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The Book of Abraham
Rabbi Shimon ben ema Duranand the School of Rabbenu Nissim Gerondi
by Seth (Avi) Kadish
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Copyright 2011 by Seth (Avi) KadishSome rights reserved
Open Content License
CC BY-SA 3.0
Original version Ph.D. dissertationUniversity of Haifa
Faculty of the HumanitiesDepartment of Jewish History
January, 2006
Revised online publication 2011'"
Rationalist Judaism Bloghttp//www.rationalistjudaism.com/
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Chapter 3. Books of Principles
Books about the Principles of the Torah
In 1405, Rabbi Shimon ben ema Duran penned the very first full-fledged,
sustained analysis of the principles of the Torah as a concept. This was certainly not the
first list of principles of the Torah, but it was the very first essay devoted to asking
fundamental questions about such lists in a systematic way. For instance By what criteria
are certain ideas found in the Torah deemed to be its principles while others are not? If
one principle is implied by another, should they both be considered principles? How
many principles does the Torah have? What are the consequences for denying a
principle? Durans analysis of these and other related questions appears in the
introductory chapters to Ohev Mishpat (chapters 8-10),1 his commentary on the book of
Job. This was his first non-Talmudic work, which he completed when he was forty-five
years old (about fourteen years after he fled from Spain).
Following his conceptual analysis of the idea of principles in Ohev Mishpat,2Duran
designed Magen Avot as a book of principles of the Torah, i.e. a book whose very
structure is determined by the principles themselves. Its formal structure of three major
parts divided into thirteen chapters is a reflection of Maimonides thirteen principles as
divided into three parts,3while other structural features accommodate further ideas about
1 Kellner,Dogma, contains annotated translations and analysis of part of the introduction to Ohev Mishpat(p. 84), the full content ofOhev Mishpatchapters 8-10 (pp. 84-94), and the formal plan forMagen Avotfrom the end of its introduction (pp. 94-95). Translations from these sections are his (with occasionalmodifications). We will supplement these texts with comments by Duran in Ohev Mishpatchapter 1 thatare extremely relevant to the structure ofMagen Avotas a book of principles, as well as taking intoconsideration the major deviations ofMagen Avotfrom the basic structure of Maimonides thirteen
principles.2 That Magen Avotwas the later work is is abundantly clear from the internal references in Magen Avotto
Ohev Mishpat. In one of them, Duran mentioned his former views in Ohev Mishpatand explained why hechanged his mind (see chapter 5). Epstein and Hershman have it that he wrote Magen Avoton the heels ofOhev Mishpatduring his forty-fifth year (i.e. in 1406). A chronological order for his bibliographic list,however, might suggest that it was written a number of years later (Ohev Mishpatis #3 while Magen Avotis #8-9, with major halakhic works interveningZohar ha-Raki`a and the three volumes of the Tashbazresponsa). However, besides the first and last books on the list, it is not certain that the order of the rest ischronological. The fact that the three volumes of responsa are listed one after another (#5-7) certainlyinterrupts the chronology, though it is easy to understand why Duran might violate a general tendencytowards chronological order so as to group them together. In any case, Magen Avotappears late in the list,
just before collections of works that Duran continued to add as God added to his years towards the endof his life, which suggests that it was written many years afterOhev Mishpat. This is supported byDurans comment towards the end ofMagen Avot(96a47) that he was writing in the year 5185 (1425),though this passage could conceivably have been updated by Duran himself. Be the issue of dating as it
may, it is clear that Ohev Mishpatcame first, and that the structure ofMagen Avotis based upon itsmethodology, as we shall see in this chapter.
3 See the previous chapter, where Durans introduction in which he explains the books structure was citedand discussed. On the history of the division of Maimonides thirteen principles into three groups, usuallyinspired by the mishnah in Sanhedrin (101), see Kellner, ibid., pp. 24-33.
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the principles of the Torah that Duran had already expressed in Ohev Mishpat.4 During the
same period in Spain, two other members of the school of Gerondi wrote books on the
principles of the Torah, each according to his own original system of principles Or
Hashem by asdai Crescas (completed in 1410/11) and Sefer ha-Ikkarim (The Book of
Principles) by Rabbi Yosef Albo (completed in 1425). Unlike Durans Magen Avot, the
two latter works abandoned Maimonides list of thirteen principles entirely.The writing of books on the principles of the Torah, along with the systematic
analysis of what such principles are, was a genre unique to the school of Rabbenu Nissim
Gerondi. This chapter will begin by defining the time and place of that unique genre in
Jewish history, and conclude by showing that Durans preoccupation with the topic, as well
as his specific theory of principles, set him squarely into the school of Gerondi. But in
order to show Durans place in Gerondis school, we will first nned to explore the overall
interest of Gerondi himself in the principles of the Torah, and especially his rejection ofcreation as a principle.
In addition, we will also summarize an early work by a student of Crescas that has
never been studied in this context before, namely theFour Columns of Abraham bar Judah,
a disciple of asdai Crescas.5 It was written in Crescas home in 1378, and Shalom
Rosenberg has pointed out that many of its themes contribute to our understanding of how
Crescas thought developed.6 We will show that the Four Columns deals not only with
principles of the Torah, but also anticipates elements of the structure of Crescas Or
Hashem, and is explicitly based upon a distinction central to the entire school of Gerondi
between general providence and specific providence. It also shows a relatively early
passion for the principles of Judaism, and I will argue that it is anticipates the three major
books on the principles of the Torah from the early 14 th century (Magen Avot, Or Hashem,
and Sefer ha-Ikkarim) in both its structure and contents.
After this we will return to Duran, contrasting his idea of derivative principles,
i.e. doctrines that are logical prerequisites to other principles, to the rejection of creation as
a principle by Gerondi and others. The idea of derivative principles is crucial to
understanding Duran, because it impacted not only on his theoretical understanding of
Maimonides list of thirteen principles, but also on the very structure and method ofMagen
Avot. The organization of Magen Avot Part III cannot be understood without this
4 See the end of this chapter. The books true structure is somewhat better reflected in the summary of itgiven in Durans bibliographical list, which he wrote at the end of his life aftercomposing Magen Avot,than in the introduction he wrote at the books outset. An annotated version of that list may be found inYoel Katans introduction to Teshuvot Rabbi Shimon bar ema Vol. I (Jerusalem Makhon Yerushalayim,
1998), pp. 49-53.5 Shalom Rosenberg, The Arbaah Turim of Rabbi Abraham bar Judah, Disciple of Don asdai Crescas(Heb.). The summary in this chapter is based upon a full survey which appears as Appendix C to this
book.6 Ibid., pp. 525-527.
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preliminary idea, which makes this chapter a necessary introduction to later chapters in the
book. At the very end of this chapter we will examine Durans remarks about the
apparently voluminous books he wrote in reaction to reading Crescas Or Hashem towards
the end of his life (he completed them in the years 1436-1438), and what those remarks
may indicate about his theory of principles of the Torah.
The Chronology of Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought
The classic books on the principles of the Torah were written in a very specific
historical context. Menachem Kellners Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thoughtexamines the
central texts on Jewish principles of faith, and succeeds in showing how ideas related to
dogmawhat a principle of the Torah means according to Jewish thinkers, which
doctrines are counted as principles and which are not, and whydeveloped historically.
His study of principles led Kellner to think about the chronology of principles of the
Torah, i.e. about when the dogmas of Judaism became the objects of systematic study
Once Saadia Gaon had for the first time methodically expoundedthe beliefs of Judaism7 in the tenth century, systematic theology became astandard and widely accepted branch of Jewish intellectual endeavor. Itwas not until the twelfth century, however, that we find the firstcomprehensive account of the dogmas of Judaism. Maimonides (1135-1204) was the first non-Karaite Jewish author systematically, self-consciously, and explicitly to posit specific beliefs which all Jews quaJews had to accept. In the two centuries following the publication ofMaimonides principles the question of the dogmas of Judaism receivedalmost no attention. The fifteenth century saw intensive interest in thesubject; with the close of that century, however, the subject disappearedalmost entirely from the agenda of Jewish intellectuals, to resurface onlyin the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.8
It is the terminus ad quem of this gap, described here as spanning the entire thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries,9that will concern us here, because Duran himself marked its closure.
