ADMIN LAW CASE DIGEST

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25024 March 30, 1970

TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago, petitioner-appellant, vs.MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO,respondents-appellees.

Teodoro M. Santiago for petitioner-appellant.

Ramon C. Carag for respondent-apellees.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing, on a motion to dismiss, its Civil Case No. 2012 — for certiorari, injunction and damages — on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action, and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying

the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal.

The record shows that at the time Civil Case No. 2012 was commenced in the court below, appellant Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista, Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, against the above-named committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.

The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia: that plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st, 1965 with thehonor rank of

third place, which is disputed; that the teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor", whose grave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit, while the other defendants were included as Principal, District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school; that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third; that Santiago, Jr. had been prejudiced, while his closest rival had been so much benefited, by the circumstance that the latter, Socorro Medina, was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil; that the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI; that there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85%, and some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank at the end of the school year; that several district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and

other than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such district examinations were not advisable; that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural; that the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made; that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances; and, that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00. They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965, and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The injunction prayed for was denied by the lower court in its order of May 20, 1965, the said court reasoning out that the graduation exercises were then already set on the following day, May 21, 1965, and the restraining of the same would

be shocking to the school authorities, parents, and the community who had eagerly looked forward to the coming of that yearly happy event. As scheduled, the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21, with the same protested list of honor students.

Having been required by the above-mentioned order to answer the petition within ten (10) days, respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead. Under date of May 24, 1965, they filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds (1) that the action for certiorari was improper, and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action, the question brought before the court had already become academic. This was opposed by petitioner.

In an order dated June 4, 1965, the motion to dismiss of respondents was granted, the court reasoning thus:

The respondents now move to dismiss the petition for being improper and for being academic. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss, the Court has carefully examined the petition to determine the sufficiency of the alleged cause of action constituting the special civil action of certiorari.

The pertinent portions of the petition alleging 'grave abuse of discretion' are found in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. These allegations may be substantially summarized as follows: Paragraph 3 alleges that since grades one to six, the students closely contending for class honors were Socorro

Medina, Teodoro Santiago, Jr., Dolores Dalican and Patricia Liñgat.

Socorro Medina obtained first honor thrice (grades I, V and VI); once second honor (grade IV), and twice third place (grades II and III).

Teodoro Santiago, Jr. obtained first place once (grade IV); four times second place (grades I, II, III, and V) and once third place (grade VI).

Dolores Dalican obtained twice first place (grades II, III); once third place (grade I).

Patricia Liñgat once third place (grade V); and once second place (grade VI).

That as now ranked in the graduation Liñgat is given second place while Teodoro Santiago, Jr., is given the third place only. This is the ranking now disputed by petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, Jr.

Paragraph 4 alleges that Socorro Medina was tutored in the summer of 1964 by Mrs. Rosalinda Alpas who became her English teacher in the sixth grade; that as such, Mrs. Alpas unjustly favored Socorro against her rivals.

Paragraph 5 alleges that the teachers who composed the committee on honor students are all grade six teachers while the Service Manual For Teachers provides that the committee shall be composed of the teachers from the fifth and sixth grades.

Paragraph 6 alleges that there are direct and circumstantial evidence showing the change of ratings of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat from 80% to 85% and the intention to junk petitioner to a lower rank.

Paragraph 7 alleges that the giving of district examinations upon which ratings were partly based were not advisable.

Paragraph 8 alleges that the teachers rated Socorro Medina a perfect pupil which is unnatural.

Paragraph 9 alleges that on the first grade certificate of the petitioner the word "First Place" was erased and changed to "Second Place".

Paragraph 10 alleges that petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities but they only 'passed the buck to each other.'

SECOND PARAGRAPH VIOLATED

Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

'Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court

alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings, as the law requires, of such tribunal, board or officer.'

'The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.'

It is striking, indeed, that this petition has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order complained of, together with all pleadings and documents which are relevant thereto, as required by the second, paragraph of the aforequoted rule. This violation renders the petition extremely indefinite and uncertain. There is no written formal judgment or order of respondents that is submitted for revision or correction of this Court. This violation is fatal to the petition.

