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Property | Art. 484

Art. 484

SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 122047. October 12, 2000]

SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, andsubstituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada)respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition forcertiorariunder Rule 45 assails the Decision[1] dated March 25, 1994,of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions[2] dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 inCA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional TrialCourt of Pasig City, Branch 113, and nullified the sale of the subject lot by the spousesCrisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portionof the respondent court's decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is herebyREVERSED, and a new one is rendered:

1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of AbsoluteSale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V. Alejo in favor ofAnita Bonode Si.

2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancelTransfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of AnitaBonode Si, married to Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married toRemedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada Jr., single.

3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and reviveTransfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose, Crisostomoand Severo, Jr.

4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the sharecorresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30) daysfrom notice in writing by Crisostomo Armada.

5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay theplaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.

6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay theplaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigationexpenses and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."[3]

The factual background of the case is as follows:

The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the propertyin dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr. This was covered byTransfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460. During the lifetime of the spouses, theproperty was transferred to their children and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued TCTNo. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA,

married to Cresenciana V. Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married toRemedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., si ngle, all oflegal age, Filipinos."[4] Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "... byvirtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979, executed byCRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of ANITA BONODE SI, married toSerafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No. 17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary Public of PasayCity, Manila, Julian Florentino)."[5]

On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, filed acomplaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with Damages, againstherein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana.Isada brokered the sale.

The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by making itappear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a Filipino citizen, residing withIsada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomoand Cresenciana had migrated and were already citizens of the United States of America. Italso stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they inserted the phrase"... and that the co-owners are not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them.",and that petitioners knew of the misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the complaint allegedthat the other owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale; and that allupon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private respondents filed a complaint forannulment of sale and reconveyance of title with damages, claiming they had a right ofredemption.

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with theconsent of her husband executed three separate deeds of sale (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3) [6]conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33 square meters each toCrisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale particularly described the portion conveyed toeach son in metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the property was already three

distinct parcels of land, there was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Joseand Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si.Petitioners point out that it was only because the Armada brothers failed to submit thenecessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in Pasay City that separatetitles were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued and registered in the names of Jose,Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. With costsagainst the plaintiffs."[7]

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994, theappellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In reversing the decision ofthe trial court and ruling for private respondents, the Court of Appeals found that:

"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the portion sold byvirtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1, 2, & 3) to the Armada brothers do not appear in the saidtitle, neither does it indicate the particular area sold. Moreover, no evidence was presented to

show that the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the basis of the saiddeeds of Sale. In fact, TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose,Crisostomo and Severo, Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33 sq. m.respectively.

Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'),executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si, stated that the portion sold was the'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square meters' of the parcel of land

covered by TCT NO. 16007 of the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City, which meanswas sold to defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold portion of the whole.

Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on March 27, 1979, CArmada, thru his attorney-in-fact and co-defendant, Cresenciana Alejo, sold his113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Expresented for registration with the Register of Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying the sale (TSN, pp. 6-8, December 20, 1988). Instead, it appears that the phrase 'aco-owners are not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to them', was inseDeed of Sale (Exh. 'B').

x x x

Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the undivided not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry Property, unless accompanaffidavit of the Vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemp

On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion for reconsiderationdenied by the Court of Appeals on November 21, 1994, for being filed out of time.

On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under Sect53 of the Revised Rules of Court. [9] Petitioners presented new evidence, TCT N2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la Rosa, married to Severo Armadannotation at the back stating that the cancellation was by virtue of three deedsfavor of Escolastica's sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied threasoning that when the motion was filed, the reglementary period had lapseddecision had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for reconsideratiresolution was denied.

Hence, the present petition, alleging that:

"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling thaco-ownership still existed.

"2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of 25 March 1994 on purtechnical grounds.

"3. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying Motion for New Trial.

"4. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordepetitioners to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses athe costs of the suit."[10]

In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether respondent courdenying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or the Motion for New Trial; (private respondents are co-owners who are legally entitled to redeem the lot un1623 of the Civil Code; [11] and (3) whether the award of moral damages, attorney'costs of suit is correct.

The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right of runder Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The trial court found that the disputed land was an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of absolute sale[12]technically desportion sold to each son. The portions belonging to the three sons were separatelyfor taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21Jose's testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when shhad been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose.[14]More signi

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January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued threenew titles as follows: (1) TCT 134594 [15] in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 134595[16]under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 134596 [17] owned byJose Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record.

However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's findings. [18]

In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance withthose of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts ismanifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review the evidence in order to arrive at thecorrect factual conclusion.[19] This we have done in this case. It is our considered view now,that the trial court is correct when it found that:

"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been

partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of Jose,Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which documents purports tohave been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay City, on September 18, 1970, andas a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed andtransferred to the three sons was definitely described and segregated and with thecorresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition.Moreover, every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposeswith the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are the unblinkablefacts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada andCresenciana Armada was concretely determined and identifiable. The fact that the threeportions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinableor identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion lessexclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-ownersexists."[20] (citation omitted)

". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have knowledge aboutthe impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is that they were properly notified.Reacting to such knowledge and notification they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on

February 22, 1979, a portion of said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves,and you can sell your share of Levereza."[21] (emphasis omitted)

After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownershipterminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longeravailable.[22]

Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, [23] there is co-ownership whenever the ownership ofan undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-ownership when thedifferent portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separatelyidentifiable, even if not yet technically described. [24] This situation makes inapplicable theprovision on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:

"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised exceptwithin thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as thecase may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unlessaccompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to allpossible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."

Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed of theimpending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated February 22, 1979, Josetold his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your shareof Leveriza."[25] Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are not entitled to written notice. Awritten notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of thesale to enable them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days.

But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or afterwards, awritten notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does notdemand what is unnecessary.[26]

Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein privaterespondent could redeem the lot bought by petitioners, the issue of whether the appellatecourt erred in denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration and new trial need not bedelved into. The same is true with respect to the questioned award of damages and attorney'sfees. Petitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot put apremium on the right to litigate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals datedMarch 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995 and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R.CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE . Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgatedon August 29, 1989, isREINSTATED .

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003]

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR,petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground ofpsychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of theFamily Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before theRegional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997.[1]

After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner andrespondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution oftheir conjugal partnership of property.[2] The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January30, 1998 states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the marriage between ElnaD. Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on March 14, 1985 is hereby declared null andvoid on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent toperform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the FamilyCode.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between theparties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation ofproperty between the said spouses is established in accordance with thepertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the rightspreviously acquired by creditors.

Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO

FEHR and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is hereby awarded to petitioner, she beingthe innocent spouse.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil andproperty registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.[3]

On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various motions [4]

filed by respondent after the case had been decided. The Order pertained to theheld by the parties, thus:

x x x x x xx x x

After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by bparties, the Court finds the following properties to be excluded from tconjugal properties, namely:

a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of TNo. T-137232, considering that the same is owned by pe titioners pareHerminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and

b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by CondominCertificate of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was purchased installment basis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriagas evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx

Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondshall be distributed in the following manner:

TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:

a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84m., covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14734; and

b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)

TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:

a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and

b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)

Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is heredeclared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHAccordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204the name of respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title N14735, being respondents exclusive property, acquired prior to his marriage

Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of subject properties, namely the Ground Floor Front (Fridays Club), GrouFloor Rear Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC Condominium, all leasby Bar 4 Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in commonproportion to one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting expenses for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes, MuniciLicense fees, clearances, etc. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directeddeliver to respondent the following: a) the balance of his share of the monrentals from February 1998 to May 1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of

monthly rentals of the aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this daThereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their respective share of monthly rentals derived from the properties adjudicated to them as staabove.

The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly supptheir minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniformfood and medical expenses.[5]

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Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to theadjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioneralleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner andrespondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit ofmarriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of theFamily Code. Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the best interests of thechildren if she would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share in thesupport of the children. She instead proposed that the Upper Basement and the LowerGround Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could use theincome from the lease of said premises for the support of the children. [6]

Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated October 5, 2000 that sincethe marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common

pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, noted that the parties havealready agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereofproportionately among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 forrespondent and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCGCondominium was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and therefore pertained solely torespondent.[7]

On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the October 5,2000 Order of the trial court. [8] Respondent filed an Opposition to the Notice of Appeal. [9] OnJanuary 12, 2001, petitioner withdrew the notice of appeal [10] and instead filed on the followingday a special civil action for certiorariand prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioningthe findings of the trial court in its Order dated October 5, 2000.[11]

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26, 2001, dismissed the petitionforcertiorarifor lack of merit. The appellate court stated that petitioner has not shown anyreason to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as the errors she raised were mere errorsof judgment which were the proper subject of an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.[12]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied bythe appellate court.[13]

Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following arguments:

1) Petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against theRegional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 in the Court of Appeals in viewof the fact that the questioned orders were issued with grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of or lack of jurisdiction.

2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the questioned orders wereerrors of judgment and not of jurisdiction.[14]

We shall first address the procedural issue, whether the Court of Appeals erred indismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner.

Petitioner argues that the filing of a petition forcertiorariwith the Court of Appeals wasproper because the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of its Orderdated October 5, 2000, and there were no other speedy and adequate remedies available.

She asserts that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it held that Suite 204of the LCG Condominium was the exclusive property of respondent, although it wasestablished that they lived together as husband and wife beginning March 1983, before theexecution of the Contract to Sell on July 26, 1983. Furthermore, the trial courts ruling dividingtheir properties into three, instead of two as provided under Article 147 of the Family Code, orfour, as allegedly agreed by the parties during a conference with the trial court judge on May3, 2000, also constituted grave abuse of discretion.[15]

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioner may no longer avail of any

remedy, whether an appeal or a petition forcertiorari, as she had lost all the right to appealfrom the time the Decision of January 30, 1998 became final and executory. He argues thatthe Order of the trial court dated October 5, 2000 is no longer assailable because it wasmerely issued to execute the final and executory Decision of January 30, 1998. He alsosubmits that the division of the properties into three and the distribution of 1/3 share each tothe petitioner, the respondent, and their children was proper, in accordance with Articles 50,51, 147 and 148 of the Family Code mandating the delivery of the presumptive legitime of thecommon children upon dissolution of the property regime. Respondent further claims Suite204 of LCG Condominium to be his exclusive property as it was acquired on July 26, 1983,prior to their marriage on March 14, 1985.[16]

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officerexercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction,or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no

appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion isdefined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction. As a general rule, a petition forcertiorariwill not lie if an appeal is the properremedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long as a court actswithin its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, anysupposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than an error of judgmentreviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari.However, in certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in amanifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which aretechnical rules may be relaxed. Certiorarihas been deemed to be justified, for instance, inorder to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge hascapriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clearfailure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a partyfrom the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.[17]

The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject respondents submission that allthe appellate remedies of petitioner have been foreclosed when the Decision dated January30, 1998 became final and executory. What is being questioned in this petition is not the

