A Theory-neutral approach to well-being

Dr Tim TaylorInterdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre, University of Leeds

Political Studies Association Conference, 31 March 2015

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The Context

• Governments and international organisations are increasingly recognising the limitations of purely economic measures and are looking to measure well-being for the purposes of informing public policy and/or assessing its success.• Thus in the UK, for example, we have the Office for National Statistics

programme for Measuring National Well-being.• Other countries such as Germany are taking similar steps, as are

organisations like the EU.

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The Problem

• The decision to measure well-being for the purposes of public policy requires consideration of what it is, exactly, that is to be measured.• There are many different theories about what well-being consists in:

‘Subjective’ theories ‘Objective’ theoriesHedonism/mental state theories Objective-list theoriesDesire/preference-satisfaction theories Aristotelian theoriesLife-satisfaction theories Capability approach

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The Problem

• There is no prospect that the debate between these rival theories will be resolved any time soon. • They make competing claims about what well-being is, which suggest

different foci for measurement programmes. • But an approach based on any one of the competing theories will be

open to challenge from adherents of the others.

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The Problem – Solvable?

• It is desirable that an approach to the measurement of well-being for public policy purposes should be able to secure broad acceptance among both the academic community and the wider public. • This paper argues that, contrary to appearances, there is a

broad area of common ground between the theories which can provide a principled rationale for a theory-neutral approach which can meet that desideratum.

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Finding Common Ground

• The main focus of disagreement between rival theories of well-being is over the question of what well-being consists in. • However, it is not only constituents of well-being that are

relevant in the context of its measurement for policy purposes. • Something may also be relevant if it is productive or indicative of

well-being. • I call something that is either constitutive, productive or

indicative of well-being a marker of well-being.

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Finding Common Ground

• Theories which disagree on what constitutes well-being may nevertheless find a large measure of agreement on the markers of well-being.• This is because what is constitutive of well-being according to one

theory can often be regarded as productive or indicative of well-being according to another. • In such a case, although the two theories will disagree about whether

the thing concerned is a constituent of well-being, they can still agree that it is a marker of well-being.

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Finding Common Ground An example: health• Health is a constituent of well-being according to many ‘objective’ theories.• Subjective theories like hedonism and desire-satisfactionism do not regard

health as constitutive of well-being. However, proponents of these theories have good reasons case to regard health as productive of well-being: • It is a subject of some of our desires/preferences and an enabler of the achievement

of others; • good health is sometimes a source of happiness and life-satisfaction – and ill-health

often a source of unhappiness and dissatisfaction

• So proponents of all these theories might be willing to acknowledge health as a marker of well-being, even though they do not all regard it as a constituent.

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A Theory-neutral approach

• The alternative to a theory-specific approach to the measurement well-being is a broadly-based, theory-neutral approach, using a range of different objective and subjective measures.• The actual measurement strategies used by Governments and

International Organisations fall into both categories: e.g. the ONS approach in the UK is broadly based, whereas the UN Human Development Index is based on a particular approach (the Capability approach).• The notion of markers of well-being, and the prospect of common

ground between different theories, can provide a principled rationale for a theory-neutral approach.

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A Theory-neutral approach

• A theory-neutral approach to the measurement of well-being requires a set of markers of well-being that are widely shared between the competing theories. • No marker is likely to be common to all possible, or even all actual

theories. • The aim should be to find markers which are shared by all or most of the

mainstream theories – those which are well-established and widely-held. • I suggest that these are: hedonism/mental state theories;

desire/preference-satisfaction theories; life-satisfaction theories; Aristotelian theories; objective-list theories and the Capability approach.

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The Markers of Well-being

• I offer the following definition of what would count as a marker of well-being for the purposes of a theory-neutral approach:

• X is a marker of well-being if, according to all or most mainstream theories of well-being, either:

i) X is constitutive of well-being; orii) X is something that can be regarded as reliably productive

of well-being; or iii) X is something that can be regarded as a reliable indicator of well-being.

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The Markers of Well-being

Some clarifications:• Something might be a marker (constitutive, productive or indicative)

of overall well-being, or only of some particular aspect or constituent of well-being. • Both can be considered markers of well-being, but I call the second

group pro tanto markers. • The distinction is important because a pro tanto marker is relevant to

overall well-being, but can’t be taken as a proxy for it.• Most markers of well-being, in practice, are pro tanto markers.

