Answers to China CP and DA

8/13/2019 Answers to China CP and DA

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AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA DA
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NO UNIQUENESS


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US Influence Resilient

US influence in Latin Americas resilient and the thesis of the DA is wrongDuddy & Mora, 5/1 [Patrick US Ambassador to Venezuela until 2010 and Senior Lecturer at

Duke. And Frank Director of Latin American Center at Florida Intl University and formerAssistant Secretary of Defense Western Hemisphere (09- 13). Latin America: Is U.S. influencewaning? 5/1/13 http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy]

As Moises Naim notes in his recent book, The End of Power, there has been an important change in powerdistribution in the world away from states toward an expanding and increasingly mobile set ofactors that are dramatically shaping the nature and scope of global relationships . In Latin America,many of the most substantive and dynamic forms of engagement are occurring in a web of cross-national relationships involving small and large companies, people-to-people contact throughstudent exchanges and social media, travel and migration . Trade and investment remain themost enduring and measurable dimensions of U.S. relations with the region. It is certainly the case that oureconomic interests alone would justify more U.S. attention to the region . Many observers who worry aboutdeclining U.S. influence in this area point to the rise of trade with China and the presence of European companiesand investors. While it is true that other countries are important to the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, it is also still true that the United States is by far the largest and most importanteconomic partner of the region and trade is growing even with those countries with which we do not have freetrade agreements. An area of immense importance to regional economies that we often overlook isthe exponential growth in travel, tourism and migration . It is commonplace to note the enormous presence offoreign students in the United States but in 2011, according to the Institute of International Education, after Europe, Latin Americawas the second most popular destination for U.S. university students. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. tourists travel every year to

Latin America and the Caribbean helping to support thousands of jobs. From 2006-2011 U.S. non-governmentorganizations, such as churches, think tanks and universities increased the number ofpartnerships with their regional cohorts by a factor of four. Remittances to Latin America andthe Caribbean from the United States totaled $64 billion in 2012 . Particularly for the smaller economies ofCentral America and the Caribbean these flows can sometimes constitute more than 10 percent of gross domestic product. Finally,

one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region . The power ofnational reputation, popular culture, values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S.influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify . Example: Despite 14 years ofstrident anti-American rhetoric during the Chvez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visasevery year, including many thousands of Chvez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the

hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferatinginterests in the region . As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize theimportance of our ties to the region. We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We dontneed a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-LatinAmerica strategy . A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countrieson the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate. The United States still has theeconomic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its owninterests.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpyhttp://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpyhttp://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpyhttp://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpyhttp://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-us-influence.html#storylink=cpy


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US Influence wont be challenged its resilient.Keck & Nye Jr. 11 (Zachary Keck, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Research Interns at CNAS, ChinasGrowing Influence in Americas Backyard: The Trends Policymakers Should be Watching,January 19, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoul)

While American policymakers should be mindful of these growing trends in their own backyard,one shouldnt expect China to usurp U.S. influence in the region anytime soon. The UnitedStates is still far more active in the region than China ; in 2009 U.S.-Latin America trade 4.75 times that of PRC-LATAMs trade, at $530 billion and $111.5 billion respectively. Beijing has also been relatively cautious assertingitself in Americas backyard. Finally, significant barriers between LATAM and China remain,including the lack of historical ties between the two as well as significant cultural differences . In fact,some countries in LATAM have grown increasingly suspicious of China in recent years. For instance, althoughChina has become Brazils largest trading partner, and the two countries form half of the BRIC alliance, Brazil has accepted Chinas

presence only grudgingly, consistently reaffirming tariffs directed against Beijing. Brazil has also emerged as one of themost vocal critics of Chinas currency manipulation. But while these suspicious countries may rebuff continuedChinese expansion i nto Latin America, Beijings not likely to quit making the sell (literally and figuratively) for building strong ties

with an ascendant China.

China will never overtake the US in Latin America because of proximity.George 11 (Tarun, Chinas Influence in Latin America: How Far Can it Go? February 17th,2011, http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/chinas-influence-latin-america/

When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Obama in Washington month, its safe to say that one item on the agenda was the tradeimplications of Chinas increasingly influential economic footprint, especially in emerging markets. The fact that China is r eplacingthe US as the main trading partner in countries like Brazil should make American policymakers take notice. Until very recently, LatinAmerica has been a low priority for the US, both in terms of foreign policy and commerce. Trade agreements like DR-CAFTA havereceived a mixed response from Latin America, and the results are slow in coming, especially for professional services. So China has

been filling the vacuum. But will Chinese investment in the LatAm outsourcing industry replace the US?

Highly unlikely. Advantages like proximity, time zone and access to technically skilled labor ensure that the Nearshore will continue to be an extremely attractive location for US buy-sideclients . In turn, the US will continue to be an attractive market for LatAm vendors. But one thing is clear as China increasinglymoves into the tech services industry, its LatAm business links will increase just as they have for natural resources. In the years tocome, US buyers may face Nearshore competition.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoulhttp://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoulhttp://www.nearshoreamericas.com/chinas-influence-latin-america/http://www.nearshoreamericas.com/chinas-influence-latin-america/http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoulhttp://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2011/01/china-s-growing-influence-america-s-backyard-trends-policymakers-shoul


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Competition Now

China and the U.S. competing for resources now link is inevitable.Regenstreif 06/12 (Gary is the editor at large at Reuters. The looming U.S. -China rivalry over Latin Americahttp://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ June 12 2013)Though the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a new model of cooperation at their weekendsummit, a growing competition looks more likely . The whirlwind of activity before President Barack Obama metwith President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washingtons sights are set on a similar prize and face

differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin America and the prize is increased trade andinvestment opportunities in a region where economic reforms have pulled millions out of povertyand into the middle class . Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that both Chinaand the United States need , largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travel itinerary: Obama visitedMexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went to Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chilespresident paid Obama a visit last week, Perus leader arrived Tuesday and Brazils is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden leftTrinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. andChinese officials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge betteragreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leading tradeposition against China which has money to burn in the region.
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/


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No Mexico Cooperation

China has a long way to go before reaching good relations with Mexico.Wu 5/1 (Chunsi is a M&T Professor of Banking and Finance Department of Finance and Managerial Economics at University ofBuffalo. U.S.-Mexico-China Relations in the Context of Regional Cooperation: A Chinese Perspective China and the New TriangularRelationships in the Americas May 1 2013)

In order to improve Chinese-Mexican cooperation, China must strengthen its efforts in variousareas . Firstly, building a mutually beneficial economic relationship is the central pillar to developing relations between China andMexico. As presented above, both China and Mexico have taken numerous measures to coordinate their policies, andtrade disputes between them are not as serious as one might imagine. However, this has not been sufficient. In accordancewith the strategic importance view of China -Mexico relations , China must create a larger blueprint for itseconomic cooperation with Mexico . Moreover, China should encourage its academic and research communities tocommunicate with their counterparts in Mexico to plan proposals for bilateral cooperation. Through measures like this, China andMexico may come to agree on more points vital to their sustained cooperation, and make joint efforts to move forward in the samedirection.

