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Critique of Marx s 1857 Introduction

Rafael Echeverria

To cite this ArticleEcheverria, Rafael(1978) 'Critique of Marx's 1857 Introduction', Economy and Society, 7: 4, 333 366

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Volume 7 Number 4

November 978

Con ents

Rafael Echevarria

Critique of Marx's 1857 Introduction

Marie Lavigne

Advanced socialist society

Grahame Thompson

Capitalist profit calculation and inflation accounting

Revie article

John Mepham

heGrundrisse: method or metaphysics?

Notes on Authors

Volume Index

Published quarterly for the Editors by Routledge Kegan Paul Ltd.

London Henley and Boston


3/37

Editorial Board

Talal Asad

University of Hull

Terence J. Johnson

Univers i ty of Leices ter

Ernesto Laclau

Univers i ty

of

Essex

Grahame Thompson Open Univers i ty

Keith Tribe Univers i ty of Keele

Harold Wolpe University of Essex

Sami Zubaida

Birkbeck Col lege Univers i ty of Lon don

Claude Meillassoux

Centre National de la Recherche Scien tifique Paris

(Corresponding Member)

G. Carchedi

Univer si t y o f A ms te r dam (Corresponding Member)

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E c o n o m y an d S o c i e t y V o l 7 N o 4 November 978

Critique

of

Marx s

7857 lntrodu tion

Rafae l cheve r r i a

1

Definition of the problem

From its beginnings, the Marxist tradition of thought has had to

confront the problem that Marx did not leave a clear and systematic

exposition of his logic of investigation. Apart from a few passages

in which Marx insisted upon the innovatory nature of his method,

and those in which he indicated that this method was based on an

inversion of the Hegelian dialectic, the necessary elements for an

adequate characterisation of it were not given.

Marx himself was apparently aware of this gap, expressing his

intention to write a work on the materialist dialectic. This project

was first mentioned in a letter dated 14th January,

858

to Engels,

and reiterated eighteen years later in a letter to Dietzgen. In the

latter Marx stated

When I have shaken off the burden of my economic labours, I

shall write a dialectic.

Unfortunately, this project was never accomplished and its absence

has given rise to different and contradictory interpretations.

In recognising this problem, Lenin suggested an approach to its

resolution

If

Marx did not leave behind him a Logic (with a capital

letter ), he did leave the

logi

of Capital and this ought to be

utilized to the full in this q~ e s t i o n . ~

According to Lenin, Marx s logic of investigation can be extracted

from the logic exhibited and realised in Capital. Although this logic

is not systematised, it can be found there, in the specific treatment

of the object of analysis.

Lenin s suggestion entails two difficulties. The first of these,

pointed out by Marx himself, is that the method of investigation

is said to be distinct from the method of exposition. This means

that if the exposition of Capital is to be used to specify the method

of investigation which produces it, it is necessary to specify the

existing relation between the logic of exposition realised in this


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4

Rafael Echeverr ia

work anci the logic of investigation which, as Marx has warned us,

is distinct from the former.

The second obstacle is to be found in the discovery of an Intro-

duc t ion written in 1857, which Marx intended t o precede his

major and still unwritten economic work. This text brings together

related methodological considerations which appear to redeem the

absence of an exposition of his logic of investigation. The discovery

of this text has meant that the search for the logic of

Capital

has

been subordinated to the formulations asserted there, and thus the

problem has been defined in terms of determining the manner in

which Marx fulfils in Capital the criteria advanced in the 1857

Introduction. Therefore, the reading of Capital has assumed the

identity of the methodological criteria of both texts. As far as we

know, there are no exceptions to this approach to the problem of

Marx s logic of investigation. The r 857 Introduction has been

elevated to the rank of an authority for decoding the logic of

Capital from different political and theoretical positions, pro-

ducing diverse interpretations. Althusser located the In troduct ion

at the level of Marx s Discourse on

et hod.^

In general, the

content of this text has been treated uncritically as Marx s position

on his logic of inve~t iga tion.~

Given the import of these interpretations, any attempt to

decode Marx s logic of investigation requires a careful examination

of the

1 8 5 7

Introduction.

One of the basic aims of this is to

challenge the supposed identity of the criteria of the

Introduction

with those of Capital, and thus to demonstrate the profoundly

problematic character of the Introduction. This Introduction was

writ ten before Marx s appropriation of Hegel,5 and this will prove

to entail important effects. After a critical analysis of the 1 8 5 7

In troduct ion, the distinction between the method of exposition

and that of investigation will be tackled. Only then can Lenin s

approach to the analysis of the logic of Capital be taken up.6

2 ritique o the 857 ntroduction

The Introduction was written between August and September of

1857, a period in which Marx proposed to develop systematically

his analysis of capitalist society. It is not surprising that , as shown

by the content of the Introduction, a main preoccupation was

tha t of the method and order of analysis.

It must be made clear that Marx himself was not satisfied with

what he had written in this text , as two years later he replaced th e

1 8 5 7 In troduct ion with the well-known 1 8 5 9 Preface. In the

Preface Marx criticised the Introduction recognising that it might

generate some misunderstanding:


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Crit ique

of

Marx s

857 ntroduction

5

I am omit t ing a general introduct ion which I had jot ted down

because on closer reflection an y anticipation of results still to

be proved appears to m e t o be dis turbing, and the reader wh o

on the w hole desires to fol low me m ust be resolved to ascend

from t he part icular t o th e general.

MESW ,

180

Althou gh Marx s critique of his l n t r oduc t i on is not generally

considered, i t , nevertheless , represents an important c lue to the

recognition o f th e problem s co ntained in it . It is n ot a question of

rejecting everything that is put forward in the 1857 In t roduct ion

since in many respects the text i l luminated some important

aspects in connection with his logic of investigation. However, in

order to recognise its effective contributions, specific deficiencies

must also be identified.

2 1 Analysi s o f t he

Introduct ion

In this section we will discuss the content of the

1857 Zntroduc-

t i o n according to i ts own order of exposi t ion. This may prove to

be hard t o follow. Nevertheless, i t has the advantage of providing a

more accurate reading from which to develop our cr i t ic ism. I t is

necessary to anticipate th at we will pay special attention to Marx s

use of the concepts of the abstract and the concrete , s ince we

consider th at they are central to his posi t ion and basic to any

assessment of this text.

T h e 1857

In t roduct ion

begins by indicating tha t

the object before us , to begin w ith, is material produ ct ion.

G , 83)

This f i rs t s ta tement is open to two interpretat ions. On the one

han d, i t can be tak en t o mean that Marx considered mater ial pro-

du ctio n in itself t o be th e exclusive object of his analysis. In this

case mater ial product ion is bo th the point of departure and the

defined obje ct of analysis. On th e othe r hand , it could also suggest

th at , envisaging a wider obje ct of analysis than material produc-

t ion , Marx considered tha t th e explanat ion of this wider object

should com men ce from th e analysis of a restricted objec t, m aterial

produc t ion . In this case, i t does no t necessar ily fol low that

mater ial prod uct ion must be the fi rst t e r m of analysis, since, in

its turn, th e analysis of material prod uctio n could well begin

from an even more restr ic ted object , an object which, while

belonging t o material produ ction is not, however, directly iden-

tifiable with it . The difference between these two possible inter-

pretations then, lies in the fact that in the second case, material

prod uctio n as a first l imited obje ct of analysis, could in itself be

analysed by starting from something different from itself. If this


7/37

6 Rafael cheverria

is accepted, it means that while Marx posited material production

as a restricted object from which the analysis must begin, none-

theless, the problem of the actual starting point is still left to be

decided. The development of Marx s argument permits the de-

duction th at the initial statement is to be interpreted in the second

sense for Marx is proposing the necessary recognition of the

determinant nature of material production in history, and there-

fore, the necessity of considering it as the initial object of his

study.

