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RJEPORT NUMBER 8-213oTITLE WHO IS GOING TO SHOOT DOWN THE FIRST ICBM -- MAN OR MACHINE?
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JOHN 0. PIEPENBRINK, USAF
FACULTY ADVISOR MAJOR BRUCE THIEKAN, ACSC/EDW '*
SPONSOR COLONEL NORMAN F. FENNELLY, sDOs/S
Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITY " -"
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19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)The short time available to attack ballistic missiles with aStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI) wep.on system, will rrecludetraditional national level decision mpkin-. A unique command andcontrol (C2) conceDt is required to best serve the balancebetween effectiveness and weapon system safety. :his Prticledevelops that conceot with a blend of autonomous oreration witnman in the loop and advocates early resolution to ensure 22strategy and tactics push technology development.
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PREFACE
This research paper was sponsored by Colonel Norman F.Fennelly from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.Subject to clearance, this manuscript will be submitted to SIGNALmagazine for consideration. The specific statement of theproblem discussed in the article is: Since timing considerationspreclude traditional national level decision-making in an activeStrategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Battle Management System, thena command and control (C2) concept must be devised to best servethe balance between effectiveness and weapon system safety. Thebasic question of who or what is going to push the button toshoot at the incoming missiles is critical to the entire programand requires early resolution because it reflects the operationalstrategy and eventual tactics for the system. The weapon systemstrategy and tactics are primary and should push technologydevelopment rather than being pulled in the wrong direction bythe rapid flow of system development. This issue must beresolved soon to guide the current SDI program in it's researchand concept development stage and certainly before developmentand deployment decisions are finalized.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Major John 0. Piepenbrink is a student in the Air Commandand Staff College, Class of '88. His background in strategiccommand, control and communications (C3) includes bothoperational and staff experience with the Organization of theJoint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC).His most recent assignment was with the OJCS C3 SystemsDirectorate (J6) as a systems engineer charged with assessing thecurrent and proposed DOD space and strategic connectivity systems .to satisfy operational requirements. That tour of duty includedplanning and participating in JCS worldwide command postexercises and briefing senior decision makers on the capabilityof the National Command Authorities to control strategic nuclearforces. He served at Hq SAC as a concepts development engineerin the C3 and Force Management Division, Deputy Chief ofStaff/Plans. His responsibilities included developing andstaffing operational requirements for strategic C3 systems withparticular emphasis in strategic command centers. He has alsoserved as a Minuteman Launch Control Officer with extensiveexperience as an instructor and standardization evaluator. Hehas a BS in Electrical Engineering Technology from BradleyUniversity and an MBA from Marymount University of Virginia. Heis a graduate of the Joint C3 Staff Officer School, SquadronOfficer School in residence and Air Command and Staff College byseminar. As a member of the Armed Forces Communications andElectronics Association (AFCEA), he was named a DistinguishedYoung AFCEAN of the Year for 1985.
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____ ___ ___TABLE OF CONTENTS _ _ _ _ _ _
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Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..iiiAbout the Author................................................ ivTable of Contents............................................... vLizt of Iluztrations........................................... viExecutive Summary............................................. vii
ARTI CLEIntroduction...............................................System Description.........................................Command and Control Considerations........................ 6Manned VS Unmanned Control ........................Centralized VS Decentralized Command and Contr 2..........2Solution.................................................. 1
BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................
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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FIGURES
FIGURE 1 Ballistic Missile Flight Phases ...................... 3
FIGURE 2 Strategic C3 Cycle .................................. 5
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY APart of our College mission is distribution of the Astudents' problem solving products to DoD
, sponsors and other interested agencies toenhance insight into contemporary, defense
, related issues. While the College has accepttd thisproduct as meeting academic requirements forgraduation, the views and opinions expressed orimplied are solely those of the author and shouldnot be construed as carrying official sanction.