Lots of boundaries between Chinese and Mexican cooperationSun 5/1 (Hongbo is a Senior Principal Member Research Staff at Mitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories . The StrategicPartnership Between China and Mexico: A Multilateral Perspective China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May1 2013)

Several economic issues stand out in Chinese-Mexican policy analysis . For one, Mexico still does notrec- ognize Chinas economic status . The two countries also have not reached a consensus on thediscrepancy in bilateral trade volume. Mexico argues that Chinas direct investment there is tooscarce, yet the risk of investing in Mexico is often too high for Chinese investors . China hopes to enter intotalks concerning a possible free trade agreement, while Mexican manufacturing groups are concerned with their own incompetence- an issue that had been touched upon during the second Mexican presidential election debate in June of 2012.

China and Mexico are not engaged as much as they could be in the status quoArmony 5/1 (Ariel C. is the director of the University of Miamis Center for Latin American Studies and is also the WeeksProfessor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies. Conclusions and Debates on the US -Mexico-ChinaRelationship China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013)A careful reading of the chapters in the volume provides clues as to the features of the TR among the United States, Mexico, andChina. The following list summarizes some of the most relevant features: The stability of each of the b ilateral ties in the triangle:

the fundamental relations in the triangle are US-Mexico and US-China . These ties play a vital role for thecountries involved in particular for Mexicos relationship with the United States. One way in which China can affect the stability ofUS-Mexico ties is by posing a hegemonic challenge to the United States, that is, by seeking peer status or attempting to becomethe new hegemon (Paz 2012:19). Chinas consistent strategy of restraint in Latin America and the US -China institutionalized

dialogue on Latin America, among other factors, suggest that China will not rise to challenge the hegemony ofthe United States in Latin America any time soon .2 The dominant strategies of each of the parties and how thesestrategies evolve over time: Mexicos regional and global position is being shaped by an increasing accent on diplomatic and tradediversification. The decline in US influence and the expected reforms in the Mexican energy sector may open more room for Mexicoto adjust to a growth strategy less dependent on the United Sta tes. Chinas rising role as a regional and global power and the neweconomic scenario marked by higher wages and growing concentration in industrial commodities and products are likely to affect

the pace of change according to which Chinas going out str ategy will develop in the near future. If Mexico and Chinareorient their strategies, it is likely that there will be an adjustment in the triangles dynamic,which may result in a closer relationship between these two countries.


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Mexico and China have a lot of differences, prevents them from being closetrading partnersArmony 5/1 (Ariel C. is the director of the University of Miamis Center for Latin American Studies and is also the WeeksProfessor in Latin American Studies and Professor of International Studies. Conclusions and Debates on the US-Mexico-ChinaRelationship China and the New Triangular Relationships in the Americas May 1 2013)

Political relations between Mexico and China are less central but still relevant, particularly when viewed in thecontext of rising powers and a restructuring of alliances in international politics . Convergence/divergence ininternational relations (e.g., voting behavior in the UN General Assembly and new dynamics of influence in the IMF andWorld Bank), trade disputes (especially before the WTO), and bilateral political tensions (the H1N1 health crisis in2009 and the 2011 visit of the Dalai Lama to Mexico) are important factors defining the Mexico-China side of thetriangle . As Sun Hongbo explains in his chapter, the divergence between Mexico and China in votingpatterns in the UN General Assembly has increased since 2004 .6 If one considers votes on controversialmatters (such as nuclear policy, Palestine, Korea, Iran and so on), Mexico has voted more in line with its northernneighbor than with China . While Mexicos positions in the United Nations are aligned with the US -led Western bloc, thereare other areas in which Mexico is close to China. The two developing countries have benefitted from power realignment in the IMFand World Bank. They share similar concerns about South-South cooperation, energy security, and UN reform. Even though

Mexico and China have had important trade frictions, Mexico initiated fewer trade disputes against China beforethe WTO than the United States did during the period 2003-2011.Taken as a whole, these dimensions suggest a relationship inwhich Mexico stays firmly in the US sphere of influence, while maintaining its autonomy, and apattern of interaction with China that is shaped by periodic disagreements and gaps inpreferences (for example, in their respective preferences concerning mechanisms to address trade disputes). Still, thenonstrategic nature of the triangle provides both countries with the environment to find a common framework for a closer, andmutually rewarding, relationship.


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NO IMPACTNegs impact is overhyped, CCP wont resort to nuclear weapons Hachigian 9 (Nina Hachigian is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. ChinasNew Engagement in the International System Center for American Progress, pg 34, November2009, A_Yu)

Today, China is a member of nearly every major nonproliferation organization and has signed

every international treaty meant to stem proliferation of nuclear weapons , including thosewith intrusive inspection regimes . China has become an active member and even an advocate ofthe nonproliferation regime. This history is all the more remarkable given that China often acted against itsown short-term economic and security interests by curbing its proliferation . It agreed to give upprofitable sales of nuclear weapons technologies in the 1980s and 1990s at the same time it was already making drastic cuts to itsmilitary budget to free up resources for economic development and could have used the extra revenue. Further, China could not

offer this valuable technology as a strategic sweetener to friendly states any longer. Gill argues that this shift in behavior hasoccurred for three reasons. First, and most significant, China now views nonproliferation as in its best interests .Helping to create a stable external security environment allows Beijing to concentrate on its domestic concerns. Second, Chinasinvolvement in nonproliferation helps project a benign image to nations potentially anxiousabout its rise . Third, Chinas involvement serves to mollify U.S. fears about potential conflict whileconstraining U.S. influence by sometimes lobbying for alternative positions in international negotiations. But just as importantly, asEvan Medeiros, now director for China at the National Security Council, has argued, U.S. policy intervention played a signif icant andenduring role in fostering Chinas increasing commitment to nonproliferation. Americas use of rewards and sanctions repeatedly ledChina to expand its commitments and comply with them. American policymakers prioritized nonproliferation at the highest leve lsof the relationship, and U.S. policy became instrumental in many of Chinas nonproliferation milestones, particularly during periodswhen Beijing sought improved U.S.-China relations for trade and stability, as well as access to U.S. technology. Medeiros also pointsto the increasing sophisti cation and expertise of Chinas nonproliferation officials, who consolidate the norms of nonproliferationfrom the inside.


