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FROM “STAR WARS” TO THE WAR ON TERROR
American Public Opinion Polarizationon
Defense Policy
Donald M. Gooch
Political Polarization
Public Perception: Red vs. Blue Academic Debate: Social Issues Polarization Puzzle: Myth or Madness? Gaps in the literature:
Non-social issues (i.e. economic, foreign policy, etc.)
Empirical definition of polarization Determinants of polarization
Defense Policy Polarization
Define Polarization Theoretically Empirically
Examine the Polarization of Public Opinion on Defense Spending
Assess the relationship between Polarization on Defense Spending Public Opinion and trends in actual Defense Spending
Assess other factors that could cause polarization in the distribution of opinion on Defense Spending
Polarization: Concepts
Polarization is not divisiveness or “angry” politics. Polarization is not an increase in “heated rhetoric.” Polarization as a concept is the relative distribution
of opinion in the American electorate along either single or multiple issue dimensions.
A “polarized” opinion distribution is the distribution of opinion relative to a “theoretical maximum” (DiMaggio, 1996).
Polarization as a process refers to the change in the distribution of opinion relative to this maximum or a prior distribution of opinion over some specified period of time.
Relatively Polarized
Polarized vs. Normal Voter Distributions
Figure 2.1: Polarized Elites? Are Elites Located Distant from Median Voter and the Mass of Voters?
XMED
POLICY
Republican Party Elites Democratic Party Elites Fiorina’s Normal Distribution of voter ideal points Bi-Modal Distribution of voter ideal points Median Voter Position
If the distribution of voters is normal and centrist, then the party elites have moved away from voters
If the distribution of voters is bimodal, then the party elites are located with their respective constituents
Polarization: Measures
Variation (Standard Deviation)
Central Tendency (Means)
Bimodality (Kurtosis)
Polarization Measures
TABLE 3.1: ILLUSTRATION OF POLARIZATION NOT REFLECTED IN AVERAGE POSITIONS IN A HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION Population (n=8)
TIME PERIOD 1 Distribution of Pop. Opinion on X Issue
TIME PERIOD 2 Distribution of Pop. Opinion on X Issue
TIME PERIOD 3 Distribution of Pop. Opinion on X issue
Citizen 1 0 0 5
Citizen 2 0 1 5
Citizen 3 0 2 5
Citizen 4 0 5 5
Citizen 5 10 5 5
Citizen 6 10 8 5
Citizen 7 10 9 5
Citizen 8 10 10 5
MEAN STAND. DEV.
5.000 5.345
5.000 3.780
5.000 0.000
Source: Compiled by the Author.
Foreign Policy Periods: The Cold War
The Cold War “Let me share with you a vision of the future
which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today…a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from the rain“ - Ronald Reagan, 1983
Foreign Policy Periods: The New World Order
The New World Order Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world
in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order… A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. - George H. W. Bush, 1991
"I know…that the United States cannot--indeed, we should not--be the world's policeman, and I know this is a time, with the Cold War over, that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our shores." -William J. Clinton, 1994
Foreign Policy Periods:The War on Terror
The War on Terror States like these, and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. - George W. Bush, 2002
Theoretical Models Partisan Model. Public opinion polarization on issues is conditioned by
the reactions of the electorate to the partisanship of those in control of government policy. In particular, partisans of the opposite party are more likely to polarize in response to the other party in control of the policy agenda.
Policy Model. Public opinion polarization is responsive to the actual implemented policy and changes in the levels or status of that policy. If, for example, defense spending increases, then the public polarizes or depolarizes relative to the change in the status quo and their preferred level of defense spending.
Events Model. Public opinion polarization is responsive to exogenous shocks to the system, relatively independent of the current policy makers or their policy prescriptions. These events independently affect the average issue positions of the public. For example, the September 11th attacks could produce a significantly higher preferred level of defense spending.
Variables
Actual Defense Spending, % GDP
Average Defense Spending Public Opinion
Bimodality of Defense Spending Public Opinion
Foreign Policy Periods
Z-ScoresEquation 7.2: Z-Score for Defense Spending
ZDS =
Where: = the ith observed value of defense spending for year. = the ith mean value of defense spending for year.
= the ith standard deviation of defense spending for year.
