Deterrence DA Answers

8/6/2019 Deterrence DA Answers

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Arthur Erlendsson Deterrence DA AnHawken School 2010

1 | D e t e r r e n c e

DETERRENCE ANSWERSDeterrence Fails General (1/2) ........................................................................................................ 2Deterrence Fails General (2/2) .........................................................................................................3

AT China Impacts (1/3) ....................................................................................................................... 4AT China Impacts (2/3)....................................................................................................................... 6AT China Impacts (3/3) ........................................................................................................................ 7AT Iran Impacts ................................................................................................................................... 8

Deterrence doesnt check Iranian aggression ideological motivations outweigh................. 8AT Middle East Impacts ..................................................................................................................... 10AT Japan Prolif Laundry List ......................................................................................................... 11AT Japan Prolif Tech Barriers ........................................................................................................ 13AT North Korea Nuclear Umbrella Deters .................................................................................... 15AT Asian Prolif (1/2) ........................................................................................................................... 16AT Asian Prolif (2/2) .......................................................................................................................... 18AT East Asian Conflict ........................................................................................................................ 19AT Turkish Prolif Nukes Solve........................................................................................................ 21Afghanistan Withdrawal Inevitable .............................................................................................. 22Afghanistan Terrorism Inevitable ................................................................................................. 23Afghanistan Cant Get Nukes ......................................................................................................... 24AT: Levine and Herridge 2009 ......................................................................................................... 25No Link ............................................................................................................................................... 26

AT: Generic Link .................................................................................................................................27AT: ResolveConventional Deterrence Fails (1/2) ......................................................................... 28AT: ResolveConventional Deterrence Fails (2/2) ........................................................................ 29Conventional Superiority Turn - Proliferation ................................................................................ 30


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DETERRENCE FAILS GENERAL (1/2)

Deterrence fails {If time} (forces dont prevent terrorism, and countries can defendthemselves)at worst we can spot them assistance to prevent escalationFriedman and Preble 10 Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at theCato Institute, and Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at Cato (6/14, Benjamin Friedman and Christopher Preble,

Defense Cuts: Start Overseas, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11896)But the dirty secret of American defense politics is that we are fairlysafe.Weare surrounded byvast seas and friendly neighbors. But our military spending is nearlyequal to half the world's, and our allies spend most of the other half. Russia, China, North Korea, Syriaand Iran collectively spend about a fourth of what we do on defense, according tostatistics compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Even if we cut our military in half,it would still be far bigger than that of any conceivable rival. Encouragingly, membersof President Obama's bipartisan commission on the deficit and debt have said that the military ought to be among the items on thetable for possible spending cuts. Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Reps. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), Walter B. Jones (R-N.C.) and RonPaul (R- Texas) last month sent a joint letter to the commissioners arguing that the trims to the Pentagon budget should flow from

cuts in overseas commitments. The commissioners should take that advice. The Cold War is over. While wewere defending our allies in Europe and Asia, they got wealthy.The newstatus quo is that weoffer them perpetual security subsidies and risk being drawn into warsthat do not serve our security interests.The recent trouble regarding the sinking of a South Korean navalship by Pyongyang is illustrative. Odious as North Korea is, we have no obvious interest in fighting for South Korea, which has grown

far richer and militarily capable than its northern rival. South Korea can defend itself. So can our European and Japanese friends .Terrorism cant justify a huge military. Most of our military spending goes to conventional forcesadept at destroying well-armed enemies. Terrorists are lightly armed and mostly hidden. The trick is finding them,not killing or capturing them once they are found. Counterinsurgency enthusiasts claim that we can only be safe fromterrorists by using ground forcesto rebuild the states where they operate. Butwe have learned the hard waythat theory badly overestimates our ability to organize other nations' politics. Even ifwe could master that imperial art,itwould not be worth the cost. By avoiding the occupation of failingstates and shedding commitments to defend healthy ones, we could plan for farfewer wars, allowing cuts in force structure, manpower, procurement spending and operational costs. The resultingforce would be more elite, less strained and far less expensive. Even if the commission calls forcutting defense commitments, the Obama administration has shown little interest in following such recommendations. When the Japanese government

recently asked us to remove our Marines from Okinawa after 65 years, for example, the administration hectored Tokyo into letting us keep our baserather than wishing the Japanese well and bringing the troops home. Instead of looking to shed missions, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recentlyadvocated maintaining current funding levels while cutting overhead costs by a few billion to fund frontline forces. Good idea, except that i t won't offsetthe rapidly rising cost of the military's personnel, healthcare and operational spending. The likely result will be that these accounts will continue to takefunds needed for manpower and force structure, leaving a shrinking force overburdened even in peacetime. Our deficit problem is an opportunity tosurrender the pretension that we are the world's indispensable nation, preventing instability, shaping the international system and guiding history.

We should be content to settle for being the big kid on the block that looks out for itself and occasionallyhelps friends in a bad spot. That approach would take advantage of the security wehave, and save money we don't.


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DETERRENCE FAILS GENERAL (2/2)

Deterrence failsempirically provenKober 10 research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (6/13, Stanley, The Deterrence Illusion,http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11898)

The first world war was the product of a mode of rational thinking that went badly off course. The

peace of Europe was based on security assurances. Germany was the protector of Austria-Hungary, and Russia was the protector ofSerbia. The prospect of escalation was supposed to prevent war, and it did until, finally, itdidn't. The Russians, who should have been deterred they had suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of Japanjust a few years before decided they had to come to the support of their fellow Slavs. As countries honouredtheir commitments, a system that was designed to prevent war instead widened it.We have also beenliving in an age of globalisation, especially since the end of the cold war, but it too is increasingly

being challenged . And just like the situation at the beginning of the last century, deterrence isnot working. Much is made, for example, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) invoking Article V the famous"three musketeers" pledge that an attack on one member is to be considered as an attack on all following the terrorist attacks of

September 11. But the United States is the most powerful member of NATO by far. Indeed, in 2001,it was widely considered to be a hegemon, a hyperpower. Other countries wanted to be in NATO

because they felt an American guarantee would provide security. And yet it was the US that wasattacked. This failure of deterrence has not received the attention it deserves. It is, after all, notunique. The North Vietnamese were not deterred by the American guarantee to South Vietnam.Similarly, Hezbollah was not deterred in Lebanon in the 1980s, and American forces were assaultedin Somalia. What has been going wrong? The successful deterrence of the superpowers during the cold

war led to the belief that if such powerful countries could be deterred, then lesser powers shouldfall into line when confronted with an overwhelmingly powerful adversary. It is plausible, but itmay be too rational. For all their ideological differences, the US and the Soviet Union observed red lines during the cold war.There were crises Berlin, Cuba, to name a couple but these did not touch on emotional issues or vital interests, so thatcompromise and retreat were possible. Indeed, what we may have missed in the west is the importance of retreat in Soviet ideology."Victory is impossible unless [the revolutionary parties] have learned both how to attack and how to retreat properly," Lenin wrotein Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. When the Soviets retreated, the US took the credit. Deterrence worked. But what ifretreat was part of the plan all along? What if, in other words, the Soviet Union was the exception rather than the rule? Thatquestion is more urgent because, in the post-cold war world, the US has expanded its security guarantees, even as its enemies show

