A GENERAL THEORYOF DELEGATION,ACCOUNTABILITY AND EMPOWERMENT
J. PeterVentonMinistry ofFinanceToronto,Ontario
Abstract: Delegation,accountability,and empowermentare parts of asystemaimed at high performance.This article presentsdefinitionsandpurposesoftheseterms,describesthenatureof theirinterrelationshipsandimpactson performance,andcommentson how advancedprogramevaluationmethodscanrenderdelegationandaccountabilitymoreeffectiveandempowermentlessrisky.
Résumé: La delegation,la responsabilisationetl’habilItation font partied’un systèmequi vise un rendementeleve. Cet article avancedesdefinitions et desobjectifs pour ces termes,et ii décrit lanaturede leur rapportmutuel, ainsi que leurs repercussionssur le rendement.Tout au long de l’article figurent descornmentairessur les manièresdont les méthodesavancéesd’évaluation desprogrammespermettentd’accroItrel’efficacite deladelegationet la responsabilisationet dediminuerle risqueliea l’habilitation.
A number of authors have describedthe "New Public.Management"as a set of strategiesfor higher performancedrawnlargelyfrom businessmanagementtheoryandpractice.Two ofthesestrategiesare strengtheningaccountabilityof governmentto thepublic andempowermentBorins, 1995;Kernaghan,1993; Savoie,1995;Thomas,1996.
Generally,governmentsaroundthe world havebeenslow and relatively ineffective in implementingthesestrategies,for two relatedreasons.First, governmentofficia’s in chargeofimplementationhavenotunderstoodthetermsaswell astheymight have.Second,governmentshavelaunchedpoorly conceivedandundercapitalizedreformcampaignsin milieux ofpervasiveandsubtleresistanceto change.
This articleaddressestheproblemof inadequateunderstandingbydevelopinga theorythat providesbothmeaningandcontextfor the
I 164 THE Cri JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
terms. It doesnot, however,addressthesecondproblem,of the difficulty in managingchange.Interestedreaderscan find good discussionsof effectivechangemanagementstrategiesfor governmentorganizationsin Carr andLittman 1993 andOsborneandPlastrik1997.
Theproblemofinadequateunderstandingof accountabilityandempowermentmay be attributedto theunderdevelopedliteratureonthe subject.My conclusionfrom an analysisof a recentsetof articles on accountability in public administration Gagne, 1996;Langford, 1996;Wright, 1996 is that those articlesdo not employcommondefinitions of terms.As Wright states,the "definitions ofaccountabilitytendto bevague,incompleteor convoluted"1996,p.227. More importantly, the literaturedoesnot appearto containanexplicit coherenttheoryofmanagementthatprovidesaclearcontext for accountabilityandempowerment.For example,the objective of the Gagnearticle is to "stimulate reflection and informeddiscussion"ratherthanconstructa theoryorframeworkfor accountability in the public service1996, p. 213. In commentingon theGagnearticle,Wright concludesthat "there is a needfor a framework that is sufficiently detailedto allow for the diversity of government activities but broad enough to allow for validgeneralizations"1996, p. 234.
The theoryin this article is basedupon thewriting of popularauthorities Drucker, 1974; Peters,1988 and somelesswell knownauthoritieson businessmanagementArbuckle,1992;Jaques,1996;Oncken,1975.I believethatthebusinessmanagementtheoryhereinis consistentwith theprinciplesof accountabilityin governmentand,more particularly in the Canadiancontext, with the principles oftheWestminstermodelof responsiblegovernment.Thesearesummarizedby Gagneasthe"complementarynotionsofministerialaccountability andbureaucraticanonymity"and the"viewpoint thatMinisters are electedto decidewhereasofficials are appointedtoadministerandadvise"1996,p. 214. In termsof businessmanagement theory,theminister is a managerby virtue of having a decision-making role which he or she must accomplish throughsubordinatesin the bureaucracy.Furthermore,anonymity of bureaucracymeansthat the ministers,andonly the ministers, areaccountableto thepublic. Onecannot simultaneouslybe answerableto thepublic andretainanonymity.
The theory in this article also addressestheproblemsurroundingtheview that realizing accountabilityis more difficult in govern-
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EvALUATION DE PROGRAMME 165 I
ment where thereare a multiplicity of foci of accountability.Thearticles cited abovesuggestthat individual civil servantsmay beaccountableto a variety ofentities,including their immediatesuperiors, higherlevel superiors,ministers, thegovernmentof the day,parliamentsandlegislatures,andthepublic. Civil servantsmayalsobeheldaccountablefor compliancewith rules,procedures,dueprocess,achievingresults, or achievingperformancetargets Gagne,1996; Wright, 1996.
There aretwo central assumptionsto the theory developedin thisarticle. The first is that delegation,accountability,and empowerment arepartsof a systemwhoseaim is high performance.Thesecond is that within this systemaccountabilityandempowermentareinstrumentsfor enhancingthe scopeand effectivenessof the managementprocessof delegation.In addition to theseassumptions,thetheoryis specifiedby identifying thepurposesofeachterm,by aproposedspecific definition for eachterm, by a description of theinterrelationshipsamong the terms, and by a list of prerequisiteconditionsfor effectiveaccountabilityandempowerment.
The definitions of delegation,accountability, and empowermentinthis article havebeendevelopedusing threecriteria: authority, relevancy, and simplicity. They are authoritative by virtue of beingderivedfrom dictionary definitionsandthework ofprominentwriterson thesubject.Theyarerelevantin thesensethat theyrelatetothe problemsthat thesemanagementpracticeswere designedtosolve.And theyaresimple becausetheyarebrokeninto irreducibletermsin plain language.