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES NEGLECTED

All that the petition alleges is that the petitioner personally appealed to the school authorities who only 'passed the buck to each other.' This allegation does not show that petitioner formally availed of and exhausted the administrative remedies of the Department of Education. The petition implies that this is the first formal complaint of petitioner against his teachers. The

administrative agencies of the Department of Education could have investigated the grievances of the petitioner with dispatch and give effective remedies, but petitioner negligently abandoned them. Petitioner cannot now claim that he lacked any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to real grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the petition states no cause of action and should be, as it is hereby dismissed.

Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof, but the same proved to be futile, hence, this appeal.

Appellant here assails the holding of the lower court that his petition states no cause of action on the grounds — discussed by the court a quo in the appealed order above-quoted — (1) that the petition does not comply with the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 65 because it has not been accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment or order subject thereof, together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto; (2) that

administrative remedies were not first exhausted; and (3) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the teachers who constituted the committee referred to. On the other hand, appellees maintain that the court below did not err in dismissing the case on said grounds. Further, they argue in favor of the questioned order of dismissal upon the additional ground that the "committee on the ratings of students for honor" whose actions are here condemned by appellant is not the "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions" against which an action for certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

The last point raised by appellees deserves first consideration, for if really the said committee of teachers does not fall within the category of the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65, further discussion of the issues raised by appellant may no longer be necessary. To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:

In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.' (Section 1, Rule 67.) A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court (34 C.J. 1182). In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or

officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.

'Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered. It implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on the one hand — for the tribunal must decide according to law and the rights of the parties — or with dictation on the other; for in the first instance it must exercise its own judgment under the law, and not act under a mandate from another power. ... The character of its action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the country or State, as in its varied jurisdictions it may by turns be each.' (In Re Saline County Subscription, 100 Am. Dec. 337, 338, cited in Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 181 S. E. 836-837.)

'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of

parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.' (State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of St. Louis County, et al. v. Dunn, 90 N. W. 772-773.)

(2) the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.

'The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject

matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.' (34 C.J. 1183-1184.) .

(3) the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to

the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.

... the distinction between legislative or ministerial functions and judicial functions is difficult to point out. What is a judicial function does not depend solely upon the mental operation by which it is performed or the importance of the act. In solving this question, due regard must be had to the organic law of the state and the division of power of government. In the discharge of executive and legislative duties, the exercise of discretion and judgment of the highest order is necessary, and matters of the greatest weight and importance are dealt with. It is not enough to make a function judicial that it requires discretion, deliberation, thought, and judgment. It must be the exercise of discretion and judgment within that subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. If the matter, in respect to which it is exercised, belongs to either of the two last-named departments of government, it is not judicial. As to what is judicial and what is not seems to be better indicated by the nature of a thing, than its definition.' (Whealing & Elm Grove Railroad Co. Appt. v. Town of Triadelphia, et al., 4 L.R.A. (N. S.) pp. 321, 328-329.)

[Emphasis supplied]1

'WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to the writ ofcertiorari. It is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word is used when applied to the courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the

officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be their public character. ...' "In State ex rel. Board of Commrs. vs. Dunn (86 Minn. 301, 304), the following statements were made:

'The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,

he acts judicially.'2

It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task. From the above-quoted portions of the decision cited, it will be gleaned that before tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. As pointed out by appellees,3

however, there is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore

automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.

At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs. Leuterio, etc., et al.,4

the issue presented for determination was whether or not the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions. It was reasoned out thus:

For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by schools and colleges in this islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914 and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of judges afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not reflect the audience's preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to

invoke judicial intervention; for it is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable.

Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes are secondary.

No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because theirs was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right unless and until they were proclaimed winners of the competition by the appointed arbiters or referees or judges.

Incidentally, these school activities have been imported from the United States. We found in American jurisprudence no litigation questioning the determination of the board of judges.

Now, the fact that a particular action has had no precedent during a long period affords some reason for doubting the existence of the right sought to be enforced, especially where occasion for its assertion must have often arisen; and courts are cautious before allowing it, being loath to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with

the generally accepted views thereon. (See C.J.S. Vol. 1, p. 1012.)

We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter, the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction.