January 30, 1998 Decision of the trial court declaring the marriage between petitioner andrespondent void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trialcourt dated October 5, 2000 dividing the common properties of petitioner and respondent intothree1/3 to petitioner, 1/3 to respondent and 1/3 to their children, and affirming its previousruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the exclusive property of respondent. The issueon the validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has long been settled in the mainDecision and may no longer be the subject of review. There were, however, incidentalmatters that had to be addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of theparties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Orderpertained to the division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner andrespondent, pursuant to the courts directive in its mai n decision to dissolve the conjugalpartnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally disposes of the issues concerning thepartition of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, and as such it may beappealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However,considering the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the generalrule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in theircommon property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support theirchildren whom the court had entrusted to her care. We have held that where a rigid

application of the rule that certioraricannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifestfailure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rulesmay be relaxed.[18]

We now go to the substantive issues. The crux of the petition is the ownership ofSuite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties acquired by petitioner and respondentshould be partitioned.

It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with responlatters residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, MicFehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 19meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 exerespondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. also signed the contract as witness, using the name Elna Mercado Fehr. Upon of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner.[19

In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioners submission thawas acquired during the parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Faprovides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wwithout the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages asalaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the propeacquired by both of them through their work or industry shall governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired whthey lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joefforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal sharFor purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to hacontributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the formers effoconsisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of thousehold.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or

share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in commwithout the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitatio

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favotheir common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to trespective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and notany impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, [20case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties thduring their cohabitation.

We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City :[21]

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a womsuffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live togetas husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marria

The term capacitated in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refto the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any male or femalethe age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impedimementioned in Article 37 and 38 of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses throutheir work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownershAny property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have be

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obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in theacquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributedthereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance ofthe family household.

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated tomarry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) theirunion is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements arepresent in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered anyimpediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wifewhen petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage.Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because ofrespondents psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installmentbasis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already livingtogether. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.

As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, wehold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in therecords that support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have agreed to dividethe properties into three1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their children.Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on afour-way division of the properties1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover, respondents argument that the three -waypartition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code does not hold water assaid provisions relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages underArticle 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriagecontracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. [22]

In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominiumis a common property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the parties

should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to

the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of petitionerand respondent in accordance with this Courts ruling.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150707 April 14, 2004

APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN,MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX OCAMPOJR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR.,VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO, ELISA OCAMPO,

BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORESOCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O.FORTUNO, petitioners,vs.FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTEBARRITO, NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving itby a preponderance of evidence. In an action involving property, petitioners should rely on thestrength of their own title and not on the al leged weakness of respondents claim.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing theOctober 31, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56941. Thedecretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the awards for damages andattorneys fees are hereby deleted, the judgment appealed from is, in all otherrespects,AFFIRMED. Without costs."3

The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,4 rendered on October 30, 1996,which decreed thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, holds and declares thatdefendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito, are the true andlawful exclusive owners of the following properties, namely:

(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacionof Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampoand Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by astreet, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo,containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more or less, presentlycovered by TCT No. 13654 in the name of Belen Ocampo-Barrito,married to Vicente Barrito and previously covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No.18856 and assessed at P17,240.00.

(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua,Camarines Sur, bounded on the North and East by a barrio road, on

the South by a creek, and on the West by Lot 237, with an area ofabout 300 square meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with anassessed value of P6,240.00.

(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur,bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on theSouth by Lot 10325, and on the West by Lot 10322, with an area ofabout 4884 square meters, declared under TD No. 35122 andassessed at P6780.00

as described and referred to in paragraph 9, sub-paragraphs (a), (b)and (c) of the original complaint and it is hereby ordered that:

1. The complaint and supplemental complaint aredismissed for failure of the plaintiffs to prove theircause/causes of action by preponderance of evidenceand on the added ground of prescription;

2. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay as their joint andseveral obligation, to defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo,

Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito, the total sumof P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and other expenses oflitigation and P50,000.00 for moral damages;

3. The plaintiffs jointly and severally pay the cost of thissuit.

4. Upon the finality of this decision, the notice of lispendens annotated at plaintiffs behest in the Certificates

of Title covering the properties in question, of dbe cancelled; and the plaintiffs, their agents anrepresentatives as well as successors-in-intereordered to respect the right of ownership of sadefendants thereto, and to vacate and restore possession of all portions of said properties to defendants, their agents, representatives andsuccessors-in-interest."5

The Facts

The CA adopted the RTCs summation of facts as follows:

"Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar and syntax, the followsummation of the relevant and material antecedents of the case by the

quo, is substantially correct --This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by plaintifthe defendants.

The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouseOcampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) cnamely: Fidela, Felix, Andres, Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia, FeLuisa, Rosario, and Luis. Of the aforementioned children, tfollowing are already dead, namely: Felix, who is survived bwidow, Melita F. Ocampo and children Felix, Jr., Ramon anAndres, who is survived by Juana Ocampo and children JoAndres, Imelda, Violeta and Mercedita; Jose, who is survivchildren Antonia, Elias and Juan (Johnny); Rosario, who isby Ernesto O. Fortuno; Luis, who is survived by his childrenRicardo, Jonas, Maria Dolores, Rebecca, Fidela and Luis, JLuisa, who is survived by Carlos Llorin and children MecitaCarlos, Jr., Carmelita and Marilou L. Arellano.

