An Inside View of Reconciliation (Off Print)

8/8/2019 An Inside View of Reconciliation (Off Print)

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myanmar/burma

Copyright 2010The Brookings InstitutionKonrad Adenauer Foundation


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Konrad Adenauer Foundation

Brookings Institution Press

Washington, D.C.

myanmar/burmaInside Challenges,Outside Interests

Lex Rieffel

Editor



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about brookings

The Brookings Institution is a private nonpro t organization devoted to research, education,and publication on important issues of domestic and foreign policy. Its principal purposeis to bring the highest quality independent research and analysis to bear on current andemerging policy problems. Interpretations or conclusions in Brookings publications should

be understood to be solely those of the authors.Copyright 2010 the brookings institution

konrad adenauer foundation

1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036www.brookings.edu

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any formor by any means without permission in writing from the Brookings Institution Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication dataMyanmar/Burma : inside challenges, outside interests / Lex Rieffel, editor.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.Summary: Through the eyes of ASEAN members, neighbors China and India, and the

United States, examines current state of affairs in Myanmar/Burma and focuses on nationalreconciliation and economic development, as the country approaches multiparty electionsin fall 2010 and after the Obama presidency has initiated a new approach to relationsProvided by publisher.

ISBN 978-0-8157-0505-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)1. BurmaPolitics and government1988 2. BurmaForeign relations1948

I. Rieffel, Alexis, 1941 II.Title.JQ751.A58M03 2010959.105'3dc22 2010033153

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed on acid-free paper

Typeset in Minion

Composition by Cynthia StockSilver Spring, Maryland

Printed by R. R. Donnelley Harrisonburg, Virginia



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52

An Inside View of Reconciliation

maung zarni

3

Both historically and in the present, the de ning characteristics o politics in Myanmar have been mass poverty in all its dimensions, a mul-tiplicity o conficts, domination o the weak by the strong, and resistance

rom below.1 Sixty years a ter her independence rom Britain, Myanmar isthe only country in Southeast Asia that remains engul ed in domestic con-ficts, both armed and nonviolent. Despite numerous local and externale orts at mediation and direct political negotiations, neither positive peacenor lasting resolution o conficts is in sight.

First, a word about my personal perspective. I was born in Myanmarand spent the rst twenty- ve years o my li e in an extended military am-ily where a state-centric, Burmese nationalist view prevailed. I have spentthe second hal o my li e in exile as a dissident and a student o Burmesea airs, and my earlier views have necessarily been challenged by my com-plete immersion in Aung San Suu Kyiled opposition politics and rst-handexperience working with ethnic minority resistance groups. My views on

peacemaking in Myanmar have evolved as a result o both intensive pro-essional training in peace negotiations and rsthand experience in seeking

common ground with the other side. 2

Patterns and Trends in Peacemaking

Until 1989 the confict in Burma was a three-way a air between the SocialistPartycontrolled Burmese army, the armed Maoists, and a number o indig-

enous ethnic armed resistance groups. Within ninety days o Burmas inde-pendence in 1948, an open struggle or state power between the commu-nists and the socialistswith irreconcilable ideological visions and personal



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An Inside View of Reconciliation 53

rivalriesgave birth to a civil war within the ethnically Burman elite. Thebattle raged on until both the socialist-controlled military regime and theirnemesis, the Communist Party o Burma, collapsedin July 1988 and April

1989, respectively. Armed opposition rom most ethnic minorities o politi-cal signi cance also began early, hardly paused during the 198890 transi-tion, and continues to this day, despite a patchwork o disparate and ragilecease re deals with the countrys military rulers.

Three distinct historical approaches to peacemaking can be seen between1948, when the civil war rst broke out under a parliamentary government,and 198889, when the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) beganpursuing cease re deals with various ethnic armed resistance groups. In the

rst, infuential nationalist gures in the elds o culture, literature, andpolitics, all ideologically leaning toward the le t, launched a Le tist Unity campaign in the 1950s to mediate the confict between the Maoists and thesocialists. The objective, which did not come to ruition, was a lasting peacebetween the two most power ul orces in the confict.

In the second approach, many Burmese politicians in U Nus parliamen-tary government sought to establish a temporary cease re with the Maoistsrather than a lasting peace, to concentrate resources on the military campaignagainst the armed ethnic minorities that were demanding greater autonomy or outright secession. At one point, U Nus government was on the verge o total de eat at the hands o the Karen National De ense Organization, whichcontrolled territory reaching the suburbs o the capital city o Rangoon. Thenationalist elites rationale was two old: keeping the Union o Burma intactwas more important than Burman leadership conficts and ideology; and assoon as the military threats posed by the Karen National De ense Organi-zation were addressed e ectively the communists and the socialists couldresume their own intra-ethnic, ideological eud. Lasting peace did not seem

to be an end in and o itsel or either the Burman politicians on both sidesor the armed units on both sides.

In the third approach, peace meant only two things or the Tatmadawleaders. One was acceptance by all opposition groups o the militarys pre-rogatives, including the historical entitlementthe sel -perceived institu-tional righto the Tatmadaw to con gure the postcolonial state in linewith its uncompromising vision o a unitary polity. The other was accep-tance by all opposition groups o the militarys operational terms o peace. In

short, the military saw peacemaking as en orcement o a set o rules dictatedby a central state (in Myanmar) led by the military and subject to its dictates.Since the Tatmadaw was created almost seventy years ago, its sel -image



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54 Maung Zarni

has evolved rom servant o the people to guardian o the people. Today inMyanmar, the army is the statereal, not imagined.

Between 198889 and 1994, the military reached separate cease re agree-

ments with more than seventeen ethnic armed resistance groups o varyingsizes and degrees o political signi cance. According to Maung Aung Myo,an army-bred ormer lecturer at Myanmars infuential National De enseCollege, the decisive actor behind the regimes decision to seek these agree-ments was its ear o cross-ethnic alliances among the armed opposition inconcert with the popular opposition movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi. 3 To be sure, the new external developments such as the approaching end o the cold war and post-Maoist Beijings withdrawal o support or communist

and to a lesser extent ethnic armed rebellions across Southeast Asia turnedout to be an external enabling actor or Myanmars cease resor peacesettlements, as the regime labels these disparate agreements. The regimespursuit o cease re agreements, however, was largely motivated by an instru-mentalist strategic objective, not a genuine desire or a lasting peace, whichwould require addressing long-held grievances (past rights abuses, denial o basic rights) and substantive political disputes (di erent political visions,extreme asymmetry o power, local economic and resource exploitation, andother issues related to ethnic, economic, or political justice). 4

Two Thematic Issues in Peacemaking

Since it was ormed in 1942 with the sole support o ascist and militaristJapan, the Tatmadaw has gone through a long process o metamorphosis inits ideological oundations, organizational structure, strategic alliances, andrelations with the countrys civilian population. While it has always beena key player in Myanmars national politics, the military seems to be have

locked itsel into a process o regressive evolution.5 In spite o its noble inten-tions at the beginningto liberate the people rom the yoke o British impe-rialist ruleits present-day worldview and mode o operations have cometo be characterized rather accurately as ascist and militarist. This view re ersnot just to the Tatmadaws policies, decisions, and behavioral patterns butalso to the actions o troops on the ront lines. One report a ter another romcredible local and international organizations over the past twenty yearslends credence to allegations o atrocities throughout the country su ered

at the hands o the military. The militarys own view rom the barracks isdiametrically opposed to the widely held view rom the outside.



