JOINTPCTR/STC/STCEES

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NATO Parl iamentary Assembly

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS (PCTR),

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) AND SUB-COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY (STCEES)

VISIT TO WASHINGTON D.C. AND SAN FRANCISCO, UNITED STATES

MISSION REPORT*

9 – 13 JULY 2012

International Secretariat November 2012

* This Mission Report, prepared by Henrik Bliddal, Director of the Science and Technology Committee, and Steffen Sachs, Director of the Political Committee, is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly.

Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato - pa.int

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Thirty-eight legislators from 19 NATO member states, including NATO PA President Dr. Karl A. Lamers, visited Washington D.C. and San Francisco from 9 to 13 July 2012 to discuss a broad range of transatlantic security issues.

2. The state of the transatlantic relationship, the current situation in Afghanistan, relations with Pakistan, developments in the Middle East and North Africa, China, and Iran were among the discussed issues. In addition, unmanned aerial vehicles, energy security and biological threats featured prominently on the agenda of the visit. The meetings in Washington D.C. included an exchange with Congressional leaders, consultations with senior officials from the Departments of Defense and State as well as independent security experts. In San Francisco, the delegation met with independent experts from the Asia Foundation and former Secretaries of State and Defense, George Shultz and William Perry to discuss a broad range of issues, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The programme concluded with visits to McAfee and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories. The delegation comprised members from the Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee (STC) and the Political Committee’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Relations (PCTR), and was led by Jan Arild Ellingsen (Norway) and John Dyrby Paulsen (Denmark).

II. US DEFENCE AND SECURITY PRIORITIES

3. The delegation had the opportunity to talk about current US defence and security priorities at the Department of Defense (DoD), where it was hosted by Dr Ashton Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense. In his remarks, Dr Carter focused on three key topics: Afghanistan; the new strategic guidance for the DoD released in early 2012; and the future of NATO. The Deputy Secretary considered Afghanistan “job one”. Naturally, many challenges remained, for example in increasing Afghan governance capacity, denying safe havens for terrorists and building up the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). However, progress had been made, especially regarding the latter. He pointed out that in about half of the operations the ANSF were already in the lead and that 75% of the population was living in areas where transition had already taken place. An issue of concern that needed to be addressed was the future of the highly trained ANSF after demobilisation which was currently envisaged after 2016. Dr Carter made clear that the United States was firmly committed to the security and stability of Afghanistan and had a clear plan going forward. The speaker welcomed the re-opening of the supply lines through Pakistan, adding that Pakistan needed to secure these lines.

4. Regarding the new defence guidance, he argued that the United States needed to turn a strategic corner. The changing international environment, characterised by the continuing financial crisis and the drawdown of US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, required the United States to focus on new capabilities, such as cyber, Special Operation Forces, and capabilities to counter Weapons of Mass destruction and terrorist threats. At the same time, the lessons of counter-insurgency efforts needed to be maintained. It was clear that the US defence budget would not continue to grow as in the past ten years, he said, adding that the evolving security landscape and the budgetary limitations would lead to a reduction of the US Army and the US Marine Corps. The renewed attention of the US towards Asia was primarily witness to the fact that Europe was now a source of security which was not the case for the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast to Europe, which benefitted from the existence of NATO and a number of collective security organisations, no formal mechanisms existed in the Asia-Pacific region. The Deputy Secretary of Defence stressed the pivotal role that the US military had played for keeping peace and security in the region, which had allowed countries like Japan, South Korea, and the People’s Republic of China to rise to prosperity. The US pivot to Asia in no way meant less

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security for Europe. Rebalancing primarily related to the drawdown of the US military presence in Iraq and in Afghanistan, he said. He underlined that the United States had “total commitment” towards Europe and saw a bright future for the Alliance.

5. With Jim Townsend, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for European and NATO Policy, the members delved deeper into some of the key issues on NATO’s agenda. For Mr Townsend, a crucial question was how the Alliance will make it through the so-called “age of austerity”. Asked about the rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the Deputy Assistant Secretary noted that there was no common US and European strategy towards Asia, but that they shared common interests. There were so many issues that were important to the US and the European allies beyond security which had their roots in Asia, he said. Similar positions were held by other US government officials, including the Deputy Secretary of Defence, Dr Ashton Carter and Tina S. Kaidanow, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, who stressed that the US and Europe have a huge stake in Asia. Ms Kaidanow emphasised the need for European and American allies to engage in a dialogue on security challenges in Asia.

6. Mr Townsend suggested that the creation of a NATO-China commission would be a good idea to better align strategies in Alliance Member States. He did not anticipate a rebalancing towards Europe in the near future, which he considered to be a good thing, as that would mean that Europe once again was a source of stability. He did see opportunities for better co-ordination with the Smart Defence initiative and an improved NATO-EU relationship. European NATO Member States needed to lift more of the burden, however, because the United States was providing an unhealthy amount at this point. The discussions also turned on Afghanistan, China, Libya, and North Korea.