In order to illustrate the principlesof the theory, the article refersto governmentorganizationsand, in somecases,the Ontario government.Thesereferencesaresolely theauthor’sand do not necessarilyrepresentthepolicies,practices,or opinionsof the Governmentof Ontario or any ofits agencies,boards,and commissions.
Throughoutthe article, referencesaremadeto therole of programevaluationin helping to make delegationand accountabilitymoreeffective and empowermentless risky. In this context it should benoted that thesesuggestionsrepresent"best practices" advancedprogramevaluationroles.They ignorethe factorsfrequentlyfoundin many governmentorganizationsthat preventthe full utilizationand limit the effectivenessof advancedprogramevaluationmethods.The "usualsuspects"havebeendocumentedin the literature.
I 166 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
They include1 budgetsystemswith built-in disincentivesfor program managersto conduct summativeevaluations;2 hiring ofevaluationpractitionerswho are intuitive rather than analytical,with consequentpoor formulationof goalsandoutcomesmeasures;3 an absenceof a customer.focus in the organization,leading tocomplexitiesgeneratedby "turf wars"amonginternalstakeholders;4 aninadequatelevel ofstrategicthinking in centralagenciesleading to an absenceof policy frameworkswithin which comparativeprogramevaluationscan be conducted;5 indifferenceof politicalleadersto value-for-moneyevaluations;and6 starvationfundinglevelsfor theprogramevaluationfunction Bish & McDavid, 1988;Love 1991; Patton,1986. Theseimpedimentsarenot inherent ingovernmentorganizations,in the sensethat they arewithin thepower of governmentsto change.Furthermore,in my view, theseobstacleshavebeenovercomesubstantiallyby thecollectivity of thefew jurisdictionsthat haveimplementedthe "New Public Management."
The remainderof this article beginsby developingdetaileddefinitionsofthetermsdelegationandaccountabilityanddiscussingtheirtheoreticalimplications.Conditionsfor effectiveaccountabilityarethen described.Next, the detaileddefinitionsof empowermentaredevelopedandconditionsfor reducingtheperceivedrisks of empowermentaredescribed.The article concludesby summarizingthe interrelationshipsbetweenthethreetermsandhighlighting theroleofprogramevaluationin makingdelegationandaccountabilitymoreeffectiveand empowermentlessrisky.
DELEGATION
Context
As organizationsget larger it becomesnecessaryto divide up thework. Typically, work tasksandprocessesaredivided accordingtofunction andlevel, andmorespecifically, on threebases:
1. Work is dividedbetweenamanagementgroupandaworkergroup.
2. Work is dividedinto "departments"in governmentor "autonomousbusinessunits" in privatecompanieson thebasis of different customer groups or different logics ofproductionanddelivery.Theresultingorganizationalstructure is called abureaucracy.Although thedictionarydefi
LA REVUE CANADIENNE DtEVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 167 I
nition of bureaucracyis the administrationof governmentthrough departmentsand subdivisionsmanagedby setsofofficials following an inflexible routine,referencesto corporate bureaucraciesarealsocommon.
3. Within the managementgroup, work is further dividedamonglevels.Eachlevel hasa managerwho managesthework of severalsubordinatesat the next-lower level. Theresultingorganizationalstructureis calleda managerialhierarchy.Best statesthat the role ofthemanagerialhierarchy is to "coordinate,monitor, andplan overmultiple phasesalongtheproduction[value] chain [ofanorganization’sgood,service, or program] 1990, pp. 58, 59. I have addedthetermsin bracketsto reflect the fact that someauthorsusevaluechain ratherthanproductionchain and that governmentstypically produceprogramoutputsratherthanproducts.Jaques1996 alsousesthetermmanagerialhierarchy.
In a managerialhierarchy,eachincumbentplaysa dualrole ofmanagerand subordinate,except for thoseat the very top level. Thisorganizationalarrangementrequiresthe establishmentof appropriate "vertical relationships"betweenmanagerand subordinate,called"delegation-accountabilityrelationships."Managerialhierarchiesalsorequiretheestablishmentofinformal lateralrelationshipsbetweenmanagerswho areat thesamelevel in different divisions.
The delegation-accountabilityrelationshiprequiresthemanagertoplay severalroles. First, the managercontrolsthework of thesubordinate. Second,insofar as the manageris held accountableto amanagerat thenext level for the outputsof subordinates,he or sheis expectedto play a leadershiprole. Leadershipinvolves assigningtasks, settingthe context for the assignedtasks, and communicating expectedresults and deadlinesfor the tasks. However,leadership also involves supporting subordinatesby providing resourcesto enable them to get the job done right and by coaching andmentoring Drucker, 1974; Jaques,1996. In summary, the managerin a delegation-accountabilityrelationshipplays all threerolesof controlling, directing, andsupportingthe subordinate.
PurposeofDelegation
Thepurposeof delegationis to increaseorganizationalperformance.Delegationis believedto accomplishthis goal in a variety of ways.Thesecanbe illustrated by referenceto a hypotheticalgovernment
I 168 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
minister who is accountableto the public through the legislaturefor the managementof his or her ministry. It is useful to imaginethat, in thefirst instance,theministeris respQnsiblefor all work aswell asresults.The problemfacing theminister is how to delegatethework to ministry employeeswithout violating his or her obligation to be accountableto thepublic through the parliamentor thelegislature.
By delegatingwork to the deputy and ministry staff, the ministercanincreaseperformanceof programsby transferringresponsibilities for work to individuals whohavea wider anddeepersetof skillsfor doing thework thantheminister. Furthermore,customerneedscanbebettermet if the minister’s transferof work to the deputyis,in turn, transferredto employeeson the front line who, throughexperience,know betterhow to servethecustomerthan doesthe minister. In addition, thetransferofwork from thehighly remunerateddeputy to less remuneratedstaff reducesthe overall costs of services. As well, the deputy’sdelegationof work may widen the scopeof jobs at lower levels, therebyincreasingjob satisfactionand employeemorale, which builds employeecommitment to perform forthe organization.