The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. 'Wrong' as used in the aforesaid principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges.

Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of 'damnum absque injuria'. This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.

But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did, that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of appellant to comply with the requirements of

Section 1 of Rule 65. To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany his petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto "is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but by precedents as well. In the case of Alajar, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations,5

where it was claimed by therein petitioners that the respondent court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in estimating certain rice harvests involved in the case in terms of cavans instead of cans, allegedly in complete disregard of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191,6

and in ordering thereafter the division of the said rice harvests on the ratio of 70-30 in favor of the tenants, this Court denied the petition for certiorari on the ground, among others, of failure on the part of said petitioners to attach to their petition copies of the decisions allegedly violated. Speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes then, this Court held:

The petition is patently without merit. In the first place, it is not even sufficient in form and substance to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari prayed for. It charges that the Court of Industrial Relations abused its discretion in disregarding the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Expropriation Proceedings No. 84 and of this Court in G.R. No. L-6191; yet it does not attach to the petition the decisions allegedly violated by the Court below and point out

which particular portion or portions thereof have been disregarded by the respondent Court.

The same principle was applied in the more recent case of NAWASA vs. Municipality of Libmanan, et al.,7

wherein this Court dismissed (by Resolution) the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority against the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and the municipality of Libmanan. In the following language, this Court emphasized the importance of complying with the said requirement of Rule 65:

While paragraph 3 of the petition speaks of the complaint filed by the respondent municipality with the respondent court for recovery of property with damages (Civil Case No. L-161) no copy thereof is attached to the petition.

Similarly, paragraph 4 of the petition mentions the decision rendered by the respondent court on December 10, 1965, but no copy thereof is attached to the petition.

Again, paragraph 5 of the petition speaks of the order of default entered by the respondent court and of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the case above-mentioned, but no copy of the order of default is attached to its petition.

Bearing in mind that the petition under consideration was filed for the purpose of enjoining the respondent court from executing the decision

rendered in Civil Case No. L-161, the importance of the missing pleadings is obvious.

Moreover, the petition is also for the purpose of securing an order commanding the respondent court to approve either the original or the amended record on appeal filed petition, but no copy of either is attached to its petition.

In view of the foregoing, the petition under consideration is dismissed.

It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition. The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers — as the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate — which appellant never bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65

above-mentioned. With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other two errors assigned by appellant.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Ruperto vs. Torres, et al., L-8785, February 25, 1957, (Unreported).

2 Municipal Council of Lemery vs. Provincial Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 268.

3 See pp. 5-6, Brief for Appellees.

4 91 Phil. 482 (May 30, 1952).

5 G.R. Nos. L-8174 and L-8280-86, October 8, 1955, 97 Phil. 675.

6 Republic of the Philippines vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461.

7 L-27197, May 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 337.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41315 November 13, 1986

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE OIL INDUSTRY COMMISSION and MANUEL B. YAP, respondents.

Angara, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Office for petitioner.

J. T. Barrera & Associates for respondent Manuel B. Yap.

PARAS, J.:

This is a Petition for certiorari assailing certain orders issued by respondent Oil Industry Commission (hereinafter known as OIC) in OIC Case No. 144.

Briefly the facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and superseded in the year 1969 (Annex "A") of the petition). The latter was

filed and registered with the OIC on April 30, 1971 as required by Republic Act #6173 (R.A. #6173).

While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their contract as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement, " to wit:

5. Effective Date, Direction and Termination of Agreement. -This Agreement, duly signed by the DEALER, shall become effective for both parties first of January, 1969 and shall continue indefinitely thereafter, until terminated by either party giving to the other ninety (90) days notice in writing of such termination.

Respondent Yap filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo docketed as Civil Case No. 9507 for damages with preliminary injunction against petitioner Shell Respondent Yap questioned the validity of the exercise by petitioner of its contractual right to terminate the contract. Barely less than a month from the filing of his complaint, respondent Yap again filed with the respondent OIC Case #144 where he likewise raised the same issue. Without affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the matter, respondent OIC issued anex-parte preliminary mandatory injunction commanding

petitioner to perform the following acts: 1) to continue selling to respondent Yap petroleum products 2) to maintain the status quo insofar as the operation by respondent Yap of the gasoline station is concerned 3) to sub t a verified statement of the unpaid accounts of respondent Yap.