The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of theJose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired separcels of land and, upon their death, left the following propnamely:

(a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land situthe poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, boundNE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, oby the Burgos Street, on the SW by a Street, aNW by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, an area of 1,119 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the namOcampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and asP17,240.00;

(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North by a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and West by Lot 237, with an area of about 300 squ

meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with an value of P6,240.00; and

(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, NCamarines Sur, bounded on the North by Lot 1the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 1032the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4

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brothers and sisters. According to the CA, however, not a shred of evidence was adduced toprove that such a Chinese custom existed or was observed in that place.

The CA also dismissed petitioners contention that common ownership was indicated by thefact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and lived on the subject property. Itruled that fraternal affection could have been the motive that impelled respondents to allowtheir relatives to use it.

In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said that respondents were able to giveclear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and thecorresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.

Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for damages and attorneys fees, because thetrial court had failed to cite the factual, the legal and the equitable bases therefor.

Hence, this Petition.8

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

"1. Where the evidence presented, oral and documentary, on the question of co-ownership, is overwhelming as it is unopposed, unrebutted and unimpeached,has co-ownership been proved?

"2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long, public possession by co-owners,did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that there is no co-ownership?

"3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak, puerile and inconsistent, did thecourts commit a grave misapprehension of facts when they gave credence to it?

"4. Where a deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs oftheir hereditary shares, is said deed valid?

"5. Where a declaration against interest has not been opposed, assailed, rebuttedor impeached, did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in holding there isno such declaration?"9

At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed property?

The Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Ownership of the Subject Property

At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3) properties originally involved in thelitigation brought before the RTC, petitioners appeal dealt only with the first one, referred to inthe Statement of Facts above -- a parcel of residential/commercial land situated in thepoblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In their CA appeal, petitioners declared that "the focus ofthis case is on the first [property] which is located at downtown Poblacion of Nabua andtherefore a valuable piece of property, 1,119 square meters in all." 10 Because petitioners hadnot questioned the RTC Decision with regard to the other properties, then the adjudication ofthese matters became final. Thus, only one property is left for resolution in the present

proceedings.11

Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division ofthe property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.12 Thesettlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition.13 This action willnot lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. Parties filing the action arein fact required by the Rules of Court14 to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extentof their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition thereof until and unlessthe question of ownership is first definitely resolved.15

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving itby a preponderance of evidence.16Petitioners chief evidence of co-ownership of the propertyin question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. Asmentioned earlier, both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this pieceof documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentaryevidence that were adduced by respondents, as will be expounded below.

Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the questioned propertythat eventually led to them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their parents -- SpousesOcampo -- whose deaths passed it on to the children. Petitioners, however, presentedabsolutely no proof of ownership of their predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was sotransferred and thus co-owned, the former rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownershipexecuted by Fidela, their eldest sibling.

On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the propertyand presented preponderant proof of her claim.

First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land,17 referring to the subjectproperty, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. Thedocument dated July 6, 1948, was signed in the presence of two witnesses andacknowledged before Juan B. Ballecer, a notary public.

The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by this document, which they nevercontested. According to them, the land in question was the conjugal property of their parents;and that upon the latters deaths, the former inherited it in common. If indeed the land was theconjugal property of Spouses Ocampo, then petitioners should have presented evidence toprove such ownership by their alleged predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to doso, how then can they prove the transfer to them of ownership that has not been establishedin the first place? It is axiomatic that no one can transfer to another a right greater than thatwhich one has;18 thus, the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than its source.19

Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his "exclusive ownership" ofthe property, "having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his] continuous,public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his]

predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any claim of otherpersons."20

Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, this property had been sold toFidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered the property,actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion ofpetitioners.

As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. RT-4389 (983),21 which named the former as owner in fee simple; and a Declaration ofReal Property,22 evidencing payment of real property taxes, also by Fidela as owner.

To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also presented aReal Estate Mortgage23 executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had executed it infavor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is nowrepresented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apoloniaadmitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.

The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that themortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.24 Co-ownership cannot bepresumed even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of ones interest in the idealorabstractpart of the undivided thing co-owned with others.25 The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portionthat may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership.26 In this case,Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any acknowledgement ofco-ownership.

Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos27 executed on January between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate sourcformers claim of sole ownership of the property.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title toproperty from the donor to the donee.28 Petitioners stubbornly rely on the AcknowledCo-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlofact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its auand due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document rby petitioners. We agree with the RTCs ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself madacknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputedplaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration aFidelas interest since the alleged acknowledgement was written and ex24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the property aprevious, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her propertidefendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more prwith which she can have an interest to declare against."29

Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be considered asdeclaration against interest. A statement may be admissible as such a declaration ifcomplies with the following requisites: 1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2to a fact against the interest of the declarant; 3) at the time of the declaration, the dewas aware that it was contrary to his or her interest; and 4) the declarant had no mofalsify and believed the declaration to be true.30

As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-ownershnot be a fact against the interest of the declarant, since her right over the property hbeen extinguished by the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, could not have acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no more property against whad an interest to declare.

Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13654 31 as proof of her ownthe property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is the Certificate of(TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to defeat the face value of resTCT, which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of issuance.32 It is quite surprisidespite the process of transfers and titling of the subject property -- commencing in eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 198433 -- it was only after 1984 tpetitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof.

We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of title doeforeclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persnamed therein.34 But given the circumstances of this case, the claim of co-ownershipetitioners has no leg to stand on. Again, we stress, Belen clearly traced the sourcesole ownership of the property in question and thereby foreclosed the unproven andunsubstantiated allegation of co-ownership thereof.