"insights into tomorrow"
REPORT NUMBER 88-213oI AUTHOR(S) MAJOR JOHN 0. PIEPENBRINK
TITLE WHO IS GOING TO SHOOT DOWN THE FIRST ICBM -- MAN OR MACHINE?
Many assumptions must be made to limit the scope of thisarticle and focus on it's central issue concerning top levelcommand and control of SDI. The political desirability of SDIand the eventual weapon system design issues are beyond the scopeof this article. The President has already directed the effortin his March 1983 speech, yet the outcome is many years away andwill continue to change as the research matures. The articlefirst describes the basic SDI defense goals, the generic systemand the timing considerations. It is a very brief discussionsince the expected audience should have a basic understanding ofSDI. The key assumption deri'ed in this section of the articleis that timing considerations will preclude the existing methods ,,of "going to war" in most scenarios. The next section describesthe problems that must be considered in developing the optimum C2concept. This includes potential weapon system safetyrequirements and the ramifications of wrongful system activation.It also includes the advantages and disadvantages of an unmannedautonomous system. With those descriptions, tradeoffs ofcentralized versus decentralized command and control arediscussed. An analyses of the various alternatives leads to asolution with both old and new concepts blended to match thenational strategy and make military operational sense.
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INTRODUCTION
President Reagan, in his address to the nation on March 23, %
1983, called for achievement of "our ultimate goal of eliminatingthe threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles" (1:50). Theeffort he launched that evening has become known as the StrategicDefense Initiative (SDI). It is still only a research effort and -
there is much debate over the merit of strategic defense. The .debate has focused on two ends of a spectrum. One end, argued bythe engineers and scientists, concerns the technical feasibilityand high cost. The other end, argued by the strategist, is theutility for defense, since nuclear deterrence through offensivecapability has been the basis for keeping peace in the atomic agefor over 40 years. An equally important issue that relates toboth is the strategy anticipated to control the system. It cannot be ignored or assumed away and must be resolved even beforethe system is fully defined. While it is true that technology .
influences strategy, command and control strategy should drivethe technology and system architecture rather than visa versa.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The basis of the Strategic Defense Initiative is a tiereddefense against ballistic missiles. It is best described by theDirector of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Lt GenJames A. Abrahamson, in his presentation to the Virginia MilitaryInstitute in April 1986:
SDI research is focusing on defenses against ballisticmissiles of all ranges, including intermediate-range(IRBM), intercontinental (ICBM), and submarine-launchedballistic missiles (SLBM). Our emerging technologieshave the promise of overcoming previous obstacles,thereby making possible a layered defense at each stage -
of a ballistic missile's flight: the boost (or launch)phase when the first- and second-stage rocket motorsare burning and an intense infrared signature iscreated; the post-boost phase when the multiple ftf
warheads and penetration aids are deployed; themidcourse phase when the warheads and penetration aids ,.ftravel on ballistic trajectories above the earth'satmosphere; and the terminal phase when the warheadsand penetration aids reenter the atmosphere. Eachphase offers different opportunities for a defensesystem; each poses different challenges. A highly beffective counter to a massive missile attack on the US
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will require multiple tiers of defense, each designedto significantly reduce the number of incoming warheadsuntil their number is actually too small to be of anymilitary utility (2:50).
The phases of ballistic flight are shown in Figure 1 along withthe associated timing of each phase. It is clear that attackingeach phase of an incoming missile is important for the overallsuccess of the system, but the first phase attack--the boostphase attack--is the most vulnerable. This phase provides themost effective defense opportunity because the target is larger,still has all multiple warheads attached, is slower, is easier to 1vtrack with bright rocket motor flames, and is full of volatilefuel. The space shuttle Challenger disaster is an example ofwhat can happen to a rocket in boost phase. Technical advancesoffer new opportunities to attack missiles in this phase. As GenAbrahamson said: "A decade ago there were no means available oreven envisioned that were capable of intercepting a missileduring the boost phase" (2:50). Advances in weapon technology toattack a missile in boost phase bring the problem of attacktiming to the forefront.
