4.1 - Brunkhorst, Hauke - Romanticism and Cultural Criticism (en)

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Romanticism and Cultural Criticism

Romanticism and Cultural Criticism

by Hauke Brunkhorst

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 4 / 1986, pages: 397-415, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=d1e91a38-03f5-4166-a958-30489ae8fdfdhttp://www.ceeol.com/


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MODERNITY, AESTHETICS AND POLITICS

ROMANTICISM AND CULTURAL CRITICISIM*Hauke Brunkhorst

To begin with, I would like to make some preliminary remarks on themethodological status of my theses and on the concept of romanticism:a) I am not primarily concerned with an empirical investigation of thehistorical relationship between Enlightenment and romanticism. Rather, myprimary concern it conceptual clarification. Is what we usually understand by"Enlightenment" compatible or incomr,atible with our understanding of"romanticism"? These concepts are frequently used in such a way that anunbridgeable opposition between them is created. Such an understanding ofromanticism and Enlightenment is historically plausible. Yet there are otherexplications of these concepts which are historically no less plausible, andwhich make is appear possible to overcome the fundamental opposition ofEnlightenment and romanticism in favour of a dialectical strategy of mediation, complementation, and reciprocal correction.I will begin here with the distinction between two contradictory types ofcultural criticism. The paradigm of cultural criticism I is the classicalrationalism of the age of Enlightenment; the paradigm of cultural criticism I I isthe explicit irrationalism of the German "critique of civilization": from Klagesto Spengler; from Nietzsche to Scheler; from Othmar Spann to Carl Schmitt;from the George-circle to the Tat-circle; from the youth movement to the"ideas of 1914"; from Lebensphilosophie to "conservative revolution".We shall see that romanticism as critique of the Enlightenment and of thealienation of modern life cuts across both types of cultural criticism in apeculiar way. It resists being easily subsumed under either, and its relationship to the irrationalistic cultural criticism 11 is at least ambivalent. Here Iproceed from the frequently observed fact that the history of irrationalismproper begins, in a schematic sense, only after the death ofHegel. Originally,the romantic impulse was by no means anti-rational or irrational--contrary tothe way it has been read from Lukacs to Popper. As Herbert Schnadelbachconcludes in his book German Philosophy 1831-1933, the history of Lebensphilosophie (which plays a paradigmatic role in cultural criticism 11 as a"metaphysics of the irrational") begins only "where 'life' as a principle is setagainst the principles of 'rationalism', which is by no means the case inRomanticism. It is only in Schelling's late philosophy, which originates as acounter-move against his own system of identity, and then above all inSchopenhauer's work that the critique of rationalism is transformed into ametaphysics of the irrational."lThis transformation necessitates differentiations in the concept of romanticism.* Translated by John Cole.Praxis International 6:4January 1987 0260-8448 $2.00


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398 Praxis IntemationalIt becomes clear that the actual social thrust of romanticism lies in its aestheticand expressive modernism. To use a technical metaphor perhaps not entirelyappropriate to the theme, this thrust is one of the motors of social differentiation: that is, the differentiation of art and erotics. But from this sociologicalpoint of view the rigid, fundamental opposition of romanticism and Enlightenment begins to loosen. The contrasts remain quite sharp, yet theirmediation no longer seems impossible. But to this end a further conceptualdifferentiation becomes necessary-this time in the concept ofEnlightenment.The movement of the Enlightenment was followed by the differentiation oftechnology and science, of law and morality; the Romantic movements werefollowed by a differentiation of art and erotics. The logic which comes toprevail in all areas according to the inherent principles of each operatesthroughout on the premise that the differentated cultural spheres of valuemust form their identity on their own patterns and only on their own patterns.The logic set in motion by the Enlightenment is one of objectivization andmoralization of nature and society; whereas the logic unleashed byRomanticism is subjectivizing and sensitizing. Both of these logics areself-explicative, justifiable only in their own terms, and completely immanent.They represent a type of logic which renounces and breaks with all metaphysics dependent upon a transcendent source or based upon support fromexternal authorities. As Habermas has put it, "a modernity without models,open to the future and addicted to innovation, can produce its standards onlyout of itself."2 That is what finally unites Enlightenment and romanticism, forall their differences.

b) I would like to make one more preliminary remark on the concept of"romanticism". The attempt to come up with an operational definition isfutile. We must be satisfied with what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances" or at best, perhaps, necessary (but not sufficient) conditions. In any case,the counterpart of romanticism is not "Enlightenment" but "classicism". AsMario Praz remarks in the introduction to his book on black romanticism, TheRomantic Agony, such termsare approximate labels which have long been in use. The philosopher solemnlydismisses them, exorcizing them with unerring logic; but they quietly slip backin and obtrude themselves--elusive, tiresome, but indispensable. The literaryhistorian tries to give them their proper status, their rank and fixed definition;but at the end of all his laborious efforts he discovers that he has been treatingshadows as though they were solid substance. Like so many other words in dailyusage, these approximate terms have their value and fulfill a useful role,provided that they are treated as what they are-namely, approximate termsand that what they cannot give is not expected of them . . . They are empiricalcategories, whose fictitious character can easily be demonstrated. But if theproof that they are relatively arbitrary leads us to dispense with their services,then I do not see that literary history would benefit by it. 3Let us begin our discussion of romanticism and cultural criticism with aschematic diagnosis of the contemporary scene. My first point concerns (1) thecontemporary relevance of Georg Lukacs' thesis on the "destruction of reason".The differentiations in the concept of romanticism which emerge from the

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Praxis International 399discussion of Lukacs then serve to call to mind (2) the modernism ofromanticism. As a third step, I will deal with the developmental logic ofromantic modernism: that is, with (3) the differentiation of art and erotics, as aresult of which a new one-sidedness and new exclusive claims to absolutevalidity and totality originate. Out of these (4) paradoxes of romantic modernismgrows the pathological fundamental opposition of Enlightenment andromanticism, from which we will be saved in the end-if all goes well!-bythe dialectical strategy of a (5) corrective complementation ofEnlightenment andromanticism.Whether such a mediation can actually be worked out is an open, practicalquestion. The issue here is to consider whether it is theoretically possible. Letus begin, then, with a diagnosis of the contemporary scene.