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Recently the elderly and controversial local writer and ormer communistMaung Suu San, also known as Comrade Chan Aye, has described contem-porary Burmese politics as post-ideological. He is correct i the ideological

division is de ned along the conventional le t versus right split. But thisobservation overlooks the crystallization o an alternative ideology that hastwo components. First, it rames the military as the only time-tested, battle-seasoned, and best-quali ed natural ruler o the country. Second, it de nesnational security narrowly as regime security and places regime security asthe overarching policy objective governing all other dimensions o nationbuilding. Regime security, in turn, is equated with the personal security o Senior General Than Shwe and his extended amily. These two de ning

components, pervading the regimes governing discourse and sel -percep-tion, are institutionalized and constantly rein orced.Besides, the Tatmadaws care ully constructed, sel -serving view rom the

barracks is dominant among the new o cer corps. At the organizationallevel, this hegemonic view serves as a rare ideological basis or elite cohesionwithin the o cer corps but not necessarily among privates and other ranks. 6 One reason Tatmadaw o cers hold closely to this view is clearly that doingso helps compensate or the tremendous reputational loss su ered by themilitary as the direct result o both its categorical ailures as nation builderand widespread and ongoing human rights crimes against the citizenry o all class, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Another rationale is the abortedcoup, chronic splits, quiet mutinies, periodic wholesale purges, and highrates o desertion experienced by the military since it rst assumed power in1958. In the words o Maung Aung Myo, a ormer lecturer at the NationalDe ense College, at present, the Tatmadaw is concerned with the institu-tional unity, operational capability and troop discipline. There appears a lowmorale and high rate o desertion. 7 Whether the militarys internal tensions

and conficts o interests will boil over and result in a serious institutionalsplit, which might create political space or dissidents and ordinary citizens,remains to be seen. But one thing is certain: public wel are as the main con-cern o the Tatmadaw has been replaced with a military-centered, statist per-spective. A local analyst recently observed that the military seems to havestopped re erring to itsel as being the army o , or, and by the people.8

Thus the Tatmadaw as the ultimate rulerwhose right to rule at willis cemented in the 2008 constitutionis one o the two major themes

local peacemakers eel they have to work with. Operating within this para-digm, the generals pursue what they consider their historical mission to



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56 Maung Zarni

reconsolidate the power o the centralizing state, which was disrupted by acentury o British colonial rule and six decades o post-independence civilwar. By contrast, local peacemakers tend to rame the objective as reconcili-

ation between the military rulers and the suppressed civilians representedby the National League or Democracy (NLD). From their perspective,civilians have as much right as the military to decide how to mold Myanmarinto a modern nation, and they reject the militarys attempt to constitu-tionalize the political apartheid wherein the military arrogates to itsel theconstitutional right to be the national arbiter, occupying the rst tier o politics and society.

The second important theme is ethnic equality, which bears an oppos-

ing set o historical memories. The Tatmadaw has gradually moved away rom the two cardinal oundations o Myanmar historiography: that Myan-mar regained its independence through a collective e ort by a number o playersCommunist cadres, ethnic minority eudal elites, le tist-inspiredmasses, rightist nationalists, and soldiers; and that the ounding o post-independence Myanmar was based on a ormal agreement among severalmajor ethnic groups o varying sizes to voluntarily orm a ederated Uniono Burma as politically equal ounding partners. 9 These two actors are notirreconcilable in and o themselves. However, the tragic assassination o sev-eral key architects o the union on the eve o the countrys independencemade the task o implementing the new arrangement extremely di cult,especially since the Bama or Myanmar leadership that assumed the reins o the newly independent state did not seem to be as committed to the idea andreality o Burma as a voluntary ederal association whereby the paramountprinciple o equality among indigenous ethnic groups, including the Bamatribes, was to be enshrined constitutionally in both spirit and letters.

In the gradual evolution o its institutionalized sel -image, the Tatmadaw

views the majority Burman ethnic group as rst among equals. This is refec-tive o the ethnic makeup o the military leadershipBurmans and ethnicminorities who share the militarys view on ethnic hegemony. To the gener-als, creating a modern state involves no cultural subjugation, political domi-nation, economic exploitation, or territorial expansion and control by theBurman population over the rest o the population. In its own story line, theTatmadaw is only seeking to restore multiethnic harmony and sa eguard theterritorial integrity o Myanmar as it has existed since time immemorial. The

generals insist that orging a nation-state, even in a confict-soaked multi-ethnic country such as Myanmar, involves no cultural, military, or politicalsubjugation, despite glaring evidence to the contrary.



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Pro les of Reconcilers

Although natural prejudices do arise rom di erences in ethnic, class, reli-

gious, and pro essional backgrounds, they rarely degenerate into violentconfict. The all-encompassing confict seen today is constructed by the elite,which exploits each groups distrust and ear o the ethnic Other, rather thanby the grass roots. Although Myanmars elite o all ethnic and class back-grounds have been engaged in this ethnopolitical mobilization, the over-whelming public sentiment is that the generalsand their power base, theTatmadawmust bear the lions share o responsibility or the continuingconficts and their own spectacular ailures at nation-building. To be air,

blame must be shared with the uneducated or uncritically educated domi-nant Myanmar ethnic group, especially the Burmese intelligentsia, whichsubscribes to the myopic Bama- or Burmese-centric nationalism. The ongo-ing confict refects a strong two old legacy: deeply ingrained and localized

eudal and paternalistic political cultures, on the one hand, and post-inde-pendence political experience, with autocratic regimes, elite domination, andcontrol o the public realm, on the other. Given the elites near-total controlo both the decisionmaking process and the public sphere, it is no surprisethat its dialogue and reconciliation e orts have made a signi cant imprinton society at large. The collective hatred toward the military that has devel-oped during the past hal century o military rule, however, transcends allbounds o ethnicity, religion, political ideology, and economic background.Even many local businesspeople, including well-known regime cronies, whohave bene ted rom their close ties with the regime pro ess privately theirdeep disdain toward their patrons in generals uni orms. 10

The reconcilers can be divided into two categories: internal and external.The internal reconcilers can be urther divided into pro essional ones and

accidental ones. Pro essional reconcilers are individuals with some ormaltraining in mediation, political negotiation, and confict resolution. Acci-dental reconcilers are those who have had no training but whose social andpolitical position makes them ideally suited to the task o mediation.

