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1 R.C.Lanza Accelerator Based Techniques for Detection of Explosives and SNM Richard Lanza MIT Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering IAEA RCM “Neutron Based Techniques for the Detection of Illicit Materials and Explosives” Johannesburg, South Africa 16 – 20 November 2009
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1R.C.Lanza

Accelerator Based Techniques for Detection of Explosives and SNM

Richard LanzaMIT

Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering

IAEA RCM“Neutron Based Techniques for the Detection of Illicit Materials and Explosives”Johannesburg, South Africa

16 – 20 November 2009

2R.C.Lanza

Outline• Overview• Explosives

– Neutron Resonance Radiography• Monoenergetic Neutron Radiography

• SNM– Materials of concern– Monoenergetic Gamma Radiography

• New Accelerator developments

3R.C.Lanza

Neutron Resonance Radiography

• Make transmission images of objects using high energy (MeV) neutrons• Attenuation by a particular element varies with energy in a manner unique to a given element• Utilizes element specific resonances in energy to enhance the contrast• Especially for imaging low Z elements such as carbon, oxygen and nitrogen, but can be extended to others• Utilize this contrast enhancement mechanism to produce elementally resolved images of objects under inspection

4R.C.Lanza

Advantages Of Using Neutron Attenuation

• Multiple Element (H,C,N,O +) Discrimination For 2-6 MeV Neutrons

• Proof Of Concept Application– Separation Of Diamonds

(Carbon) From Kimberlite Rock.

• Sensitivity scales as 1/R2 rather than 1/R4– TNA or PFNA detect excited

gammas which adds another factor of 1/R2 for overall scaling of 1/R4

5R.C.Lanza

NRR concept• Like dual energy x-ray machines, NRR uses multiple neutron energies to extract information.

• Each energy produces its own equation.Consider a simple set of linear equations:2H + 3C + N + 2O = 85H + 4C + 3N + O = 133H + C + 2N +3O = 9H + C + 2N + 3O = 7Solving the set of equations will tell how much of each element is present. A set of neutron attenuation images can be decomposed into contributions from each basis element.

6R.C.Lanza

NRR prototype concept: Accelerator rotates to vary neutron energy

7R.C.Lanza

NRR Prototype System – Side View

8R.C.Lanza

System components• Deuteron RFQ accelerator generates incoming d+ beam• Beam transport system focuses beam onto deuterium gas target to make neutrons.• Rotation of accelerator and adjustable collimator allows

variation of neutron energies• Neutron detection via plastic scintillator and photomultiplier tube. • Custom readout electronics / data acquisition provides

experimental control and data recording.• Prototype built in 2006 at Bates Linear Accelerator Center in warehouse with minimal climate control (airport

conditions).

9R.C.Lanza

Elemental Cross Sections-Theory vs. Measurement

Nitrogen

Oxygen Silicon

Carbon

10R.C.Lanza

Elemental Calibrations- Measurement of Melamine chemical composition

(constrained by angle selection)

11R.C.Lanza

Elemental Calibrations: Measurement of Ammonium Nitrate chemical composition

(unconstrained angle selection)

12R.C.Lanza

Application: Detection of explosives in air cargo

13R.C.Lanza

LD3 Container

14R.C.Lanza

LD3 Container

Explosive Simulant,Oxygen Detection1.0 m cargo

Carbon block, Carbon detection 1.5 m cargo

Carbon block, Carbon detection, 0.5 m cargo

15R.C.Lanza

LD3 Container

Carbon Image with detection

Detection targets100cm Hydrangeas

Total elemental map (H+C+N+O+Si)

16R.C.Lanza

Carbon in cut flowers.

Target correctly and automatically detected in typical air cargo background

17R.C.Lanza

Detection of SNM Using NRR Facility

• Basic Approach– Use fast neutrons from NRR to induce

fission in SNM– Detect fission neutrons and/or fission

gammas– Large area detectors located out of

neutron beam

18R.C.Lanza

Detection of SNM Using NRR Facility

• What radiation to detect?– Fission neutrons during RFQ pulse

• Requires a “gamma-blind” detector• Possible candidate is large liquid scintillator

– Delayed fission neutrons– Delayed (10’s of s) high energy gammas > 3MeV

• May be a unique signature for fission products of SNM• Great penetration of cargo for easier detection• Does not require good energy resolution• May be able to use liquid scintillator for both neutrons and γ’s

19R.C.Lanza

Advantages of this approach• Container is imaged with existing NRR neutron beam• Require relatively small add-on to current NRR system• Present design allows increased interrogation time for suspicious regions

• Pulsed nature of RFQ allows for both prompt and delayed γand neutron detection

• Keeping neutron energy below 10 MeV avoids production of interfering 6.1 MeV γ from 16O(n,p)16N and 7.1 s decay of 16N

20R.C.Lanza

Catastrophic Event Matrix

High Medium LowLikelihood

21R.C.Lanza

What is the SNM problem?• Active detection and localization of small quantities of fissile materials in containers

