RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES,petitioner,vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO,respondents.GUERRERO,J. | G.R. No. L-37453 | May 25, 1979

Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner Rizalina Gonzales as the principal beneficiary and executrix.Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that Lutgarda with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up to the time of her death.The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages. The attestation clause, which is found on page four, reads as follows:PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSIKaming mga nakalagdang mga saksi o testigo na ang aming mga tinitirahan ay nakasulat sa gawing kanan at kahilira ng aming mga pangalan sa ibaba nito, ay pagpapatutuo na ipinakilala ipinaalam at ipinahayag sa amin ni Isabel Gabriel na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng Limang Dahon (Five Pages) pati na ang dahong ito, na siya niyang TESTAMENTO AT HULING HABILIN, ngayong ika 15 ng Abril, 1961, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing testadora na si Isabel Gabriel ang nasabing testamento sa ibaba o ilalim ng kasulatan na nasa ika apat na dahon (page four) at nasa itaas ng patunay naming ito, at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon (and on the left hand margin of each and every page), sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing testadora, at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng patunay ng mga saksi at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng testamentong ito.At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence, 961 Highway 54, Philamlife, for Miss Orobia, and 12 Dagala St., Navotas, Rizal, for the two Gimpayas. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)", "Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud, Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales, herein petitioner, assailing the document purporting to be the will of the deceased on the following grounds:1. that the same is not genuine; and in the alternative2. that the same was not executed and attested as required by law;3. that, at the time of the alleged execution of the purported wilt the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness; and in the second alternative4. That the purported WW was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person for her benefit.Lutgarda Santiago filed her Answer to the Opposition on February 1, 1962. After trial, the courta quorendered judgment, the summary and dispositive portions of which read:Passing in summary upon the grounds advanced by the oppositor, this Court finds:1. That there is no iota of evidence to support the contentio that the purported will of the deceased was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner, or of some other person for her benefit;2. That there is insufficient evidence to sustain the contention that at the time of the alleged execution of the purported will, the deceased lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness;3. That sufficient and abundant evidence warrants conclusively the fact that the purported will of the deceased was not executed and attested as required by law;4. That the evidence is likewise conclusive that the document presented for probate, Exhibit 'F' is not the purported win allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting witnesses on April 15, 1961.WHEREFORE, Exhibit "F", the document presented for probate as the last wig and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel is here by DISALLOWED.From this judgment of disallowance, Lutgarda Santiago appealed to respondent Court, hence, the only issue decided on appeal was whether or not the will in question was executed and attested as required by law. The Court of Appeals, upon consideration of the evidence adduced by both parties, rendered the decision now under review, holding that the will in question was signed and executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961 in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, signing and witnessing the document in the presence of the deceased and of each other as required by law, hence allow ed probate.Oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales moved for reconsideration3of the aforesaid decision and such motion was opposed4by petitioner-appellant Lutgarda Santiago. Thereafter. parties submitted their respective Memoranda,5and on August 28, 1973, respondent Court, Former Special First Division, by Resolution6denied the motion for reconsideration stating that:The oppositor-appellee contends that the preponderance of evidence shows that the supposed last wig and testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses did not sign the will in the presence of each other.The resolution of the factual issue raised in the motion for reconsideration hinges on the appreciation of the evidence. We have carefully re-examined the oral and documentary evidence of record, There is no reason to alter the findings of fact in the decision of this Court sought to be set aside.7In her petition before this Court, oppositor Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales contends that respondent Court abused its discretion and/or acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in reverssing the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. The Court, after deliberating on the petition but without giving due course resolved, in the Resolution dated Oct. 11, 1973 to require the respondents to comment thereon, which comment was filed on Nov. 14, 1973. Upon consideration of the allegations, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition, as well as the Comment8of private respondent thereon, We denied the petition by Resolution on November 26, 1973,9the question raised being factual and for insufficient showing that the findings of fact by respondent Court were unsupported by substantial evidence.Subsequently, or on December 17, 1973, petitioner Rim Gabriel Goes fried a Motion for Reconsideration10which private respondent answered by way of her Comment or Opposition11filed on January 15, 1974. A Reply and Rejoinder to Reply followed. Finally, on March 27, 1974, We resolved to give due course to the petition.The petitioner in her brief makes the following assignment of errors:I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F" was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnessII. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the lower court that the preparation and execution of the win Exhibit "F", was unexpected and coincidental.III. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that Atty, Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F".IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "Pangalan" and "Tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion.V. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the wilt Exhibit "F , without any note or document, to Atty. Paraiso.VI. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the finding of the trial court that Matilde Orobia was not physically present when the Will Exhibit "F" was allegedly signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya.VII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the win was improperly executed.VIII. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions, and misrepresentations of witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away, and that the trial court erred in rejecting said testimonies.IX. The Court of Appeals acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.X. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.It will be noted from the above assignments of errors that the same are substantially factual in character and content. Hence, at the very outset, We must again state the oft-repeated and well-established rule that in this jurisdiction, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not reviewable, the same being binding and conclusive on this Court. This rule has been stated and reiterated in a long line of cases enumerated inChan vs. CA(L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 743)12andTapas vs. CA(L-22202, February 27; 1976, 69 SCRA 393),13and in the more recent cases ofBaptisia vs. Carillo and CA(L32192, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 214, 217) andVda. de Catindig vs. Heirs of Catalina Roque(L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83, 88). In the case ofChan vs. CA, this Court said:... fromGuico v. Mayuga, a 1936 decision, the opinion being penned by the then Justice Recto, it has been well-settled that the jurisdiction of tills Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive. More specifically, in a decision exactly a month later, this Court, speaking through the then Justice Laurel, it was held that the same principle is applicable, even if the Court of Appeals was in disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of the evidence with a consequent reversal of its findings of fact ...Stated otherwise, findings of facts by the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantive evidence are not reviewable on appeal by certiorari. Said findings of the appellate court are final and cannot be disturbed by Us particularly because its premises are borne out by the record or based upon substantial evidence and what is more, when such findings are correct. Assignments of errors involving factual issues cannot be ventilated in a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals because only legal questions may be raised. The Supreme Court is not at liberty to alter or modify the facts as set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reversed. Where the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in order, and resort to duly-proven evidence becomes necessary. The general rule We have thus stated above is not without some recognized exceptions.Having laid down the above legal precepts as Our foundation, We now proceed to consider petitioner's assignments of errors.Petitioner, in her first assignment, contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that the document, Exhibit "F", was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the three instrumental witnesses were credible witnesses. She argues that the require. ment in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. According to petitioner, unless the qualifications of the witness are first established, his testimony may not be favorably considered. Petitioner contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the qualifications of witnesses.We find no merit to petitioner's first assignment of error. Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a win. These Articles state:Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 806 of this Code. "Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthythiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. We reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party.We also reject as without merit petitioner's contention that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code should be given the same meaning it has under the Naturalization Law where the law is mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their honesty and uprightness. The two witnesses in a petition for naturalization are character witnesses in that being citizens of the Philippines, they personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of the Naturalization Law (Section 7, Commonwealth Act No. 473 as amended).In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. And We agree with the respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.It is true that under Article 805 of the New Civil Code, every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or morecrediblewitnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another, While the petitioner submits that Article 820 and 821 of the New Civil Code speak of thecompetency of a witnessdue to his qualifications under the first Article and none of the disqualifications under the second Article, whereas Article 805 requires the attestation of three or more credible witnesses, petitioner concludes that the termcrediblerequires something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to beingcompetentunder Articles 820 and 821 must also be a credible witness under Article 805.Petitioner cites American authorities that competency and credibility of a witness are not synonymous terms and one may be a competent witness and yet not a credible one. She exacerbates that there is no evidence on record to show that the instrumental witnesses are credible in themselves, that is, that they are of good standing in the community since one was a family driver by profession and the second the wife of the driver, a housekeeper. It is true that Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix But the relation of employer and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a competent testamentary witness. (Molo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344; Testate Estate of Raymundo, Off. Gaz., March 18,1941, p. 788).Private respondent maintains that the qualifications of the three or more credible witnesses mentioned in Article 805 of the Civil Code are those mentioned in Article 820 of the same Code, this being obvious from that portion of Article 820 which says "may be Q witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code," and cites authorities that the word "credible" insofar as witnesses to a will are concerned simply means " competent." Thus, in the case ofSuntay vs. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500, the Supreme Court held that "Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost wig must be clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses.'Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay. "emphasissupplied).InMolo Pekson and Perez Nable vs. Tanchuco, et al., 100 Phil. 344, the Supreme Court held that "Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a win, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may be entitled to credence. There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which we may cite:A 'credible witness is one who is not is not to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other cause. Historical Soc of Dauphin County vs. Kelker 74 A. 619, 226 Pix 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).As construed by the common law, a 'credible witness' to a will means a 'competent witness.' Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837. (lbid, p. 341).Expression 'credible witness' in relation to attestation of wins means 'competent witness that is, one competent under the law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon's Ann. Civ St. art. 8283.Moos vs. First State Bank of Uvalde, Tex . Civ. App. 60 S.W. 2nd 888, 889. (Ibid, p. 342)The term 'credible', used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible witnesses means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the timr it is offered for probate,Smith vs. Goodell101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 111. 145. (Ibid.)Credible witnesses as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses that is, such persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust co 152 N.E. 545, 546, 322 111. 42. (Ibid. p, 343)In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. Thus, in the case ofVda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo,No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.Under the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth assignments of errors, petitioner disputes the findings of fact of the respondent court in finding that the preparation and execution of the will was expected and not coincidental, in finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit "F", in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan" and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion, in holding credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will without note or document to Atty. Paraiso, in holding that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and the other witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings as proof that the will was improperly executed, and in holding that the grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of the witnesses (subscribing and notary) presented by the petitioner had been explained away.Since the above errors are factual We must repeat what We have previously laid down that the findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and controlling which We cannot review, subject to certain exceptions which We win consider and discuss hereinafter. We are convinced that the appellate court's findings are sufficiently justified and supported by the evidence on record. Thus, the alleged unnaturalness characterizing the trip of the testatrix to the office of Atty. Paraiso and bringing all the witnesses without previous appointment for the preparation and execution of the win and that it was coincidental that Atty. Paraiso was available at the moment impugns the finding of the Court of Appeals that although Atty. Paraiso admitted the visit of Isabel Gabriel and of her companions to his office on April 15, 1961 was unexpected as there was no prior appointment with him, but he explained that he was available for any business transaction on that day and that Isabel Gabriel had earlier requested him to help her prepare her will. The finding of the appellate court is amply based on the testimony of Celso Gimpaya that he was not only informed on the morning of the day that he witnessed the will but that it was the third time when Isabel Gabriel told him that he was going to witness the making of her will, as well as the testimony of Maria Gimpaya that she was called by her husband Celso Gimpaya to proceed to Isabel Gabriel's house which was nearby and from said house, they left in a car to the lawyer's office, which testimonies are recited in the respondent Court's decision.The respondent Court further found the following facts: that Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya obtained residence certificates a few days before Exhibit "F" was executed. Celso Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114942 was issued at Navotas, Rizal on April 13, 1961 while Maria Gimpaya's residence certificate No. A-5114974 was issued also at Navotas, Rizal on April 14, 1961. The respondent Court correctly observed that there was nothing surprising in these facts and that the securing of these residence certificates two days and one day, respectively, before the execution of the will on April 15, 1961, far from showing an amazing coincidence, reveals that the spouses were earlier notified that they would be witnesses to the execution of Isabel Gabriel's will.We also agree with the respondent Court's conclusion that the excursion to the office of Atty. Paraiso was planned by the deceased, which conclusion was correctly drawn from the testimony of the Gimpaya spouses that they started from the Navotas residence of the deceased with a photographer and Isabel Gabriel herself, then they proceeded by car to Matilde Orobia's house in Philamlife, Quezon City to fetch her and from there, all the three witnesses (the Gimpayas and Orobia) passed by a place where Isabel Gabriel stayed for about ten to fifteen minutes at the clinic of Dr. Chikiamco before they proceeded to Atty. Cipriano Paraiso's office.It is also evident from the records, as testified to by Atty. Paraiso, that previous to the day that. the will was executed on April 15, 1961, Isabel Gabriel had requested him to help her in the execution of her will and that he told her that if she really wanted to execute her will, she should bring with her at least the Mayor of Navotas, Rizal and a Councilor to be her witnesses and that he (Atty. Paraiso) wanted a medical certificate from a physician notwithstanding the fact that he believed her to be of sound and disposition mind. From this evidence, the appellate court rightly concluded, thus: "It is, therefore, clear that the presence of Isabel Gabriel and her witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya including the photographer in the law office of Atty. Paraiso was not coincidental as their gathering was pre-arranged by Isabel Gabriel herself."As to the appellate court's finding that Atty. Paraiso was not previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses as to enable him to type such data into the document Exhibit ' L which the petitioner assails as contradictory and irreconcilable with the statement of the Court that Atty. Paraiso was handed a list (containing the names of the witnesses and their respective residence certificates) immediately upon their arrival in the law office by Isabel Gabriel and this was corroborated by Atty. Paraiso himself who testified that it was only on said occasion that he received such list from Isabel Gabriel, We cannot agree with petitioner's contention. We find no contradiction for the, respondent Court held that on the occasion of the will making on April 15, 1961, the list was given immediately to Atty. Paraiso and that no such list was given the lawyer in any previous occasion or date prior to April 15, 1961.But whether Atty. Paraiso was previously furnished with the names and residence certificates of the witnesses on a prior occasion or on the very occasion and date in April 15, 1961 when the will was executed, is of no moment for such data appear in the notarial acknowledgment of Notary Public Cipriano Paraiso, subscribed and sworn to by the witnesses on April 15, 1961 following the attestation clause duly executed and signed on the same occasion, April 15, 1961. And since Exhibit "F" is a notarial will duly acknowledged by the testatrix and the witnesses before a notary public, the same is a public document executed and attested through the intervention of the notary