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IMPACT TURNSTheir scholarship is biased need to be realist and kick China out!Farnsworth, 12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas inWashington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy forthe Americas. Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, AmericasQuarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)

Should the United States React? Can It? To the extent that simple commercial exchange dominates the China story in the Americas,the implications for the United States are minimal. A rational and appropriate response would simply be to promote a level,transparent playing field for U.S. business and investors to compete effectively with a new, well-financed competitor. This is exactlythe way Chinese leaders have presented their efforts: as benign economic actions that offer little challenge to U.S. interests. Indeed,the stock of U.S. investment in the region continues to dwarf Chinese investment, and regional trade with the United Statescontinues to surpass trade with China by a factor of almost four to one. At this point, neither Chinese pronouncements nor concreteactions establish a reason to believe that China has strategic designs on Latin America from a military or security perspective, either

to project power into the region or to challenge U.S. military predominance from a hemispheric platform. Nonetheless,

Chinas entrance into the Americas does have strategic implications for the U.S., and from thisperspective Washington has been overly complacent . In part, this is because most Latin Americaspecialists in the policy community are not well versed in international relations theory orpractice , and therefore do not focus on geostrategic issues (Sabatini, March April 2012, Foreign Affairs). They are developmentspecialists, historians, human rights advocates, sociologists, Spanish (though generally not Portuguese) linguists, community

activists, and the like . Some are uncomfortable with the idea that the U.S. has legitimate nationalinterests to pursue or values to promote, viewing the region through a historical filter that highlights theU.S. as the primary threat to the region rather than as a critical if imperfect driver of democraticgovernance and economic growth and opportunity . As a result, there may be a tendency to besuspicious of actions that promote U.S . economic and national security interests, including trade and investmentexpansion, counternarcotics programs, security assistance, and even democracy promotion in relation to Cuba and elsewhere. It iswithin this intellectual construct that they place the growing influence of extra-regional actors and also rising regional actors such as

Brazil. This overwhelming bias in the policy and academic communities a bias that does notgenerally inform U.S. policy in other regions continues to put U.S. policy in the region at adisadvantage. It focuses on things we cannot fully change while neglecting initiatives that wouldaccrue to our benefit.
http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworthhttp://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth


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US Econ Turn

China dangerous to the US growth in the futurePalley 12 (Thomas I. Palley is an economist who currently holds a B.A degree from Oxford

University and a PhD in International Relations and a PhD in Economics from Yale University.The Economic and Geo -Political Implications of China- Centric Globalization. New AmericanFoundation). HyeongMoney

Looking into the future, the current path of China-centric globalization poses a threat to both U.S.economic recovery and global growth and development. It has not only hindered Americanattempts to escape from the post-bubble recession that began in December 2007 but it has alsothreatened to block future attempts to recalibrate and improve the globalization process . Ifanything, U.S. policy has failed to come to grips with the problems associated with China-centricglobalization . Especially troubling is the U.S. Treasurys policy toward Chinas exchange rate. TheTreasurys past policy can be accused of dereliction of duty in its failure to protect the U.S. manufacturingsector. Its current policy of encouraging China to introduce a flexible yuan exchange rate with free capitalmobility promises to compound that damage. It is important to remember that China-centricglobalization has been largely the product of U.S . policymakers and U.S. corporations . It thereforeshould be subject to review. As it is now, China-centric globalization has set in motion a momentousprocess that is causing changes of historical proportions. This process has developed rapidly with littlepublic consideration of its implications. It was put in place in the late 1990s by a triumphant corporatesector, at a time when the public was caught up in the euphoria of a long-running cycle of asset bubblesthat created illusory prosperity. Change of this proportion would be dangerous even if the U.S. and Chinawere close allies, which they are not. At the end of the 19th century, a similar seismic shift of economicpower between Great Britain and Germany, whose monarchs shared a common lineage, contributed tothe tragedy of World War I. That history speaks to the dangers of such developments and should be acaution to U.S. policymakers. The troubling developments already in place and in prospect should be analarm. Yet, U.S. policymakers do not seem to have fully grasped the dangers inherent in Chinese-centric

globalization.

China involvement crushes US exporters and jobs.Brandt 12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), Chinese Engagement in Latin Americaand the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy December 2012 American UniversityPage 9)Essentially, Latin American countries, which have long been big buyers of US goods, areincreasingly making a larger proportion of their purchases from China. 5 Assuming this trend continues,there are huge implications for US exporters and jobs . Although US exports do not necessarily compete

with Chinas (the United States primarily sells high technology goods such as aircraft, and medical equipment to the

region, while China sells mostly apparel and consumer electronics),US exporters face the challenge ofcompetition not only from Chinas undervalued currency but also from Chinas manufacturing

sector . 6 For example, Chinese automakers are making valuable gains in emerging auto marketsby focusing less on quality and design and more on ruthless cost - cutting. These measuressignificantly challenge companies like General Motors that are looking to emerging markets forgrowth but have considerably higher sticker prices on their cars .


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China engagement is terrible for the USPalley 12 (Thomas I. Palley is an economist who currently holds a B.A degree from OxfordUniversity and a PhD in International Relations and a PhD in Economics from Yale University.The Economic and Geo -Political Implications of China-Centric G lobalization. New AmericanFoundation). HyeongMoney

This pattern of China-centric globalization has two negative effects for the United States . First, itreduces source diversity in the U.S. global supply chain, thereby making the U.S. moredependent on China and more vulnerable to interruptions of supply by China. Second, it makes countries in East Asia more dependent on China as a market for their exports . This latter effect hasbeen almost entirely over-looked. Making the countries of East and Southeast Asia moreeconomically dependent on China increases Chinas geo -political power . Given that Southeast Asiais an important region of geo-political competition between the U.S. and China, this economicreorientation weakens the U.S. position in the region.

