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Beyond Modularity

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lJCc Learning , Development ,

and

Conceptual Change

Lila

Gleitman

,

Susan

Carey

,

Elissa

Newport

,

and

Elizabeth

Spelke

,

editors

Names

or

Things

A

Study

n

Human

Learning

John

Macnamara

1982

Conceptual

hange

n

Childhood

Susan

Carey

1985

I'

Gawgai

" or the Future

History

of

the

Animal

Language ontroversy

David

Premack

1986

Systems

hatLearn An Introduction

o

Learning

Theoryor Cognitive

nd

Computer

cientists

Daniel

N.

Osherson

1986

From

Simple

nput

to

Complex

rammar

James

.

Morgan

,

1986

Concepts

Kinds

and

Cognitive

Development

Frank

C

. Keil

,

1989

Learnability

nd

Cognition

The

Acquisition

f

Argument

Structure

Steven

Pinker

,

1989

Mind

Bugs

The

Origins

of

Procedural

isconception

Kurt VanLehn, 1990

Categorization

nd

Naming

n

Children

Problems

f

Induction

Ellen M.

Markman

,

1990

The

Childis

Theory

f

Mind

,

Henry

M.

Wellman

,

1990

The

Organization

f Learning

Charles

R.

Gallistel

,

1990

Understanding

he

Representational

ind

,

Josef

Perner

1991

An

Odyssey

n

Learning

nd

Perception

Eleanor

J

. Gibson

1991

BeyondModularity

A

Developmentalerspective

n

Cognitive

Science

Annette Karmiloff

-

S

nithl

1992

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4/241

Modularity

Karmiloff

-

Smith

Beyond

Annette

A

Developmental

Perspective

on

Cognitive

Science

A

Bradford

Book

The MIT

Press

Cambridge

Massachusetts

London

,

England

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5/241

- -

- -

-

rebieval

)

without

permission

n

writing

from

the

publisher

Palatino

United

Catalogingin-Publica iOI1

Karmlloff

-

Smith

.

p

. cm

.

- (

Leaming

development

and

conceptual

change

Includes

biblio-

graphical

eferences

nd

index

.

ISBN0-

262

11169

1

(

HC

)

,

0-

262

61114

7

(

PB

)

925006

ill

MITr..

.

C

1992

Massachusetts

nstitute

f

Technology

All

rights

eserved

No

part

of

his

book

may

e

eproduced

n

any

orm

by

anyelecb

onic

or

mechanical

eans

indudin

~ photocopyingrecording

or

information

torage

nd

States

f

America

rinted

and

bound

in

the

etn

Datalibrary of Congress

Karmlloff

-

Smith

,

Annette

.

Beyond

modularity

: a

developmental

perspective

n

cognitive

science

Annette

I n children

. 3

.

Constructivism

1993

Fourth

printin

.e

,

1999

First

MIT

Press

aperback

dition

,

1996

D. Series

8m3

.

CSK376

155

4

'

13- dc20

1

.

Cognition

n children

. 2

.

Modularity

(

Psychology

(Psychology4. Nativism(psychology I. Title.

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6/241

.

for

Marekand

Samuel

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From behavioral

mastery

o

metalinguisticknowledge

f

the article

system

54

Beyond

he word

and

the sentence 60

From the nativist

infant

to the constructivist

linguist

62

Chapter

3

The Child as a

Physicist

65

Understanding

he

physical

world

:

The

Piagetian

nfant

65

Understanding

he

physical

world

: The

nativist

infant

66

Constraintson

objectperception

n

early infancy

67

Understanding

object

behavior

Innate

principles

and

subsequent

learning 72

Rethinking object

permanence

74

The

representational

tatus

of early knowledge

Do

infants

have

theories? 77

Becoming

little theorist 78

From behavioral

mastery

o

metacognitive

nowledge

bout he animate

inanimate

distinction

79

From behavioral

mastery

o

metacognitive nowledge

bout

gravity

and

the

Law

of

Torque

82

Representationaledescription

nd

theory building

87

Chapter

4

The Child as a Mathematician 91

Number

acquisition

as

a domain

-

general

process

91

Challenges

o

Piaget

'

s view 93

Number

acquisition

as

a

domain

-

specific

innately guided

process

96

The role

of

subitizing

:

Perceptual

or

conceptual

?

