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VFA vs COMELEC

FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with thenational elections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions participated. OnJune 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve partiesand organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-

list system.Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their ownproclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move filled up the 52seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul theCOMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps.HELD:1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC: The20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory.2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe themechanics of the party-list system.3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC: As to the method of

allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes theyeach obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for theparty-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes casthave an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering morethan two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number ofvotes. The formula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no.of votes of concerned party dividedby no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first party. As for the firstparty, just take it at face value. ( 5% = 2 seats )

Partido ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC , GR 164702, March 15, 2006

The petition involves the formula for computing the additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-listelections. Several party-list participants sent queries to the respondent COMELEC regarding the formula

to be adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. In

response, the respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835, adopting the simplified formula of

"one additional seat per additional two percent of the total party-list votes.

ISSUE: What is a decision Pro Hac Vice?

Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion. A ruling expressly qualified as pro

hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. In this case, it was ruled that it was

erroneous for respondent Commission to apply Resolution No. 6835 and rule that the formula in Veterans

has been abandoned.

In a subsequent case, Banat vs. COMELEC, the court ruled that the formula in Veterans is not applicable

anymore.

CIBAC vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007

Applying the Veterans formula in petitioners case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to

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an additional seat. Party-list Canvass Report No. 20 contained in the petition shows that the first party,

Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC,

on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna,

was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats based on June 2, 2004 Resolution NO. NBC 04-004 of the

COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result:

No. of votes of

concerned party No. of additional Additional

x seats allocated to = Seats for

No. of votes of the first party concerned

first party (Emphasis supplied.) party

Applying this formula, the result is as follows:

495,190

x 2 =

1,203,3050.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986

This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier

allotted seats for the first party, viz:

Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats

____________________ for First Party

Votes Cast for First Party

Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:

Additional seats = 495,190 x 3 = 1.2345________

1,203,305

Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani

and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.

Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain

or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that in

order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. Clearly, petitioner is not

entitled to an additional seat.

BANAT v. COMELEC

G.R. 177508

August 7, 2009

FACTS

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party list petitioned in Court

for the constitutionality of RA 9369, enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from

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implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 andHouse Bill No. 5352.

Petitioner also assailed the constutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of the said Republic Act and

alleged that they were of questionable application and their validity was doubtful.Petitioner raised the

issue whether RA 9369, RA 7166 as amended, being a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House

Bill No. 5352, violated Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which states that "Every bill passed

by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." BANAT

also questioned the validity of Sections 37 and 38, whether or not it violated Section 17 or Article VI of the

Constitution which specifies that the Senate and the House of Representatives should each have an

Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election, returns, and qualification contests relating

to its Members. Petitioner alleged that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll

automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.

Petitioner also alleged that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor pertaining to

the subject matter of RA 9369.

ISSUE

Do Sections 37 and 38 of RA 7166 not violate Section 17, Article VI?

HELD

No. It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the legislature

intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a law

unconstitutional must show that there is a clear an unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a

doubtful, speculative or argumentative one. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Section 37 and 38 do not

violate Section 17, Article VI. The COMELEC maintained that the amendments introduced by Section 37

pertained only to the adoption and application of the procedures on the pre-proclamation controversies. It

did not provide Congress and the COMELEC "en banc" may entertain pre-proclamation cases for national

elective posts.

Marcos vs. COMELEC G.R. No.119976, September 18, 1995Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate ofCandidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the

same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that

petitioner did not meet the constitutionalrequirement for residency. Private respondent contended that

petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement forcandidates for the House of

Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6

of the Constitution

Held: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the

qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided

in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents;

Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to

Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide

intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with

the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of

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origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile

because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner

married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a

domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and

acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the

country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the

Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and

Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to

disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for

congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year

immediately preceding the elections.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residencequalification as a candidate for congressman as

mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of

Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident

of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately

preceding that elections. At that time, his certificateindicated that he was also a registered voter of the

same district. Hisbirth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands

consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his

most recentcertificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium

unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in

Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones

original domicile.

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Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertio n which

is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an

actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place

of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the

absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes itmandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers andemployees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certainoffenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorialcandidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.

Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition ofadditional qualification on candidates for Senator?

Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed orelected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL.Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congresscannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, orweaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law oran administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has noeffect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choicebut to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang

PoliticalLaw Freedom of Speech and Debate

Cabangbang was a member ofthe House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on

National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letteraddressed to

the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious

study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such

strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was

planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,

among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used

as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general

circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against

Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be

dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered

by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members

ofCongress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.