• Minimize dose• Reduce size and cost• Separate Hi-Z (> 74) and low-Z materials• Separate W, Pb, U• Separate 235U and 238U

22R.C.Lanza

Area of Destruction from 2 kTon Nuclear Weapon

(from T. Postel, MIT)

23R.C.Lanza

Small quantities of Fissile Material are Involved

• Nuclear weapons need only about 1-2 critical masses of weaponizable material

• Critical assembly must be supercritical to explode• Chart shows the critical masses for some weapon isotopes• Bare refers to the critical mass of a sphere of material without anything surrounding it• Reflected refers to the critical mass when surrounded by a neutron reflector such as Iron or Tungsten• Using a neutron reflector always

reduces the critical mass• Generally a few tens of kilograms or less of material will be involved.

15

4354

10

36

12

75

8718

32

5

20

5

31

3

120

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

92-U

-233

92-U

-235

93-N

p-237

94-P

u-239

94-P

u-240

94-P

u-241

95-A

m-24

1

94-P

u-242

96-C

m-24

3

Isotope

Critic

al Ma

ss (k

g)

Bare Reflected

M.V. Hynes 2009

24R.C.Lanza

Critical Mass and U-235 Enrichment

•Critical mass of U-235 depends on enrichment level.•HEU is formally any enrichment above 20%•WGU is formally any enrichment above 80%•Any enrichment above about 20% can be weaponized•Smaller masses are preferred because it is a lot of metal to move around with a propellant

M.V. Hynes 2009

25R.C.Lanza

Background Neutrons are a Problem Because of Predetonation Probability

• Predetonation happens when the chain reaction is triggered before the device is fully assembled– Due to spontaneous fission neutrons

– Due to (alpha,n) reactions with Oxygen– This is called a fizzle

• The rate of neutron emissions is plotted in adjoining graphs for various isotopes (top) and oxides (bottom)• For U-235 this rate is very small• For Pu-240 and Pu-238 the rate is very high• Keeping the Plutonium metal free of oxides suppresses the (alpha,n) reactions

FOUO

FOUO

1.0E-041.0E-031.0E-021.0E-011.0E+001.0E+011.0E+021.0E+031.0E+04

U-235 Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240

Isotope

Neutr

ons/s

-gr1.0E+00

1.0E+01

1.0E+02

1.0E+03

1.0E+04

1.0E+05

(238)PuO2 (239)PuO2 (240)PuO2Isotope Oxide

Neutr

ons/s

-gr

M.V. Hynes 2009

26R.C.Lanza

Fizzle Yields can be Substantial

• Fizzles happen when the neutron background triggers the chain reaction before the assembly is complete– Only a problem for Plutonium– All Pu weapons have a chance for a Fizzle

• For a Plutonium implosion weapon can use LANL model to estimate probabilities and yields– 45 generations of neutrons, time for supercriticality, and time between generations are assumed values– Graph shows probability of full yield versus background

• Every Pu implosion weapon has a minimum yield regardless of Pu grade.– What changes with grade is the likelihood it will perform at the minimum yield– In LANL model Ymin = 0.027Y0 where Y0 is the design yield– For a 20Kt design Ymin = 540 tons– This is 54 times bigger than a MOAB

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.0E+04 1.0E+05 1.0E+06 1.0E+07

Neutron Background (per sec)Pr

obab

ility o

f Full

Yield

Weapon grade

Reactor grade

FOUO

FOUO

M.V. Hynes 2009

27R.C.Lanza

Nuclear Effects of 500 Ton Burst

• 500 Ton burst in Manhattan -– GZ at 42rd and Fifth Avenue– Three prompt nuclear effects– Radiation – 500 rads is LD50– Overpressure – 5psi is edge of survivability– Thermal – 3rd degree burns is edge of survivability

• All effects increase getting closer to GZ• Deaths for daytime burst

– Blast – 27,500 – Radiation (LD50) – 44,700

• About 70,000 people dead from a fizzle• Not corrected for urban environment

500 rad dose5 psi blast

3rd degree burns

Unclassified

Unclassified

M.V. Hynes 2009

28R.C.Lanza

Basic Approach• The fundamental approach is to generate both neutrons and monoenergetic gamma rays by means of low energy nuclear reactions.

• This multi-particle method images the SNM through shielding and also identifies it by inducing fission in the suspect material.

• Use transmission imaging to locate high-Z materials

• Use photofission and/or neutron induced fission as final check

29R.C.Lanza

Multi-particle Probing

30R.C.Lanza

Why use Monoenergetic Gamma Imaging?