1. The Contemporary Relevance ofLukacsFor those who are still committed to Enlightenment and who believe thatcritique can draw its strength from the utopian potential of Westernrationalism, the formula for denouncing the spirit of the times lies close tohand: the straggling remains of dialectical reason, once a proud avant-gardeon the broad march route of progress, have been caught between the fronts ofneo-conservatism and neo-romanticism and are being ground down. If theutopian vision of the neo-conservatives has been blinded, then that of theneo-romantics has sunken into itself and faces backwards-in an inward,imploring longing for undestroyed nature and original wholeness. Thusneo-conservatives and neo-romantics carve up among themselves the businessof the destruction of reason. It suddenly seems that Lukcics has once againbecome relevant for critical intellectuals, to whom he had seemed utterlysuperseded by the Dialectic ofEnlightenment. Relevant, at least, is the thesis ofhis book, as summed up in its title: The Destruction ofReason. And so is thedichotomy of rationalism and irrationalism, which separates good from evil.Of course, the thesis is very general and the dichotomy an oversimplification. They are also burdened from the outset with overly strongvalue judgements which, one may suspect, presume the validity of a highlyspeculative philosophy of history.Nevertheless, Lukacs' thesis is quite plausible for the development of theconservative counter-revolution against the "ideas of 1789" in the periodfollowing Hegel's death. Toward the end of the nineteenth century lateromantic, lebensphilosophische, and existential anti-rationalism became theleading intellectual currents and thus a formative influence on the pre-fascisteducated elites. In Germany, these tendencies first culminated in the "ideasof 1914", continued later in the so-called "conservative revolution", the"revolt of the middle classes" (Kracauer), and finally ended in the "nationalawakening" of 1933. Nor are the tendencies of our own times suited to refutethe old thesis of the destruction of reason. On the contrary: the developmentfrom the cultural criticsm of the 1960's to that of the 1980's has followed a linefrom utopian rationalism to profound skepticism about reason. Growing


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400 Praxis Internationalobscurantism and irrationalism: these are the signs of the times. They leadbackward from rational cultural criticism to a rather irrational critique ofcivilization.In most, if not all, cases a rationalistic cultural criticism has a utopianorientation toward the progress of Enlightenment, demystification, demythologization, and a "receding of natural barriers" (Marx). It is politicallyuniversalistic, socially egalitarian and inclusive; as critique, it is cognitivisticand moralistic. Let us call this ideal-typical version of cultural criticism:cultural criticism I.Its counterpart is cultural criticism 11: on the whole, this is an irrationalisticcritique of civilization which links the contradiction of culture and civilizationto a negative historical metaphysics of cultural decay. Cultural criticism 11 ispolitically particularistic, socially exclusive, and oriented toward criticalstandards which are primarily aesthetic and expressive. (Cf. Figure 1)standards of evaluative social political historical ontologicalcriticismcultural cognitive inclusive universalistic progressive culture vs.criticism nature

Icultural expressive exclusive particularistic regressive culture vs.criticism civilization11

Figure 1The romantic protest against modern alienation and the objectivism ofscience has often been identified with cultural criticism 11, for example byLukacs, Russell, and Popper,4 above all because romantic criticism isoriented toward aesthetic and expressive standards. Romanticism is seen as aregressive reaction to the process of modernization; that is, romanticism isseen as irrationalism.The irrationalism thesis identifies the dichotomy of cultural criticism I and 11with the fundamental opposition between Enlightenment and romanticism. Itis usually supplemented with a historical continuity thesis: the suggestiveconstruction of an almost unbroken continuum of development in the historyof ideas from Romanticism (1800) via the irrationalistic critique of civilization(1900) to fascism (1933)-and then, at will, on into the "green"-alternativefundamental opposition and the West German peace movement of our owntime.But this interpretation fails to take account of the well-analyzed, specific,and radical modernism of romanticism. The conceptual equipment of a rigiddichotomy between rationalism and irrationalism, or between cultural criticism I

and cultural criticism 11, cannot do justice to this aspect of romanticism and bring itinto play. Such dichotomies distort our view of the dialectic ofEnlightenment andromanticism. Cultural criticism 11 is romantic only in the sense of a dogmatizedversion ofromantic thought which perverts it into a degraded metaphysics ofhistory.


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Praxis International 401Against the irrationalism thesis, which equates romanticism with culturalcriticism 11, I would like to argue for a position which agrees with theemphasis on the modernism of romanticism and takes it even further: that theromantic impulse includes a socially significant potential for rationalization.This position is also opposed to the continuity thesis. The transformation of

romantic motives into irrationalistic cultural criticism-via which it passedinto the hands of the fascists--is not the sole imaginable pattern of development. It is a borderline case (and certainly the most momentous), the mostextreme possibility of development which can be reconstructed with anyplausibility. That it actually won out was due to the seemingly paradoxicalcircumstance that romantic modernism, and with it the rational potential ofromanticism, remained socially ineffective. Incidentally, this thesis (which Icannot go into more closely here)5 was represented by Talcott Parsons fromthe 1940's onwards. According to Parsons, "romantic elements are inherent inthe nature of modern societies."6 Thus Parsons accounts for the developmentof German fascism partly in terms of a degeneration and twisting of theromantic impulse into its opposite. This meant a peculiar masculinization ofromanticism, whose causes Parsons saw in peculiarities ofGerman history, andquite similar to those cultural and structural lags analyzed around the sametime by Plessner and Lukacs, and long before by Heine, Marx, and Engelsand then later by Dahrendorf and Ringer, among others. Precisely the modelof romantic love, whose inclusive, universalistic tendency to break up socialstratification is characteristic of all Western societies, has remained ineffectivein this case. Far into the twentieth century, intimate relations remain orientedtoward pre-modern, feudal models. Under these circumstances the Nazismanaged "to mobilize the deeply-rooted romantic tendencies in Germansociety in the service of one of the most aggressive political movements."7 AsParsons points out, it seems that the "inclination to a romantic idealization ofthe youth model ... is characteristic ofmodern Western society as a whole."Yet in Germany, the one-sided masculinization of romanticism in the ideal ofthe warrior-hero led to the dominance of amodel which "corresponded" to thequasi-feudal, pre-modern "separation of sex-roles in Germany: a model whichidealizes the man in that role for which the woman is traditionally least suited,the role of the fighter." '''Comradeship' in a sense very close to that of soldiersin the field was emphasized from the beginning as the ideal social relationshipin the strongest possible way. By way of contrast, in American youth cultureand its image as romanticized by adults, the relationship between the sexesstands much more clearly in the foreground . . . The dominant model wasalways the idealization of the isolated, romanticized couple. Certainly amongradical youth there were certain tendencies to a political orientation, yet inthese cases there was a complete lack of emphasis on solidarity with membersof the same sex. Instead, the tendency was much more to completely ignoredifferences of sex by means of an interest in common ideals. "8 Such anon-reactionary politicization of romantic motives throughout the Westernworld took place spectacularly and on a broad scale-and in Germany for thefirst time - in the course of the student protest movements of the 1960's.