98

Constraintson learninghow to count 100

The

representational

tatus

of

early

number

knowledge

104

Learning

the

language

of

counting

and mathematiCs 105

Is

mathematical otation essential o

number

development

107

Reconciling

domain

-

specificcounting

principles

with the

failure

to conseroe

Cultural universals 107

Becoming

little mathematician 110

Metamathematical

knowledge

The

child

'

s

changing

heoryof

number 110

Number n nonhuman

species

112

The RR modeland number

representation

n thehumanchild 114

viii

Contents

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9/241

Chapter

5

The

Child

as a

Psychologist

117

The

Piagetian

view

of

the

child

as a

psychologist

118

Thedomain-

specific

view:

Infancy

prerequisites

o a

theory of

mind

118

What

con

specifics

ook

ike

118

How

con

specifics

nteract

121

Theoryof

mind

in

nonhuman

species

124

What

is

special

about

theory

-

of

-

mind

computations

?

126

The

oddler

s

theory of

mind

127

Is

language

essential

for

distinguishing

propositional

attitudes

from

propositional

contents?

129

Thechild

'

s developingbeliefdesirepsychology 130

The

RR

model

and

changes

n

children

s

theory of

mind

132

Should

theory of

mind

be

set in

a

broader

domain

-

general

context?

134

Is

theory of

mind

just

like

any

other

theory

-

building

process

137

Chapter

6

The

Child

as a

Notator

139

Does

precedence

mply

derivation?

140

Notation

from

a

domain

-

general

perspective

141

A domain-

specific

approach

o notation 142

Preliterate

and

prenumerate

hildren

s

notational

competence

143

The

RR

modeland

early

notational

skills

145

Biology

versus

culture:

The

~

radox

of

notational

systems

146

Using

the

notational

domain

to

probe

he

RR

modeland

microdevelopmental

change

148

The

importance

of

behavioral

mastery

155

Constraintson

representational

edescription

155

Implicit representationsnd their proceduralstatus 161

RR

and

the

progressive

elaxation

of

sequential

onstraints

162

Exogenously

riven

and

endogenously

riven

change

163

Contents ix

168

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Chapter

8

Modeling

Development

:

Representational

Redesaiption

and

Connectionism

175

Soft

core

and

hard core

approach

es

to the

modeling

of

development

175

The

Nlsic

architecture

of

connectionist

models

176

Nativism

and connectionism

179

Domain

specificity

and connectionism

180

Behavioral

mastery

and

connedionism

181

Implicit

representations

nd

connectionism

182

Explicit

representations

nd connectionism

186

What

is

missing

rom

connectionist

models

of

development

188

Therell be noflowcharts n this ~ k! 190

Otapter

9

Concluding Speculations

191

Notes

195

Bibliography

Index

229

x Contents

205

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Series

oreword

This

series in

learning , development , and conceptual change will

include

state- of

-

the

-

art

reference

works

,

seminal

book

-

length

monographs

,

and

texts on

the

development

of

concepts

and

mental

structures

.

It

will

span

learning

in

all

domains of

knowledge

,

from

syntax

to

geometry

to

the

social

world

,

and

will

be

concerned

with

all

phases

of

development

,

from

infancy

through

adulthood

.

The

series

intends

to

engage

such

fundamental

questions

as

the

following

.

The

nature and

limits

of

learning

and

maturation:

the

influence

of

the

environment , of initial structures, and of maturational

changes

in the

nervous

system

on

human

development

;

leamability

theory

;

the

problem

of

induction

;

domain

-

specific

constraints on

development

.

The

nature

of

COnceptual

hange

conceptual

organization

and

conceptual

change

in

child

development

,

in

the

acquisition

of

expertise

,

and

in

the

history

of

science

.

Lila

Gleitman

SusanCarey

Elissa

Newport

Elizabeth

Spelke

8/9/2019 9780262276740.pdf

12/241

This

book

aims not

only

to

reach

developmental psychologists ,

but

also to

persuade

students

and

scientists in

other

areas of

cognitive

science-

philosophy

,

anthropology

,

linguistics

,

ethology

,

adult

cognitive

psychology

,

neuroscience

,

computer

science-

to treat

cognitive

development

as a

serious

theoretical

science

contributing

to the

discussion

of how

the

human

mind

is

organized

internally

,

and

not

as

merely

a

cute

empirical

database

about

when

external

behavior can

be

observed

.