In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration35 inthat she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the excpetitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to prownership. Having filed an action involving property, they should have relied on the their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents claim.36

Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was sufficiently protheir witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We disagree. Their testcannot prevail over the array of documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownersh

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be based simply on the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties,self-serving as they are.

As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster their claim of co-ownership, weaffirm the CAs disposition showing the flimsiness of their claim as follows :

"The other piece of documentary evidence presented by appellants really provednothing. The ancient photograph showing the spouses Chino Jose and JuanaLlander Ocampo together with their ten children, simply proved that there wassuch a picture taking of the spouses with their children. But the photograph doesnot prove communal ownership by appellants over the disputed parcels of land;neither does it prove that the said properties were indeed owned by the spousesChino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and then later on transferred to and commonlyowned by their children. By the same token, the picture exhibited by appellantshowing the name Oniang Ocampo -- 1-15-61 (or Apolonia Ocampo, one of thechildren of the spouses Chino Jose and Juana) engraved in the house or building,does not prove communal ownership of the properties in question. At best, it issusceptible of various meanings, like: that of Oniang Ocampo was born on 1-15-61, or that she got married on that date, or that she was celebrating a specialevent on the date mentioned, or that she even died on the date mentioned. Andeven assuming ex gratia argumenti, that the said engraving proved ownershipover the disputed building, some such fact can only work to the prejudice ofherein appellants. Why? Because it would mean that only Oniang (or Apolonia)was the owner of the building and that the building is not, therefore, a communalproperty of the children of the late spouses Chino Jose and Juana. Adverting tothis piece of evidence, the Trial Court postulated --

The engravings on the house ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-61cannot serve as evidence that the property is of common ownership.At most, this can only establish the fact that said building wasconstructed for a certain Oniang on 15 January 1961. If, indeed, theproperty is of common ownership, there could not have been anydifficulty to engrave thereon HEIRS OF JOSE OCAMPO and JUANA

LLANDER-OCAMPO -- 1-15-61 instead of ONIANG OCAMPOBLDG. -- 1-15-61."37

Neither can we accept petitioners contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact thatsome of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses on theproperty. The appellate court correctly found that since the litigants in this case were bloodrelatives, fraternal affection could have been a good motive that impelled either Belen orFidela to allow petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownershipamong the parties cannot be presumed.

Neither are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses Ocampo placed the subjectproperty in the name of only one person in accordance with a Chinese custom. As mentionedearlier, that custom consisted of placing properties of parents in the name of the eldestunmarried son or daughter, with the implicit understanding that ownership thereof would laterrevert to the siblings.

In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that such custom existed and was practiced inthat place,38 Belen presented evidence that clearly negated any claim of ownership by theformers predecessors-in-interest. Having shown that the property in question was originally

owned by one Adolfo Ocampo -- not by Spouses Ocampo, from whom petitioners derive theirright -- the claim of custom becomes immaterial.

The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not necessarily favor petitioners and provethat the property in question is indeed co-owned. If they felt that her testimony would provetheir cause, then they could have easily called her as an adverse or a hostile witness.39 Butsince respondents were confident in the documents they presented in court, they did not seeany need to call her as a witness.

Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for donating her properties, when she is stillalive and needs money in her old age. They clearly overlook the nature of a donation.

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right infavor of another who accepts it.40 Once perfected, a donation is final; its revocation orrescission cannot be effected, absent any legal ground therefor.41 A donation may in factcomprehend the entire property of the donor.42 At any rate, the law provides that donorsshould reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and thatof all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled tobe supported by them.43

In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the subject property, petitioners arecontradicting even themselves. On the one hand, they assert that she would not havedisposed of her property, since she would need it in her old age; on the other, they argue thatit was not hers alone anyway. It should be clear that the law protects donors by providing that,without any reservation of sufficient means for themselves, the donation shall be reducedupon the petition of any person affected.44

To be sure, petitioners arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the Deed ofDonation itself. The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced to writing, anagreement must be presumed to contain all the terms agreed upon; and there can be,between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than thecontents of the written agreement.45

Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the donation. Never was there anyintimation that she had either been coerced or defrauded into entering into it. As all theessential elements of a donation -- consent, subject matter and cause46 -- have been satisfied,we see no reason to entertain any doubt about the Deed pertaining thereto.

The question of why the land was registered several years after the donation is purelyspeculative. What is important is that there was a duly proven Deed of Donation, whichformed the basis of Belens claim and led to the registration of the property in her name.

Petitioners also question Fidelas filing of an unlawful detainer suit after the date of the Deed

of Donation. Again, we remind petitioners that because this action involves property, theyshould rely on the strength of their own title, not on the alleged weakness of the claim ofrespondents. At any rate, the burden of proof of the claim of co-ownership rests on the former.

Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the review of factual findings of the courtsbelow. It is a settled doctrine that in a civil case, final and conclusive are the factual findings ofthe trial court, if supported by clear and convincing evidence on record. Usually, the SupremeCourt does not review those findings -- especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, asin this case.47 From the records of the present case, no cogent evidence appears that wouldimpel us to apply the above doctrine differently. The courts below have not overlookedessential facts that, if considered, may produce a different outcome. The trial court correctlyexplained thus:

"This Court from the outset had the opportunity to see and hear the tell-tale[signs] of truthfulness or perjury like the flush of face, or the tone of voice, or thedart of eyes, or the fearful pause [--] and finds that credibility is with thedefendants [herein respondents]. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence iswith defendants whose testimonial evidences are buttressed by theirdocumentary evidences."48

Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards for damages and attorneys fees forrespondents failure to show any factual, legal orequitable bases therefor.49

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed DecisionAFFIRMED. Costsagainst petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152766. June 20, 2003]

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. APresiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIrespondents .

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a Special Civil Action forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Couand set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as wResolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.

Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owparents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor MLilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.[1] On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered unde289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Abssupposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 [2] by all six (6) co-owners in hPetitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subrefused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an

recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court Caloocan City sometime in September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that c

On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the

Absolute Salehaving been established as a forgery.

Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Calosubsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor eher of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any pleading with Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petithowever refused to heed the Notice.

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners houany special permit of demolition from the court.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitforced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the houses laundry area.

On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed herPetition for Relief from Judgmentwi

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on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submitpetitioners appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and the subsequentMotion for Reconsideration.

On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorariwith the Court of Appealsalleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.

On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On 18June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied themotion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.

As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-calledextraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before theCourt of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the acts of which forsome reason or other are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of theextraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional TrialCourt, it is either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ mustbe presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2) grounds existbefore it gives due course to a certioraripetition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board orofficer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or hisjurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in theordinary course of law.

Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to thispetition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the merits to effectsubstantial justice.

The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object ofsecuring a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.[4]

The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts inthe speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them. Liberal constructionof the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.[5]Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on meretechnicalities.[6]

Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as negligence ofpetitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to have beenunconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client.[7] Under the peculiarcircumstances of this case, it appears from the records that counsel was negligent in notadequately protecting his clients interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction ofthe Rules.

The rationale for this approach is explained inGinete v. Court of Appeals -[8]

This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case fromits operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the caseowing to appellants failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reasonwould this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has

already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relaxprocedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, suchas the period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerablenumber of cases x x x x

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed asmere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigidapplication, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than

promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules ofCourt reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules canbe so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself hasalready declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instantcase x x x x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every partylitigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of hiscause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Courthas consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to overridesubstantial justice.

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant thesuspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by

the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other elements that should beconsidered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) themerits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the partyfavored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought ismerely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[9]

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmitywas not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantialjustice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the present controversy thatwas brought about by the absence of any partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in question. Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall putan end to the dispute on the property held in common.

In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco [10] we held:

There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally noticeto counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effectsupon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case,however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding

circumstances; otherwise, in the courts desire to make a short-cut of theproceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to thedetriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell ones rightsdown the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the courtaffecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, oneshould not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to hisclients.

Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.

This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership.Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership[11] was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in theinterest of substantial justice. Certiorarishould therefore be granted to cure this grave abuseof discretion.

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two ormore persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. [12]

Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead ofbeing exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercisedby two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and thesame.[13]

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single object which isnot materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the

recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-ow

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-oproperty or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that eachbecomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prethe interest of his co-owners.[15]

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownecreate an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownform of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others. [16]

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abs

or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in th

the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validlundivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.[18] But he hto sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned inbecause his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without anadjudication.[19]

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes aof petitioners lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed oSale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the propertrespected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without pthe rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of thedispute.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of App23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No. 289216TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer and the PARTITION of thelot are ORDERED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan Cithe aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appepetitioner Lilia Sanchez.

The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia TeriaRESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned

SO ORDERED.

CARMEN FANGONIL - HERRERA,Petitioner,

- versus -

T O M A S F A N G O N I L , P U R A F A N G O N I L T I N O , M A R I N A F AM A R I A N O F A N G O N I L , M I L A G R O S F A N G O N I L - L A Y U G a n d VF A N G O N I L E S T O Q U E , [1 ]

Respondents .

http://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sept%201998/127596.htmhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sept%201998/127596.htmhttp://www.supremecourt.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/sept%201998/127596.htm

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In this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,petitioner assails the (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 inCA-G.R. CV No. 61990, and (b) the Resolution of the same Court dated 15 July 2005 denyingpetitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner urges this Court to modify the assailedDecision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision dated 9 October 1998 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 in Special Proceedings Case No. A-806 for Judicial Partition. The petition prays that the two parcels of land, one located inMagsaysay, Tubao, La Union, more particularly described as:

A parcel of rice land which the middle portion (15,364 sq.m) has been included and situated in Barrio Lloren, Tubao, La Union,declared under Tax Dec. Number 2889. Bounded on the North, bythe property of Manuel Ordoa; on the East, by the property ofSeverino Padilla, Nicolas Caniero, and Heirs of V. Selga; on the

South, by the properties of Manuel Ordoa and Francisco Padilla;and on the West, by a river; containing an area of more than twohectares; x x x. [2]

and the other in San Nicholas East, Agoo, La Union, designated as:

A parcel of unirrigated rice land without permanent improvements,situated in Barrio San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union with an area of10,777 sq. m. (1 Ha. 1,777 sq. m.) more or less, visible by signs ofpilapiles around its perimeter, assessed at P400.00, declared for taxpurposes in my name under Tax Declaration Number 6373, andbounded-on the North, by Donato Eslao; on the East, by the Heirs ofFlaviano Fangonil, and others; on the South, by Eulalio Fangonil; andon the West, by the heirs of Remgio Boado; x x x.[3]

be adjudged solely to petitioner to the exclusion of respondents. In addition, petitionerrequests that another parcel of land located in Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, be divided inaccordance with the manner she proposes.