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402 Praxis InternationalLet me summarize the theses of the first section.First, the irrationalism thesis equates romanticism with cultural criticism 11;second, within the framework of German history, a continuity thesis is thendeduced: from Romanticism (1800), via the critique of civilization (1900), tofascism (1933).Against these two theses I would like to make a case for the modernism thesis,which will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

2. The Modernism ofRomanticismThe continuity thesis draws its power of suggestion from the identification ofthe aesthetic and expressivemodernism of romanticism, which can scarcely bedisputed, with the politically regressive longing for original wholenesswhether in the form of an archaic, mythological unity with nature or of a"spiritually-fired theocracy" with redeemer, leader, and following.9 A conservative political utopianism has undoubtedly shaped the self-image of manyromantics and many aestheticiansof modernism, at least in their pious orneo-pagan late phases. Among the romantics such turns have only too oftenresulted from fright in the face of their own modernism, a fear "of theindefinite monstrosity of their own purposes" (Marx).Nevertheless, we must draw a sharp sociological distinction between themotley variety of the romantics' self-interpretations and the modernistic, aesthetic

and expressive impulse of romanticism. In the process of social differentiation,this impulse is largely independent and has often been objectively effectiveagainst the resistance of changing self-interpretations.Indeed, the insurmountable breach between aesthetic-expressive practiceand socio-political practice is precisely the objective contradiction ofromanticism itself. Thus the Romantics' love-hate relationship to Goethe'sWilhelm Meister, which had become the aesthetic symbol of the affirmativeidea of an ascetic-realistic unity of art and life-as the Romantics saw it,unattainably and for the last time. This very unity is destroyed by theaesthetic modernism of romanticism. In transforming affirmative aestheticutopias into the intermittent utopia of the aesthetic instant, aesthetic modernism explodes the continuum of past and future. It becomes a rebellionagainst the "male gang of economy, science, and politics", against thenormative and ethical ordering of life, against reality itself: the dissolution ofall relations to the world, "self-dissolution", "self-illumination" (Karl-HeinzBohrer).lo From Giinderode and Brentano to Benjamin and Adorno

The only spiritual communication between the objective system and subjectiveexperience is the explosion which tears them from each other, illuminating for asplit second with its blast of flame the figure which they form together. 11Since the days of early Romanticism, the tendency which led first toart-for-art's-sake and then to Surrealism has been clear: the total "de-realizingof the real" (Sartre),12 the transformation of reality into fantasy and dream,


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Praxis International 403into mere appearance; the absolutizing of the New into a point withoutextension, a literally timeless instant. The essence of the romantic, accordingto Mario Praz, consistsin that which cannot be uttered. Word and form, says Schlegel in Lucinde, areonly accessories. The Romantic exalts the artist who does not give material formto his dreams: the poet ecstatic before a page which forever remains blank, themusician who listens in on the prodigious concerts in his soul withoutattempting to translate them into notes. How often has the enchantment of theineffable been celebrated: from Keats' verse-"Melodies heard are sweet, butthose unheard/Are sweeter"-to Maeterlinck's theory that silence is moremusical than any sound!13

And Baudelaire notes: "What does an eternity of damnation mean to one whohas experienced the infinity of pleasure in a second?,,14There is, then, an aestheticist version of romanticism-let us call it versionI-which came into its own in art-for-art's-sake and in Surrealism, and wasconceptually formulated by Nietzsche and Benjamin. We can only do justiceto the aesthetic modernism of romanticism if we strictly distinguish thisaestheticist version of romanticism, version I, from its historical-metaphysicaldecay form (version 11), which ultimately leads to cultural criticism 11. Only themodernistic version I of romanticism has become effective as a driving force inthe process of social differentiation.Of course, we should not be too quick to condemn version 11. A longing forwholeness in view of the "atomism" and "division" (Hegel) of the modernworld, expressed in an aesthetically-sensitized subjective experience, is notalways irrational and politically conservative. We can distinguish between theideal types of a utopian-rationalistic version (IIa) and its regressive-irrationalisticcounterpart (version lIb). Only version lIb resembles the irrationalisticcritique of civilization (i.e. cultural criticism 11). The paradigm of version Ilais the Oldest System-Program of German Idealism (Hegel, Holderlin,Schelling), which, in an entirely rationalistic fashion, places poetry and theaesthetic at the center of social integration construed in the utopian form of a"mythology of reason". Here, wholeness is not a regressive fantasy of fusionbut is seen as dialectical, proceeding through alienation and difference.Nevertheless, it seems no accident that no program of research has followedthis paradigm. Aside from the early Schelling, there have only been isolatedattempts to pursue it scientifically or philosophically-above all in the muchlater interpretation of Freud by Herbert Marcuse, and recently in ManfredFrank's attempts to build bridges between transcendental hermeneutics andpost-structuralism. In any case, solid foundations for cashing in on thecomprehensive socio-theoretical claims of the Oldest System-Program arenowhere in sight. Prima facie, the program is implausible: the illocutionarybinding force of the aesthetic is obviously weaker than that of the normative.This is particularly true under the conditions of aesthetic modernity: theutopia of the aesthetic state pales in view of the detachment of the aestheticrealm from that of the normative, which was instituted by romanticism. Theidea of social integration through the medium of poetry becomes abstractinsofar as the aesthetic by now represents just the contrary: an explosive force