they are not impressed. The Iraqi insurgents were not intimidated by President Bush's challenge to"bring 'em on". The Taliban have made an extraordinary comeback from oblivion and show norespect for American power. North Korea is demonstrating increasing belligerence. And yet theUS keeps emphasising security through alliances. "We believe that there are certain commitments, as we saw in abipartisan basis to NATO, that need to be embedded in the DNA of American foreign policy," secretary of state Hillary Clinton

affirmed in introducing the new National Security Strategy. But that was the reason the US was in Vietnam. It had abipartisan commitment to South Vietnam under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation, reaffirmed through theTonkin Gulf Resolution, which passed Congress with only two dissenting votes. It didn't work, and found its commitments were not

embedded in its DNA. Americans turned against the war, Secretary Clinton among them. The great powers could notguarantee peace in Europe a century ago, and the US could not guarantee it in Asia a half-century ago.Before the US makes further guarantees, it needs to understand the reasons for these failures,lest new promises lead to tragedy both for the US and those who would put their trust in it.


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only a handful of PLA personnel stationed abroad in embassies, on fellowships, and in U.N.peacekeeping operations.


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AT CHINA IMPACTS (2/3)

Not a threat 1 child generation hurt militaryThompson 10 -- director of China studies and Starr senior fellow at the Nixon Center(David,Foreign Policy, Think Again: China's Military.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military?page=0,0)

Probably. The PLA's hardware is improving, but what about its recruits? China's one-childpolicy is widely perceived as creating a generation of spoiled, overweight boys, dubbed "littleemperors," who are doted on by four grandparents while their parents toil to support them infields, factories, and offices. Although accounts are sometimes exaggerated (in practice, manyfamilies, particularly in rural areas, have managed to have more than one child), the dramaticdemographic shifts brought about by this policy, started in 1979, certainly impact the PLA. By2006, "only-child soldiers" made up more than half of the force, up from just 20 percent adecade earlier, giving China the largest-ever military with a majority of only-children.In a nod to the fact that enlistees are often the sole support for aging parents and grandparents,the PLA has shortened service commitments. In 1998, China reduced the time conscripts mustserve to two years, lessening the economic and social burdens on rural families dependent on an

only son. With a significantly shortened time to train conscripts and participate in exercises,many units will likely maintain low levels of readiness. Only-child officers are also more likely toleave the PLA to enter the private sector, where they are better able to support their parents andfamilies.

No plans to invade Taiwan Chinese focus is on modernizationThompson 10 -- director of China studies and Starr senior fellow at the Nixon Center(David,Foreign Policy, Think Again: China's Military.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military?page=0,0)"China's War Plans Are All About Invading Taiwan." That was then. Chinese military leaders in therecent past did place intense focus on preparing their armed forces to fight a "limited war" overTaiwan, fully expecting that the United States would enter the conflict. Many weapons systems

the PLA acquired or developed, as well as the exercises it trained for, were largely aimed atfighting a technologically superior enemy -- with particular emphasis on developing tactics tokeep the United States from bringing naval assets to China's shores, a strategy known as "accessdenial." In the past, massive annual amphibious-assault exercises, known derisively as the"million-man swim," defined the military experiences of hundreds of thousands of conscripts.

Although simulating a Chinese D-Day on Taiwan might be a tidy demonstration of the PLA'score mission, the armed forces today are developing capabilities and doctrine that willeventually enable them to protect China's expanding global interests. The PLA's Second ArtilleryCorps and science-and-technology units are increasingly capable in space and cyberspaceoperations, and they have honed the ability to launch and operate satellites to improvecommunications and intelligence collection. New air and naval platforms and capabilities, suchas aerial refueling and new classes of ships, also increase the PLA's ability to deploy abroad.

Official Chinese military writings now pay increasing attention to a greater range of militarymissions, focusing not only on China's territorial integrity, but on its global interests. From oilrigs in Nigeria to a crude-oil pipeline under construction that will connect Yunnan's capital cityto Burma's port of Sittwe on the Bay of Bengal, Beijing thinks it must be able to defend itspeople, infrastructure, and investments in some of the world's most volatile places -- much asthe British did in the 1800s.


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AT CHINA IMPACTS (3/3)

No timeframe for China global expansionThompson 10 -- director of China studies and Starr senior fellow at the Nixon Center(David,Foreign Policy, Think Again: China's Military.http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military?page=0,0)"China's Military Has Global Aspirations."Perhaps someday. At the height of the Cold War, Soviet military vessels prowled the world'soceans, and its aircraft patrolled international airspace. By contrast, China's navy rarely leavesits home waters; when it does patrol farther afield, it still does not cross the Pacific. But there islittle doubt that China is steadily building its ability to project power beyond its shores.Milestones such as the PLA Navy's around-the-world cruise in 2002 and its anti-piracy missionoff the African coast indicate that China is looking to operate more globally. Although Beijinghas not yet sought to deploy combat-capable military units to the sites of international naturaldisasters, in the not-too-distant future Chinese military aircraft might be delivering Chinese-made disaster-relief supplies. Having recently commissioned a hospital ship, Chinese navalstrategists have already identified disaster relief as a key mission for a future Chinese aircraftcarrier, while military writers discuss how to conduct regional missions to protect China's

interests outside its territorial waters. Undoubtedly, Chinese war planners see a future in whichChina will be able to defend itself offshore and its navy will operate beyond what is sometimesreferred to as the "first island chain" (an imaginary line stretching from Japan, through Okinawaand Taiwan, and south to the Philippines and the South China Sea), eventually encompassingmuch of the Western Pacific up to the "second island chain" that runs from Japan southwardpast Guam to Australia. But whether Beijing envisions one day establishing overseas bases, orsimply having the capability to project power globally when needed, is unclear. Some wonder

whether China and the United States are on a collision course. Kaplan raised the ominouspossibility in theAtlantic that when the Chinese navy does push out into the Pacific, "it will veryquickly encounter a U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the

Asian mainland," resulting in a "replay of the decades-long Cold War, with a center of gravitynot in the heart of Europe but, rather, among Pacific atolls." Unquestionably, there is deep

strategic mistrust between the two countries. China's rapid economic growth, steady militarymodernization, and relentless nationalistic propaganda at home are shaping Chinese publicexpectations and limiting possibilities for compromise with other powers. This does not makeconflict inevitable, but it is cause for long-term concern and will shape U.S. efforts to avoidhostilities with China. Military-to-military contacts lag far behind the rest of the U.S.-Chinarelationship. Taiwan is an obvious point of disagreement and the one place where the twopowers could conceivably come into direct conflict. U.S. maritime surveillance activities insideChina's exclusive economic zone are another contentious point. There is, however, a growingrecognition that the United States and China should engage one another and seek to avoid aconflict that would almost certainly be destructive to both sides. Despite the goose-steppingsoldiers at Chinese military parades, the PLA is far from a carbon copy of the Soviet threat. Forall the jargon-laden, prideful articles about China's inevitable rise in the world, Chinese

strategists are cautious not to openly verbalize aspirations to conquer the globe or establishdistant bases, outposts, or supply stations. Perhaps a generation from now, Chinese militaryplanners might be strategizing more openly about how to acquire overseas basing rights andagreements with allies where they might station their forces abroad, just as the French andBritish have done since the Napoleonic wars and the Americans have done more recently. But

with China, that process has not begun in earnest. At least, not for now.