However, as an object of study, material production demands

certain specifications. There are three alternative ways in which

material production can be considered as an object of study:

(1) To define this object as production in general,

2)

To examine the historical development of production,

3 ) To concentrate upon a particular stage in this development,

e.g. capitalist production, and its theoretical characterisa-

tion.

In the first section of the Introduction Marx concentrated on

dismissing the first op tion , i.e. the definition of production in

general . He does this by criticising the way in which political

economy treats material production. His first critical observation

affirms the necessity of conceiving production not as an individual

activity, but in considering individuals producing in society

G ,

83), being, therefore, production by social individuals

G ,

85).

The isolated individual is not the natural individual conceived by

the economists. The fiction of the isolated individual is revealed

through an examination of history, which proves that even this

appearance is the product of highly developed social relations.

From this Marx deduced that production can only be referred

to at a definite stage of social development G , 85) . Production

in general , therefore, does no t exist. This does not mean tha t a

general concept of production is void of content and theoretically

useless

all epochs of production have certain common traits,

common characteristics. Production in general is an abstraction,

but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and

fixes th e common element and thus saves us repetition.

G , 8 5

In this first reference to abstraction Marx indicates that, whereas

production in general cannot be the object of study, the

general concept of production is useful in its capacity to en-

compass certain common characteristics of all modes of produc-

tion, despite their particular deter~ninations. n this sense, the

general concept of production constitutes a rational abstraction

and has therefore a positive function, even though restricted to


8/37

Crit ique

of Marx s 857

ntroduction

7

merely avoid repetit ions. I t should be pointed ou t th at th e concept

of abstraction used by Marx in this passage refers to a particular

understanding of th e construction of a conce pt, on th e basis of

general characteristics. The general concept of production is

acceptable because it is sustained by th e general character of

certain features in all particular fo rms of p rodu ction. T his gives

abstraction a markedly empir icis t content, to the extent that i t

involves a simple generalisation from observable characteristics in

reality.

Despite its positive func tion, th e general con cept of pro ducti on,

in its application to different stages of th e evolution of producti on,

must give way to the particular determinations proper to these

stages. It is precisely these particular d eterm inatio ns which are

theoretically important both in reference to the analysis of a

determ inate fo rm of society and in th e understanding of historical

evolution. It should be indicated t hat Marx s treat men t of the

relation betw een the general and particular determ inant s in th e

In t roduct ion

differs from that presented later in

Capital.

In the

In t roduct ion

Marx is inclined to separate the general and par-

ticular determinants , making them independent of each other .

Th e particular is understood as th at which is no t accounted for by

the general. In

Capital

on the o ther han d, the par ticular is def ined

as the

particular ordering

of the basic and general elements of all

processes of pro ducti on. Every form of prod uctio n must unify , in

on e way or an other , the basic elem ents of t he prod uctive process

and the particularity of every productive stage corresponds to

particular form s of o rdering general elements.

The specific manner in which this union is accomplished dis-

tinguishes th e different epochs of the str uctur e of society from

one another . ( K , 11,

36-7)

Having argued that production in general has no real existence

from a diachronic point of view, Marx then proceeds to dem on-

strate th at i t does not exis t f rom a synchronic view point e ither .

At each particular stage, production can only be recognised as a

totality, or as a structured whole of particulars, but never in

general. Produc tion is particular synchronically insofar as it refers

to particular branches of production: agriculture, cattle-raising,

manufacture etc . However , this does not mean that production

should be reduced t o i ts mere par ticular forms: .

.

production is

not only par ticular production G ,

86 .

Th e branches of production are integrated in a s tructured totali ty ,

forming a social body and a social subject, active in the diverse

branches.

After developing a critique of the use made by the economists


9/37

8 Rafael Echeverria

of the general concept of production, from which they derive

certain general preconditions of all production, Marx concludes:

There are characteristics which all stages of production have in

common, and which are established as general ones by the

mind; but the so-calledgeneral preconditidns of all production

are nothing more than these abstract moments with which no

real historical stage of production can be grasped.

G ,

88

Despite Marx s acceptance of abstraction, he assigns it an insig-

nificant role in its capacity for explanation of distinct historical

stages.

In the second section of the

ntroduct ion Marx examines the

relation between production, distribution, exchange and con-

sumption, criticising both the political economists for separating

these inadequately, and those he calls socialists, belletrists and

prosaic economists , who consider these moments as identical.

Once again, Marx s position is based on the concept of totality.

The conclusion we reach is not tha t production, distribution,

exchange and consumption are identical, but that they all

form the members of a totality, distinctions within a unity.

Production predominates not only over itself, in the anti-

thetical definition of product ion7, but over the other

moments as well. G , 99)

Each moment leads to the next, but this does not impede recogni-

tion of the primacy of production. This reinforces the priority of

production as the restricted object of study, even at the level of

the economic structure itself.

In this second section there are two critical references to the

concept of abstraction. The first refers to:

humanity in the

abstract (G, 94), rejecting the false identity of production and

consumption. The second emphasises the importance of the

recognition of distribution within production, which, if over-

looked, leaves an empty abstraction , a concept lacking sense.

The third section of the

ntroduct ion

entitled The Method of

Political Economy , is undeniably the most important, and it is

within it that the deficiencies of the text are most apparent. Here

Marx approaches two distinct questions. The first is his relation to

the discussion of the two options left open for the determination

of the restricted object of study after the dismissal of what has

been referred to as production in general . The second refers to

the logic of investigation once the problem of the object of study

has been resolved.

This section begins with a hypothetically constructed argument.

When Marx confronts the object of study of political economy,


10/37

Crit ique

of

Marx s

857 ntroduction

9

i .e . the polit ico-economic analysis of a determ inate cou ntry , he

indicates that appearances suggest the correct method consists in

taking popu lation as a p oint of departu re, representing tha t real

and concrete being the basis and the subject of the social act of

all pro duc tion . This is to say th at Marx locates himself within the.

perspective of a defined object of stud y, examines the method of

analysis imposed by appearance, indicating its point of departure.

Having formulated this hypothetical argument, he then moves to

its critique.

T he argu men t is as follows: althou gh th e popu lation is a real

conc rete, i t proves t o b e a n abstraction if , for example, the social

classes of which it is composed are dispensed with. Social classes

in the i r turn are demonst ra ted as an emp ty phrase (no te the

previous al lusion t o emp ty abstractions ) withou t consideration

to their consti tuent elements: wage labour, capital , etc. These

elements themselves are deficient without consideration of ex-

change, division of labour, prices, etc. Therefore, as a starting

poi nt , population would be a chaotic conception of the whole

(G, loo), demanding an analytical movement towards even more

simple concepts

from th e imagined concr ete towards even thinner ab stractions

until I had arrived a t th e simplest determination.

G ,

1 0 0 )

This would entai l working back t o the concept of t he population

bu t this t ime n ot as a chaotic conception of th e whole, but as a

rich total i ty of many determinations and relat ions.

G,

1 0 0 )

Marx argues tha t this two-way road is fol lowed by t he econom ists

of the seventeenth century, in the origins of economic science.

