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Beyond Modularity
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lJCc Learning , Development ,
and
Conceptual Change
Lila
Gleitman
,
Susan
Carey
,
Elissa
Newport
,
and
Elizabeth
Spelke
,
editors
Names
or
Things
A
Study
n
Human
Learning
John
Macnamara
1982
Conceptual
hange
n
Childhood
Susan
Carey
1985
I'
Gawgai
" or the Future
History
of
the
Animal
Language ontroversy
David
Premack
1986
Systems
hatLearn An Introduction
o
Learning
Theoryor Cognitive
nd
Computer
cientists
Daniel
N.
Osherson
1986
From
Simple
nput
to
Complex
rammar
James
.
Morgan
,
1986
Concepts
Kinds
and
Cognitive
Development
Frank
C
. Keil
,
1989
Learnability
nd
Cognition
The
Acquisition
f
Argument
Structure
Steven
Pinker
,
1989
Mind
Bugs
The
Origins
of
Procedural
isconception
Kurt VanLehn, 1990
Categorization
nd
Naming
n
Children
Problems
f
Induction
Ellen M.
Markman
,
1990
The
Childis
Theory
f
Mind
,
Henry
M.
Wellman
,
1990
The
Organization
f Learning
Charles
R.
Gallistel
,
1990
Understanding
he
Representational
ind
,
Josef
Perner
1991
An
Odyssey
n
Learning
nd
Perception
Eleanor
J
. Gibson
1991
BeyondModularity
A
Developmentalerspective
n
Cognitive
Science
Annette Karmiloff
-
S
nithl
1992
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4/241
Modularity
Karmiloff
-
Smith
Beyond
Annette
A
Developmental
Perspective
on
Cognitive
Science
A
Bradford
Book
The MIT
Press
Cambridge
Massachusetts
London
,
England
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5/241
- -
- -
-
rebieval
)
without
permission
n
writing
from
the
publisher
Palatino
United
Catalogingin-Publica iOI1
Karmlloff
-
Smith
.
p
. cm
.
- (
Leaming
development
and
conceptual
change
Includes
biblio-
graphical
eferences
nd
index
.
ISBN0-
262
11169
1
(
HC
)
,
0-
262
61114
7
(
PB
)
925006
ill
MITr..
.
C
1992
Massachusetts
nstitute
f
Technology
All
rights
eserved
No
part
of
his
book
may
e
eproduced
n
any
orm
by
anyelecb
onic
or
mechanical
eans
indudin
~ photocopyingrecording
or
information
torage
nd
States
f
America
rinted
and
bound
in
the
etn
Datalibrary of Congress
Karmlloff
-
Smith
,
Annette
.
Beyond
modularity
: a
developmental
perspective
n
cognitive
science
Annette
I n children
. 3
.
Constructivism
1993
Fourth
printin
.e
,
1999
First
MIT
Press
aperback
dition
,
1996
D. Series
8m3
.
CSK376
155
4
'
13- dc20
1
.
Cognition
n children
. 2
.
Modularity
(
Psychology
(Psychology4. Nativism(psychology I. Title.
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.
for
Marekand
Samuel
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From behavioral
mastery
o
metalinguisticknowledge
f
the article
system
54
Beyond
he word
and
the sentence 60
From the nativist
infant
to the constructivist
linguist
62
Chapter
3
The Child as a
Physicist
65
Understanding
he
physical
world
:
The
Piagetian
nfant
65
Understanding
he
physical
world
: The
nativist
infant
66
Constraintson
objectperception
n
early infancy
67
Understanding
object
behavior
Innate
principles
and
subsequent
learning 72
Rethinking object
permanence
74
The
representational
tatus
of early knowledge
Do
infants
have
theories? 77
Becoming
little theorist 78
From behavioral
mastery
o
metacognitive
nowledge
bout he animate
inanimate
distinction
79
From behavioral
mastery
o
metacognitive nowledge
bout
gravity
and
the
Law
of
Torque
82
Representationaledescription
nd
theory building
87
Chapter
4
The Child as a Mathematician 91
Number
acquisition
as
a domain
-
general
process
91
Challenges
o
Piaget
'
s view 93
Number
acquisition
as
a
domain
-
specific
innately guided
process
96
The role
of
subitizing
:
Perceptual
or
conceptual
?