III. NATO POST-CHICAGO

7. US officials emphasised the relevance of the recent NATO Summit in Chicago for the future development of the Alliance. Ms Kaidanow said that the Chicago Summit was substantively quite important, particularly as the Alliance was facing diverse threats and an austere fiscal environment. The Summit followed up on the decisions taken in Lisbon in 2010, and the Heads of State and Government endorsed the core values of the Alliance. Ms Kaidanow highlighted that the Chicago Summit further defined the goals that they had agreed upon with regard to transition in Afghanistan. According to this, in mid-2013 the ANSF would take the lead for security responsibility all over Afghanistan and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will focus on training and advising. At the Chicago Summit, Allied Heads of State and Government also iterated their commitment for Afghanistan post-2014. She stressed that the commitments made by the governments of NATO member countries were absolutely critical for the stability of Afghanistan and encouraged the members of the delegation to provide the necessary support in their national parliaments.

8. Furthermore, Ms. Kaidanow highlighted that the Allies agreed at Chicago on the need to maintain capable, interconnected, and modern military forces. To that end, two key elements designed to bolster the military capabilities of NATO Allies were crucially important: Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative which aimed at improving interoperability among Allies. As far as the U.S. was concerned, the new strategic guidance for US security policy, published in January 2012, reaffirmed the US commitment to European security, and to the defence of America’s Allies according to Article 5. Accordingly, the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) reflected the US determination to maintain modern, effective, and flexible forces.

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9. In contrast to the U.S., most other Allies faced considerable gaps in military capabilities, as NATO’s engagement in Libya had demonstrated, she said. The gaps were particularly significant in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) where the US had to provide up to 90% of the assets. To tackle existing capability shortfalls, Smart Defence was an important initiative which allowed NATO member countries to pool their resources. The US continued to call on Allies to fulfil their defence commitments, as unfortunately not all Allies reach 2 % of the GDP. Moreover, it was also necessary to look at how defence resources were allocated, she said, adding that in times of fiscal scarcity innovation, creativity, and efficiency were important.

10. The Chicago summit also highlighted the role of partnerships. Ms Kaidanow pointed out that NATO had proven to be an adaptable, durable and a very cost effective military alliance and had increasingly become a hub for partnerships and a forum for dialogue with NATO partners. She elaborated by pointing out that effective partnerships allowed NATO to extend its reach, to share burdens and to benefit from capabilities of others. Referring to the important contributions NATO partners make to the operations in Afghanistan, Ms. Kaidanow stressed that the US wanted to develop partnerships further. In this context she encouraged the NATO PA to extend its activities with parliaments of NATO partner countries. She concluded by saying that much work remained to be done to implement the decisions agreed upon at Chicago and stressed the need to explain to the publics in NATO member states that defence remained important. She elaborated by arguing that the fight against al Qaeda had not yet been won and that it would be a direct threat to the NATO member states’ publics if Afghanistan went back the way it was before 2011. She was hopeful that the fact that the Afghanistan engagement would be fundamentally less costly after 2014 and that there was a clear timeline would win public support in Allied countries.

IV. AFGHANISTAN

11. In both Washington, D.C. and in San Francisco, the delegation heard government officials and independent experts speak about Afghanistan. Discussions revealed agreement that Afghanistan will remain at the top of NATO’s agenda for the foreseeable future. Security remained pivotal for the future development of Afghanistan, the delegation was informed. Tina S. Kaidanow stressed that the US and the Allies had invested too much to let Afghanistan fail. She emphasised the importance of consistency, in particular that Afghans needed to know what to expect. In her view, NATO Allies had been quite consistent in providing assistance to Afghanistan, and pointed out that Europe had stuck to its support in and for Afghanistan – which was remarkable given the fact that most governments in European NATO member states had changed and only five governments which were in power in 2009 were so today.

12. Speakers emphasised that Afghanistan was going through three different transitions: military, economic, and political. Lt. Gen. (ret) David W. Barno, Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, considered a successful military, economic and political transition in Afghanistan over the next 2 ½ years to be crucial to allow the US to concentrate on its vital interests in the region, which he considered to be the prevention of further terrorist attacks from that part of the world; countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons emanating from this region; and the aversion of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. He stressed the need “to stay on the case”, but warned that challenges on the horizon lay with these three transitions as a whole; the ‘management’ of President Karzai; the neighbouring countries and the Taliban; and the sustainment of international commitment post-2014.

