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Marx And The Bolshevization Of Marxism

Marx And The Bolshevization Of Marxism

by Svetozar Stojanovi

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 4 / 1986, pages: 450-461, on www.ceeol.com.

http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=d1bdefd8-6d05-473d-baba-ef37a525117ahttp://www.ceeol.com/

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MARXISM AND BOLSHEVISM

MARX AND THE BOLSHEVIZATION OF MARXISMSvetozar Stojanovic

Responsibility for the Mode of Theory ConstructionIn this day and age of pervasive commercialization, there can hardly beanyone who has not heard of the younger French theoreticians who inNietzschean style call themselves the "new philosophers." They started off asideologized marxists, but, shocked by Solzhenitsyn's revelations of the"Gulag," ended up in ideologized anti-marxism. To paraphrase two of them,A. Glucksmann and B. H. Levy: we must not ascribe concentration camps tobureaucracy alone; this "barbarism with a human face" would not be possiblewithout marxism; to be sure, marxism does not automatically lead to theGulag, it "merely" makes people blind and deaf to the emergency of thesecamps; the Gulag is the true realization ofmarxism, and stalinism is socialism"transformed to the point of recognizability."A diametrically opposed view is held by those who proceed from Marx'shumanism. This orientation, with the accent on "returning to the authenticMarx," played a tremendous role in the showdown with stalinism in the fiftiesand sixties. It says that marxism has not been realized, but rather has been"distorted to the point of unrecognizability" in leninism, and even more in

stalinism. Marx has no responsibility whatsoever for this ideologization ofmarxism.It is here that my reservations begin concerning such marxists. Newmarxists ought to be radically critical towards Marx himself because of his partin the bolshevization of marxism-critical, of course, in an entirely differentway than the "new philosophers." We no longer have the right to judge Marxin utter isolation from the many miscarried attempts to achieve his ideas, nomatter how unacceptable these attempts may be to humanist marxists.I still share with these marxists the belief that bolshevism constitutes anoutlook on the world and a practice which has moved far away from thehumanistic position of original marxism. But, it is much easier to rejectbolshevism in the name of such marxism, than it is to explain its bolshevization in the first place.

* * *In the way in which he constructed his theory, Marx, in my opinion, not onlyopened up the possibility of its bolshevization through reinterpretation,reduction, and transformation, but also, to a certain extent, lent it a helping

hand.Until recently there were many marxists who believed in the existence of anPraxis Intemational 6:4January 1987 0260-8448 $2.00

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Praxis International 451essentially homogeneous Marx. However, at its very foundations the edifice ofhis thought is fraught with tensions, and even contradictions, for instancebetween extreme and moderate determinism.Original marxism also left large areas of ambiguity, as in the case of the"transition period." Still worse, Marx left behind an essentially unproblematized and fallacious idea, which, because of its fertile ground for ideologization, was extemely dangerous from the start, i.e. "the dictatorship of theproletariat" during the "transition period."Let it be remembered that it was Marx himself who designated this idea ashis only original contribution to the theory of class struggle. 1 Admittedly,many see an extenuating circumstance in the fact that he explicitly mentionedthis idea only about a dozen times, but, in view of the importance Marxattached to it, this is more of an aggravating than an extenuatingcircumstance.

