+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Date post: 05-Jan-2016
Category:
Upload: emery-welch
View: 213 times
Download: 1 times
Share this document with a friend
Popular Tags:
34
Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)
Transcript
Page 1: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Altruism and rationality

Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Page 2: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Behavior & contracting in a nutshell

▪ Rationality: “bounded” costly to be rational♦ Chess playing

▪ Self-interest + Info asymmetry “opportunism”♦ Gaming incentives

▪ Orientation towards: ♦ Opportunism ex post ♦ Efficiency ex ante

• “farsighted contracting”—Does it work?

Page 3: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Human conduct

▪ Economics♦ Self-interest ♦ Rationality

▪ Observable behavior ♦ Altruistic cooperation: tips by tourists♦ Failures of rationality: emotions (revenge etc.)

▪ Two dimensions when analyzing conduct♦ Self-interested---------------Altruist ♦ Rational-------------------Emotional

Page 4: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

1. Altruism

Page 5: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Questions

▪ Does selfishness "pay“? ♦ Examples: trust problems

• Prisoners’ dilemma

• Kidnapping

▪ Are there genuine altruists out there?

▪ Could they exist, compete, survive?

Page 6: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Let us see why different types of individuals could exist

Page 7: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Returns from cooperation for different types

Honest Dishonest

Honest 4 6

4 0

Dishonest 0 2

6 2

Page 8: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

In a population with both types

▪ Proportion of honest persons = h

▪ Return for honesty = 4h + 0 (1-h) = 4h

▪ Return for dishonesty = 6 h + 2 (1-h) = 2 + 4h

Honest Dishonest

Honest 4 6

4 0

Dishonest 0 2

6 2

Page 9: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Identification impossible

Proporción de honestos

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Deshonestos

Honestos

Proporción de honestos

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Deshonestos

Honestos

Dishonest

Honest

Proportion of honest people

Page 10: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Identification at no cost

Proporción de honestos

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Deshonestos

Honestos

Proporción de honestos

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Deshonestos

HonestosHonest

Dishonest

Proportion of honest people

Page 11: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Costly identification (cost = 1) (if h>0,75 honest guys gain more without identifying)

Proporción de honestos

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Deshonestos

Honestos

Proporción de honestos

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

Deshonestos

Honestos

Dishonest

Honest

Proportion of honest people

Dishonest

Honest

Page 12: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Mental experiment

▪ Do you know someone, not a relative of yours, who, finding a wallet with 100€, would give it back to the owner?

▪ Why do you trust this person?

▪ How would she feel if she did not return the wallet?

Page 13: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

The role of emotional commitment

▪ Emotional problems and features that can avoid the corresponding problem: ♦ Deceit honesty ♦ Dissuasion vindictive ♦ Exploitation averse to suffer injustice

Page 14: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Biological mechanisms of commitment: Emotional recognizable predispositions

▪ Emotional automatic, not “rational”: “they suspend” rational calculation

▪ Recognizable♦ by others (so that they trust us) ♦ by oneself (to avoid to be deceived)

▪ Physiological examples: ♦ face expression, tone of voice, breathing, blush,

visual contact, smiling, dilated pupils, etc.

Page 15: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

What does this say to you?

Only a 15% of the population can do it voluntarily…

Page 16: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Examples of emotional commitment

Page 17: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Permanent problem: mimicry

▪ Viceroy ▪ Monarch (poisonous)

http://www.kidzone.ws/animals/monarch_butterfly.htm

Page 18: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Mimicry

▪ Conditions ♦ Costly or slow for imitator

▪ Importance of being pioneer

▪ Between people, it is advantageous: ♦ To be honest and to seem it ♦ To pretend it without being it ♦ To distinguish both types

Page 19: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Size of primates’ brains is positively correlated to groups’ size

Page 20: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

2. Rationality

Page 21: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Bounded rationality

▪ It is costly to gather & process the information needed to make optimal decisions we “satisfy” ♦ E.g.: chess with clock: 40 plays in 2,5 hours ♦ To satisfy = to optimize with information cost

▪ Systematic “errors” = violations of the “rational” rules of decision ♦ Example: Do people respond the same when going to the

movies if they discover that they have lost: (a) their ticket or (b) a 10 € bill?

Page 22: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Sunk costs

▪ New shoes, too tight: Do people react the same if they bought them as if they received them as a gift?

▪ Pizza buffet: pay 3€ you eat all you want ♦ We give back 3€ to lucky tables: Will these eat

more or less that the other tables?

▪ Firms keep investing in ruinous investments

Page 23: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Asymmetric value function (Prospect Theory) - defined on changes of wealth - aversion to losses steeper for losses - decreasing marg. utility concave in gains, convex in losses

Page 24: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Rules

▪ Segregate gains: wrap gifts separately

▪ Combine losses: “blood sweat & tears”

▪ Combine small loss with greater gain

▪ Detach small gains form large losses: cash rebates

▪ Exercise: examine marketing tricks

Page 25: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

The Benefit of Segregating Gains

Page 26: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

The Benefit of Combining Losses

Page 27: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

The Silver-Lining Effect and Cash Rebates

Page 28: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Are opportunity costs equally costly than money outlays?

▪ We bought ticket to 100 €

▪ On arrival, resale price 1,000 € > max we had paid

▪ Do we sell the ticket?

▪ Prospect theory: it seems that we consider ♦ Opportunity cost as a “lost gain” ♦ Payments a “losses”

▪ Other explanations?

Page 29: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Two types of “errors”

▪ To know & decide badly

▪ To use heuristic (approximate) rules to select the information and decide ♦ Availability ♦ Representativeness ♦ Anchoring♦ Perception ♦ Irrelevant options * Are not they errors only in an specific context?

E.g., think of possible evolutionary explanations

Page 30: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Availability

▪ We considered frequency by the memory of examples ♦ Dangerous when evaluating subordinates

▪ If easier to recover from memory (more salient, recent, etc.) it affects decisions more♦ How many words (1) begin by “r”; (2) have "r" like

3rd letter? ♦ Plane crashes?

Page 31: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Representativeness

▪ A brilliant soccer player, is more likely to be Brazilian or not? ♦ 10,000 players altogether, 100 of them brilliant♦ 50 players are Brazilian, 25 of them brilliant

▪ We underestimate the “regression to the average” ♦ Fans complain that their team plays worst after a

goal or success when in fact the team is falling back into average performance

Page 32: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Anchoring & adjustment

▪ X = % of African countries in the UN ♦ Lottery number (anchor) = n = 10 or 65 ♦ People estimates different X:

• If n = 10 E(X) = 25%

• If n = 65 E(X) = 45%

▪ To consider products ♦ 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 2.250 ♦ 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 512

▪ Conjecture: ♦ Are these experiments artful but irrelevant traps, to

our “Bayesian” mind, designed to produce probabilities from unique events, not to handle frequencies, that require great samples?

Page 33: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Perception is proportional to the intensity of the initial stimulus

▪ Luminosity ♦ We did not perceive the small differences ♦ We do not see difference between bulbs of 100

and 100.5 watt ♦ But we see a 0.5 watt bulb

▪ Price differences between stores: they influence more if they are important with respect to the price of the article ♦ Does it explain transactions costs in real estate?

Page 34: Altruism and rationality Based on Frank (1992, chapters 7-8)

Irrelevant options

▪ When adding “dominated” option C (“irrelevant”), the proportion of people inclined to a near option (B) increases

Price

Distance

A

B C

▪ But, although C is dominated, ♦ Is it truly irrelevant? ♦ Could not it be informing that the next option is

relatively better? (in similar, real, situations)


Recommended