public and as such public document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. (Yturalde vs. Azurin, 28 SCRA 407). We find no such evidence pointed by petitioner in the case at bar.Likewise, the conclusion of the Court of Appeals in holding that the fact that the three typewritten lines under the typewritten words "pangalan ' and "tinitirahan" were left blank shows beyond cavil that the three attesting witnesses were all present in the same occasion merits Our approval because tills conclusion is supported and borne out by the evidence found by the appellate court, thus: "On page 5 of Exhibit "F", beneath the typewritten words "names", "Res. Tax Cert. date issued" and place issued the only name of Isabel Gabriel with Residence Tax certificate No. A-5113274 issued on February 24, 1961 at Navotas Rizal appears to be in typewritten form while the names, residence tax certificate numbers, dates and places of issuance of said certificates pertaining to the three (3) witnesses were personally handwritten by Atty. Paraiso. Again, this coincides with Atty. Paraiso's even the sale must be made to close relatives; and the seventh was the appointment of the appellant Santiago as executrix of the will without bond. The technical description of the properties in paragraph 5 of Exhibit F was not given and the numbers of the certificates of title were only supplied by Atty. Paraiso. "It is true that in one disposition, the numbers of the Torrens titles of the properties disposed and the docket number of a special proceeding are indicated which Atty. Paraiso candidly admitted were supplied by him, whereupon petitioner contends that it was incredible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will Exhibit "F" without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso, considering that Isabel Gabriel was an old and sickly woman more than eighty-one years old and had been suffering from a brain injury caused by two severe blows at her head and died of terminal cancer a few weeks after the execution of Exhibit "F". While we can rule that this is a finding of fact which is within the competency of the respondent appellate court in determining the testamentary capacity of the testatrix and is, therefore, beyond Our power to revise and review, We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3 days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.Petitioner's sixth assignment of error is also bereft of merit. The evidence, both testimonial and documentary is, according to the respondent court, overwhelming that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed on April 15, 1961 by the testatrix and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. Such factual finding of the appellate court is very clear, thus: "On the contrary, the record is replete with proof that Matilde Orobia was physically present when the will was signed by Isabel Gabriel on April '15, 1961 along with her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. The trial court's conclusion that Orobia's admission that she gave piano lessons to the child of the appellant on Wednesdays and Saturdays and that April 15, 1961 happened to be a Saturday for which reason Orobia could not have been present to witness the will on that day is purely conjectural. Witness Orobia did not admit having given piano lessons to the appellant's child every Wednesday and Saturday without fail. It is highly probable that even if April 15, 1961 were a Saturday, she gave no piano lessons on that day for which reason she could have witnessed the execution of the will. Orobia spoke of occasions when she missed giving piano lessons and had to make up for the same. Anyway, her presence at the law office of Atty. Paraiso was in the morning of April 15, 1961 and there was nothing to preclude her from giving piano lessons on the afternoon of the same day in Navotas, Rizal."In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P. Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2nd ed., Sec. 132; Leynez vs. Leynez, 68 Phil. 745).As to the seventh error assigned by petitioner faulting the Court of Appeals in holding that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings as proof that the win was improperly executed, We agree with the reasoning of the respondent court that: "Matilde Orobia's Identification of the photographer as "Cesar Mendoza", contrary to what the other two witnesses (Celso and Maria Gimpaya) and Atty. Paraiso said that the photographer was Benjamin Cifra, Jr., is at worst a minor mistake attributable to lapse of time. The law does not require a photographer for the execution and attestation of the will. The fact that Miss Orobia mistakenly Identified the photographer as Cesar Mendoza scarcely detracts from her testimony that she was present when the will was signed because what matters here is not the photographer but the photograph taken which clearly portrays Matilde Orobia herself, her co-witnesses Celso Gimpaya. " Further, the respondent Court correctly held: "The trial court gave undue importance to the picture takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed. The evidence however, heavily points to only one occasion of the execution of the will on April 15, 1961 which was witnessed by Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya. These witnesses were quite emphatic and positive when they spoke of this occasion. Hence, their Identification of some photographs wherein they all appeared along with Isabel Gabriel and Atty. Paraiso was superfluous."Continuing, the respondent Court declared: "It is true that the second picture-taking was disclosed at the cross examination of Celso Gimpaya. But this was explained by Atty. Paraiso as a reenactment of the first incident upon the insistence of Isabel Gabriel. Such reenactment where Matilde Orobia was admittedly no longer present was wholly unnecessary if not pointless. What was important was that the will was duly executed and witnessed on the first occasion on April 15, 1961 , " and We agree with the Court's rationalization in conformity with logic, law and jurisprudence which do not require picture-taking as one of the legal requisites for the execution or probate of a will.Petitioner points to alleged grave contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations of witnesses in their respective testimonies before the trial court. On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals held that said contradictions, evasions and misrepresentations had been explained away. Such discrepancies as in the description of the typewriter used by Atty. Paraiso which he described as "elite" which to him meant big letters which are of the type in which the will was typewritten but which was Identified by witness Jolly Bugarin of the N.B.I. as pica the mistake in mentioning the name of the photographer by Matilde Orobia to be Cesar Mendoza when actually it was Benjamin Cifra, Jr. these are indeed unimportant details which could have been affected by the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory such that by themselves would not alter the probative value of their testimonies on the true execution of the will, (Pascual vs. dela Cruz, 28 SCRA 421, 424) for it cannot be expected that the testimony of every person win be Identical and coinciding with each other with regard to