thatare willing to work with the United States.

If Washington insists on promoting democracy in the Arab world, it should learn from the various electoral

experiences in the region. Where there are strongly rooted non-Islamist parties, as in Morocco, theIslamists have a harder time dominating the field. The same is true in non-Arab Turkey, where the Islamist political party has moderated its message over time to contend with the power of the secular army and withwell-established, more secular parties. Likewise, the diverse confessional mix of voters in Lebanon will probably prevent Hezbollah and other Islamists from dominating elections there. Conversely, where non-

Islamist political forces have been suppressed, as in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, Islamist parties andcandidates can command the political field. Washington should take no comfort from the success of ruling parties in Algeria, Egypt, and Yemen over Islamist challengers: once stripped of their patronage andsecurity apparatus, ruling parties do not fare very well in democratic transitional elections.


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Terrorism and ethnic strife is already occurring in Africa the extinction impact isempirically disproven.The Associated Press 20075 killed in explosions in Mogadishu http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/27/africa/AF-GEN-Somalia.php July 27

MOGADISHU, Somalia: Two explosions killed at least five civilians in the Somali capital, where the government isstruggling to contain an insurgency, witnesses said Friday.

In one blast late Thursday, a gunman lobbed a hand grenade at tea shop in the Hurwa district, a hotbed ofsupport for an Islamic group that ruled much of southern Somalia for six months last year.

"The bomb went off among dozens of men," said Muhiyadin Ga'amey, a witness. Three people were killedand five were wounded, he said.

Also Thursday, a land mine exploded in southern Mogadishu after a government convoy drove by, killingtwo people and wounding three, said Hussein Haji Jibril, who witnessed the blast.

Terrorist movements are currently in Africa, the aff has no reason why they wouldsuddenly escalate now..The Associated Press 20075 killed in explosions in Mogadishun http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/27/africa/AF-GEN-Somalia.php July 27

Since an Islamic movement known as the Council of Islamic Courts was driven out of Mogadishu inDecember by Ethiopian troops supporting this country's fragile government, roadside bombs, attacks ongovernment installations, assassination attempts and gunbattles have become common. Civilians often arecaught in the crossfire.

Insurgents linked to the Islamic movement have vowed to launch an Iraq-style guerrilla war until thecountry becomes an Islamic state. Hundreds of thousands of people have fled the violence in the capital.

On Friday, Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi said without specifying that "many stakeholders" from theIslamic movement were attending an ongoing National Reconciliation Conference, meant to heal the

wounds of 16 years of war. The movement's leadership has denounced the conference.


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TERRORISTS WON’T USE BIOWEAPONS AND THERE’S NO IMPACT IF THEYDO

O’NEILL 2004 (Brendan, Spiked Politics, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction,” August19, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CA694.htm)

Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use- in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He citesthe work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 yearsonly four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The mosteffective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankansoldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none.

The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine

drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem withusing unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventionalweapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigershave not used WMD since.


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NO IMPACT–HISTORY PROVES BIOWEAPON USE IS UNLIKELY

O’NEILL 2004 (Brendan, Spiked Politics, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction,” August19, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CA694.htm)

Yet, as Rapoport points out, while the Aum Shinryko attack certainly had tragicconsequences, it also showed up the limitations of WMD attacks in terms of causingcasualties or destruction. He says that even though Aum Shinryko had 'extraordinarycover for a long time' - meaning that the Japanese authorities were nervous aboutmonitoring the group on the grounds that it was a religious outfit - and despite the factthat it had '20 members with graduate degrees in science, significant laboratories andassets of over a billion dollars', it still did not succeed in its aim of taking hundreds orthousands of casualties, of causing mass destruction. For Rapoport this shows that suchweapons are far from easy to use, especially when the groups using them must movearound quickly, 'as all terrorists must do'.

According to Rapoport, the most striking thing about the Aum Shinryko attack is that noone died from inhaling the sarin gas itself - in every fatal case, the individual had madecontact with the liquid. He cites Parachini again, who says that the individuals killed byAum Shinryko are the only people to have lost their lives as a result of a WMD attack bya terrorist group over the past 25 years. (There were also five deaths as a result of anthraxattacks post-9/11, but Parachini doesn't include those because the individual responsibleand the motivation for those attacks remain unknown.)