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404 Praxis Internationalin the structure of social normality, and as such is a destructive force of socialdifferentiation. In this respect, the new, aesthetically-construed "mythologyof reason" does not really represent a historically promising alternative to theaesthetic modernism of romanticism (version I).Whether in its likeable, progressive form or in its repugnant, reactionaryform, romanticism in version 11 represents the attempt to shift the modernismof romanticism I back into the framework of an integrative, most often "bad"metaphysics. Only this relapse into the times of integral world-views, timeswhich are irretrievably gone and in fact no longer desirable at all, makes itpossible to exalt and transfigure the aesthetic into a socially-integrative force. Butsuch an affirmative transfiguration is completely foreign to the aestheticmodernism of romanticism. That, in my opinion, is the most importantmessage of Adorno's aesthetics. The socially-integrative transfiguration of theaesthetic is profoundly conservative. 15 Perhaps it is this conservatism, thisreflex against "fright in face of the indeterminate monstrosity of one's owngoals", which time and again has driven so many of the Romantics, along withNietzsche, Bataille, and Heidegger, into an ideological and philosophicalmystification of the specifically aesthetic-a step which Adorno and Benjaminresisted taking.In any case, we can define romanticism in versions IIa and b as the attempt toreconcile version I with the socially-integrative binding forces of a long-decayedmetaphysics, and thereby to renew the affirmative character of culture (Marcuse)on the level of aesthetic modernism.The diagram summarizes the distinctions which have been reached so far:

Romanticismversion Iaesthetic andexpressivemodernism

version 11aestheticism integratedthrough a metaphysicsof history

/ ~version IIa version lIbFigure 2

utopianrationalistic regressiveirrationalistic(and culturalcriticism 11)

These distinctions form the basis for the (3) modernism thesis: therationalizing potential of romanticism I becomes manifest in a social-evolutionaryfashion in the differentiation of art and erotics.This is the subject of part 3.


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Praxis International 4053. The Differentiation ofArt and EroticsRomanticism is by no means a merely passive reaction to modernizingimpulses set loose elsewhere. Rather, in its characteristic response to Enlightenment and classicism, it develops a modernity of its own and becomes aforward-driving element in the modernizing process: as innovative as science,bent on the New, it makes past experiences obsolete, shatters traditionaldogmas, and sets anti-traditional accents by doing just as the sciences do-byradicalizing questions of validity and detaching them from traditional framesof reference.To the extent that such common characteristics of science and romanticismcan be termed "rational", a rational potential emerges in romantic andaesthetic modernism as well. Of course, romantic motives analogous to thoseof Enlightenment and science work themselves out in other realms: not inpolitics and the economy, research and technology, but rather in art and in

love. In these areas, romanticism and aestheticism convincingly refute theimperialism of the Enlightenment's cognitive and moral claims. Such arestriction of the specifically aesthetic and expressive to the areas proper tothem-art and erotics-may not make romantic art and romantic love morerational than their pre-modern predecessors. But romanticism does show thatthe encroachment of religion and tradition upon art and love is just asinappropriate as that of Enlightenment and science. And such a well-foundedrefutation or relativization of inappropriate claims can be considered rational.This has two implications: first; in this way, the aesthetic and expressivemodernism of romanticism indirectly brings forth a rational potential. Butsecond, modernization and rationalization produce new divisions, "ruptures",and "collisions" (Hegel); they run up against limits, which can eventually leadto paradoxical, self-destructive consequences.First: the differentiation of art and erotics as autonomous realms was set inmotion, at the latest, by romanticism and then further radicalized byaestheticism. It has separated the cultural specificity of these realms from eachother, but above all from other "spheres of value" in society: from economyand politics, from estate and class, from law and morality, from science andtechnology. The proponents of Enlightenment and science have producedreflexive formulae ofautonomy for the realm of the economy ("profit-for-profit'ssake"-Ricardo/Marx; "commodity production by means of commodities"(Sraffa) or for science ("value-free science"-Max Weber). Romanticism andaestheticism have likewise developed similar reflexive formulae for theautonomy of art and erotics.The principle of "art-for-art's sake", propagated by Gautier, Elaubert, andBaudelaire against the binding of art to utility and morality, was prepared byRomanticism through the stress upon reflexive forms (art criticism ascompletion or continuation of the work of art; the Kunstlerroman; techniquessuch as the "deceived deception"), as well as through experimental anticlassicism and open anti-moralism (the beauty of crime; black romanticism;the aesthetic of the unconscious, the grotesque, the paradoxical; the flowers ofevil). As Enzensberger has shown, Clemens Brentano's poetics is alreadysuffused with modernistic "shocks" and the "distortion" of traditional poetic


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406 Praxis Internationaland religious models. 16 Diderot was one of the first to anchor the autonomy ofthe aesthetic sphere in the anti-moralism of the beautiful. For Diderot "evil"has already become an "aesthetic category" (Karl-Heinz Bohrer):17"Whatever injures moral beauty almost always doubles poetic beauty.,,18Similarly in love: Jean Paul proclaims the slogan of romantic love,unrestricted by any traditional bonds or instrumental considerations. "Lovefor-Iove's-sake" marks off the sphere of personal relations from all otherswhich are "nonpersonal": "All love loves only love; it is its own object."(Levana)For Friedrich Schlegel, the beautiful is "distinct from the true and theethical ... and (has) rights equal to these" (Athenaeum Fragment 252). Butthis legal claim is also a claim to rationality. It expresses a reasonable insightbecause it negates the applicability of moral categories to aesthetic or eroticobjects-consider, for example, Schlegel's Lucinde. As objects of sensitivesubjective experience, these are of a different kind than objects of moraljudgement or instrumental manipulation. The claim to autonomymade by artand love is rational in the sense that it exposes and corrects a category mistake.As the aestheticians of modernism have argued since the days of earlyRomanticism, moral reservations are impermissible on categorial groundswithin the precincts of subjective self-realization. Duties against oneself,meant to fetter this realm with normative shackles, are invalid. This is theentirely rational point in the romantic celebration of suicide or in thediscovery of evil as an aesthetic category. The concept of evil, ironicallyestranged from its own context and stylized into an aesthetic category, loses itsspecifically normative sense and serves the unmasking of a category mistake.Scandal, which stages evil in the realm of aesthetic appearances, exposes theimperialistic flourish of moralizing pathos as an excessive, empty gesture.Hegel, in his Aesthetics,19 defines the specific modernism of romanticallyradicalized aesthetic and erotic experience as the "inward infinity of thesubject": "In classical art, love does not appear as a subjective inwardness ofsensation." What is new in romantic love is "this seizing hold of the whole ofone's existence", "utter randomness", "the arbitrariness of subjectivity." Likemodern art, romantic love brings "subjectivity as such" into its own; itdestroys the space-time continuum of the existingworld and shines forth as aninstantaneous utopia "which has neither extension nor generality", whichbuilds upon nothing and edifies no one.Bound up with the differentiation of art and erotics is a radicalization ofquestions of validity, a clear tendency toward the principalization of themes.This is quite analogous to modern science, which also radicalizes questions oftruth-by allowing in principle only statements which are generally defensibleand susceptible of examination, and by seeking to substantiate the truthwithout regard to whether it is beautiful or ugly, good or evil. In analogousfashion, romantic love radicalizes questions of sincerity and candor in personalrelations. Whether love is true is ultimately determined neither by the paternalwill nor by the correct ceremony or marriage certificate; in the end, only thelovers themselves know.In the "willfulness" of romantic love, which "gives absolute preference to