Delegationwill alsohavethebenefitof freeingup theminister anddeputy minister’s time to concentrateon "core functions" such asinterpreting what is in the public interest, broadpolicy formulation, strategicand long-rangeplanning, and planning for buildingthefuture capability of the government’shuman,financial, technical, and other resources.Theseare corefunctions in thesensethatthey reflect the "comparativeadvantage"of deputyminister skillsvis-à-vis the skills of managersand workers. A relatedhypothesisis that thesefunctionsarehighervalue-addedthanthenoncorefunctions ofperformingthe work.
Noneoftheforegoingdiscussionaboutthepurposesof delegationisnew. In fact, mostof it wasderivedfrom Ontario governmentpamphletsproducedin theearly 1980s,which weredescribedasa "framework of managementprinciplesandprovenmanagementprocesses"Ontario ManagementBoardofCabinet,1981 a, b, c, d; 1982 a, b, c.
A Defmition ofDelegation
Delegationis thetransferfrom aprincipal to an agentof dutiesandsufficient meansto enablethe agentto dischargethe dutiesto meettheprincipal’s expectations.
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 169 I
Principal meansdelegatorandagentmeansdelegatee.Examplesofprincipal-agentpairsarea governmentministry programmanagerandhis or her subordinate,or a governmentministry and aninstitution receivingagovernmentgrantor transferpaymente.g.,schoolboard,college,university,hospital,communityhealthorganization.
Agentsare"subordinate"only in thesensethat they dependon theprincipal for their remunerationfor work done.Subordinationdoesnotmeaninferiority, but ratheracceptingtheprincipal’s control byvirtue of acceptingthe remuneration.Remunerationmay includethewagesandsalariesof employees,governmentgrants,or transfers paid to institutionsorpersons.
Dutiesinclude theduty to perform delegatedwork responsibilitiesandtheduty to complywith rulesandregulationslaid downby theprincipalor theprincipal’sorganization.Examplesof rulesandregulationsincludesuchdisparateitemsascompliancewith employmentstandards,hiring practices,allocationswithin budgets,confidentiality, andgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples.
Elementsof Delegation
The work transferredto the agentcomprisesprocessesand tasks.All servicesor programscan be describedin termsof their component processes.A processis a sequenceof tasksthat collectivelytransforminputs/resourcesinto serviceoutputs.Thetransformationor changein the inputs to outputsaddsvalue for the intendedrecipient of the output, who is the customerof theprincipal. Processesmaybesimpleor complex;complexprocessesinvolve sequencesoflinked simpleprocesses.
Tasksare piecesof work to be performedby a clearly designatedindividual, sometimesreferredto asa "taskowner." The taskowner’s work can be describedfrom theperspectiveof transforminginputs into outputsor from the perspectiveof the characteristicsoftheoutput.
Bothprocessesandtaskstransforminputs into outputs.Thereasonfor distinguishingbetweenthe two is to facilitate thinking abouthow serviceoutputscanbe linked backto individual employees.Thislinkage is important becauseaccountabilityinvolves individualsratherthanprocesses.
I 170 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
Resourcesincludesuchthingsasbudgets,personnel,buildingspace,equipment,and suppliesand supplier inputs. Theseresourcesareeither inputs into tasks and processesor are usedto purchaseinputs into tasksandprocesses.
Authoritiesarewhat managersneedto organizepeopleand processesin orderto produceserviceoutputsandoutcomesto meettheprincipal’sexpectations.Authorities includethemandatesto executeprocessesto produceand deliver services.They may also includecertainmanagerialpractices.For example,minimal authoritiesfora managerincludeaveto of appointmentsof subordinates,authority to decidewhat typesof work will be assignedto subordinates,authority to decidepersonaleffectivenessandmerit recognitionofsubordinates,and authority to removesubordinatesfrom rolesJaques,1996.
TheoreticalImplications
Theprincipal’sexpectationsareparamount.Theworddelegatemeansto entrustauthorityto actasone’sagentor representative.Whatthisimplies is that theagentshouldstrive to actasthe principalwouldif theprincipalwereto performthework himselfor herself.
Limits of Delegation
Obviouslythatwhichis delegatedcannotexceedtheminister’smandatedsetofresponsibilities.Moreover,theextentof thedelegationmaybe limited by thecapabilitiesofthedeputyandothersto whomwork would otherwisebe delegated.
In practicethe delegationof work will be limited . by "managerialstyle." More specifically, it will be limited by themanager’sviewsabouttherisks of losing control through delegation.Managersingovernmentorganizationstraditionally haveinvesteda lot of timeensuringquality by controllingthetasksandactivitiesthatgo intoproducingtheservice.In this situation,their genericanxietiesaboutmore delegationmay stemfrom fears that work may not get doneon time, that thequality of work outputsmaybeunsatisfactory,orthatmistakeswill be madethat will costtime andmoneyto fix.
