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OECD workshop on Inter- Agency Crisis Management Lessons , improvements and challenges after the 2010 earthquake in Chile June 28, 2012. Agenda. Earthquake and tsunami impact . Emergency response. Lessons learned and main improvements . . Juan Fernández. Juan Fernández. 4. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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OECD workshop on Inter-Agency Crisis Management Lessons, improvements and challenges after the 2010 earthquake in Chile June 28, 2012
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Page 1: Agenda

OECD workshop on Inter-Agency Crisis ManagementLessons, improvements and challenges after the 2010 earthquake in ChileJune 28, 2012

Page 2: Agenda

2Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Agenda

• Earthquake and tsunami impact.• Emergency response.• Lessons learned and main improvements.

2

Page 3: Agenda

3Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Juan Fernández

3

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4Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 4

Juan Fernández

4

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5Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Highway #5

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6Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Highway #5

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7Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 7

Dichato

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8Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Dichato

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9Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 9

Talcahuano

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10Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Santiago10

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11Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Concepción

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Page 12: Agenda

12Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

• 526 fatal losses and 25 people still missing• 370,000 destroyed/seriously damaged houses (11% of total)• 79 destroyed hospitals • 3,049 destroyed and damaged schools• 1,250,000 children out of school• 221 destroyed and damaged bridges• 900 towns and communities affected• 75% of the population lives in the affected area• Total cost estimated at US$ 30 billion (~15% of GDP)

Main impacts

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13Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

System main weaknesses during crisis

• Basic communication systems were down for more than 12 hours• No transportation capabilities available to authorities• Confusing and contradictory information was given by different sources• Multiple unnecessary decision points in the tsunami alert process and

decisions made based on intuition• No special force available specialized in emergency procedures nor

dedicated to help in initial evaluation of damages• Heavy looting begun after the earthquake• Disorganized war room dynamic:

• Unrestricted access• Everybody sitting around the same table randomly• Press with direct access to the room

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Page 14: Agenda

14Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Agenda

• Earthquake and tsunami impact.• Emergency response.• Lessons learned and main improvements.

14

Page 15: Agenda

15Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

• Assumed a role that ONEMI was not prepared to assume (e.g. food supply, ONEMI building)

• Coordination role within the Government and with private and non-profit sectors.

• Information gathering—one of the main challenges for good decision making.

• No pre-existing organizational structure—lack of rules and protocols.

• Staffed with people from different government services, from the armed forces and the private sector.

• Help overcome weak organizational, people and financial capabilities at the local level.

Unintended consequences : flexibility, creativity

Emergency committee

15

Page 16: Agenda

16Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Government response organized in 3 stages

Emergency committee main tasksMore than US$ 320 million in emergency response 12,500 beds, 125,000 blankets, 60,000 mattresses

80,000 emergency housing solutions 3 million cubic meters of debris

10 million daily servings of food and water Public utilities recovery (sewage, drinking water, electricity…)

Coordinated emergency employment to more than 19,000 people

Building deconstruction and demolition

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Page 17: Agenda

17Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Agenda

• Earthquake and tsunami impact.• Emergency response.• Lessons learned and main improvements.

17

Page 18: Agenda

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Some things that worked well

Population knowledge

Lack of fires Robust civil infrastructure

Chile’s construction norm and developers being responsible for 10 years provided a civil infrastructure that was able to protect Chilean citizens overall

Chile’s energy network shuts down automatically in the event of any major earthquake

Chile’s coastal population have a very good understanding of the need to evacuate in the event of any big earthquake

Page 19: Agenda

19Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

a. Improve ONEMI’s response and civil protection capabilities

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Page 20: Agenda

20Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Implication

Main issues identified at ONEMI

a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

i

There is no clear communications protocol between ONEMI-SHOA-SSN.

Lack of predefined check-list of what needs to be done at each point in time and no standardized evacuation protocol in case of Tsunamis

Evacuations take at least 35 min to be triggered and no mass communication channels are used to inform the population

There is no clear chain of command from National to Comunal level

Too many advisors in the crisis committee that are not efficiently organized to address issues; decisions made based on intuition not technical expertise or protocols

People in the Civil Protection network do not clearly know their roles

There is no ongoing assessment of emergency procedures knowledge

Lack of robust telecommunication platforms among SHOA-ONEMI headquarter-ONEMI regional-SSN

Absence of seismic sensors to monitor activity in real-time

Proc

ess

Org

aniza

t. st

ruct

ure

Peop

le

prep

a-re

dnes

s

Infra

s-tr

uctu

re

Define processes and protocols that maximize efficiency and effectiveness in crisis response

Key issues identified

Set up structure that facilitates crisis management

Get the appropriate resources in place

Ensure each individual knows what to do during a crisis

Place the right human resources in the right placeTa

lent k Key positions at national, regional and local level are not appropriately staffed

j Absence of transportation capabilities available for authorities

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21Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Are the processes for crisis management effective?