Chinese competition hurts the USPalley 12 (Thomas I. Palley is an economist who currently holds a B.A degree from OxfordUniversity and a PhD in International Relations and a PhD in Economics from Yale University.The Economic and Geo -Political Implications of China- Centric Globalization. New AmericanFoundation). HyeongMoneyFor the U.S., Chinas resource diplomacy entails significant economic costs . Chinas competition for resources has driven up the price of virtually every resource at a cost to U.S. producers andconsumers . As importantly, Chinas resource diplomacy also has potentially significant geo-politicalcosts as resource rich countries form new commercial alliances with China that diminish newamerica foundation U.S. geo-political standing . That might be of little consequence if the newalignments were unambiguously beneficial for the countries and the global economy, but they are not.Though countries have benefited from higher commodity prices and higher commodity incomes owing toChina, there are also significant downsides that harm their economic and political developmen t.

All of these concerns are visible in Africa where Chinas rise has produced both positive and negativeeffects. With regard to the postive, Chinas rise has ha d three major economic benefits for Africa. First,China has increased demand for African commodity exports, which has contributed to higher commodityprices. Second, Chinas rise has triggered a surge in FDI in Africa, particularly in the commodity produc tionsector, to which China has contributed. Third, Chinas rise has increased the global supply ofmanufactured goods that Africa imports and consumes, which has lowered the price of manufacturedgoods. These developments have raised Africas national inc ome, loosened the external financialconstraint on development, and increased economic growth.


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US Security Turn

Chinese presence in Latin America threatens stability and securityHilton 13 (Isabel Hilton, writer and broadcaster and editor for chinadialogue China in LatinAmerica: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREF Expert Analysis February 2013) -KarlaLatin American countries face trade imbalances: Chinese products are flooding domesticmarkets to the detriment of local manufacturers, and Latin America is losing out to Chinese

competition in export markets. Mexico is the outstanding example : Kevin Gallagher, of Boston University,calculated in 2009 that 97% of Mexicos manufacturing exports were threatened by Chinesecompetition. In addition , China enjoyed the competitive advantage of price and local supply chains,which , after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 , stimulated the transfer to China of Mexicanelectronics assembly plants (maquiladoras) that served the U.S. market . More recently, as C hinascurrency has appreciated and labour costs have risen by an annual 10%, the Mexican position has begun to recover . Central

American nations suffered too , losing textile industries to China. This is of concern to the

United States , which is anxious to protect manufacturing in some of its poorest neighbours, such as

Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador , in order to promote stability and maintain the U.S.- led War onDrugs . Nations such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia which has a 10:1 trade deficit with China are also exposed. Only Chile,which runs a trade surplus, and Peru, which has a near surplus on China trade, are exceptions. Brazil and Argentina, which havesubstantial capitalist middle classes and strong labour unions, have the strongest potential for anti-China policies. The BrazilianIndustrial Association, for example, has lobbied President Dilma Rousseff to take a stronger line against Chinese imports. OnSeptember 15th 2011, Brazil announced a 30-point increase in its industrial-product tax on cars, with the notable exceptions of carsmanufactured in Mexico and Mercosur. The policy was effectively aimed at China. Brazil, in fact, runs a slightly smaller risk fromChina than many other Latin American nations because of its relatively closed economy and substantial domestic market. AlthoughRousseff is under strong pressure to protect domestic sectors, she must also balance the benefits of commodity exports to China. AsBrazil continues to grow, it may decide, as the United States has in the past, that across the economy the benefits from trading with

China equal or outweigh the costs of dumping. Argentina was forced to accept a difficult lesson in 2010when it was forced to reverse the attempt to impose a tariff on light manufactured goods afterChina responded with countervailing duties on Argentinian soy beans. Up to 74% of Argentinas soy beansgo to China.

China economic influence spills over to military influence.Brandt 12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), Chinese Enga gement in Latin Americaand the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy December 2012 American UniversityPage 9)The last decade has witnessed substantial growth in military relations among China, Latin

America and the Caribbean region, taking the form of rising arms sales, high - level defensevisits, and military student exchanges. While these developments warrant close future monitoring, they presently donot threaten US national security interests, and may even represent an opportunity for trilateral cooperation among China, the

United States, and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. A number of high - level defense visits haveoccurred between China and Latin American nations. 45 While these interactions have notresulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve as confidence buildingmeasures and provide openings for arms transactions. 46 47 Defense visits are coupled with arise in military personnel exchanges, which build upon Chinas objectives to establish goodwill in


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Latin America. Chinese entities like the PLA Defense Studies Institute, Army Command College,and Navy Command School welcome officers from about 18 Latin American countries, offeringSpanish and English courses on military planning, special forces operations, aerialcommunication, artillery repair and security strategy . 48 These exchanges are supplemented with port visits bymilitary training ships and warships by each side. 49 In 2009, a Chinese naval flotilla visited Chile, Peru, and Ecuador and, thoughbenign in character, such visits benefit the PLA Navy, helping it to identify requirements for the use of Latin American por ts by its

ships in the future for maintenance, resupply, or other purposes. 50 Furthermore, while presently inconsequential to US interests,it is important to note that both China and Chile have military facilities located next to each other in Antarctica. 5