GenericProblemswith Delegation
Generallyit is muchmoredifficult to getwork donethroughagentsthan it is for theprincipal to do the workhimself or herself.This is
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 1711
manifestedin severalgenericsubproblems.First, principalstendtorun out of time in dealingwith all the agentsto whom they havedelegatedwork. Herethereis aneedto managemanagementtimeOncken,1975. Second,the transferof work to agentswith widerand deeperskill setscreatesa situation whereprincipals maynotunderstandtheskills oftheagentsandthereforecannoteasilyjudgetheagents’effectiveness.It is then difficult for principals to controlagents’activitiesin order to getthemto meettheprincipal’s expectations. Here thereis a challengeto find a way to deal with theprincipal’s inability to judgethe skills of his or her agents.Third,thereis a potentialcommunicationsproblem.Althoughtheprincipal knows what is needed,agentsmaynot fully understandwhattheprincipal expects.Most humansfind it far moredifficult to articulatewhat they areactually doing andwhat they want than to‘lust do it" or getit for themselvesPullen & Bunker, 1995.A central challengefor principalsis to communicatetheir expectationstotheagentclearly.In reality, communicationis assistedby aprocessof principal-agentdialoguein which feedbackhelps the agent tounderstandtheprincipal’s intentandalsoprovidesinformationthatmay help theprincipal to formulatehis or her expectationsmoreclearly. Thefourth problemis that the agentis unlikely to be committed to theprincipal’s expectationsas muchas theprincipal is.Here thechallengeis to find waysto build theagent’scommitment.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Context
The problemof thepossiblelackof agentcommitmentprovidesthecontextfor accountability.
PurposeofAccountability
The purposeof accountabilityis to build theagent’scommitmenttoservethegoalsoftheprincipal.An importantbyproductofthatcommitment is theprincipal’strust andconfidencein theagent.
Definition ofAccountability
Accountability is a condition in which theagentis likely obligedtoreport measurablegapsbetweenthe principal’s expectationsandthe resultsof the dischargeof the agent’sdelegatedduties, to ex-
1. Results are measuredand comparedwith the principal’sexpectedresults, and gapsbetweenthe two are,reported.Either the principal or the agentcanmeasurethe results- at thediscretionof theprincipal. In otherwords,theprincipal decideswhetherornot to delegatethe functionof measurement.
2. The agentexplainshow he or shemanagedthe delegateddutiesto achieveactualresults.
3. The agentexplainsany gapsby attributing themto external factorsthat impinged upon his or her managementofthework processes.
4. The agentis liable to makegoodor recompensetheprincipal in the eventthat theprincipal is not satisfiedwith theagent’sexplanationof the gaps.
Accountability ReportingRequirements
Theprogramevaluator’sstandardmeasurableelementsinputs/resources,individual tasks,processes,programoutputs,programeffects, intermediateoutcomes,and ultimate outcomesrepresentasubstantial part of the framework for accountability reportingMayne, 1997; Treasury Board of Canada:Comptroller General,1981.Theseelementsarepresentedanddefinedin Figure 1. Theycanbepositionedasa hierarchyof elementsbeginningwith inputs/resourcesand endingwith ultimate outcomes.Alternatively, theymaybeviewed assequentialphasesin theproductionchainbeginning with inputs/resourcesandendingwith ultimate outcomes.Thislatter perspectiveis discussedlater in thesectionon empowerment.
From Figure 1 "traiisformational"-typeperformancemeasurescanbereadily calculated.Theseincludeefficiency= outputsover costsandcosteffectiveness= outcomesmeasuresovercosts.In thecaseofprocessesandtasks,efficiencymeasuresof elapsedtime from thebeginning to the end of the processmay also be called for. Whenoutcomesaretranslatedinto monetaryvalues,cost-benefitperformancemeasurescanbe calculated.
Accountability reportingalso requires"goal achievement"performancemeasures.Goal achievementmeasuresarebasedon standard
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 173 I
Figure 1Hierarchy of Elements in the Production Value Chain Used in Program Evaluation
ultimate outcome the consequent benefit or utility of the intermediate outcomes as perceived by an individual customer or by society
intermediate outcomes consequences of the program effects that affect the ultimate outcomes
program effects immediate or first consequences of program outputs
outputs a unit of work recognizable by a customer as a service or productprocesses two or more tasks that are coordinated to produce an outputtasks a piece of work for which there is a clearly designated owner i.e., a
‘ask owner"inputs/resources human resources time, financial resources, plant space, equipment,
supplier inputs
andtargetlevelsof outcomes,outputs,or resources.Standardmeasuresrefer to the minimum level that is deemedto constitutesuccessin terms of meetingthe principal’s expectations.Targetsmaybe setbelowor abovethe standard,dependingon the ambitionandcapabilitiesoftheprincipal and agentand also on whetherthe targets are short, intermediate,or long term. Goal achievementperformancemeasuresindicatethedegreeof frequencywith which thepredeterminedstandardsand targetsaremet for all customersoreventsin a repeatableprocess.For a single event,they representthedegreeto which the standardor targetis met.
Thecomponentsfor bothtransformationalandgoalachievementperformancemeasuresaredepictedin the matrix in Figure 2. Reporting requirementscanpertain to any or all elementsin the matrix,dependingon theprincipal’s expectationsandinterests.
Principalsmayexpectagentsto reportnot only, on resultsandperformancemeasures,but also on indicatorsof compliancewith rulesandprocedures.Thesemight be in responseto theprincipal’s questions, suchas‘Were resourcesspentonly on authorizedprojects?"
In summary,thepossibletypesof accountabilityrequirementsincluderesults,activities,resources,authorities,rulesandprocedures,and performance.These should parallel the elements of thedelegationarrangement.Figure 3 depictstheserelationships,thusproviding an overview of the potential reportableitems in the delegation-accountabilityrelationship.
I 174 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
Figure 2Components of Performance Measures
. < Goal Achievement Element >
Resource transformation element Actual Standard TargetOutcomes measures
NonmonetaryMonetary .
Outputs .Costs of resources
TheoreticalImplications
Inherentin the definition,of accountability is the assumptionthatthe principal’s expectationsmustbe measurable."Account for" impliesmeasurementaswell asexplanation.Withoutmeasuresthereis, by definition, no accountability.
