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‘All together in a safe couch’
Press briefing on the Mass transportation security demonstration programme
Prague May 2009
Dr E. Anders Eriksson, FOI
DEMASST Coordinator
www.demasst.eu Dr E. A. Eriksson; [email protected]
Why is mass transportation security important?
Extremely high densities of people – accidents, terrorist attacks, contagious diseases, etc. may
create very major casualties Public transport is a critical infrastructure for the good
functioning of all metropolitan regions– disturbances very costly
Increased market share for Public transport has big environmental upside – requires improvement in security and other dimensions of
quality of service Important with all hazards approach to exploit
synergies between the different types of risks and threats
www.demasst.eu Dr E. A. Eriksson; [email protected]
Why is mass transportation security difficult? Compared to air transport:
– large numbers of open access points
– much more passengers typically 100 times more per day in major PT system vs. major airport
– infrastructures squeezed into existing cities with imminent risks for collateral effects of all kinds of disturbances
– lower acceptance of delays and disruptions of service
– lower acceptance of invasion of privacy
– lower acceptance of investment and operations costs for security systems
PT systems typically tax subsidised
– more heterogeneity systems developed over many decades and without obvious
needs for standardisation and harmonisation difficult for solutions to find sufficiently big market
www.demasst.eu Dr E. A. Eriksson; [email protected]
The FP7-SEC modular approach to building
security System-of-systems level:
– Demonstration programmes (DP)
– DEMASST first phase of DP Mass transportation security
System level: – Integration projects
Modular level: – Capability projects
The economies of modularity:– Use the same module in
different systems (and systems-of-systems)
– Don’t make new modules if good alternatives are available off-the-shelf
www.demasst.eu Dr E. A. Eriksson; [email protected]
Work towards the roadmap proper
Shared system-of-systems map to– identify candidate integrated solutions– guide the design of experiments
Identification of experimentation resources– live experimentation in systems under normal operations
necessary to capture e.g. new types of passenger behaviour due to new ICT services
– test ranges and test beds– computer simulation
necessary for the most dangerous, dull and difficult tasks
www.demasst.eu Dr E. A. Eriksson; [email protected]
B. Major interchange (typically intermodal)
A. Whole urban/intra-regional transport system (network level)
C. Passenger information systems (system-to-customer and peer-to-peer)
D. Lines and roads
E. Vehicles/transport platforms
F. Vehicle parking areas, repair and maintenance shops, etc.
G. Technical support systems incl. SCADA
H. Intelligence
I. Risk assessment-based command and control
J. Comprehensive threat detection
K. Preventive/early intervention
L. Passive/automatic protection
M. Cyber defence
N. Post-incidentintervention andrestoration of services
O. Forensics
P. Learning and training
System-of-Systems Map for Mass Transport Security
Demonstration & Experimentation
Thick lines – much info exchange
Green/red – easy/difficult to do real life experiments