They began f rom th e concre te whole , i. e. the popula t ion, only to

return to i t . However, according t o M arx, the ini t ial endeavour is

completely unnecessary and can only be justified as a search for a

few abstract and general definit ions, which once at tained, permit

the return. Therefore, despite appearances, correct scientif ic

method should obviate the f irst endeavour and be directed from

these abstract and general definit ions towards the concrete:

The concrete is concrete because i t is the concentrat ion of

man y determinations, hence u nity of the diverse. I t appears in

the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentra-

t ion , as a result , no t as a point of dep arture, even thoug h i t is

the poin t of de parture in reali ty and hence also the p oint of

departu re for observation an d conception. G, 1 0 1 )

Marx indicates that this is the proper way to reproduce the concrete

in thought.


11/37

34 Rafael cheverria

close exam ination of Marx s arg ume nt is necessary. F irst, it

must be recognised that the logical trajectory proposed in the

In troduct ion is neither differen t , nor cri tical with respect t o th at

followed by classical poli tical eco nom y. On th e contrary, by

criticising only the logic of investigation used in the origins of

economic science in the seventeenth century, Marx proposed a

direction which coincides with that of Smith and Ricardo. Smith

initiates his analysis with t he division of labou r, and Ricardo with

the examination of value or exchange value. Both start ing points

correspond to abstract and general determinants, exactly as Marx

proposed and, therefore, his posit ion is simply endorsing the

meth ods of classical econo my.

On the other hand, i t is evident that the whole argument is

based on the s imul taneous and cont radic tory presence of two

differen t conc epts of abstraction. If t he population is crit icised as

a start ing poin t because i t is abstrac t , i t is no t possible t o conclude

that the analysis should b e ini tiated from abstract and general

definit ions without a result ing introduction of a new and com-

pletely different concept of abstraction. This point has been

generally ignored in th e interpretat ions of this tex t , which vainly

attempts to at tain a consistency between two opposing concepts

of abstraction. The 1 8 5 7 In troduct ion is a text in transition

between a conception of science with Feuerbachian undertones

and a completely different conc eption, which wil l be inaugurated

as a stable position in 1858.Yet, as a transit ional text , the 1 8 5 7

In troduct ion anticipates, albeit in a con tradictory manner, some

aspects of the later co nception. Marx s defence of abstract and

general definitions clearly indicates his shift towa rds the adop tion

of a position in which abstraction will be considered as an indis-

pensable recourse f or scientif ic w ork.

T h e

1 8 5 7

In troduct ion illustrates Marx s move tow ards c ertain

posit ions contained in Hegel, al though Marx did no t have access to

the Science of Logic when writ ing i t . This was sent to him in

October , 1857 af ter he had f in ished the Introduction and there is

only evidence of reappraisal at the beginning of

1858.

Neverthe-

less, Marx exam ined som e of Hegel s arg ume nts in th e Introduc

t i o n and asserted that , despite questionable and mistaken con-

clusions, these possessed a certain merit . However, Hegel s influence

is not limited t o explicit reference and it is even strong est whe n it

is not openly acknowledged. One instance, as demonstrated by

Carver, occurs in t he final section of Marx s argum ent. When Marx

refers to the concrete he is almost directly paraphrasing Hegel,

who had wri t ten in the Science of Logic:

The concrete total i ty which makes the beginning contains as

such within itself the beginning of the advance and develop-


12/37

ritiqueof Marx s

857 Introduction

34

ment. As concrete, it is di f ferent iated wi thin i t sel f ; but by

reason of i t s f irs t imm edia cy the first differentiated deter-

mina tion~ re in the first instance merely a diversity. The

immediate, however, as self-related universality, as subject, is

also the u n i t y of these diverse determinations.

The differences notwithstanding, there is undoubtedly common

ground between the positions held by Hegel and Marx. However,

an important displacement between both arguments should be

noted. Whereas Hegel makes allusion to the concrete totality,

Marx refers only to the concrete. Marx discards the concrete as a

starting point, i.e. population, indicating that this represents the

terminal point of the analysis. Marx twice recognises that the

population, as concrete reality, refers to the whole , asserting also

that it represents the basis and the subject of the entire act of pro-

duction. Its emptiness as a starting point actually results because

it expresses totality, this being the reason why it would be the

terminal point of the analysis, in which it is revealed as a concen-

tration of many determinations and a unity of diversity. However,

the inadequacy of the population as a starting point in relation to

the concrete totality does not allow the deduction that the start-

ing point should not be concrete, and even less that it should be

abstract. This could only be asserted via a reduction of the concrete

totality to every concrete, which is a legitimate procedure only

from an idealist Hegelian standpoint. From a Hegelian point of

view, the reduction of the concrete totality to the concrete is a

function of the idealist premise that that which is concrete is the

truth. The 857 In t roduct ion oscillates between a Feuerbachian

and a Hegelian position, without being able to conciliate both

epistemological perspectives. The population is first considered to

be concrete because it is real in Feuerbachian terms; and then it s

considered to be abstract because it is still theoretically indeter-

mined, in Hegelian terms. This results in an impossible conciliation.

The ambiguous presence of the concept of concrete totality in

Marx s argument, clear in that of Hegel, impedes the distinction

between the particular concrete and the concrete totality, as will

be drawn later in his position, and this is the source of ambiguity

in his argument. It will be superseded no t by a mere superposition

of the Feuerbachian and the Hegelian epistemological standpoints ,

but by a critical and rectificatory appropriation of Hegel, which

will produce an original Marxist distinction between the concrete

and the abstract.

This can be seen as the principal logical inconsistency of the

857 In t roduct ion recognised by Marx in the 859 Preface and

rectified in Capital. In indicating in the Preface his decision to

abandon the

I n t r oduc t i on

on account of its disturbing effects and


13/37

34 Rafael cheverria

in th e necessity t o m ove from th e part icular t o the general , Marx

distinguished the part icular in t he analysis of th e con crete, moving

away from his previous reduction of th e concrete t o the concrete

total i ty.

Captive in th at logical incon sistency , Marx was forced t o con-

front the problem of the scientif ic basis of those abstract and

general definitions which he saw as a fitting starting poin t fo r his

analysis. Given his materialist premises, these co nstit ute a problem

which could remain unanswered. Th e solution presented in the

nt roduct ion

is the assert ion that the abstract and general are

known to be t he result of observation and con ception , processes

in which concrete reali ty now becomes a real start ing point . This

argument is based o n t he recognit ion of three different instances:

observation, conception an d thoug ht, ( th e function s of thinking

and comprehending within thought are dist inguished later) . Also

in this argum ent M arx is lookin g to Hegel since in the

Logic

of the

~ n c ~ c l o ~ a e d i a :egel had also distinguished betwee n Sen se, Con -

ception and Thought. Whereas for

Hegel this distinction is not

problemat ic , t o the e xtent th a t he conceives of the concre te as the

product of thought, i t is problematic for Marx who asserts not

only the indepen dence of concrete reality with respect to the

activi ty of th oug ht, but also th e practical determ ination of though t.

The affirmation that abstract and general definit ions are the

produ ct of observation and conc eption, necessi tates a relat ion of

unproblematic continuity between conception and these abstract

definit ions. These are considered t o be directly based on th e

immediate, wherein th e solution acquires empiricist roots, contrary

to th e po sit ion Marx was t o assume later . Concep ts such as value,

surplus value, abstrac t labo ur, etc., Marx later recognised as with -

ou t direct references in th e imm ediate, but rather to be in an

initially negative relation to immediate referents. The empiricist

bas is of the solution offered ~ e r m i t s arx to locate a t the same

level of abstraction, concepts that will later be considered as

having a dist inct theoretical status, such as value, price and m oney

G ,

100 .

Price and mon ey will n o longer be conceived as abstracts

in contradist inction to value.