Each phase of a ballistic missile's flight takes a differentamount of time as shown in Figure 1. The first or boost phase isvery short and therein lies the problem. One of the longestburning ballistic missiles is the Russian SS 18 ICBM. The SS 18missile spends about 300 seconds accelerating and another 300seconds deploying it's 10 reentry vehicles (8:13). The fiveminute boost phase is not very long to accomplish the necessaryactions required to destroy the missile. A faster burningbooster has been discussed as a counter to SDI. A moderatelyfast burning booster, critics propose, could have a burn time of100 seconds (8:13). However, a degrade in accuracy would result. kiTechnology advances in weapon reaction time together withcomputer and signal processing speed and efficiency make itplausible that the hardware and software can be developed toreact to this 1.66 minute boost phase but the human reaction timeand decision-making process may be the limiting factor.
The command and control system for SDI will have to copewith these timing considerations. Today, many command andcontrol functions must take place in a relatively short period oftime. If not, the capability to respond to an attack withnuclear weapons may be seriously degraded. Existing nuclear "weapon execution requirements very stringently mandate SPresidential authority for release to ensure control of the USnuclear arsenal rests with our elected officials--the Presidentor his successor. A very extensive command, control andcommunications (C3) system is designed to ensure that type ofcontrol exists in case of nuclear war. The strategic C3 systemused today to respond to a ballistic missile attack is undergoinga massive modernization to meet the evolving threat and maintain
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deterrence. This modernization effort is designed to cope withvery demanding time constraints to detect an attack, assess thatattack, decide how to respond and ensure that the chosen responseis carried out prior to destruction by the incoming missiles.
Figure 2 shows the strategic C3 cycle designed to respond toa nuclear attack. The first portion of this system is attackdetection. This includes both strategic warning; e.g., theindicators that provide pre-launch warning as far in advance aspossible and tactical warning; e.g., the satellite and radarsensors. Besides these indicators and sensors, the processorsand communication systems used to sort out and present the dataare essential to ensure timely, clear, reliable and unambiguouswarning.
This warning information is assessed as to its origin,composition and general objecties then presented for decision-making actions. Forces and control assets must be postured forsurvival and decisions on employment options must be made by theNational Command Authorities (NCA) in conference with themilitary commanders in chief (CINCs) and Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff.
After the decision process, many redundant means ofcommunications, each with differing forms of survivability, areemployed to convey the Presidential attack orders to the forces.Each leg of our strategic Triad (land based intercontinentalballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, andmanned bombers) has individual peculiarities that are consideredto ensure connectivity in the event of nuclear war. All of thesesystems, starting with the warning to eventual execution ofnuclear weapons, comprise the strategic C3 capability we dependon to deter war. One critical aspect of this entire system isits capability to function under the time lines imposed by enemyballistic missile flight time.
Figure 1 shows the typical intercontinental ballisticmissile flight time. The total time varies depending on thedistance from launch origin to target. Coastal bomber bases orWashington D.C. may have as little as 10 minutes between launchfrom Russian submarines off the Atlantic Coast till weapon impactdue to the short flight time (6:51). The more accurate, Russianland based ballistic missiles could arrive within 30 minutes.The strategic C3 system is designed to react within those timeconstraints and ensure the retaliatory capability to inflictdamage unacceptable by any standards. This Is the classic formof deterrence in today's offensive posture. However, deterrencethrough SDI requires different reaction times.