98
Constraintson learninghow to count 100
The
representational
tatus
of
early
number
knowledge
104
Learning
the
language
of
counting
and mathematiCs 105
Is
mathematical otation essential o
number
development
107
Reconciling
domain
-
specificcounting
principles
with the
failure
to conseroe
Cultural universals 107
Becoming
little mathematician 110
Metamathematical
knowledge
The
child
'
s
changing
heoryof
number 110
Number n nonhuman
species
112
The RR modeland number
representation
n thehumanchild 114
viii
Contents
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Chapter
5
The
Child
as a
Psychologist
117
The
Piagetian
view
of
the
child
as a
psychologist
118
Thedomain-
specific
view:
Infancy
prerequisites
o a
theory of
mind
118
What
con
specifics
ook
ike
118
How
con
specifics
nteract
121
Theoryof
mind
in
nonhuman
species
124
What
is
special
about
theory
-
of
-
mind
computations
?
126
The
oddler
s
theory of
mind
127
Is
language
essential
for
distinguishing
propositional
attitudes
from
propositional
contents?
129
Thechild
'
s developingbeliefdesirepsychology 130
The
RR
model
and
changes
n
children
s
theory of
mind
132
Should
theory of
mind
be
set in
a
broader
domain
-
general
context?
134
Is
theory of
mind
just
like
any
other
theory
-
building
process
137
Chapter
6
The
Child
as a
Notator
139
Does
precedence
mply
derivation?
140
Notation
from
a
domain
-
general
perspective
141
A domain-
specific
approach
o notation 142
Preliterate
and
prenumerate
hildren
s
notational
competence
143
The
RR
modeland
early
notational
skills
145
Biology
versus
culture:
The
~
radox
of
notational
systems
146
Using
the
notational
domain
to
probe
he
RR
modeland
microdevelopmental
change
148
The
importance
of
behavioral
mastery
155
Constraintson
representational
edescription
155
Implicit representationsnd their proceduralstatus 161
RR
and
the
progressive
elaxation
of
sequential
onstraints
162
Exogenously
riven
and
endogenously
riven
change
163
Contents ix
168
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Chapter
8
Modeling
Development
:
Representational
Redesaiption
and
Connectionism
175
Soft
core
and
hard core
approach
es
to the
modeling
of
development
175
The
Nlsic
architecture
of
connectionist
models
176
Nativism
and connectionism
179
Domain
specificity
and connectionism
180
Behavioral
mastery
and
connedionism
181
Implicit
representations
nd
connectionism
182
Explicit
representations
nd connectionism
186
What
is
missing
rom
connectionist
models
of
development
188
Therell be noflowcharts n this ~ k! 190
Otapter
9
Concluding Speculations
191
Notes
195
Bibliography
Index
229
x Contents
205
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Series
oreword
This
series in
learning , development , and conceptual change will
include
state- of
-
the
-
art
reference
works
,
seminal
book
-
length
monographs
,
and
texts on
the
development
of
concepts
and
mental
structures
.
It
will
span
learning
in
all
domains of
knowledge
,
from
syntax
to
geometry
to
the
social
world
,
and
will
be
concerned
with
all
phases
of
development
,
from
infancy
through
adulthood
.
The
series
intends
to
engage
such
fundamental
questions
as
the
following
.
The
nature and
limits
of
learning
and
maturation:
the
influence
of
the
environment , of initial structures, and of maturational
changes
in the
nervous
system
on
human
development
;
leamability
theory
;
the
problem
of
induction
;
domain
-
specific
constraints on
development
.
The
nature
of
COnceptual
hange
conceptual
organization
and
conceptual
change
in
child
development
,
in
the
acquisition
of
expertise
,
and
in
the
history
of
science
.
Lila
Gleitman
SusanCarey
Elissa
Newport
Elizabeth
Spelke
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This
book
aims not
only
to
reach
developmental psychologists ,
but
also to
persuade
students
and
scientists in
other
areas of
cognitive
science-
philosophy
,
anthropology
,
linguistics
,
ethology
,
adult
cognitive
psychology
,
neuroscience
,
computer
science-
to treat
cognitive
development
as a
serious
theoretical
science
contributing
to the
discussion
of how
the
human
mind
is
organized
internally
,
and
not
as
merely
a
cute
empirical
database
about
when
external
behavior can
be
observed
.