Internal reconcilers can also be divided into two categories: those with anonmilitary background and those who are or have been military o cers.Reconciliation work may be de ned as both public and private attemptsto help establish common ground between the ruling military regime and

its political opponents, the long-term objective being harmonious coex-istence among all elite groups, both ethnic and military, and their institu-tions. I ocus here on elites because grassroots communities are generally not



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58 Maung Zarni

engaged in communal, racial, ethnic, or religious conficts. With the excep-tion o the violent conficts between the Karens and the Burmans in lowerBurma in the 1940s and occasional outbursts o collective hostilities directed

at the economically dominant and culturally chauvinistic local Chinese, eth-nic communities across the country were not warring against one another.It is usually di erent ethnic elites who attempt to stoke ethnoprejudices as astrategy or political mobilization in their elite-level power struggle. Never-theless, ethnic tensions and divisions, as well as widespread prejudices, aresigni cant issues among Myanmars grassroots communities that deserveserious attention. 11

However, only a ew o the local players in the politics o reconciliation

are known to have had any pro essional training in confict trans ormation,resolution, or management. Even or these ew, their current involvementis accidental and circumstantial rather than a result o their pro essionalbackground. A cursory look also shows that the local peacemakers come

rom highly diverse backgrounds: senior Buddhist monks, Christian pastors,university pro essors, medical doctors, ormer and serving military o cers,prominent dissidents, businessmen, women, drug warlords, and insurgentleaders. Conspicuously absent are Muslim leaders and civil servants. Muslimleaders are not players presumably because o the negative and widespreadsocial attitudes toward them. Civil servants, by contrast, stay out o peace-making because the military rulers direct them to avoid political activities.

Exploring a Track-Two Approach

Following what is considered a ailed attempt by the SPDC in 2003 to physi-cally harm Aung San Suu Kyi and her senior colleagues through a mobambush, I was assigned to lead a small team o dissidents mandated to seek

Western support or strengthening armed resistance by the National Coun-cil o the Union o Burma, an umbrella group o armed resistance and dis-sident organizations, including the Karen National Union (KNU), based atthe Thai-Burmese border. 12 As others be ore us had done, we hit the wall o policy indi erence and overestimated Western solidarity with our struggle

or reedom. Finding no prospect or either arms or nancial support, wedecided to embrace pragmatism and start talking to the military. 13 Similarly,within six months o our quietly signing o on our mission to seek Western

support, the late general Saw Bo Mya decided rather pragmatically to acceptthe cease re o ered to the KNU by General Khin Nyunt, the third rankinggeneral, who, in his capacity as head o the power ul Directorate o De ence



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Services Intelligence (the military intelligence unit), served as the regimestop troubleshooter. The spy chie was increasingly viewed as the only gen-eral in the country whom the outside world could do business with, as

one senior Western diplomat based in Rangoon remarked to me a ter KhinNyunt was arrested. This is the view also prevalent within the Associationo Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Domestically, Khin Nyunt, with noin antry troops under his command, was the weakest o the top three gen-erals, and he was there ore compelled to build his base by adopting what Iwould call a politics o give and take with the regime adversaries such asAung San Suu Kyi and armed resistance groups.

At this time the intelligence camp, whose wings were beginning to be

clipped by the rival hard-line group with their zero-sum understanding o politics, was looking or new strategic alliances with ethnic resistance groups,opposition circles, religious leaders, and academics as well as internationalorganizations and oreign diplomats. Uneasy with the dri t into the embraceo Beijing and concerned about the damage the domestic political deadlockwas doing to the countrys economic and political development, the intel-ligence camp became interested in mending ences with Washington, whichit saw as a counterweight to the growing Chinese power in the region. InWashington, a less moralistic, more strategic-minded group o policy ana-lysts, advisers in Congress, and career diplomats saw the growing infuenceo China in Myanmar as part o a larger pattern o Chinese activity with thepotential o undermining U.S. interests around the world. By the autumn o 2003, in consultation with my team o ellow dissidents in exile and with theknowledge o the U.S. government, I was in direct communication with theo ce o prime minister and intelligence chie General Khin Nyunt.

Building on these divergent concerns, I proposed to Matthew Daley, thendeputy assistant secretary o state or East Asian and Paci c a airs at the U.S.

State Department, the idea o organizing a track-two initiative. While track-two diplomacy, most broadly de ned, re ers to non-governmental, in or-mal, and uno cial contacts and activities between private citizens or groupso individuals, the term as used in this essay re ers to a subset o uno cialactivity which involves pro essional contacts among elites rom adversarialgroups with the purpose o addressing policy problems in e orts to analyze,prevent, manage and ultimately resolve inter-group or inter-state conficts. 14

Daley was himsel rustrated with the U.S. governments rigid adherence

to its sanctions as he saw how little impact they were having on the regimesbehavior or policies. So he jumped at the opportunity and in due coursehelped secure the necessary political support rom the U.S. government. For



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60 Maung Zarni

without the governments o cial consent, the communications my dissi-dent colleagues and I were having with Burmese counterintelligence wouldhave been problematic, especially since we had all been granted asylum by

the United States. Moreover, i our Burmese e orts were not classi ed astrack-two, my travel to Rangoon while holding a United Statesissued re u-gee travel document would have been in violation o U.S. immigration andcitizenship laws.

The moment or my own ace-to- ace con dence-building talk camewhen Senior General Than Shwe overruled a political deal that General KhinNyunt had reportedly secured rom Aung San Suu Kyi as early as March2004.15 The NLD issued a public statement saying it was staying away rom

the National Convention where the constitutional discussions were takingplace o and on, citing the regimes ailure to respond to the NLDs requestthat certain antidemocratic provisions and principles be put on the conven-tions agenda or debate. The news that leadership-level dialogue had hit yetanother dead end compelled our group o dissidents to act, believing thatchannels o communications ought to be maintained at all levels. 16

A brie detour here may be use ul. My understanding o the deal was thatAung San Suu Kyi, still under house arrest at the time, would be allowed toaddress the National Convention, thereby helping to legitimize the regime-sponsored seven-step roadmap to democracy. The military would also per-mit the NLD to seek changes at the convention in some o the blatantly anti-democratic provisions o the dra t constitution. This was a deal that boththe intelligence camp and the NLD elt could move the country on the pathtoward much-needed re orms. However, eeling increasingly threatened by what he viewed as the hidden agenda o his own chie negotiator and intel-ligence chie , Than Shwe eared that Khin Nyunt might make a deal withthe Western-backed opposition movement and eventually betray him. Than

Shwes greatest ear is known to be meeting the ate o his ormer boss, thelate general Ne Win, who was put under house arrest and denied access tocritical medical care by Than Shwe himsel . It is hardly surprising that thedeal was shot down. As a matter o act, in January 2004 Than Shwe backped-aled on the cease re agreement that the Khin Nyuntled intelligence camphad reached with the KNU. 17

The track-two initiative undertaken by my colleagues and me needs tobe placed in its proper context. The common ground we elt we had was

our view that Western sanctions were hampering the process o change thatMyanmar desperately needed. We were also o the opinion that i we wereto move away rom a military-controlled state then a certain segment o the



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military needed to be working with us. In other words, the weakened intel-ligence camp o potential re ormists and the dissidents disillusioned by theempty Western rhetoric o democracy promotion needed each other. The

plan we proposed to General Khin Nyunt was to hold a series o ace-to- acecon dence-building meetings bringing Khin Nyunts deputies together witha group o pragmatic dissidents in exile.