Marx's ambivalence has often been analysed and criticized: on the onehand, he advocates self-organization by the proletariat, citing the ParisCommune as a model, but on the other, he talks about communists as themost far-sighted part of the proletarian movement. But without the mediationof the "dictatorship of the proletariat," this second aspect was in itself not asufficient basis for the bolshevization of marxism.As for (co-)responsibility for the bolshevization, it is entirely natural that inthe case of Marx we should concentrate on theory, for he was primarily atheoretician and this theoretical aspect of his work particularly influenced thebolsheviks. In discussing Lenin's (co-)responsibility (for the stalinization ofbolshevism), the accent would quite certainly shift to his practical and politicalactivity, because he was, above all, a revolutionary and the founder of a newstate.Since a disproportionately large number of philosophers have always takenpart in discussions on the continuity or discontinuity between classicalmarxism and bolshevism, too much stress has been placed on the philosophicalaspects of the problematic: dialectics, determinism, anthropology, etc. Theuninitiated, therefore, could get the impression that Lenin and his followerswere mostly preoccupied with the need to realize Marx's philosophy.However, the decisive theoretical inspiration for bolshevism should besought in Marx's socio-political ideas. That is why the kingpin in my analysis isthe "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the "weakest link" in classicalmarxism. In renouncing precisely this project, Eurocommunists must havepreceived the principal nexus between bolshevism and classical marxism."Dictatorship of the proletariat" was the driving idea of the "negativedialectic of marxism." This, of course, is not to say that Marx's ideas weremore decisive for the emergence and victory of bolshevism than the sociohistorical conditions prevailing in Russia and the world at the time. Still,because of Marx's enormous authority in social democracy, an important rolewas played by Lenin's and other bolsheviks' ability to cite his "dictatorship ofthe proletariat." Certainly, a theory which deliberately takes upon itself theresponsibility for changing the world, must not in principle avoid the(co-)responsibility for its own fate in the world.

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452 Praxis IntemationalThe process in the marxist tradition which is analogous to the "dialectic ofenlightenment" could also be analyzed. Furthermore, certain similarities existbetween the devastating role of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in relationto communist-humanist ideals and the fateful influence of private ownership

in the negative dialectic of liberal humanism with its ideals of freedom,equality and fraternity.It is not true, as some would have it, that Marx had in mind only thesociological and not (like the bolsheviks) the political-juristic notion ofdictatorship as well. There is no doubt that he also pointed out the necessity ofrepressive action by the proletarian state against the overthrown ruling class.And yet, there is an enormous difference between the idea of thedictatorship of the proletariat in classical marxism and its realization in thebolshevik form. Marx desired and envisaged transitory dictatorship by thevast majority of the people over the deposed bourgeois minority. But, theultimate result of bolshevism is a lasting dictatorship by the minority over theproletariat and generally over the large majority of the people. Exactly how,then, is Marx (co-)responsible for the bolshevization of marxism?In my critique ofMarx I shall try to proceed as immanently as possible. Hisambition was to found a new critical theory. My starting question is of ameta-theoretical character: how did Marx actually build his theory and, as itscreator, what, given his ambitions and the criteria he applied to others, werehis obligations? Setting out from the criteria immanent to his theory (whichshould be radically and consistently self-reflexive and self-critical), we cancriticize Marx's theoretical procedure for having played into the hands ofdictatorial communists (bolsheviks).What are these immanent criteria? Marx was: a philosopher and thinker ofemancipatory practice; a staunch critic of utopian socialism and communism;a great critic of ideology; a major critic of alienation.The Utopia of the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat"

The realizability and realization of an idea such as the dictatorship of theproletariat should have been the focal point of attention for Marx as a thinkerof emancipatory practice and a critic of utopianism. Regrettably, he did notdwell on this problem at all.We must include in the core ofMarx's theory not only the distant objectivesof the communist movement, but also the ways and means by which they wereto be achieved-for he wanted to be different from the utopians. We shouldcritically analyse whatever Marx said about these ways and means, but weshould also establish the related problems he did not raise, although he couldand should have done so given the level ofknowledge and experience that existed inhis day.If it cannot be realized in a way which preserves its conceived abstract

meaning, then perhaps the "dictatorship of the proletariat" can be realized atthe expense of that meaning, and itself be (ab)used as an ideologicaljustification for a different practice. Here, then, we are talking not about thelogical consequences of Marx's idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but