Nowadays

much of

the

literature

focuses on

what

cognitive

science can

offer

the

study

of

development

.

In

this

book

,

I

concentrate

on what a developmental perspective can offer cognitive science.

As

Piaget

'

s

conception

of the

sensorimotor infant

is

being

severely

undermined

by

new

paradigms

for

studying

infancy

,

the

battle between

nativism

and

constructivism

once

again

rears

its

rather

unconstructive

head

.

In

this

book I

do

not

choose

between

these

two

epistemological

stands

,

one

arguing

for

predominantly

built

-

in

knowledge

and

the

other for a

minimum

innate

underpinning

to

subsequent

domain

-

general

learning

.

Rather

,

I

submit that

nativism and

Piaget

'

s

constructivism

are complementary in fundamental ways, and that the

ultimate

theory

of

human

cognition

will

encompass

aspects

of

both .

The

state of

the art in

developmental

theorizing

is

currently

such

that

an

exploration

of

the

integration

of

nativism and

Piaget

'

s

constructiv

-

ism

is

timely

.

I

spent

some

13

years

immersed

in

Piagetian

theory

at

Geneva

University

,

first

as

a

student

and

then as a

research

collaborator.

During

that

time

,

the

home

-

grown

Piagetians

always

considered

,

me

a

heretic

,

both

personally

and

theoretically

. I

refused

to

address

Piaget

asPatron,

meaning

"Boss," as he

expected

everyone

in his

department

to

do

;

I

dared

to

put

in

writing

that

Piaget

had

underestimated

the

role of

language

in

cognitive

development

;

and

,

worse

,

I

argued

that

sensorimotor

development

alone

could

never

explain

how

language

acquisition

initially got

off

the

ground

-

that

there had

to

be

some

innate

component

,

even if

more

general

process

es

might

operate

in

Preface

8/9/2019 9780262276740.pdf

13/241

subsequent

development

.

Yet each

time

I went out into

the

big

wide

world

of

psychology

conferences

,

I was considered

a

prototypical

constructivist Piagetian- one who knew about Descartes, Kant , and

Hume but

who had

never even

heard of the

journal

Child

Development

Does

this

strange

cocktail

of

Piagetian

and anti

-

Piagetian

theoretical

musing

mean that

epistemological

schizophrenia

is

setting

in? No

;

I

think it reflects

the state of

developmental

theorizing

in recent

years

,

as

dynamical

systems

theory

and

connectionism

have started

to offer

some formal

modeling

of

a number of

Piagetian

ideas while

at the

same time

infancy

research

has

suggested

more

innate

underpinnings

to the human mind than

had

previously

been

granted

.

Piagetians

attribute the

absolute

minimum of

innate structure

to the

human

infant . Nativists

attribute

a

great

deal of

built

-

in

,

domain

-

specific

knowledge

to

the neonate

,

relegating

learning

to

a

less

important

role

.

Yet these

epistemologies

are not

necessarily mutually

exclusive

for a

theory

of

development

. In

this

book

I

argue

that

a

fundamental

aspect

of

human

development

is

the

process

by

which

information

that

is

in

a

cognitive

system

(

partly

captured

within

a nativist stance

)

becomes

knowledge

to that

system

(

partly

captured

within

a constructivist

stance). The theoretical discussions are illustrated by empirical findings

from both

linguistic

and

nonlinguistic

development

. This book is

intended

to excite

the reader

about the

possibilities

that

adevelop

-

mental

perspective

embracing

both

innate

predispositions

and con

-

structivism

might

yield

.

Many

friends

and

colleagues

have

influenced

my

thinking

,

not least

Jean

Piaget

,

Barbel

Inhelder

,

Mimi Sinclair

,

and their

numerous col

-

laborators

at Geneva

University

. If at times

I

seem

somewhat

anti

-

Piagetian, this in no way detracts from the enormous influence that

my

studies

and

my

work

at

Geneva

University

still

have on

my

thinking

. I

should

also

particularly

like to

acknowledge

thought

-

provoking

debates

in recent

years

with all

my present

and

previous

colleagues

at the Medical

Research

Council

'

s

Cognitive

De

"

elopment

Unit

in

London

-

in

particular

its Director

,

John

Morton

. The

COU

has

been

a most

stimulating

work environment

,

largely

due to

John

'

s

deep

commitment

to theoretical

as well

as

experimental

advances

.