Peacemaking without a License

On May 30, 2004, I few rom Bangkok to Yangon and met with three o Khin Nyunts deputies: Brigadier General Than Tun, Colonel Hla Min, and

Colonel Tin Oo.18

Initially, our requests included that we also meet withAung San Suu Kyi, but the intelligence camp re used, saying the politicalclimate was too tense. 19

The news o our one-day meeting, rumored to be backed by the U.S. gov-ernment, set o a strong reaction or our di erent reasons. First, the NLDparty leadership in Yangon elt seriously threatened by the track-two initia-tive. They were outraged that I had stepped orward as an opposition inter-locutor a ter Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD had pulled out o negotiationswith the regime because the regime had backtracked on a sealed deal. Inaddition, the NLD eared that i Washington were indeed backing an initia-tive with the regime without consulting with or having the prior blessing o the NLD, then the United States might be relaxing its economic and politicalpressure on the regime.

Second, many Myanmar dissidents have a rigid idea o who quali es asa legitimate revolutionary or dissident: unless the individual is either in thearmed resistance or has spent time in jail or antimilitary activities, he orshe is not considered a bona de dissident. Despite my track record as an

e ective organizer and campaigner who helped translate the NLDs call orsanctions and economic boycotts into a policy reality (in e ect serving asa key campaign spokesperson internationally), I was not viewed as a bona

de revolutionary or dissident. That I was the only exile who actually wentto Yangon with the backing o the U.S. government and at the invitation o Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was too much or them to stomach. 20 Personali-ties are at the heart o Myanmar politics. 21

Third, the intelligence camp itsel could not bring all its key in-house

players onto the same page. There were ongoing internecine ghts betweendi erent cliques. For example, some sought short-term public relationsor propaganda gains by claiming that certain dissidents were opposing



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U.S. sanctions and seeking cooperation with the regime; others saw valuein building long-term strategic ties with dissidents. The public relationsoriented clique proactively leaked the news o my one-day trip to Myanmar

exiles and the exile media.Last but not least, that General Khin Nyunt, the main backer o this track-

two initiative rom the regimes side, was ousted less than ve months a terthe initiative got o the ground blocked any momentum that may havestarted to gather. Two months be ore his arrest in October 2004, Khin Nyuntsent me a clear message that he was ready to support moving ahead on theinitiative by accepting my proposal that we organize a meeting in Thailandbetween his top deputies (such as Brigadiers Kyaw Win, Thein Swe, Kyaw

Thein, and so on) and a group o infuential and pragmatic exiles who wereopen to exploring new ideas or ending the deadlock between Than Shweand Aung San Suu Kyi. The Thaksin government also indicated to me thatit would be prepared to provide logistical support or such a Burmese-to-Burmese dialogue. This was nipped in the bud by Khin Nyunts ousting eightweeks a ter giving the project his approval. These were the ingredients o theexplosive mix that set o one o the hottest political controversies in the pastdecade. Needless to say, the rst casualty was my own reputation.

Id been orewarned about the risk to my reputation by ormer generalsin Manila who were advising me on the need to build channels o commu-nication with potential re ormists within the military regime. The Filipinogenerals, who played a catalytic role as good soldiers, encouraged me toaccept the risk because it was not my reputation that should matter most butthe strategic mission o building ties with orward-looking o cers within themilitarys inner circle. But the longer-term implication was a public contro-versy that scared o anyone who was inclined to pursue any type o media-tion initiative without Aung San Suu Kyis blessing.

It is signi cant that, with the exception o those who have worked onethnic cease re initiatives, local reconcilers lack either access to or the con -dence o key parties in the underlying confict, such as Aung San Suu Kyi andThan Shwe. While Aung San Suu Kyi is unlikely to suspect that external play-ers such as UN special envoys have traded their conscience or the regimespermission to meet with her, she might well distrust a proreconciliation Bur-mese. As an illustration, Suu Kyi re used to believe credible reports about aconfict o interest on the part o Ismail Razali, the retired Malaysian diplo-

mat who was appointed as special adviser on Myanmar to the UN secretary-general. At the time he accepted this position, Razali was chairing the boardo directors o a Malaysian company that specialized in making electronic



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passports. He reportedly sought business contracts or his company rom theMyanmar government. When a reporter asked Aung San Suu Kyi pointedly whether she thought Razali had violated the confict-o -interest principle,

she said no. Whether she knew about Razalis business interests in Burma issomething only she can answer. Her remarks may simply have been a showo aith in Razalis integrity. I he had been Burmese her reaction would havebeen totally di erentbecause there had been numerous cases o Burmesedissidents within the NLD who turned out to have worked or the regime

rom a multiplicity o motives, circumstances, and logics.

Peacemaking by External Players

Peacemaking initiatives can be launched by ve types o external players: thesuperpowers, the United Nations and other international bodies, riendly countries, humanitarian groups, and private sector parties. In the case o Myanmar, the rst three are relevant.

SuperpowersDespite taking a rather hard line publicly, several Western countries, includ-ing the United States as the leader, have tried with no apparent success tomediate the conficts in Myanmar. These e orts have targeted not just theconfict between the military regime and the mainstream opposition o AungSan Suu Kyi but also the armed confict between the Karen National Unionand the Tatmadaw. When Washington o ered to help mediate the KNU-Tatmadaw confict about a decade ago, the KNU elt that by holding outinde nitely it could get a better deal. More recently, Washington tried bothbilaterally and with Beijings help to get some kind o meaning ul engage-ment with the military regime on policy issues, including the latters treat-

ment o Aung San Suu Kyi and her opposition party.In June 2007 Beijing hosted and provided logistical support or a bilat-

eral meeting between the United States and Myanmar. Washingtons del-egation was led by a deputy assistant secretary in the State Department,while the Myanmar delegation was led by the oreign minister and includedthe regimes liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi, Brigadier General Aung Kyi.Washingtons approach to dialogue with the military regime was based oneconomic and nancial incentives, including millions in development and

humanitarian aid. However, the Myanmar regime is not attracted by eco-nomic bait; it only craves public recognition rom Washington. Nothingshort o ull recognition will move the military regime.



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Chinas role in national reconciliation in Myanmar is ambiguous. Onone hand, Beijing eels it must de end the principle o noninter erence inother countries a airs. On the other, China seems uneasy about the military

regimes ailure to maintain domestic political stability. The Sa ron Revolto 2007 was only the most televised in a long series o social upheavals inMyanmar. Furthermore, the Chinese leadership is ully aware o the generallack o competence on the part o the military regime in handling interna-tional relations. There ore, China has sent top o cials to Naypyidaw andinvited Tatmadaw generals to Beijing to dispense advice on how to handleinternational controversies. For instance, at the height o the internationalprotests over the military regimes mishandling o the Cyclone Nargis disas-

ter in May 2008, the Chinese were actively involved in mediating the escalat-ing tension between the military regime and the international community.China has also been involved in mediation between the military regime andthe United Nations.