Petitioner Shell also filed a complaint with the then CFI of Cebu docketed as Civil Case No. 13675 to collect the long overdue debts of respondent Yap. Shell filed with the OIC an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Dissolve the Writ (Annex "I") and filed its answer to complaint of respondent Yap principally impugning the jurisdiction of the OIC. A decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 13675 ordering respondent Yap to pay his overdue liabilities: 1) P47,537.30 representing the value of petroleum products he bought from the petitioner 2) P1,000, litigation expenses 3) P5,000, attorney's fees.

Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right because the stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within which to pay his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in Civil Case No. 13675.

Petitioner Shell moved for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it. However, a modification was made by declaring that the permission it gave respondent Yap to pay

his judgment debt was "merely a suggestion." OIC ordered that petitioner must comply within ten (10) days from notice.

The issues now of the petition are the aforementioned orders of the respondent OIC, petitioner Shell submitting that they are null and void on any, or all, of the following grounds:

1. Respondent OIC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.

2. Respondent Manuel B. Yap himself first invoked the jurisdiction of the then CFI of Iloilo to resolve the dispute so that he is now estopped from impugning the jurisdiction of the civil courts.

3. Peremptory declaration by respondent OIC that the contractual stipulation that either party may declare the contract terminated after a 90-day written notice constitutes an "unfair and onerous trade practice" is an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contracts and a deprivation of property without due process of law.

4. There is no factual basis for respondent OIC's conclusion and ruling that the disputed contract is an "unfair and onerous trade practice."

The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act (R.A. #6173) will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon respondent OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of

course a well settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers. As We declared in Miner vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):

. . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to, or in connection with, the performance of administrative duties which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.

Sec. 6 of R.A. #6173 restricts the extent and scope of the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub-paragraphs "a" to "f".

A contrary interpretation would collide with the familiar principles of statutory construction that, in making a detailed enumeration, the law-making body intended to accomplish a purpose and that the all-embracing and general word "jurisdiction" must be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory (not judicial) powers.

The phrase "to set the conditions" under subparagraph "a" refers to the right to prescribe rules of conduct. It appertains to rule-making functions and cannot include quasi-judicial

powers. The limitations of supervision and regulation are reiterated in the provisions of Sec. 7 (4) (d), to wit:

(4) (d) To regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry in order to encourage orderly competition, prevent monopolies and collusive practices within the industry, giving due regard to the ecological and environmental needs of the country;

There is no question that respondent Yap first invoked the jurisdiction of the then CFI of Iloilo to resolve the dispute and without waiting for the determination of the issues, he filed a complaint with respondent OIC raising the same issues. Respondent Yap thus submitted a single and indivisible controversy to two different entities. This cannot be permitted without making a mockery of justice.

It is not amiss to mention that even before the creation of the OIC in 1971, petitioner Shell and respondent Yap were already bound by their dealership agreement. From the time said agreement was registered with the OIC as required by R.A. 6173, respondent OIC never informed the petitioner that said agreement or any of its provisions was contrary to the provisions of R.A. No. 6173. Neither did respondent Yap show any disapproval of the provisions of Sec. 5 of their agreement. Said provision is not contrary to law.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of respondent OIC, in OIC Case #144 are hereby declared null and void.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr, and Cruz, JJ., concur.

Fernan, J., took no part.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or

official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their

representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary

restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they

were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10

6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very

badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of

administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,

receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.

The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being

within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases

against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa

I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their parents;

(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend the same;

(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.

The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.

# Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa

I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their parents;

(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend the same;

(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.

The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 6-13.

2 G.R. No. 95445 (Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v. Hon. Perfecto Laguio, Jr., etc., et al) and G.R. No. 95590 (Alliance of Concerned Teachers [ACT], et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cariño, etc., et al.).

3 (Joint) Resolution, G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, prom. Aug. 6, 1991, pp. 3-4.

4 Rollo, p. 7.

5 Id., p. 7.

6 Also impleaded as respondents were other teachers, Adelaida dela Cruz, Ma. Teresa Rizardo, Rita Atabelo and Digna Operiano (Rollo, p. 77).