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Praxis International 407one and one only, each and every time", Hegel as a conservative aesthetictheorist criticizes the moments of "obstinacy" and "particularity". But at thesame time, he is also enough of a modernist, inspired by his philosophy ofhistory, to give an emphatic defense of the new, post-traditional standard ofvalidity in love. For in its new foundation of validity, romantic love"acknowledges the higher freedom of subjectivity and its absolute choice-thefreedom not merely to be subjected to a pathos or a divinity, like Euripides'Phaedra."Second: This development of enlightened and romanticized spheres of valueis by no means without its risks. It produces and intensifies tensions betweenthe spheres. The radicalized validity claims posed by the specificity of a givenarea are at once universal and one-sided-with the result that each makesclaims to totality which exclude the totality claims of the others; that is, eachtends to exclude the others.Thus, for example, in principle everything and anything can become theobject of scientific research: for the purposes of science, no areas are exemptedfrom the scientific search for truth. Whereas for every other way ofconsidering the world, science is blind (i.e. one-sided), from within theperspective of science aesthetic, religious, or moral considerations of the sameworld are utterly senseless'. To the extent that they have nothing to say on thequestion of truth, they are scientifically worthless. And vice-versa: theaesthetic orientation toward the world, which has been radicalized time andagain since the Romantic movement, means that everything, any object, "themany" (Adorno), however trivial and "low", can become the object ofaesthetic experience-from Blake's famous grain of sand to Beuys' honeypump. Arthur C. Danto has reduced this to the formula of the "transfiguration of the commonplace" in his book of the same title; Gouldner even speaksof a romantic "democratization of reality": "The 'classical' view of the worldhad shut out certain enclaves of reality, whose neglect seemed without anyhesitation to be justified. From the romantic point of view, the insignificanceof such things was due to a lack of imaginative power; reality was democratized.,,20 And Mario Praz cites Flaubert-"There is poetry hidden everywhereand in everything"-in order to stress that since romanticism "even thingswhich are commonly seen as low and repugnant can serve as the material ofbeauty and poetry."21But here, too, the post-classical, inclusive tendency corresponds to anew,secondary exclusivity: the radical devaluation of the instrumental and technical,the utilitarian, and finally even the religious and ethical orientations to theworld. The scientific and the romantic-aesthetic experience of the world cometo seem irreconcilable.Apparently there are tensions built into the very logic of differentiation:tensions connected with cultural one-sidedness and secondary exclusivity,which can produce a fundamentalistic rivalry among the differentiated spheres ofvalue. (Think ofWeber's polytheism of values, the "eternal struggle" between"ultimate orientations" to life.) In the course of this rivalry the questions,perspectives, orientations, and goals of each area become increasinglyincomprehensible to the others-and thus senseless and devaluated.


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408 Praxis InternationalAs Hegel already saw, the specifically modern trait of romantic love drives ittoward "collisions" with "family life, political organization, the citizenry, thelaw, justice, mores, and so on." "On account of theses ruptures, the purposesof love cannot be carried out in concrete reality without leading to collisions,for alongside love the various other spheres of life claim their rights and maythereby infringe on its absolute sovereignty."22What Hegel refers to here as "absolute sovereignty" is what I have calledsecondary exclusivity, the self-destructive totality claims of particularizedspheres of value against one another: "Reason splits itself into a plurality ofspheres of value, destroying its own universality. "23Such consequences emerge clearly in yet another respect: in the relationshipof the differentiated spheres of validity to everyday social life. Here, too, therearise novel problems in communication which can lead to the loss anddestruction of meaning. The language of lovers becomes idiosyncratic and

decays into family pathologies, ending up as double-bind and schizophreniccommunication. Having a true identity to express becomes part of Foucault'sthreatening dispositifs of control and invisible but universal power relations.No one understands the provocations of the artistic avant-garde any more.Scientific research shrinks into senseless specialization, counting amoebas inan aqarium, and the radicalism of moral convictions has terroristic consequences.As the differentiated spheres of value gradually shut themselves off fromeach other, perplexity begins to spread and it becomes unlikely that the armyof social repair brigades-therapists and art teachers, social workers anduniversity instructors-will have much more impact than the earnest paneldiscussions conducted on television.To summarize the modernity thesis (3):1. Romanticism in version I is the cultural driving-force in the differentiation ofart and erotics. The realms of the aesthetic and of intimate relationsseparate themselves offfrom the pre-modern cultural totality according totheir own, inherent spheres of value. In this they set out by following themodels of romantic art and romantic love.2. From these models a rational potential emerges in their socio-evolutionarydevelopment. This can be seen in three respects:a) in the rejection of categorially inappropriate claims made on art andlove-first by tradition and religion, then by Enlightenment andscience. The reflexive formulae of autonomy are meant to expose allclaims originating outside a given sphere as category mistakes, whichfail to address what is really at stake;b) in the tendency to radicalize and principalize questions of validity, thestandards proper to these spheres become clear: subjective concernand authenticity, sensibility and candor. (The value of "authenticexpression", as Taylor calls it);

c) in the inclusive tendency to draw in "the many", Romantic art andRomantic love blast open the classical hierarchies of reality, theevaluative gradation of being; they transcend all traditional classbarriers and social stratification.