Nowadays
much of
the
literature
focuses on
what
cognitive
science can
offer
the
study
of
development
.
In
this
book
,
I
concentrate
on what a developmental perspective can offer cognitive science.
As
Piaget
'
s
conception
of the
sensorimotor infant
is
being
severely
undermined
by
new
paradigms
for
studying
infancy
,
the
battle between
nativism
and
constructivism
once
again
rears
its
rather
unconstructive
head
.
In
this
book I
do
not
choose
between
these
two
epistemological
stands
,
one
arguing
for
predominantly
built
-
in
knowledge
and
the
other for a
minimum
innate
underpinning
to
subsequent
domain
-
general
learning
.
Rather
,
I
submit that
nativism and
Piaget
'
s
constructivism
are complementary in fundamental ways, and that the
ultimate
theory
of
human
cognition
will
encompass
aspects
of
both .
The
state of
the art in
developmental
theorizing
is
currently
such
that
an
exploration
of
the
integration
of
nativism and
Piaget
'
s
constructiv
-
ism
is
timely
.
I
spent
some
13
years
immersed
in
Piagetian
theory
at
Geneva
University
,
first
as
a
student
and
then as a
research
collaborator.
During
that
time
,
the
home
-
grown
Piagetians
always
considered
,
me
a
heretic
,
both
personally
and
theoretically
. I
refused
to
address
Piaget
asPatron,
meaning
"Boss," as he
expected
everyone
in his
department
to
do
;
I
dared
to
put
in
writing
that
Piaget
had
underestimated
the
role of
language
in
cognitive
development
;
and
,
worse
,
I
argued
that
sensorimotor
development
alone
could
never
explain
how
language
acquisition
initially got
off
the
ground
-
that
there had
to
be
some
innate
component
,
even if
more
general
process
es
might
operate
in
Preface
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subsequent
development
.
Yet each
time
I went out into
the
big
wide
world
of
psychology
conferences
,
I was considered
a
prototypical
constructivist Piagetian- one who knew about Descartes, Kant , and
Hume but
who had
never even
heard of the
journal
Child
Development
Does
this
strange
cocktail
of
Piagetian
and anti
-
Piagetian
theoretical
musing
mean that
epistemological
schizophrenia
is
setting
in? No
;
I
think it reflects
the state of
developmental
theorizing
in recent
years
,
as
dynamical
systems
theory
and
connectionism
have started
to offer
some formal
modeling
of
a number of
Piagetian
ideas while
at the
same time
infancy
research
has
suggested
more
innate
underpinnings
to the human mind than
had
previously
been
granted
.
Piagetians
attribute the
absolute
minimum of
innate structure
to the
human
infant . Nativists
attribute
a
great
deal of
built
-
in
,
domain
-
specific
knowledge
to
the neonate
,
relegating
learning
to
a
less
important
role
.
Yet these
epistemologies
are not
necessarily mutually
exclusive
for a
theory
of
development
. In
this
book
I
argue
that
a
fundamental
aspect
of
human
development
is
the
process
by
which
information
that
is
in
a
cognitive
system
(
partly
captured
within
a nativist stance
)
becomes
knowledge
to that
system
(
partly
captured
within
a constructivist
stance). The theoretical discussions are illustrated by empirical findings
from both
linguistic
and
nonlinguistic
development
. This book is
intended
to excite
the reader
about the
possibilities
that
adevelop
-
mental
perspective
embracing
both
innate
predispositions
and con
-
structivism
might
yield
.
Many
friends
and
colleagues
have
influenced
my
thinking
,
not least
Jean
Piaget
,
Barbel
Inhelder
,
Mimi Sinclair
,
and their
numerous col
-
laborators
at Geneva
University
. If at times
I
seem
somewhat
anti
-
Piagetian, this in no way detracts from the enormous influence that
my
studies
and
my
work
at
Geneva
University
still
have on
my
thinking
. I
should
also
particularly
like to
acknowledge
thought
-
provoking
debates
in recent
years
with all
my present
and
previous
colleagues
at the Medical
Research
Council
'
s
Cognitive
De
"
elopment
Unit
in
London
-
in
particular
its Director
,
John
Morton
. The
COU
has
been
a most
stimulating
work environment
,
largely
due to
John
'
s
deep
commitment
to theoretical
as well
as
experimental
advances
.