7 Rollo, pp. 77-78.

8 Id., pp. 77-81.

9 Id., pp. 7-8, and 47-50 (Annex "I," petition: Decision of Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio in Civil

Case No. 90-54468 of the RTC of Manila [Branch 18] entitled Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al. v. Hon. Isidro Cariño and Hon. Erlinda Lolarga).

10 Id., pp. 8; 51-52 (Annex J, Petition: Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of 7 affiants including respondents Budoy, Babaran, and del Castillo), and 53-54 (Annex K, petition: sworn statement given by Apolinario Esber under questioning by Nicanor S. Agustin, CHR).

11 Id., p. 56: Order in Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90-775, 1st par., p. 1.

12 Id., 1st and 2nd pars., p. 1.

13 Id., pp, 56-57.

14 Id., pp, 11-58-76 (Annex M, petition).

15 SEE footnote 8 and related text, supra.

16 SEE footnote 3, supra.

17 Rollo, p. 11.

18 Id., pp. 12-13.

19 Including Regional Trial Courts designated and acting as Special Agrarian Courts, and the Court of Tax Appeals. SEE Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 eff. April 1, 1991.

20 Vested with judicial authority or quasi-judicial powers are such agencies, boards or officers like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform, Government Service Insurance System, Employees' Compensation Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission. SEE Circular No. 1-91, supra. Also possessed of quasi-judicial authorities are department heads and heads of office under the Civil Service Law, and the Ombudsman.

21 The nature of a "judicial function" was inter alia described in Republic of the Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 90478 as follows: "The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison d'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second after that determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively, definitively and finally."

. . . "It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially." . . . Mun. Council of Lemery v. Prov. Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260, 270, citing State ex rel. Boards of Commrs. v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 304.

It has been held that a special civil action of certiorari "would not lie to challenge action of the "Integrity Board" set up by Executive

Order No. 318 of May 25, 1950, because that board, like the later Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, was not invested with judicial functions but only with power to investigate charges of graft and corruption in office and to submit the record, together with findings and recommendations, to the President." Ruperto v. Torres G.R. No. L-8785, Feb. 25, 1957 (Unrep., 100 Phil. 1098) (Rep. of the Phil. Digest, Vol. 1, Certiorari, Sec. 22, p. 430).

Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., treating of "jurisdiction" in relation to a criminal case, states it to be "the power of a court to inquire into the fact, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment, in a regular course of judicial proceeding . . ." In Black's Law Dictionary 5th Ed., "adjudge" is defined as: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle

or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment (emphasis supplied).

22 A distinguished Member of the Constitutional Commission that drew up the 1987 Constitution, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., citing the Commission's official records, states that the "principal function of the Commission (on Human Rights) is investigatory. In fact, in terms of law enforcement, this pretty much is the limit of its function. Beyond investigation, it will have to rely on the Justice Department which has full control over prosecutions. Thus, under Section 18 (9) it can only request assistance from executive offices." (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, a Commentary, 1988 ed., Vol. II p. 503/).

23 Art. XIII, Sec. 17. (1).

24 Id., Sec. 17. (3).

25 Id., Sec. 18.

26 E.g.: the prosecution of persons guilty of crimes, or institution of civil or administrative proceedings; exercise of visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; the submission of recommendations to the Congress of measures to promote human rights provide for compensation to victims of violations thereof, etc.

27 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is: "To search or inquire into; to examine (a matter) systematically or in detail; to make an inquiry or examination into." The American College Encyclopedic Dictionary (1959 ed.) defines (a) "investigate" as "to search or examine into the particulars of; examine in detail;" and (b) "investigation," an act or process of investigating; a searching inquiry in order to ascertain facts; a detailed or careful examination.

28 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.

29 Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.

30 Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is "To adjudge; to award; "to give something controverted to one of the litigants, by a sentence or decision. . . . To try and determine judicially; to pronounce by sentence of court. . . . To sit in judgment and pronounce sentence; to act as a judge, or court of judgment."

31 Id., the Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., 1961) definition is "To settle, determine, or decide judicially; to adjudicate upon; . . . To pronounce or decree by judicial sentence . . . To award judicially; to grant, bestow, or impose by judicial sentence . . . ."