HELD:Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from

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arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the

same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The

publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by

Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements

made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in

Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in

Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members

of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the

time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was

published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in

thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a

member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the

lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages.

Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as

planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be n oted that defendant, likewise,added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have

absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based

explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they

may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to

Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed

Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief

of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as planners

include these two (2) high ranking officers. Petition is dismissed.

Adaza vs Pacana

SingularityofOffice/Position

Adaza was elected governorof the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He

took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana

was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective terms

of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for

the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections,

petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as

Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office.

On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before PresidentMarcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful

occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He

argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the

province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the

parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the

position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected memberof Parliament.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province

simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original

position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other

office oremployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including

government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member

of the cabinet . . .

The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices

abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more

than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became

a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume

the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against

BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which

specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay offic ials

shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.

Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his

certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as

provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local

Government Code.

Puyat vs de Guzman

PoliticalLaw Appearance in Court

On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries.

The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were notproperly counted hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and

Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a

member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a member of

Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to

have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for

Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to

anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited

himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this

said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person

who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effectgranting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to question the Commissioners action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC

case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in

such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a

counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is

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still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference

he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the

constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is

clearly an act after the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be

done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

US vs PONS

Political Law Journal Conclusiveness of the Journals

Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamerLopez y Lopez arrived

at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to

Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs

authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed

merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby

discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing

opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and

introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act

2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission(Congress) was not in session. He said that his

witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of

the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null

and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was

indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go

beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to

inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said,

clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the

Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department

of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons

witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the

legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This

settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed

upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Facts:A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of

the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,

charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-

mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

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The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A

bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and

Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the

interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll

call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos

interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and

ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the

Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo

was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,

although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the

conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and

the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The

enrolled billwas signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the

House

Held:Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to

revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily

procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded

by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of

nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is

subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of

the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to

question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of

seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court

should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was

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effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn

for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The

question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the

purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due

to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the

lowerHouse except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House

Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of each house) in orderto pass the

Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an

enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective

House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to

vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed

amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution.

Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the

conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said

resolution was duly enacted by Congress.

HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an

authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of

the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of

a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The

SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with

considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the

opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy

in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the

copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the

two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it

would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies

shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the

proper officers of each,approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides:

Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of

any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of

those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by

the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the

Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the

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presidingofficers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts

and of the due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the

legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the

journals.

Case Digest: Casco Chemical Co. vs GimenezFacts of the Case:

Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bondinglumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation ofurea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paidP33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitionersought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board ofsaid bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde isexempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve thesaid refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of

section 2 of RA 2609.

Issue of the Case:Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

Held:

No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished productwhich is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends that the bill approved in Congresscontained the conjunction and between the terms urea and formaldehyde separately as essentialelements in the manufacture of urea formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the viewof the Senate and the intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been anymistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curativelegislation, not by judicial decree.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as

well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT

system and enhance its administration by amending the NationalInternal Revenue Code. There are

various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required

by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills,

H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as

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required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as

required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but

the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of

Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative

process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would

be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills

authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the

House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the

House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the

Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from

the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as

required by the Constitutionbecause the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this

was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed

with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the

certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing

and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Philippine Judges Association et al vs DOTC Secretary Pete Prado et al

6112010

Equal Protection Franking Privilege of the Judiciary

A report came in showing that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. of this amount, frank mailsfrom the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such asthe intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759.Frank mails coming from the Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from thepetitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The postmasters conclusion is that because of

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this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.Acting from this, Prado implemented Circ. No. 9228 as the IRR for the said law. PJA assailed the said lawcomplaining that the law would adversely impair the communication within the judiciary as it may impairthe sending of judicial notices. PJA averred that the law is discriminatory as it disallowed the frankingprivilege of the Judiciary but has not disallowed the franking privilege of others such as the executive,former executives and their widows among others.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before the law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs thefranking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted tothe judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of thefranking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmasterwould intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should haveremoved the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem of therespondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogetherfrom all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved byretaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinctionbetween those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or thingswithout distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a lawprohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth butviolate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined accordingto a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each otherin certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need ofthe President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is noreason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for suchprivilege

Astorga vs. Villegas

PoliticalLaw Journal When to be Consulted

In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of

the citygovernment as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in

Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall

five members of the city police force who had been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under

authority of RA 4065. Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition

with this Court on September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary

Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to

comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the

Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose

Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known

as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been

enacted. When the this said law passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to

the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities

headed by Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the

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Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made

significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to

the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to thePresident for approval and it

became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to

the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the

version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly

approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines

withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA

is still vald and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the

statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive

proof of a bills due enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was validly enacted.

HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The

Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of

misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. This SC is merely asked to

inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Presidentwas the same text passed by bothHouses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and

resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and

lengthy amendmentswere introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated

in the printed text sent to the Presidentand signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to

incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted

and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive,

when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is

supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and

holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about

mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Abbas vs SET

Political Law Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal

On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22 candidates

of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections

by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six

(6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for thedisqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the

said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that

considerations of public policy and the norms offairplay and due processimperatively require themass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the

following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for

the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are

disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1)

Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the

situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the

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resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court,

whose disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the

Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its

composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which

shall be the solejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective

Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices

of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of

the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of

proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the

party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the

Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share

the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications ofSenators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution

of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not

to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from

sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his

conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his

personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is

saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its

entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-

Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

Lazatin vs HRET

Political lawHRETs Jurisdiction over Electoral Protests

Lazatin filed the instant petition assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to annul his proclamation after

he had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the

1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the

COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatins opposition), alleged

that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had

already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of

the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the instant petition should be given due course because the proclamationwas valid. The Telex Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the

winner if warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code, was in effect a grant of authority

by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the

COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal and void because the board simply

corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of

candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRETs jurisdiction.

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HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition.

The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional

elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as

Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against him would be to usurp

the functions of the House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been

previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connectiontherewith, and

despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,

considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Bondoc vs Pineda

PoliticalLaw HRET Removal of a Member

Bondoc and Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda is a

member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipno. While Bondoc is a member of

the Nacionalista Party. Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result and was

subsequently declared as the winner by the House Electoral Tribunal. One member of the Electoral

Tribunal, Juanito Camasura Jr and a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDPs leader)that he voted for Bondoc. This resulted to his expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they

withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new

representative that theyd be placing in the HRET will be voting for Pineda this time. Camasura was then

removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice Herrera by virtue of a resolution passed by the HOR.

ISSUE: Whether or not such action by the HRET is valid?

HELD: The act is not valid for the HRET has already reached and rendered a decision and such decision

may not be annulled due the reason that LDP has withdrawn its representative in the HRET who

participated in the voting. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot

and academic. LDP change their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should

be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a validcause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right tosecurity of

tenure.

**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party

(LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which

shall be thesolejudge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective

members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices

of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of

the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the

party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

Tanada vs Cuenco

ConstitutionalLaw Political Question

After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly occupied

by the NacionalistaParty. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the other hand was a

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senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET. But prior to a decision the SET

would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members; 3

justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only

one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the

NP. Lorenzo assailed this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be

dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his

election contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the

issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET

is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise the issue before

judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The

term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers

to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or

executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,of a particular measure.

Guingona vs. Gonzales

HRETs Composition Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3

LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must

have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of

a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce

7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he

rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP -PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA.

This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected

members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.

Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise

is against proportional representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA.

HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on

the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of

Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to

do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate

converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5

to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membershipwas

correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less

than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is

no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the

proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more

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representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS

NUCD or the NPC.A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the

CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot

constitutionally claim aseat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to

come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other

party.

Lidasan vs Comelec

Political Law EffectifTitle Does Not Completely Express the Subject

Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating

the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later

on that barrios Togaig and Madalum justmentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of

Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,

Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, themunicipality of Parang, also

in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato

voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voterregistration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being

unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be

including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province

Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be

enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did

not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in

the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their

territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanaodel Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that

even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his

own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

Philconsa vs Gimenez

Political Law Salaries of the Members of Congress Other Emolument

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same

allows retirementgratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives,

and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement gratuity is an

attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase ofsalaries of the members of Congress duringtheir term ofoffice, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same

provision constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to

retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every

four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all

other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service

and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in

any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the

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highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator

to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement orpension benefits under Republic Act

No. 3836 to theofficers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute forbidden compensation within

the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not

constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said

Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and,

therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.

HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,

receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and

other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective

district in the case ofMembers of the House of Representatives and to and from their places of residence

in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation

shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of theHouse of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation

of sixteen thousand pesos.

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the

amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as

follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all

the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words,

under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the NationalAssembly to increase

the salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the

members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term

compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether

the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other

emoluments.

Emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; tha t which is received as compensation for

services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of

compensation for services of one possessing any office.

Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,

1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of

all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such

provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is

hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.

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ROBERT V. TOBIAS, ET AL. vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, ET AL.

Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan were one legislative district until the passage of the RA 7675 with title An Act

Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of

Mandaluyong." Same bill is now in question at to its constitutionality by the petitioners by invoking their

right as tax payers and residents of Mandaluyong.