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Praxis International 4093. At the same time, the development of autonomous spheres of. valueproduces new perils by releasing new potentials of rationality throughcultural differentiation: secondary exclusivities and absolutistic claims tototality on the part of the particular spheres shift the achieved gains into thetwilight of the dialectic of Enlightenment. This leads us to consider point

4: the paradoxes of romantic modernism.4. The Paradoxes ofRomantic Modernism

All cultural protest movements whose crItIque of the Enlightenment'ssecondary-exclusive partialities--instrumentalism, objectivism, and reificationis brought to bear modernistically are romantic. That is, they proceed from theperspective of sensitized self-experience, which follows from the principalization and differentiation of art and erotics into autonomous, self-referentialspheres of action. But the modernistic radicalization of aesthetic and eroticexperience embodied in autonomous art and romantic love also destroysmeaning. At the outset, their effects are quite similar to those of thephenomena they criticize-scientific-technical Enlightenment and the differentiation of economy and science, law and morality. They respond to theEnlightenment's secondary-exclusive partialities at the price of creatingfurther exclusive partialities.This is the paradox of romantic modernism. Romanticism, which begins as acritique of the instrumentalistic destruction of traditional meanings, itselfbecomes an expressivistic destruction of traditional meanings. The Romanticcritique of the devastation of culture becomes possible through a shift ofperspective-from instrumental to expressive, from objective to subjectivemodernity-at the price of a further round of devastation. From "love aspassion" on down to "love as problem:"24the outcomes are circular discourse,empty activity, schizophrenia and the family, the endless quest for selffulfillment and fulfilled meaning, spontaneity as a program.Such dramatic possibilities of development were envisioned by Max Weberin his well-known vision of a grimly swaggering "nothingness", parading asthe pinnacle of "humanity" at the post-modern endpoint of modern culturaldevelopment: "specialists without spirit, dilettantes without heart"; or, asHegel put it, "empty breadth" and "empty depth".The discovery of such paradoxical developmental perspectives throws aharsh light on the profound ambiguity of romantic modernism ill tworespects. On the one hand, the differentiation of art and erotics asserts motifsfrom the romantic critique of reification: longings for fulfilled expression; fora nature which "speaks" meaningfully and "returns our gaze"; for originsbeyond the original sin of instrumentalism; for subjective meaning andcollective orientation. This takes place along the entire romantic spectrum, inall three versions (I, Ila and lIb). And thereby romantic modernism edgesbewilderingly close to the conservative or reactionary fundamental oppositionto modern culture and its utopian rationalism. This is why the road whichleads from a "refusal to equate modernity with reification" (Gouldner),25which at first was by no means irrational (romanticism in versions I and Ila),


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410 Praxis Internationalback to a conservative anti-modernism (romanticism in version lIb andcultural criticism 11) was often not long-above all, when it was paved withone's own class interests.On the other hand, the motives which underlie the romantic critique ofreification are not identifiable as rational in quite the same way as those intechnology, economy, and science-the traditional domains of the purposiverational model of action. The dominance of the positivist myth which equatesrationality with instrumental rationality makes it difficult to recognize therational motives which distinguish the authentic expression of our subjectivityfrom its pathological distortion. The result has been the irrationalisticself-misunderstandingwhich has lurked in cultural criticism 11 since the days ofearly Romanticism. This phenomenon has been justly criticized in Nietzscheby observers from Lukacs to Habermas: Nietzsche deceives himself aboutthe "rational moment" which lies "in the specificity of the radically differentiated realm of avant-garde art." He constantly tries to push this moment offinto the "metaphysically transfigured irrational." His critique of reason,which absolutizes the aesthetic point of view, possesses "a certain suggestiveness" only because of its implicit, relative rationality. Nietzsche appeals "atleast implicitly to standards . . . which derive from the basic experiences ofaesthetic modernity." He "enthrones taste, the 'Yes and No of the palate', asthe organ of knowledge beyond true and false, beyond good and evil. But hecannot legitimate the standards of aesthetic judgement he retains: because hetransposes aesthetic experience into the archaic; and because he will notacknowledge that the faculty of valuation, sharpened in dealing with modernart, is an aspect of reason, still linked to objectivizing knowledge and moralinsight in the process of discursive substantiation.,,26To bring the motives of the romantic critique of reification to bear rationallyaginst a merely partial, secondary-exclusive rationality is an indispensablemethodological step away from skepticism in reason, which in turn leads toirrationalism. It leads instead via the romantic paradoxes to the dialectic ofEnlightenment-that is, to the unabridged rationality of Enlightenment.Rationality so understood can prove itself only in the dissolution ofinstrumentalistic partialities and secondary exclusivities, never in a merebreak in perspectives, a fundamentalistic jump from one dogmatic partialityto the next. Gouldner: "To the extent that romanticism strives to replace(instead of complement) enlightening objectivism with a modernity founded insubjective experience, it becomes prone to irrationalism and antiintellectualism."27The border which separates reason from irrationalism runs between the strategiesof complementation and replacement. That is the only reasonable conclusionwhich we can draw from the paradoxes of romantic modernism: the idea of adialectical mediation or, to dispense with the Hegelian vocabulary, a reciprocally corrective complementation of Enlightenment and romanticism.5. Enlightenment and RomanticismThis brings us to the final point. There is an alternative to the fundamental


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Praxis International 411oppostion ofEnlightenment and romanticism: it is the idea of their mediation.Mediation means complementation, reciprocal correction of the extremesthrough the extremes, without falling back beneath the level of the "greatpartialities which constitute the signature of the modern".28 What must besuperseded is not the partiality of spheres of value, their extremism, butrather their absolutization-their secondary exclusivity. The romanticimpulse, in its aesthetically and expressively radicalized modernism, becomesproductive as a "critique . . . of a rationality which has become an absolute",as Adorno says in his Aesthetic Theory. Dialectic so understood pursues thepractical goal of dissolving the ''false identities" of the modern world, whosemalady is based on the fact that "they set up something conditioned asabsolute, in everyday life as in philosophy."29"Mediation" and "dialectic" in the sense intended here-as a methodicalstrategy of complementation-must be distinguished from two other readingsof these concepts: from the neo-aristotelian concepts of a Geisteswissenschaftshorn of transcendental speculation, as well as from the orthodox, transcendental concepts of "mediation" and "dialectic" embedded in a speculativephilosophy of history. In the first of these, the neo-aristotelian, geisteswissenschaftliche reading (Ritter school), mediation shrivels into the Aristoteliancategory of the mean, if not into compromise and bargaining; dialecticbecomes cleverness, phronesis, closed hermeneutics, retrospective appropriation of the intellectual and cultural tradition, respectfully bowing before itsauthority. History has run its course, the horizon of the future is closed. In itsfundamental opposition to the utopian potential of Western rationalism, thisreading turns out to be a high-brow version of cultural criticism 11.On the other hand, the strategy of complementation breaks with thephilosophical absolutism of the speculative, historico-philosophical readings ofdialectic and mediation, whose validity Georg Lukacs still simply assumed.The relata which are to be mediated in the process of complementation arethe more radical heirs of Enlightenment and romanticism: uncompromisingly post-absolutistic knowledge (scientific and moral-practical knowledgewhich is open to revision and refutation); and uncompromisinglyanti-traditionalistic romanticism, in the evolutionarily progressive, aestheticist version I.Having set out by demarcating the concept of romanticism (in versions Iand Ila) from that of cultural criticism 11, we now find ourselves compelled toa final twist. Two orientations of rationally enlightened thought (i.e. culturalcriticism I) toward romanticism must be distinguished: an older form basedon a philosophy of history, presented idealistically by Hegel and materialistically by Lukacs (cultural criticism la); and a more advanced form which ispost-absolutistic and scientific (cultural criticism Ib).The following schema summarizes all the distinctions made so far andintegrates the distinction between a historical-metaphysical version la and apost-traditional cultural criticism Ib:


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412 Praxis IntemationalEnlightenment~cultural culturalcriticism criticismla Ib Romanticismv e r S i o n ~ S i o n II

the Enlightenment critical-philosophy of scientifichistory Enlightenmentmodernistic affirmative~verslonIIa verslonlIb

culturalcriticismIlcmetaphysics ofhistory post-traditional,post-absolutistic

RATIONALISM

Figure 3

metaphysics ofhistoryIRRATIONALISM

Hegel, in his Logic, had still tried to develop the speculative dialectic out ofthe terminus medius which joins or mediates the termini extremi of Aristoteliansyllogistics. For us, in terms of figure 3, the dialectic lies in the posttraditional middle of the diagram, if not in strict, logically speculative proofs.Our schema implies a supplement to the (3) modernism thesis in the form ofa(4) compatibility thesis: Enlightenment as cultural criticism Ib is compatiblewith romanticism in version I;And finally an(5) incompatibility thesis: In version lIb or as cultural criticism 11, romanticismis incompatible with Enlightenment. Romanticism in verion Ila is onlycompatible with Enlightenment as cultural criticism la within theframework of a metaphysics of history (or a philosophical anthropology).The condemnation of romanticism, from the late Hegel to Lukacs, cannow be seen as the result of a twofold blindness. Once the romantic impulsehas been reduced to irrationalism and cultural criticism II-that is, to theextreme right wing of Figure 3-so that from this perspective the modernismof romanticism begins to escape the critical view, then the subsumption of theaesthetic under the concept of reason (in Hegel's Aesthetics and in the lateLukacs) cuts off the specificity of the aesthetic and expressive even further.The perspective of cultural criticism la is also blind to the incommensurable


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Praxis International 413and non-identical moments in romantic modernism. Only the second orientationof enlightened thought to romanticism (cultural criticism Ib) makes it possible tocorrect this distortion.Today the sciences are heir to the rationalism of the enlightened culturaltradition. Whether they lay claim to this inheritance or let it decay into thepositivism of everyday, run-of-the-mill science-in any case, the rationalismof the Enlightenment becomes a conjecture which can prove false, a hopewhich can be disappointed, a knowledge which can become obsolete.In the age of science, even the very idea of Enlightenment comes to be seenfor what it really is: a system of propositions for which there is no certaintyand which has exhausted the dream of an absolutely secure metaphysicswithout abandoning the methodical search for practicable routes and thussurrendering them to the pastors of Being.The idea of a mediation between Enlightenment and romanticism is therebytransformed and radicalized into the idea of a mediation of cultural criticismIb and version I of the romantic impulse-that is, it is concentrated in themiddle of Figure 3. These days, such a project is forced to wrestle with thetroublesome problems of a scientifically disenchanted rationalism. Therational motives of romanticism must also pass through this needle's eye, nowthat the hope of a speculative mediation has collapsed along with Hegel's ideaof a non-aristotelian logic.In order to avert the threat of a relapse into a new absolutism, what isneeded is reflection: that is, a corrective learning process by which thescientized spheres would learn to incorporate romantic motives reflexivelyand without injuring the specificity of the respective spheres of validity. Thus,the mediation of Enlightenment and romanticism must also prove itselfwithinthe framework of scientific rationality. Then the cultural-critical motives ofEnlightenment could become effective together with cultural-critical motives ofromantic origin in the context of the social sciences. Wherever this succeeds,we can speak of a concrete example of an exemplary mediation betweenEnlightenment and romanticism.It is Alvin Gouldner's achievement to have provided a case study whichdemonstrates the fruitfulness of genuinely romantic motifs in the history ofthe social sciences. Moreover, this takes place under the premises of aradically hypothetical mode of thought (cultural criticism Ib), whichrenounces all historico-philosophical certainty (cultural criticism la) as well asany kind of fundamentalist critique of civilization (cultural criticism 11):romanticism in the cross-tabulations and in the technical vocabulary of socialresearch-in nineteenth-century French sociology as in Marx and Weber, inFreud and in Anglo-Saxon cultural anthropology as in George Herbert Meadand the Chicago School, and even in positivistic methodologies such as that ofPaul Lazarsfeld, not to mention such intellectual figures as Charles WrightMills. 30 Gouldner's study demonstrates that the Frankfurt School, fromHorkheimer and Adorno to Apel and Habermas, is anything but an exceptionto this transformation of romantic motifs into programs of social-scientificresearch.From the other direction, one can also point to examples of a mediation