It is not reasonable to expect an SDI system (even withperfect/instantaneous C3, if that was possible) will allow thePresident to get enough information and make a rational decision
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about system employment in a little more than the minute and ahalf boost phase of a fast burning enemy ICBM. This isespecially true if the enemy used one of the basic principals ofwar--surprise--or acted in accordance with the wisdom of Sun Tzuwho said: "All warfare is based on deception" (4:79). It can bedebated that surprise is not possible in today's era of vast andmarvelous intelligence indicators, but wasn't that assumed priorto the Pearl Harbor raid? It is naive to depend on intelligencealone and not plan or prepare for surprise attack, no matter howremote the possibility may be. Napoleon, in his Maxims of Warstated: "To be defeated is pardonable; to be surprised--never!"(4:317). If surprise is the only way to defeat a system, then anenemy will surely develop a capability to exploit that weakness.Capability to react to surprise with effective responses detersthe enemy from surprise tactics. Therefore, SDI success requiresthe capability to react to surprise. It also must attackmissiles in all flight phases to be truly effective (2:50). Thefirst phase is so short in duration that it is not feasible for aPresidential response to be given In time. The question thenbecomes what other command and control concept is the mostfeasible.
COMMAND AND CONTROL CONSIDERATIONSAs with any defensive or offensive weapon system, there are
safety considerations to ensure against inadvertent or wrongfulsystem activation. These safety precautions, referred to aspositive control, must be considered when designing the commandand control system. The human element becomes important to theseconsiderations and provides advantages and disadvantages whencompared with unmanned autonomous system concepts.
The amount of positive control built into the system canvary from the extreme, used with nuclear weapons, to the limitedamount over soldiers guarding a boundary line with rifles. IIone case, Presidential authority, numerous codes, two manpolicies, and human reliability measures protect the system. Inthe other case, only the judgement of a single young soldierdetermines when the defenses become active. Positive control ofSDI must fall between these two extremes--not as sensitive asunleashing weapons of mass destruction, yet not as simple asshooting a rifle whenever the enemy crosses a line. A sensitiveor strong positive control over SDI, with layers of checks andbalances against unauthorized or accidental use, can limit it'sability to perform it's mission in a timely fashion. On theother hand, a "hair trigger SDI" could invite a disaster. A keydeterminant in the amount of positive control required for SDI isthe ramifications of false alarm or improper activation.
Regardless of the design of the SDI sensors and algorithmsused to pick out threats and ensure the validity of thosethreats, basic positive control measures will allow only targets
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with specific signatures, which identify it as a threat, to beattacked. With this limited target base, only events that soclosely resemle a threatening missile attack could "fool" thesystem and invite false alarm. The signature definitions mustnot be so stringent that the enemy could attack with a new ornon-standard event to deceive and cause SDI not to react.
The ramification of shooting a false target could be severe,such as destroying a Russian manned space launch in peace time,but not nearly so severe as initiating a nuclear war. When the -
Russians shot down an airliner full of civilians in September of1983 (KAL 007), it created a very serious situation, but not awar. The false alerts from the U.S. missile attack warningsystem, back in 1980, caused a serious uproar over thecredibility and danger of our warning system. Although the falsealerts were quickly noted and corrected before any seriousactions were taken, the uproar was over the envisionedramifications of reacting to false information with nuclearretaliatory forces--a much more serious crisis than reacting withdefensive weapons (5:65). The false defensive action ofdestroying a peaceful (possibly manned) rocket, by mistake, oversovereign territory, has more serious overtones than thesoldier's rifle going off, by mistake, in a tense border controlsituation. The safety on the rifle trigger and the SDI sensoralgorithms are relatively simple forms of positive control butthey are hardware controls not human controls. The ramificationsof mistakes in these two examples may dictate humancontrol/responsibility at the level of the young soldier in onecase and at the Presidential level in the other case. The properlevel of human control over SDI will be discussed later butfirst, the issue of human versus machine control meritsdiscussion.
MANNED VERSUS UNMANNED CONTROL
There are pros and cons to both manned and unmanned commandand control concepts. Much study has been done on this subjectfor other reasons such as man in space, remotely piloted vehicles(RPVs), robotics and artificial intelligence. Usually, thesolutions recommend man in the loop except in cases where theenvironment or life support requirements severely impact themission (such as high threat military missions like tactical vreconnaissance where RPVs are used). Positive controlconsiderations for SDI, discussed above, may require man in theloop. This does not have to be in the traditional sense ofmaintaining total control, but only to satisfy specific positivecontrol demands.