Weekly

meetings

of

the

University College

London

'

s

Cognitive

Science

faculty

,

organized

by

David Green

,

also

provided

a

lively

forum for

exploring

ideas

. I should also

like to

acknowledge

stimulating

discussions

at various

times

with

Liz Bates

,

Ursula

Bellugi

,

Ellen

Bialystok

,

Susan

Carey

,

Andy

Clark

,

Jeff

Elman

,

Rochel Gelman

,

Ed Klima

,

Jay

McClelland

,

Lila Gleitman

,

Lissa

Newport

,

David

Premack

,

Lolly Tyler

,

and

particularly

Jean

Mandler

.

A

number

of

people generously

provided

comments

on

different

chapters

of the book

: Simon

Baron

-

xiv Preface

8/9/2019 9780262276740.pdf

14/241

Cohen

,

Maggie

Boden

,

Mani

Das

Gupta

,

Jeff

Elman

,

Rochel

Gelman

,

Ron

Gold

,

Francesca

Happe

,

John

Morton

,

Joseph

Perner

,

and

Jim

Russell.

Uta

Frith

'

s

encouragement

was

especially helpful

in

stoppingme from

throwing

in the

sponge

as I waded

through

critical

comment

from

others.

Thanks

are

above all

due

to Susan

Carey

,

who

ploughed

through

the

entire

text

and

provided

many

pages

of

constructive

suggestions

,

pointing

out

inconsistencies and

raising

deep

and

difficult

questions

,

and

to

Julia

Grant

,

who

combed

every

page

for

linguistic

and

conceptual

inadequacies

,

acted

as a vital

go

-

between

when I

was

in

Pittsburgh

doing

last

-

minute

work

on

references and

figures

,

and

was at

all

times

a wonderful colleague and friend . Rich Lehrer read the manuscript

from

the

stance of an

educational

psychologist

,

Marie -

Oaude

Jones

from

an

undergraduate

student'

s

viewpoint

,

and

Yuko

Munakata

from

a

graduate

student'

s

viewpoint

.

All

provided

many

useful

suggestions

.

Leslie

Tucker

helped

me with

proofreading

.

It

takes a

special

type

of

publisher

to be

generous

enough

to

offer

editorial

comments

despite

the

book

'

s

not

being

with

his

house

,

so

special

thanks

are due

to

Philip

Carpenter

for

his

reactions to

chapter

1.

Betty

and

Harry

Stanton

'

s

midnight

calls

reminded me in the nicest

of

ways

to

get

back

to the

computer

when

the

going

was

tough

.

Teri

Mendelsohn

was of

vital

help

to me

as

the

completion

of

the

manuscript

neared

-

1

know

that

,

had it

been

possible

,

she

would

have

sent

jasmine

tea

over

electronic mail

to

get

me

through

the final

few

nights

!

Paul

Bethge

of The

MIT

Press

did a

splendid

editing job

.

Igor

Karmiloff

helped

with

editorial

suggestions

from a

professional

outside

the

field

of

psychology

,

and let

me

use

his

beautiful

home in

Provence

to

do

some

of

the

writing

.

Finally , particular thanks go to my dear friends Marek

Dobraczynski

Johnson

and

Samuel

Guttenpian

.

They

read

,

reread

,

and

(

"

oh

,

not

again

!

"

)

re

-

reread

various

parts

of

the text

,

giving

me

feedback

from

the

viewpoints

of

cognitive

neuroscience

and

philosophy

,

respec

-

tively

.

It

is

Samuel to

whom I

shall

always

be

grateful

for

persuading

me

to

spend

all

my

savings

on a

good

computer

,

and

Marek

to

whom

I

owe

special

appreciation

for

so

many

things

-

not

least

for

enticing

me

to

jazz

concerts and

art

exhibitions

as a

gentle

reminder

that

there

is more to life than writing a book (he had finished his)! Fiona Cramp-

ton

-

Slnith

and

Connie

Musicant

dragged

me

out to

jog

and

work

out

when I

least

wanted

but

most

needed

to

.

My

daughters

,

Yara

and

K

yra

,

read

various

portions

of

the

manuscript

and

made

rude

but

helpful

comments about

its

unintelligibility

;

they

also

learned

to reverse

roles

and

~

e

great

care

of

me

.