Two other dimensions o Chinas relations with Myanmar are worth not-ing in this context. One is Beijings role in cease re agreements between themilitary regime and the ethnic armed resistance groups, particularly thosewith past ties to Beijing: the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), theUnited Wa State Army (UWSA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alli-ance (MNDA) made up o Han ethnic Chinese locally known as the KokangChinese, and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) based inMongla, Shan state. In the second hal o 2009, a furry o high-level visitsto Beijing by Tatmadaw generals took place or the purpose o seeking Bei- jings assistance in disarming certain cease re groups that were re using togo along with the SPDCs plan to convert them into border guard units.

The other dimension is Beijings relations with the NLD and other oppo-sition players. In act, the Chinese embassy was the rst diplomatic mission

in Yangon to meet with the NLD leadership a ter the 1990 elections and o era message o congratulations. Beijing has maintained contact with someproAung San Suu Kyi dissidents in exile over the years while it continues todevelop its o cial relations with the military regime.

International Bodies

One well-documented area o peacemaking is a range o initiatives by theUnited Nations. Over the past teen years, the UN General Assembly has

passed annual resolutions calling or national reconciliation in Burma. Whilethey are not binding, these resolutions lend credibility to all UN initiativesto end Myanmars long-running internal conficts. As noted by the Brazilian



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scholar Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN special rapporteur on the situationo human rights in Myanmar rom 2000 to 2008, the United Nations hasundertaken nearly orty visits by its envoys and o cial messengers. These

include a rst visit by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in May 2008 to pleador humanitarian access to the victims o Cyclone Nargis and a second visit

in July 2009 to urge the military regime to release Aung San Suu Kyi and all2,100 political prisoners, make the 2010 elections inclusive, credible, ree,and air, and pursue a genuine process o national reconciliation. None o these mediation missions has produced a signi cant outcome. Besides theseovertly political e orts, the United Nations and its agencies have engaged inpolicy discussions on a broad range o issues with sparse results.

In November 2007 the European Union appointed an Italian diplomat,Piero Fassino, as its special envoy or Burma-Myanmar. More than two yearsa ter he assumed this assignment, Fassino has still not been issued a visa by the Burmese regime. 22 Myanmars military-controlled media recently lam-basted the European Union or its pro-sanctions policy.

For its part, ASEAN has stayed clear o direct mediation e orts. AungSan Suu Kyi has in the past singled out ASEAN as a regional block whosepolicy o constructive engagement is skewed because it engages only withthe military rulers and not with civil society representatives. In the a ter-math o Cyclone Nargis, which devastated the countrys rice-growing deltaand its shing industry in May 2008, the regime tactically chose the lesser o two evils (that is, ASEAN and UN humanitarian missions over the EuropeanUnion and the United States) by conceding limited humanitarian engage-ment in the ace o the global outcry against its blockage o emergency relie supplies or Cyclone victims. But the initial optimism surrounding the jointe orts by ASEAN and the UN to expand humanitarian space in Myanmar(and its potential or change) proved premature. A ter the much-publicized

initial humanitarian cooperation with ASEAN and the UN, the regime reinedin local humanitarian e orts, jailed local citizens who voiced their concernsabout the regimes manipulation o aid provisions, issued stricter guidelines

or international NGOs, and, last but not least, removed its top liaison anddeputy oreign minister Kyaw Thu rom both assignments, as he had becometoo riendly with external humanitarian engagers or the generals liking.

Friendly Countries

Thailands role in peacemaking in Myanmar is intriguing because be ore theBritish arrived Thailand and Myanmar were rival imperial powers and hadought numerous wars against each other. Military elites in both countries



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66 Maung Zarni

still harbor mutual distrust. The Thai military views the SPDC as an isolatedand backward bunch o generals, while the SPDC views the Thai military as a stooge o the United States. Thailands national security establishment

deems Myanmar the top nontraditional security threat to Thailand, whilethe Burmese generals perceive Thailand as the top traditional security threatto their country. 23 Nevertheless, the two countries have established exten-sive economic relations out o necessity and convenience. Myanmar saleso natural gas to Thailand generate a signi cant portion o Thailands elec-tric power consumption. Thailand is planning to import coal and electric-ity rom Myanmar through hydropower projects along Salween River, whileThai companies are heavily invested in major resource extractive sectors o

the Myanmar economy. The Thai economy bene ts rom an estimated 2million to 3 million Burmese migrant workers across Thailand who are paidless than hal o Thailands minimum wage.

This economic entanglement serves as a power ul incentive or Thailandto play a mediator role in Myanmars internal conficts. In particular, Thai-land under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra hosted the Bangkok Processin December 2003, which involved high-level discussions between SPDCo cials and their counterparts rom teen other governments concernedabout Myanmars domestic political situation. The Thai government alsoreadily agreed to help acilitate the track-two initiative that General KhinNyunt and I were working on, which ended prematurely when Khin Nyuntwas sacked in October 2004. More important, successive Thai governmentshave played a quiet mediator role between the KNU, which served as a strate-gic bu er or Thailand, and the military regime or the past ten years, includ-ing acilitation o a well-publicized trip to Yangon in December 2003 by aKNU delegation led by its iconic leader, General Saw Bo Mya.

Other below-the-radar track-two e orts by various confict resolution

pro essionals have included those by the ather o peace research and itsleading practitioner, Johan Gultang; European Unionbased organizationssuch as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation; and private sector players, includ-ing executives rom Western natural resource extraction companies workingin Myanmars gas and oil sector. None o these e orts has produced eithera concrete outcome or a mechanism or confict resolution. The way theregime approaches all mediation e orts including various track-two initia-tives, especially a ter the ousting o Khin Nyunt, helps explain the categorical

ailure o mediations. For the generals divide the world into two vast camps,riends and oes, not unlike the worldview in amously espoused by then U.S.president George W. Bush and his neoconservative advisers and deputies. 24



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And they are only interested in using these encounters with external playersas the propaganda orums in which the regime spokespersons air their well-rehearsed narratives regarding the state o the a airs in Myanmar, spread

alse tales o Aung San Suu Kyis uncompromising idealist stance vis--visher captors in power, and stoke the international communitys ear o ethnicbalkanization in Myanmar absent the strong hand o the military. 25

To sum up, the military regime has stuck to its guns, both literally and g-uratively, having apparently decided to engage with both outside and insidegroups only on its own terms. Meanwhile, it has been pursuing its strategicplan to constitutionalize military rule while continuing to weaponizeand nuclearize.

At the end o 2009, the military regime was pursuing closer ties with Rus-sia and North Korea (both o which supply Myanmar with weapon tech-nologies, including nuclear and missile technology) while also be riendingthe theocratic regime in Iran. The regime is developing twenty major sites ormanu acturing weapons, investing a signi cant portion o its GDP to importdual-use (civilian-military) technology, training up to 4,100 military o cersin Russia in the areas o nuclear engineering and nuclear sciences, and build-ing 600800 underground tunnels and command centers.