SDI requirements for sensors and processors to fuseinformation and implement reactive actions are so constrained bythe timing considerations that adding man in the loop may not be
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possible. Human decision-making demands that fused informationbe displayed or presented in a format for comprehension.Unmanned command and control systems can be faster since theinformation used for decisions does not have to go through adisplay and human comprehension process before being acted on.Unmanned autonomous systems can be designed for speed and Nefficiency. Onboard satellite processing can reduce transmissiondelays and take advantage of advanced technology such as parallelprocessing techniques whereby the numerous battle managementtasks can be performed simultaneously. Since decisions can beprogrammed into algorithms developed to cope with anticipated aindications, the human decision-making can be done over time withthe input of many experts and approved at any level desired. Inother words, the President, his staff, or even the Congress candecide how to respond to various threats using SDI. This isprogramed into the system to then allow autonomous operation.The human frailties (such as fatigue, emotion, personality, etc.)associated with limited reaction time decisions won't interferewith successful time sensitive command and control. However, arethe human decision-making qualities necessary for SDI?
History has proven the need for human control oversituations that could have led to disaster without intervention.Dr. Stephen Cimbala points out an example in discussing crises:
Throughout U.S. history but particularly during thepost-World War II era, U.S. Presidents have had toexert strong personal control over crises to preventstandard operating procedures and organizationalroutines from propelling events beyond policy control.The Cuban missile crisis is one example. PresidentKennedy had to order the Navy to move its originalblockade line closer to Cuba in order to providedecision time to Soviet leaders. Instructions aboutthe interception of surface ships that approached theblockade line were important to the President and toSecretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who argued .about the procedures with the Chief of NavalOperations. Political leaders failed to exerciseequally strict control over the U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises, known as hunter-killer routines. Six Soviet submarines were forced tosurface during the crisis before the President orderedthe ASW efforts restricted (7:24).
The Cuban missile crisis measured in days can be very differentthan SDI scenarios measured in seconds. A crisis requiringintense negotiation between sides needs human decision-making,but time does not permit such actions in other situations.Flexibility is a key attribute to a command and control system
allowing ultimate control to shift according to the situation.
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I define the command and control needed for SDI operation aseither strategic or tactical. Strategic command and controldecides what constitutes a threat or if lethal actions should betaken in a given situation. Tactical command and controldetermines the optimum detailed system functions such astracking, identification, discrimination, intercept, negation,and kill assessment. Most, if not all, strategic decisions aboutan SDI system can be made in advance and the immediate tacticalcommand and control can be automatic. The requirements forstrategic command and control and human decision-making can bereduced by having specific rules of engagement detailed for SDI.If the human decision will follow the rules of engagement like a"cookbook recipe" or checklist, then a machine can follow itinstead--quicker and more efficiently.
Upon activation, friend and foe could be notified of SDIcapabilities and the rules of engagement. This leaves humandecisions required only if something malfunctions or if asituation unfolds requiring different rules of engagement or ashift in control to higher authority. Man is better suited todeal with the unexpected situations, yet advances in computersassociated with artificial intelligence and expert systems canlead to new roles for autonomous systems. The only requirementsdemanding man in the loop are to maintain positive control and toensure proper system operation. These requirements can beinterpreted as being major and very significant, or minor. Itdepends on the trust in system integrity and likelihood ofunexpected situations. The significance placed on theserequirements determines the degree of human command and controland it's hierarchy.
CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL
The question of where the ultimate command and control ofSDI should reside is a tough one. The most highly centrali7ed C2concept would have the President control the "button" while themost decentralized concept would have the system autonomous withonly maintenance technicians on duty to monitor. Time will notalways allow for the President to control SDI and the system istoo lethal to operate so decentralized that no man is in theloop. Somewhere between these extremes lies the proper conceptfor SDI.
