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CANADIAN IOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Supplementary Volume

II

1976)

Anaximanders Argument

MICHAEL C. STOKES, University

of

Durham

This topic was first put on a proper scholarly footing by the late

Werner Jaeger and by Charles H. Kahn; earlier scholars tended either

to refrain from speculating on the relation to Anaximander of

Aristotles Physicsarguments on the infinite, or to deduce the Milesian

provenance of one of them simply from

i ts

inclusion of

a

mention of

Anaximanders name2.

It

way my original intention in this paper to

execute

a

tidying-up operation after the two well-planned attacks on

Anaximanders argument by JaegerandKahn.

I

said some time ago in a

footnote that hoped to strengthen Professor Kahns case for the unity

of the argument concerning the infinite a t Physics 203b4-153. I f the

following remarks achieve anything, i t will be the half-fulfilment of

that half-promise: instead of strengthening Kahns reasoning for the

unity of Aristotles argument, what follows wil l tend to weaken

it.

But

without the materials and the example of Jaegerand Kahn this present

operation could never have been mounted, and disagreement with

their strategy or tactics indicates no ingratitude and no narrowly

polemical intent ion.

The texts concerned will be familiar to scholars, and most of them

specially familiar to readers of Jaeger and Kahn. They are appended

1

Jaeger, Jheo logyof the Early Creek Philosopherspp. 24ff. with notes,and Kahn,

Anaximander and the Arguments concerning theAnElPON a t Physics 203b4-

15, Festschrift rnst Kapp (Hamburg 1958) pp. 19-29.

2

See bibliography

a t

Kahn, opcit. p.

x

n.2.

3 One

and

Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington, D.C./Cambridge, Mass.

1971) p.29 and n.28 (on p.276). I should like to emphasize that I s t i l l find Kahns

paper illuminating. I s t i l l think also that H.B.Gottschalks firm negative, cited in

that note of mine, outruns the evidence.

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Michael

C.

Stokes

below for reference only, with translation of the more directly

relevant portions (namely, the whole of passages (a), (b )and (c i i ) and

the underlined parts

of

the rest).

L

Copyright

(c)

2001

ProQuest Information

and

Learning Cornpang

Copyright (c) University of Calgary Press

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Anaximanders Argument

(a)

Again, all (who accept the infinite) have good reason to

regard

it as

a

principle. For

i t

cannot exist in vain, and cannot

have any other function than that of

a

principle: for

everything i s either a principle or derived from a principle,

but of the infin ite there

i s

no beginning (principle): for that

would be

a

limit of

it.

And what i s more, i t i s both

ungenerated and indestructible, as befits a principle: for

what has come to be must attain completion, and there i s a

final end to every destruction. For this reason, aswe

say,

there

i s no beginning (principle) of the infinite, but

it i s

thought to

be the beginning (principle) of the other things, and to

surround everything and steer everything:

so

say

all

who

refrain from placing other causes beside the infinite, such as

Mind or Love. Further, this i s the divine,for it

i s

immortal and

indestructible, as Anaximander says (and most of the

physicists).

Since, then, it did not come to be, it isand wasand always will

be and has no beginning or end, but

i s

infinite. For

i f

it had

come to be, i t would have

a

beginning (for i t would have

begun coming to be a t some time) and an end (for it would

have finished coming to be

a t

some time). But since

i t

neither

began nor ended, it always was and always will be and has no

beginning or end: for

a

thing cannot possibly always be

unless it all is.

(c )

A beginning i s ungenerated: for necessarily everything

which comes to be comes to be from a beginning, but the

beginning does not come to be from anything whatever: for

i f a

beginning were to come to be from something

it

would

no longer be a beginning. But since

i t

is

ungenerated

i t

is

necessarily also indestructible. For, the beginning once

destroyed,

i t

will never itself come to be from anything nor

will anything else come to be from it,

i f

indeed everything

must come from

a

beginning.

(i) And again, from the (suggestion that) thus alone would

generation and destruction not fail,

i f

there were an infinite

from which what comes to be

i s

taken.

(ii)

For it

i s

not, in order that generation may not

fail,

necessary for there

to

be

a

perceptible body infinite in

actuality:

i t

i s possible for the destruction of one thing to

be the generation of another, while the whole remains

finite.

(b)

(d)

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Michael

C.

Stokes

(iii)

At least

he

says

it i s infinite, in order that the

generation which subsists may not

fa i l

in any respect.

(iv) He was the first

to

suggest an infinite, in order

to

be

able

to

use

it

without restriction for the generation (of

things).

We may adopt for a start Kahns handy division of the Aristotle

passage (a) into Argument A and Argument B, the break occurring

a t

203b7 with the mention of r r ipcrs , limit. In Kahns account the

division is for convenience only, and he argues strongly for the

continuity of the whole. It

i s

worth discussing

f i rs t

his account of the

relation between the two halves: Argument B serves to confirm the

conclusion of Argument A.

It

does not prove that the Unlimited i s an

Q lp x 6 ,

but that it has attributes which an

.pxri

should have:

i t

i s

ungenerated and imperishable, and therefore d i ~ i n e . ~ahn writes

also, somewhat la ter in his paper, Platos proof that an p x