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414 Praxis Internationalbetween romantIcIsm and Enlightenment in the context of aesthetic andexpressive forms. A good example is the long-standing controversy over PeterWeiss' Aesthetic of Resistance, a work which transcends the petty bordersbetween the disciplines. Weiss manages-without injuring the specificity ofan uncompromisingly modern aestheticism-to handle themes and motifs insuch a way that our cognitive image of history (the theory of fascism) alongwith our practical orientation to it (resistance) are de-ranged and changed. 31Other examples can be found in the realm of the avant-garde essay: in theradicalized continuation of Adorno's method of aestheticizing philosophy inthe form of the essay. These days, as Karl-Heinz Bohrer has observed, theaesthetic and surreal modernism of the "shock", which has run up against itslimits in the idling avant-garde, tries to put science at its service. But in adialectical irony, it does so only to sense its own limits all the more painfully:"The sensation in the salon, the wild orgies in the halls of academia, whichhad been sought even before the Surrealists: these no longer make it as theyonce did. Such delights may still be re-enacted these days, but we don't getaway with it so easily any more: today's debauchees must be more spartan ifthey want to rape reason and still find something left over afterwards . . .Scandal arises only when the essay's violent fornication with reason has all thetrappings of the permissable: one knows how to deploy one's footnotes andbows to the rules of logic. But whereas science ends up by patting itselfon theback and can no longer think because of its compulsive theorizing, the essaysucceeds in thinking further by wishing to recommend its results to no one.Without meaning to, it carries on the tradition ofRomantic irony. That's justwhat's so fantastic about scandals: their contradiction with reason onlybecomes apparent when they seem most reasonable."32Only when such mediations succeed, whether in the framework of scienceor of its aesthetic-expressive complement, are we no longer forced to retreateven a single step behind the critical-scientific rationalism of cultural criticismIb and its utopian heritage-the step of retreat which leads down thetreacherous slope toward cultural criticism 11.This is precisely what distinguishes the dialectical idea of a mediation ofEnlightenment and romanticism from all conservative attacks against theEnlightenment, which seek to blind its utopian vision and force it back intonaIvete.One of Botho Straufi' most-quoted sentences runs: "Without dialectics wethink more stupidly at once; but so it must be: without it." Why, actually?Even today there is nothing to be added to the answer already given inMinima Moralia: "The defense of the naive, as practiced by irrationalists andvicious anti-intellectuals of all sorts, is degrading."

NOTES1. Cambridge 1983, quoted from the German edition, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983,) p. 177.2. J. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985) p. 55.3. Mario Praz, Liebe, Tod und Teufel. Die schwarze Romantik (Miinchen: dtv, 1970), p. 27.


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Praxis Intemational 4154. G. Lukacs, Die Zerst6rung der Vernunft (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1962); B. Russell, "Die geistigenVater des Faschismus," in: Russell, Philosophische und politische Aufsiitze (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971),pp. 114-135; K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (London: G. Routledge, 1945).5. cf. my book: H. Brunkhorst, Der Intellektuelle im Land der Mandarine (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986).6. Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1954), quoted from the Germantranslation: Soziologische Theorie (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1964), p. 281.7. Ibid.8. Ibid., pp. 81f.9. cf. M. Brumlik in: Th. Kreuder, H. Loewy, Konservatismus in der Strukturkrise (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp, 1985).

10. K. H. Bohrer, "Identitat als Selbstverlust. Zum romantischen Subjektbegriff', Merkur, Vol. 426,1984, p. 379.11. Th. W. Adorno, Prismen, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969) p. 106.12. cf. H. Brunkhorst on Sartre's 'Flaubert' ( 'L'idiot de la famille'): "Wie man sich zu dem macht, derman ist," in: T. Konig, ed.: Sartre's Flaubert lesen, (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1980) pp. 27-43.13. M. Praz, op. cit. , pp. 40ff.14. Quoted by M. Praz, op. cit ., p. 150.15. J. Ritter has made an influential attempt to build such a program of neoconservative aesthetics:Landschaft, Zur Funktion des Asthetischen in der modernen Gesellschaft, in: Ritter, Subjektivitat(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 141ff; for a critique of Ritter and the German neoconservativeschool of his desciples, cf. H. Brunkhorst, op. cit. (1986).16. H. M. Enzensberger, Brentanos Poetik, (Miinchen: Hanser, 1961). One of the first poets, who hascelebrated Brentanos' aesthetic modernism of shock, distortion and destruction, was Heinrich Heine,

as Enzensberger emphasizes: "Einen ganz wesentlichen Aspekt der Entstellung, namlich den derZerstorung des Vorgegebenen, sieht am scharfsten Heinrich Heine: 'Die Muse die uns aus denPoesien des Herrn Clemens Brentano so wahnsinnig entgegenlacht, ... zerreifit ... die glattestenAtlasschleppen und die glanzendsten Goldtressen, und ihre zerstorungssiichtige Liebenswiirdigkeit, und ihre jauchzend bliihende Tollheit erfiillt unsere Seele mit unheimlichen Entziickenund liisterner Angst. Seit fiinfzehn Jahren lebt aber Herr Brentano entfernt von der Welt,eingeschlossen, ja, eingemauert in seinen Katholizismus. Es gab nichts kostbares mehr zu zerreifien... Gegen sich selbst und sein poetisches Talent hat er am meisten seine Zerstorungssucht geiibt.'("Die romantische Schule," erschienen 1833/35) Heinrich Heine ist auch der einzige Dichter des 19.Jahrhunderts, auf den die Poesie Brentanos eine unmittelbare Wirkung ausgeiibt hat." (Enzensberger, op. ci t., p. 134).The quotation from Heine shows him making implicit use of our distinction between Romanticism Iand II, in celebrating Brentanos' poetic modernism and condemning his later turn to catholicism asthe pious end of his poetic force.

17. K. H. Bohrer, "Das Bose-eine asthetische Kategorie"? Merkur, Vol. 436, pp. 459-473.18. Letter to Sophie Volland, quoted by M. Praz, op. cit. , p. 50.19. G. W. F. Hegel, Asthetik IIII (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1971), pp. 564ff; especially, pp. 620ff.20. A. W. Gouldner, "Romantisches und klassisches Denken," in: Gouldner, Reziprozitiit und Autonomie(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984), p. 174.21. M. Praz, op. cit., p. 46.22. Hegel, op. cit., pp. 624ff.23. J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. I, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 337.24. cf. N. Luhmann, Liebe als Passion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982).25. Gouldner, op. cit., p. 17426. Habermas, op. cit., (1985) pp. 117 ff.27. Gouldner, op. cit., p. 175.28. Habermas, op. cit. (1981), Vol. 11, p. 584.29. Adorno, Asthetische Theorie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1973), p. 93; Habermas, op. cit. (1985)30. Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 165-214.31. cf. the interesting essay by A. Sollner in Leviathan Vol. 3 (1984): 'Peter Weifi' "Asthetik desWiderstands", gelesen von einem Sozialwissenschaftler.'32. K. H. Bohrer, Plotzlichkeit (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1981) p. 87.

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4.1 - Brunkhorst, Hauke - Romanticism and Cultural Criticism (en)

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