'When you think that fewer than 15 people have been killed by known terrorist use ofchemical and biological weapons, and contrast that to the thousands who were killed on9/11 and in conventional bombings in Madrid or Bali or Istanbul, it's quite remarkablethat we are so obsessed with WMD', says Rapoport.


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THERE’S NO IMPACT TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS–DILUTION, WEATHER,REVERSE CONTAMINATION AND HISTORICAL EXAMPLES PROVE

ROTHSTEIN, AUER AND SIEGEL 2004 (Linda, editor, Catherine, managing editor,and Jonas, assistant editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, BAS,

November/December, http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04rothstein)

In "The Dew of Death," Joel Vilensky and Pandy Sinish recounted the strange story oflewisite, an arsenic-based chemical weapon developed by the Chemical Warfare Serviceduring World War I.By the end of the war, the United States was producing 10 tons a day of the stuff, yet itwas never used in battle, where it would probably have flopped. Lewisite shares many ofthe problems that have prevented most chemical weapons from entering the world'sarmies' battlefield arsenals: Most chemicals are very hard to disseminate in sufficientlyundiluted form, and might not work in weather that is too hot, too cold, too windy, or toowet. The dilution problem would also make it very difficult to carry out an attack

involving the poisoning of a major city's water supply. Nearly every article about terrorist uses of chemical or biological weapons begins byrecalling Aum Shinrikyo's use of sarin gas in 1995 in the Tokyo subway. Employing fiveseparate packages of poison, cult members managed to kill 12 commuters, althoughanother 1,000 had to seek hospital treatment. The attack was shocking, yet fell short ofthe cult's ambitions. (Shoko Asahara, the leader of the group, aspired either to be Japan's prime minister or to kill as many of his countrymen as possible.)Saddam Hussein's forces used poison gas at Halabja in the open air. Halabja, a Kurdishcity in northern Iraq, is perhaps the best known of the several dozen towns and villagesSaddam Hussein is thought to have gassed in 1987 and 1988. Some 5,000 of its population of 70,000 died as a result of being bombarded with what might have been acombination of mustard gas, nerve agent, and possibly cyanide.The attack was a monstrous crime, but the Iraqi military succeeded by having completecontrol over the place, the time, and the choice of a day with ideal weather--and becauseit faced no danger of experiencing any resistance. Saddam's men were able to spread the poisons systematically (delivery might have been by a combination of dispersal fromlow-flying planes and attack with chemical shells). The Halabja massacre was not ademonstration of the unique power of chemical weapons, but of the fact that the population was defenseless.Iraq, and probably Iran, also used poison gas during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Evenas thousands of young people were slaughtered in a war that ended in stalemate, the war'sless-controlled, battlefield use of chemical weapons is customarily assessed as havinglent neither side an advantage.Today, few of the world's militaries would even consider using chemical weapons--theycan contaminate the battleground and come back on the attackers if the wind takes anunexpected turn. The major militaries--including those of the United States, Britain,Russia, and Germany--have dumped old munitions (not always carefully) or have spent,or need to spend, billions of dollars to neutralize decaying munitions that could threatencivilians who live near storage sites. Some tiny amount of worry should probably bedevoted to leaking chemical munitions.


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TERRORISTS CAN’T STEAL A NUCLEAR WEAPON–SECURITY IS TIGHT ANDTHE WEAPONS ARE TOO COMPLICATED



Of these, the first is the least likely. It would be extremely difficult for terrorists to acquire an intact weapon from one ofthe eight nuclear weapon states. The security of these weapons, especially those in Russia and Pakistan, is avalid concern. But to detonate an intact, stolen Russian nuke, a terrorist would have to get past securitysafeguards built into the weapon, such as authorization codes. And Pakistani nuclear weapons (believed to numberup to 50) are reportedly stored separately from the weapons' cores. Besides the difficulties associated withobtaining a ready-made, good-to-go nuke, there would be other barriers--such as transporting and preparing

to deliver it undetected. This is perhaps the lowest probability, highest consequence scenario of nuclear terrorism.


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TERRORISTS CAN’T BUILD A NUCLEAR BOMB–YOU SHOULD ASSIGN THISZERO RISK



Could terrorists produce an entirely do-it-yourself nuclear bomb? Fabricating fissilematerial, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium, is exceedingly labor-and resource-intensive--and both activities present many opportunities for detection.Terrorist-produced fissile material is so extremely unlikely that it's safe to call itimpossible.