details of an incident and that witnesses are not expected to remember all details. Human experience teach us "that contradictions of witnesses generally occur in the details of certain incidents, after a long series of questionings, and far from being an evidence of falsehood constitute a demonstration of good faith. In as much as not all those who witness an incident are impressed in like manner, it is but natural that in relating their impressions, they should not agree in the minor details; hence the contradictions in their testimony." (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429).It is urged of Us by the petitioner that the findings of the trial court should not have been disturbed by the respondent appellate court because the trial court was in a better position to weigh and evaluate the evidence presented in the course of the trial. As a general rule, petitioner is correct but it is subject to well-established exceptions. The right of the Court of Appeals to review, alter and reverse the findings of the trial court where the appellate court, in reviewing the evidence has found that facts and circumstances of weight and influence have been ignored and overlooked and the significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial court, cannot be disputed. Findings of facts made by trial courts particularly when they are based on conflicting evidence whose evaluation hinges on questions of credibility of contending witnesses hes peculiarly within the province of trial courts and generally, the appellate court should not interfere with the same. In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had overlooked and misinterpreted the facts and circumstances established in the record. Whereas the appellate court said that "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso;" that the trial court's conclusion that Matilde Orobia could not have witnessed anybody signing the alleged will or that she could not have witnessed Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sign the same or that she witnessed only the deceased signing it, is a conclusion based not on facts but on inferences; that the trial court gave undue importance to the picture-takings, jumping therefrom to the conclusion that the will was improperly executed and that there is nothing in the entire record to support the conclusion of the court a quo that the will signing occasion was a mere coincidence and that Isabel Gabriel made an appointment only with Matilde Orobia to witness the signing of her will, then it becomes the duty of the appellate court to reverse findings of fact of the trial court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the lower courts.Still the petitioner insists that the case at bar is an exception to the rule that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Again We agree with the petitioner that among the exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the presence of each other as required by law. " Specifically, We affirm that on April 15, 1961 the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, together with Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and his wife Maria Gimpaya, and a photographer proceeded in a car to the office of Atty. Cipriano Paraiso at the Bank of P.I. Building, Manila in the morning of that day; that on the way, Isabel Gabriel obtained a medical certificate from one Dr. Chikiamko which she gave to Atty. Paraiso upon arriving at the latter's office and told the lawyer that she wanted her will to be made; that Atty. Paraiso asked Isabel Gabriel to dictate what she wanted to be written in the will and the attorney wrote down the dictation of Isabel Gabriel in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by her; that Atty. Paraiso read back to her what he wrote as dictated and she affirmed their correctness; the lawyer then typed the will and after finishing the document, he read it to her and she told him that it was alright; that thereafter, Isabel Gabriel signed her name at the end of the will in the presence of the three witnesses Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya and also at the left-hand margin of each and every page of the document in the presence also of the said three witnesses; that thereafter Matilde Orobia attested the will by signing her name at the end of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of pages 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel and the other two witnesses, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya; then, Celso Gimpaya signed also the will at the bottom of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of the other pages of the document in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Maria Gimpaya; that Maria Gimpaya followed suit, signing her name at the foot of the attestation clause and at the left-hand margin of every page in the presence of Isabel Gabriel, Matilde Orobia and Celso Gimpaya; that thereafter, Atty. Paraiso notarized the will as Page No. 94, Book No. IV, Series of 1961, in his Notarial Register. On the occasion of the execution and attestation of the will, a photographer took pictures, one Exhibit "G", depicting Matilde Orobia, the testatrix Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya, Maria Gimpaya and Atty. Paraiso, taken on said occasion of the signing of the will, and another, Exhibit "H", showing Matilde Orobia signing testimony that he had earlier advised Isabel Gabriel to bring with her at least the Mayor and a Councilor of Navotas, Rizal to be her witnesses for he did not know beforehand the Identities of the three attesting witnesses until the latter showed up at his law office with Isabel Gabriel on April 15, 1961. Atty. Paraiso's claim which was not controverted that he wrote down in his own hand the date appearing on page 5 of Exhibit "F" dissipates any lingering doubt that he prepared and ratified the will on the date in question."It is also a factual finding of the Court of Appeals in holding that it was credible that Isabel Gabriel could have dictated the will, Exhibit "F", without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso as against the contention of petitioner that it was incredible. This ruling of the respondent court is fully supported by the evidence on record as stated in the decision under review, thus: "Nothing in the record supports the trial court's unbelief that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will without any note or document to Atty. Paraiso. On the contrary, all the three attesting witnesses uniformly testified that Isabel Gabriel dictated her will to Atty. Paraiso and that other than the piece of paper that she handed to said lawyer she had no note or document. This fact jibes with the evidence which the trial court itself believed was unshaken that Isabel Gabriel was of sound disposing memory when she executed her will.Exhibit "F" reveals only seven (7) dispositions which are not complicated but quite simple. The first was Isabel Gabriel's wish to be interred according to Catholic rites the second was a general directive to pay her debts if any; the third provided for P1,000.00 for her sister Praxides Gabriel Vda. de Santiago and P2,000.00 for her brother Santiago Gabriel; the fourth was a listing of her 13 nephews and nieces including oppositor-appellee