The rest of the third section suffers from the absence of an

adequate dist inction between the concrete part icular and the con-

cre te to ta l i ty , and the presence of tw o cont radic tory concepts of

abstraction wi tho ut the more r igorous conce pt of abstraction used

later by Marx. In mos t of this section Marx examines the problem

of the relat ion between that which he calls simple and abstract

categories and concre te categories. The problem of th e determina-

t ion of conc rete reality an d abstract definit ions is also posed. Con-

cepts su ch as exchange value, possession, and m one y are treated as


14/37

Critique o

Marx s

857 ntroduction

4

simple and ab stract categories in an apparen t identif ication of the

dimension of simplicity with tha t of abstraction. This was later to

be rectified with th e recognition of simple concre tes such as com -

modities. In the same way the simple and abstract are identified

with th e scientific category .

Marx then proceeds t o examine th e conce pt of labour as a

simple, scientif ic category. Here he maintains that economic

science is from its origins related to th e capa city of th e category of

labour

to

express a simple abstraction detache d fro m th e particular

and con crete asp ects of labo ur. This is first achieved by th e classical

economists, particularly Smith and Ricardo. Nevertheless, Marx

unde rstood tha t the condit ions of possibil ity for the emergence of

this abstract category of labour should be sought in objective

reali ty. These condit ions are met with th e development of capita-

list relations of produ ction , within which labou r attains in practice

a high degree of indifference t o its qualitatively concre te cont en t,

and also achieves extensive mo bility.

Hence, then, for the f irst t ime, the point of departure of

modern economics, namely the abstraction of the category

labour , labour as such , labour pure and simp le, becomes true

in practice. The simplest abstraction, then , which mode rn

econo mics places as th e head of its discussions, and which ex-

presses an immeasurably ancien t relation valid in all forms of

soci ety, nevertheless achieves practical tru th as an abstraction

only as a category of the most modern society. ( G ,

104-5

This conclusion is of great importa nce within his general theor y.

At this stage, however, M arx s analysis lacks his later rigorous dis-

t inction between concrete labour an d abstract labour, different to

that presented in the

18 57

In t roduc t ion and, which he will con-

sider as on e of his two mo st imp orta nt scientific discoveries. Marx

was later to affirm the im portanc e of the co ncept of abstract work

without underest imating the analytical importance of the concept

of concrete labour MESC,

180 .

On the basis of this conclusion, Marx once more encou ntered

the problem of th e definition of his object of stud y, in th e sense

of opting for the historical sequence followed by production or

conce ntrating on a particular stage. As we will recall, th e first

option, i.e. that of production in general, had already been dis-

carded. His response to the remaining options wil l favour the

necessity of concentrat ing upon the prod uction of capital ist society.

His basic argument is as follows:

Bourgeois society is th e mo st developed and th e m ost com plex

historic organization of prod uction. Th e categories which ex-

press i ts relat ions, th e com prehension of i ts stru cture, thereby


15/37

44 Rafael cheverria

also allows insights into th e structure and the relations of

produ ction of all the vanished social forma tions ou t of whose

ruins and eleme nts it built itself up whose partly still un -

conquered remnants are carried along with it whose mere

nuances have developed explicit significance within it etc.

Human anatomy contains the key t o the anatom y of the ape.

The intimation of higher development among subordinate

animal species however can be understood only after the

higher developmen t is already know n. Th e bourgeois econ omy

supplies the key t o the ancient etc. G , 105 .

Once Marx has decided with respect to the options opened in

connection with th e object of study he must confront the problem

of the order in which th e categories necessary for the study of th e

said object should be placed. Once again Marx relies on a hypo-

thetically constructed argument in order to develop his response:

nothing seems more natural than to begin with ground

rent with landed prop erty since this is bound up with the

earth the source of all produ ction and of all being and with

the first form of pro duction of all more o r less settled societies

griculture. But nothing would be more erroneous. In all

forms of society there is on e specific kind of pro duction which

predominates over the rest whose relations thus assign rank and

influence to t he others. It is a general illumination which bathes

all th e oth er co lours and mod ifies their particularity. It is a par-

ticular ether which determines the specific gravity of every

being which has materialized within it. In bourgeois society

agriculture more and more becomes merely a branch of

industry and is entirely domina ted by capital. Ground ren t like-

wise. In all forms where landed pro perty rules th e natural relation

is still predo mina nt. In those where capital rules th e social his-

torically created element. Ground rent cannot be understood

and is entirely dominated by capital. Grou nd ren t likewise. In

all forms where landed prope rty rules the natural relation is

still pred om inan t. In those where capital rules th e social his-

torically created element. Ground rent cannot be understood

with out capital. But capital can certainly be understood with-

ou t ground rent . Capital is the a l ldomin at ing economic power

of bourgeois society. It must form the starting point as well as

the finishing point and mu st be dealt with before landed

property. G , 106-7

A t this stage Marx is able to o utline th e global project of his work

indicating th at as a result of these conclusions the logical seque nce

of analysis to be:


16/37

Critique

of Marx s

857

introdu tion

345

1) the general, abstract determination which obtain in more or

less all forms of society, but in the above-explained sense.

2) The categories which make up the inner s tructure of

bourgeois society and on which the fundamental classes rest.

Capital, wage labour, landed property. Their inner relation.

Town and country. The three great social classes. Exchange

between them. Circulation. Credit system (private).

3 )

Con-

centration of bou rgeois society in the form of th e state. Viewed

in relation to itself. Th e unprodu ctive classes. Taxes. State

de bt. Public credit. Th e population. T he colonies. Emigration.

4) The internat ional relat ion of production. Internat ional

division of labour. International exchange. Export and import.

Rate of exchange.

( 5 )

Th e world m arket and crises.

G ,

1 0 8 )

A dem onstration has been atte mp ted here of the deficiencies of

Marx s argum ent in relation to th e problem of meth od. In general

terms it should be recognised that the

857 Introduction

is con-

tradictory in that , on the one hand, i t manifests t races of em-

piricism, whereas on the othe r , i t at te mp ts to supersede these.

This is clearly manifested in two different concepts of abstrac-

tion, through which Marx defines abstraction as a theoretical

deficiency at the same time as affirming that this deficiency can

be superseded through abstraction itself.

Th e project of a logical sequence of analysis which results from

this position expresses the problematic nature of the standpoint

o n which i t is based. The plan proposed recognises at least tw o

important problems. Firstly, it offers a flawed solution with

respect t o the star ting point of systematic exposi t ion. Secondly,

it establishes an in adeq uate logical relation betwee n capital, wage-

labour and landed property, w hich are considered as independ ent

units of analysis, to be treated consequatively. The best way of

clarifying these tw o problem s consists in con fronting their projec ts

of resolution in the

857

Introduction

with their actual theo-

retical resolution, effected in Capital and with M arx s later com -

mentaries on th e method fol lowed therein.

Before starting this analysis a brief reference should be made t o

the fourth and last sect ion of the

Introduction. This consists of a

list of the me s and problem s (with brief com men taries) which refer

to the role of war; the relation between t he real and th e ideal type

of historiography hith erto de veloped; th e materialist nature of

Marx s the ory ; the dialect ical relat ion of th e conce pts of the

forces and relat ions of production; the relat ion between the

development of material prod uction and artis tic production ; the

necessary and contingent nature of historical development, etc.

Th e last point of th e l ist is the following:


17/37

46

Rafael cheverria

8 ) The point of departure obviously from the natural charac-

teristic; subjectively and objectively. Tribes, races, etc.