The following are the antecedent facts:

Petitioner and respondents[4] are children of the late Fabian Fangonil and MariaLloren Fangonil[5] of Tubao, La Union. The Fangonil spouses had 7 children: Tomas, Pura,Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso, and Carmen. Fabian died on 1 June 1953, while MariaLloren died on February 1976. The spouses died intestate, leaving an estate consisting of 7parcels of land herein specified:

Parcel 1 a 1,800 square meter residential land located atPoblacion, Tubao, La Union, which is facing the Town Plaza;

Parcel 2 a 922 square meter residential lot located at BarangaySta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union;

Parcel 3 a 54,759 square meter agricultural land located at FranciaWest, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 4 an 84,737 square meter agricultural land located atFrancia West, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 5 a 5,821 square meter parcel of agricultural land located atFrancia Sur, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 6 a 17,958 square meter parcel of agricultural land locatedat Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 7 9,127 square meter parcel of agricultural land located atSan Nicolas East, Agoo, La Union.

The only remaining heirs are the 7 children. Prior to an extrajudicial settlementexecuted by the heirs in 1983, there was never any settlement of the estate. The parties donot dispute that the succeeding transactions involving parcels 6 and 7 took place. FabianFangonil, with the consent of Maria Lloren Fangonil, obtained a loan secured by a mortgageover a 15,364 square meter middle portion of the sixth parcel of land for P1,450.00,executedunder a Deed of Mortgage [6] in favor of Francisca Saguitan on 20 April 1949. A portion of the

sixth parcel, with an area of 4,375 square meters, was sold with a right to repurchase to acertain Constantino Oribello for P1,450.00 on 15 December 1953. The transaction was underan agreement designated as a Deed ofPacto de Retro Sale[7] between Maria Lloren Fangonil,who was a widow by then, and Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel ofland was sold, with a right to repurchase, by Fabian Fangonil to Quirino Estacio under anagreement denominated as Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro[8] on 12 December 1949 forP2,600.00. The total amount received by the Fangonil spouses for the properties wasP5,500.00.

The parcels above-mentioned were never repurchased or redeemed by theFangonil spouses. Prior to foreclosure, the portion of the sixth parcel covered by a Deed ofMortgage was released from the mortgage on 20 April 1956 upon petitioners payment ofP1,950.00 to Francisca Suguitan. The portion of the sixth parcel covered by the Deed ofPacto de Retro Sale was repurchased on 16 October 1956 upon petitioners payment ofP1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel subject of the Deedof Sale with Pacto de Retro was repurchased by petitioner on 13 November 1959 upon thepayment of P2,600.00 to Quirino Estacio. Petitioner paid the total amount of P6,100.00for theredemption of parcels 6 and 7.

On 14 November 1983, the parties executed an Extrajudicial Settlement andPartial Partition of the estate of the Fangonil spouses covering the seven parcels of land.Although petitioner signed the extrajudicial settlement, she refused to accede to the proposedmanner of partition of parcel 1. Thereafter, all the heirs concerned, except petitioner,executed a joint affidavit dated 19 December 1994, stipulating on the partition of parcel 1. On2 February 1995 or 11 years after the execution of the extrajudicial settlement, petitionerexecuted an affidavit[9] refuting the portions pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, on the ground thather late brother Sinforoso Fangonil who was a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge then,committed misrepresentation and convinced her to sign the said settlement.

On 1 March 1995, six of the seven children of the Fangonil spouses, excludingherein petitioner, filed with the RTC a petition for judicial partition of the seven parcels of land,with prayer for appointment of Marina Fangonil as administratrix. The case was docketed asSpecial Proceedings Case No. A-806. Petitioner intervened before the trial court to opposethe petition. She likewise prayed that she be appointed administratrix, claiming exclusiveownership over parcels 6 and 7.

The parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings,considering there was no disagreement as to the manner of sharing Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 ofthe estate. In addition, on 16 September 1996, the respondent heirs deposited in courtP7,453.00[10] as payment to petitioner and her brother Tomas Fangonil as the only outstandingdebtors of the estate as specified in the 14 November 1983 extrajudicial settlement. On 2September 1998, respondents, through counsel, submitted a Manifestation/Motion dated 31

August 1998, proposing a manner of computation for repayment to petitioner, thportions of which read:

3. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S.Dollar on November 13, 1959 is P3.90 to U.S. $1.00;

4. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S.Dollar as of this date August 31, 1998 is P42.00 to U.S. $1.00;

5. So that the amount of indebtedness of P6,100.00 onNovember 13, 1959 has now the equivalent of P65,790.00 as of 31August 1998;

5.1 The equivalent amount of P65,790.00 shall

be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and every heirhaving a share in said indebtedness in the amount of P9,398.57;[11]

On 7 October 1998, the RTC issued an Order generally apprmanifestation/motion except for the computation, modifying the amount to P138,10present equivalent of the amount of P6,100.00 previously paid by petitioner to rede6 and 7. In its Decision[12] dated 9 October 1998, the RTC ruled in favor of respondeand declared parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of the spouses Fangonil to be pand ordered the partition of parcel 1 based on the manner proposed by respoordered the payment of the estate debt to petitioner and her brother in the aP138,100.00, the money equivalent of the P6,100.00 paid by her at the time of redparcels 6 and 7. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this courthereby adjudicates and partitions the inherited properties, includingthe controversial parcels 6 and 7, in accordance with the following:

FIRST PARCELx x x x

This is divided into two (2) segments, the EasternPortion and Western Portion.

The Eastern Portion shall belong to three (3) heirs,namely Tomas Fangonil, Sinforoso Fangonil represented by VictoriaEstoque and Marina Fangonil. The Western Portion shall belong totwo (2) heirs, the Southwestern part belongs to Pura F. Tino and theNorthwestern part belongs to Carmen Fangonil Herrera x x x.