Fundamentally, Myanmars military regime sees politics as the extensiono war, not the other way around. Indeed, it does not eel a need to pursueeither peace as a negotiated process o give and take or reconciliation as aprocess o healing among historical antagonists. It is hard to see any e ortsat reconciliation having any impact on the confict landscape o Myanmar,however creative or imaginative or power ully supported they may be, aslong as the regime views national reconsolidation as simply the restoration o a national unity that never existed, with the military as the ultimate uni er.

The SPDCs Approach to National Reconciliation

As noted earlier, Myanmars ruling generals are not pursuing reconciliationbecause they see something wrong with their behavior, policies, and prac-tices. Instead, seeing themselves as the guardian o the nation, they considerall actions that advance the objective o achieving a uni ed nation-state tobe justi ed. No wonder that reports o the militarys use o violence, torture,rape, pillage, orced labor, orced relocation, and so on keep piling up. 26

The ruling generals believe that they are good Buddhists who meditate andobserve occasional Buddhist sabbath and daily precepts, despite their unmis-takably antihumanist and antiliberal policies and practices. They appear to



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68 Maung Zarni

see no dissonance between their sel -image and their actions. 27 State buildingis a undamentally criminal process, as Charles Tilly noted when he amously remarked that wars ma[ke] states and states ma[ke] wars. 28 It requires get-

ting tough and doing unpleasant things like shooting unarmed monks orimplementing a policy o our cuts in ghting armed dissidents, that is,cutting o ood, unds, intelligence, and recruits.

As noted above, the military regime has invented a historical ction torein orce its sovereignty-based political philosophy: I any trace o ethnicdisharmony and division exists inside the country, it is a legacy o the Britishcolonial practice o divide and conquer. Armed with this radically distortedhistorical memory, the military resorts to various methods to compel those

inclined toward peacemaking to accept its terms o engagement. Amongthese are the ollowing:pursuit o separate cease re agreements with ethnic armed resistance

groups rather than a comprehensive, multilateral, and collective peace agree-ment with all

divide-and-conquer tactics, such as inducing intra-group splits betweenthe Shan State ArmyNorth and the Shan State ArmySouth, between theBuddhist rank and le o the Karen National Union and its predominantly Christian leadership, between the dominant ethnic minorities and the lesspower ul ones, and even between siblings and relatives in the same amily

providing di erential access to economic rewards in the orm o com-mercial licenses, export-import deals, and the like

psychological manipulation o key players, taking advantage o their senseo sel -importance and their personal political and organizational missions

blackmail and threats o loss o livelihoods, access to education, medi-cal treatment, and the like

the classic counterintelligence practices o spreading misin ormation,

slanderous rumors, and whispersgeopolitical and economic games with outside powers, such as reneging

on a commitment to grant oil concessions to India and giving them insteadto China, a ter China vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, proposed by the United States, condemning the military regime or its suppression o theSa ron Revolt in September 2007

demographic engineering by displacing communities to change thepopulation mix in a direction avorable to the regime

However, there are also progressive practices by the military regime thathave practical bene ts in its relations with various cease re groups. Forinstance, the incidence o orced labor and other abuses by the Tatmadaw



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has signi cantly declined in cease re areas, indicating sel -restraint. Cease-re groups have been permitted to pursue various types o commercial proj-

ects that bene t either the ethnic leaders or their communities more broadly.

The military regime also recognizes the symbolic power o their cease repartners by letting Tatmadaw o cers be disarmed by cease re groups whenthe ormer enter the headquarters o certain cease re groups, such as theUnited Wa State Army. These are among the regimes peace dividends.

But the undamental problem o reconciliation in Myanmar remainsunaltered. The regime is dead set against honestly refecting on why it is seenalmost universally as the great obstacle to peace by the people in whose nameit justi es its existence, policies, and decisions.

In his ne but unpublished analysis o the cardinal problem o the mili-tary regime, Maung Aung Myo perceptively observes that the militarysoveremphasis on regime survival in the name o order and stability andits egotism o knowing what is best or the people has invariably isolatedthe Tatmadaw government rom the society it is supposed to protect andgovern. The same author sums up the essence o Myanmars ongoing crisisthus: With absolute authority, backed up by the monopoly o the instru-ments o violence and the absence o checks and balances, the Tatmadawgovernment has increasingly become the captive o a small group that ailedto di erentiate between private, corporate, and public interest. 29

Even General Khin Nyunt and his men in the now-de unct intelligenceapparatus, credited with being modern politicians who understood politicsas an art o give and take, pursued political deals with armed and unarmeddissidents because they were more pragmatic, not because they were drivenby a system that values peace and reconciliation. With the last batch o prag-matists in the military completely purged or relegated to positions o stra-tegic insigni cance, peacemaking is incomparably more di cult because

policies are being determined by hard-liners whose paradigm is conquest,control, and domination.

What Can the International Community Do?

I see our areas where external actors might insert themselves in ways thatpromote, complement, and strengthenrather than undermine, over-whelm, and displacethe quest or peace and conciliation by local actors.

First, the intellectual community should develop honest analyses rather thanstrategically ramed, discursive narratives that are distorted by sel -censor-ship. Peacemaking e orts based on less than a ully honest examination o



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70 Maung Zarni

the objective nature o those who hold power, their sel -perception, theirpower instruments, and their historical narratives can do serious disserviceto the countrys oppressed public. A fawed peacemaking process can be

worse than no peacemaking at all.Second, practical refections among reconcilers is one way to address this

intellectual de cit. Current analytical paradigms and historical understand-ings might be subjected to a collective critique by bringing together a groupo local and external reconcilers, in a mentally and physically sa e setting,with a group o expert mediators whose views o Myanmar and her con-ficts have not been tainted by rsthand involvement. The current domi-nant state-centered narrative, coming rom both the regime and the United

Nations system, needs to be held up to serious intellectual and empiricalscrutiny. The colonial, hegemonic, racist, class-based, sexist, and predatory nature o the military-ruled state in Myanmar needs to scrutinized. The stateis the elephant in the room. Regrettably, most peacemakers or various rea-sons have chosen not to discuss this beast.

Third, an in-depth comparative study o similar conficts might yield use-ul results. With massive investment by the regime in weaponization o the

already thoroughly militarized state, Myanmar today is moving away rom,not toward, a democratic, peace ul political system. It is deepening its exis-tence as a state in which national security is coterminous with survival o the leadership and the regime, with no space to develop along the lines, orexample, o the East Asian Tigers. Confict-soaked Myanmar could use ully be examined against two alternative sets o states: developmentally success-

ul states in East Asia, such as Taiwan and South Korea, and developmen-tally ailed states, such as Iran and North Korea. Additionally, a comparativestudy could be done between Myanmar and the Southeast Asian states thathave moved or are moving away rom past militaristic, authoritarian rule,

such as post-Marcos Philippines, post-Suharto Indonesia, post-MahathirMalaysia, and pseudo-communist Vietnam.