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NO IMPACT TO A DIRTY BOMB–TERRORISTS CAN’T BUILD ONE ANDCASUALTIES WOULD BE LOW



Detonated in a populated area, a dirty bomb would expose many people to radioactive particles dispersed by the explosion, but any immediate fatalities would be caused by the blast and not exposure to radioactivity (although exposure has the potential to causeeventual fatalities).

Among the many types of damage would be economic; analysts at the University ofSouthern California's terrorism center predict that a dirty bomb exploded at the LosAngeles and Long Beach port complex could cost $34 billion. That's just a best guess; noone really knows for sure the kind of damage a dirty bomb would do because it would

depend largely on unpredictable factors such as bomb design, detonation location, andweather.

There has never been a dirty bomb attack. True, Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago andaccused of plotting, in the words of Attorney General John Ashcroft, "to build andexplode a radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb,' in the United States."

But as Lewis Z. Koch explained in "Dirty Bomber? Dirty Justice," the evidence againstthe ex-gang member was thin. Plus, Koch reported, "Although some materials fromhospitals, research universities, and other facilities are radioactive enough to be lethal, itwould be very difficult to deliver high doses to more than a few people." One way aterrorist might do more damage is by using the extremely radioactive spent fuel from a power plant, but "Putting aside the controversy surrounding security at U.S. nuclear power plants, a would-be dirty bomber faces a Herculean task." The spent fuel is heavy,hard to access, and dangerously radioactive, Koch noted. If would-be dirty bombers wereto somehow access a spent fuel pool and remove rods to another location, they wouldhave been exposed to "enough radiation to make them burnt toast."


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TERRORISTS WON’T BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS–IT’S TOO COMPLEX

KAMP 1996 (Karl-Heinz, heads the foreign and security policy section of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Sankt Agustin, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July)

Reports of nuclear smuggling appear to lend added weight to the idea that terrorists can build their own bombs, because they suggest that fissile material may now be obtained on a

nuclear black market. After all, if gram quantities of uranium 235 and plutonium 239 have appeared on the market, it seems likely that larger quantities are also available. Andin view of remarks made by readily quoted "experts"--that one kilogram of plutonium is enough to piecetogether a nuclear weapon--it would seem virtually inevitable that some terrorist group will build a bomb.But the idea that terrorists can readily build a bomb is naive. After all, a number of countries with vastresources and a wide range of scientific and technical personnel have struggled unsuccessfully to producenuclear weapons. Iraq's nuclear program, which was exposed after the Persian Gulf War, is an example of acostly, time-consuming, and ultimately unsuccessful quest for a nuclear device.

Iraq began recruiting nuclear experts in the early 1970s, and used its worldwide trade links and an elaboratesecret procurement network in an effort to obtain the necessary technology. Failing at more advancedmethods, Iraq eventually turned to an extremely energy-intensive technology--"calutrons"--that the UnitedStates had used to produce uranium in the 1940s. Still, after spending 20 years and more than a billiondollars, Iraq had yet to produce a functioning weapon by the time it was defeated in 1991. It is difficult to

imagine that a small terrorist group or an individual--who would certainly have far fewer resources--wouldfind bomb building easier.

TERRORISTS CANNOT BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

FROST 2005 (Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, BritishColombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

Do-it-yourself’ nuclear weapons. It is most improbable that any terrorist group could become a do-it-yourself nuclear power: unlike rough conceptual outlines, the detailed plans and engineering drawings

necessary to build a bomb are not easily available.2 It would also be very difficult, if not effectivelyimpossible, to acquire sufficient quantities of suitable fissile materials. The expertise and facilities requiredto build a functional bomb, even a crude one, are of a higher order than those possessed by any knownterrorist organisation. Developing nuclear weapons requires state-level resources, and the process takesyears.


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TERRORISTS COULDN’T BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVEN IF THEY GOTFISSILE MATERIAL–OTHER PARTS OF THE BOMB ARE TOO COMPLEX


Obtaining weapon-grade fissile material is only the first step in building a bomb--nuclear weapons require ahost of other "exotic" raw materials. And the amount of fissile material needed depends on the level ofaccessible technology. As a rule, the more basic the design of a nuclear weapon, the more fissile material

required.

It is true that some weapons need no more than a single kilogram of plutonium, but these are weapons produced only in the huge nuclear laboratories of the superpowers, the United States and Russia. And theyrequire technologies like supercompression, which have not yet been mastered by other Western nuclear

powers, let alone by any non-governmental nuclear aspirants.