(Kellner even called the gap From Maimonides to Duran. 10) As we shall see in this
chapter, though Duran was indeed the author of the first sustained analysis of the principles
of the Torah, significant attention was already paid to the question of principles decades
earlier by Rabbenu Nissim Gerondi and members of his school.
7 Actually, it is now known (since after KellnersDogma appeared) that Saadia not only expounded on thebeliefs of Judaism but also seems to have been the first author of explicit lists of the principles of theTorah. See Haggai Ben-Shammai, Saadya Gaons Ten Articles of Faith (Heb.), Da`at37 (1996), pp. 11-
26.8 Introduction, p. 1.9 More accurately from Maimonidespublication of his principles to the fifteenth century, which as Kellner
notes elsewhere (p. 67) was actually closer to two hundred and fifty years.10 The title of Kellner, chapter two, ibid. 66-82.
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Furthermore, Sara Klein-Braslavy has shown11that Gerondis ideas on Creation as
a principle of the Torah had a major impact on the two most influential books of
principles written in the early fifteenth century, namely those by Crescas and Albo. In
Dogma, Kellner traced the origins of two opposing schools of thought on whether or not
Creation is a principle to the mutually exclusive influences of Maimonides (Guide II25)
and Gerondi.12 It will be my contention that a fundamental dichotomy exposed byMaimonides in that crucial passage of the Guide was at the very heart of a process which
led to the careful attention that Gerondi paid to the matter, and which in turn led the
writing of the central books of Jewish principles in the two generations following Gerondi,
and can even go a long way towards explaining the the very structure of those books.
We will now proceed with Maimonides and Gerondi, continue with Abraham bar
Judahs Four Columns, and conclude with a new understanding of how and why Durans
understanding of principles of the Torah led him to write both Ohev Mishpatand MagenAvot, as well as how and why he structured the latter book the way he did.
Creation and the Principles of the Torah
Maimonides did not include the creation of the world in his original formulation of
the thirteen principles. However, he discussed it extensively in the Guide,13 and towards11 Sara Klein-Braslavy, Terumato shel Rabbenu Nissim Gerundi le-`Izzuvan shel Torot ha-`Ikkarim shel
asdai Crescas ve-shel Yosef Albo,Eshel Beer Sheva 2 (5740), pp. 177-197.12 Kellner, ibid,.p. 216.13 II13-31. All of the discussions creation in this book, both here and in chapter 5, will reflect Durans
assumption that Maimonides exoteric position is his only position. For more regarding that assumptionon Durans part about Maimonides for all issues, see chapter 7; also cf. chapter 4, n. 40).
For background regarding Maimonides position on creation, see Thierry Alcoloumbre,Cration ou ternit? Lenjeu de la question chez Mamonide,Pardes 31 (2001), pp. 73-82; E. Bertola,Il problema delleternita del mondo nel pensiero di Mose Maimonide, Sefarad56 (1996) pp. 339-360;Joseph Dan, Nachmanides and the Development of the Concept of Evil in the Kabbalah in Mosse benNahman I elseu Temps (Gerona Ajuntament de Girona, 1996), pp. 161-179; Herbert A. Davidson,Maimonides Secret Position on Creation in Isadore Twersky, ed., Studies in Medieval Jewish Historyand Literature (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 16-40 and Further on a Problematic
Passage in Guide for the Perplexed 2.24, Maimonidean Studies 4 (2000), pp. 1-13; James Diamond,The Failed Theodicy of a Rabbinic Pariah A Maimonidean Recasting of Elisha ben Abuyah,JewishStudies Quarterly 9 (2002), pp. 353-380; William Dunphy Maimonides and Aquinas on Creation ACritique of Their Historians in Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and MedievalPhilosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR (Toronto Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983),pp. 361-379; Seymour Feldman, An Averroist Solution to a Maimonidean Perplexity, MaimondeanStudies 4 (2000), pp. 15-30; Jerome Gellman, Jerome Maimonides Ravings,Review of Metaphysics45 (1991), pp. 309-328; Andrew Gluck, Maimonides Arguments for Creation Ex Nihilo in the Guideof the Perplexed, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 7 (1998), pp. 221-254; Steven Harvey, AverroesUse of Examples in his Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, and Some Remarks on his Role asCommentator,Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 7 (1997), pp. 91-113; Warren Zev Harvey The MishnehTorah as a Key to the Secrets of the Guide in G. Blidstein et aleds., Me'ah She'arim: Studies inMedieval Jewish Spiritual Life in Memory of Isadore Twersky (Jerusalem Magnes 2001), pp. 11-28;
Daniel Hoffman In Between Creating And Created Things Maimonides Concept Of The Creation inIrene Kajon, ed.,La storia della filosofia ebraica (Milan Cedam, 1993), pp. 81-97; Michael Zvi.Nehorai,The Manner in Which Maimonides Expressed his Views on Creation,Da'at37 (1996), pp. 119-126;Tamar Rudavsky, Philosophical Cosmology in Judaism,Early Science and Medicine 2 (1997), pp. 149-184; Norbert Samuelson, Maimonides Doctrine of Creation,Harvard Theological Review 84 (1991),
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the end of his life he even revised his original formulation of the fourth principle to include
it.14 The Maimonidean passage that had extraordinary influence on future books of
principlesinfluence that went far beyond the specific question of creationis the
following (Guide II25)15
Our belief that the deity is not a body destroys for us none of thefoundations of the Law and does not give the lie to the claims of any
prophet. The only objection to it is constituted by the fact that theignorant think that this belief is contrary to the text; yet it is not contraryto it, as we have explained, but is intended by the text. On the other hand,the belief in eternity the way Aristotle sees itthat is, the beliefaccording to which the world exists in virtue of necessity, that no naturechanges at all, and that the customary course of events cannot bemodified with regard to anythingdestroys the Law in its principle,necessarily gives the lie to every miracle, and reduces to inanity all thehopes and threats that the Law has held out, unlessby God!one
interprets the miracles figuratively also, as was done by the Islamicinternalists;16 this, however, would result in some sort of crazyimaginings.
If, however, one believed in eternity according to the secondopinion we have explained17which is the opinion of Platoaccordingto which the heavens too are subject to generation and corruption, thisopinion would not destroy the foundations of the Law and would befollowed not by the lie being given to miracles, but by their becomingadmissible. It would also be possible to interpret figuratively the texts inaccordance with this opinion. And many obscure passages can be foundin the texts of the Torah and others with which this opinion could beconnected or rather by means of which it could be proved. However, no
pp. 249-271; M. Schneider, The Form And Formation Of Man In Maimonides Philosophy in A. LvovI. Dvorkin and M. Virolainen eds., Greki i evrei: dialog v pokoleniiakh (St. Petersburg Peterburgskiievreiskii universitet, 1999), pp. 137-154; Dov Schwartz, On Maimonides Disputations with AristotelianPhilosophy A New Look at the Purpose of Existence,Iyyun 47 (1998), pp. 129-146; Kenneth Seeskin,Maimonides Conception of Philosophy in David Novak, ed.,Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem andAthens Critically Revisited(Lanham, MD Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), pp. 87-110 and Maimonides,Spinoza, and the Problem of Creation in Heidi M. Ravven and Lenn E. Goodman, eds.,Jewish Themesin Spinoza's Philosophy (Albany SUNY Press, 2002), pp. 115-130; idem., Searching for a Distant God:The Legacy of Maimonides (New York Oxford University Press, 2000); Masha Turner, Examinng theRelationship Between the Opinions on Creation and the Opinions on Prophecy in the Guide of the
Perplexed,Da'at50-52 (2003), pp. 73-82; Roslyn Weiss, Maimonides on the End of the World,Maimonidean Studies 3 (1992-93), pp. 195-218.For other medieval views, see Herbert Davidson, The Principle that a Finite Body can Contain
Only Finite Power in S. Stein and R. Loewe, eds., Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual HistoryPresented to Alexander Altmann (University University of Alabama Press, 1979), pp. 75-92; HebertDavidson,Proofs for Eternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and JewishPhilosophy (New York Oxford University Press, 1987); William Dunphy, ibid.; Robert Eisen, Josephibn Kaspi on the Secret Meaning of the Scroll of Esther,REJ160 (2001), pp. 379-408; SeymourFeldman, In the Beginning God Created the Heavens PhiloponusDe Opficio Mundi and RabbinicExegesisA Study in Comparative Midrash in J. P. Rothschild, Gad Freudenthal, and G Dahan, eds.,Torah et science: perspectives historiques et theoreiquesEtudes offertes a Charles Touati (LeuvenPeeters, 2001), pp. 37-69 and Philoponus on the Metaphysics of Creation in Ruth Link-Salinger, ed.,AStraight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and CultureEssays in Honor of Arthur Hyman
(Washington, DC Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp. 74-85; Steven Harvey, Averroes Useof Examples in his Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, and Some Remarks on his Role asCommentator,Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 7 (1997), pp. 91-113; Basil Herring,Joseph ibn Kaspi'sGevia Kesef: A Study in Medieval Jewish Philosophic Bible Commentary (New York Ktav, 1982); TamarRudavsky, Philosophical Cosmology in Judaism,Early Science and Medicine 2 (1997), pp. 149-184.