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AT IRAN IMPACTS

Deterrence doesnt check Iranian aggression ideological motivations

outweigh.

Rubin, 2008 (11/08, Michael Rubin, PhD, major research area in the Middle East, with special

focus on Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish society, American Enterprise Institute, Can a NuclearIran Be Contained or Deterred? http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896)Should achievement of nuclear weapons capability make such debates moot, then what policy options short of military strikes wouldthe West have? Alongside any diplomatic or economic strategy, the United States and its allies would have to rely on deterrence or

containment. Both are military strategies. Successful nuclear deterrence requires two conditions: First, the Iranianleadership must prioritize the lives of its citizenry above certain geopolitical or ideological goals.Second, the deterring power--in this case, the United States--must be willing to kill hundreds ofthousands of Iranians should authorities in Tehran or their proxies ever use nuclear weapons. Onboth questions, there is a disturbing lack of clarity. At its heart, the Islamic Republic is an ideologicalregime. Many visitors to the Islamic Republic may be rightly impressed by Tehran's vibrant political culture, but when pushcomes to shove, the Iranian leadership believes sovereignty derives from God and must be channeledthrough the supreme leader. The ambitions and values of ordinary people are subordinate to the will of God asinterpreted by the supreme leader and the apparatus established to serve him. Hence, the Council of Guardians constrains any outlet

for ordinary Iranians by disqualifying any potential political leaders whose governing philosophy does not conform to Khamenei'snarrow views. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), its associated paramilitary Basij, and assortedstate-sanctioned vigilante groups exist to enforce ideological discipline and punish those whofail to conform .[16] Regardless of what most Iranians think, the Islamic Republic ascribes to a setof values far different from our own. Is Abizaid correct when he argues that the Islamic Republicis not suicidal? It is a crucial question. During the Cold War and after the Soviet Union's nuclear

breakout, the United States had no choice but to deter. An ideological clash may have driven theCold War, but neither Moscow nor Washington believed the other side to be suicidal. Eachsuperpower pursued its interests but checked its own ambitions so as not to provoke a nuclear war that would destroy its home

country. Despite mutually assured destruction, deterrence almost broke down on severaloccasions, bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war: the Berlin crisis, the Cuban missile crisis,and the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 each nearly escalated beyond control. In retrospect, deterrence broughtneither the security nor the stability to which some historians and many current policymakersascribe it. At the very least, nuclear deterrence is a highly risky strategy. The Soviet leadership was notsuicidal, but how does the Iranian leadership approach questions of mass death? If Westernpoliticians project their own value system onto their foes when calculating opponent decision-making, then they would assume that their Iranian counterparts would not be willing to absorba nuclear attack. Such reasoning, however, ignores the role of ideology in the Islamic Republic.Regardless of what most Iranians think, the Islamic Republic ascribes to a set of values fardifferent from our own. Ahmadinejad shocked the West when, soon after taking office, he calledfor Israel's destruction; dismissed the Holocaust as a fabrication; and hinted that he channeledthe Hidden Imam, also known as the Mahdi, Shia Islam's messianic figure. Mahdism is not new to theIslamic Republic. After the first parliamentary elections in May 1980, Khomeini instructed the victors to offer their "services to theLord of the Age, May God speed his blessed appearance."[17] Nevertheless, most parliamentarians at the time rooted themselves in

the more pragmatic policy debates swirling around construction of the new system.Ahmadinejad, however, heightened

emphasis on apocalyptic thought when he argued that Mahdism is "the defining strategy of theIslamic Republic" and that human action could hasten the Mahdi's return.[18] Indeed, it is thisaspect of Ahmadinejad's thought that is especially dangerous because it suggests that

Ahmadinejad believes that he and his fellow travelers could perhaps hasten the Mahdi's returnby precipitating violence, setting the stage for the return as prophesied in some readings ofIslamic texts. Ahmadinejad is not alone in such beliefs. Mesbah-Yazdi, his religious mentor, argues that the"superiority of Islam over other religions is stressed in Qur'an, which calls on believers to wage war against unbelievers and preparethe way for the advent of the Mahdi and conquering the world."[19] In his study of apocalyptic thought in Iran, Mehdi Khalaji, asenior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who trained for fourteen years in the seminaries of Qom, noted,

"Ahmadinejad appears to be influenced by a trend in contemporary apocalyptic thought in which


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the killing of Jews will be one of the most significant accomplishments of the Mahdi'sgovernment."[20] Certainly it is plausible that Ahmadinejad might, like Rafsanjani, believe Islamicinterests make Iran's weathering a retaliatory nuclear strike worthwhile. If this is true, and theinterpretation is certainly plausible, then traditional deterrence becomes impossible.


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AT MIDDLE EAST IMPACTS

Middle East stability at an all time low a single trigger will set off a regional warLondon, 6/28 -- president of Hudson Institute and professor emeritus of New YorkUniversity. He is the author of Decade of Denial (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001)and America's Secular Challenge (6/28/10, Herbert, Hudson New York, The Coming Crisis InThe Middle East, http://www.hudson-ny.org/1387/coming-crisis-in-the-middle-east)The coming storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum; like conditions prior to World WarI, all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey's provocative flotilla, oftendescribed in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission, has set in motion a gust of diplomaticactivity: if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, which they haveapparently decided not to do in favor of land operations, it could have presented a casus belli.[cause for war] Syria, too, has been playing a dangerous game, with both missile deploymentand rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts, Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000long-, medium- and short-range missiles, and Syrian territory has been serving as a conduit formilitary materiel from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its ownscuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war withIsrael could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran, with sufficient fissionable material to

produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize the missiles, but theroad to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctionscan convince Iran to change course. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran,poised to be "the hegemon" in the Middle East; it is increasingly considered the "strong horse"as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend onIranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi

Arabia, regional strategic vision is a combination of deal-making to offset the Iranian Shiaadvantage, and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counterweight to Iranianambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state; should either fall, all

bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni "tent" muststand on two legs: if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should this tent collapse, and should Iran takeadvantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling empowered, and no

longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario, Iran, with nuclear weapons in tow, might decide thata war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However implausible it may seem at the moment,the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclearexchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States'policy. Yet, curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from theregion.