With a plebiscite held on April 10, 1994, people of Mandaluyong voted to for the the conversion of

Mandaluyong to a highly urbanized city ratifying RA 7675 and making it in effect.

Issues:

WON RA 7675 is in:

1. Violation of Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution regarding 'one subject one bill rule".

2. Violation of Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) as to the number ofmembers of the Congress to 250 and

reappropriating the legislative districts.

Ruling:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality pertaining to

Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficientcompliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are

germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of

the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning

the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION vs VALENCIA

Facts:This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed by theBolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc., and MonserratBroadcastingSystem, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein,

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against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the RadioControl Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting Service,sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said intervenor having been granted a constructionpermit to install and operate a television station in Manila.

Petitioners applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be filed twomonth before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by RepublicAct 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications(formerlyCommerce And Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for renewal of station oroperator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be disapproved without givingthe licensee a hearing. Thus the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to petitioners. Clearly, theintention of the investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications forrenewal. According to petitioner however, the violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing wascondoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July24, 1962.The lonereason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof,is therefore no longertenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need forthe present investigation.Issues:(1)

Whether the investigation being conducted by respondents, in connection with petitioners' applications forrenewal of their station licenses, has any legal basis; (2) whether or not there was abandonment orrenunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network (CBN) of channel 9in favor of PBS; and (3) whetheror not Philippine Broadcasting Service can legally operate Channel 9 and is entitled to damages, forCBN's refusal to give up operations thereof.

Held:In the case at bar, the issuance of the said circular, the lone reason given for the investigation ofpetitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect,ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for the present investigation. There was noexpress agreement there was abandonment or renunciation by the Chronicle Broadcasting Network(CBN) of channel 9 in favor of PBS. The only basis of the contention of the respondents that there was

such renunciation is the statement"Channel 10 assigned in lieu of Channel 9", appearing in the construction permit to transfer television station DZXL-TV from Quezon City to BaguioCity, issued to petitioner. This statement alone, however, does not establish any agreement between theradio control authority and the station operator, on the switch or change of operations of CBN fromChannel 9 to Channel 10.As regard intervenor's claim for damages, it would have been sufficient to statethat it having failed to prove the alleged agreement between CBN and said intervenor on the exchange ofuse of Channel 9 and 10, no right belonging to said intervenor had been violated by petitioner's refusal togive up its present operation of Channel 9. Based on the Appropriations Act the amount appropriated forthe operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the sameshall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are alreadyexisting commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the President maylegally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. The executive's veto

power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to insubsequent cases.If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restrictionimposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, forthe purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already televisionstations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the appropriationand, consequently, null and void.It is not difficult to see that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenorwould not have been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures

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Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Political Law Inquiry in AidofLegislation When notAllowed

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and

unjustly enrichedthemselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of theBengzon law office and Ricardo LopaCorys brother in law, among others, control over some of the

biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and

Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Sen. Enrile subsequently delivered aprivilege speech alleging

that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was

referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After

committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending

civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a

letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to haveaninquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea. Claiming that the Senate

Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in

proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and

blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and

injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of law, the Bengzon et al filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary

restraining order and/or injunctive relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of

contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of

RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other words, the purpose

of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives

of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or

39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended

legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation

because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation

is to find out whether or not the relatives of the Presidentor Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA

No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of

the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa

died during the pendency of this case.

Senate vs Ermita

Question Hour EO 464

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In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci

tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies

particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to

certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.

Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to

pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.

Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements

were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.

EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in

the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers

of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chiefof Staff

are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief

superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered

by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security

Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the

President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents

approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then

invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2

military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos orderbarring military personnel from

testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were

relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s

constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to

conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.

HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of

EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. TheCongress power ofinquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with

power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions

advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In

other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to

the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of

information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the

legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true

recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the

Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as acomplement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet

would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of

legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to

inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses,

he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of

legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it

was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and

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complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.

One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit

information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question

hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately,

the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it

under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a

co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to

comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for

department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt

by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive officialmay be exempted from this

power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except

through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch,

and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-

standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is

only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the

Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of

legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to

appear in suchinquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by

the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes

which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as

Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In

such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may

only requesttheir appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their

appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatoryfor the same reasonsstated inArnault.

Neri vs Senate Committee

Legislative (Sec21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

On 21 April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)

for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the

amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the

PRC. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, De Venecia

issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence topush the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify

before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and

during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his

approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery

attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they

discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In

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particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the

NBN Project, (b) whether o