In theabsenceof measuresoftheprincipal’s expectations,theprincipal may useimplicit defacto measuresto assessan agent.Thesemayrelateto answersto questionssuchas"How do you getaheadaroundhere?"and"How do yOu stayout of trouble?"Joiner,1997.The measuresmaybe madeup orbasedon theprincipal’s "anecdotal," "representative,"‘or "comprehensive"information abouttheagent’sresultsandperformance.Theymaybesubjectiveor objective.But theagentwill neverknowthem. In thesecircumstancesit maybe advantageousfor theagentto getcontrol overhis orher destinyby negotiatingformal reportingrequirementswith theprincipal.
Unsophisticatedprincipalsmay assumethattheagent’sactionsanddecisionsarethesolecauseof all results.Satisfactoryexplanationsdependon the agent’sability to attribute gapsto external factorsratherthan factorsundertheagent’scontrol. The measurementofthis attribution is a core function of programevaluators.Withoutsuchprogramevaluationtherearelargerisksto theagent.
If theprincipal’s expectationsarenotmetheor shehasa right andanobligationto requesttheagentto explainthegaps.In theearlierexampleofthehypotheticalminister,that ministeris positionedastheprincipal who retainsaccountabil’ityfor theresultsof theworkdelegatedto the agentthrough the deputy. The customersof theservicelook to theministerwhentherearecomplaintsor problems
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 1751
Targets or standardsTargets or standardsTargets or standardsTargets or standards
Report measurable results:outcomes, outputs, or both
ACTIVITIESProcessesTasks
RESOURCESBudgetsOther resources
Authority of agent tocoordinate/implementprocesses
Provision of resourcesto agent to manage
Explain how processes andtasks achieved* performance* results
Describe stewardship ofresources
AUTHORITIES Authorities granted toagent
Explain which authorities wereused
PROCEDURES &RULES
Delineate rules &procedures with whichagent must comply
Report on rule/procedurecompliance variances
PERFORMANCEGoal achievement
StandardsTargets
TransformationEfficiency
Output/costResponse time
Cost effectivenessCost benefit
Expected performance
Target or standardTarget or standardTarget or standardTarget or standard
Report and explain gaps between* actuals vs. standards* actuals vs. targetsReport on efficiency, costeffectiveness, cost benefitExplain variances with benchmarkperformance levels
with serviceoutputs.Customersmaycomplainto theagent,but onlytheministeris mandatedto be accountableto thecustomer.In reality, theministermayhavedelegatedto theagentthetaskofproviding explanationsto thecustomer.However,by definition theministerremainsaccountableto thecustomerfor theexplanationsmadebythe agent.This implies that theminister cafinot escapebeingac
Figure 3Elements of Delegation and Accountability
Elements of the Delegation AccountabilityProduction Value Chain Elements Elements
I 176 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
countableto the public by blaming eventson the agent. It furtherimplies that blamingthe agentis, in effect, an admissionthat theminister is unableto managethe agent’sresultsoutputs or outcomessuccessfully.This implicationhighlights theminister’s corerole asamanager.
Anotherimplicationis thataccountabilitycannotbedivided betweenpolicy andmanagementbecausetheministeris accountablefor theoutputsor outcomesof theagent.Theoutcomesarea resultof thecombinedeffectsofpolicy, programdesign,administration,andcustomerservice.Althoughtheministercan delegateany of thesecomponentinstruments,he or sheremainsaccountablefor all of them.
Conditionsfor EffectiveAccountability
Five prerequisiteconditionsfor effectiveaccountabilitycanbelisted.
1. A clear identification of theprincipal and the agent.The identityoftheagentshouldbe establishedat thebeginningoftheyear or ofthe project. The agentmay be an individual manager,a teamorworkgroupleader,or aninstitution. In all of thesecasestheidentities of theagentandtheprincipal needto be madeexplicit to bothparties.The simpletestis to be ableto answerwith namesthequestions"Who dowelook to if thereis a complaintor if thingsgo wrong?"or "Who do we recognizeif expectationsareexceeded?"
2. Principal-agent mutually negotiatedagreements.Mutual agreementsneedto benegotiatedcarefullybetweentheprincipalandtheagent.The rationalefor the negotiationprocessleadingup to themutual agreementis that it createsmore understandingbetweenthe parties,producesmorerealistic expectationsi.e., credibility,andbuildsin moreagentcommitment.This processandits rationale areat theheartof theperformanceappraisalsystem.For alignmentwith theorganization’smission,performanceappraisalsystemsshouldbeintegratedwith theorganization’sbusinessplans.
Thesemutual agreementsneedto specify severalimportant matters. First, theprincipal needsto describehis or her expectationsspecifically.Then, theprincipal andagentneedto agreeon thenature of the outcomemeasuresthat will indicate progresstowardmeetingthoseexpectations.Without advancedprogramevaluationexpertisein this step, thereis a risk that the outcomesmeasureswill not betrue indicatorsof progress.
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 177
It is also important to establish agreed-upontarget levels of outcomesmeasuresup front. Theseshouldbe challenging,becausethetendencyto innovate in order to improve performanceis muchgreaterwith challenginggoals.At thesametime, thetargetsshouldnot beoverwhelming.It may alsobe importantto settargetssomewhereabovetheachievementsof competingsuppliersor comparable jurisdictions,wherethesecan be identified.
The agentandprincipal shouldalso agreeup front that resourcesandauthoritiesgrantedto theagentaresufficient to enabletheagentto achievetheprincipal’s expectedresults.Without this thereis norealism,and henceno genuineagentcommitmentto the accountability process.Instead,apracticeofincompleteandmisleadingreportingtendsto setin, leadingto reducedtrust.
Theprincipalandagentshouldalsoidentify up front thecriteriaforsatisfactoryexplanations.Thesecriteria will determinehow gapsareto be attributedto externalfactors i.e., beyondthe agent’scontrol and to the agent’sactionsand decisions.Programevaluatorscan play a critical role in assistingwith themeasurementof suchattribution.