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AT JAPAN PROLIF LAUNDRY LIST

Japan will never go nuclear too many obstacles and leaders know the DAsBakanic et. al., 2008 (Elizabeth, Mark Christopher, Sandya Das, Laurie Freeman, GeorgeHodgson, Mike Hunzeker, R. Scott Kemp, Sung Hwan Lee, Florentina Mulaj, Ryan Phillips,Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Relations,Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt.)Japan Nuclear HistoryAs a direct result of the World War II nuclear attacks on Hiroshima andNagasaki, Japan developed a strong aversion to nuclear weapons. Yet, this nuclear allergynotwithstanding, Japan has in the past explored the nuclear weapons option. Japanese leaders havestudied the desirability and feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons twice: first after China tested nuclear weapons in 1964, and thenagain in 1994 while formulating the countrys post-Cold War global strategy. On both occasions, Japan concluded that becoming anuclear weapons state was not in its interests.1 As part of its robust civil nuclear energy program, however, Japan has developedboth enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Some have suggested that this is part of a hedging strategy that would give Japan theability to produce fissile material quickly should it ever decide to develop a nuclear weapon.2 Following North Koreas ballisticmissile tests in 1998 and 2006 and its nuclear test in 2006, the Japanese government and people have shown more willingness todiscuss publicly the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. At present, the discussion remains essentially a debate on whether tohave the debate, but even this level of discourse indicates a significant increase in Japanese tolerance of the subject. Constraints on

Developing Nuclear Weapons Japans relationship with the United States, its longstanding commitment tonuclear nonproliferation, its dependence on uranium imports for power, its established policies,

and Japanese public opinion all discourage the country from pursuing nuclear weapons. TheU.S.-Japan alliance is a key variable in Japans calculus on nuclear issues. Pursuing nuclearweapons would severely damage if not destroy Japans alliance with the United States, on whichJapan relies for security guarantees including extended nuclear deterrence. Japan has long beena vocal supporter of the nonproliferation regime. Given the rigorous and intrusive inspectionsregime to which Japan subscribes under the Additional Protocol of the NPT, the country could noteasily pursue a covert nuclear weapons program. As a result, any decision to pursue nuclear

weapons would likely take place openly and involve withdrawing from the NPT. Reneging on itsNPT obligations would severely damage Japans international reputation. Japans arrangements

with uranium suppliers strictly prohibit Tokyo from using imported uranium for purposes otherthan fueling its civil nuclear energy program. Were Japan to launch a weapons program,uranium imports would be suspended. Given that nuclear energy accounts for approximately

one-third of Japans electricity production,3 suspension of uranium imports would take a heavytoll on Japans economy. Japans standing policy on nuclear weapons is summarized by the three nos:no manufacturing, no possession, and no introduction of foreign nuclear weapons into Japaneseterritory. Whilethese principles are not legally binding, they attract significant political support. Tokyo hasdiscussed dropping or amending the third no to allow U.S. nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese harbors, but any changes

would spark intense public debate and considerable opposition.4 The 1955 Basic Lawon Atomic Energyalso strictly limits Japans use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes; changing this law wouldrequire action by the Diet. Finally,Article 9 of Japans constitution prohibits the country from developingoffensive military capabilities. Many Japanese leaders including current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and hisimmediate predecessor Shinzo Abehave stated that a nuclear option could be considered a defensive capability and is thus

compatible with Japans constitution, but putting this interpretation into practice would likely spark a constitutionaldebate.5 Japan is undergoing something of a generational shift on nuclear issues. Many Japanese policymakers take as axiomaticthat younger Japanese, those without firsthand experience of the WWII nuclear bombings, tend to be less opposed than older

generations to the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons.6 Still, the majority of the public continues to view the nuclear optionunfavorably, and debate on the topicwhile more open than in previous yearsremains stifled. In short, Japans nuclearallergy is still strong.

Japan wont go nuclear constitution, memory of bombings, expert consensus.Yoshihara and Holmes, 2009 -- associate professors of strategy at the Naval War College(Toshi and James, THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE. Google Scholar)In any event, Japans nuclear allergy persists to the present day. Matake Kamiya explainsTokyos self-imposed injunction against bombmaking in terms of the general pacifism codified


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in Japans peace constitution, lingering memories of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima andNagasaki, and antimilitary sentiments dating from the interwar years.11 As a result, concludesKamiya, opposition to nuclear weapons is deeply embedded in postwar Japanese culture andsociety. . . . [I]t is still far stronger, even today, than those who warn of impending Japanesenuclear armament realize.12 The vast majority of observers in Japan and in the West are inclinedto agree with Kamiya, if for different reasons. Indeed, very few scholars have lent credence to

rationales for a nuclear buildup.13


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AT JAPAN PROLIF TECH BARRIERS

Technological barriers to Japan prolifYoshihara and Holmes 2009 -- associate professors of strategy at the Naval War College(Toshi and James, THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE. Google Scholar)Even assuming that Japan can procure enough fissile materials to build an arsenal, its engineers

would still have to leap over several technical barriers. First, Japan must devise an effective,efficient delivery system. The most direct route would be to arm Japans existing fleet of fighteraircraft with nuclear bombs or missiles. The fighters in the Air Self-Defense Force (SDF)inventory, however, are constrained by four factors: vulnerability to preemptive strikes whilestill on the ground at their bases; limited range, as Japan possesses no strategic bombers;susceptibility to interception by enemy fighters while en route to their targets; and vulnerabilityto increasingly sophisticated integrated air-defense systems. Compounding these shortcomings,Japan is surrounded by water, substantially increasing flight times to targets on the Asianmainland.In light of this, ballistic or cruisemissiles would likely rank as Japans weapon of choice. Thechallenges would be two. First, if Tokyo chose to rely on amissile delivery system, it would haveto produce a workable,miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an accurate

cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering prowess, but it wouldinvolve significant lead time. Second, the nation must develop the delivery vehicle itself. Eventhe U.S. defense-industrial sector, with its half-century of experience in this field, takes years todesign and build new missiles. Japan could conceivably convert some of its civilian space-launch

vehicles into ballistic missiles, but it would have to perfect key components, like inertialguidance systems. If it opted for long-range cruise missiles, Tokyo would in effect find itselfunless it could purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles off the shelf fromtheUnited States, adoubtful prospect, given the highly offensive nature of Tomahawks and thus the politicalsensitivity of such a salecompelled to start from scratch. Procuring and integrating satelliteguidance, terrain-contour matching, and other specialized techniques and hardware woulddemand long, hard labor from Japanese weapon scientists.There is also the question of testing. Japan would need to ensure the safety and reliability of its

nuclear arsenal. There would be no substitute for an actual nuclear test that proved this new (forJapan) technology while bolstering the credibility of Japanese deterrence. The JapaneseArchipelago is simply too small and too densely populated for a test to be conducted theresafelyeven leaving aside the potential for a political backlash, given thememories of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki it would conjure up. Tokyo could detonate a device near some Japanese-heldisland in the Pacific, such as Okinotori-shima. But again, the diplomatic furor from flouting theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)would be intense,while the Japanese populace wouldthink back to the Lucky Dragon incident during the Bikini tests of the 1950s.46 One need onlyrecall the uproar over French and Chinese tests on the eve of the CTBTs entry into force.Computer simulations of weapon performance may be less optimal but would certainly be morepalatable from a political standpoint for Japan. The Israeli experience may be instructive herefor any Japanese bomb-making efforts.