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13. With regard to the military transition, there was general agreement that the ANSF had made remarkable progress, even though some difficulties continued to exist. One of them was ethnicity as the personnel of the ANSF did not reflect the ethnic makeup of the country, which could negatively impact ANSF cohesion. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend pointed out that the Taliban and their leadership had been degraded over the last years. He added that the Taliban needed to be reduced to a threat level where the ANSF could handle them.

14. Speakers, including Ms Kaidanow, acknowledged that the international community was unlikely to finance a 352,000-strong ANSF. Therefore, a part of the trained ANSF personnel would have to be demobilised gradually beginning in 2016. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Karl W. Eikenberry, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and Asia Foundation Trustee, commented that the ANSF was now the largest and most complex organisation that Afghanistan ever had. The ANSF would thus play an important role for the stability of the country, particularly as Afghans considered it to be the most trustworthy of all Afghan institutions, he said. Lately, however, Afghan power brokers had begun to reach into the ANSF, he added. The international community needed to monitor this closely and prevent Afghan warlords from using parts of the ANSF for their personal political interest.

15. Speakers on Afghanistan agreed that the drawdown of the international military presence would have negative repercussions on the country’s economy. Lt. Gen. (ret) David W. Barno anticipated the transition in Afghanistan to be “unsettling” in that it would have a jarring effect on the Afghan economy. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Karl W. Eikenberry reminded the delegation that the Afghan economy that had been built up after 2001 was “very artificial” as it was primarily based on the military presence of the international community. He, too, expected the economy to suffer severe shocks post-2014. The question was how these economic shocks would impact the political system, he added.

16. Several speakers, including Lt. Gen. (ret) David W. Barno, considered the political transition perhaps the most dangerous transition. In this context, the General reminded the delegation that President Karzai’s term expired in 2014 and that the fairness and the open and free conduct of the elections would be extraordinarily important. This view was shared by Mr Townsend who also pointed out the importance of the elections in Afghanistan in 2014 and how well they would be prepared. In a similar vein, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Karl W. Eikenberry noted that Afghanistan lacked political movements and parties. He and others emphasized the importance of electoral reform and the emergence of new national political movements.

17. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Karl W. Eikenberry stressed the need to bringing Afghanistan from de jure towards de facto sovereignty. He said that governance challenges loomed large, especially the legitimacy of the central government and problems of corruption. In this context he noted that the approach of the international community had been “overly Karzai-centric” in the past and stressed the need for a “clever decentralisation” of Afghanistan which could help establish necessary checks and balances.

18. In addition to the unclear security situation after 2014, corruption remained a key issue, speakers agreed. Emphasising the importance of accountability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), Ms Kaidanow said that the U.S. was working on mechanisms to make sure that the financial assistance that the U.S. was providing to Afghanistan was used well.

19. Overall, speakers shared a guardedly optimistic view of Afghanistan’s future. All agreed on the crucial need for good co-ordination among international donors, particularly after 2014. General Eikenberry pointed to four reasons that gave him reason for cautious optimism: a fair success of the economy, civil society and governance, especially in urban areas; the absence of

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outside actors having great leverage on domestic politics; the war weariness of the adult population; and the continued international support.

V. PAKISTAN

20. Presenters in Washington and in San Francisco agreed that Pakistan played a crucial role for the future development of Afghanistan. Lt. Gen. (ret.) Karl W. Eikenberry suggested that Pakistan provided permissive sanctuary to insurgents. He acknowledged, however, that Islamabad’s ability to take on the insurgents might be limited. Unless Pakistan was prepared to stop hedging its bets and support the efforts of ISAF wholeheartedly, successful transition in Afghanistan would be much more difficult to achieve, he said. Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, said that Pakistan anticipated that the West would “cut and run” from Afghanistan. However, this was a misreading of the US and NATO, he added.

21. Noting that Pakistan was all-too-often considered merely in the context of Afghanistan, Mr Riedel proposed to look at the country in its own right. He thus focused on five aspects: demographics; geography; its status as a nuclear weapons state; the terrorist presence; and democracy. As a heavily populated country, which would be called an emerging power alongside Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the ‘BRICS’) if it were not for India being its neighbour – with the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world, both in size and capability – it was severely challenged by terrorist activity on its soil. However, despite all its problems the current democratic government had survived longer than any democratically elected Pakistani government in the past. He reminded the delegation that Pakistan had experienced four military dictatorships in its more than 65 years of existence and that the disrupted civil-military relationship remained today. Turning to Islamabad’s relationship with the West he noted that the US had provided approximately US$ 25 billion of assistance to Pakistan since 2001. The bilateral US-Pakistani relationship had been a rollercoaster, and today, the U.S. is engaged in a war in Pakistan with UAVs. Tackling the unstable relationship between the West and Pakistan demanded engagement, however hard it might be. There had been a few improvements in this relationship lately, but they were very small and could easily be undermined. He did not believe that tackling terrorism was possible on a bilateral basis, but had to be done unilaterally, after transition in Afghanistan perhaps with US-Afghan counter-terrorism efforts. However, one way to improve relationships would be to achieve a rapprochement between Karzai and the Taliban. Mr. Riedel also reminded the delegation that the bi-lateral Pakistani-Indian relationship weighed heavily on Islamabad’s policy towards Afghanistan. The speaker said it would be difficult to influence India-Pakistan relationship, but that the West should try collectively to encourage improvement of bilateral relations, which could, in the long term, improve regional security.