G , 110)

It is undeniable that this point of departure does not refer either

to the problem of the logic of investigation, which Marx had

considered to be resolved through abstract and general deter-

minants, or to the initial object of study, which he defined as

capitalist production, and even less to the process of production

of the fundamental scientific categories which he had indicated as

emerging from the observation and conception of objective reality

in the more developed societies. He is dealing, therefore, with a

point of departure somewhat different from those mentioned

above. This is none other than the global object of study through

which Marx defines his theoretical activity: history. The themes

mentioned by Marx in this fourth section emphasise that his

ultimate concern was not limited to the explanation of capitalist

society, but to the explanation of all historical development,

which through the necessity of starting from its most developed

stage, has its real point of departure in those natural characteristics

which relate t o the first tribes and races.

2 2 The 1857

Introduction

and 1859

Preface

Considering what has been said above, it is not surprising that

when Marx perceived the deficiencies of the

1857 In troduct ion

and replaced it with the 1859Preface he decided t o present there

the basic conceptual s t w w e of his theory of history. His aim

was to emphasise that his theoretical endeavour was not only re-

stricted to the particular results of a determinate historical stage.

These results represent only the completion of the initial stage of

a more ambitious project.

Although Marx replaced the In troduct ion

with the

Preface

the

content of the

Preface

was not the same as that of the

Introduc-

t ion . This leaves unresolved an important aspect in the relation

between the two texts. Having specified their negative relation

(the reason behind their replacement), it is still necessary to

establish their positive relation, in which two different contents,

referring to different problems, have both been considered as

alternative introductory texts through which the analysis of

capitalist production is situated.

It has been demonstrated tha t both texts fulfil the objective of

locating history as the final object of analysis, although they do so

in different ways. Curiously, although the In troduct ion was

written first, its contents presuppose those of the

Preface.

But, on

a closer consideration, this proves to be reasonable. Marx s exposi-


18/37

Crit ique o Marx s 857

Introduction

47

t ion in the

Preface

is not the result of conclusions he had reached

dur ing tha t per iod, bu t of those of the 1840s . At t ha t t ime, wi th

his break wi th Feuerbach, he came to th e pos it ion tha t h is tory , i t s

different stages and developments, needed to be understood

through an analysis of th e forms of prod uction, th e specification

of. the nature of the diverse modes of p rodu ction, an d the con-

tradict ions developed within the m. These refer to the ex amination

of th e relat ion between the forces of production and th e relations

of produ ction, also expressed as relat ions of pro perty. T he total i ty

of the structure of society and fo rms of consciousness are based

on and determined by the p redominant mode of product ion. This

is the conclusion developed in th e

859 Preface.

Whilst the 857 Introduct ion starts from this conclusion, stat ing

tha t material pro duction consti tute s the ini t ial object of analysis ,

i t does not develop this argument. I ts fourth and last section

brings together m any of the p roblems generated from this premise,

problems which Marx examines and explains in th e Preface. There-

fore, this fourth section results from the absence of a sufficient

explanation in connection with the initial premise. This explana-

t ion is th e theoretical core of the

859 Preface.

By taking the primacy of prod uction in history as premise and

point of depar ture , the Irztroduction discusses other problems.

These refer to the al ternative method of analysis through which

material pro duction can be studied. Th e Introduct ion is the first

text in which Marx form ulates the problems of th e logic of investi-

gation, an issue which is not present in his earlier writings. T h e

German Ideo logy , for example, is not only deficient on account

of some impo rtant conceptual weaknesses (absence of the con-

cepts of relat ions of production. and of private property of th e

means of production1 O , but also because of a logical disorienta-

t ion. Th is work is based on th e assumption tha t i t is possible to

ad op t the approach of production in general fo r the study of

history.

The

857

Introduct ion

shows that this is mistaken. Its

importance as a text resides in the understanding of different

logical alternatives which are examined in ord er t o discard two of

them and to accept a very determ inate logic of investigation. Marx

argues tha t produ ction cann ot be conceived in general ( th e view

taken in T h e G e r m a n I d e o l o g y , nor is i t possible to start the

analysis from th e first stages of produ ction. Capitalist pro duc tion

must b e taken as the f i rs t objec t of s tudy and f rom there t o pro-

ceed t o the exp lanation of past historical periods. This is argued to

be so since such an und erstand ing provides th e basic theoretic al

structure necessary for the analysis of previous modes of produc-

t ion.

This shows that the synthesis provided in the

Preface

does not


19/37

48 Rafael cheverria

represent Marx s complete position in relat ion t o the problems of

history as the f inal object of analysis . The contribution of the

857

In troduct ion is not picked up in the Preface t o t h e e x t e n t

tha t , in this later w ork, t he problem of the logical al ternatives for

the study of history is absent . Only a combined examination of

bot h texts provides Marx s posit ion on th e problem of h istory as

his object of study. This also demonstrates that Marx was only

able t o fulfil th e first stage of his final objective. His logical design

for th e study of history was only com pleted for t he stage of capita-

l ist production and even restr icted to the level of development i t

had reached a t tha t t ime.

Th e part ial fulf i lment of Marx s global object of study does no t

mean tha t his contribu tion should be reduced to the analysis of

capitalist production. It also involves the bases from which other

historical stages should be studied. These bases result from the

combination of the conclusion synthesised in the

859

Preface

with those of the

857

In troduct ion on the logical foundations

for a global scientif ic explanation of h istory. Marx s contrib ution

to the study of history is incomplete unless both texts are taken

into account . However , in order to incorpora te th e c ont r ibut ions

made by the

857

Introduction its logical deficiencies must be

clearly located.

Engels correctly indicated th e necessity of considering tw o

central discoveries in his acc ou nt of Marx s theore tical w ork

( M E S W ,

370-74 . First , a who le conception of the world history ;

secondly,

the dem onstrat ion how , within present society and und er the

existing capital ist mode of produ ction, the exp loitat ion of t he

worker by th e capitalist takes place.

Although these tw o dimen sions of Marx s th eory sho uld be recog-

nised, they are of quite d ifferent chara cter. It is evident th at if

Marx had achieved the f irst , the second would not have been

necessary, since it would have been assimilated within th e whole

conc eption of history , fr om w hich it is a part. If it is valid to

mention both, this is because the f irst was not actually fulf i l led.

Marx having provided th e bases from which it should be accom-

plished. Marx s conception of history does no t con sti tute the

specific explanation of history. T he lat ter is st il l to b e do ne.

What has been said also explains why M arx did no t define him-

self as an eco nomist . Although he appropriated many of the theo-

ret ical developments effected by poli tical econom y and considered

that he had resolved many of the problems this left unanswered,

Marx s object of study goes beyond the boundaries of economic

science. This is due to the fact that when analysing capital ist


20/37

Critique

of Marx s

857 Introduction

49

economy, this is only a restricted aspect of a broader concern

which extends to the whole of capitalist society as well as

to other historical stages. This dimension of his theoretical under-

taking enables Marx to recognise the historical and, therefore,

transitory nature of the capitalist relations of production. Unlike

political economy, Marx can recognise that previous societies are

based on specific historical forms which cannot be accounted for

as mere imperfections in relation to capitalist categories. In the

same way, he is able to assert the historical and unnatural character

of these later categories.

The recognition of the inadequacy in defining Marx as an eco-

nomist has often produced an alternative procedure to account for

his theoretical contribution. Accepting that the definition of

economist is restricted, an attempt is made to supersede this re-

striction by adding new theoretical perspectives to it. Thus, Marx

is also depicted as being an historian, a sociologist, a philosopher,

etc. and when the list does not seem to exhaust the character of

his undertaking, he has even been described as a prophet. How-

ever, this procedure is deficient in its partialisation of dimensions

inextricably related within his thought. Marx s essential difference

with the political economists is that of a difference of object. It is

because his object is history, that a multiplicity of dimensions

(which traditional social sciences tend to isolate as autonomous

disciplines) are incorporated within his conception.