Rizalina Gabriel and the amount for each legatee the fifth was the institution of the petitioner-appellant, Lutgarda Santiago as the principal heir mentioning in general terms seven (7) types of properties; the sixth disposed of the remainder of her estate which she willed in favor of appellant Lutgarda Santiago but prohibiting the sale of such properties to anyone except in extreme situations in which judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. (Roque vs. Buan, et al., G.R. No. L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., G.R. No. L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967; Hilarion Jr. vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. L-19570; Sept. 14, 1967).Petitioner's insistence is without merit. We hold that the case at bar does not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated above. We likewise hold that the findings of fact of the respondent appellate court are fully supported by the evidence on record. The conclusions are fully sustained by substantial evidence. We find no abuse of discretion and We discern no misapprehension of facts. The respondent Court's findings of fact are not conflicting. Hence, the well-established rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its findings of fact are binding and conclusive and should not be disturbed by this Tribunal and it must be applied in the case at bar in its full force and effect, without qualification or reservation. The above holding simply synthesize the resolutions we have heretofore made in respect ' to petitioner's previous assignments of error and to which We have disagreed and, therefore, rejected.The last assignments of error of petitioner must necessarily be rejected by Us as We find the respondent Court acted properly and correctly and has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision by the Supreme Court, and as We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and admitting to probate Exhibit "F", the last will and testament of the deceased Isabel Gabriel.We rule that the respondent Court's factual findings upon its summation and evaluation of the evidence on record is unassailable that: "From the welter of evidence presented, we are convinced that the will in question was executed on April 15, 1961 in the presence of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya signing and witnessing the same in the the will on a table with Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya sitting around the table. Atty. Paraiso, after finishing the notarial act, then delivered the original to Isabel Gabriel and retained the other copies for his file and notarial register. A few days following the signing of the will, Isabel Gabriel, Celso Gimpaya and another photographer arrived at the office of Atty. Paraiso and told the lawyer that she wanted another picture taken because the first picture did not turn out good. The lawyer told her that this cannot be done because the will was already signed but Isabel Gabriel insisted that a picture be taken, so a simulated signing was performed during which incident Matilde Orobia was not present.Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof, who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, Makasiar, De Castro and Herrera, JJ., concur.UNSON VS. ABELLAVILLAMOR,J.|G.R. No. 17857| June 12, 1922FACTS: Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an attached inventory of her properties, in the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died and the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the court of First Instance of Laguna an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of administration in his favor. An opposition was presented by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other. The judge a quo overruled the opposition of the contestants and ordered the probate of the will holding that both documents contained the true and last will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea. The contestants have appealed, and in their brief they assign three errors, which, in their opinion, justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.The first error assigned by the appellants as committed by the court said to be the will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea, was executed with all the solemnities required by the law. The attesting witnesses, Eugenio Zalamea and Gonzalo Abaya, clearly testify that together with the other witness to the will, Pedro de Jesus, they did sign each and every page of the will and of the inventory in the presence of each other and of the testatrix, as the latter did likewise sign all the pages of the will and of the inventory in their presence. The appellants impeach the credibility of Eugenio Zalamea, for having made a sworn declaration before the justice of the peace of Santa Cruz, Laguna, before the trial of this case, to the effect that he was really one of the witnesses to the will in question, which fact was corroborated by himself at the trial. The appellants take Zalamea's testimony in connection with the dismissal of a criminal case against a nephew of his, in whose success he was interested, and infer from this fact the partiality of his testimony. The allegation is of a little importance to impeach the credibility of the witness Zalamea, especially because his testimony is corroborated by the other attesting witness. Gonzalo Abaya, and by attorney Luis Abaya, who had prepared the testament at the instance of the testatrix. The foregoing is sufficient for us to conclude that the first assignment of error made by the appellants is groundless.ISSUE:1. WON the will of Josefa Zalamea is valid?HELD:1. YES As to the paging of the will, the Supreme Court cited the case of Aldaba vs. Roque where it was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision, we said: "It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures. Supreme Court further stated that they do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of no importance. But since its principal object is to give the correlation of the pages, we hold that his object may be attained by writing one, two, three, etc., as well as by writing A, B, C, etc.They see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the paging is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory in question. So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, and followed inAldava vs. Roque, with regard to the appreciation of the solemnities of a will. As to the inventory, Supreme Court held that inventory referred to in the will as an integral part of it, they find that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the inventory. The actuation of not bringing Pedro de Jesus to court does not render the will invalid. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, the general rule is that, where the opposition is made to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be pronounced. With the exception wherein when a witness is dead, cannot be served with the process of the court, his reputation for truth has been questioned and he appears hostile to the cause of the proponent. Thus, the will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of said witness, if upon the other proofs adduced in the case, the Court is satisfied that the will has been duly executed.

