OECD workshop on Inter-Agency Crisis ManagementLessons, improvements and challenges after the 2010 earthquake in ChileJune 28, 2012
2Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Agenda
• Earthquake and tsunami impact.• Emergency response.• Lessons learned and main improvements.
2
3Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Juan Fernández
3
4Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 4
Juan Fernández
4
5Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Highway #5
5
6Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Highway #5
6
7Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 7
Dichato
7
8Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Dichato
8
9Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo 9
Talcahuano
9
10Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Santiago10
11Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Concepción
11
12Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
• 526 fatal losses and 25 people still missing• 370,000 destroyed/seriously damaged houses (11% of total)• 79 destroyed hospitals • 3,049 destroyed and damaged schools• 1,250,000 children out of school• 221 destroyed and damaged bridges• 900 towns and communities affected• 75% of the population lives in the affected area• Total cost estimated at US$ 30 billion (~15% of GDP)
Main impacts
12
13Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
System main weaknesses during crisis
• Basic communication systems were down for more than 12 hours• No transportation capabilities available to authorities• Confusing and contradictory information was given by different sources• Multiple unnecessary decision points in the tsunami alert process and
decisions made based on intuition• No special force available specialized in emergency procedures nor
dedicated to help in initial evaluation of damages• Heavy looting begun after the earthquake• Disorganized war room dynamic:
• Unrestricted access• Everybody sitting around the same table randomly• Press with direct access to the room
13
14Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Agenda
• Earthquake and tsunami impact.• Emergency response.• Lessons learned and main improvements.
14
15Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
• Assumed a role that ONEMI was not prepared to assume (e.g. food supply, ONEMI building)
• Coordination role within the Government and with private and non-profit sectors.
• Information gathering—one of the main challenges for good decision making.
• No pre-existing organizational structure—lack of rules and protocols.
• Staffed with people from different government services, from the armed forces and the private sector.
• Help overcome weak organizational, people and financial capabilities at the local level.
Unintended consequences : flexibility, creativity
Emergency committee
15
16Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Government response organized in 3 stages
Emergency committee main tasksMore than US$ 320 million in emergency response 12,500 beds, 125,000 blankets, 60,000 mattresses
80,000 emergency housing solutions 3 million cubic meters of debris
10 million daily servings of food and water Public utilities recovery (sewage, drinking water, electricity…)
Coordinated emergency employment to more than 19,000 people
Building deconstruction and demolition
16
17Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Agenda
• Earthquake and tsunami impact.• Emergency response.• Lessons learned and main improvements.
17
18
Some things that worked well
Population knowledge
Lack of fires Robust civil infrastructure
Chile’s construction norm and developers being responsible for 10 years provided a civil infrastructure that was able to protect Chilean citizens overall
Chile’s energy network shuts down automatically in the event of any major earthquake
Chile’s coastal population have a very good understanding of the need to evacuate in the event of any big earthquake
19Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
a. Improve ONEMI’s response and civil protection capabilities
19
20Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Implication
Main issues identified at ONEMI
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
There is no clear communications protocol between ONEMI-SHOA-SSN.
Lack of predefined check-list of what needs to be done at each point in time and no standardized evacuation protocol in case of Tsunamis
Evacuations take at least 35 min to be triggered and no mass communication channels are used to inform the population
There is no clear chain of command from National to Comunal level
Too many advisors in the crisis committee that are not efficiently organized to address issues; decisions made based on intuition not technical expertise or protocols
People in the Civil Protection network do not clearly know their roles
There is no ongoing assessment of emergency procedures knowledge
Lack of robust telecommunication platforms among SHOA-ONEMI headquarter-ONEMI regional-SSN
Absence of seismic sensors to monitor activity in real-time
Proc
ess
Org
aniza
t. st
ruct
ure
Peop
le
prep
a-re
dnes
s
Infra
s-tr
uctu
re
Define processes and protocols that maximize efficiency and effectiveness in crisis response
Key issues identified
Set up structure that facilitates crisis management
Get the appropriate resources in place
Ensure each individual knows what to do during a crisis
Place the right human resources in the right placeTa
lent k Key positions at national, regional and local level are not appropriately staffed
j Absence of transportation capabilities available for authorities
20
21Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Are the processes for crisis management effective?
Do we have an organizational structure that facilitates crisis management and ensures efficient use of resources?
Process Infrastructure
Preparedness Talent
Organizational structure for emergency operations
36 opportunities for improvement across 5 dimensions
Do we have the appropriate resources in place?
Does each individual know what to do during a crisis?