Finally, the wisdom o intellectual activism, i peacemaking or reconcilia-tion can be called that, needs to be made accessible to the people o Myanmarin their local languages. Without an enlightened population, peace deals atthe elite level, while valuable and welcome, will remain elite power-sharingdeals. They will not trans orm society to accept peace as an intrinsic value. Asystematic translation initiative devoted to peacemaking and confict analy-

ses could be developed and unded.The elite-driven peacemaking o the past sixty years has ailed in partbecause elite peacemakers are con ronted with two major obstacles. First, i



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they move too ar rom the collective position o the community they rep-resent, the community grows suspicious o their mission, and they standaccused o being co-opted by the regime in exchange or personal gain. Sec-

ond, some peacemakers, though their e orts are grounded in humanitarianand development experience, do not have a grassroots base. While Myan-mar is not the West Bank and her communities are not up in arms againstone another, the long-standing elite-level conficts, both between and withinethnic groups, have a deeply negative social and psychological impact at thegrassroots level across the country. There is no silver bullet or Myanmarsconficts; a spiritual, intellectual, and political trans ormation o society isthe only ultimate solution. Elite-level peacemaking can help trigger this pro-

cess, but ultimately it is human beings, not states or multinational corpo-rations or multilateral institutions, that make peace. Power does not makepeace; it only manipulates, exploits, deceives, controls, and dominates.

An initiative that brings people into the peace process needs to do seventhings: address prejudicial ethnic, class, and gender attitudes and norms;revise o cial historical narratives; enable communities and individuals tonegotiate peace in their localities; empower people by providing them withproductive and sustainable livelihood opportunities; trans orm people intoindependent thinkers who are less susceptible to ideological manipulation;give communities greater control over natural resources and the environ-ment in their localities; and enhance individual and communal capabili-ties to resist the centralizing power o a modern nation-state that serves thelargely imperial world order.

Global Dimensions of Peace and Reconciliation

The turmoil in Myanmar is taking place not simply within the countrys

domestic landscape. Those who claim that the domestic landscape mustchange be ore peace or prosperity can be established are categorically fawedin their understanding o the nature o both the conficts within the country and the external world order. The turmoil is taking place within a processo regressive globalization, a negative orm o globalization that strengthenssystems o political oppression and economic exploitation at the expense o peace, stability, and citizen rights in natural resourcerich and geopolitically strategic countries. The Myanmar people are not merely up against their

countrys unsavory rulers. Their struggle or peace is in act against someo the worlds most power ul ideological, economic, political, and military orces. For example, their oppressor enjoys reliable support rom China and



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72 Maung Zarni

Russia, the two members o the UN Security Council that have used theirveto to block e orts to push or reconciliation in Myanmar.

The global resource extraction industries are deepening their ties with

the Myanmar military regime. Among the global exploiters o Myanmarsnatural resources are Total o France, Chevron o the United States, IvanhoeMines o Canada, China National Petroleum Corporation, Daewoo Interna-tional o South Korea, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation o India, Petro-nas o Malaysia, and Thailands PTT Exploration and Production. They all

ll the military regimes co ers and in e ect und the SPDCs oppression.Until the external equation changes undamentally, reconciliation in Myan-mar, not just human rights and human dignity, will remain a victim o glo-

balization. The military regime is simply the local proxy in a process that isseeing the countrys economic sovereignty slip away.

Notes

1. I use Myanmar as the countrys name only to be consistent with other chap-ters in this book. In 1989 the ruling military junta changed the countrys name romBurma to Myanmar , arguing that the old name, the Anglicized word or Bama,

which re ers speci cally to the countrys dominant Buddhist tribe, did not refectthe countrys ethnic diversity. Besides the dictatorial manner in which the generalschanged the countrys name, the new name, Myanmar, is linguistically incorrect,because the word Myanmar has no meaning without the su x Lu Myo, to denotethe Bama ethnicity, or Tai or Pyi, to re er to the polity (which belongs to the Bama).Nor does it remotely capture the countrys ethnic diversity, as the generals claim.Finally, the correct transliteration o the new name rom written Burmese to Englishis Myanmathat is, without the nal consonant r .

2. My conversations and meetings have ranged across civil society opinion mak-

ers, business elites, and high-ranking military o cers. Key regime o cers includeLieutenant General Myint Swe (widely known as Senior General Than Shwes petand the rst chie o the newly created Military A airs and Security Department,the military intelligence unit), ormer brigadier general Than Tun (head o coun-terintelligence under Khin Nyunt and chie regime liaison with Aung San Suu Kyi),

ormer colonel Hla Min (spokesperson o the SPDC), and ormer colonel Tin Oo(the right-hand man and rst personal security o cer o Khin Nyunt, not the NLDchairman and ormer de ense minister Tin Oo). Opposition leaders whom I metand held discussions with include the late Pdoh Saw Ba Thin, chair o the Karen

National Union; Pdoh Mhan Sha La Phan, the KNU general secretary, who wasassassinated in the Thai-Burmese border town o Mae Sot in 2008; other top KNUleaders (KNU de ense chie General Tamala Paw, Major Tu Tu Lei, and Pdoh KweHtoo); and high-ranking brigade commanders and strategic advisers in the Karen



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National Union in the low-intensity war zone o Kawthoolei or Karen state. I alsohad substantive conversations with various local and oreign mediators who havemade attempts at peacemaking in Burma. Among these individuals were the Rev-

erend Saboi Jum (a Kachin Baptist pastor), Dr. Simon Thar (a Karen neurosurgeonand politician), and Dr. Christian Peter Hauswedell, who headed the Asia Division atthe German oreign ministry.

3. Maung Aung Myo, The Future o the Tatmadaws Political Role in Myan-mar: Prospects and Problems, unpublished manuscript.

4. For the most recent discussion o the militarys re usal to address histori-cal grievances across the board and its consequences, see my orthcoming essay,Bottom-Up Pursuit o Justice in Burma, in Global Civil Society 2011: Globality andthe Absence of Justice, ed. Martin Albrow and Hakan Seckinelgin (Basingstoke, U.K.:

Palgrave-Macmillan, orthcoming).5. Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyis martyred ather, and his closet nationalist col-leagues, who ounded the Burma Independence Army or the Tatmadaws nucleus,were all le tist radicals and agitators who admired Stalins Soviet Union. This helpsexplain the act that military commanders were answerable to underground nation-alist agitators who served as political commissioners during the Tatmadaws rstbattlethe revolt against its Japanese masters.

6. In-depth interviews across Southeast Asia with a number o Tatmadaw de ec-tors, both o cers and other ranks, between January and June 2010.

7. See Maung Aung Myo, Future o the Tatmadaws Political Role in Myan-mar, p. 35. Maung Aung Myos observation has been repeatedly con rmed by a hal dozen army o cers o varying ranks who deserted the Tatmadaw as late as spring2010, during the time o my interviews with them.

8. Personal communication with Arthur Win (not his real name), a Rangoon-based local writer and political analyst, Bangkok, January 2010.

9. The treaty was known as the Panglong Agreement, named or a small ethnicShan town where it was signed by a group o Bama and other ethnic leaders. Despitethe treatys central original fawthat it does not ully protect the interests and con-

cerns o its diverse ethnic populationits modern-day adherents continue to cher-ish its ederalist spirit while acknowledging its limitations and hence the need orsigni cant modi cations.