32 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.; in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, "adjudicate" is defined as: "To give judgment; to render or award judgment," and "adjudge" as: "To give judgment; to decide, to sentence." In Bouvier's Law Dictionary Third Revision (8th Ed.), "adjudication" is defined as "A judgment; giving or pronouncing judgment in a case. Determination in the exercise of judicial power."

33 SEE footnotes 6 to 8, and 15, and related text, supra.

34 SEE footnotes 16 and 17 related text, supra.

35 SEE footnote 26, supra.

Cariño v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook “mass concerted actions” to “dramatize and highlight” their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter’s attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.

ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

RULING: No.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to “investigate,” cannot and not “try and resolve on the merits” (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,

their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995

LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs.ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the

Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.

On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.

Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on which it is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.

Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a dispute are compelled by the government to forego their right to strike and are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party. 1The essence of arbitration remains since a resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested third party whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed by the government.

Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a dispute by the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause in their collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final and binding resolution. 2Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to be complied with by both parties without delay, such that once an award has been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by both parties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed to have freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for that particular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutually acceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Above all, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator's decision.

In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for a machinery for the resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnel policies. 3

For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name and designate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, or include a procedure for

their selection, preferably from those accredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides for exclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBA and (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of the parties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the Labor Code has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:

. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;

3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts;

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

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It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter. 4

The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," 5

while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." 6

Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal

from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.

Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, 7

in effect equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of the Court, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.

In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the

settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 9

this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. 10

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

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(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial

agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicial instrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunal operating under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 11 that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included in the above-quoted provision.

An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 12 Thus, the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" are synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. 13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state, contemplates an

authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function. 14 An individual person, like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in the settling of an estate, 15 in the same manner that a sub-agent appointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court,16 and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state. 17

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein. It will be noted that, although the Employees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization, and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amending Sec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities 18 not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewable directly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.

In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. 19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court of Appeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforth remand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for proper disposition.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., concurs in the result.

Narvasa, C.J. and Melo, J. are on leave.

Footnotes

1 Seide, A Dictionary of Arbitration (1970).

2 Ibid.

3 Art. 260, Labor Code.


5 Art. 262-A, par. 4, Labor Code.


7 Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v. Romero, et al., 130 SCRA 392 (1984); Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, et al., 180 SCRA 177 (1989).

8 98 SCRA 314 (1980).

9 Supra.

10 Art. 262-A, in relation to Art. 217 (b) and (c), Labor Code, as amended by Sec. 9, R.A. 6715.

11 Executive Order No. 1008.

12 Laurens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 112 S.E. 2d 716, 719, 236 S.C. 2.

13 Govt. of P.I. v. Springer, et al., 50 Phil. 259, 334 (1927).

14 Ciulla v. State, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 545, 550, 191 Misc. 528.

15 In re Turncock's Estate, 300 N.W. 155, 156, 238 Wis. 438.

16 In re Brown Co., D.C. Me., 36 F. Supp. 275, 277.

17 Gagne v. Brush, D.C.N.H., 30 F. Supp. 714, 716.

18 First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. CA, et al., 231 SCRA 30 (1994).

19 Section 23, R.A. No. 876.


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC., respondents.

K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country

(per Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its Decision, dated October 24, 1986. 3 The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. The Resolution, dated September 24, 1987 disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986 Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner's own motion for reconsideration.

The facts are not in controversy. We quote:

On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.

The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task

Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. 5

Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.

In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:

1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners;

2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor;

3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had already been implemented and executed. 8

On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void.

Accordingly, the respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the personal properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the aforementioned search warrants.

SO ORDERED. 9

On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.

On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court.

In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:

Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883.

The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void.

Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable to the Office of the President.10

On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer' countenanced by

the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure.