Chinas search for energy poses a threat to the US Blumenthal 08 (Dan Blumenthal, director of Asian studies at the American EnterpriseInstitute specializing in East Asian security issues Concerns with Respect to Chinas EnergyPolicy July 1, 2008) -KarlaThe speculation game is a perilous one, but given Chinas importance it is necessary to engage init. China is a dynamic country with a highly skilled population . As its economy continues to grow,so too does its defense industrial and technological base, as well as the capabilities of its

military personnel . The PRC has developed its military in ways not predicted by analysts less than a decade ago. No longercan China watchers say that the PRCs armed forces are not very good and not getting better fast.55 Most nationalsecurity analysts now believe that China can pose serious challenges to an American militarytrying to come to the defense of Taiwan or other allies in the region . In the past decade a very smallarsenal of ballistic missiles has grown into an arsenal of some nine hundred more accurate andlethal ballistic and cruise missiles. A decade ago China had just a few modern Kilo-class diesel submarines; today Chinahas Kilos, Songs, and Yuans as well as two nuclear submarine programs. A decade ago, Chinas fleet of fourth -generation aircraft was

minimal, today it is significant: an increasing percentage incorporate fourth- generation technology.56 China has madeadditional strides in mine warfare and information warfare , and is contesting the UnitedStates in space. China has also grown bolder in using its military capabilities as evidenced by itsactivity in and around the East China Sea . A decade ago few if any analysts predicted that China would provoke Japan

in this way. There is no reason to believe that China will stop improving its military capabilities. Itsdefense industrial base is improving, it has money to spend on military projects, and it has the

ambitions of a country anxious to retake its place in the sun. The ongoing energy debate will obviouslyinfluence the PLAs course. If China continues to tend toward the energy -mercantilist side of the energy policy spectrum, ascompared to relying solely on the open market, then the PLA will increase in importance to Beijings energy strategy.


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Democracy Turn

China bad for democracySanborn, 11 (Cynthia is professor of social sciences and the direc tor of the Center of

Investigation of the Universidad del Pac fico , China, Latin America, and the United States: TheNew Triangle, January 2011, Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars Institute of the Americas)

Cynthia Sanborn of the Universidad del Pac f ico in Lima, Peru, situated the presence of Chinese state -ownedfirms in Latin America in the context of the region s still fragile political democracies. Thesedemocracies are characterized by an increased concern for industry diversification , changing roles forthe state and political institutions, and the presence of new actors such as global NGOs, the Catholic Church, indigenouscommunities, and environmental organizations that demand a voice in natural resource policy. In many countries of the region,

new or expanded democratic space enables these groups to question who has the right tosubsoil property , whether local communities can veto concessions and how they can benefit from revenue distribution, andhow to control the environmental im- pacts created by these industries. In response, global programs such as the Extractive

Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) have

created new industry standards for addressing revenue transparency, improving relationshipswith the communities where companies mine, and using cleaner technologies in the extractionprocess. Many Western companies have voluntarily acceded to these regulatory bodies. By

contrast , Sanborn classified agreements between China and Latin American governments as

accommodationist . China does not belong to the EITI, and one has only to look to Venezuelaand Ecuador to ob- serve that China adapts to changing rules of the game more successfullythan its Western counterparts . China is not only looking for trade opportunities, but is also interested in the stability ofLatin American soci- eties and seeks local capacities for negotiation. Sanborn specifically ad- dressed the case of Peru and itsevolving relationship with China. In Peru, mineral exploitation accounts for one-fourth of tax revenues and 6 percent of GDP, thoughin certain regions mineral revenue constitutes up to half of GDP. Thirty-four percent of mineral investments in Peru are f rom China,and Peru represents 26 perc ent of Chinas global mergers and acquisitions (M &A). Indeed, 40 percent of oil production in Peru isowned by China investors through a partnership between China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and the Argentine firm

Pluspetrol. Eight large Chinese fir ms are present in Perus extractive in - dustries, and while six of them are purely state-owned, thereare also private Chinese investors purchasing lots. Given that China is expected to invest $7 billion in minerals over the next fiveyears, this trend is unlikely to wane.


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AFF ANSWERS TO CHINA CPYou can obviously use a lot of the aff answers to the DA. For example, not zerosum is a great perm argument. Als o, any of the impact turns are disads to theCP.


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Says No

Latin America says No to China no cultural connection.Hilton 13 (Isabel Hilton, writer and broadcaster and editor for chinadialogue China in Latin

America: Hegemonic Challenge? NOREF Exp ert Analysis February 2013)-Karla

The environmental and ethical practices of Chinese companies have drawn unfavourablecomment. The first major Chinese mining company in the hemisphere was Shougang Group, which began operations in Peru in1992 with the purchase of the state-owned Hierro Peru for 14 times an independent valuation. Shougang has contributed heavily to

the poor reputation of Chinese companies , over fines for environmental damage for the contamination of water sup- plies,

low wages and dangerous working conditions. It has been the object of f requent strikes and protests. Other companies have

experienced problems with community relations. After buying the Canadian company Corriente in 2010,Tongling and China Railway Construction Corporation proposed an open-pit mine in the province of Zamora Chinchipe in Ecuador.National protests followed an agreement with the government, including a march on the capital by the countrys most powerful

Indigenous movement, Confederacin de Nacionalidades Indgenas del Ecuador (CONAIE). Chinese companies lack

experience of compliance with much higher environmental or community relations standardsthan prevail at home. Some are adapting, hiring local managers, public relations (PR) and law firms, but they are likelyto struggle for some time with the cultural gaps and the lack of understanding of local concernsand political considerations . One example of an attempt to meet those concerns is the Chinese mining company Chinalcosrelocation of 5,000 residents of the town of Morococha, 150 kilometres east of the Peruvian capital, Lima, to remove them from anarea likely to be contaminated by the new $2.2 million Toro- mocho opencast copper mine. Advised by local managers and PRconsultants, Chinalco is investing $50 million in an entirely new town nearby, a project it describes as the biggest private ly-fundedsocial project in Perus history (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ people.cfm?authorI D=580). Two-thirds of theresidents have moved, although the project has also been dogged by complaints about inadequate housing and compensation.

Although some dispute the claim that Chinese conduct is worse than U.S. or local equivalents, China suffers fromwidespread negative perceptions and the identification of Chinese companies with the Chinesestate . Local labour groups, some government officials and many indigenous and social groups in the region make little distinctionbetween private Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises. Local opinion surveys reveal that most companies,

whether large or small, state owned or private, suffer from anti- Chinese sentiment and theperception that they put profit above environmental and social concerns . In several African countries,

Chinese security guards have been deployed to defend companies interests and have even, on occasion, killed Africans . Both thePeruvian president, Ollanta Humala, and the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, political allies ofChina, have felt obliged to insist to their electorates that Chinese troops would never be allowedto set foot in their countries.