Weekly
meetings
of
the
University College
London
'
s
Cognitive
Science
faculty
,
organized
by
David Green
,
also
provided
a
lively
forum for
exploring
ideas
. I should also
like to
acknowledge
stimulating
discussions
at various
times
with
Liz Bates
,
Ursula
Bellugi
,
Ellen
Bialystok
,
Susan
Carey
,
Andy
Clark
,
Jeff
Elman
,
Rochel Gelman
,
Ed Klima
,
Jay
McClelland
,
Lila Gleitman
,
Lissa
Newport
,
David
Premack
,
Lolly Tyler
,
and
particularly
Jean
Mandler
.
A
number
of
people generously
provided
comments
on
different
chapters
of the book
: Simon
Baron
-
xiv Preface
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Cohen
,
Maggie
Boden
,
Mani
Das
Gupta
,
Jeff
Elman
,
Rochel
Gelman
,
Ron
Gold
,
Francesca
Happe
,
John
Morton
,
Joseph
Perner
,
and
Jim
Russell.
Uta
Frith
'
s
encouragement
was
especially helpful
in
stoppingme from
throwing
in the
sponge
as I waded
through
critical
comment
from
others.
Thanks
are
above all
due
to Susan
Carey
,
who
ploughed
through
the
entire
text
and
provided
many
pages
of
constructive
suggestions
,
pointing
out
inconsistencies and
raising
deep
and
difficult
questions
,
and
to
Julia
Grant
,
who
combed
every
page
for
linguistic
and
conceptual
inadequacies
,
acted
as a vital
go
-
between
when I
was
in
Pittsburgh
doing
last
-
minute
work
on
references and
figures
,
and
was at
all
times
a wonderful colleague and friend . Rich Lehrer read the manuscript
from
the
stance of an
educational
psychologist
,
Marie -
Oaude
Jones
from
an
undergraduate
student'
s
viewpoint
,
and
Yuko
Munakata
from
a
graduate
student'
s
viewpoint
.
All
provided
many
useful
suggestions
.
Leslie
Tucker
helped
me with
proofreading
.
It
takes a
special
type
of
publisher
to be
generous
enough
to
offer
editorial
comments
despite
the
book
'
s
not
being
with
his
house
,
so
special
thanks
are due
to
Philip
Carpenter
for
his
reactions to
chapter
1.
Betty
and
Harry
Stanton
'
s
midnight
calls
reminded me in the nicest
of
ways
to
get
back
to the
computer
when
the
going
was
tough
.
Teri
Mendelsohn
was of
vital
help
to me
as
the
completion
of
the
manuscript
neared
-
1
know
that
,
had it
been
possible
,
she
would
have
sent
jasmine
tea
over
electronic mail
to
get
me
through
the final
few
nights
!
Paul
Bethge
of The
MIT
Press
did a
splendid
editing job
.
Igor
Karmiloff
helped
with
editorial
suggestions
from a
professional
outside
the
field
of
psychology
,
and let
me
use
his
beautiful
home in
Provence
to
do
some
of
the
writing
.
Finally , particular thanks go to my dear friends Marek
Dobraczynski
Johnson
and
Samuel
Guttenpian
.
They
read
,
reread
,
and
(
"
oh
,
not
again
!
"
)
re
-
reread
various
parts
of
the text
,
giving
me
feedback
from
the
viewpoints
of
cognitive
neuroscience
and
philosophy
,
respec
-
tively
.
It
is
Samuel to
whom I
shall
always
be
grateful
for
persuading
me
to
spend
all
my
savings
on a
good
computer
,
and
Marek
to
whom
I
owe
special
appreciation
for
so
many
things
-
not
least
for
enticing
me
to
jazz
concerts and
art
exhibitions
as a
gentle
reminder
that
there
is more to life than writing a book (he had finished his)! Fiona Cramp-
ton
-
Slnith
and
Connie
Musicant
dragged
me
out to
jog
and
work
out
when I
least
wanted
but
most
needed
to
.
My
daughters
,
Yara
and
K
yra
,
read
various
portions
of
the
manuscript
and
made
rude
but
helpful
comments about
its
unintelligibility
;
they
also
learned
to reverse
roles
and
~
e
great
care
of
me
.