22. Erik Jensen, Senior Advisor for Governance and Law at the Asia Foundation and Professor of the Practice of Law at Stanford Law School, characterized the 1990s as a period of non-engagement with Pakistan which must not be repeated. He provided an overview of the legal and political institutions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The speaker noted that court systems were very hard to build in general, running into four principal obstacles: resources; capacity; customs; and incentive structures. In particular, it was easy to pass a law, but much harder to implement it. In Afghanistan, it was crucial to understand traditional structures. The international community also needed to realize that the Taliban were a part of the fabric of the country. In general, the future of the country needed to be decentralized because one of the main problems was that governance structures were highly centralized. Abandoning Afghanistan was not an option, but we should recognize that a degree of stability was all that could be hoped for. Even in the worst-case scenario, economic growth pools would survive, especially in urban areas. In Mr

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Jensen’s view, the key question in Afghanistan was to what extent the Afghans would be willing to fight to keep the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed.

23. One of the problems in Pakistan was that the power of family networks was so persistent even in democratically elected governments. There was a clear need to stimulate collective action for better government. In this regard, he noted that civil society in Pakistan was now stronger than in the past and that the freedom of electronic media had improved. He also believed that the Supreme Court had been over-reaching recently, but perhaps this showed that a better balance of power was emerging.

VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA)

24. General Mike Minahan, Principal Director of Middle Eastern Policy, gave the delegates an overview of current US policy towards the Middle East which continued to rest upon three pillars: opposing violence; promoting universal rights; and supporting political and economic reforms that meet the needs and desires of the peoples of the region. The changes in the region were critical for the United States as well as NATO. In the longer term he considered the Arab awakening to provide an opportunity to the US and the Allies.

25. Elizabeth Dibble, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, said that the US administration had no illusions about the challenges the region was facing. She noted that the region was only at the early stage of transformation and that it was entering a more critical stage. MENA governments needed to be responsive to the needs of their people. In a separate meeting Mr Townsend seconded this view, explaining that it was important to need to take advantage the post-revolution euphoria now before it petered away. As to the long-term threats to the security of the region, Ms Dibble identified population increase, the limited number of available jobs, lack of comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours, and the challenges posed by Iran. The regime of Bashar al-Assad had created tremendous regional instability.

26. Providing a general overview of the current situation in the MENA, Ms Dibble described Syria as the most immediate concern. The Assad regime escalated repression which even led the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia to admit that the regime must make way. With the exception of Iran which continues to support it, President Assad’s regime is isolated in the region. She expressed concern that the instability in Syria would spill over into Lebanon. Even though the Syrian opposition was very fractured, it appeared that the Assad regime was losing its grip over the country. She strongly criticised the regime for using violence against its own people. Asked about Western, particularly US, assistance to the opposition, Ms Dibble said that the US provided only non-lethal assistance. In reply to another question by a delegate why Moscow remained supportive of the Syrian regime, the speaker suggested that Russia’s interest in Syria was complex, and was not limited to keeping the naval base at Tartus; there were also economic, military, ideological links between Russia and Syria. Any possible solution to the crisis in Syria must include Arab countries and the Arab League.

27. Ms Dibble briefly referred to the situation in Egypt by saying that the US had congratulated the newly elected President. It remained to be seen how the President Mohamed Morsi acted and how the situation in Egypt developed, she commented, adding that she was concerned about the looming economic crisis in Europe and its impact on the MENA countries. An important question for the future development of the region was how governments in non-transitional countries reacted to Arab awakenings in neighbouring countries.

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28. The only path forward to achieve regional stability was the completion of democratic reform, she said, adding that the substance and style of Western policy had to change as new leaderships in the region emerged. Host country speakers shared the view that the security of NATO and MENA were closely linked, among others because they faced the same threats, and that NATO Allies should support the countries in transition. NATO partnership with partner countries is crucial, as the example Libya had shown where Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made important contributions to operation Unified Protector. NATO must therefore be able to co-operate with the countries of the MENA region, the delegation learned. As to NATO’s possible role for the stabilisation of the MENA region, Deputy Assistant Secretary Townsend said that it was unclear at this point in time if NATO would play a role for African security. In Libya, NATO could assist in the rebuilding of the military; it could also offer a counter-terrorism programme. Elizabeth Dibble suggested that NATO could help with capacity building and strengthening civilian control of the security forces. Moreover, NATO’s role as venue for political dialogue for countries and for institutions, including the Arab League, should be further developed.