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Praxis International 453about the spectrum of realistic possibilities for its practical application. This takesus back to my distinction between the ruling and the dominant class.2Marx erred seriously when he embraced entirely different types of classdomination within one and the same notion of the "ruling" class. There is anessential difference between a class which structurally monopolizes the stateand one which, admittedly, does dominate the state but has no structuralmonopoly over it.Unfortunately, his mistake of looking at every "ruling" class in terms of thestructural monopoly modelledMarx to the erroneous conclusion that each andevery class rule, even when bourgeois, is more or less class dictatorship. From here,per analogiam, it was just one step to the idea of proletarian rule anddictatorship. But, even if the premise of the rule and dictatorship of thebourgeoisie were tenable, this still does not necessarily imply anything aboutthe chances for the proletariat to establish successfully its rule and dictatorship. Since it does not constitute a class of owne(s of the means ofproduction, the proletariat has an incomparably weaker basis than thebourgeoisie for establishing class domination, let alone class rule and dictatorship.As an economic (and not a political-economic) class, workers did not norcould they become the ruling, let alone the dictatorial class. In order for aneconomic (and for that matter a property-less) class to hold power, of adictatorial character at that, at least one part of it would have to abandonproduction and become ex-workers. Marx's citing of the Paris Commune as amodel is ofno help here3: had it lasted, the people would have had to return toeveryday affairs. A wise conception of the relationship between classes andstate authority ought not to set out from a state of emergency.No matter how we look at it, Marx's idea of the dictatorship of theproletariat was practicable only by having one group rule in the name of theproletariat as a whole. In the best of cases, it would rule in its interest andunder its control. In the worst case, it would rule without any kind ofsupervision and against its vital interests. In conceiving a new state it is nosmall oversight to set out from the most optimistic assumptions, where no realthought is given to measures and guarantees against the abuse of power.Mankind had already had plenty of bad experience with its rulers. Theselessons were wisely remembered by liberal thinkers, for instance, and bysomeone like Rousseau, not to mention Bakhunin's direct warnings whichMarx arrogantly derided.At any rate, by analogy with the differentiation of the Third Estate and thebourgeoisie's separation from it, it was not difficult to imagine the dangersthreatening the proletarian class from those dictating in its name.Much has been written about Marx's aggressive attitude towards rivals andcritics, and about his attitude's impact on the development of authoritariantendencies in marxism. For me Marx's personal characteristics are of interestto the extent that they came to expression in the construction of his theory.We cannot simply shut our eyes to the negative consequences of how athinker's ideas have been carried out. Moreover, he is objectively (co-)responsible for the consequences he could have forseen at the given level of

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454 Praxis Internationalexperience and knowledge, but did not take into consideration. This especiallyapplies to a thinker with as many practical concerns as Marx.The assumptions regarding the proletariat as the ruling class and itsdictatorship "answered" all crucial questions before they had even beenraised. Had Marx set out from the paradigm of the dominant class, he wouldhave been more prone to contemplate what the eventual dominance of theworking class could be based on. Since this class is not comprised of owners ofmeans of production, its power over the new state apparatus would have to bebased on special institutions and organizations. Unfortunately, within thescope of his class paradigm, Marx was uninterested in contemplating them.Nor, as a rule, did Marx's followers look for institutional-organizationalmeans against general statization and the formation of a new ruling class madeup of "representatives" of the working class. With stalinization, the new partyand state apparatus in the end really did become the ruling class. But Marxcould not foresee such a possibility and tendency because he lacked a notion ofthe political-economic class.What especially attracted many revolutionaries (not only bolsheviks) toMarx was his realistic approach to the dangers posed to the revolution by theoutgoing ruling class, even when ousted from power. Everyone had heard ofthe counter-revolution's savage reckoning with the Paris communards.Because of his dichotomous approach to the future-after capitalisminevitably comes socialism-Marx did not realize the extent to which theproletariat could be endangered by its "own" state (statism).It is interesting to note that the impetus for ideologization in a theory usuallycomes with the very first wrong step-in the choices of language. The realpoint is not, as some critics claim, that Marx speaks about proletariandictatorship instead of proletarian democracy. It is to be presumed that thosewho come to power through revolutionary violence are likely to defend itthrough dictatorship.Had Marx called his idea revolutionary dictatorship he probably would nothave put such a lid on the problems stemming from the relationship betweenrevolutionaries and the proletariat, and from the asymmetry between emancipatory objectives and authoritarian means. These problems include: how tomake repressive restrictions affect only the former ruling class, withoutharming workers; how to prevent the revolutionary elite from becomingautonomous and establishing a dictatorship over the proletariat; how toproletarianize, and then liberalize and democratize the revolutionary dictatorship once it has actually come into being.Marx's radically anti-utopian self-understanding has long since beenbrought into question. Ample and persuasive analysis has been devoted tothose components in Marx's picture of a communist future which bear thesigns of utopia, and even of absolute utopia, where all basic contradictions willsupposedly be transcended, including the contradiction between man'sessence and man's existence.4However, I take the usual criticism of Marx's utopianism a step further,and claim that the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat is itself utopian.Not only is the ultimate goal utopian, but so is the road leading up to it. Out of