The broadening of the object of study of political economy,

i.e. capitalist economy, in the posing of history as Marx s object,

is confirmed by his study of early societies, once he had finished

his analysis of capitalist production, as shown in his last manu-

scripts.

2 3 Problems o f the Introduction and their resolution

The project of logical sequence presented at the end of the third

section of the Introduct ion has been said to contain at least two

important failings later rectified by Marx. These are:

1 ) an inadequate resolution of the problem of the point of de-

parture for his systematic exposition, and

2 )

an inadequate logical relation between capital, wage labour

and landed property.

Marx s attempt to resolve these two problems and the analysis of

his definitive solutions will now be examined.

It should be taken into account that when Marx finished the

Introduct ion in the middle of September, 857 he did not begin

writing the projected work which this text was intended to intro-

duce. A year intervened during which Marx wrote the

Grundrisse


21/37

35 Rafael cheverria

a collection of manuscripts in which he resolved important theo-

retical problems. Marx never intended to publish these manu-

scripts, which do not represent a systematic exposition of his

positions, and amidst which can be found criticism, positive theo-

retical analysis and projects of his future work.

During this year Marx modified the original project of the Intro-

duct ion. The first modification is found in the second notebook of

the

Grundrisse

written in November, 1857. Marx wrote:

In this first section, where exchange values, money, prices are

looked at, commodities always appear as already present.

The internal structure of production therefore forms the

second section; the concentration of the whole in the state in

the third;. G , 227)

continuing to detail the already known project of the Introduction.

This was the first indication tha t Marx was again preoccupied with

the problem of the point of departure of exposition. In this period

Marx was moving towards the initiation of an analysis of the con-

cept of value and recognised the presence of the commodity with-

in its treatment. This position tends t o coincide with Ricardo s

starting point. It is later reiterated in the same notebook:

It is commodities (whether in their particular form, or in the

general form of money) which form the presupposition of

circulation; they are the realization of a definite labour time

and, as such, values; their presupposition, therefore, is both the

production of commodities by labour and their production as

exchange values. This is their point of departure, and through

its own motion it goes back into exchange-value creating

production as its result. We have therefore reached the point of

departure again, production which posits, creates exchange

values; but this time, prod uction which presupposes circulation

asa developed mom ent and which appears as a constant process,

which posits circulation and constantly returns from it into

itself in order t o posit it anew.

G ,

5 5)

Marx was aware that the explanation of capitalist production is

founded in the explanation of capital. In the Introduction he had

already recognised that the historical conditions which made

economic science possible are found in the practical character of

abstract labour, established by the capitalist relations of produc-

tion. The result of these two conclusions is that in the Introduc-

t i o n Marx tended to assimilate ambiguously the problem of the

practical determination of economic thought within the problem

of the logic of investigation of the analysis of capitalist economy.

Nevertheless, Marx later proved these two problems to be distinct


22/37

Critiaue

of Marx s 857

ntroduction 351

and showed that capital is not reached through the abstract con-

cept of labour. He recognised that this was only possible through

value

To develop the concept of capital i t is necessary to begin no t

with labour but with value, and precisely, with exchange value

in an already developed movement of circulation. It is just as

impossible to make the transition directly from labour to

capital as it is to go from the different human races directly to

the banker, or from nature t o the steam engine.

G ,

259

Although value is maintained as an adequate starting point, the

initial criterion of starting the analysis from abstract and general

definitions begins

to

show its weakness. Marx came to the position

that not all of these, at least not labour in itself, could be the

necessary starting points that could lead to the more concrete

concepts that he has to explain. The concept of the division of

labour suffered the same fate. Nevertheless, Marx continued to

maintain the necessity of an abstract point of departure and when

he affirms the importance of value, despite the fact that the con-

cept of commodity tends to move in, it is still to value that Marx

is giving logical priority.

The decision to abandon the possibility of a starting point based

on labour and his option for value entailed the transference of the

level at which analysis is initiated from production t o circulation.

It also became necessary to distinguish the problem of the order of

determination of the different moments which compose the eco-

nomic totality from the problem of the logical order of the analysis

of that totality. Without denying that production is the deter-

minant instance of circulation, exchange and distribution, the ex-

planation of production requires an analysis that starts from the

level of circulation in order t o return, once production is explained,

to the sphere of circulation.

In that same notebook of the

Grundrzsse

Marx returns to for-

mulate new outlines of logical sequence in his work. G ,

264

and

275 .

Both projects omit the problem of the point of departure,

starting with an extended breakdown of the analysis of capital and

its logical sequence. In the first of these projects, since the second

refers to the particular structure for the analysis of capital without

extending to later themes, Marx continues to maintain the need

for an independent analysis of the three elements on which the

social classes of capitalist society are based: capital itself, landed

property and wage labour. At this moment, however, the order of

consecutive treatment is no longer as proposed in the

In troduct ion.

Landed property is located in second place and wage labour in the

last. The structure of extended analysis proposed for capital in-


23/37

35

Rafael cheverria

dicated that it should be studied first as a general concept, next in

its particularities, and finally with the analysis of individual

capitals.

Marx introduces a new modification in his letter to Lassalle

dated 22nd February, 1858. This was the incorporation of the

first and most abstract section within the general concept of

capital.

Th e whole work is divided into six books.

1 ) Capital (contains some introdu ctory chapters).

( 2 ) Landed property. (3 ) Wage Labour.

4) The State.

5 )

International Trade.

6 )

World Market . ( M SC 96)

This plan was described in more detail in a letter t o Engels date d

2nd April of the same year. After reiterating wha t he had outlined

to Lassalle, Marx elaborated :

I. Capital contains four sections: (a) Capital in general ( thi s is

the subjec t-mat t er o f t h e f ir s t p ar t ) . (b) Com pe t i t i on

(C) Credit (d ) Share Capi ta l .

Marx continues to detail the first of these sections:

I Capi tal . First sec t ion : Capital in general 1 ) Valu e

(2) M o n e y (3) Capital. (MESC, 97-101).

This illustrates Marx s extension of the scope of capital towa rds

the origins of his exposition, although it is not defined as the

chosen point of departure. Marx is still situating the concept of

value, as the starting term of his equa tion, within the bracket of

the general concept of capital. However, beyond the change in the

stru ctur e of his project, the lette r to Engels reveals Marx s re-

appraisal of his original contention of the necessity of starting his

analysis from an abs traction:

The m ost abstract definitions,

when m or e care fu ll y exam i ned ,

always point to a further definite concrete basis (of course

since the y have been a bstracte d from it in this particular form )

(MESC,9, ou r emphasis).

Although he recognises the problem of the relation between the

abstract and the concrete, the terms within which the problem is

located do not clearly distinguish the determination of the abstract

by the concrete from the logical order of these moments in the

sequence of th e analysis.

In Jun e, 185 8, in the seventh notebook of the Grundrisse, Marx

wrote:

Th e first category in which bourgeois wealth presents itself is


24/37

ritique

of

M ar x s 857 Introduction

5

tha t of the commodi t y . Th e comm odity appears as the u nity of

tw o aspects .

I t

is use value i .e. object of th e satisfaction of an y

system whatever of hum an needs. This is its material side, which

the most disparate epochs of production may have in comm on,

and whose examination therefore l ies beyond polit ical econom y.