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necessity could impell us to do this unless this opinion weredemonstrated. In view of the fact that it has not been demonstrated, weshall not favor this opinion, nor shall we at all heed that other opinion,
but rather shall take the texts according to their external sense and shallsay The Law has given us knowledge of a matter the grasp of which isnot within our power, and the miracle attests to the correctness of ourclaims.
Know that with a belief in the creation of the world in time, allthe miracles become possible and the Law becomes possible, and allquestions that may be asked on this subject, vanish. Thus it might besaid Why did God give prophetic revelation to this one and not to that?Why did God give this Law to this particular nation, and why did He notlegislate to the others? Why did He legislate at this particular time, andwhy did He not legislate before or after it? Why did He impose thesecommandments and these prohibitions? Why did He privilege the
prophet with the miracles mentioned in relation to him and not with someothers? What was Gods aim in giving this Law? Why did He not, if suchwas His purpose, put the accomplishment of the commandments and
nontransgression of the prohibitions into our nature?If this were said, the answer to all these questions would be that itwould be said He wanted it this way; or His wisdom required it this way.And just as He brought the world into existence, having the form it has,when He wanted to, without our knowing His will with regard to this orin what respect there was wisdom in His particularizing the forms of theworld and the time of its creationin the same way we do not know Hiswill or the exigency of His wisdom that caused all the matters, aboutwhich questions have been posed above, to be particularized.
If, however, someone says that the world is as it is in virtue ofnecessity, it would be a necessary obligation to ask all those questions;
and there would be no way out of them except through a recourse tounseemly answers in which there would be combined the giving the lieto, and the annulment of, all the external meanings of the Law withregard to which no intelligent man has any doubt that they are to be takenin their external meanings.
It is then because of this that this opinion is shunned and that thelives of virtuous men have been and will be spent in investigating thisquestion. For if creation in time were demonstratedif only as Platounderstands creationall the overhasty claims made to us on this point
by the philosophers would become void. In the same way, if the philosophers would succeed in demonstrating eternity as Aristotle
understands it, the Law as a whole would become void, and a shift toother opinions would take place. I have thus explained to you thateverything is bound up with this problem. Know this.
In this crucial passage, Maimonides has linked two claims First, that the possibility
of miraclesand the viability of the Law along with itstands or falls based on the
question of divine volition (as per the Torah) or necessity (as per Aristotle). Second, that
the first question is inextricably bound up with the problem of creation versus eternity.
14
For extensive discussion of this see Kellner,Dogma, pp. 53-61.15The Guide to the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1963), vol. 2, pp.328-330.16 Isma`ili.17 See Guide II13.
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The fate of the second claim in later centuries is fairly straightforward. On the one
hand, as Kellner has shown,18 the majority of later thinkers accepted Maimonides stated
position, leading many of them to posit creation as the central principle of Judaism (in an
analytic or axiomatic sense). On the other hand, Klein-Braslavy has shown that Gerondi
(who in turn influenced Crescas and Albo) chose to reject Maimonides second claim by
freeing the problem of creation versus eternity from the question of volition versusnecessity.
The roots of Gerondis rejection of the creation of the world as a principle of the
Torah are latent in the passage from the Guide cited above, where Maimonides declared
the centrality of creation. It was Maimonides himself, after all, who set up Platos
conception of creation as a kind of eternity that could coexist with a volitional universe.
It is thus not the question of the eternity of matter that is most crucial, but rather the
conception of God that lies behind is. It is well worth citing Gerondi in full (the Hebreworiginal is included here because the book is not widely available)
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There is no doubt that had the Torah not explained the matter ofcreation, and a person accepted eternity in the sense that God cannot bethought of as capable of creating, as the philosophers believedthat forthis person the Torah must fall in its entirety, and he cannot believe in thecommandments in any way. But one who believes in the commandmentsdespite believing in eternityhe cannot believe in it that way,19 for if
everything happens out of necessity then God did not command the portion This month shall mark for you the beginning of months(Exodus 122), [and] that [God] will not punish with cutting off he whoeats leavened bread [on Passover], as is written in it (v. 15).
Therefore, anyone who who observes a commandment andaccepts the Torah despite accepting the eternity of the world, justifyingthis by thinking that it is Gods will that the worlds existence has notceased,20 not that He cannot be conceived to do its opposite, and thus his
18 P. 213.19 My emphasis here and below. According to Aristotle, anything that is eternal is necessary (Generation
and Corruption 338a1-4;Physics 203b28; Metaphysics 1050b815), and this is clearly the basis for
Maimonides comments in Guide II25, cited above. It is unclear if Gerondi denies this and accepts thepossibility of a volitional eternity, or if he means that for one who believes this (perhaps mistakenly) theTorah need not fall. In either case, creation is no longer an axiom, and according to Gerondi this
becomes the reason for Rabbi Isaacs question about why the Torah begins with Genesis.20 This comment is clearly echoed by Crescas in Or Hashem III15.
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belief harms nothing in his Torahfor this reason Rabbi Isaac explainedthat the Torah need not have begun [with Genesis] but with thecommandments21
In other words, if a person can conceive of the worlds eternity a parte ante in terms of
volition rather than necessity, then there is no need to regard creation as an axiom of the
Torah andjust as Maimonides himself suggested regarding Platos view of creationthe
creation of the world in time, ex nihilo, need notbe singled out as something upon which
the Torah stands or falls. The worlds creation thus remains one of the many truths taught
by the Torah, with no special status as a principle of the Torah.
All this debate about Maimonidessecondclaim clearly shows that there was much
concern with the general question What is a principle of the Torah? during the late
lifetime of Gerondi (a concern that deeply influenced his students), along with the more
specific question of whether creation is to be counted as one of them. This is decades
earlier than the early fifteenth century works of Duran (Ohev Mishpat, 1405) and Crescas
(Or Hashem, 1410/11).22 We must not, however, let the debate over the status of creation
as a specific principle, important as it may be, overshadow the wall-to-wall agreement with
Maimonides stated views in his firstclaim, namely that the Torah stands or falls on the
question of divine volition versus necessity.
We will deal with divine volition as a central theme in Magen Avot in later
chapters,23
and show that the passion for this theme is mirrored in the writings of Gerondiand all of his students. In this chapter we will show that allof the books in the principles
of the Torah genre were written primarily in opposition to Aristotelian naturalism and
those who interpreted the Torah according to it. Divine volition is central to all of these
books, as is their firm opposition to the kind of radical naturalistic exegesis that becomes
necessary precisely when volition is denied.24 Allegiance to Maimonides openly stated
position on Divine volition is the chief characteristic of every one of these books.