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Praxis International 455a number of socialist and communist theoreticians, it is in Marx that thebolsheviks found support because (among other things) his scientific realismseemed to make him different from the others. Actually, in Marx we haveelements of both communist utopia and the utopia of the "transition period."This is not to say, of course, that Marx's entire picture of the new society isutopian.Distancing himself from the utopians, who countered reality with ideals,and in the process often appealed to ruling groups and individuals, Marxlooked to social life itself for the class vehicle of change towards socialismcommunism. But the crucial question that should have been asked in thisconnection is: does the proletariat have sufficient power and means to introduceits dictatorship during the "transition period?" The plausibility of the entireproject of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" hinges on the answer to thisquestion. What else if not this question of the power and means of basic socialgroups in capitalist society can be called a scientific approach to socialism andcommunism?Instead of perceiving and examining this problem, Marx wrongly believedin a kind of ontological predetermination of the proletariat:It is not a question ofwhat this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat,at the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, andwhat in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aimand historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own lifesituation as well as in the whole organisation of bourgeois society today. There isno need to explain here that a large part of the English and French proletariat isalready conscious of its historic task and is constantly working to develop thatconsciousness into complete clarity. (The Holy Family, Marx and Engels,Collected Works (New York: International Publishers), Volume 4, p. 37.What strikes the eye is that Marx worked with the concepts of the being andthe consciousness of the proletariat, entirely skirting the question of its classpower. As though the only problem lies in the development of classconsciousness, while the actual class power of the proletariat is not problematic at all! It is not true, in my view, that the question is "what theproletariat is, and what in accordance with this being, it will historically becompelled to do;" the real question is what the proletariat is and what, inaccordance with its being and power, it will historically be capable of doing.It is perfectly clear why the development of (self)consciousness was in theforefront of Hegel's system. There would be no point here to any questionabout the real power of the world spirit, because it ultimately constitutes thecause of all happening. Even someone like George Lukacs was unable to stepbeyond the Hegelian framework. That is why he studied the relationshipbetween history and class consciousness, and not between history, class powerand class consciousness. In his otherwise self-critical foreword to the newedition of History and Class Consciousness (1967), he wrote:As to the way in which the problem was actually dealt with, it is not hard to seetoday that it was treated in purely Hegelian terms. In particular its ultimatephilosophical foundation is the identical subject-object that realizes itself in the

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456 Praxis Internationalhistorical process. Of course, in Hegel it arises in a pqrely logical andphilosophical form when the highest stage of absolute spirit is attained inphilosophy by abolishing alienation and by the return of self-consciousness toitself, thus realizing the identical subject-object. In History and ClassConsciouness, however, this process is sociohistorical and it culminates when theproletariat reaches this stage in its class consciousness, thus becoming theidentical subject-object of history. But is the identical subject-object hereanything more in truth than a purely metaphysical construct? Can a genuinelyidentical subject-object be created by self-knowledge, however adequate, andhowever truly based on an adequate knowledge of society, i.e. however perfectthe self-knowledge is? ... Thus the proletariat seen as the identical subjectobject of the real history of mankind is no materialist consummation thatovercomes the construction of idealism. It is rather an attempt to out-HegelHegel ... (History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1968), p. XXII f.We see that even Lukacs's self-criticism does not raise the problem of therelationship between consciousness and power, as though the proletariat, evenif it were to become entirely conscious of its class interest, would certainlyhave sufficient power to see it through. And anyway, what does it mean for theproletariat to grow from a class in itself into a class for itself without soberlytaking stock of its own power potential?One of the most repeatedly discussed questions in the history ofmarxism iswhether the proletariat can spontaneously develop full class consciouness.Lenin, as is known, took up Kautsky's idea that revolutionary consciousnessshould be instilled in the proletariat from "outside." But, if politicalconsciousness has to be introduced into an economic class from outside, thenwhy should not the same apply to its political power? No one, however, hasever mentioned introducing class power into the proletariat from outside!