The technical dilemmas reviewed above demonstrate that there is no shortcut to a nuclearbreakout, even for a technological powerhouse of Japans standing. The Congressional ResearchService notes, If one assumes that Japan would want weapons with high reliability andaccuracy, then more time would need to be devoted to their development unless a weapon orinformation was supplied by an outside source.47 Kan Ito, a commentator on Japanesestrategic affairs for nearly two decades, concurs, considering observers who predict a rapid

breakout utterly presumptuous.Declares Ito, It is dangerous to believe such a misconception.It will take 15 years for Japan to build up its own autonomous nuclear deterrence capability thatis truly functional.48 While one may quibble with his fifteen-year timeline, which seems unduly


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pessimistic, the period required to develop and field a credible deterrent would probably bemeasured in years rather than the weeks or months cavalierly bandied about.


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AT NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR UMBRELLA DETERS

Nuclear umbrella deters North Korea not troopsAlagappa 2009 distinguished senior scholar at East-West Center (Muthiah, Global Asia,nuclear weapons reinforce stability and security in 21st century Asia. Google scholar)For non-nuclear weapon states like Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrencecommitments have been a significant factor in assuaging their security vulnerabilities in the

wake of the North Korean nuclear test. Both countries insisted on reaffirmation of the U.S.commitment, and Japan is exploring measures to increase the credibility of that commitment.In reassuring Japan, the U.S. commitment is a significant factor along with others in forestallingexploration of an independent nuclear option by that country. The U.S. commitment enablesSouth Korea to maintain a nonnuclear posture, provides time to build a self-reliant defensecapability, and is a fallback in dealing with a nucleararmed North Korea.


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AT ASIAN PROLIF (1/2)

Asian prolif inevitableAlagappa 2009 distinguished senior scholar at East-West Center (Muthiah, Global Asia,nuclear weapons reinforce stability and security in 21st century Asia. Google scholar)Continuing emphasis on non-proliferation and calls for elimination of nuclear weaponsnotwithstanding, it appears likely that nuclear weapons will persist and influence nationalsecurity policies and strategies of major powers, as well as certain second-tier powers andisolated states in the foreseeable future.1 Initial anticipation in the West especially in the armscontrol and nonproliferation community of the decreasing security relevance of nuclear

weapons was ill-founded. The effort in the last decade and a half to arrest and reverse the spreadof nuclear weapons has not been any more successful than earlier ones. Leaders andgovernments in nuclear weapon states, their allies, and aspirants to the nuclear club believe thattheir nuclear forces or those of their allies can advance national security. Nuclear weapons,

ballistic missiles, and strategic defense have entered or reentered the security thinking of theold, new, and prospective nuclear weapon states and their allies in a fundamentally differentstrategic environment and in a nuclear era that is substantially different from that of the Cold

War. It is important to understand the security significance and roles of nuclear weapons in the

new era, investigate national strategies for their employment, and explore their implications forinternational security, stability, and conflict resolution in the 21st century. This is particularlyimportant in the broadly defined Asian security region which confronts serious securitychallenges and includes five of the seven declared nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia,China, India, Pakistan), one undeclared nuclear weapon state (Israel), two aspirant states(North Korea and Iran), and several states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia) that relyon the American nuclear umbrella for their security.

And, not destabilizing.Alagappa 2009 distinguished senior scholar at East-West Center (Muthiah, Global Asia,nuclear weapons reinforce stability and security in 21st century Asia. Google scholar)Nuclear weapons have not disrupted or destabilized the overall distribution of power or

fundamentally altered the patterns of amity and enmity in the Asian security region. Theunipolar structure of the present system and the anticipated changes in the distribution ofpower in the Asian security region are consequences of change in the overall national power ofstates that has several dimensions. Military power is an important component of nationalpower; and having nuclear weapons makes a significant difference in national militarycapability. However, military power by itself is not a sufficient basis for major power status. Theenormous destructive power of nuclear weapons is also less fungible and less relevant to thepursuit of high priority non-traditional security goals. Nuclear weapons add to but are not asufficient basis of national power. The present dominance of the United States, the decline in theposition of Russia, and the rise of China and India are not due to their nuclear weaponcapabilities. U.S. dominance is grounded in its vast lead in several dimensions of power.

Withdrawal wont cause regional instability the recent Taiwanese electionhas decreased the likelihood of warBandow 08 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan(6/9/08, Doug, National Interest, Ending US-Korea Alliance,http://www.facebook.com/home.php?)The pro-alliance mantra includes promoting regional stability, but the contention that East Asia

would dissolve into chaos and war without Uncle Sams restraining hand is both arrogant andpresumptuous. Everyone in the region has an interest in preserving peace and promotingprosperity. North Korea remains a problem state but the threat of war on the Korean peninsula


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has diminished dramatically; the result of the recent Taiwanese election has moderated fearsabout potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beyond these two cases, there are no obvious

bilateral controversies with much likelihood of flaring into violence.


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AT ASIAN PROLIF (2/2)

Withdrawal wont wreck our extended deterrence the current policy isoutdated and flawedBandow 08 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute and former special assistant to Reagan(6/9/08, Doug, National Interest, Ending US-Korea Alliance,http://www.facebook.com/home.php?)Yet Washington is locked in the past.We are told that U.S. troops must remain inSouth Korea to defend that nation from ever-diminishing threats, threats

which the ROK is capable of handling. As the world changes, so shouldAmerican security commitments and military deployments. Much ofWashingtons global security structure is outdated.Nowhere is that more obviousthan on the Korean peninsula. The only way to create a twenty-first centurystrategic alliance with the South is to end todays outmoded twentieth-century alliance.

Withdrawal wont cause a decline in deterrence the U.S. will still be

committedLee 08 (4/14/08, Youkyung, Council on Foreign Relations, The US-South Korea Alliance,http://www.cfr.org/publication/11459/ussouth_korea_alliance.html)Experts have expressed concerns over how the development in military alliance would shape thefuture of Northeast Asia. Michael OHanlon at Brookings posits that the realignment of themilitary may be perceived by North Korea as a sign of weakening of the alliances strength andstrong deterrence against the North. However, Gen. B. B. Bell, commander of USFK, says theUnited States is continuously committed to the political alliance regardless of the militarycommand structure. Commanding control apparatus is not a statement of the commitment ofthe two nations to each others security, said Bell during his visit at Korea Society. Therestructure of the U.S.-Korea military alliance also reflects the changing role and paradigm ofU.S. leadership in the world. Hyeong Jung Park, a former fellow at Brookings, points out that

the alliance now is designed more for assisting U.S. global and regional strategy than for thedefense of South Korea in the narrow sense.