Centralized structures provide the highest level of positivecontrol. Highly centralized (Presidential) command and controlis required for nuclear release due to positive control and thenature of the orders. Specific top authority guidance is neededconcerning which offensive response to use (such as retaliationagainst military targets or cities or additional countries).Once that top level guidance is given, the more detaileddecisions, such as which weapons to use for which target, can
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follow pre-planned procedures (7:51). However, this offensivedecision-making must be closely tied to defensive actions, oncethat capability is fielded. Offensive response options should beoptimized by indications from surveillance sensors to know whichfriendly weapons are under attack and which enemy targets areempty holes. There is an economy and an offensive missioneffectiveness imperative that must be gained from linking SDI C3to the existing centralized strategic C3 architecture. LinkingSDI to the existing C3 structure does not mean they must sharethe same control procedures. The SDI actions can take placewithin the limited time constraints while tinder a moredecentralized control, yet still report actions taken throughexisting C3 channels. This will enhance offensive responses andmaximize the offense-defense synergism.
Decentralized control offers more survivability sincecontrol is distributed to other locations and not confined to acentral node or to single point failure. Proliferated anddispersed control centers can share duties in normal operationand hand-off control if portions go down under attack.Geographic or mission segmentation of control allows for parallel Poperations, decreased data transmission, and decreased processingloads at a central location. This means faster performance. Ofcourse, there are hybrids of all these control concepts.
SOLUTION S
Developing a right solution on how to command and controlSDI requires taking the best attributes of the variousalternatives and combining to form a concept which makes the most
operational sense. Military operational sense should come as thefirst concern rather than political or technical concerns. Somesolutions follow today's way of doing business while others callfor completely new and different concepts. SDI may cost lessmoney by relying on existing national command and control sy,;temsin it's architecture, and that: may placate those cautious ofradical new procedures. New technology under research maysuggest different methods of command and control. The best Ssolution has both old and new concepts blended to match thenational strategy for SDI.
First of all, man must be involved in the command andcontrol process. This is required for safety (positive control)and to deal with unexpected situations. In contrast, quicker and 4Pmore efficient autonomous operation is also required to meet thethreat timing. This indicates a compromise that gives man veto ppower to deactivate the system for safety or malfunction3 but ifleft alone, SDI takes automatic lethal action to defend agains.t Iattack. This action must be under detailed and unambiguous rulesof engagement. These rules are the key aspect of the C2 systemand must be very precise, yet not so rigid that deception could
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defeat the system. By operating onder automatic control, SDI
deters surprise. The veto switch maintains positive control. Ifcontrol nodes are attacked, the system remains in an automaticmode deterring a decapitation attack. This form of command andcontrol should be the normal day to day concept. Flexibility toadjust the command and control with changing conditions is alsoneeded.
Capability to shift control must be available to meetdifferent scenarios. If a crisis builds and alert readinessconditions change, stricter positive control measures may berequired. Higher authority "hands-on" control options must beavailable. The building crisis scenario has less chance of thesurprise that requires decentralized automatic control and hasmore call for human logic to negotiate an end to the crisiswithout use of weapons. This shift away from automatic controlto direct human control could be linked to the procedures takenwhen higher states of readiness are sought. Flexibility isneeded to shift back to decentralized automatic control if thehigher authority human control nodes are confirmed lost toattack.
In normal operations, the human control element shouldreside at a level that can guarantee technical expertise andfunctional responsibility over the entire SDI. The controllersmust devote full effort to the SDI system and maintain propertechnical knowledge to recognize and anticipate problems.Positive control measures should require two man authorization,much like our control of nuclear weapons. This is becausepossession of the critical veto power to stop the system is so
important that no one person should be given power to act alonewhen controlling SDI. The Personal Reliability Program is alsoapplicable to personnel controlling SDI. This program monitorsthe physical and mental health of people holding criticalresponsibilities.