Thus, a very deep concern with volitionconcern that coincided with what
Maimonides wrote in the above passageis what lay at the heart of the debate over
whether or not creation is a principle of the Torah. Though Gerondi, followed by most of
his students, famously rejected creation as a principle of the Torah, he toowriting
decades before any of the major books of principles were to be pennedgranted special
status to a number of other ideas in the Torah, showing his concern not only for what
21 Rabbenu Nissim ben Re'uven Gerondi (Ha-Ran): Perush al ha-Torah, ed. Leon Aryeh Feldman(Jerusalem Makhon Shalem, 5728), p. 4.
22
Gerondi died in 1376 (see chapter 1 n. 7). His commentary on the Torah is incomplete; its abrupt end nearthe beginning of the portionHayyei Sarah (Genesis 2320 to be precise) was because of his death.
23 In the last two chapters of this book (chapter 5 on creation and miracles, and chapter 6 on prayer).24 Recall here Maimonides dismissal of one who interprets the miracles figuratively because of his belief
in Aristotelian eternity of the world, which would result in some sort of crazy imaginings.
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defines a principle of the Torah (as expressed in the creation issue), but also for the
question ofwhich ideas are principles of the Torah. He mentions all of the following in his
Twelve Sermons25
1. Existence and Unity of God These are called roots (#9), and unity is also a
principle (#7).
The first two of the ten commandments, which for Gerondi relate to the existenceand unity of God, are called two cornerstones of the Torah (second version of #5 and #9)
and the foundations of the Torah (second version #5, and also cited in the name of
Gerondi in his students commentary on the Torah 26). These two commandments are also
the pillar of the Torah and its root (#9).
2. Miracles That what is impossible according to nature is not impossible for God
is a crucial point about which Gerondi declares, This is the greatest cornerstone of the
religion, and he who denies it denies the entire religion by entirely denying reward andpunishment. And since this is the axis (kotev) of the the Torah around which redemption
which is an axiom (???) of the Torahrevolves, God wanted to spread this opinion in the
Land of Egypt, for that is the land of sorcerers and magicians (#3). Egypt thus became
the proving-ground for the existence of miracles, which not even the sorcerers and
magicians could produce with their natural wisdom.
3. The Exodus The exodus from Egypt is, as we just mentioned, a primary example
of a miracle and a central event in the Torah. Gerondi thus calls it the foundation of the
Torah for it shows that the divine aspect clings to us (#1). The first month is the one in
which the exodus occurred because it is fitting that we base our count on the roots of the
Torah and not on nature (#3).
4. Two more general ideas related to nature versus miracles, which Gerondi calls
roots (but not roots of the Torah) concern the role of nature. The first is that God
generally lets nature follow its own rules unless there is a great need for interference. The
second is that natural events have general natural causes operating through a chain of
events, but not specific (volitional) causes.
5. Freedom of choice for man is singled out by Gerondi Whoever denies this, will
deny the entire Torah (#5).27
6. On the idea that a person merits the world to come through performing even one
commandment, Gerondi agrees with Maimonides that this is a principle of the belief in
the Torah, a root, and even an extremely precious root (#6), though he disagrees
about what it means.
25 Some (but not all) of the examples that follow were pointed out previously by Klein-Braslavy.26Perush al ha-Torah le-Rabbenu Yosef ben David mi-Saragosa, ed. Leon Aryeh Feldman (JerusalemMakhon Shalem, 1973), p. 164.27 Cf. Gerondis commentary to Genesis 1514 (which also touches upon Divine knowledge).
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7. The very thoughts that lie behind a transgression may be said to deny the
cornerstones of the Torah (#6).
8. Three cornerstones proven through the binding of Isaac are (1) How great is
the love of God in the hearts of His servants; (2) that the prophets have no doubt that their
prophecies come from God; and (3) the eternity of the soul.
There seems to be no systematic criterion that can explain which ideas Gerondisingles out for their importance as principles or cornerstones or roots, nor is there
any clear rule that determines which term he applies to each. Neither the examples
themselves, nor the terms used to single them out, are the function of a system. Rather,
they are quite clearly the function of context Gerondi was writing a book of sermons, not a
book of principles.
Nevertheless, the thought-processes revealed here are extremely important Gerondi
took it for granted that certain ideas are more basic to the Torah than others, and he singledthem out freely whenever the felt that the context warranted it. As he did so, he also made
use of all the classic Hebrew terms for principles of the Torah that had been already used
before him, and were soon to be heavily employed in the books of principles written after
him. In the case of the creation of the world, beyond specifying and labeling, he also
employed an explicit criterion to decide whether or not that specific doctrine counts as a
principle of the Torah. As we shall see in this chapter, his students continued to focus on
the very same issues for the next two generations.
Among them, it was only Duran who chose to rework all of these issues within the
original framework of Maimonides thirteen principles (which was abandoned by all the
rest). Rather than letting his questions on the topic lead him to an alternative list as it did
for others, he instead made room for the ideas of Gerondis school within a nuanced
interpretation of Maimonides principles, which in turn led him to a modified presentation
of those principles in the structure ofMagen Avot(as we shall see in the last part of this
chapter). But first we will examine another early text from Gerondis school, one that
exemplifies its early concern with the principles of the Torah roughly three decades before
Durans Ohev Mishpatand Crescas Or Hashem were written.
TheFour Columns of Rabbi Abraham bar Judah
In 1984, Shalom Rosenberg published the manuscript of Abraham bar Judahs Four
Columns.28 As mentioned earlier, it was written in 1378 in the home of asdai Crescas
28 Since then it has received little attention. On the fourth column, see Eric Lawee, The Path to FelicityTeachings and Tensions in Even Shetiyyah of Abraham bar Judah, Disciple of asdai Crescas,Mediaeval Studies 59 (1997), pp. 183-223.
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(just two years after the death of Gerondi, Crescas teacher). Here we will make do with a
short summary of the work, column by column, that will allow us to evaluate it as a book
of principles.29
Column I deals with the existence of God and general providence, Column II
with particular levels of providence, Column III with knowledge of the Torah and its
benefits, and Column IV with the ultimate purpose of the commandments. The four-partstructure of the book is tied in closely with the problem of volition, an idea that is also
central to the later books of principles from the early fifteenth century.
Column I is the longest of the Four Columns by far, with a programmatic
introduction followed by a number of subsections. It begins with a brief summary of the
classic proofs for the existence of God and His unity. This is followed by spelling out three
precious cornerstones of the Torah (pinnot yekarot toriyyot) that support its entire
structure God is characterized by volition and kindness.
God has full knowledge of His creations in all of their details. This knowledge is
part of His essence which gives them reality (not through receiving knowledge of
them externally).
There are no limits to Gods power, and He depends on no resource outside of
Himself.
These three cornerstones are followed by two great questions that must beaddressed in order to strengthen the faith of Israel
Divine Omniscience Does God know only eternal generalities or is He also aware
of particular events?
How can Divine foreknowledge be reconciled with contingent events that are not
predetermined?
These two related questions, both of them about divine knowledge, lead to an
important discussion of the eternity of Gods knowledge and His will, which never change,and this leads to further discussions of problems such as creation at a specific point in time,
miracles, the immutability of the Torah, and human free will.
Though there are quite a few tangential discussions and significant redundancies in
Column I, its overall theme is clearly what Abraham bar Judah called general
providence. This is the one eternal act of volition by which God created the world and
continues to know it and provide for it. General providence is Abraham bar Judahs
alternative to naturalistic models of the Aristotelians.
However, the model of general providence does not go far enough. Alone, it
29 Since theArba'ah Turim has never been described in English, a full survey of its contents (upon whichthis summary is based) is included asAppendix Cto this book.
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cannot explain why God chose to give certain laws to a certain people or how there can be
divine providence for individuals. These are the kinds of problems that led Maimonides to
declare that naturalism leads to the nullification of the Torah, and are dealt with in the next
column.
Column II is about the different levels of providence among the creations. When
it comes to the three great levels of creation, namely the separate intellects, the spheres,and the lower world, it may be said that the higher levels receive Gods emanation more
directly than the lower levels, which receive it through the intermediaries above them.