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AT EAST ASIAN CONFLICT

Asia unstable now North Korea, radical Islam, China military growthBlumenthal 6/7 resident fellow at American Enterprise institute(Dan, The WeeklyStandard, AEI, Losing Asia?. http://www.aei.org/article/102121)

Yet, today, there are a number of developments that threaten the region's stability. First, NorthKorea has conventional missiles that can destroy Seoul and gravely damage Japan. It also has anuclear arsenal. The North's brutal dictatorship could, moreover, suddenly collapse: leavingSouth Korea, Japan, the United States, and China scrambling to find and secure weapons ofmass destruction while stabilizing the state. The allies and China have very different notionsabout what a secure Korean Peninsula means. China's pursuit of its own goals during a crisis is arecipe for trouble. Second, Southeast Asia suffers the scourge of radical Islam. The U.S. militarymay be called upon to help respond to terrorist attacks--as it has been doing, with a lightfootprint, for almost a decade in the Philippines. And then there is China, which has the greatestpotential to undermine the Asia-Pacific peace. China has translated its economic resources intoan impressive and growing military arsenal. Its Second Artillery ballistic and cruise missileforces pose a particular threat to U.S. and allied air supremacy in the "first island chain" (Japan,

Taiwan, and the Philippines). China's missiles could seriously damage and ground most U.S. airassets at our most important Pacific base--Kadena in Japan. The Second Artillery is refining aland-based anti-ship ballistic missile. China could soon have the capability both to establishlocal air supremacy and to hit any surface ship coming its way from the Western Pacific. Chinahas a growing fleet of diesel and nuclear submarines. The diesel boats, which can stay longerundersea, carry arsenals sufficient to enforce a blockade of Taiwan and threaten surface ships inand around China's littorals. With a new base in Hainan Island, China's nuclear submarine forcehas easy access to the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Given historic Sino-Indianmistrust and America's reliance on the Indian Ocean for its own energy trade, China's ability tocause mischief at critical Pacific and Indian Ocean chokepoints is a serious strategicdevelopmen. Some experts argue that just because China has developed these capabilities doesnot mean that it will use them to threaten America or its allies. India, too, the logic goes, is

undertaking a military modernization program. This is simply what great powers do. But it isthe character of a rising power that matters. Those who take comfort in the assertion that "allgreat powers do it" should consider China's revanchist claims, its troubling internationalactivities, and its internal dynamics.

No impact to East Asian conflict economic turmoil in North Korea makesregional conflict impossibleCucullu 5 a former Special Forces lieutenant colonel dealing with East Asia nations(10/27/05, Gordon, Korean Troop Withdrawal,http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,79439,00.html)North Korea is an acknowledged dangerous foe. It has massed artillery poised to rain steel downon Seoul and forward-deployed American units. It fields a 1.2 million man army with massive

reserves. Aircraft, logistical support, armor units, and special operations infantry units havebeen deployed into protected attack positions for years. We know about the missiles, the nucs-bugs-and-gas WMD that Kim Jong Il possesses and seems willing to use on military and civiliantargets. But we also know that the hedonistic Kim regime has one foot in the economic grave andthe other on a banana peel. Without massive infusion of foreign assistance and revenue gainedfrom illegal operations such as counterfeiting, narcotics, slave labor, and sale of weaponssystems to other rogue states, it is likely that an economic implosion would have flushed hisregime away. Thirty years ago analysts calculated that North Korea had upwards of 90 dayssupplies for a full-scale war. Given the economic disintegration of North Korea since 1994, it


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would be surprising if the North could mount an all-out war for more than 14-21 days.Nevertheless, in any conflict the North Korean wild card is the horrific damage it could inflict onthe civilian population of Seoul even without using WMD.


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AT TURKISH PROLIF NUKES SOLVE

Nuclear guarantee solves risk of Turkish prolifKamiya et al, 9 -- *Matake: professor of International Relations at the National Defense

Academy of Japan and a leading security expert in Japan. He is also a member of the board ofdirectors of the Japan Association for International Security, and a member of the board oftrustees as well as a member of the policy council of the Japan Forum on InternationalRelations, AND ** Henri J. Barkley: visiting scholar in the Carnegie Middle East Program andthe Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen Professor at Lehigh University.He served as a memberof the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff working primarily on issues related to theMiddle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and intelligence from 1998 to 2000. He has taught atPrinceton, Columbia, the State University of New York, and the University of Pennsylvania,

AND ***Marcos C. de Azambuja (September, 09, Matake and Henri J., Pragmatic Steps forGlobal Security, Barzil, Japan, and Turkey,http://www.stimson.org/nuke/pdf/BJT_Print_Final.pdf)In contemplating conventionally armed foes, the Turkish armed forces are quite competent.For example, the first post-Cold War demonstration of Turkish military prowess occurred in

1998 when the Turks threatened Syria with military intervention unless it stopped providing thePKKs leader, Abdullah calan, with refuge in Damascus and Syrian-controlled parts ofLebanon. With most of its divisions facing south against Israel, Syria quickly capitulated andsent calan on his waya decision that ended with his capture and imprisonment by Turkishofficials. With the capture of calan and further political changes in both Turkey and Syria,relations between the two governments have improved significantly.5 However, in the absence ofany nuclear weapons of its own, when it comes to contemplating threats from nuclear-armednations, Turkey has little else to rely on other than NATOs guarantees. This might be relevant inconsidering the possibility of a revanchist Russia, or scenarios in which Iran and/or Syriaacquire nuclear weapons. Hence, despite the discordant voices emanating from various groups,Turks continue to rely on the American security umbrella. Ankara has always stressed theimportance of its NATO commitments. Moreover, as will be discussed below, there is no easy

way for Turkey to obtain such weapons, even assuming it was willing to forsake its alliance andtreaty pledges. It currently has no nuclear power plants and only the beginnings of aresearch/technical infrastructure. What has made the Turkish military a potent force has beenits NATO links. The combination of NATO, a robust army, and a willingness to take securityseriously has served effectively as Turkeys primary form of deterrence.


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Afghanistan Withdrawal Inevitable

Non Unique Withdrawal date

Yang, 10(Ai, Writer for China Daily, 4/8/10, Early US pullout from Afghanistan could be a problem for Pakistan, China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/2010-04/08/content_9699910.htm, NJ)

The United States' strategy in Afghanistan has come in for flak from the intelligence establishment in Pakistan, withofficials complaining that Washington'sannouncement of the date of its pullout from the war-torn nation as being too soon. If the US did not take more effort to train Afghan security forces, thehasty troops withdrawal plan would be disastrous for Pakistan, they added. "Washington has made a mistake by announcing the

withdrawal date (starting July next year).It is being seen as a sign of weakness and wanting to leave because they

feel defeated," a senior official of Pa kistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) told China Daily in Islamabad.


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Afghanistan Terrorism Inevitable

Terrorism is inevitable

Jacoby, 8(Jeff, columnist for the Boston Gl obe, Anti-Americanism is Inevitable, Even Under Obama , Boston Globe, http://www.bwcitypaper.com/Articles-i-2008-11-13-225276.113121_AntiAmericanism_is_Inevitable_Even_Under_Obama.html, NJ)

The storyline goes something like this:America's one-time popularity in the world was squandered by George W. Bush, whose

belligerence and unilateralism after September 11, 2001,alienated allies and engendered widespread anti-Americanism. But now, with theelection of Barack Obama, America can restore its good name and regain the world's goodwill. One vigorous exponent of this narrative has been Obama himself. "The single mostimportant issue that we're facing in th is election," he said during the campaign, is choosing a leader "to repair all the damage that's been done to America's reputation overseas."