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Solveny Turns

China involvement causes Dutch Disease (unstable commodity dependence)

Brandt 12 (Jon et. el. Masters in US Foreign Policy), Chinese Engagement in Latin Americaand the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy December 2012 American UniversityPage 9)Since 2000, LAC exports of commodities have constituted 70 percent of export growth. The China - LAC relationship is predominatedby natural resource extraction. This has led to near - term boon for Latin American countries; foreign currency reserves haveincreased, governments have been far more financially secure and there has been a rise in investment and development. However,the long - term projection of this commodity trading is risky. Latin American countries aredependent on sustained commodity prices to uphold an economy that has yet to develop into amore modern, dynamic level. If commodity prices fall, countries could fall back into chronicdebt. Furthermore, many Latin American countries have not used the influx of capital fromChina to invest in manufacturing , research and development and other value - added stages ofproduction to elevate the quality of economic output. If these Latin American countries are

lulled into Dutch disease, they run the risk of not advancing socio - economically and puttingcontinued strain on the primary commodity sector to perform year in and year out. This socio -economic concern is of the US national interest as future trade, research and development iscontingent on

Chinese presence in Latin America net worse trades off with local economiesFeinberg 11 Richard Feinberg Graduate School of International Relations and Pacifi c StudiesUniversity of California, San Diego. 2011. Latin American Research Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 by theLatin American Studies Association. C H I N A , L AT I N A M E R I C A , A ND T H E U N I T E D STAT E S : C O N G RU E N T I N T E R E S T S OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE? http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf At the same time, the volume is not oblivious to the threats that Chinas economy poses to certain countries andsectors in Latin America. The impact is varied, clashing most directly with producers ofmanufactured goods. Chinese exports directly compete with Mexican textiles, electron - ics, and telecommunications equipment in thirdmarkets, notably in the United States. The removal of quotas for textiles and apparel (a change the volume does not fullycapture) has hit maquilas in Central America and the Caribbean hard, as efficient Chinese firmsemploying cheap labor seize a greater share of global markets. A particularly interesting and innova- tive chapter byRobert C. Feenstra and Hiau Looi Kee argues that every 1 percent increase in the variety of Chinese exportsreduces that of Mexi- can exports by 0.5 percent (table 8.3, 258). Chinas expansion constrains thedynamic gains that might otherwise be available to Mexico as a result of U.S. tariff liberalization under the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agree- ment. This adverse impact is of particular concern because the growth of export varieties benefitsaggregate productivity in the exporting country. However, the dominant constraint on Latin American manufacturing ex-ports comes not from Chinese competition but from domestic shortcom- ings. Examining Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, Gordon H. Hanson andRaymond Robertson point to local constraints on manufacturing growth, such as relatively high energy prices, poor telecommuni cations infrastructure,and slow growth in the supply of skilled labor. In response to those problems, the edi tors of Chinas and Indias Chal - lenge to Latin America propose aseries of policies. Latin American work- ers who lose their jobs to Chinese imports should be retrained, and countries should focus on innovation andexpanded capabilities in science and technology admittedly, improvements easier said than done. In this regard, cooperation with China might be agood option, as the joint Brazilian-Chinese program in satellite development exemplifies. But Latin Americans should eschew protectionism; rather,firms should seek integration into global production networks, including those that involve Chinese (and Indian) firms. Some countries can concentrateon sectors in which geographical proximity gives them an edge, such as tourism and health-care services. In his contribution to Chinas Expansion intothe Western Hemisphere: Im- plications for Latin America and the United States, Robert Devlin accepts that China is more opportunity than threat;

nevertheless, he is agitated by the threat and daring in the pol icies that he proposes. The prowess of the Asian giant is a loudwake-up call for the region , Devlin warns, and a motivation for Latin America to make better and more systematic use of its inherentadvantages. A former manager at the Inter-American Development Bank, Devlin does not want Latin America to return to heavy-handed statism of the


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sort that generated gross inefficiencies in the earlier era of import sub- stitution; but he does see an important lesson in the success of East Asia andChina: after the market-oriented reforms of the Washington Consen- sus, the state should be brough t back into development strategy.


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Perm

China and United States seeks to cooperate with each other in Latin Americaand Cuba not a zero sum game.

Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is a researcher at the School of Social and Political Sciences atthe University of Sydney, he has conducted research in both Cuba and China for a couple ofyears. Cuba and China: Lessons for the United States Commissioned report for the CubanResearch Institute, June 2009, A_Yu)For the United States, the value added by the above process lies in its promotion of trilateral cooperation. Both China and theUnited States favor more open markets in Cuba , and considering the attempts of Chinese enterprises to buildCubas export capacities and develop its transport, manufacturing, and resource sectors, the United States is a logical sourc e ofmanagement services and marketing expertise. Building on existing U.S. activities in agriculture, medicine, and telecommunications,expansion into these sectors would bring both economic benefits for U.S. firms and opportunities for harmonizing approaches to

governance and information sharing. Indeed, the Obama administrations relatively conciliatory stance towardCuba could lay the foundation of a much- needed mutually reinforcing diplomacy with China inthe region (Wilder 2009:4). A defining challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century will be the development of mutually

beneficial partnerships with China. With sensible diplomacy, Chinese projects in Latin America could become asource of deeper cooperation , for as Daniel Erikson concisely put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, trade

is not a zero sum game (2008:3). Hu Jintaos proposal at the 2009 G-20 to jointly develop financial

monitoring mechanisms reflects Chinas desire for cooperative relations with the United

States . With legal authorization, Cuba could become a platform for advancing responsibly governedtrilateral projects that demonstrate awareness of regional diversity and a commitment tointernational cooperation . Accommodating diversity is critical to effective diplomacy, for although Confucius may havestated, have no friends not equal to yourself, in his pragmatic wisdom he also taught his followers to be firm in the right way, andnot merely firm.


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No Trade-Off

Engagement is not zero-sum the US & China have different interests.Cerna 11 (Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State

University, Kennesaw , April 15, 2011. China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implicationsfor U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region. http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/)

While Chinas commodity -based trade structure is currently lucrative, it does not encouragediversification of Latin Americas exports into more value -added goods, manufactured products, and modern services.Economic relations are dependent on often unstable commodity market demands. U.S. investment in the region is farmore diversified and spans a range of value-added activities, including manufacturing, finance, telecom, retailand other services. Going back to a comparison with the United States, while China accounts for 6.7% of the regions total ex ports,the United States continues to be the largest buy er, with a 40% share. Latin Americas exports to the U.S. are more diversified andremain fairly balanced so it is better suited to survive a possible commodity cut- off in Latin America. Roughly 24% of the regionsexports are raw materials, another 12% consists of resource-based goods and 60% is manufactured products. Karen Poniachik ofLatin Trade also sees enormous risks for the region: The steep overvaluation of the regions currencies due in part to the flood of

investment flows and export proceeds is eroding the competitiveness of its higher-value added goods and services. This could inturn fuel its already high level of overdependence on commodities. Future Implications With both the U.S. and Chinamaking gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow;which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents analternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The U.S. is much morediversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into directcompetition . However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that Chinais going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful politicalconsequences primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine,Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democraticalternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem.