The Obligations of a Critic of Ideology and AlienationIt is a great pity that Marx did not creatively return to his early criticism of"crude" and "despotic" communism. In my opinion, his early works outlinewhat is in many ways a (pre)Nietzschean genealogy of envious communismwhich strives for universal levelling. This was a superb model of sociopsychological analysis, but also an analytical framework which had a numberof limitations.Why did Marx only mention democratic communism (as a contrast todespotic communism), without saying anything more specific about it?Furthermore, are not some people envious not only ofwealth and the power itbrings, but also of political power as such? Why did not Marx also foresee adifferent, incomparably more lasting and more dangerous type of despoticcommunism, leading not to primitive egalitarianism but, on the contrary, tomajor social differences, both in political power and in material advantages?

Why did it never occur to Marx that levelling despotism-if such a term canbe used-would be only a short-lived "transition period" to despotic rulewhich establishes privileges for itself and for the strata it needs?Admittedly, Marx's only experience was with communism in opposition,

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Praxis International 457not with communism in power. The Paris Commune's levelling egalitarianismdid not last long enough to give more visible signs of opposite tendencies. Itwas only la,ter that a form ofcommunism-bolshevism-shifted quickly fromthe phase of ascetic levellers to the period of stalinist super-despotism inwhich the ruling statist class holds enormous privileges.Experience also teaches us that envy can just as easily prompt the "negativeabolition" of bourgeois democracy and not just of private ownership. Thosewho, in the name of the proletariat, try to come to power at any cost, also wantto discredit bourgeois democracy at any cost. Such communism never reaches,the level of that (or any other) democracy, no matter how much it boasts ofhaving already transcended it.Why was it that Hegel's analysis of the consciousness of the servant inrelation to the master did not inspire Marx to generalize the tendency of notonly ruling groups and classes but also the oppressed to develop ideologicalconsciousness? Of course, with Hegel we are talking about stoic, skeptical andunhappy consciousness. The first simply ignores its subjugated position, thesecond denies the possibility of any other kind of relationship among people,and the third internalizes its own impotence by turning it into a virtue.I am referring to a line of thought where Marx's critique of despoticcommunism could have been more penetrating. It points to yet another formof ideology from below: while invoking the interests of the subjected classesand humanistic ideals, a group can conceal (even from itself) its envy ofpower-holders and its desire for power at any cost.One wonders whether Marx would have upheld the idea of dictatorship ofthe proletariat had he examined it critically in the light of his analysis ofdespotic communism (and of the so-called Asiatic mode of production anddespotism).Marx was interested primarily in the ideology of the ruling classes,especially the bourgeoisie. He did not integrate his own critique of variousforms of communism and socialism into his view of ideology. This onlyincreased the possibility of his theory being (ab)used as an ideology: first as arevolutionary and, later, as a ruling ideology.However, as a critic of ideology Marx was obliged to try to reduce thedanger of his own thoughts being ideologized. This is also implied by theprinciple of critical self-reflection and by Marx's ambition of creating anew,critical social science.Since the future of the communist movement and theory, like every future,was entirely open, Marx should have problematized that future. It was nothard to presume that among the various tendencies in that movement therewould be those which would try at all costs to (ab)use Marx's idea forideological purposes. What would happen if, inspired by The German Ideologyand Marx's other critiques of the ideologies of the time, a critique were madeof Marx himself? The task of the critic would be to shed as much light aspossible on the actual and potential ideological aspects of Marx's work.In calling for measures taken in the construction of critical theory whichwould defend it against ideologization, I have no "prescriptions for thefuture" in mind. Indeed Marx himself firmly and rightly rejected any such