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO,respondents.G.R. No. 76464 | February 29, 1988 | SARMIENTO,JFacts: October 20, 1963- Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these 4 heirs commenced on Nov. 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate at CFI of Iloilo. However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the parties Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate, dividing the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964. That should have signaled the end of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not. 3 years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the CFI of Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. May 24, 1967- Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed a motion to annul the proceedings (extrajudicial settlement) and for the allowance of the wills. This was denied by the trial court. They filed an action for certiorari which was denied by the SC and they were advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. They filed for probate the first time which was dismissed by the trial court. On certiorari, the SC remanded back the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. The trial court to which the case has been remanded found the will to have already been revoked by the testatrix, Adriana Maloto, and thus denied the petition. IAC affirmed the order. Significantly, the appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent court stated that the presence ofanimus revocandiin the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. Hence, this petition.ISSUE: WON the purported will of Adriana has already been revoked by her.HELD: No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:(1) By implication of law; or(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled withanimus revocandion the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under theexpress directionand in thepresenceof the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.In this case, whileanimus revocandior the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandiis only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in herpresence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.There is also no res judicata in this case contrary to the averment of the respondents since no final judgment has been rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned.CANIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALSNarvasa, C.J. | G.R. No. 110427 | February 24, 1997

FACTS:

On November 20, 1989, Carmen Caiza, 94 y/o, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent, because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia, by judgmentof the RTC of Quezon Cityin a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Caiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the MeTC of Quezon City to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren andsonsinlaw to temporarily reside in her house, rentfree; that Caiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment; that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that by the defendants act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they were enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they were saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent was losing much money as her house could not be rented by others. In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caizas house since the 1960s; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she bequeathed to the Estradas the house and lot in question. Judgment was rendered by the MeTC in Caizas favor,the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises. The decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. On appeal to the CA, the appellate courtaffirmed the RTCs judgment in toto.It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accionpubliciana in the RTC, not anaccioninterdictal in the MeTC, since the defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted familyof Carmen Caiza,; and (b) while said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants claim to the property, it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caizas supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out. The case reached the Supreme Court. In the responsive pleading filed by the Estradas to the SC,they insist that the case against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any contract, express or implied, as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law. Neither could the suit against them be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the real owner, Carmen Caiza, which occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Caiza is admitted to probate. They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caizas legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises. Carmen Caiza died on March 19, 1994,and her heirs the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively were substituted for her.ISSUES: WON Evangelista, as Caizas legal guardian, had authority to bring an ejectment action; and WON Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latters death.HELD:1. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the wards will. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or revoked;and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court (ART. 838, NCC) An owners intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the formers taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owners resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age. Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianshipdated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties **.By that appointment, it became Evangelistas duty to care for her aunts person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her wellbeing, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends.It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caizas property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency.That right to manage the wards estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it,and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.2. Amparo Evangelista, as niece ofCarmen Caiza, is one of the latters only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caizas nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Courtof June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased. To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caizas demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her through her guardian.That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.NEPOMUCENO vs. CA139 SCRA 206 || G.R. No. L-62952 || October 9, 1985FACTS: Martin Hugo, the testator, died and left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the will on page 3 and on the left margin of pages 1, 2, and 4, in the presence of 4 attesting witnesses who likewise affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margins of the mentioned pages, in the presence of the testator and the Notary Public. (in short the will was duly executed in accordance with the formalities of law) In the said will, the testator named and appointed petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the will that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but had been estranged from his wife for so many years and had been living with petitioner ans husband and wife. That in fact, the testator and petitioner were married in Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, his legal wife and two children his entire state and the free portion to petitioner. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will of the deceased before the CFI of Rizal and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. The legal wife and her children opposed this petition. CFI: denied probate of the will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his will to cohabiting with petitioner until his death, the wills admission will be an idle exercise because on the face of the will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provision is evident Petitioner appealed to respondent appellate court. CA: set aside the decision of the CFI denying the probate of the will. It declared the will to be valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void according to Art. 739 in relation to Art. 1028 of the New Civil Code (NCC). Petitioner contends that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate proceedings but in some other proceedings because the purpose of the probate of a will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that a will was executed with the formalities required by law, and that the declaration of its nullity could only be made by the proper court in a separate action. Respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the will on its face indubitably admit of the meretricious (illicit) relationship between the testator and the petitioner put in issue the legality of the devise. Petitioner filed an MR but was denied. Hence, this appeal.ISSUE: WON respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the will validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisionHELD: Petition DISMISSED. Decision of the CA is affirmed. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will and declared the devise in favor of petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the courts area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule HOWEVER, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it do and pass upon certain provision of the will. A separate or latter proceeding to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. The Court sees no useful purpose that would be served if they remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. Art. 739 of the NCC provides:The following donations shall be void:a) those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation; xxx There is no question from the records and as what is stated in the will, that the testator had a prior existing marriage when he executed the will and there is also no dispute that petitioner and testator lived together as husband and wife under an illicit relationship. The records do not also sustain a finding of innocence and good faith on the part of the petitioner. The prohibition in Article 739 on the NCC is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery and concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The very wordings of the will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.NAGUID VS. NAGUIDSANCHEZ,J.| G.R. No. L-23445 | June 23, 1966