In the lower world, providence works differently for different creatures. For
mankind, even though all are equal in humanity, their individual providence is not equal,
and the reason for this is the laws they live by More and better laws serve to prepare
certain people and nations to receive more substantial individual providence. In the case of
Israel the situation is even more radical The Torah completely bypasses the higher level ofthe cosmos, and directs divine providence to Israel with no intermediaries. In other words,
in the case of Israel there is a mechanism for direct specific providence that is greater than
the general laws of nature but it itself a part of Gods eternal, unchanging volition.
Column III is a short, mostly homiletic section on the study of the Torah. Abraham
bar Judah stressed that the commandments are be performed with understand, not blindly,
because they inculcate important ideas about the relationship between God and human
beings. In other words, in addition to physical performance of the commandments, there is
also a value in contemplation.
Column IV is about the purpose of the commandments.30 It has important
implications for the place of the intellect and the value of philosophical study, suggesting
parallels with Duran, and we will therefore deal with it at length within this summary.
Abraham bar Judah rejected naturalistic conceptions of felicity that depend on
intellectual perfection alone, and saw performance of the commandments as an essential
instrument of perfection.31 Like other rabbis of his age he was concerned about
philosophical antinomianism, which he polemicized against in this column. Lawee
suggests, however, that even as he censured philosophic teachings that emphasized a
contemplative ideal, Abraham bar Judah was himself was drawn to that ideal as well,
which may have created somewhat of a spiritual quandary for him. The problem, in a
nutshell, is this Even though performance of the commandments is an essential condition
for reaching human felicity, the highest level of perfection nevertheless depends upon
30
Lawee, The Path to Felicity (above, n. 28) is devoted entirely to Column IV, making this column theonly one of theFour Columns that has received any significant attention from a modern scholar. Thedescription here is largely based on Lawees analysis.
31 For Abraham bar Judah this would seem to imply severe ramifications for non-Jews, since as noted above(in the discussion of Column II) the Torah canceled the seven laws of Noah in his opinion.
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contemplation and the perfection of the intellect.32
There is no doubt a tension here, and it is a tension that Abraham bar Judah shared
with his contemporaries. As we saw when we explored the Abraham model in chapter 2,
nearly all the figures in the school of the Gerondi saw intellection as something positive
and precious, as long as its dangers were avoided and it didnt interfere in any way with the
wholehearted performance of the commandments. This shared attitude is reflected inAbraham bar Judahs fascinating parable of the tree and the birds, already translated and
discussed by Lawee.33 In that parable the king promises to reward anyone who can bring
down birds (representing wisdom) from the top of a tree (representing the
commandments), but withoutdisturbing the tree in any way. However, if a person disturbs
the tree in his attempt to bring down the birds, then he is to be severely punished.
The reward for bringing down the birds is not a naturalistic consequence in this
parable, but the result of the kings direct wish (i.e. the volitional God demanded by theschool of Gerondi rather than a naturalistic God without volition). But most striking is the
kings very desire that the birds be procured by men God desires men to strive for wisdom
despite the very real danger that such efforts may disturb their performance of the
commandments. Abraham bar Judahs parable thus reveals a serious tension between
competing ideals, a tension that was expressed in various ways by Gerondi and a number
of his students. Duran had a different way of illustrating the very same tension As we saw
in chapter 2, he wrote Magen Avotfor those who wanted to explore the Abrahams path of
intellectual exertion in an effort to establish the truth, despite the fact that the Torah of
Moses would seem to make any such effort entirely superfluous. Writing Magen Avot
according to the path of Abraham thus shows the attraction of the contemplative ideal for
him as well.
TheFour Columns as a Book of PrinciplesAbraham bar Judahs Four Columns shows great interest in the principles of the
Torah. It singles out certain ideas as more basic to the Torah than others, sometimes in an
analytic or axiomatic sense.34 The problems that it deals with are more or less the same as
in the works dealing with the principles of the Torah that were to be written decades later
in first quarter of the 15th century, and many of the ideas it expresses are similar or
identical.35 Its terminology and some of its concepts also bear a striking resemblance to32 Lawee, pp. 198 ff.33
Ibid.34 The distinction between analytic and axiomatic systems of principles is applied by Kellner to Crescas (pp.125-127) and Albo (pp. 149-151) respectively.
35 The similarities to Crescas in particular have already been explored by Rosenberg in his notes to the text,so we have not dwelt upon them here.
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GerondisDerashot.
The structure of the book differs from the later books of principles in that each
column (or subsection of a column) is not always devoted to one principle. Therefore,
what is most import when comparing Abraham bar Judahs Four Columns to later works
that deal with principles of the Torah is his formal distinction between Column I and
Column II The former is devoted to Gods existence and His general knowledge andvolition, general in the sense of creating eternal natural laws. This view is opposed to the
concept of naturalistic emanation (for God could have chosen not to create the world).
Alone, however, it nevertheless fails to account for acts ofspecific providence, like the
election of Israel; the mechanisms for such specific providence are supplied only in the
Column II.
The distinction between the Columns I and II bears a strong resemblance to the
structure of Parts I-III of Crescas Or Hashem36
(though Abraham bar Judahs columns areless clearly organized). Column I roughly corresponds to Or Hashem Parts I-II (the
existence of a volitional God), and the Column II to Or Hashem Part III (matters specific
to the Torah of Israel). What is important for our purposes is this Although the Four
Columns has no direct parallel in the structure of other books of principles, the basic idea
of how general and specific providence complement each other was taken for granted
by all of them. In fact, it was a central idea shared by all members of Gerondis school, a
point that we will examine in depth in the last part of this book,37 but it was made most
explicit by Abraham bar Judah in his distinction between Column I and Column II. Also
important, and more immediately relevant to our present discussion, is the early
preoccupation of Abraham bar Judah with the idea of principles of the Torah and his use
of various terms for them. This preoccupation is shared with Gerondi, and they both
anticipate the later, full-fledged works of Duran, Crescas, and Albo.
Columns III and IV both deal with what the later books of principles also called the
ultimate end (takhlit) of the Torah and the felicity of man What we have here is a version
of the critique of the Acquired Intellect, a critique that Abraham bar Judah shared with all
of the later books of principles.38
In short, preoccupation with the principles of the Torah is evident in both Gerondi
and Abraham bar Judah, decades before the early 15 th century books on the topic were
written. This interest is reflected in the identification of specific doctrines as principles, in
the use of various key terms to indicate them, and in the beginnings of systematic
questioning about what makes a doctrine qualify as a principle. Abraham bar Judahs book
36 This is an overall similarity that was not noted or discussed by Rosenberg, who pointed out parallelsbetween Abraham bar Judah and Crescas regarding their specific ideas.
37 Chapters 5-6.38 This will be discussed in chapter 4 within the context of Durans anthropology.
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went further than Gerondi in that it not only reflected interest in the topic, but even began
to anticipate the path that such books would take later in their structure and contents.
Sustained interest in the principles of the Torah over the course of several generations,
and the eventual composition of full-fledged books of principles, are part of a process
that can be clearly identified as a shared characteristic within the school of Rabbenu
Nissim Gerondi.
Books of Principles Intellectual Challenge versus Religious Persecution
The Four Columns contains one polemic passage against Christianity, but anti-
Christian argumentation was not the major focus of the treatise. The brief polemic was
nevertheless a sign of the times 14 th century Spain, even before 1391, was not an easy
environment for Spanish Jews.
In this, too, the Four Columns is similar, though not identical, to later works on
principles Durans Magen Avotand Albos Sefer ha-Ikkarim both contain major polemical
sections within books that nevertheless seem to be far more concerned by philosophy than
by Christianity, at least in terms of the overt topics making up the bulk of their contents.39
As for Crescas, his polemical tract is a short, separate work with no overt connection to his
major book of principles.40 These full-fledged polemical sections or separate works are far
more sustained for the later writers than for Abraham bar Judah, whether one considers the
anti-Christians chapter in Sefer ha-Ikkarim, the chapter against both Christianity and
Islam41 in Magen Avot (which is the size of a full-length book in itself), and Crescas
booklet-length treatise; surely all this sustained interest was also a sign of how times had
changed for the worse since Abraham bar Judah. Nevertheless, for Crescas, Duran and
Albo, just as for Abraham bar Judah before them, the primary goal of their books of
principles remains largely in overcoming Aristotelian naturalism and philosophic
antinomianism, not Christianity.That the flowering of interest in the principles of Judaism in the early 15 th century
was directly related to severe persecution by a creed-orientated religion is
incontrovertible.42 It more difficult to explain, however, why the primary product of that
persecution was in writing books of principles that struggled with philosophic
naturalism, rather than polemical tracts against Christianity. Had the Christian creed been
39 For Duran this is Magen AvotII4, later published separately and best known asKeshet U-Magen (seechapter 1 for details). For Albo, the relevant sections are Sefer ha-Ikkarim I20; III19, 21, 25; IV30.