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458 Praxis Internationalprescrlpnons. What I do have in mind are major moves in elaboratingprimarily the idea of communism as a movement-and in formulations thatare more of a negative and orientational character. Marx repeatedly stressedthat he did not want to construct the picture of the future, but to contribute tothe self-consciousness of the workers' movement. Would not the saidmeasures be a contribution to developing the class consciousness of theworking class, to transforming it from a class in-itself to a class for-itself?Many Marxists have made a habit ofuncritically and without differentiationpraising Marx's way of theorizing on the future society. A recent examplefrom an otherwise good article: "True, in regard to concrete modalities of thetransition to socialism Marx never tied his hands-this is, after all, anadvantage of his concrete-historical way of thinking, that only anti-historicaldogmatists can reproach him for ... (H. M i i n k l f ~ r , Marx heute, a weekly"Das Parlament", Bonn, 12. Ill. 1983). Here, no distinction is made betweentwo things: defining "concrete modalities of the transition to socialism" andproblematizing the basic idea of that transition.It would, indeed, hardly be in the spirit of an emancipatory theory such asMarx's, which proceeds from the self-activity and self-organization of theproletariat, to prescribe it any "concrete modalities." On the other hand, itwould be absurd to proclaim as a feature of the "concrete historical way ofthinking" the fact that Marx did not problematize. the basic principle of socialorganization in the transition period at all-the dictatorship of the proletariat.My objection, therefore, has nothing to do with any construction of thefuture, with the concrete modalities of realizing the idea of the dictatorship ofthe proletariat, but rather with the uncritical presumption of its realizability.History has shown this to be not a small, but a fatal, shortcoming of Marx'stheoretical practice.One can almost coin the following rule: If oppressive consequences can atall be extracted from an idea, there will always be a sufficient number ofpeople who will unscrupulously try to realize the idea in precisely this way. Tobe sure, no thinker can completely prevent the alienation of his own ideas, buthe has the obligation to oppose explicitly and fully such a tendency, especiallyif, like Marx, he is himself a vigorous critic of alienation.The Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach and the First Thesis on Marx

There should be no need to remind Marx that in practice (including that ofa theoretical nature) not only are existing possibilities realized, but new onesare created. The founding fathers of spiritual orientations, even the greatestand most humanistic, have no right to reserve for themselves the exclusiveclaim on creative influence, and to shift completely onto their followers theresponsibility for the ideological outcome of their ideas and deeds, especially ifwe are talking about those with a pronounced and explicit emancipatoryinterest at heart.Why is it that so many marxists, when it suits them, have taken to makingan exception of Marx and to reducing his emancipatory interest to hisemancipatory intention? Is emancipatory responsibility restricted to the

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Pfaxis International 459intended and predicted meaning and consequences of somebody's ideas andacts? Marx would never have denied that men, including thinkers, aredetermined first and foremost by what they actually do, and not by what theywish. Precisely because of the justified effort to overcome subjectivism, thecategories of "objective meaning" and "objective responsibility" have beenfrequently used in the history of marxism; with full justification, wheneverthey referred to the whole predictable meaning and to all predictable consequences of ideas and conduct, but with impermissible ideologization of thenotion of responsibility whenever unpredictable meaning and consequenceswere used in order to manipulate people.Willy nilly, with their theories and the way in which they construct them,thinkers add something to the potential "ideological pool." Social movements,parties and organizations use these ideas, through selection and transformation, to construct ideologies. This applies also to bolshevism and its relationto Marx.It is interesting to note the impetus Marx lends, according to G. Cohen, tothe study of how ideologies emerge:

But before an ideology is received or broadcast it has to be formed. And on thatpoint there are traces in Marx of a Darwinian mechanism, a notion thatthought-systems are produced in comparative independence from social constraints, but persist and gain social life following a flirtation process which selectsthose well adapted for ideological service. There is a kind of 'ideological pool'which yields elements in different configurations as social requirements changes.Yet it is unlikely that ideas fashioned in disconnection from their possiblesocial use will endorse and reject exactly what suits classes receptive to them.Here a Lamarckian element may make the picture more plausible.... Becauseof the delicacy of intellectual constructions, sets of ideas enjoy a partly similarplasticity: one change of emphasis, one slurred inference, etc., can alter theimport of the whole. (G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defense(Princeton, N.].: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 290.Of primary interest to me here has been the "Darwinian mechanism" in theprocess of the bolshevization of classical marxism. I have been preoccupiedwith the question which basic idea ofMarx especially lent itself to selection by

the bolsheviks, and only mentioned in passing the "Lamarckian" moment,i.e. the bolshevik transformation of that idea.I am not trying to suggest, of course, that Marx, with his theoreticalprocede, could have entirely prevented unwanted interpretations, but ratheronly to point out that he did not do nearly enough to narrow down thepossibility of at least the most dangerous practical interpretations.Practical application is not a marginal dimension ofMarx's theory, and stillless is it an external approach to it. Marx is renowned for his Eleventh thesison Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways,the point, however, is to change it." One of a number of radically revisionisttheses on Marx, should, in my opinion, read as follows: In order to reduce thedanger of the world being changed in an undesired direction, in the name ofphilosophy, and ofphilosophy itself being abused as an ideological justification for

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460 Praxis Internationalsuch change, the way ofphilosophizing on the world must be changed by focusing onthe question of the realizability of that philosophy.Resignation which says that absolutely nothing can be done to prevent theevil fate of theory, because there will always be someone to abuse it in one wayor another-would be entirely out of keeping with Marx's activist philosophy.After all, the point here has not been to protect Marx's theory from allpossible abuse, but from a particular abuse-dictatorship over the proletariatin the name of the proletariat. Marx wanted to influence the change of theworld, and to a considerable degree he succeeded. Obviously, he was entirelywrong in predicting the true nature of this influence.A praxis-oriented thought does not leave the slightest room for quietisticallygiving up on its own fate. In any event, it is far "easier" to influence the fate ofone's own theory than the change of the world. Also in this regard Marxwould have to reject the Hegelian understanding of philosophy expressed inthe metaphor of Minerva's owl which takes wing only at dusk.It would be interesting to compare the fatalism of two opposing sides: theone, which in the name of classical marxism resolutely rejects its bolshevization, while at the same time considers that in the construction of the theoryabsolutely nothing could really have been undertaken to prevent this fromhappening-and the other, that attacks classical marxism, claiming that itinevitably leads to bolshevism or its ilk.Critical rationalism has contributed much to the study of "strategy ofimmunization" (H. Albert) of theory against criticism. Such a strategy is apretty good indication of a hidden ideological tendency. What interests mehere is the reverse problem which can eventually open up a new area offruitful metatheoretical exploration. This is the strategy, so to speak, ofimmunizing theory against ideologization. I say "so to speak" because there isno chance of creating a theory completely immune to ideologization. But, whosays an all or nothing stand needs to be taken? There is no reason tounderestimate the task of reducing the potential of ideological abuse of theory.I am convinced that just as the full intellectual potential of classical marxismhas still not been taped, so its ideological vulnerability has yet to be sufficientlystudied and elucidated. Hegel was right in saying that theories are not handedover to followers like money ready to be used, rather they must fight for themby dint of their own interpretations. Is it, however, not equally true that thecreators of theories are obliged for precisely this reason to render them asresistant as possible to distortion?

NOTES

1. Ralph Milliband rightly points out: "This is a crucial concept in Marx's political thought, and also inLeninism." (T. Bottomore ed., A Dictionary ofMarxist Thought, Basil Blackwell, p. 129).2. "Marxism and Democracy: Ruling or Dominant Class?", Praxis International, Vol. 1, No. 2. (July1981), pp. 160-171.3. Ralph Milliband writes: "This points to the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat in Marx's view

of it was meant literally: in other words, that he meant by it not only a form of regime, in which the

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Praxis Intemational 461proletariat would exercise the sort of hegemony hitherto exercised by the bourgeoisie, with the actualtask of government being left to others, but also a form of government, with the working class actuallygoverning, and fulfilling many of the tasks hitherto performed by the state." Cop cit., p. 130).

4. I discussed this in Chapter 11 ofmy book: Berween Ideals and Reality, English edition, (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1973).