Finally, thenatureand magnitudeof liability in the event of unsatisfactoryexplanationsof performanceneedsto be specifiedupfront.
3. Requiredregular reporting on results. The defmition of accountability incorporatesonly a likelihood that theagentwill be calledtoreport, explain, andmake amends.The call for reportsand’ explanationsis madeat thediscretionof theprincipal. However,if theprincipal doesnot utilize this discretionvery frequently,the risksofnoncompliancewill be too low to influencetheagent’sbehaviororefforts.In this eventaccountabilitywill be lost. Therefore,it is necessaryto establisha reportingprocesswherebythereis, from timeto time, a formal report on gapsbetweentargetsandactualresultsandan explanationofhow the agent’sdecisionsand actionsrelateto thegaps.
In aperfectworld, whereprincipalsalwayshire agentswhoseinterestsareidenticalto thoseoftheprincipal andwhoseinterestsalwayschangewith theprincipal’s expectations,it might not be necessaryto haveregularreporting;theagent’sself-motivationwould be sufficient. However,even in sucha perfectworld, whereinterestsare
I 178 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
congruent,the principal-agentdialogueaboutgapsis an importantmeansofcontinuousimprovement.Underthesecircumstancesboththe managementpracticeof motivation through positive reinforcementandthatof accountabilityarenecessaryfor high performance.Oneinstrumentaloneis unlikely to be aseffective asboth.
4. Establishedsanctionsfor unsatisfactoryexplanations.There islittle point in reportingand explaininggapsif no sanctionsfor unsatisfactoryexplanationsresult. The absenceof sanctionssendsanimplicit messagethat the principal doesnot really careabout theagent’scommitment.Consequently,thereis little risk to the agentin lowering the commitment.
In practice,therearethreetypesof sanctionsfor unsatisfactoryexplanations. One is to find blame and imposepenaltiesfor failure.The other is to insist that the agentwork constructivelywith theprincipal to improve thesituation and closethe gap.A third optioncombinesthefirst two.
Ideasfor improvementwill flow from theprocessofhavingtheagentexplain actionsand decisionsand externalfactors that causedthegaps.Among other things, the diagnosisand analysismay revealthat emphasizingsomefactors under the control of the agentwillhavesignificantinfluenceon someoftheexternalfactorscontributing to thegap.
5. Independentperiodic reviews.An independentreviewe.g.,auditshouldbe establishedto ensurethat theaccountabilityframeworkis working to the satisfactionof the principal and agent.Specifically, this audit shouldensurethat the following aresatisfactory:
* the natureof theresultsmeasures* the explanationsofthegaps* the adequacyof delegatedauthoritiesandresourcesin ena
bling the agentto achieveexpectations* the natureand magnitudeof the sanctionsfor unsatisfac
If any of the above are unsatisfactory,corrective action should betaken.Suchactionmayincludearenegotiationofa newframework,retraining or educationof either party, or a careerchangefor theagent.
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 179I
All five conditionsfor effective accountabilitymustbe operational.Missing any one of them could seriously underminethe process.Theseconditionscan be madeoperationalby 1 conductingperiodic programevaluationswhoseresults are included in appraisalsof the programmanager’sperformance,and 2 continuouslyandrigorously applying the performanceappraisalprocess.Thesearenot new prescriptions.Consultantsmadetheserecommendationsto theOntariogovernmentmorethan10 yearsagoPriceWaterhouse& CanadaConsultingGroup, 1985, p. 83.
EMPOWERMENT
Context
It was suggestedearlierthat amanager’sperceivedneedto controlsubordinateswas a factor that limits the degreeof delegationandhenceorganizationalperformance.
Purposeof Empowerment
Thepurposesof employeeempowermentareto expandthescopeofdelegationand augmentthe flow to seniormanagementof ideasforredesigningand streamlining work systems.Both thesepurposesareexpectedto leadto higherperformance.
Definition ofEmpowerment
Empowermentmeans:1 giving workers more control over theirwork in exchangefor their taking responsibility for meetingthemanager’sexpectations,and2 workerparticipationin contributingandimplementingideasfor improvingwork systems.This definitionis a synthesisof definitions by Peters1988, pp. 285, 287, Gore1993, andthe Ontario Ministry ofMunicipal Affairs 1993, p.9.
Elementsof Empowerment
Additional control of workers over their tasks,processes,andoutputsmustbe accompaniedby workercommitmentto achievingthemanager’sexpectations.Thehallmarkofempoweredworkersis theirsenseof responsibilityfor meetingthemanager’sexpectations.
I 180 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
The secondaspectof empowermentof worker involvementin worksystemdesignmaybephasedin. In stage1, workersaregiven theopportunity to contribute ideasabouthow to do thejob betterPeters, 1988, p. 287. In stage2, managersassignto workersresponsibility for suggestingideasfor work systemimprovement.In stage3,workersnot only make suggestionsfor improvedwork systemdesignbut alsoparticipatein theimplementationofthoseideaswhichmanagementaccepts.
TheoreticalImplications
Thereare two dimensionsto measuringdegreeof empowerment.First, empowermentis greaterthe higher the level in the production value chainusedto defineexpectationsof workers.For example, a worker who is expectedto produceoutcomesor outputs isworking at a higher level of empowermentthan a worker who isexpectedto performtasks or simple processes.Figure 4 showsthelevels of decisionmaking for different types of decisions.Second,the level of empowermentis greaterthehigher the"degreeof freedom" theworkerhasto makedecisionsaboutsequencing,coordination, andchoosingfrom alternatives.In thiscontext,five degreesoffreedomaredefinedOncken,1975:
1. Wait until told what to do2. Ask what to do3. Recommend,thentakeresultingaction4. Act, then adviseat once5. Act on own andreportroutinely to manageronly
Worker involvement in implementingwork system designconstitutes a sharing of one of the traditional five generic objectivesofmanagement,"organizework systemsfor productivity andmotivation." The other four objectivesare"meet operationalperformancetargets,""align all activities with the missionor vision," "build futurecapacity,"and"innovate newandsloughoff obsoleteactivities"Drucker, 1974.