"When I become president," he often told voters, "the world will look at America differently." Sure enough, much of the international reaction to Obama's election has been ecstatic."Legions of jubilant supporters set off firecrackers in El Sa lvador, danced in Liberia, and drank shots in Japan," the Los Angeles Times reported. Kenya declared a national holiday.South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu exulted, "We have a new spr ing in our walk and our shoulders are straighter." The Sun, Britain's most popular newspaper, headlined its

story "One Giant Leap for Mankind." For Obama, such worldwidejubilation must be gratifying. He should take it all with a healthy

grain of salt, however. Because it isn't going to last. Antagonism to the United States is as old as the United States. It d idn't begin with the current president,

unpopular though he is, or in response to American military action in Iraq. Nor is it going to vanish on January 20. In Hating America,a survey ofmore than twocenturies of anti-American hostility, Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin note that an upsurge of anti-Americanism was

already "strong in the Middle East and well under way in Europe" before Bush took office in 2001. In the 1990s, for example, Greeks opposed U.S. support forKosovo's Muslims, and vented their anger at President Bill Clinton. "Among the epithets flung at Clinton in the mainstream Greek media," the Rubins recount, "were criminal,

pervert, murderer, imposter, bloodthirsty, gangster, slayer, nave, criminal, butcher, stupid, killer, foolish, unscrupulous, disgraceful, dishonest, and rascal."


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Afghanistan Cant Get Nukes

Cant get nukes from Pakistan

Mueller, 10(John, professor of political science at Ohio State University, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science & Technology, Winter2010, Vol. 26, Issue 2)

The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a " loose nuke" somewhere. However, it seemsprobable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their

territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed,

finished bombs have been outfitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb

if it is tampered with . And there are other security techniques:Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts

stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes

are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, "only a few people

in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon." / There

could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse ; Pakistan is frequently

cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However,even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably

remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own

territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled.


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AT:LEVINE AND HERRIDGE 2009

The book talked about doesnt even refer to drones- it talks about

hidden enemies.

Levine and Herridge 2009,

The books also displays a deep-seated paranoia of hidden enemies,according to MEMRI. It claims that anyone from the old and infirm to the imam of amosque could be a U.S. spy." The danger of these spieslies not only in theabilityof these hidden 'brigades' to infiltrate and reach to the depths," the booksays. "They include the decrepit, hunchbacked old man who can hardly walk two steps;the strong young man who can cover the length and breadth of the land; the infirm

woman sitting in the depths of her house; the young woman whose veins still flow withyouth; and even perhaps the prepubescent adolescent who has not reached the age oflegal maturity [in Islam]." Lev, of MEMRI, said that the group's suspicions could

be used as an excuse to conduct a purge, which could further harm

the Al Qaeda's stature in Pakistan.

Obviously a purge would not affect drones if they were there, so

drones not key.


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NO LINKA Smaller Footprint can still deter. Kuwait, Iraq and Asia prove.Institute for Defense Analyses, (James S. Thomason, Project Leader,Senior Analyst,Strategy, Forces and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, Ph.D., InternationalRelations, Northwestern University, B.A., Government, Harvard College, Senior Projects

Manager, Institute for Defense Analyses, Director of consulting team to the CORM, ProfessionalStaff Member, Center for Naval Analyses, Consultant, State Department, Robert J. Atwell,Robert Bovey, William E. Cralley, James Delaney, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Kongdan Oh Hassig,Charles Hawkins, Gene Porter) July2002, Transforming US Overseas Military Presence:Evidence and Options for DoD, Volume I: Main Report

In the Southwest Asia Theater, the power projection capability that the US nowpossesses is estimated to have an even greater effect on the chance of deterrence successthan in the NEA theater. While the local military balance between the US and Kuwait vs.Iraq issubstantially in Iraqs favor (0.29:1), the overall military balance overwhelmingly favors the US andKuwait (5.97:1). Given this enormous advantage, the estimated probability of the US deterringfuture acts of aggression by the Iraqi regime is Hi even if the US were to reduce its

contribution to the local force balance by 50%or more. As in the NEA assessment, this highprobability estimated by Huths approach is primarily a function of the huge advantage that the US andKuwait possess in the overall military balance, once again illustrating the important role that Huth hasshown power projection to play in extended-immediate deterrence.


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AT: GENERIC LINKNo impact deterrence theory is non-falsifiable and counter-productive

unless applied to specific scenariosGray, Ph.D., Reading University International Politics and Strategic Studies Professor, Former

Advisor to US and British Gov't, National Institute for Public Policy Founder, Former

Reagan President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament Advisor,Former Hudson Institute and International Institute for Strategic Studies Fellow, 8/1/2003[Colin, "Maintaining Effective Deterrence,"http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=211, da: 7/26/10]

Develop a more empirical theory of deterrence. In its immediate form, deterrence isalways specific. It is about persuading a particular leader or leaders, at aparticular time, not to take particular actions. The details will be all important,not be marginal. A body ofnonspecific general theory on deterrence is likely toprove not merely unhelpful, but positively misleading. It is improbable that broadgeneral precepts from the canon lore of American Cold War deterrence theorycould yieldmuch useful advice for the guidance ofU.S. policytoday. What the United States requires

is detailed, culturally empathetic, understanding of its new adversaries. That understandingshould include some grasp of the psychology of key decisionmakers, as well as knowledge ofhow decisions tend to be made. Readers should recall the words of Keith Payne quoted earlier.He said that if we could make the convenient assumption that rationality alone fosteredreasonable behavior, then we could predict adversary behavior simply by asking ourselves

what we would deem to be reasonable were we in their circumstances. If we can predict thereasoning of our enemies reliably enough, because of the general authority of our theory ofdeterrence, the hard work of attempting to understand the opponents particular beliefs andthought can be avoided. The fact that the Cold War did not conclude with World War III is notproof that Payne is wrong. It may well be that our strategy of deterrence was not severely tried.There may never have been a moment when the Soviet leadership posed the question, Are wedeterred? Given the weight of the general stakes in the superpower contest, notwithstanding

the blessed shortage of direct issues in contention, and the transcultural grasp of the horrors ofnuclear war, it was probably the case that the success or otherwise of deterrence did not dependupon ine-grained strategic calculation or knowledge. Of course, one can write that with muchmore conidence today than one could during the decades when responsible oficials were obligedto assume that deterrence could be fragile.However, if the United States now aspires to deter the leaders of culturally mysterious andapparently roguish states, the convenient assumption that one size its all with the(American) precepts of deterrence, is likely to fail badly. It is bad news for those among us

who are not regional or local specialists, but to improve the prospects for deterrence of suchpolities as North Korea, Iran, Syria, and the rest, there is no intelligent alternative toundertaking empirical research to understand those whom we strive to inluence. It will notsufice either simply to reach for the classics of American strategic thought, or to assume that the

posing of a yet more decisive military threat must carry a message that speaks convincingly inall languages.