Apart from producing or obtaining fissile material, the production of a weapon requires highly qualified personnel with specialknow-how in the fields of physics, chemistry, metallurgy, and electronies. Special technical apparatus andcomplex components are needed that cgnnot be purchased off the shelf. This applies in particular to plutonium components, which must be machined to exacting technical demands. It is almost absurd to fearterrorist bombs made from smuggled plutonium.

More basic nuclear weapon designs--so-called "gun-type" devices--use only uranium 235. And gun-typedesigns require masses of fissile material--quantities that go far beyond any amount that has reportedly

been offered on a black market.


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STATES WON’T GIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS


Given the record so far, it seems unlikely that any sponsoring state would willingly "pass along" nuclear know-howor nuclear weapons. Every country that possesses nuclear weapons attaches overriding importance to thecontrol of its nuclear arsenal. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the relations between nuclear and non-nuclear allies--even in NATO--involve security arrangements that imply deep distrust. The security ofnuclear weapons and their protection against abuse or unauthorized use have the highest priority and areguaranteed by extensive technical and organizational measures by every current member of the "nuclearclub."

Would a state that achieved nuclear capability choose to put nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists,

knowing that a dangerous group could turn against its own patron? The idea that any state--"rogue nation"or not--would hand over the control of nuclear weapons to an organization of criminals or religious zealotsis nearly inconceivable.

NO STATE WOULD EVER GIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO TERRORISTS


State sponsors of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear-weapon states, even ‘rogues’, are most unlikely to be foolish enough tohand nuclear weapons, which are among their dearest national treasures, over to such unreliable,unpredictable and potentially dangerous characters as terrorists, especially when the chances of a suspectedstate sponsor suffering nuclear retaliation and annihilation are so good, and so blindingly obvious.


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TERRORISTS CANNOT STEAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM RUSSIA


Well, maybe. But it must be noted that the military organizations responsible for nuclear weapon security in the formerSoviet Union have proven more reliable than feared a few years ago. There has been no illegal passing onof complete nuclear weapons or key components. And none of the reports about the marketing of ex-Sovietnuclear materials has involved critical items taken from weapon stocks. There seem to be two decisive reasons for the stability of the ex-Soviet nuclear weapons sector, particularlyin Russia. First, even if Russian leaders did not take Western fears about nuclear-weapon security seriously,they would still be concerned about the risks that uncontrolled nuclear proliferation could pose to their own

country. As far as possible, resources have been channeled into the nuclear armed forces sector toguarantee its workability. Soldiers in this sector are better paid and facilities have been better maintainedthan in other areas.

Second, the military's nuclear elites have met very high standards in the past. It is hard to imagine that nuclearunits trained during the Soviet era would neglect their tasks under hostile conditions and abuse the goods

placed under their command. It would be extremely difficult for terrorists to steal complete nuclear

weapons from depots or to obtain them with the help of security personnel. Of course, there is no guarantee that the currentstability in the military nuclear sector will continue in the indefinite future.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SECURITY IS STRONG


Russian nuclear weapons. Russian nuclear weapons appear to be under the generally good control of élite troops.There is no evidence in open-source material that a single nuclear warhead, from any national arsenal or

another source, has ever made its way into the world's illegal arms bazaars, let alone into terrorist hands. No actual or aspiring nuclear-weapon state has ever claimed to have nuclear weapons without also havingall of the technical infrastructure necessary to produce them ab initio, although they could, if the ‘loosenukes’ arguments were sound, easily have bought a few on the black market. Even the extravagant sumssometimes mentioned as the alleged asking price for stolen weapons would be tiny fractions of the amountrequired to develop an indigenous nuclear-weapon capability, yet circumstances seem to have compelledstates to choose the more expensive course.