Do we have theright human resources in the right place?
21
22Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
Most of the initiatives are neither cost nor time intensive
Tim
e to
impl
emen
t
Qualitative assessment of initiatives as a single unit
0m
24m
2.000Cost (CH$ MM)
ProcessInfrastructure
PreparednessTalent
Org. structure foremergency ops.
100
6m
12m
21
0
10
5
~50% of the initiatives are zero cost, but require appropriate management
5001.500
1213
14
54m
17
2
4
6
8
15
11
16
30
18
24
193634
27
32
Operational and up front expenses expected for 201122
23
Example of detailed process analysis and redesign Revised Detection process – End State
Actual process
Inform earthquake
Answer questions
Answer questions
Collects data OfficialEarthquake report
Require quake report
Inform earthquake
Official Tsunami report
Map incident by calling adjacent regions
First Earthquakeassessment
Require Tsunami report
Require quake report
Formal process
Informal process
Bigger than 5Merc.?
Receive reports
Feel the earthquake
Asses if earthquake is > 7 Merc / 20 sec
Yes
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
a6
a7
a11 a12
a13
a14a8
a9
a10
a15 a16
ONEMIs regionales
SSN
SHOA
Police, fire fighters
Coastal community
ONEMI national
OfficialEarthquake report
Yes
Feel the earthquake
Asses if earthquake is > 7 Merc / 20 sec
Bigger than X?
OfficialTsunami report
Sensors detect earthquake
Receive reports and acknowledge them
Input into Tsunami forecast table
Detection is done automatically and precisely with sensors
Redundancy: either SHOA, ONEMI or SSN can generate reports if necessary, as opposed to only SSN
n1 n2 n3
n4 n5
n6
n7 n8
SOURCE: McKinsey & Co
▪ Earthquakes and Tsunamis detected by sensors and communicated to all stakeholders automatically- Total steps reduced from 11 to 5 steps, resulting in a ~90% time reduction (from ~25-30 min to ~ 2 min)
▪ Back – up processes incorporated so if any of the agencies fail the others can take care of it
Earthquake report is generated automatically by the system
24Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
b. From disaster management to disaster risk reduction
24
25Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
International consultancies and agreements
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
United Nations (UN)
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
California Emergency Management Agency (CAL EMA)
25
26Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
National system of emergency and civil protection
Some guiding principles
Multisectorial approach. Central government get involves only subsidiarily. Minimize discretionary decision making. Relience on existing capabilities. Focus on prevention rather than response.
Main Challenge
Create and establish a national system of emergency and civil protection, including a risk reduction strategy with civil society playing a central role.
26
27Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
National system of emergency and civil protection
Clearly defined emergency levels
Emergency operations committee
• Level 1—can be addressed with resources available at the local level.
• Level 2—can not be addressed at the local level.
• Defined by the President.
• Clear rules for each level.
• Non-permanent bodies at the local and national level to plan, coordinate and direct actions to respond to an emergency.
• Deployment of public resources, rely on armed forces for humanitarian aid support.
• Receive technical support from the Agency.
Formal role for the armed forces• To get involved in
emergency prevention and preparedness, and in humanitarian aid.
• Involvment must be required by emergency operations committes.
• First response task force.
27
28Gobierno de Chile | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
National system of emergency and civil protection
National Agency of Civil Protection
National Council of Civil Protection
• Promote and implement prevention and emergency response actions.
• Coordination and advisory role.
• Descentralized organization.
• Replaces ONEMI.
• Advisory body integrated by members of different sectors.
• Public, private and civil society members.
• Help Minister of the Interior developing the National Civil Protection Strategy.
• Replicated at local level.
National Civil Protection Strategy
National Fund of Civil Protection
• Defines priorities and guiding principles for risk reduction and preparedness.
• Must be revised at least every 5 years.
• Complemented by national plans of different sectors.
• Replicated at the local level.
• To secure a long-term source of financing for public and private prevention activities and initiatives.
28
29
Challenges going forward
▪ Maintain a sense of urgency even a long time after the earthquake has happened.
▪ Have capable and motivated people in key positions and hold them accountable for the quality of their work when risks are latent.
▪ See Civil Protection as a country wide issue that requires coordination and cooperation among multiple agencies (ministers, armed forces, private companies, etc)
▪ Keep all those who would be involved in crisis management well trained and informed.
▪ Secure funding to support the different initiatives and the human resources responsible for them in the long term.
▪ Long term commitment of every agency involved to push this effort forward.
30
Gracias.