Preface xv

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Beyond Modularity

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Chapter

TakingDevelopment

eriously

Nature

has contrived

to have t both

ways

,

to

get

the best

out

of fast

dumb

systems

and

slow

contemplative

nes

by

simply refusing

o

choose

between hem

.

(

Fodor 1985

p

. 4

)

Have

you

noticed how

quite

a

large

number of

developmental psychologists

are loath to attribute

any

innate

predispositions

to the human

infant ?

Yet

they

would not hesitate to

do so with

respect

to the

ant

,

the

spider

,

the bee

,

or the

chimpanzee

.

Why

would Nature

have

endowed every species except the human with some domain-specific

predispositions

?

Yet

,

if it turns

out

that all

species

have such

predispositions

,

that

most

can maintain a

goal

in

the face of

changing

environmental

conditions

,

and that most have the

capacity

for

learning

on

the

basis of interaction

with

con

specifics

and the

physical

environment

,

what

is

special

about

human

cognition

?

Is

it

simply

that the

contentof

knowledge

differs between

species

? s it

language

that makes

humans

special

?

Or are there

qualitatively

different

process

es

at work

in the human mind ?Does human cognitive change affect all domains

of

knowledge simultaneously

,

or

does

development

occur

in

adomain

-

specific

fashion

?

Are cross

-

species

differences

relevant

only

to adult

cognition

,

or do humans differ from other

species

from birth

?

This book sets out to address such

questions

and to demonstrate

that

one can attribute various

innate

predispositions

to the

human

neonate

without

negating

the roles of

the

physical

and sociocultural

environments and without

jeopardizing

the

deep-

seated conviction

that we are

special

- creative

,

cognitively

flexible

,

and

capable

of conscious

reflection , novel invention , and occasional nordinate

stupidity

.

Is the Initial

Architecture

of

the

Infant

Mind

Modular?

Fodor

'

s 1983book The

Modularity of

Mind

(

which

I

later criticize

)

made

a

significant

impact

on

developmental

theorizing

by

suggesting

how

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the

nativist thesis

and the

domain

-

specificity

of

cognition

are relevant

to constraints on the architecture

of the human

mind

.

For Fodor

,

the

notion of

"

architecture

"

refers

to the

organization

of

relatively

fixed

and

highly

constrained

innate

specifications

: the invariant features of

the human

information

-

processing

system

.

Unlike Bruner

(

1974

-

75

)

and

Piaget

(

1952b

)

,

who

argue

for domain

-

general development

,

Fo-

dor

holds

that

the

mind

is

made

up

of

genetically

specified

,

independently

functioning

,

special

-

purpose

"

modules

"

or

input systems

.

!

Like

Fodor

,

I

shall use

the terms

"

module

"

and

"

input system

"

as

synonyms

.

Each

functionally

distinct module has its own dedicated

process

es and

proprietary inputs

.

According to Fodor, information from the external environment

passes

irst

through

a

system

of

sensory

transducers

,

which transform

the

data into formats that each

special

-

purpose input system

can

process

.

Each

input system

,

in turn

,

outputs

data in a

common format

suitable for central

,

domain

-

general

processing

.

The modules are

deemed

to be hard

-

wired

(

not

assembled from more

primitive proc

-

esses

,

of fixed neural architecture

,

domain

specific

,

fast

,

autonomous

,

mandatory

,

automatic

,

stimulus

driven

,

giving

rise to shallow

outputs

,

and insensitive to central cognitive goals

.

A

further characteristic of modules is

that

they

are

informationally

encapsulated

(

or

,

as

Pylyshyn

[

1980

put

it

,

"

cognitivelyimpenetrable

"

)

.

Other

parts

of the mind can neither

influence nor have access o the

internal

workings

of

a module

,

only

to its

outputs

.

Modules have

access

only

to information from

stages

of

processing

at

lower levels

,

not

to information from

top-

down

process

es. In other words

,

what

the mind knows and believes cannot

affect

the

workings

of a module

.

For

Fodor

,

the essential

fact about modules

is their informational

encapsulation

. He is neutral about whether they are resource encapsulated

(

i .e

.

,

whether different

modules share

,

say

,

inference

algorithms2

)

. In

defense of

informational

encapsulation

,

Fodor cites

the

example

of

perceptual

illusions such

as the Muller

-

Lyer

illusion

(

figure

1.1

)

. In

that illusion

,

even when

subjects

have measured the

Chapter

1

~

7

>