The human control element must have a full understanding ofthe military offensive and defensive employment strategy andcapability that was used to program the SDI system. Knowledge ofworld events which comprise the strategic situation and the realtime tactical situation are critical to the control element.This implies access to national level intelligence and directcontrol resting with a military officer of flag rank. Automaticreporting should follow existing command, control andcommunications systems and procedures to the Nationc] CommandAuthorities (NCA). This is the greatest departure fromtraditional strategic C2 concepts. The NCA must be content witha concept that reports actions taken rather than asks or makesrecommendations on what to do. While this concept ofdecentralized control is unlike nuclear cont.rol procedures, ithas congruence with other conventional weapon control procedures.Ship captains at spa are givpn authority to defend their ships
11
from attack and air defense pilots scrambled to protect sovereignair space are armed with lethal weapons and authority to fireunder their rules of engagement.
SDI should not be controlled like a nuclear weapon system,yet should have sound positive controls. Its importance andworldwide range should not cause the top level controlarchitecture to be cumbersome and less effective. The properarchitecture should be very simple and streamlined. No oneshould be fooled into thinking SDI command and control can gothrough many layers of decision-making and still react in timenor should they think there can be no man in the loop.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. REFERENCES CITED
Books
1. Brezezinski, Zbigniew K. and Richard Sincere, Marin Strmecki, andPeter Wehner (eds.). Promise or Peril, The StrategicDefense Initiative. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and PublicPolicy Center, 1986.
2. Guerrier, Steven W. and Wayne C. Thompson (eds.). Perspectives onStrategic Defense. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
3. Guertner, Gary L. and Donald M. Snow. The Last Frontier.Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1986.
4. Heinl, Robert D.,Jr, Col, USMC (Ret). Dictionary of Military andNaval Quotations. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute,1966.
Articles and Periodicals
5. Cammarota, Richard S., Lt Col,USAF. "Defensive Watch." Air ForceMagazine, (February 1985), pp. 63-67.
6. Cimbala, Stephen J. "U.S. Strategic C31." National Defense,(April 1985), pp. 50-54.
7. Cimbala, Stephen J. "Is A Soviet Bolt From The Blue Impossible?"Air University Review, (May/June 1985), pp. 23-27.
8. Lerner, Eric J. "Old Problems Nag New SDI." Aerospace America, .
Vol. 25 (August 1987), pp. 12-14.
9. Offutt, James, Cmdr, USN and Dr J. Bryan Danese. "Communicationsfor SDI." Signal, Vol. 39, No. 11 (July 1985), p. 31.
B. RELATED SOURCES
Books
Dallmeyer, Dorinda G. and Daniel S. Papp (eds.). The Strategic KDefense Initiative New Perspectives on Deterrence. Boulder,CO: Westviev Press, 1986. .,
Articles and Periodicals
No Author. "National Security: Why C31 is the Pentagon's TopPriority." Government Executive, (January 1982), pp. 14-20.
13I
CONTINUED
Herres, Robert T., Gen, USAF. "C31 Strategic Aerospace D2fense: TheC h a l l e n g e s ." D e f e n s e :, e e n e . a nI d E I - ... . . . . .. .
(June 1935), pp. 42-50.
Latham, Donald C. "Deterring Nuclear War, Supporting Natio.alPolicy." Defense Science and Electronics, V., . 4, N.(June 1935), pp. 71-73.
"S t- ra t: g An O er viw . ~ .Merritt, Jack, Lt_ Zen, USA. "Strtegic 52 An .v~~vw D. -
Science and Electronics, Vol, 4, No. 6 (June 19'5), pp. 5260.
Sagan, , c:, -. *u ear a n c-.a L D . an'!... "rity. (Spring 19'5), pp 79 -19
_ . .. ... . .. C az a a _S.I:SlosL, '-eon aric M: r Deni:; M11l t. ".5 uciar Strategy
Evolutic .: " eteg c eviw l. , ... 1.pp. .19-20.
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