Preface xv
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Beyond Modularity
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Chapter
TakingDevelopment
eriously
Nature
has contrived
to have t both
ways
,
to
get
the best
out
of fast
dumb
systems
and
slow
contemplative
nes
by
simply refusing
o
choose
between hem
.
(
Fodor 1985
p
. 4
)
Have
you
noticed how
quite
a
large
number of
developmental psychologists
are loath to attribute
any
innate
predispositions
to the human
infant ?
Yet
they
would not hesitate to
do so with
respect
to the
ant
,
the
spider
,
the bee
,
or the
chimpanzee
.
Why
would Nature
have
endowed every species except the human with some domain-specific
predispositions
?
Yet
,
if it turns
out
that all
species
have such
predispositions
,
that
most
can maintain a
goal
in
the face of
changing
environmental
conditions
,
and that most have the
capacity
for
learning
on
the
basis of interaction
with
con
specifics
and the
physical
environment
,
what
is
special
about
human
cognition
?
Is
it
simply
that the
contentof
knowledge
differs between
species
? s it
language
that makes
humans
special
?
Or are there
qualitatively
different
process
es
at work
in the human mind ?Does human cognitive change affect all domains
of
knowledge simultaneously
,
or
does
development
occur
in
adomain
-
specific
fashion
?
Are cross
-
species
differences
relevant
only
to adult
cognition
,
or do humans differ from other
species
from birth
?
This book sets out to address such
questions
and to demonstrate
that
one can attribute various
innate
predispositions
to the
human
neonate
without
negating
the roles of
the
physical
and sociocultural
environments and without
jeopardizing
the
deep-
seated conviction
that we are
special
- creative
,
cognitively
flexible
,
and
capable
of conscious
reflection , novel invention , and occasional nordinate
stupidity
.
Is the Initial
Architecture
of
the
Infant
Mind
Modular?
Fodor
'
s 1983book The
Modularity of
Mind
(
which
I
later criticize
)
made
a
significant
impact
on
developmental
theorizing
by
suggesting
how
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17/241
the
nativist thesis
and the
domain
-
specificity
of
cognition
are relevant
to constraints on the architecture
of the human
mind
.
For Fodor
,
the
notion of
"
architecture
"
refers
to the
organization
of
relatively
fixed
and
highly
constrained
innate
specifications
: the invariant features of
the human
information
-
processing
system
.
Unlike Bruner
(
1974
-
75
)
and
Piaget
(
1952b
)
,
who
argue
for domain
-
general development
,
Fo-
dor
holds
that
the
mind
is
made
up
of
genetically
specified
,
independently
functioning
,
special
-
purpose
"
modules
"
or
input systems
.
!
Like
Fodor
,
I
shall use
the terms
"
module
"
and
"
input system
"
as
synonyms
.
Each
functionally
distinct module has its own dedicated
process
es and
proprietary inputs
.
According to Fodor, information from the external environment
passes
irst
through
a
system
of
sensory
transducers
,
which transform
the
data into formats that each
special
-
purpose input system
can
process
.
Each
input system
,
in turn
,
outputs
data in a
common format
suitable for central
,
domain
-
general
processing
.
The modules are
deemed
to be hard
-
wired
(
not
assembled from more
primitive proc
-
esses
,
of fixed neural architecture
,
domain
specific
,
fast
,
autonomous
,
mandatory
,
automatic
,
stimulus
driven
,
giving
rise to shallow
outputs
,
and insensitive to central cognitive goals
.
A
further characteristic of modules is
that
they
are
informationally
encapsulated
(
or
,
as
Pylyshyn
[
1980
put
it
,
"
cognitivelyimpenetrable
"
)
.
Other
parts
of the mind can neither
influence nor have access o the
internal
workings
of
a module
,
only
to its
outputs
.
Modules have
access
only
to information from
stages
of
processing
at
lower levels
,
not
to information from
top-
down
process
es. In other words
,
what
the mind knows and believes cannot
affect
the
workings
of a module
.
For
Fodor
,
the essential
fact about modules
is their informational
encapsulation
. He is neutral about whether they are resource encapsulated
(
i .e
.
,
whether different
modules share
,
say
,
inference
algorithms2
)
. In
defense of
informational
encapsulation
,
Fodor cites
the
example
of
perceptual
illusions such
as the Muller
-
Lyer
illusion
(
figure
1.1
)
. In
that illusion
,
even when
subjects
have measured the
Chapter
1
~
7
>