29. As for Palestine, Ms Dibble said that the US continued to assist the Palestine people. In this context she informed the delegation that the State Department was setting up a USD 770 million Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund, which focused on facilitating reforms in region. Regarding Bahrain, General Minahan said that the US continued to urge Bahrain to introduce reforms and to urge the government and the opposition to resume dialogue.

VII. IRAN: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND US DIPLOMACY

30. Iran, particular its nuclear programme and its relations with its immediate neighbours, was also discussed during the visit. Officials in Washington said that the US remained determined to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and that it preferred a diplomatic solution. General Minahan said that to achieve this, the US would keep all options on the table. The U.S. policy was not about containment, he explained, adding that Iran was increasingly isolated. With regard to Tehran’s nuclear programme, Ms Dibble underlined that Iran had a choice, either to meet its international commitments or to continue facing economic pressure. The State Department official also said that Iran had a role to play in finding a solution for Syria. She regretted, however, that Iran had, thus far, pursued a destructive role, adding that Iran’s support for repression in Syria, was not gaining it friends. The speaker also explained that the US was concerned about continued human rights violations in Iran and the regime’s support for terrorist groups as well as for groups which posed risk for regional stability.

31. Ali Alfoneh, Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, provided the delegation with an assessment of domestic developments in Iran while Kenneth Pollack, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, commented on bilateral US-Iranian relations. Mr Alfoneh surveyed the current state of Iran’s political structures. He suggested that the country was developing into a military dictatorship, coming to resemble Pakistan’s current structures. Traditionally, power was distributed in an alliance between Shia clergy and the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (also known as the Revolutionary Guards). However, a new system had emerged where there existed no more clear division of labour between the two. The Revolutionary Guards were at this point protecting the regime – one of its original purposes – but also beginning to rule it. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, over 50% of the seats were obtained by former members of the Revolutionary Guards. The leadership of the Revolutionary Guards which had been shifting into politics thrived on the network of veterans of the Iran-Iraq War and the experience they shared among themselves. For example,

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12 of the 18 ministers in the current government were former members of the Guards, the speaker informed the delegation. The Guards were also by this point financially independent from the state, due to their many business ventures. The speaker pointed out that these arrangements of powers had several adverse consequences. First, in the nuclear talks, civilian representative were negotiating agreements that would not be backed up in Tehran by the Revolutionary Guards power brokers. Second, the Guards had steadily been increasing the toll on the population, extracting ever-more resources. Third, a permanent state of emergency served their purposes of keeping themselves in power: more sanctions meant more international isolation and thus more benefits for the Revolutionary Guards. Fourth, the Guards were much less risk averse as they saw the United States in decline similar to the post-World War II British Empire.

32. Kenneth Pollack noted that the history of US diplomacy towards Iran post-1979 continued to be a source of current conundrums. When President Obama came into office he wanted to take the exact opposite of President George W. Bush’s policies, which meant more carrots and fewer sticks, focusing on engagement. Only after these efforts failed were new sanctions were adopted in 2010. Mr Pollack criticized the current administration for not denouncing Tehran’s human rights abuses more strongly and by supporting the opposition. While the nuclear talks in 2012 were very unproductive, the United States was going back to the negotiation table, Mr Pollack noted.

33. He was pessimistic that an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme could be reached in the near future, as the regime remained recalcitrant. In addition, Iran was an utterly opaque, byzantine place, which made finding a diplomatic solution difficult. There were no great options, the speaker suggested. Only few additional sanctions were left to impose and, even if the U.S. wanted to draw the military card, there were not many surgical options for a military strike. Israelis would not have a real military option as it could bomb a few places, but that would not have a real impact on Iran. Moreover, he said that that cyber actions and targeted killings would only slow down Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, not prevent it. Mr Pollack expressed concern about the repercussions of such possible actions as they would likely lead to an inadvertent escalation. In this context, he commented that if the attempt to kill the ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the US had been successful, this would have represented a very important escalation on the Iranian side, which would have triggered a severely negative reaction by the U.S. The last option was containment, which, however, had become a “dirty word” in Washington. This was a negative development because containment policies had served the United States well in the past. Still, he thought that with time containment would be practiced – without calling it this way.