10. This observation is based on my personal communication outside Myanmarwith a diverse group o local businesspeople over the past ve years.

11. See my analysis o Burmas intra- and inter-group ethnic politics in Con rontingthe Demons, June 19, 2010 (www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=17011).

12. The team members were drawn rom di erent ideological and organizationalbackgrounds. They were Aung Saw Oo, Naw May Oo, Aung Thu Nyein, and Min

Zaw Oo.13. We were not the only team o dissidents who were assigned to seek West-ern support or renewed armed resistance. Concurrently, KNU leader GeneralSaw Bo Mya also sent his son, Colonel Nada Mya, to Western capitals on a similar



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74 Maung Zarni

assignment, something my colleague Naw May Oo picked up on during our chancemeeting with the colonel in Washington.

14. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Rethinking Track Two Diplomacy: The Middle East and

South Asia, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers 3 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute o International Relations, 2005), especially What Is Track Two Diplomacy? (www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050601_cdsp_paper_diplomacy_3_kaye.pd [July 2010]), pp. 57.

15. Priscilla Clapp, who served as U.S. charg da aires and chie o mission inRangoon rom 1999 to 2002, has noted that Than Shwe overruled the deal his intel-ligence chie Khin Nyunt reached with Aung San Suu Kyi in 2004. See Priscilla Clapp,Burmas Long Road to Democracy (Washington: United States Institute o Peace Spe-cial Report 193, 2007 (www.usip.org/ les/resources/sr193_0.pd [July 2010]).

16. Our groupincluding prominent dissidents in exile such as Tun Kyaw Nyein,Bobo Kyaw Nyein, Aung Thu Nyein, ormer physician to Aung San Suu Kyi, Dr. AliceKhin Saw Win, and so onbroadly agreed that we should keep talking with GeneralKhin Nyunts o ce, despite this negative development. The dissidents among uslater changed their tune rom involvement and approval to disentanglement anddenunciationwhen the Burmese media criticism o my day trip to Rangoon lookedimminent. An Irrawaddy editorial, A New Blow to the KNU, discusses the ri tsand allout resulting rom our talking to the enemy (www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=6707 [July 2010]). Even General Bo Mya, the late iconic revolu-

tionary with an impeccable record o personal involvement in the KNUs armedrevolution, who few to Rangoon in December 2003 to hold ace-to- ace cease rediscussions with General Khin Nyunt, did not escape attacks and slanders rom hisown rank and le.

17. During the last round o cease re negotiations between the KNU and theregime immediately be ore the dismantling o the Directorate o De ence ServiceIntelligence (or military intelligence) under Khin Nyunt, the regimes chie negotia-tors, such as Brigadiers Kyaw Thein and Thein Swe, would tell their KNU counter-parts that the agreement made the previous day needed to be renegotiated, as the

Lu-gyi (big man, re erring to Than Shwe) did not accept it. My dissident colleagueNaw May Oo, in the Free Burma Coalition o ce, was in daily satellite-phone contactwith her Karen colleagues who led the KNU delegation during the negotiations.

18. Brigadier General Than Tun was the chie liaison o cer between the mili-tary regime and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He was also chie o counterintelligence inGeneral Khin Nyunts Directorate o De ense Services Intelligence (DDSI). ColonelHla Min was the government spokesperson at the time while Colonel Tin Oo wasGeneral Khin Nyunts very rst personal security o cer or aide dcamp and a con-

dante. They are all serving lengthy prison sentences a ter their bosss down all in

October 2004.19. At our insistence during the last-minute negotiations in Bangkok regardingthe details o my con dential day trip to Rangoon, Colonel Tin Oo axed us a letter



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con rming that we had pressed or a meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi but that hisside, that is, the prime ministers o ce, decided against it, citing the tense politicalatmosphere.

20. At the Bi-annual Con erence o the Burma Studies at Northern Illinois Uni-versity, DeKalb, Illinois, in October 2004, Matthew Daley remarked publicly thatthere was nothing personal about the U.S. State Departments support or my tripand went on to justi y such support on grounds that the U.S. governments Burmapolicy is to encourage and support dialogue among Burmese citizens in politicalconficts.

21. Besides our track-two dissident team, the intelligence camp also made contactwith several other infuential dissidents such as Harn Yawnghwe, then top opposi-tion lobbyist based in Brussels, and Dr. Thaung Htun, a New Yorkbased representa-

tive o the Burmese exile government headed by Aung San Suu Kyis rst cousin, Dr.Sein Win. However, no ollow-up activity was taken by either side. Personal com-munications with Harn Yawnghwe and Dr. Thaung Htun, November 2006 and June2010, respectively.

22. Even i the regime were to allow him into the country, Fassino is not believedto be the right man to advance the European Unions unspoken Myanmar policy objective o high-level dialogue with the generals. Personal communications withboth European Commission o cials in charge o Burma and Southeast Asia andambassadors to Burma rom key EU countries, 200810.

23. Personal communications with Thai security analysts at Chulalongkorn Uni-versity, Bangkok, as well as with the Tatmadaw de ectors in two Southeast Asiancapitals, 2010.

24. In May 2006 I served as a acilitator and interpreter or a meeting in Rangoonbetween Pro essor Johan Galtung and a senior military o cial in the Military andSecurity A airs Department. The department chie and his deputies wanted me toassure them that Galtung came to see them because he wanted to be riend the mili-tary government.

25. In June 2010 a senior Chinese scholar and administrator rom Chinas

National Academy o Social Sciences told me about his experience interacting withMyanmar academics, who are also civil servants. According to him, at the scholarly exchange orum held in Rangoon in 2008and initiated and unded by a Germanpolitical oundationthe academics, handpicked by the Myanmar regime, explainedto oreign visitors that Aung San Suu Kyi was a major obstacle to the Myanmar mili-tary governments desire or wanted peace and reconciliation because she continuedto insist on trans er o power on the basis o the NLDs election victory two decadesago, a veri ably incorrect assertion. During my two-and-a-hal -hour meeting withthem in Rangoon in May 2004, even Khin Nyunts deputies, who were relatively

open minded compared with the o cers who replaced them, were more keen onheaping blame on Aung San Suu Kyi or the countrys political stalemate than on jointly exploring potential solutions to break the political deadlock.



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76 Maung Zarni

26. These reports have culminated in the Harvard Law Schools May 2009 reportCrimes in Burma, a power ul indictment o the regimes atrocities both in areasunder its direct rule and in the countrys armed confict zones. Crimes in Burma,

report by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 2009 (www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Crimes-in-Burma.pd [July 2010]).27. In one o my meetings with Lieutenant-General Myint Swe, then head o mili-

tary a airs and security, he told me directly that he was observing sabbath or the day despite his busy schedule and indicated that his bosses and senior colleagues werealso doing the same. He even exhorted me to go and pay homage at the Shwedagonpagoda a ter the late a ternoon meeting to build up my karma.

28. Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Bring-ing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 16991.29. Maung Aung Myo, The Future o the Tatmadaws Political Role in Myanmar:Prospects and Problems, p. 39.


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