FACTS: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at barISSUE:1. WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.HELD:1. YES Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance, in turn, is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law. Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.In re Estate of the deceased Gregorio Tolentino. ADELAIDA TOLENTINO,petitioner-appellee, vs.NATALIA FRANCISCO, ET AL.,oppositors-appellants.STREET,J. | G.R. No. L-35993| December 19, 1932 At the time of his death on November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was sixty-six years of age. During the more vigorous years of his life he had been married to Benita Francisco, but she predeceased him years ago. The pair had no children, and the generous instincts of the survivor prompted him to gather around him in his comfortable and commodious home a number of his wife's kin; and by him various younger members of the connection were supported and educated. At one time Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly to these kin of his wife, of the surname Francisco; and for several years prior to his death, he had kept a will indicating this desire. However, in October, 1930, strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Francisco relations and he determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, worth probably about P150,000, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library To this end, on October 17, 1930, Tolentino went to the office of Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, an attorney at 97 General Luna, Manila, and informed him that he wanted to make a new will and desired Repide to draft it for him. After the necessary preliminary inquiries had been made, the attorney suggested to Tolentino to return later, bringing a copy of the will previously made. Accordingly, on the second day thereafter, Tolentino again appeared in Repide's office with the prior will; and the attorney proceeded to reduce the new will to proper form. As the instrument was taking shape Tolentino stated that he wanted the will to be signed in Repide's office, with Repide himself as one of the attesting witnesses. For the other two witnesses Tolentino requested that two attorneys attached to the office, namely, Leoncio B. Monzon and Ramon L. Sunico, should serve. For this reason, in the draft of the will, as it at first stood, the names of the three above mentioned were inserted as the names of the three attesting witnesses. When the instrument had been reduced to proper form it was placed in the hands of Tolentino, the testator, in order that he might take it home to reflect over its provisions and consider whether it conformed in all respects to his wishes. On the morning of October 21 he again appeared in Repide's office and returned to him the draft of the will with certain corrections. Among the changes thus made was the suppression of the names of Monzon, Sunico, and Repide as attesting witnesses, these names being substituted by the names of Jose Syyap, Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda. The explanation given by the testator for desiring this change was that he had met Jose Syyap on the Escolta, the day before, and had committed the indiscretion of communicating the fact that he (Tolentino) was having a new will made in which Monzon, Sunico, and Repide would appear as the attesting witnesses. Now Syyap had been the draftsman of the former will of Tolentino, and in this same will the name of Syyap appeared as one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being Vicente Legarda and Vergel de Dios. When, therefore, Syyap learned that a new will was being drawn up without his intervention, he showed profound disappointment, saying to Tolentino that he considered it a gross offense that he, Legarda, and Vergel de Dios should be eliminated as witnesses to the new will. Upon this manifestation of feeling by Syyap, Tolentino decided to avail himself of Syyap, Legarda, and Vergel de Dios as witnesses to this will also, and he therefore requested Repide to change the names of the attesting witnesses. After this point had been settled Tolentino stated that he would request Syyap, Legarda, and Vergel de Dios to appear at the office of Repide for the purpose of signing the will. To this end Tolentino went away but returned later saying that he had spoken to Syyap about it and that the latter strenuously objected, observing that the will should be signed at a chop-suey restaurant (panciteria). Tolentino further stated to his attorney in this conversation that he had arranged with Syyap and the other two intending witnesses to meet at five o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, which was October 22, for the purpose of executing the will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Pursuant to these instructions Repide made the desired changes in the will; and just before twelve o'clock noon of the next day Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the criminal document with a carbon copy thereof. Repide advised the testator that the copy should be executed with the same formality as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not be frustrated by the possible loss or destruction of the original.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library It is a custom in the office of Repide not to number the consecutive pages of a will, on the typewriting machine, the duty of numbering the pages being left to the testator himself. This precaution appears to have been born of experience, and has been adopted by Repide to prevent the possible destruction of a will by the mere erasure of the figures or letters indicating the pagination, - a disaster which, in Repide's experience, had occurred in at least one case. Accordingly, upon delivering the completed will and carbon copy to the testator, Repide took particular pains to instruct the testator to write the consecutive paging of both original and duplicate before signing the instrument.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarycal law library At his interview the testator suggested to Repide that the latter should also go to the place where the will was to be executed, so that he might be present at the formality. The attorney replied that it was impossible for him to do so as he had another engagement for the hour indicated, which would prevent his attendance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library At about 4:30 p. m. on the same day, which was October 22, Tolentino started in his car to pick up Syyap and Vergel de Dios at their respective homes on Antipolo and Benavides streets. He then caused his chauffeur to drive with the three to La Previsora Filipina, on Rizal Avenue, where Vicente Legarda, the third intending witness was to be found. Arriving at this place, the three entered the office of Legarda, who was manager of the establishment, and they were invited to take seats, which they did. Tolentino then suggested that the three should go as his guests to apanciteria, where they could take refreshments and the will could be executed. Legarda replied that he must decline the invitation for he had an engagement to go to the Cosmos Club the same afternoon. Upon this Tolentino asked Legarda to permit the will to be signed in his office, and to this request Legarda acceded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saving that it was his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc. He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library After the original of the will had been executed in the manner just stated, the testator expressed his desire that the duplicate should be executed in the same manner. To this Syyap objected, on the ground that it was unnecessary; and in this view he was supported by Vergel de Dios, with the result that the wishes of the testator on this point could not be carried out. As the party was about to break up Tolentino used these words: "For God's sake, as a favor, I request you not to let any one know the contents of this will." The meeting then broke up and Tolentino returned Syyap and Vergel de Dios to their homes in his car. He then proceeded to the law office of Repide, arriving about 6:15 p. m. After preliminary explanations had been made, Tolentino requested Repide to keep the will overnight in his safe, as it was already too late to place it in the compartment which Tolentino was then renting in the Oriental Safe Deposit, in the Kneedler Building. In this connection the testator stated that he did not wish to take the will to his home, as he knew that his relatives were watching him and would take advantage of any carelessness on his part to pry into his papers. Also, in this conversation Tolentino informed Repide of the refusal of Syyap to execute the duplicate of the will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libr