As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolution(s) above-mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction," 11 specifically:

a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of the Supreme Court that no Regional Trial Courts may countermand or restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by a quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS Task Force;

b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its erroneous basis for reconsidering its previous Decision dated October 24, 1986 (see Annex "I") and thus promulgated the questioned Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers;

c) In not resolving directly the other important issues raised by the petitioner in its Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622-SP despite the fact that petitioner has demonstrated sufficiently and convincingly that

respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders in Special Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C" and 'D"), committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction:

1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to be seized as stated in the contested search warrant were too general which allegedly render the search warrants null and void; (b) the applications for the contested search warrants actually charged two offenses in contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not become moot and academic, even if the contested search warrants had already been fully implemented with positive results; and

2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936 'judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. 12

We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions that confront us are- (i) is the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and (ii) may the said presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.**

In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "express powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and punished under PD No.

1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the charges of foreign exchange violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi-judicial power or the power of adjudication ." 14

The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi-judicial powers to petitioner did not diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional, exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which come before them." 16

This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition below and its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co-equal with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with

such a jurisdiction. An examination of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review (of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is whether it is the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the Court of Appeals exercises:

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Court and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 18

xxx xxx xxx

Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on Constitutional Commissions, it is provided, in part that:

... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. 19

On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction:

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 20

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise:

... The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian case, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasi- judicial bodies and agencies and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. 21

xxx xxx xxx

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22

... The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now, Court of Appeals] from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. 23

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rule of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 24

Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, 25 jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal." 26

Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the Commission of Land Registration, en consults, are appealable to the Court of Appeals. 27

The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, 28 and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.29

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court.

A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." 30 The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:

(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.

(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.

(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.

(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.

(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the

Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. We quote:

SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force.-The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred to as Task Force, shall have the following powers and authority:

a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;

b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation;

c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, both oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws

or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;

d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and to adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.

xxx xxx xxx

f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country.

Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.

The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti- Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into

consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.

The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20 %) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20 %) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40 %) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force . 33

The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government either, the executive body appointed to investigate and prosecute cases involving "ill-gotten wealth". It had been vested with enormous powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar

processes, but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized authorities. It cannot pronounce judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34

If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.

In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.

It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task Force has been empowered to issue warrants of arrest, search, and seizure, makes it, ergo, a "semi-court". Precisely, it is the objection interposed by the private respondent, whether or not it can under the 1973 Charter, issue such kinds of processes.

It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent, the case has become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the question has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to resolve it as the final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution during whose regime the case was commenced.

Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 36 a 1975 decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein that, by virtue of the responsible officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest.37 Authorities, however, have continued to express reservations whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given such a power. 38

Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in which we categorically averred: Until now only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest." 40 "No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular responsible officer ." 41

Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the same question persisted following this Courts subsequent rulings upholding the President's alleged emergency arrest powers .42 [Mr. Justice Hugo Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not a species of "arrest" in its technical sense, and that the (deposed) Chief Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his capacity as a "responsible officer" under the 1973 Charter, but rather, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of emergency, or in order to carry out the deportation of undesirable aliens.43 In the distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts that can be done

without need of judicial intervention because they are not, precisely, judicial but Presidential actions.]

In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by the Local Government Code, 45 but had ceased to be one with the approval of the 1987 Constitution according judges sole authority to issue arrest and search warrants. But in the same breath, we did not rule the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of the former Constitution. We were agreed, though, that the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 46

In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on American jurisprudence, notably,Katz v. United States, 47 Johnson v. United States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which the American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors (like the petitioner) cannot be given such powers because of their incapacity for a "detached scrutiny" 50 of the cases before them. We affirm the Appellate Court.

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," 51 he stands, invariably, as the

accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.

It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.

According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Constitution was founded on the requirements of due process, notably, the assurance to the respondent of an unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers on which our republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially an executive function (the petitioner itself is chaired by the

Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the Constitution, the President has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they cannot be made to issue judicial processes without unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the courts.

At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter, although the Court hopes that this disposition has clarified a controversy that had generated often bitter debates and bickerings.

The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the scourge of "dollar- salting", a pernicious practice that has substantially drained the nation's coffers and has seriously threatened its economy. We recognize the menace it has posed (and continues to pose) unto the very stability of the country, the urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and foremost, the need for cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out campaign. But while we support the State's efforts, we do so not at the expense of fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and unreasonable acts of Government. If in the event that as a result of this ruling, we prove to be an "obstacle" to the vital endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing of valuable foreign exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, do not mean it. The Constitution simply does not leave us much choice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Cruz, Feliciano and Cortes, JJ. concur in the result.

Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Herrera, Manuel, J., Camilon and Magsino, JJ., Concurring.

2 Herrera, Manuel, J., Bellosillo and Magsino, JJ., Concurring.

3 Herrera, Manuel, J., Camilon and Magsino, JJ., Concurring.

4 Guadiz, Teofilo, presiding Judge, Branch CXLVII Makati, Metro Manila.

5 Order, dated April 16, 1985, 1.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id., 2. Reference to "Court" is Regional Trial Court.

9 Id., 9.

10 Decision, dated October 24, 1986, 4-5.

11 Petition, 6.

12 Id., 7-9.

** We decide this case notwithstanding the private respondent's prayer for extension to file a memorandum. (The Solicitor General has asked that he be excused from filing one). We do so since the pleadings on file with the Court have sufficiently shown the respective positions of the parties and since only questions of law are involved, questions we can already resolve without the aid of any more other pleading or paper.

13 Id., 15-16.

14 Id., 16.

15 Dated May 20, 1988.

16 Id., 2-3.

17 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

18 Supra, sec. 9, Par. (3).

19 CONST. (1987), art. IX (B), sec. 7.

20 Supra, sec. 19, par. (6).

21 Supra, sec. 23.

22 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC, DATED JANUARY 11, 1983, PROVIDING FOR

THE INTERIM OR TRANSITIONAL RULES AND GUIDELINES RELATIVE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1981 (B.P. BLG. 129).

23 Supra, par. 22, subpar. (c).

24 Rep. Act. No. 5434, sec. 1.

25 The Court of Agrarian Relations for instance, was abolished by Batas Blg. 129, sec. 44. The Labor Code, sec. 298, on the other hand, abolished the Court of Industrial Relations.

26 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. L-56398, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219, 225.

27 Pres. Decree No. 1529, sec. 117; Rep. Act No. 5434, sec. 1, supra.

28 Batas Blg. 129, supra, sec. 9(3), amending Pres. Decree No. 902-A, sec. 6.

29 Supra.

30 GONZALES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, A TEXT 13 (1979).

31 Id., 14-15.

32 See Pres. Decree No. 1883 as amended by Pres. Decree No. 2002.

33 Pres. Decree No. 1936, sec. 1; Pres. Decree No. 2002, supra, sec. 2; emphasis in original.

34 Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pena, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988; Feliciano, J., Concurring with qualifications. While the Regional Trial Courts may not take cognizance of cases involving the Commission, this is so because the various Executive Orders creating it specifically invested the Sandiganbayan of the jurisdiction, and not because it is co-equal with the said courts.

35 CONST. (1987), art. III, Sec. 2.

36 No. L-22554, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 299.

37 Supra, 306, fn. 7; emphasis supplied.

38 BERNAS, THE 1973 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION A REVIEWER-PRIMER 37 (1981).

39 Nos. L-34038, 34243, 36376, 38688, 39525, 40031, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 356.

40 Supra, 380.

41 Supra.

42 See Cruz v. Gatan No. 1,449 10, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 226 in which the Court sustained the Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order (ASSO) under General Order No. 2-A; Garcia-Padilla v.

Enrile, No. L-61398, April 20,1983,121 SCRA 472 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-61016-7, April 26,1983,121 SCRA 538, in which we held valid Presidential Commitment Orders) (PCOS) pursuant to Letters of Instructions Nos. 1125-A and 121 1; and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, No. L-61388, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 647, in which we recognized the validity of Presidential Detention Action(s) PDAs per Presidential Decree Nos. 1877 and 1877-A.

43 Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, supra, 604, Gutierrez, Jr., J., Concurring.

44 No. L-72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 647.

45 Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, sec. 143, pars. (1), (3).

46 Ponsica v. Ignalaga, supra, 662.

47 389 US 347 (1967).

48 333 US 10 (1948).

49 403 US 433 (197 1).

50 Resolution, dated September 24, 1987, id., 2.

51 Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462, 470.

52 CONST. (1987), art. VII, sec. 5.

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