The expectedbenefitsofmanagement-workerinvolvementin worksystemdesignarebasedon the following hypotheses:
* More mindsplus workerexpertisecan leadto betterdesignandoperationof work systems
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 1811
Figure 4Type and Level of Decision Making’
Sequencing* decisions to move from one task to another* decisions to move from one process to anotherCoordinating* coordinating resources to complete a task* coordinating tasks to complete a process* coordinating processes to produce program outputs* coordinating outputs of different programs to increase outcomesChoosing from Alternatives* choosing from alternative ways to complete a task* choosing from alternative processes to produce program outputs
choosing from alternative programs to increase outcomes
* Two different approacheslead to innovationsthat neithergroupwould havethoughtof alonesynergy.
To theextentthat managersretaintheprerogativeto rejectworker’s ideas,they havethe responsibilityto communicatetheir reasonsfor suchrejectionandreport thosereasonsto their superiorsandtheworkerswho madetheproposals.
Ways‘to ReducePerceivedRisksof Empowerment
As was notedearlier, genericanxietiesof managersaboutempowermentarebasedon theperceivedrisksthatwork will notgetdoneon time, that quality of work outputsmaybeunsatisfactory,or thatmistakeswill be madethatwill costtime andmoneyto fix.
Managers’fears are likely basedon their observationsof the current behaviorof their subordinates.In this context, it may not beunderstoodthattheobservedbehavioris partly aresultof managers’ interventions.Theseinterventionssendimplicit messagestosubordinatesthatproductquality is themanager’sjob, not thesubordinate’sjob. As a consequence,subordinatesdevelopan attitudeof "why bother,themanagerwill catchit."
An underlyinghypothesisof empowermentis that manystaff willrise to thechallengeof producingresultsif giventhe chance.Man-
I 182 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
agersshouldappreciatethat staff attitudesor valueswill changeonlywhenthereis aclear,explicit, mutual,up-frontagreementthatstaff, not the manager,are expectedto meetmanagerialexpectations for servicequality. As discussedearlier,suchagreementsareat the heartof effective accountability.Effective accountabilitymechanismsare thereforeone methodof reducingthe manager’sperceivedrisk frOm empowerment.
Anotherkey strategyfor reducingtheperceivedrisks of empowermentis adequatepropereducationandtraining for empowerment.Managerscanbenefitfrom formal trainingin humanresourcemanagementconceptssuchashowto really delegate,how to coachstaffto be empowered,how to readstaffto know whentheyarereadytoembraceempowerment,how to follow up and checkthat staff aregenuinelycommittedto assumingtheir responsibilities,andhow tohire empoweredor"mutually empowered"people.Figure5 describesthedifferencesbetweenempowermentand mutual empowerment.This training is importantbecausenot all staffwill want to be empoweredandthosewho do wantempowermentwill "grow into it" atdifferentrates.
Staffcan also be trained aboutthe meaning,nature,and implications of empowerment.This will helpthemto know themselvesandwhenthey arereally readyto work in an empoweredmode. A simple exampleofsuchtraining would showstaffhow to planin orderto give managersearlywarningsaboutthepossibility of a misseddeadline.
Managerscanalsoreduceperceivedrisk throughmeasurementtechniquesto "objectify" risk. Theseinvolve measuringtheprobabilityof error, thecostsof damagecreatedfrom theerror, andtheresulting expectedvalue of thecostof the damage.This enablesmanagersto take"calculatedrisks" ratherthanoperateon "gut feel." Heretheunderlyinghypothesisis that decisionsbasedon gutfeel tendtoexaggeratelow-probability risks and risks where the cost is notmaterial.Anothermeasurementapproachis to simulatetestingofserviceprovision underpilot projectsfeaturingempoweredconditions for feedbackandcorrectiveactionto makeimprovements.Heremanagerscan look for ways to test thedecision-makingability ofstaffandevencreateartificial circumstancesthat aresimilar to realbusinessproblemsof theorganizationalunit. Programevaluatorscan assistmanagerswith thesemeasurementtechniques.
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 183 I
Figure 5On Empowerment, Disempowerment and Mutual Empowerment
Disempowe red People. "Disempowered people are the products of control-obedience culturesthat teach people to be helpless and not to trust themselves. For these people, the world is nota friendly place and their task is to protect themselves or find a safe haven. Safety is part of thedeal in an obedience-control culture but it brings with it the feelings of powerlessness, being avictim, being dominated, being oppressed and seeing no way out ... Typically, disempoweredpeople expect others to ‘tell them what to do and they expect others to approve of what theyhave done’."Empowered People. "Empowered people are the product of cultures built on initiative and freedom to act. They see themselves as the centre of a world in which everything is a problem to besolved or an opportunity to be captured. They are convinced that they can go it alone. Theyhave rigid boundaries around themselves and lack meaningful connections with others. Theirstrong needs are to be autonomous, to fully express themselves, to be creative and to make asignificant difference. Their expectations are to be left alone, to be rewarded for what theyachieve, to advance continuously, and to work hard and win."Mutually Empowered People. "Mutually empowering people are highly interdependent and seekto establish or enhance partnerships and mutually satisfying connections. They value and demonstrate equality, compassion and intimacy ... People who are mutually empowered expect tocreate success with others for mutual benefit and they expect success to be shared. Theyexpect that the people be good resources to each other and that they use each other as helpfulresources."Summary. Being disempowered is a passive way of living life, being empowered is an active
wayof living life and being mutually empowered is an interactive way of living our life.
Source. Arbuckle, 1992, pp. 63, 64.