SECOND PARCELx x x x

This parcel goes to Mariano Fangonil and MilagrosFangonil Layug.

THIRD PARCELx x x x

A drawing of lots was conducted on April 25, 1997 withrespect to parcel 3. Parcel 3 was divided into seven by GeodeticEngineer Gerardo Dacayanan. The result was the following (seealso, Order dated April 25, 1997, page 166, Record of the case):

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Lot 1 (A) Milagros F. LayugLot 2 (B) Tomas FangonilLot 3 (C) Mariano FangonilLot 4 (D) Pura F. TinoLot 5 (E) Sinforoso FangonilLot 6 (F) Carmen F. HerreraLot 7 (G) Marina Fangonilx x x x

FOURTH PARCELx x x x

The same thing happened. There was a drawing of lots.

The result was the following:

Lot 1 (A) Marina FangonilLot 2 (B) Carmen F. HerreraLot 3 (C) Tomas FangonilLot 4 (D) Sinforoso FangonilLot 5 (E) Milagros F. LayugLot 6 (F) Pura F. TinoLot 7 (G) Mariano Fangonil

x x x x

FIFTH PARCELx x x x

On May 2, 1997, the drawing of lots on Parcel 5 wasconducted. The result was as follows:

Lot 1 Pura F. Tino

Lot 2 Marina FangonilLot 3 Milagros F. LayugLot 4 Sinforoso FangonilLot 5 Carmen F. HerreraLot 6 Mariano FangonilLot 7 Tomas Fangonil

SIXTH PARCELx x x x

On August 27, 1998, the drawing of lots was conductedwith respect to the controversial parcels, the SIXTH PARCEL and theSEVENTH PARCEL. The result on the sixth parcel was as follows:

Lot 1 Pura F. TinoLot 2 Sinforoso FangonilLot 3 Tomas FangonilLot 4 Marina FangonilLot 5 Carmen F. Herrera (boycotted thedraw)Lot 6 Mariano FangonilLot 7 Milagros F. Layug

x x x x

SEVENTH PARCEL

x x x x

The draw was made on the same day, August 27, 1998.Just like in the drawing of lots for the Sixth Parcel, Carmen F.Herrera boycotted the draw. Hence, the Court ruled that since thereare seven rolled papers for the seven heirs to draw, the last undrawnrolled-paper containing the lot number shall be for Carmen Herrera.The result for the draw for the SEVENTH PARCEL was as follows:

Lot 1 Carmen HerreraLot 2 Tomas FangonilLot 3 Milagros F. LayugLot 4Marina FangonilLot 5 Sinforoso Fangonil

Lot 6 Mariano FangonilLot 7 Pura F. Tino

It should be noted that after the draws on August 27,1998, Atty. Baltazar, counsel for [respondents], manifested that hewill file a motion as regards the accounting of the produce of the sixthand seventh parcels. However, what he filed was theManifestation/Motion dated August 31, 1998.

The six heirs (excluding Carmen F. Herrera) shallreimburse the amount of P138,100.00, each one contributing theamount of P19,728.57, to Carmen F. Herrera. Since the other sixheirs did not insist on the accounting of the produce with respect toparcels 6 and 7, Carmen F. Herrera does not have to render anaccounting. As a matter of fact, this Court, in its Order dated October7, 1998, considered the produce of the said two (2) parcels, whichshe appropriated from the 50s to the present as interest on hermoney.[13]

Petitioner appealed the above RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging theunfair and prejudicial manner of partition of parcel 1 and claiming exclusive ownership overparcels 6 and 7. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal in its Decision promulgated 30January 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the October 9, 1998 Decision of theRegional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, in SpecialProceeding Case No. A-806, is AFFIRMED in toto.[14]

Under said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed intoto the findings of the trialcourt, pronouncing that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would support her claimthat the distribution was not equal and prejudicial to her interest. It concurred with the trialcourt in concluding that, at the most, she is only entitled to the reimbursement of the amountshe spent for redemption of the questioned lots in an amount equivalent to what her moneycommanded then, stating that petitioner is simply holding the said property in trust for theother co-heirs. At the same time, it upheld the trial courts finding on the equivalent of themoney which petitioner paid to redeem and repurchase parcels 6 and 7, but the dispositiveportion merely indicated the amount of P130,100.00.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 January 2004 Decisionwhich the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 15 July 2005. Dissatisfied with thefinal resolution of the Court of Appeals on the matter, petitioner now comes before this Court

via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner insthe exclusive owner of parcels 6 and 7 and rejects the partition of parcel 1 as beinand prejudicial, raising the following issues:

I.THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAININGTHE MANNER IN WHICH PARCEL 1 IS TO BE PARTITIONEDBASED ON THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS POSITION WHICH ISCLEARLY UNEVEN AND UNFAIR TO THE PETITIONER WHOSESHARE WILL THEN BE FOUND AT THE REAR PORTION OF THESAID LOT.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED INNOT HOLDING THAT PARCELS 6 AND 7 SHALL BE OWNEDSOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY THE PETITIONER BEING THEONLY ONE WHO REDEEMED AND REPURCHASED SAIDPARCELS IN THE 1950S EVEN WHILE THE PARENTS OF THEPARTIES WERE STILL ALIVE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED INNOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS RIGHT TOCLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG PRESCRIBEDAS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY(40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TOEXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVENASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE

THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED INNOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS RIGHT TOCLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG BEENBARRED BY LACHES AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FORMORE THAN FORTY (4