40
Bittul Ikkarei ha-Nozerim [=The Refutation of the Christian Principles], trans. with anintroduction and notes by Daniel J. Lasker (New York, 1992).41 Duran had already been living in North Africa for at least fifteen years when he wrote Magen Avot, and
perhaps much longer.42 Kellner, pp. 80-82.
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the central challenge for these writers, the topic of principles would have been dealt with
amongst their polemics, rather than putting their polemics inside their books of
principles or alongside them.
From the evidence in this chapter, it is reasonable to suggest that the phenomenon
of books dealing with principles of the Torah came from two complementary sources
internal interest on the one hand, and external pressure on the other. Only the combinationof the two was strong enough to produce the flowering of interest in principles of the Torah
during the early 15th century.
1. Internal interest Long before the worst waves of persecution, medieval science
was already the subject of intense, positive interest in the halls of Torah study in Spain.
Gerondis Derashot are one of the earliest reflections of this fact. Durans embracing of
rational inquiry as an intrinsically worthwhile supplement to tradition and his declared goal
forMagen Avotto fulfill the path of Abraham (as we saw in chapter 2), reflects this as well.This sustained engagement with philosophy among Gerondi and at least two generations of
his students was often critical, but nevertheless reveals profound respect for the
achievements of human intellect and, even more importantly, that they saw inherent value
in its in-depth study without acrimony, despite their clear rejection of some of its
conclusions. Most striking from this perspective is Crescas, whose deep engagement with
rational inquiry for religious reasons led to new philosophical insights. In this, the school
of Gerondi in latter part of the late 14 th and early 15th centuries differed radically from that
of Nahmanides and his students a century before; they too studied medieval science as a
practical matter, but not as something that deeply mattered deeply to them.
All of this positive interest and sustained study, however, was in the context of the
traditional Jewish study hall, not the modern university. Thus, it was precisely the
conceptual tension between tradition and the results of intellectual inquiry, rather than the
detailed contents of the latter, that evoked the most interest. Direct interest in principles
grew in exactly those areas where this tension could not be resolved, and an alternative to
the philosophical model had to be offered Principles of the Torah are necessary building
blocks for such an alternative model.
Why, for instance, is the existence of Abraham not a principle of the Torah? If
Abraham never really lived, and God made no covenant with him for his children, then the
Torah falls. The medieval books on principles of the Torah would surely answer that
Abrahams life was a particular contingent event taught by the Torah like countless others,
and not a general principle. Obviously, had the the medieval books of dogma notexcluded
such examples, no list of principles would have had an end. Nevertheless, it seems that the
exclusion of particular events or commandments from lists of principles of the Torah
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by two generations of Gerondis students had much to do with their specific need to create
an alternative to Aristotelianism. In other words, the underlying reason why the existence
of Abraham need not be listed as a principle of the Torah is not because it is an
individual event, but precisely because the philosophers never denied that he existed. The
Aristotelians believed in contingent historical events; they had no reason to deny that
Abraham once lived. Rather, what their world view eliminated were breaches in thegeneral naturalistic scheme of things, such as specific providence and miracles which
indicate changes in Gods knowledge or reactions in His will as circumstances change in
the world. Because the Aristotelians denied that God willingly interfered in Abrahams life
or anyone elses, it was precisely here that an alternative model was called for, a model
allowing for acts of divine volition to override natural causation in principle. It is therefore
doctrines such as these (Gods knowledge of particulars, special providence, miraculous
prophecy, individual reward and punishment, and the immortality of the individuals soul)that were designated as principles of the Torah.
Since, as Maimonides clearly saw, nothing is more central to the medieval tension
between philosophy and tradition than the alternative conceptions of necessary emanation
versus volitional creation, this is what indeed became the central running theme at the very
heart of all the books that were concerned with principles of the Torah. The fact that
Maimonides had tied in this problem with what became the classic test case for specific
acts of divine volition, namely creation, in Guide II25, facilitated the later interest in other
principles as well, as an outgrowth of the general struggle to provide a model of divine
volition.
The need to provide such a model was itself the result of sustained, positive
engagement with intellectual inquiry in the yeshivotof Spain. Though such engagement
was often positive, there was still a pressing need to clarify alternatives when no
reconciliation was possible. It is crucial to emphasize that an intellectual culture lacking an
ongoing, positive engagement with both the rabbinic tradition and the Aristotelian corpus
could never have produced a preoccupation with the principles of the Torah. Such was
the case for the previous Spanish rabbinic school of Nahmanides and Rashba (which
frowned upon such preoccupation and whose alternative conceptions of the world were
largely rooted in the kabbalah) as well as for the radical Spanish Maimonideans of their
time (who often lacked sustained, vigorous engagement with the rabbinic tradition).
Rather, the requisite mutual engagement began in Spain with Gerondi, who was followed
by his students.
2. External pressure Christian persecution of the Jews in Spain did not begin in
1391. Gerondi and his students were sent to prison on false charges in the 1370s. The
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bridge connecting Christian persecution to principles of the Torah was the fear (justified
or not) of philosophical antinomianism.43 If the entire value in performing the
commandments lies in the political realm, then apostasy appears less frightening. The more
a Jew is convinced that felicity comes through performance of the commandments of the
Torah alone, and that God knows and rewards such performance, the better he can justify
standing firm in his faith despite persecution.Thus, the confluence of longtime internal interest and increasingly violent external
pressure is what ultimately produced the full flowering of the late medieval discussion of
principles, starting with Durans Ohev Mishpatin 1405. But strong indications of what was
to come were already clearly evident several decades earlier.
Additionally, it should be emphasized that for these writers, the conflict with
philosophy differed radically from the conflict with Christianity on an emotional level.
Anti-Christian polemical treatises rarely give the impression of being true engagementwith the enemy. No intellectual threat seems evident, just ridicule; the true threat is a
political, financial, and physical one. Anti-Christian treatises do not seem to engage an
opponent who has something significant to say, but rather to serve as doctrinal manuals
meant to be used in battles with an enemy who comes without good ideas, but
unfortunately with the force of arms.
The conflict with philosophy gives the opposite impression Here the enemys
weapons are seductive, compelling and powerful ideas. There is no physical threat, only an
intellectual one, and while the intellectual threat may not command surrender, it certainly
demands respect.
Thus, the radically different characters of these two simultaneous conflicts, along
with the widespread notion connecting them (i.e. that naturalism engendered an apathy
towards the Torah which ultimately resulted in surrender to Christianity), is what led to the
writing of books of principles whose principle engagement was with rational philosophy,
not Christianity, specifically during a time of severe Christian persecution.
Duran From Ohev Mishpatto MagenAvot
Explicit written discussion of principles by Duran preceded that of Crescas (though
the latter was the elder of the two contemporaries). This applies not only to the chapters on
the topic in Ohev Mishpat, which Kellner has analyzed in depth, but also to the structure
and content of Magen Avot, which is based upon that preliminary discussion in Ohev43 Lawee (pp. 194 ff.) contains an excellent, balanced presentation of the different historical possibilities as
to what degree such antinomianism was a historical reality among Spanish Jews in this era. Note that ifthe fear of antinomianism is connected to Christian persecution, then Column IV of Abraham bar Judah
becomes an anti-Christian polemic in its entirety.
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Mishpat.