Now how does use value become transformed into com-

mo dity? Vehicle of exchange value. Although directly united in

th e com mo dity , use value and exchange value just as directly

split apart . Not only does th e exchange value no t appear as

determined by the use value, bu t rather , furthermore, the co m-

mo dity o nly becomes a co mm odity , only realizes itself as ex-

change value, in so far as its owner does n ot relate to it as use

value. He a ppropriates use values only through their sale, their

exchange for othe r com modit ies . Appropriat ion through sale is

the fundamental form of the social system of production, of

which exchange value of th e com mod ity is presupposed, not

for i ts own er, bu t rather for th e society generally.

G , 881-2)

Then Marx opens a bracket which he will not close because he

abandons the tex t . The Grundrisse end with the discovery of the

com mod ity as the point of dep arture for his systematic exposi t ion.

Th e com mo dity becam e t he firs t category in Marx s analysis, pre-

ceding value in the logic of exposition , this latte r being expressed

by exchang e value as the sim plest and most a bstract expression .

Marx was now able to ini t iate his projected w ork, returning to i t

between September and October of 185 8, af ter two month s of ill

health. He began to write his Contribution to the Crit ique of

Political Economy

published early in 1 859 . Both in this work and

later in Capital in which the f irs t is further elaborated, the com-

mo dity became th e point of depa rture for his exposi t ion.

Th e discovery of Ju ne, 18 58 was comm unicated in a let ter

wri t ten t o Engels on 2 9th D ecember of tha t year:

th e first part has grown bigger, since the first two chapters,

of which the f i r s t: The Commodi t y has not been written in

rough draft , and the

second : M one y or Simple Circulation

is

only in quite short outl ine; the f i rs t part has been argued m ore

elaborately th an I originally intend ed.

This was reiterated in Marx s let ter t o Engels ( 1 th-15 th January,

185 9) and t o Weydemeyer (1s t February) .

Th e history of the resolut ion of the problem of the point of de-

partu re is no t com pleted in 18 58 , since Marx introduced several

modificat ions after his aff irmation of th e com mod ity as the ini t ial

term of his exposition. The first of these is located in the first

edi t ion of the f irs t volume of Capital of 1 867 . In 1 872 , in the


25/37

54 Rafael Echeverria

second German edition of the same volume, Marx again modified

the first part, which he always considered to be the most complex.

Therefore, in accordance with the order of investigation, the point

of departure of his exposition, and the treatment of its related

problems, were the last to attain resolution. Marx recognised this

displacement between the order of investigation and the order of

exposition in a let ter to Sigmund Schott in November, 1877:

Confidentially, I indeed began Capital in exactly the opposite

sequence (beginning with the third and historical par t) to which

it was shbmitted to the public, only with the qualification that

the 1st volume, which was started last, was prepared for print-

ing straight away whilst the others remained in the rough form

which all research has at the beginning.

The adoption of the commodity as the point of departure

presents various problems relating to its implications in the process

of theoretical production. Some of these will be dealt with later,

but at this stage it is necessary to clarify that this point of de-

parture

1)

was reached after completion of the 1857 Introduction

and (2) represented a marked change in Marx s previous position

with respect t o the initial term of his exposition.

The first statement has already been demonstrated here. With

reference to the

second it should be understood that the com-

modity as a point of departure rectifies the proposal that the

analysis should be based on abstract and general concepts. In his

exposition Marx considered the commodity as concrete. The

concrete nature of the commodity is clearly defined by Marx

when referring to it in his systematic works. In the first lines of

A

Contribution to the Crit ique of Poli t ical Economy Marx points

out that the commodity:

in the language of the English economists, is any thing

necessary, useful or pleasant in life , an object of human wants,

a means of existence in the widest sense of term.

( C C P E ,

27)

The first lines of Capital reiterate the same position:

commodity is, in the first place, an object outside us, a thing

that by its properties satisfies human wants of some sort or

another. K , I, 43)

Marx clearly reiterates the concrete nature of the commodity as

a point of departure in the

Notes on Adolph Wagner

written in

1879-80. The following are some of the passages in which this

concrete nature is affirmed:

neither value , nor exchange value are my subjects, but

t h e

c o m m o d i t y . NAW, 83)


26/37

Critique of Marx s 857

ntroduction

55

According t o H err Wagner,

use value and exchange value

a re to

be der ived a t once f rom th e concept o f value, no t as wi th me,

f rom a c o n c r e t u m (Konkretum), t h e c o m m o d i t y .

.

( N A W , 8 9 )

In the f ir s t p lace I do n ot s tar t out f rom concepts , and d o no t

have to divide these in any way. What I s tart ou t from is the

simplest form in which th e labour-product is presented in con-

temporary society, and this is the c o m m o d i t y . I analyse it,

and right from the beginning, in the form in which i t appears.

NAW, 1 9 8 )

.

I d o n o t d iv ide value int o use-value and exchange value as

anti theses into which the abstraction value splits , rather (I

divide) the

concrete social fo rm

of the labour-product . NAW

1 9 8 )

. . he commodi ty he s implest economic concre tum.

( N A W , 99 )

The commodity is concrete, but also a simple concrete. In dis-

t inction to the posit ion assumed in the

Introduct ion,

the ident i ty

between the abstract and the simple is broken. However, this

invalidates the unity of the argument proposed in the Introduct ion

for the point of depa rture. Marx sti ll asserts that conc rete total i ty,

by being the concentrat ion and unity of various determinations,

could not constitute the starting point of analysis. He still asserts

the need of abstraction to effect the explanation of concrete

total i ty. However, i t is not deduced from this that the point of

departure ought to be abstract . The same abstract concepts of

which science m ust m ake use need to be sustained in the c oncrete

and derived from it . If concrete total i ty emerges, from the point

of view of scientific knowledge, from abstract determinations,

these in turn require concrete condit ions from which they may be

extracted . Marx had previously understood tha t abstract concepts

are d etermined by concrete historical condit ions. Up to no w, how-

ever, this had only been recognised from the point of view of the

practical determ ination of scientific categories. Now it was also

seen as a logical exigency of analysis. The global process of the

logic of exposit ion ca nnot be affirmed on ly o n the recognit ion of

the concrete determination of the abstract concepts. I t must re-

pro du ce this recog nition in a specific logical sequen ce, sustaining

the abstract concepts in that concrete reali ty, which makes them

possible. Hegel, recognising this relation, inverted its terms and

attr ibuted t o the con cept derived from concrete reali ty the charac-

ter of the historical and logical determinant instance. Such an

interpretat ion is based on the recognit ion that the process of


27/37

6 Rafael cheverria

knowledge is capable of reproducing concrete reality within

thought. This is the inversion that Marx must reverse. To do this

it is not sufficient to affirm the independence of concrete reality

from the process which is able to know it. Neither is it enough to

assert the determination of theoretical knowledge with respect to

concrete reality. It is necessary that the logic of thought should be

capable of expressing the priority of the concrete with respect to

those variants of thought which do not find a direct reference in

reality. This logical priority is affirmed in a determinate sequence

between concrete and abstract concepts.

The rectification introduced by Marx after 1857 does not entail

the adoption and return to the point of departure criticised in the

hypothetically constructed argument offered in the In troduct ion

i.e. the population. As concrete reality, the population is expres-

sive of a concrete totality and, as such, can only be the point of

termination for a theoretical process. Neither is it possible, how-

ever, to depart from abstract and general determinate which, as

Marx maintained in 1857, should belong to every form of society.