No trade-off, the US & China offer different form of engagement.Shapiro 5 (Charles S., U.S. Department of State, Chinese En gagement in Latin America ShouldEnhance U.S., Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Western Hemisphere, September 21,2005, http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/527-00EN.shtml)

However, even though China has expanded commercial ties with Latin America and is an important newinvestor in the region , U.S. trade and investment in the Americas continues to dwarf that of China. U.S.trade with the region exceeded $445 billion in 2004, 10 times China's level, Shapiro said. He noted that Latin America's exports tothe United States are up 10 percent and imports from the U.S. are up 15 percent in the first half of 2005 compared to 2004 levels.And whereas Chinese investment in the region is approximately $8.3 billion, U.S. investment in Latin America is more than $300

billion, the State Department official said. Apart from the significant difference in scale , Shapiro explained, t heUnited States' economic engagement in Latin America fundamentally differs from that of China.Chinese exports , particularly in the areas of textiles and apparel, provide stiff competition for some LatinAmerican and Caribbean producers but the United States provides high-tech and knowledge-basedgoods and services, he said.
http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/


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Cuba Specific Perm

China and United States seeks to cooperate with each other in Latin Americaand Cuba not a zero sum game.

Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is a researcher at the School of Social and Political Sciences atthe University of Sydney, he has conducted research in both Cuba and China for a couple ofyears. Cuba and China: Lessons for the United States Commissioned report for the CubanResearch Institute, June 2009, A_Yu)For the United States, the value added by the above process lies in its promotion of trilateral cooperation. Both China and theUnited States favor more open markets in Cuba , and considering the attempts of Chinese enterprises to buildCubas export capacities and develop its transport, manufacturing, and resource sectors, the United States is a logical source ofmanagement services and marketing expertise. Building on existing U.S. activities in agriculture, medicine, and telecommunications,expansion into these sectors would bring both economic benefits for U.S. firms and opportunities for harmonizing approaches to

governance and information sharing. Indeed, the Obama administrations relatively conciliatory stance towardCuba could lay the foundation of a much- needed mutually reinforcing diplomacy with China inthe region (Wilder 2009:4). A defining challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century will be the development of mutually

beneficial partnerships with China. With sensible diplomacy, Chinese projects in Latin America could become asource of deeper cooperation , for as Daniel Eriks on concisely put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, trade

is not a zero sum game (2008:3). Hu Jintaos proposal at the 2009 G-20 to jointly develop financial

monitoring mechanisms reflects Chinas desire for cooperative relations with the United

States . With legal authorization, Cuba could become a platform for advancing responsibly governedtrilateral projects that demonstrate awareness of regional diversity and a commitment tointernational cooperation . Accommodating diversity is critical to effective diplomacy, for although Confucius may havestated, have no friends not equal to yourself, in his pragmatic wisdom he also taught his followers to be firm in the righ t way, andnot merely firm.


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No Net-Benefit


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No Taiwan War

No war economies too intertwinedBhakal 12 (Maitreya- Freelance Writer at ABSAS Solutions Pvt. Ltd. Five reasons why China

will not invade Taiwan, and an analysis of Cross- strait Relation.http://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysing-cross-strait-relations-and-5.html) China has always placed economics at the forefront of most other matters . Despite the often-tumultuous state of Sino- Indian relations (and an unresolved border dispute), trade has touched $63 billion. China is Indias secondlargest trading partner. In the Senkaku island dispute with Japan, Deng Xiaoping, as soon as he came into power in 1978, proposedthat China and Japan jointly explore the oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands without touching on the issue of sovereignty.China has also sought joint exploration in the resource-rich Spratlys, a solution which is the right step forward and is in fact more

urgent than sovereignty, which the Philippines and Vietnam and have so far been reluctant to do. China doesnt mindwaiting and biding its time until sovereignty issues get resolved. As Deng Xiaoping famouslyremarked regarding the Senkaku dispute, It does not matter if this question is shelved for sometime, say, 10 years . Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation willcertainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all. Unlike his predecessor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has used

a softer approach towards Taiwan, promoting stronger economic and cultural ties, high-levelofficial visits and direct flights in order to reduce tensions . This pragmatic approach is on display even in theTaiwan dispute. China is Taiwans largest trading partner, and Taiwan is Chinas seventh largest . Two-thirds of all Taiwanese companies have made investments in China in recent years. In 2010, China(including Hong Kong) accounted for over 29.0% of Taiwans total trade and 41.8% of Taiwans exports. The ECFA was heavily tiltedin Taiwans favor. It cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products entering Taiwan. Under the agree ment,approximately 16.1 % of exports to China and 10.5 % of imports to China will be tariff free by 2013. Taiwanese firms have invested$200 billion in the mainland, and trade between the two sides has exceeded $150 billion. Taiwanese trade with China. Source:

Reuters Both China and Taiwan have a lot to lose by fighting with each other. Another factor toconsider is the incalculable loss that an invasion will have on the Chinese economy, not tomention scaring away potential investors.
http://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysing-cross-strait-relations-and-5.htmlhttp://indiaschinablog.blogspot.com/2011/08/analysing-cross-strait-relations-and-5.html


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CP Causes Taiwan War

Chinese in Latin America emboldens Beijing causes war with TaiwanFergusson 12

(Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International BusinessTimes, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher atUniversity College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University ofGlasgow, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine, http://www.e -ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)Taiwan domestic, or foreign policy? Chinas goals in the region amount to more than the capture ofnatural resources. Although the Peoples Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue tobe a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of Chinas main foreign policy goals is toisolate Taipei internationally . The PRC and the ROC compete directly for internationalrecognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where12 of the 23 nations that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside. The historical

background Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated tothe island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the UnitedStates intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly thebattlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy. When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic ofChina (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over thePRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supportedits position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administrationwished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted theChina seat to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit ofPresident Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, andgradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomaticrecognition from Taipei to Beijing. The economics of international recognition In the Americas, the PRC had international

recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained morediplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of thestates involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that from the late1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwans direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,