Finally, managerscanlimit their risksby specifyingthenature,tolerablefrequency,andmagnitudeof acceptablerisks in empoweredsituationswith staff.
CONCLUSION
Delegationis thetransferfrom aprincipal to an agentof dutiesandsufficientmeansto enabletheagentto dischargethedutiesto meettheprincipal’sexpectations.It hasthepotentialto improveperformancebut presentsachallengeof gettingtheagent’scommitmenttomeettheprincipal’s expectations.That challengecan be met witheffectiveaccountability.
Accountabilityis a condition in which theagentis likely obliged toreport measurablegapsbetweentheprincipal’s expectationsandthe results of the dischargeof the agent’sdelegatedduties, to ex
The program evaluator’sstandardmeasurableelementse.g., resources,tasks,processes,outputs,andoutcomessatisfya substantial partof theneedsof accountabilityreporting.When augmentedby standardandtargetlevels of outcomes,outputs,andresources,theseelementsprovidevirtually all of thecomponentsof performancemeasuresneededfor accountabilityreports.
This articledescribedfive prerequisitesfor effectiveaccountability:
1. a clearly identified principal andagent;2. principal-agentnegotiatedagreementson measuresof ex
pectations,adequacyof resourcesandauthorities,targets,criteria for satisfactoryexplanations,andliabilities in theeventof unsatisfactoryexplanations;
Programevaluatorscan assistthemutual-negotiationsprocessintheseconditem by developingthemeasuresof outcomesandofcostsrequiredto meetthe principal’s expectationsand by describingthelogic i.e., hypothesesthat link work to programeffects andlinkprogrameffectsto intermediateandultimateoutcomesandtargetsthat constitutetheprincipal’s expectations.Furthermore,programevaluatorscanplay a critical rolein determiningtheextentto whichgapsareattributedto theactionsoftheagentversusfactorsbeyondtheagent’scontrol. Thesearethebasisfor assessingwhetherperformancegapscanbe satisfactOrilyexplained.
Empowermentexpandsthe scopeof delegation,therebyincreasingthe potentialfor higherperformance.The first aspectof empowermentmeansgiving workersmorecontrolover theirwork in exchangefor their taking responsibilityfor meetingthe manager’sexpectations.A secondaspectof empowermentmeansthatworkersareinvolved in contributing ideas for improving work systems andimplementingthoseideas.Empowermentcanbemeasuredin termsof degreesof freedomthat agentshavein making decisionsaboutsequencing,coordinating,and choosingalternatives.These are:
LA REVUE CANADIENNE D’EVALUATION DE PROGRAMME 185 I
1 wait until told what to do, 2 askwhat to do, 3 recommend,thentake resultingaction, 4 act, then adviseat once, and5 acton own andreportroutinely to manageronly.
Managerstypically areunwilling to empowertheir staffs becausetheybelievetherearerisksthatwork will not getdoneon time, thequality of work outputswill be unsatisfactory,or mistakeswill bemadethat will costtime andmoney to fix. These‘perceivedriskscan be reducedin a numberof ways, including effective accountability mechanismsandpropereducationand training of workersandmanagersin empowermentand relatedhumanresourcemanagementskills. Oneimportant way in which managerscanreduceperceivedrisk is to usecertainmeasurementtechniquesto objectifyrisk. Theseinclude:
* measurementsof the probability, costs,and expectedvaluesof errorsthat enablemanagersto takecalculatedrisksin. someinstancesratherthan rely solely on gut feel; and
* simulatedtestingof serviceprovision in pilot projectsfeaturing empoweredconditions for feedbackand correctiveactionfor largerexperiments.
Programevaluatorscanplay an importantrole in assistingmanagerswith theserisk-managementmeasurementtechniques.
REFERENCES
Arbuckle,J. 1992.A customer-focusedlearningorganization.A reportonthetransformationoftheOntarioMunicipal SubsidiesManagementBranchto a customer-focusedlearningorganization.Toronto:Phoenix PartnershipsInc.
Best,M. 1990. The newcompetition:Institutions ofindustrial restructuring. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press.
Gore, A. 1993. Creating a governmentthat works better and costs less.ReportoftheNationalPerformanceReview.Washington,D.C.
Jaques,E. 1996, October17. Requisiteorganization:The total management system. Toronto: Institute for Public Administration forCanada,et al. Paperpresentedat the Conferenceon Effective OrganizationDesignandManagerialLeadership,RadissonPlazaHotel, Toronto.
Joiner, B. 1997,April 9. Performanceand data: Understandingthe issues,building thelinks. Toronto: ConferenceBoardof Canada.Paper presentedat the Conferenceon Rethinking Data: FromAccountabilityto High Performancein theNew PublicSector,MetropolitanHotel, Toronto.
Ontario ManagementBoard of Cabinet.1981c. Ontario’s managementphilosophy.Overview Series1. Toronto: Queen’sPrinter.
OntarioManagementBoardof Cabinet.1981d.Ontario’s principles andstandardsofmanagement:Introduction to the series.Overview Series 1-1. Toronto: Queen’sPrinter.
Peters,T. 1988. Thriving on chaos:Handbookfor a managementrevolution. New York: Alfred Knopf.
PriceWaterhouse& CanadaConsultingGroup.1985,January.Management and accountability in the Governmentof Ontario Report tothe Chairmanof the Ontario ManagementBoardof Cabinet.Toronto: Queen’sPrinter.
I 188 THE CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PROGRAM EVALUATION
Pullen, W., & Bunker, K. 1995, July 24, 25. Leading transitions in theOntario public service.Presentation at an executive development
program workshop. Toronto: Ontario Centre for Leadership.
Savoie,D.J. 1995. What is wrongwith thenew public management?CanadianPublicAdministration, 381, 112-121.