Do we have an organizational structure that facilitates crisis management and ensures efficient use of resources?

Process Infrastructure

Preparedness Talent

Organizational structure for emergency operations

36 opportunities for improvement across 5 dimensions

Do we have the appropriate resources in place?

Does each individual know what to do during a crisis?

Do we have theright human resources in the right place?

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Page 22: Agenda

22Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

Most of the initiatives are neither cost nor time intensive

Tim

e to

impl

emen

t

Qualitative assessment of initiatives as a single unit

0m

24m

2.000Cost (CH$ MM)

ProcessInfrastructure

PreparednessTalent

Org. structure foremergency ops.

100

6m

12m

21

0

10

5

~50% of the initiatives are zero cost, but require appropriate management

5001.500

1213

14

54m

17

2

4

6

8

15

11

16

30

18

24

193634

27

32

Operational and up front expenses expected for 201122

Page 23: Agenda

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Example of detailed process analysis and redesign Revised Detection process – End State

Actual process

Inform earthquake

Answer questions

Answer questions

Collects data OfficialEarthquake report

Require quake report

Inform earthquake

Official Tsunami report

Map incident by calling adjacent regions

First Earthquakeassessment

Require Tsunami report

Require quake report

Formal process

Informal process

Bigger than 5Merc.?

Receive reports

Feel the earthquake

Asses if earthquake is > 7 Merc / 20 sec

Yes

a1

a2

a3

a4

a5

a6

a7

a11 a12

a13

a14a8

a9

a10

a15 a16

ONEMIs regionales

SSN

SHOA

Police, fire fighters

Coastal community

ONEMI national

OfficialEarthquake report

Yes

Feel the earthquake

Asses if earthquake is > 7 Merc / 20 sec

Bigger than X?

OfficialTsunami report

Sensors detect earthquake

Receive reports and acknowledge them

Input into Tsunami forecast table

Detection is done automatically and precisely with sensors

Redundancy: either SHOA, ONEMI or SSN can generate reports if necessary, as opposed to only SSN

n1 n2 n3

n4 n5

n6

n7 n8

SOURCE: McKinsey & Co

▪ Earthquakes and Tsunamis detected by sensors and communicated to all stakeholders automatically- Total steps reduced from 11 to 5 steps, resulting in a ~90% time reduction (from ~25-30 min to ~ 2 min)

▪ Back – up processes incorporated so if any of the agencies fail the others can take care of it

Earthquake report is generated automatically by the system

Page 24: Agenda

24Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

b. From disaster management to disaster risk reduction

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25Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

International consultancies and agreements

Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)

United Nations (UN)

Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

California Emergency Management Agency (CAL EMA)

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Page 26: Agenda

26Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

National system of emergency and civil protection

Some guiding principles

Multisectorial approach. Central government get involves only subsidiarily. Minimize discretionary decision making. Relience on existing capabilities. Focus on prevention rather than response.

Main Challenge

Create and establish a national system of emergency and civil protection, including a risk reduction strategy with civil society playing a central role.

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Page 27: Agenda

27Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

National system of emergency and civil protection

Clearly defined emergency levels

Emergency operations committee

• Level 1—can be addressed with resources available at the local level.

• Level 2—can not be addressed at the local level.

• Defined by the President.

• Clear rules for each level.

• Non-permanent bodies at the local and national level to plan, coordinate and direct actions to respond to an emergency.

• Deployment of public resources, rely on armed forces for humanitarian aid support.

• Receive technical support from the Agency.

Formal role for the armed forces• To get involved in

emergency prevention and preparedness, and in humanitarian aid.

• Involvment must be required by emergency operations committes.

• First response task force.

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Page 28: Agenda

28Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo

National system of emergency and civil protection

National Agency of Civil Protection

National Council of Civil Protection

• Promote and implement prevention and emergency response actions.

• Coordination and advisory role.

• Descentralized organization.

• Replaces ONEMI.

• Advisory body integrated by members of different sectors.

• Public, private and civil society members.

• Help Minister of the Interior developing the National Civil Protection Strategy.

• Replicated at local level.

National Civil Protection Strategy

National Fund of Civil Protection

• Defines priorities and guiding principles for risk reduction and preparedness.

• Must be revised at least every 5 years.

• Complemented by national plans of different sectors.

• Replicated at the local level.

• To secure a long-term source of financing for public and private prevention activities and initiatives.

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Page 29: Agenda

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Challenges going forward

▪ Maintain a sense of urgency even a long time after the earthquake has happened.

▪ Have capable and motivated people in key positions and hold them accountable for the quality of their work when risks are latent.

▪ See Civil Protection as a country wide issue that requires coordination and cooperation among multiple agencies (ministers, armed forces, private companies, etc)

▪ Keep all those who would be involved in crisis management well trained and informed.

▪ Secure funding to support the different initiatives and the human resources responsible for them in the long term.

▪ Long term commitment of every agency involved to push this effort forward.

Page 30: Agenda

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Gracias.


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