In his introductory chapters to Ohev Mishpat, Duran singled out two doctrines for
special treatment, namely the creation of the world and divine providence. The Torah
depends on the possibility of miracles, but there can be no miracles (it would be
impossible for things to deviate from their natures at all) if the world is eternal a parte
ante. Similarly, there can be no Torah without a form of divine providence that relates toindividuals. Duran continued by stating that providence necessarily follows from belief
in creation. The chain of logical necessity is as follows, where each concept allows for the
possibility of the next one
Creation of the world >> providence >> miracles >> divine Torah
Creation is the foundational act of providence. In the first chapter ofOhev Mishpat,Duran explained how creation proves that providence must continue to operate afterward
The intellect requires one to believe that the Cause of all causes, blessed be He, provides
for the needs of His creations, giving a man what he deserves according to his actions. This
is the perfection of His character, and the opposite would be a fault even for lowly men, all
the more so for Him whom the intellect requires that all perfections be found in Him...
The reason these two doctrines (creation and providence) are singled out by Duran
is not just because the Torah cannot exist without them. As he makes clear in Ohev
Mishpatchapter 1, each of them is a primary example of a doctrine that cannot be easily
established, if at all. While the set of basic doctrines about God (existence, unity,
incorporeality) can be logically proven with no room left for doubt, this is not true of the
creation of the world and individual providence
The second set of investigations, for which the human intellectcannot provide absolute proof This is the investigation as to whether theworld is created or eternal. For to bring an absolute proof for this is not inthe capacity of the human mind, but for God alone. For logical proof
involves proving from that which comes after from what came before it,since knowledge is only when a thing is known through its causes,when it has causes. But nothing preceded the world besides God, blessed
be He, while knowledge of His essence is hidden from any besides Him(though we do apprehend His existence). Therefore, the gates of logical
proof are closed to all for this investigation, except for God.The third set of investigations, for which the intellect proves them
but the senses deny them This is the investigation of providence, for theintellect forces one to believe that He who is the Cause of all causes,
blessed be He, provides for the needs of His creations... However, thesenses deny this, for how many evildoers have prospered, and how many
righteous menthe opposite! This has led some to intellectually denyprovidence, [claiming] that it is not a lack in His character, may He beblessed. But it is not the intellect that has led them to this; rather, they
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tried to appear wise through arguments they considered rational, in orderto make the intellect conform with reality...
In general, said Duran, the Torah simply states its doctrines without proving them. This is
even the case for creation, which can never be fully proven through human reason. The one
great exception to this general rule is providence Here it is not the lack of humanintellectual capacity that creates a problem, but rather the realities that people confront
throughout their lives For how many evildoers have prospered, and how many righteous
menthe opposite! That is why the Bible itself includes a book devoted to the rational
demonstration of this principle alone, out of all the principles of the Torah (namely the
book of Job). Providence is the only principle of the Torah that is continually contradicted
by the observation of events in the world.
In terms of our understanding Magen Avot as a book of principles, the materialfrom Ohev Mishpatalready explains a great deal. Maimonides thirteen principles, which
Magen Avots thirteen chapters follow, include neither the creation of the world nor the
possibility of miracles. Yet the end ofMagen Avot(93a-100a) is an extensive essay (III4,
Second Topic) on creation, whose stated goal is to prove the possibility of miracles. Here
we find, as we have before, that Duran chose to be more Maimonidean (as he understood
Maimonides) than was Maimonides himself If in the Guide Maimonides argued that the
creation of the world is an axiom of the Torah, then it should have been included amongst
his principles, but in the version of the thirteen principles available to Duran (as to all of
the medievals) it was absent. Since creation is necessary for the possibility of miracles, in
Magen AvotDuran analyzed them both in a special essay at the end of his 13 th and final
chapter, a chapter formally devoted to the doctrine that is itself the greatest miracle of all,
namely the resurrection of the dead (Maimonides 13th and final principle).
It is ironic that Duran himself noted in Ohev Mishpatchapter 9 that since creation is
an axiom of the Torah, Maimonides should have included the doctrine that every existent
other than He is not eternal a parte ante in his fourth principle. In fact, as we now know
from the autograph copy of his Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides did exactly that
in a marginal addition later in his life. Duran, however, accepted Maimonides fourth
principle for what his version of it contained, setting his lengthy essay on creation rather
artificially at the end of his final chapter on resurrection (Magen AvotIII4, Second Topic).
That choice was based on his conclusion in Ohev Mishpat that Maimonides justifiably
failed to count creation among his principles because it is a derivative principle of miracles
(and hence of resurrection).
Unlike the creation of the world, the other problematic principle of Ohev
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Mishpat, namely providence, received its very own chapter ofMagen Avot(III2), for it is
one of Maimonides thirteen (#11). However, despite receiving its own formal chapter, the
discussion of it discussion in Magen Avot is relatively brief (far shorter than Durans
discussion of creation). The reason providence is given short shrift in Magen Avotis clear
Providence is the only doctrine, according to Duran, for which the Bible itself includes a
book devoted to demonstrating it rationally. Therefore, its analysis best belongs in acommentary on that biblical book, something that Duran already provided in Ohev
Mishpat.
In Ohev Mishpat chapter 8, Duran also singled out two doctrines for special
treatment, but here the focus was on why Maimonides excluded certain doctrines from his
thirteen principles. As Maimonides eleventh principle, providence was irrelevant in this
context. But creation remained problematic from this angle as well, since Maimonides
didnt count it, and to creation Duran added the principle that man is endowed with thefreedom of choice. Just as Maimonides had argued elsewhere for the centrality of creation
as an axiom of the Torah, but nevertheless chose not to count it among his thirteen
principles, so too did Maimonides cite free will as a principle of the Torah in several
places,44 but neglected to include in his list of principles. For free will, as for creation,
Durans technical solution in Magen Avotwas to embed the neglected principle within the
confines of another topic to which it relates In III4, First Topic (On the Soul and its
Immortality), he included free will within his discussion of the intellect.45
On the Soul and its Immortality is a massive essay. As well over half of the entire
book (35a-93a), the First Topic of chapter III4, which is formally just partof the books
final chapter, simply dwarfs Durans division ofMagen Avotinto thirteen chapters based on
Maimonides thirteen principles. Yet here, too, Duran gave an explicit reason in Ohev
Mishpat (chapter 8), where he argued that Maimonides only included those principles
which are taught by explicit biblical verses, and further excluded derivative principles.
For Duran, derivative principles are doctrines presupposed by those principles which are
actually taught by explicit biblical verses, such as creation and providence as explained
above The creation of the world is a necessary assumption in order to allow for the
possibility of miracles, which is in turn necessary to allow for providence (in Ohev
Mishpat), and for resurrection (in Magen Avot). The essay On the Soul and its
Immortality is the same And since resurrection is the return [of souls] to their bodies,
which like all miracles is not natural, therefore we must speak in this [chapter] of two
topics The first is the nature of the soul and its eternity; the second is the matter of
miracles, the archetype of which is the creation of the world (Magen Avot35a3-4). In
44 The eighth of MaimonidesEight Chapters;Laws of Repentance 51-5; Guide III32.45 This major section ofMagen Avotwill be discussed in chapter 4.
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other words, both the eternity of the soul and the creation of the world are derivative
principles of resurrection (13th principle), and that is why Durans huge chapter on
resurrection (Magen AvotIII4, 34b-100a) is almost entirely devoted to these two topics.
On more thing must be mentioned about Durans methodology regarding the
creation of the world as a principle of the Torah. In Ohev Mishpatchapter 9 we find that
Duran came very close to Gerondis approach regarding creation as a principle of theTorah46
You ought further to know that the necessity of believing in thecreation of the worldin order to uphold the miracles of the Torahdoes not relate to absolute creation, i.e., the belief that the world wascreated from absolute nothingness. For you will not find any of themiracles of the Torah or prophets which involve creation ex nihilo. All ofthe miracles involve [creation of] something from something a snake
from a staff, manna from the air, and likewise with them all. If creation asit was conceived of by the ancient philosophersthat the world wascreated from something, its creation involving a transition from chaoticto ordered motionwere proved by demonstration, all the miracles of theTorah would [nevertheless] be upheld by this belief, and we could
believe it safely without fear of heresy.