• orders of magnitude reduction in dose• enhanced sensitivity in detection and verification• lower requirements for shielding• ability to reduce the size of the source part of the system by an order of magnitude or more while still meeting requirements for detection and identification of SNM

• flexibility in detection through radiography and active probing with the same device

31R.C.Lanza

Transmission Issues

32R.C.Lanza

Dose Matters!• ANSI 43.14 standard “Radiation Safety Guidelines for

Active Interrogation Systems for Security Screening of Cargo” (now in draft) – Allows as much as 5 mSv (500 mrem) to potential stowaways– But, principle of ALARA remains in place for all such systems

• requires making every reasonable effort to maintain exposures toradiation as far below the regulatory dose as practical, taking into consideration the state of technology, the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations

• Monoenergetic approach reduces dose to less than a mrem

• Reduced dose meets ALARA and allows for portable systems and reduced amounts of shielding

33R.C.Lanza

Some Candidate Reactions

34R.C.Lanza

Use Reaction d(11B,n)12C at 4 MeV• Produces fast neutrons peaking at around 12 MeV (with a broad distribution at lower energies)

• Intense gamma rays at 4.4 and 15.1 MeV– others at 10.7 and 12.7 MeV

35R.C.Lanza

11B(d,γ) Reaction Gammas

36R.C.Lanza

Neutron Yields for Various Targets

37R.C.Lanza

Transmission Statistics100 cc U cube 4.64 thickness 40 Fe thickness cm

1/cm SNR = 5Energy Fe trans ratio Counts Out Counts In counts U U trans ratio

4.4 0.2551163 0.3060633 0.948493 30.6 8.28E+05 0.63 0.8380145 0.0204633 3.79820310.7 0.2366538 0.3334438 1.033345 27.2 3.52E+05 0.26 1.005596 0.0094019 1.74508512.7 0.2395002 0.329068 1.019785 26.7 3.87E+05 0.19 1.062475 0.0072206 1.34022115.1 0.2437217 0.3226838 1 26.3 4.50E+05 0.14 1.125574 0.0053876 1

Object solid angle(sr) at200 cm 5.38E-04Source strengthphotons/sec/sr at 100 microA

dose comversion photons time doserem/hr/photon/cm2/s on cube (sec) mrem photons/cm2/s dose rem/hr

4.4 6.00E+09 6.00E-06 3.23E+06 2.6E-01 6.4E-02 1.50E+05 9.00E-0110.7 2.00E+07 1.10E-05 1.08E+04 3.3E+01 5.0E-02 5.00E+02 5.50E-0312.7 4.00E+07 1.20E-05 2.15E+04 1.8E+01 6.0E-02 1.00E+03 1.20E-0215.1 6.66E+08 1.50E-05 3.59E+05 1.3E+00 8.7E-02 1.67E+04 2.50E-01

Total Dose Rate 1.17E+00

"Counts out" are the number of detected photons required to distinguish between material when U is substituted for Fe and is the number that pass through the iron without U. Counts U is the number that pass through the region with Fe and U.The SNR is shown above. The total attenuation must still be such that sufficient number of events pass through the bulk of material with a non-U thickness given above. "Counts in" is the total input to a non-U block. A "pixel" in this case is just the area of the face of the block.

38R.C.Lanza

15.1 MeV Transmission Image

100 cc U cube in 40 cm Fe block imaged with 15.1 MeV gammas (MCNPX simulation)

39R.C.Lanza

Identifying SNM• Transmission measurement alone only identifies high-Z material

• Use two approaches to distinguish 235U by detection of fission products– Utilize photofission– Probe with low energy neutrons (< 1MeV)

40R.C.Lanza

Probing With Multiple Energies

41R.C.Lanza

Photonuclear Cross-sections

42R.C.Lanza

Potential Reactions at Higher Energies

Parameters:Produce γ’s >10MeVUse 9 MeV (p) cyclotron

43R.C.Lanza

More Reactions

44R.C.Lanza

Accelerators for this task• Low energy (<500 keV) nuclear reactions• High energy 5 -10 MeV or greater reactions– RFQ

• Difficult to vary particle type and energy– Compact Superconducting Cyclotrons

45R.C.Lanza

The MIT Nanotron: An ultracompactsuperconducting 10 MeV classical cyclotron

46R.C.Lanza

Some Conclusions• Monoenergetic gamma transmission imaging appears practical• Dose is orders of magnitude lower than alternative approaches• Compact accelerator designs are possible

– Smaller, lighter and lower power than alternatives– Flexible design in form factor and reaction choice– Can also be intense neutron sources

• (p,Be) at 12 MeV gives 4.2 x 1012 n/s @ 100 microA)– Shield the target not the machine

• Multi-particle approach gives both position and isotopic identification of SNM • Measurements conducted on full scale NRR prototype conclusively show multi-element discrimination possible with NRR.• Capability to measure rough chemical formulas demonstrated.• Automated detection based on elemental maps in air cargo sized objects demonstrated.• Dual use applications include special nuclear material detection, liquid explosives detection.

47R.C.Lanza

Acknowledgements• Timothy Antaya MIT PSFC• Curtis Bell DHS• Gordon Kohse MIT NRL• Dave Perticone L-3• Rich Sheffield LANL• Vitaliy Ziskin L-3• Bates Accelerator Lab MIT


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