The disjunction is no longer between concrete totality and

abstract generality. The commodity as a point of departure is a

concrete unit of a particular stage of production, i.e. capitalism.

As such, as an economic constituent of a particular society, it does

not belong to all forms of society. This does not mean that the

commodity is exclusive to the capitalist mode of production and,

thus, nonexistent in previous modes of production, but, as Marx

himself argues in the Introduction with reference to money, in

these less developed modes of production the commodity has not

attained its full development (intensive and extensive) and did not

represent the basic unit of production in these societies. This par-

ticular character of the commodity is recognised by Marx in the

opening sentence of Capital

The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of

production prevails, presents itself as an immense accumulation

of commodities , its unit being a single commodity. Our investi-

gation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.

K ,1,43

The point of departure is therefore the concrete economic unit of

a particular mode of production. It is the simple and particular

concrete expression (in opposition to the concrete totality) of a

particular phase (in opposition t o belonging to all forms of society).

It is also in this sense that the 859Preface in rectification of the

In troduct ion establishes the need to ascend from the particular to

the general, from the concrete unit t o the concrete totality, via the

necessary course of abstraction.


28/37

Critique of

Marx s 857 ntroduction

57

Surprisingly, the delayed resolution of the problem of the point

of departure has remained unnoticed in the analyses of Marx s

thought. Jindrich Zeleny, who offers an interesting study of the

logical structure of

Capital

points out:

Throughout all the changes of plan for his work Marx maintains

the solution made in the first years of his economic studies, that

is, that the secret of the capitalist production of commodities is

contained in the identification of the commodity as a speci-

fically economic form.

This position results from the failure to recognise the problematic

nature of the Introduction and the later rectification made by Marx

of the solutions offered there. Hence, whilst Zeleny is obliged t o

recognise the concrete nature of the commodity, he confuses this

aspect with its capacity to take on an abstract dimension. This is

expressed as follows

In the intellectual reproduction of a complex reality rich in

determination Marx does not depart from the analysis of

concrete abstractions, but from another simple reality which,

from the point of view of everything later developed, is abstract.

With this reduction of the concrete to the abstract Zeleny accepts

the flawed formulation of the

Introduction

in the sense that Marx

effects an elevation from the abstract t o the concrete .16 With

this, the previous important recognition that the commodity is

concrete, is completely dissolved.

For Marx, objects of knowledge of social reality are objects con-

stituted by social practice. It is their capacity to embody and ex-

press determinate social relations that defines the objects of

Marxist analysis. Commodity, money, capital, etc., are not things-

in-themselves, but practically constituted objects. Commodity is

not a mere thing with an external existence which can be perceived

in itself or apprehended as the result of simple and direct observa-

tion (apart from being perception and observation, one of the dif-

ferent possible ways of sensible apprehension). The form of com-

modity is given by determinate social relations of exchange which

constitute determinate things into commodities. The same can be

said in connection with capital, which Marx defines not only as

the expression of material elements, but also as a social relation.

This is the nature of the social objects. It is within this framework

that Marx introduces his distinction between the concrete and the

abstract. While the concrete alludes to real objects constituted by

social practice, the abstract refers to objects which, not being alien

to that practice and in that sense being real, are only recognised


29/37

8 Rafael Echeverria

through scientific practice. The distinction between the concrete

and the abstract is correlative with the terms spontaneous con-

sciousness and science. The bearers of spontaneous consciousness

are the individuals, not as indeterminate subjects, but as agents of

a determinate practice. Abstraction is defined as an adequate re-

course of the knowledge of the real, first in its capacity to be de-

rived from the objects constituted by social practice and directly

expressed in the consciousness generated by such practice. Second,

in its capacity to reproduce the concrete in thought, to explain its

actual movements, which the spontaneous consciousness cannot

account for. However, one of the main features of the Marxist

concept of the abstract is the assertion that abstraction, as an

operation of scientific practice, produces abstract concepts or

again abstractions, this time as the results of such operation, which

have a problematic relationship with the concrete (and its correla-

tive, the spontaneous consciousness). It is this problematic distance

between the appearance of the movement of social practice and its

essence which justifies the necessity of scientific practice.

It is important to distinguish this theory of abstraction from the

concepts of abstraction used by empiricist philosophy. Asserting

observations as the basic recourse to establish the validity of the

supposed scientific results, empiricism oscillates between two

different concepts of abstraction. On the one hand, following

Hume s position, abstraction is negated as a recourse for know-

ledge; on the other, developing Locke s standpoint, every concept

is defined as abstract, different layers of abstraction being postu-

lated according to the corresponding levels of generalisation of the

concepts with regard to what is directly observed. In Marx s case,

the process of scientific knowledge is considered to have some

break points within itself, some concepts cannot be accounted for

by means of an alleged generalisation, and the categories of the

concrete and the abstract express such discontinuities.17

It could be argued that, despite the fact that Marx considered

the commodity as a concrete point of departure, this could not be

so. This criticism could be made from different positions. One of

them consists of arguing that Marx could not start with a real and

concrete commodity but, of necessity, with the concept of the

commodity in that the concept is distinct from that which it

designates and cannot be considered as concrete. Apparently Marx

did not deny the distinction between the concept and that which

it designated, but this distinction can only be established s an

impugnative weapon in the sense that it expresses a problem of

knowledge which accounts for a problematic distance between the

concept and the thing-in-itself . This problematic distance, affirmed

in principle, represents the essence of Kant s philosophy and is one


30/37

ritiqueo Marx s 857 Introduction

59

of the expressions of his philosophical dualism. This is complete ly

alien t o Marx s p osition. W ithout de nying th e possibility of a

problematic distance between determinate concepts and reality,

Marx rejects the assertion of a problem in principle and asserts the

full capacity of th ou ght t o apprehend reality. The distance between

thought and reality can be resolved first theoretically and then

practically. The problem of the truth of knowledge held no sense

whatsoever for Marx as a problem prior and independent

to

the

act of knowing itself. It is on this basis tha t the distinction m ay be

made between concrete and abstract concepts. These do no t refer

to the problem of tru th. The d istinction is made within the process

of true knowledge. Whilst the first refer to a direct apprehension

of imm ediate reality, th e second alludes to a necessary recourse of

knowledge in problem atic relation t o concrete and immediate

reality; but the process of knowledge itself confers validity upon

them and reveals the manner in which concrete reality confirms

them. In this sense, they represent a necessary supersession of the

immediate, of appearances, yet denote the essence of this same

reality. Without them, not only would immediate reality be in-

adequately known, but the scientific endeavour itself would re-

main unjustified.

The im portance of having a conc rete point of departure, in

Marx s terms, is given as a way of initiating th e analysis from t he

firmest possible base. If, as Wagner suggested,18 Marx had sta rted

from the abstract concept of value, all his subsequent theoretical

development would have remained subject to the discussion of

such an initial conc ept. This seems to explain Marx s concern t o

oppo se Wagner s interpretation and t o emphasise the conc rete

character of his starting point. T he ab stract con cept of value that

Marx undoubtedly uses, finds its basis in the analysis of concrete

reality from which it has been derived. This is an impo rtant position

in M arx s logic of investigation. If this were n ot the case, science

becomes inevitably suspended in mid-air, as Marx was to criticise

in Ricardo. Rectifying the logical project proposed in the 857

In t roduct ion Marx simultaneously breaks with the logical design

followed by classical economy, which appeared to be vindicated in

that text .

Having affirmed th e co ncrete ch aracter of his po int of departu re,

it is necessary to pose th e problem

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58351314 Critique of Marx s 1857 Introduction Rafael Echeverria

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