Duran here utilized Maimonides implied permission to accept Platos view had it been
demonstrated. In chapter 1 of Ohev Mishpat he rejected it in practice based on
Maimonides rule that if reason does not dictate a belief, then there are not sufficient
grounds to reinterpret the biblical text in a way that removes it from its plain meaning. In
other words, Duran rejected Platos view on Maimonidean grounds. Their views are not
identical because Gerondi was not referring only to the Platonic conception when he wrote
about one who accepts the Torah despite accepting the eternity of the world, justifying
this by thinking that it is Gods will that the worlds existence has not ceased, not that He
cannot be conceived to do its opposite, and thus his belief harms nothing in his Torah...
Nevertheless, the underlying criterion for Gerondi and Duran alike is divine volition.
Lost Works from Durans Old Age
In his bibliographical list, Duran briefly described a plethora of apparently massive
essays, all devoted to refuting asdai Crescas Or Hashem and written towards the end of
his life (1436-1438). This would seem to confirm that compositions related to principles by
such authors and Gerondi, Crescas and Albo did notreach him earlier in North Africa, and
that he was unaware of them until Crescas book found its way into his hands decades after
46 Kellners translation, p. 90.
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the death of its author. Duran seems to have found Or Hashem to be a shocking and deeply
disturbing book, for he described his lost writings as follows47
Book Eleven I addedpraise be added to His praises!thanksto the blessed God who added to my days, and I composed a book whichI called Or ha-ayyim (The Light of Life), full of refutations to a book
written by Rabbi asdai son of Judah of Saragosa in Aragon. There are55 chapters in it, the sign being Hen48 the fear of the Lord is wisdom.The author called his bookOr Hashem (The Light of the Lord), andwhen I wrote this book it was over six months since I began the seventy-sixth year of my life. I wrote it on the 25 th day of Elul of the year thekindnesses of David, which is also the year of the faithful, at the
portion for it is your life and the length of your days (Niavim, 5196).Book Twelve I have further merited that God lengthen my life to
this day, when I am seventy-seven years old, close to the end of theseventh year, and I wrote a book which I have called Livyat en; [itcontains] notes on the commentary to the Torah by our wise, perfect,
great relative Rabbi Levi ben Gershom of blessed memory. I wrote thison the second day of Kislev 5198, portion Vayishla. To this book Iadded two essays (iggerot) which I called `anakim (probablynecklaces), the first one refutations to the book Or Hashem written byRabbi asdai Crescas of blessed memory, and I called the second essayMaamar ha-Yiud le-Shimon ibn ema (The Treatise on Unity byShimon ibn ema), also about refutations to the bookOr Hashem, andtwo more essays on this matter.
What specific topics might these writings refuting Crescas have discussed? Only
one of them, The Treatise on Unity, which was the second appendix to Livyat Hen,
explicitly declares its topic through its title. The writing habits of Duran, however, make it
very likely that even this treatise digressed to many other topics.
The bookThe Light of Life with its 55 chapters, and the four essays (which may
themselves have been quite long, even full length books) could conceivably have dealt
with any passage in Or Hashem that inflamed the passion of Duran. There are numerous
possibilities
1. Above all, Crescas rejection of the classical proofs for the existence of the deity
must have seemed a travesty to Duran, for this is where in his view the Torah and rational
investigation are most in harmony, as exemplified by the partriarch Abraham (introduction
to Magen Avot). It is also highly likely that Durans Treatise on Unity attempted to shore up
the traditional proofs for the existence of God, whose foundations had been shaken by
Crescas.
2. Crescas critique of Aristotle The refutation of Maimonides 26 Aristotelian
47 Katan, vol.. 1, pp. 49-53.48 The numerical value ofhen is 55.
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axioms at the beginning of Part II of the Guide was sure to have aroused the ire of Duran.
For scientific matters such as the concept of time or the impossibility of a vacuumideas
that Duran accepted rather dogmatically, following a consensus that had been in force for
centuriesit must have troubled him deeply to see Crescas dismiss them in a few brief
pages.
3. Some of Crescas iconoclastic notions about certain principles must havetroubled Duran deeply The concept of eternal creation according to Crescas, human free
will, and determinism (in man and nature) are all prime examples.
4. Some of Crescas open questions in Part IV probably troubled Duran a very
great deal as well The possibility of other worlds, whether the spheres are souls and
whether they have astrological effects, the existence of demonsDuran had very definite
views about all of these things, and they were central to his world view.49
5. Finally, let us consider the very structure ofOr Hashem as a book of principlesof the Torah. As one who himself wrote about principles parallel to Crescas, Duran
structured Magen Avotbased upon a clear understanding of Maimonides 13 principles as
falling into three groups, a position he had already argued for in Ohev Mishpat. Crescas
novel organization of the Torahs principles on several different levels must have seemed
strange and foreign to him.
Overall, Crescas very rejection of Maimonides 13 principles must have troubled
Duran. When it comes to the specifics, he was likely surprised by a new analytic structure
for principles that reducedrather than increasedthe importance of creation (besides giving
it a highly unorthodox interpretation). Seeing other Maimonidean principles reduced to
specific beliefs enjoined by the Torah (recompense, resurrection, immutability of the
Torah, prophecy of Moses, Messiah) must have bothered him as well. The inclusion of
certain specific commandments as principles (Urim, prayer, priestly blessings, repentance,
holidays) probably also didnt make sense to Duran. But most importantly, the very idea of
rejecting Maimonides list outright, rather than justifying it and improving it through
modifications (i.e. derivative principles) as did Duran, surely ran against the most basic
instincts of the North African scholar. While Duran saw himself as completing
Maimonides work on the principles of the Torah, Crescas openly divestedhimself of that
work entirely and started again from scratch.
The five possibilities listed above are educated guesses; since the texts are lost,
there is no way to verify them. Any or all of them may have been discussed thoroughly by
Duran (only Unity is certain). Nevertheless, as someone so concerned with principles, and
so deeply awareeven before he read Crescasof the important place that creation may
49 Duran discussed these cosmological topics at great length in Part II ofMagen Avot(on prophecy). We willsurvey his views in chapter 4 along with explaining why these issues make up the bulk of Part II.
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hold in systems of principles, it is tempting to suggest that some of Durans refutations
were on this topic specifically. It seems very likelythough it cannot be proventhat
Duran discussed Crescas system of principles in his voluminous anti-Crescas literature,
and it is even possible that he devoted an entire book or treatise to the matter. Thus, the
author of the very first systematic analysis of the principles of the Torah and another full-
fledged book devoted to the topic, may very well have also written a secondsuch booktowards the end of his life. It is a pity that we will never know for sure.
Conclusion
The concept of a volitional God who acts within history is at the core of all the the
ideas and systems of principles of the Torah to be found among Gerondi and two
generations of his students. Maimonides had tied in that concept with the creation of the
world, which is why creation became a test-case for the definition of a principle of the
Torah. In the case of Duran, the issue of creation and miracles had a powerful impact on
the structure ofMagen Avot, for it led Duran to develop his idea of derivative principles
as a way to both explain and expand upon Maimonides list of 13.
Overall preoccupation with the principles of the Torahthe formulation of terms
for principles and lists of them, and the writing of books of principlesbegan with
Gerondi and not before, and was a hallmark of his school. It was already evident in the
writings of Gerondi and Abraham bar Judah decades before the full-length books of
principles were written (by Crescas, Duran and Albo). The necessary internal ingredients
for such preoccupation were deep involvement in the rabbinic tradition along with
sustained, positive yet skeptical interest in the Aristotelian corpus. These ingredients were
to be found in the school of Gerondi, but not in the previous rabbinic schools of Spain (of
Nahmanides and Rashba), for whom the intense struggle against the dangers inherent in the
study of philosophy, and the firm dedication to a deeply kabbalistic world view, precludedany such development. For the school of Gerondi, these internal ingredients were
supplemented by violent persecution from a creed-oriented Christianity on the outside,
which gave added impetus to the trend. The books of principles of the Torah produced by
Gerondis students are the primary literary products of a unique intellectual culture, one
that combined intense loyalty to traditional conceptions of the Torah with a deep
appreciationtempered by honest skepticismfor the achievements of rational inquiry.
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