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The Markers of Well-being

Some clarifications:• ‘Reliable’/’reliably’ No marker can be expected to be 100% reliable, at

least as a marker of overall well-being. Sufficient that a marker be generally reliable, in a range of contexts. • In general we can expect constituents to be more reliable as markers

than things which are merely productive/indicative of well-being, at least as pro tanto markers.

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The Markers of Well-being

• How should we go about identifying the markers of well-being?• The commitments of the mainstream theories themselves provide a

supply of candidates. • I suggest an iterative process, beginning with the most secure

markers, according to the following criteria: a) How strong a case the candidate has to be considered either

constitutive, productive or indicative of well-being under each of the mainstream theories of well-being.

b) The extent to which the candidate fits with widely held folk assumptions about well-being.

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The Markers of Well-being

• Once we have established our most secure markers, we can seek to expand our list, using a further criterion:

c) Evidence from empirical studies of correlations between the candidate marker and already established markers of well-being.

• As the list expands, criterion c) increases and criterion b) diminishes in importance.• Not an exact science – there is room for debate about which

candidate markers best meet these criteria.

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The Markers of Well-being

• But here are my own views on what would make the list:• A) The most secure markers:

Happiness: a person’s overall affective response to their lifeWidely regarded as at least partly constitutive of well-being. Plausibly an indicator of well-being for those theories which deny this.Health (physical and mental)A constituent of well-being for many objective theories; plausibly productive of well-being for subjective ones.

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The Markers of Well-being

• B) Other secure markersLife-Satisfaction In effect, a person’s own judgement of how well their life is going. Not infallible, but surely deserves some credence as an indicator of well-being.Realising central life goals/values Partially constitutive of well-being for desire-satisfaction and some objective- list theories. Plausibly productive or indicative of well-being for others.Supportive personal relationships Widely endorsed as a constituent of well-being by objective-list theories. Plausibly productive of well-being for others. Correlates well with happiness and health.Personal Development Constitutive of well-being for Aristotelian and some objective-list theories. Plausibly productive and/or indicative of well-being for others.

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The Markers of Well-being

• C) Some further plausible candidates

LeisureAdequate Income/resourcesRewarding Employment

With the partial exception of leisure (endorsed by some objective-list theories) these are not widely regarded as constitutive of well-being. But they are all plausibly productive of well-being, and correlate well with happiness and health.

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The Markers of Well-being

• The list is not definitive. It includes only items which I regard as meeting the definition and criteria with a high degree of confidence. There are other items, such as autonomy and self-respect, for which a case could be made. I would welcome debate on this. • My list bears a superficial resemblance to an objective-list theory of

well-being. Important to note that it is not a theory of well-being at all. Rather, it is a list of markers that I argue could be widely acknowledged as relevant to the measurement of well-being, from a range of different theoretical perspectives.

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The Theory-neutral approach (again)

• The approach outlined above, and a list of markers of well-being along the these lines, would support and provide a rationale for a broadly-based approach to the measurement of well-being, with a range of subjective and objective measures. • This aligns with the strategy already adopted in some cases (it seems

consistent with the ONS approach in the UK, for example).

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The Theory-neutral approach

• It is important to note that the theory-neutral approach does have some disadvantages with respect to rival theory-specific approaches.• The theory-neutral approach does not offer a decision procedure for

cases where well-being measures based on different markers provide conflicting data. • Theory-specific approaches may have a theoretical basis on which to

claim that measure a) is more direct and therefore more reliable than measure b).

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The Theory-neutral approach

• However, every theory of well-being is contentious and subject to challenge.• Thus, claims made about the relative status of different types of

measures by theory-specific approaches are also contentious and subject to challenge. • I argue that, in the context of public policy, the slight ‘fuzziness’ of the

theory-neutral approach is a price worth paying for a better prospect of securing wide acceptance of a measurement regime – and the results it produces.

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Conclusions

• Though different theories disagree on what constitutes well-being, I argue that there is the prospect of a broad area of common ground on what I call the ‘markers’ of well-being: things which are either constitutive, productive or indicative of well-being. • By examining the commitments of the mainstream theories, together

with the results of empirical research, it should be possible to identify markers – such as happiness and health - which can command broad acceptance. • This provides a principled rationale for a theory-neutral approach to the

measurement of well-being, using a range of subjective and objective measures.