[51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to theformation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for LatinAmerican states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it everhas been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is thatLatin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growingeconomies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition. However, while the decision is not politicalfor Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRCdamages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designationof diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008. Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC(Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda,Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St

Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for theROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the Taiwan issue

unilaterally . Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it hastaken to outbidding Taiwan in offers of foreign aid , a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from thedefunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre oc cupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that the regions leadershave turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against eachother. *53+ Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments oninfrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. However, even Taiwans economy can be put


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under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese

cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC take forexample, the Dominican case. In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated topublic welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomaticrelationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54] This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms,

the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America. Political strategies of the PRC In political terms too; the PRC is in anadvantageous position , thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China providesincentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan, *55+ the reality is that the us e of

force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintainofficial relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitiveto the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domnguezsuggests that the PRC has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), *56+ thelegitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission inHaiti, to punish the Car ibbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. *57+ This incident showed that China is prepared

to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, Chinasexperience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations inaddition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationshipbased on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 the CCP had establishe d relationswith almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, *58+ further isolating

the ROC. The effect on American interests

Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in LatinAmerica, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the

Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican)would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations

between China and the West. As Chinas economic and political position in the world improves vis --visboth America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position whereit could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement onTaiwan, perhaps by force .


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Disads/Turns to CP


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Cyber Attack Turn

Chinese presence enables cyber-terror attacks.Ellis 13 (R. Evan Ellis is associate professor for Hemispheric Defense Studies , China's New

Backyard: Does Washington realize how deeply Beijing has planted a flag? JUNE 6, 2013,http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america)

The challenge to Washington from China's presence in the region also extends beyondeconomics and policy objectives. The U.S. Defense Department's critical posture regardingChinese cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the United States and China , thoughhighly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable. In such a conflict, China-operated ports, airports,telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts of the Chinese commercial presence in LatinAmerica would represent potential assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against theUnited States .

Cyber-attack would destroys the US economyVatis, 2000 (Michael, FBI, Congressional Testimony to the Subcommittee on Crime in theHouse and the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Service, 2/29,l/n)And this is not just a criminal problem; it is also a national security problem. This is because our nation's criticalinfrastructures -- and by that I mean those services that are vital to our economy and to our nationalsecurity , such as electrical power, telecommunications, transportation and government operations -- are now alldependent on computer technology for their very operations. And that dependence makesthem vulnerable to an attack which , if successful, could deny service on a very broad scale. Thesame basic types of cyber attacks that therefore have become attractive to criminals are alsoattractive to foreign intelligence services , who seek new ways to obtain sensitive government or proprietary

information, and also to terrorists and hostile foreign nations, who are bent on attackin g U.S.interests.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_americahttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america


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Democracy Turn

China influence decks democracy in the region.Farnsworth 12 (Eric Farnsworth is vice-president of the Council of the Americas in

Washington DC and from 1995 to 1998 was senior adviser to the White House special envoy forthe Americas. Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, AmericasQuarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)

Is China a Threat to the Normative Advances in the Hemisphere? Since the end of the Cold War, however, the region hasstruggled to develop a regime of democratic behavior that is intended to prevail in thehemispheric community of nations. Democracy , including freedom of the press, is to be respected; labor and theenvironment protected; corruption and illegal activities inspected and prosecuted. It is difficult to implement suchstandards unless leverage exists to develop a broad consensus that promotes certain behaviors, and at least one nation orregional organization is willing and able to enforce the regime effectively. For example, U.S. efforts to promote labor andenvironmental reforms through trade agreements are undermined when other nations have theability to sign similar agreements with China that do not include similar provisions. Programs of multilateral lending agencieslike the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank that promote financial reforms and good governancebecome less relevant if borrowing nations can receive funds from China or elsewhere, includingVenezuela, without conditions. To put it starkly, the oft-maligned IMF has no influence with nations such as Argentina that do not

currently require IMF funding or access to global capital markets.5 In fact, Chinas huge pu rchases of hemisphericcommodities and the provision of credits on favorable terms have greatly assisted Latin American commoditiesexporters in the ongoing global economic crisis. In some cases this has allowed leaders the flexibility topostpone indefinitely the necessary economic and political reforms that would otherwise beconsistent with open market, healthy democratic governance. Ironically, this has allowed somedemocratically elected leaders to undermine democratic institutions , including freedom of the press, andreturn to the days of corporatist, rent-seeking economies. This model failed spectacularly during the twentieth century, butit is now enabled, if not promoted, by Chinese economic engagement. At the microeconomic level, firmswith government connections have profited handsomely from these arrangements, but such an economic model tends not to foster

innovation, dynamism or sustainable, broad-based economic growth over time . It just makes the politically connectedmore wealthy exaggerating what has traditionally been one of the fundamental problems ofLatin Americas economic development . Additionally, the behavior of Chinese firms has not always followed theWestern model, which includes corporate social responsibility activities, payment of taxes, job creation in the local economy,

environmental mitigation, anti-corruption policies, and the like. This will be an increasingly important issue because China islaying the groundwork for a long-term relationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includesstudent exchanges and the export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have spread like kudzu acrossLatin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004.

Loss of democracy leads to extinctionDiamond 95 Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995,Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htmOTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In theformer Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifiesthrough increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have

utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weaponscontinue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appearsincreasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security areassociated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions forlegality, accountability , popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of
http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworthhttp://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth


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this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion donot go to war with one another . They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify theirleaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations , and they are muchless likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not buildweapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another . Democratic countries form more reliable,open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They aremore environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens , who organize toprotest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligationsand because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their ownborders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundationon which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.


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International Fiat Bad

Encourages abdicating responsibility to other countries- responsibility is anecessary precondition to making ethical judgments

Promotes bad advocacy skills- no actor faces deciding which nation should do apolicy

Unfair research burden - we have to research every country to find answers

False judicial dichotomy no actor faces deciding between whether one nationor another should do a policy, means the discussion isnt politically relevant

C/I- the NEG gets to have the same actor as the AFF (USFG)

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Answers to China CP and DA

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