Bimodality Trends in Defense Spending PO, 1980 – 2008
FIGURE 7.6: BIMODALITY TREND IN MASS OPINION ON DEFENSE SPENDING, 1980-2008
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
DEFENSE KURTOSIS
Clinton Administration
War in Iraq
Berlin Wall Comes Down
Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’
Speech
Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’
Speech
Bush’s ‘New World Order’
Speech
G.W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’
Speech
Defense Spending: % GDP, 1980-2003
FIGURE 7.7: DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1980-20031
1 “Table 3.1: Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940--2003," in Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 (2004), Washington, pp. 45--52
00.5
11.5
22.5
33.5
44.5
55.5
66.5
7
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Defense Spending % GDP
Clinton Administration
Berlin Wall Comes Down
September 11th Attacks
Public Opinion Defense Spending Bimodality & Actual Defense Spending
FIGURE 7.10: BIMODALITY TREND (-Z-SCORE) & DEFENSE SPENDING (Z-SCORE) IN WAR & PEACE, 1980-2008
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
DEFENSE SPENDING - %GDP (Z) DEFENSE BIMODALITY KURT (-Z)
COLD WAR IRAQ WAR
Glasnost Perestroika
NEW WORLD ORDER
Berlin Wall Comes Down
September 11th Attacks
Persian Gulf War
Average Public Opinion on DS, DS Bimodality, & Actual DS
FIGURE 7.11: BIMODALITY TREND (-Z-SCORE) ACTUAL DEFENSE SPENDING % GDP (Z-SCORE), PUBLIC OPINION ON
DEFENSE SPENDING (Z-SCORE), 1980-2008
- 3
- 2
- 1
0
1
2
3
1 9 8 0
1 9 8 1
1 9 8 2
1 9 8 3
1 9 8 4
1 9 8 5
1 9 8 6
1 9 8 7
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 9
1 9 9 0
1 9 9 1
1 9 9 2
1 9 9 3
1 9 9 4
1 9 9 5
1 9 9 6
1 9 9 7
1 9 9 8
1 9 9 9
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1
2 0 0 2
2 0 0 3
2 0 0 4
2 0 0 5
2 0 0 6
2 0 0 7
2 0 0 8
DEFENSE SPENDING - %GDP (Z) DEFENSE MEAN (Z) DEFENSE BIMODALITY KURT ( - Z)
Status Quo on Defense Spending
Status Quo on Defense Spending
Polarization Hypotheses
Defense Spending Public Opinion tracks with actual defense spending.
Defense Spending Public Opinion is responsive to presidential administrations.
Defense Spending Public Opinion is determined by actual Foreign Policy events.
Models (Mean & Kurtosis)
Basic Models: Defense Spending Public Opinion Polarization on Defense Spending Defense Spending +Party Public Opinion Polarization on Defense
Spending
Full Model DS + P + Foreign Policy Period POP on DS
Full Model w/ Interactions: DS + P + DS*P + FPP*P + FPP*DS POP on DS
Coding
CODING SCHEME FOR FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD & PRESIDENTIAL PARTY VARIABLE CATEGORIES VALUE
PARTY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION
REPUBLICAN 1
DEMOCRAT 0
FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD
COLD WAR 0
NEW WORLD ORDER -1
WAR ON TERROR 1
Defense Spending Polarization Models
VARIABLES
Basic Model Basic Model 2 Full Model Full Model w/ Int Defense
Spending (M) Defense
Spending (K) Defense
Spending (M) Defense
Spending (K) Defense
Spending (M) Defense
Spending (K) Defense
Spending (M) Defense
Spending (K)
ADS - 23% + 74% - + - + - +
PPA + 47% - 78% + - +
FPP + 67% + 82% --- --- --- ---
ADS*FPP + +
ADS*PPA
PPA*FPP + 78% + 85%
Regression Tables
TABLE 7.2: DEVIATION MODELS REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS (%GDP) ON DEF. SPENDING PUBLIC OPINION.
MODEL:
Intercept
(S.E.)
Parameter Estimate
(S.E.)
R2
N DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) 0.000
(0.166) -0.478
(0.169)
*** .229 29
DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) 0.000 (0.859)
0.859 (0.099)
*** .737 29
* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level
Regression Tables
TABLE 7.4: D. M. REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING & PARTY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMIN ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION.
MODEL:
Intercept
DEFENSE
SPEND
PARTY
R2
N DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) -1.029
(0.333) -0.810
(0.173)
*** 1.356 (0.398)
*** .467 29
DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) 0.435 (0.213)
0.999 (0.111)
*** -0.573 (0.256)
*** .780 29
* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level
Regression TablesTABLE 7.5: D. M. REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING, PARTY & FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION.
MODEL:
Parameter Estimate
Standard Error
DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) Intercept -0.357
0.320
Actual Defense Spending -0.826
*** 0.140
Party of Presidential Administration 0.626
* 0.372
Foreign Policy Period 0.687
*** 0.178
PR > |F| <.0001 R2 .666 N 29 DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) Intercept 0.736
*** 0.235
Actual Defense Spending 0.992 *** 0.103
Party of Presidential Administration -0.899
*** 0.274
Foreign Policy Period 0.307
** 0.131
PR > |F| <.0001 R2 .820 N 29 * significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level
Regression Tables
TABLE 7.6: REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING, PARTY & FPP ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION WITH INTERACTIONS
MODEL:
Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) Intercept -2.014
*** 0.489
Actual Defense Spending -1.283
*** 0.506
Party of Presidential Administration 2.197
*** 0.504
Foreign Policy Period
--- ---
ADS*PPA
0.606 0.508
ADS*FFP 0.533
** 0.217
FPP*PPA 0.850
*** 0.167
PR > |F| < .0001 R2 .775 N 29 DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) Intercept 0.270
0.397
Actual Defense Spending 1.218
*** 0.410
Party of Presidential Administration -0.484
0.409
Foreign Policy Period
--- ---
ADS*PPA
-0.158 0.412
ADS*FFP 0.387
** 0.176
FPP*PPA 0.427
*** 0.135
PR > |F| <.0001 R2 .852 N 29 * significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level