VIII. THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

34. Another on-going concern during the entire visit was the global economic and financial crisis and the subsequent budget reductions, including on defence spending. Congressman Michael Turner, head of the US delegation to the NATO PA, informed the delegation about the difficult budget situation. Divisions between both political parties had stalled the agenda in Congress and made it difficult to predict whether the automatic spending cuts, or “sequestration”, would go into effect later this year. The US House of Representatives would fully fund the defence budget for the fiscal year 2013 to offset the effects of sequestration, he said.

35. The delegation exchanged views on the impact of the financial crisis on the transatlantic relationship with members of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Financial Services’ Sub-Committee on International Monetary Policy and Trade. The meeting was chaired by the

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Sub-Committee’s Chairman Congressman Gary G. Miller and Ranking Member Congresswoman, Carolyn McCarthy. Congressman Robert J. Dold, the Vice-Chairman, and member Bill Huizenga were present as well, and the meeting was joined by Rick Holtzapple, Director, Office of European Union and Regional Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Mr Miller and Mrs McCarthy laid out their views on the current crisis and ways out of it. Reflecting their different viewpoints, Mr Miller stressed the fact that the United States could not “continue spending like this”, while Mrs McCarthy also underlined that growth needed to be stimulated as well. These initial interventions sparked a lively debate between the European delegates and the US representatives.

IX. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

36. Rose Gottemueller, Acting Under-Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, gave a general overview of the US administration’s arms control agenda. Implementation of the US-Russia treaty, which entered into force in February 2011, was going forward very well, she informed the delegation. She emphasised that the US was ready to work with Russia on further reductions in nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.

37. Turning to the Chemical Weapons Convention, she noted that the convention had been a success story. This was significant as chemical weapons had been more widely distributed than nuclear weapons. She described the work of the Chemical Weapons Convention secretariat as very effective. The issue of chemical weapons in Syria was, however, a cause of concern, particularly in the context of the civil war and the possible use of these weapons by the regime. In contrast to Libya, which had given up its chemical weapons, Syria never joined the Chemical Weapons Convention, which complicated finding a solution to the Syrian arsenal, she noted.

38. On Missile Defence, Ms Gottemueller noted that the programme was making progress. While the issue remained a sticking point on the NATO-Russia agenda as well as in the bilateral US-Russian relationship, there was some co-operation with Russia, as it participated in Missile Defence exercises in Germany in March 2012. Asked about a possible solution to the current impasse, she replied that legally binding constraints on Missile Defence were not acceptable for the US and the Allies.

X. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND DEFENCE

39. Maria Julia Marinissen, Director, Division of International Health Security, Office of Policy and Planning, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, informed the delegation about US domestic crisis and management capabilities in response to biological events. She also provided the delegation with a comprehensive overview of the policies and frameworks that guide the U.S. response to biological attacks and outbreaks of infectious diseases.

40. According to the speaker, 9/11 and the anthrax attacks in 2001 made the US realize how underprepared it was in its preparedness and response capabilities. These events and others, like hurricane Katrina, contributed to the overhaul of the U.S. approach on how to prepare and respond to emergencies. Since then the US government had significantly expanded its efforts to improve the ability to recognize and respond to acts of bioterrorism or other significant outbreaks of infectious disease, she said. The speaker added that U.S. government took an all-hazards

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approach to emergency preparedness. The focus on public health emergency preparedness was a capabilities-based approach, knowing that there were a number of common capabilities that were needed to prepare for and respond to most if not all emergencies. She elaborated that any meaningful reaction to a disaster requires response personnel from all sectors of government and society at large. The US national planning looked at the entire preparedness and response continuum, from prevention and protection through to response and recovery, and inherently required a multi-sectoral approach.

41. With regard to the international level, she informed the delegation that the International Health Regulations (IHR) provided obligations for 195 countries to build and maintain basic public health surveillance and response capacities and requires these same countries to assess and notify potential public health emergencies of international concern. Notification of a domestic public health event that might constitute a potential Public Health Emergency of International Concern would be shared with the World Health Organization (WHO), US border partners Canada and Mexico, a wide variety of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, and State public health professionals.

42. Moreover, the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) was the only multilateral forum of Ministries of Health created in 2001 with the goal of enhancing global preparedness to health security threats, such as bioterrorism, infectious disease outbreaks including pandemic influenza, and incidents of a chemical, nuclear or radiological nature. GHSI provided a unique forum for interaction with like-minded counterparts from Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, Mexico, the European Union, and the WHO, Ms Marinissen explained. 43. GHSI recently demonstrated its value during the H1N1 influenza pandemic: officials from all countries shared epidemiological information in real time, communicated and harmonized the public health response efforts in their countries, and facilitated common risk communication messages across all members and with the WHO. Also, through the relationships established through this group, the US Department of Health and Human Services was able to provide assistance to Mexico with antivirals and vaccines during the H1N1 pandemic and more recently to the UK during the anthrax outbreak. She concluded by stressing that international preparedness was vital to global health security.