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EVEN IF TERRORISTS STOLE A COMPLETE WARHEAD, THEY COULDN’T USEIT


However, even if a terrorist organization managed--perhaps by working with illegal arms dealers--to obtain acomplete nuclear weapon from ex-Soviet stocks, it could not necessarily detonate that weapon. Apart fromthe fact that most nuclear weapons would be highly unsuitable for terrorist use--due to their size and thedifficulty of transporting them--nuclear weapons have a series of built-in technical and security safeguards,including self-destruct mechanisms that can be overridden only by a small and specially trained circle oftechnicians. Soviet strategic nuclear weapons are secured by systems similar to the sophisticated"Permissive Action Links" (PALS) used to secure U.S. weapons. PALS prevent unauthorized or accidentaluse by employing multi-digit code systems to lock nuclear weapons against detonation. The United States provided theSoviet Union with the relevant technical know-how for these devices in the early 1960s. To make a credible threat, terrorists would not onlyhave to seize a nuclear weapon, they would have to number in their ranks someone with specificknowledge about a particular explosive device. That possibility cannot be ruled out, but it is highly unlikelyin view of the combination of requirements.


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THERE IS NO NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET


The nuclear black market. There is no evidence in the open-source literature of a true international black market innuclear materials. Virtually all known cases of nuclear theft or smuggling have involved amateurs hopingfor rich returns, despite the seeming absence of anyone interested in buying the material. To the extent thata market exists, it is almost entirely driven by supply; there appears to be no true demand, except where the buyers were government agents running a sting. Organised crime, with one known exception, has not been involved in nuclear trafficking.Even the notorious A.Q. Khan network concentrated on nuclear technology, especially centrifuge uraniumenrichment, rather than fissile materials, although there have been suggestions that Khan, a Pakistani nuclear engineer, sold uranium hexafluoride, thefeedstock for enrichment, to Libya.


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TERRORISTS DON’T WANT WMD


Psychotic terrorist killers. The overwhelming majority of terrorists are as psychologically healthy,rational and intelligent as the rest of us; indeed, mentally ill terrorists would be far less dangerous and mucheasier to deal with. Terrorists are typically neither psychopathic nor psychotic, nor are they driven by mere bloodlust. Furthermore, terrorists have not historically been particularly interested in WMD, and noterrorist use of WMD of any kind has resulted in mass casualties, unless the airliners used in New York andWashington on 11 September 2001 (‘9/11’) count as weapons of mass destruction. States, on the other hand, have usedWMD to great effect. This is not to say that terrorists are not interested in killing large numbers of people; clearly, some are. Much of the concern about nuclearterrorism derives from the reasonable fear that al-Qaeda might be planning an attack even more lethal than those of 9/11. However, neither al-Qaeda nor any ofthe organisations linked to it has ever used WMD, and the evidence that they have the will or technical

capacity to do so is limited and unconvincing.


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NUCLEAR TERRORISM WON’T CAUSE EXTINCTION–THE U.S. WOULDEASILY RECOVER


An existential threat. When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‘existential threat’ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding

nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state, in the sense of inflictingsuch damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as acoherent political and economic entity, would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with

yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplaceand detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do anysignificant damage on a national level.


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TERRORISTS COULD NOT USE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

DREYFUSS 2000 (Robert, Mother Jones, Sept/Oct,http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2000/09/phantom.html)

But even most terrorism hawks -- including experts in the U.S. intelligence community and defensecontractors like the RAND Corporation -- acknowledge that assembling and using weapons of massdestruction is a daunting project. Last year, a blue-ribbon "Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic ResponseCapabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction" issued its report to Congress and the president. The study maintains that nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorism "presents a genuine threat tothe United States." But, it goes on, carrying out such attacks requires capabilities that virtually no terroristgroup possesses, including "highly knowledgeable personnel, significant financial resources, fairlysophisticated production facilities and equipment, quality control and testing, and special handling."

Even if terrorists could acquire strains of botulism, anthrax, or plague, turning such materials into a lethaldevice for mass casualties is a highly complex undertaking. "It's simply not easy to do," explains MiltonLeitenberg, a biological warfare expert at the Center for International and Security Studies at the Universityof Maryland. Leitenberg points to the technical hurdles involved in the event that sparked much of thealarm about terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons -- the 1995 nerve-gas attack on the Tokyosubway by the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo. Subsequent investigations revealed that the group possessed significant quantities of chemicals, as well as ample funding to procure whatever equipment was

necessary to produce biological weapons. Professional scientists in the cult spent four years attempting to produce two agents -- anthrax and botulinum toxin -- considered relatively easy to work with. Yet thegroup failed to produce any biological agent, and were reduced to poking bags with umbrellas todisseminate the sarin gas they were able to make. Such difficulties explain why the government has not documented a single threat from terroristswielding toxic agents. "There is no U.S. government evidence that any group has produced or obtained biologicalweapons," Leitenberg says.

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