44. Gregory D. Koblentz, Assistant Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program, George Mason University, briefed the delegation on the role of international co-operation and assistance in responding to biological attacks. He said that the incredible diversity of biological weapons complicated the challenge for the defender. Moreover, as a result of technology, it was now possible to build biological weapons which resisted countermeasures.

45. Possible biological attack scenarios comprised bio-crime, biological terrorism, biological warfare and state-sponsored biological terrorism. Biological attacks were usually conducted covertly, their effects delayed as the outbreak would often not be detected until victims sought medical attention. Biological attacks also had a broad psychological impact and the medical and public health intervention must begin immediately to mitigate consequences.

46. There are a large number of UN and other international agencies and organizations that had partial mandates and undertake certain activities in the area of prevention of, preparedness for, and response to possible terrorist attacks with chemical or biological weapons or materials. There was, however, no single lead agency that bore overall responsibility for the response to these threats at the international level, Mr Koblentz stressed.

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47. While some progress had been achieved in improving international cooperation against biological attacks, a number of challenges remained. These were primarily obstacles to information sharing, inadequate planning, lack of co-ordination among states and international organisations, and limitations of international organisations. National preparedness was key to international assistance, he emphasised, adding that there was a delicate balance between health and security.

48. Turning to NATO, he said there was not necessarily agreement among the member countries of the Alliance that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty would be applicable if there was a biological attack against a member state. NATO had, however, developed defences against biological attacks, going back to the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments in which the Allies agreed to improve existing and develop new capabilities in specific areas, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence. In this context he mentioned the NATO Combined Joint Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Task Force. He concluded by arguing that additional steps were necessary to strengthen international capabilities to respond to biological attacks, particularly in the areas of improved co-ordination, capacity building, and enhanced global bio-preparedness.

XI. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS)

49. The visit in Washington also included a panel discussion on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) which focused on legal and ethical questions concerning their use, particularly so-called “targeted killings” of terrorists. Amitai Etzioni, Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, The Elliot School of International Affairs, at George Washington University, argued in favour of using UAVs. He started off by emphasising that one should never resort to force until all other means have been exhausted and that the only justification to go to war was to prevent the loss of life. The speaker raised a number of important issues related to the use of UAVs in attacking terrorists. He pointed out that one of the advantages of using UAVs against the terrorists was that the risk to soldiers was very much reduced. In a separate meeting, Bruce Riedel commented that from a purely counter-terrorist perspective, UAV operations were rather effective. In this context, he referred to Pakistan, where by UAV strikes had been successfully applied against a number of al Qaeda operatives in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. However, they also came with an enormous backlash as a vast majority of the Pakistani population believed they generated considerable collateral damage.

50. However, the notion of a clean surgical war was unrealistic, according to Mr Etzioni. In the case of the US, there were also sufficient checks and balances involved, as President Obama personally approved the list of people who should be eliminated, he said. Mr Etzioni admitted that it was difficult to distinguish between combatants and civilians and raised the question whether one can use force against someone who did not fit neatly into the categories of either a combatant or a civilian. Regarding the fight against international terrorism, he dismissed the notion that one could consider the whole world as a theatre of war.

51. In contrast, Jonathan Turley, J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington University, argued that under international law, an exception had been made for UAVs. The problem of UAVs was their advantage, i.e. to kill an enemy from a safe distance without putting the lives of soldiers at risk, which made war appear like a video game. Today, technology had become so overwhelming and convenient that it influenced the principles of

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warfare. In this context, he mentioned that there had been more than 300 UAV attacks, killing more than 1,500 people in Afghanistan since January 2009. He argued that UAV strike were immoral, adding that most of the UAV attacks were not lawful, but extra-judicial killings. Thus, the use of armed UAVs would, over time, dismantle the existing international legal system.

XII. US GRAND STRATEGY

52. At the headquarters of the Asia Foundation in San Francisco, David Arnold, President, and Gordon Hein, the Vice President for Programs, provided overviews of the organization. The Asia Foundation is a non-profit, non-governmental organization committed to the development of a peaceful, prosperous, just, and open Asia-Pacific region. The Foundation supports Asian initiatives to improve governance and law, economic development, women's empowerment, the environment, and regional co-operation. Drawing on nearly 60 years of experience in Asia, the Foundation collaborates with private and public partners to support leadership and institutional development, exchanges, and policy research. With 17 offices throughout Asia, an office in Washington, D.C. and its headquarters in San Francisco, the Foundation addresses these issues on both a country and regional level. In 2011, the Foundation provided more than $97 million in program support from multiple donors and distributed nearly one million books and journals valued at over $41 million. Mr Hein also briefed the delegation about developments in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He noted China’s impressive economic growth over an extended period of time which enabled the country to lift an estimated 400 million people out of poverty in the last 30 years. However, this impressive achievement came with considerable negative side effects, such as rising inequality, regional difficulties, widespread corruption, rising expectations among the population, rapid urbanisation, considerable environmental degradation, and periodic outbreaks of violence.

53. George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution and former US Secretary of State (1982-1989), sounded a pessimistic note when addressing the delegation. After World War II ended, the West had constructed a “global economic and security commons” through institutions such as NATO the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization, which was shared at the international state and open to all who wanted to be part of it. At this point in time, however, these commons were being destabilized and in danger of unravelling. Secretary Shultz pointed to four fields of change in particular. First, the face of the world was changing radically in terms of demography, with fertility in developed countries falling rapidly, but with people living longer, but other parts of the world with rising populations that were increasingly out of work. Second, the information and communication revolution was reducing the distance between the governed and their governments. Third, terrorism had changed security dynamics dramatically and a heavy price was being paid for fighting it. Fourth, the state system was becoming destabilized with sovereign states on the one hand and tribal and chaotic states on the other. He engaged the delegates on a dialogue on how to tackle these big changes. He himself saw several reasons for hope. The energy sector was undergoing a revolution through unconventional oil and gas and advances in alternative energy sources and energy efficiency.

54. Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Studies at Stanford University, addressed the issue of failed states, which he considered one of the most serious and dangerous problems in international relations at this point. The international community did not have a clear answer of what a policy towards these states should look like, and academia was equally struggling with this question. Professor Krasner outlined three competing implicit, but inchoate, theories that policy makers employ. First, there is modernization theory, which posits

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that technological development leads to economic development, which in turn leads to a larger middle class and lastly democracy. Second, “state-capacity-first” theory argues building institutions are the best way to stabilize a country and lead them to democracy in the long run. Third, elite theory believes that states had preyed upon populations for most of humankind’s history, and since this could not be changed rapidly, outside states should “pick a winner” in the elites to stabilize the country. This would recognize that failed states “run on corruption” – one would merely chose corruption that is less damaging to one’s interests. While the final evaluation of these theories had yet to be achieved, he believed that elite theory was most plausible, even though this would lead to unpleasant policy choices. This would mean “finding a good guy you can bet on”. However, such a good guy was probably absent in Afghanistan, Libya and Tunisia, but in Egypt this could be the military. If there was no “baron” to bet on, outsiders should maintain a balance of power that was not too inimical to their interests. In Syria, this would mean, for example, to get Assad out, but to keep the elites in place, thus perhaps turning Syria into another Lebanon.

55. William Perry, the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University and former US Secretary of Defense (1994-1997), reviewed the new strategic guidance to the Department of Defense by comparing the new guidance to the various strategies after World War II. He highlighted several key points in the new guidance. For one, defence spending necessarily needed to go down in light of the fiscal situation, but also recent operations coming to an end. He also registered his appreciation (and surprise) that President Obama had been this involved in the drafting process all along, which had been unprecedented in US history. Important themes were that the United States needed to concentrate more on “rebuilding the homeland”, the continued focus on terrorism, which needed to be monitored, contained and struck, the rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific Region, and the strengthening of alliances both old and new (for example with India). He also noted that the strategic guidance puts only little emphasis on nuclear weapons even though it stated the reduction of the number of nuclear warheads as an aim. All in all, the guidance was an excellent roadmap for the future and a good starting point for shaping NATO, Secretary Perry underlined.

XIII. CYBER SECURITY

56. The delegation also had the opportunity to visit McAfee, one of the leading companies that is engaged in anti-malware protection. Brian Contos, Senior Director & Customer Security Strategist gave a presentation on various information warfare topics to the NATO delegation. He explored information warfare from a defensive and offensive perspective looking at major actors such as nation-states and minor actors such as hacktivists. The speaker covered a wide variety of attack motives such as extortion, sabotage and information theft. Discussions also covered examples of the convergence of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare. Discussions focused on policy issues such as public-private partnerships to share information, litigation reform to reduce fines and regulations in favour of positive incentives for investment. Mr Contos concluded by pointing out that the cybersphere had become a great equalizer: a country does not need to be a nuclear power or even industrialized to mount a significant, asymmetric attack against another. In the future, leveraging cyber tools like botnets would act as a force multiplier, thereby significantly increasing a country’s offensive capabilities. Awareness, education, international partnership, and more tightly integrated security controls were among the topics discussed.

XIV. HIGH TECHNOLOGY

57. Briefings in the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory which conducts high-end research relevant to energy and environmental security concluded the visit. Discussions focused on

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energy research, biofuels, nanotechnology and climate modelling. The group also had the opportunity to tour the Advanced Light Source with Director Roger Falcone.

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