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AT: ResolveConventional Deterrence Fails (1/2)

Conventional deterrence fails--Motivated biases

Rhodes, Rutgers University Global Security and Democracy Center Director,2000[Edward, "CAN THE UNITED STATES DETER IRAQI AGGRESSION? THE PROBLEMS OFCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ,"

http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/rhe01/rhe01.pdf, 3/10]

* Third and most interestingly, in addition to experiencing cultural barriers to understandingand being inward-focused, potential aggressors are likely to suffer from "motivated biases" intheir evaluation of the deterrer's will or ability. That is, potential aggressors are likely toengage in pervasive wishful thinking, distorting information about the deterrer in order toavoid the stress associated with acknowledging the dangers and trade-offs actually inherent inthe situation and chosen policies. Psychological pressures to ignore warning signs will beparticularly strong during periods of internal or external crisis. Because they "need" for thedeterrer to be weak or timid for their preferred policy to work, and because the consequences oftheir preferred policy failing are too painful to bear contemplation, potential aggressors willignore or twist the available evidence to make it consistent with the image they desire.

One major study, for example, concluded that "When policy makers believed in the necessity ofchallenging commitments of their adversaries, they became predisposed to see their objectivesas attainable. They convinced themselves that they would succeed without provoking war.Because they knew the extent to which they were powerless to back down, they expected thattheir adversaries would accommodate them by doing so. Some of the policy makers involvedalso took comfort in the illusion that their country would emerge victorious at little cost to itselfif the crisis got out of hand and led to war." [Lebow (1985), 212]This inability of potential aggressors to recognize deterrent commitments -- because of cultural

barriers, the aggressor's inward focus, or its susceptibility to stress and motivated biases ininterpreting commitments -- has at least four important implications for deterrence policies.

The more the conventional deterrent, the larger risk of deterrent failure

Rhodes, Rutgers University Global Security and Democracy Center Director,2000[Edward, "CAN THE UNITED STATES DETER IRAQI AGGRESSION? THE PROBLEMS OFCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ,"http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/rhe01/rhe01.pdf, 3/10]

One additional point is worth highlighting. The historical record suggests that the willingnessof potential aggressors to launch attacks that fly in the face of the military odds may wellincrease if the odds are lengthened. When underlying political differences remain unresolved,measures by a deterrer to increase its military capacity may stimulate, rather than prevent, adeterrence failure. "If in the estimate of attackers, the long- term status quo presents anintolerable condition, they may choose to go to war regardless of the current balance of power.The impetus to go to war. . . may be the result of an assessment that the correlation of forces is

shifting even more dramatically toward the defender and, therefore, opportunities for successwill only decline." [Allan (1994), 219; see also Lebow (1985), 215]In sum, even an accurate appreciation of the fact that they will lose may not be sufficient todeter potential aggressors. Even when confronted by a deterrer with clearly superior militarycapability, and especially when the balance of power is moving against them, potentialaggressors may elect war as the only, or best, means of ending an unacceptable internationalpolitical stalemate or resolving unacceptable domestic political difficulties.


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AT: ResolveConventional Deterrence Fails (2/2)

Conventional Deterrence fails--Quick victory calculations

Rhodes, Rutgers University Global Security and Democracy Center Director,2000[Edward, "CAN THE UNITED STATES DETER IRAQI AGGRESSION? THE PROBLEMS OFCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ,"

http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/rhe01/rhe01.pdf, 3/10]

* The second conclusion regarding conventional deterrence is the importance of denyingpotential aggressors the ability to achieve a quick victory. If they are deterrable -- that is,if they are not so risk- acceptant that no deterrence is possible --potential aggressors aretypically not attracted by the promise of victory in a long war. In such a war, too much isuncertain and potential costs are too uncontrollable. For risk-averse states, a decision toundertake military aggression usually requires a perception that an option for rapid successexists. Anecessary, though not sufficient, condition for conventional deterrence to hold,therefore, is that all options for a military fait accompli , either through a decisive "blitzkrieg"or a successful war of limited aims, be foreclosed. Two key policy implications, supported bythe empirical evidence, follow:

-- The overall military balance is less relevant to deterrence than the balance of combat-capable forces in theater or immediately deployable to theater. Because potential aggressorsare unlikely to attack unless they believe they have found a way to win quickly, threats to defeatthem in a long war, however credible, are unlikely to affect their calculations.

Resolve is insufficienteven perfect resolve wont sway enemies

Rhodes, Rutgers University Global Security and Democracy Center Director,2000[Edward, "CAN THE UNITED STATES DETER IRAQI AGGRESSION? THE PROBLEMS OFCONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE ,"http://www.ciaonet.org/special_section/iraq/papers/rhe01/rhe01.pdf, 3/10]

* The first conclusion is both simple and highly cautionary: many potential adversaries are, at

least at times, undeterrable. The nature of conventional deterrence is that it will regularly fail,even in cases where commitments to respond are "clearly defined, repeatedly publicized, anddefensible, and the committed state [gives] every indication of its intention to defend them byforce if necessary." [Lebow (1985), 211] The possession of decisive conventional militarysuperiority and the visible demonstration of resolve will not necessarily permit the UnitedStates to deter attacks on friends and interests. Especially when potential aggressors definetheir situation as one in which they will experience losses unless they act, and are thus likely to

be risk-acceptant, they may fail to be swayed by what would seem to be credible threats by amilitarily superior foe. Three policy implications of this finding deserve highlighting:-- Unlike nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence does not result in a robust, stablestalemate but in a fluid and competitive strategic interaction that, at best, buys time during

which underlying disputes or antagonisms can be resolved.

-- Over the long run, in the absence of political resolution of conflicts, upholding internationalcommitments is likely to require war, either because conventional deterrence has failed orbecause war is necessary to establish or re- establish the conditions required for conventionaldeterrence to operate.


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CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY TURN - PROLIFERATIONConventional superiority leads to proliferation nuclear deterrence solves

Gerson, CFR Senior Fellow, 2009[Michael, Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Parameters,http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09autumn/gerson.pdf, 1/31]

The emphasis on conventional capabilities in Americas deterrence strategy has to carefullybalance the benefits with potential risks. Most im-portantly, efforts to capitalize on andoperationalize conventional contribu-tions to deterrence may in fact create or strengthenincentives for nuclear proliferation. One of the primary motivations for a nation to seek nucle-ar weapons vis-a-vis the United States is to deter Americas conventional, rather than nuclear,capability. For some regimes, nuclear weapons are an attractive means to offset USconventional superiority and deter interven-tion in regional conflicts.52 In this context, nuclearproliferation is an asym-metric response to US conventional superiority.This incentive for nuclear acquisition underscores the continued necessity of nuclear deterrenceas long as nuclear weapons exist. As the United States seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear

weapons by strengthen-ing conventional forces, it has to also work to offset the asymmetric op-tions used to balance against its conventional power. Consequently, as the United Statesexpands the role of conventional capabilities in deterrence, a credible nuclear deterrent is stillrequired, at least for the foreseeable fu-ture, to help convince current and potential adversariesthat nuclear weap-ons are not an effective tool to restore freedom-of-action or gain coerciveleverage over its neighbors or the United States.

Proliferation causes extinction.Taylor -02[Stuart Taylor, Senior Writer with the National Journal and editor at Newsweek, Legal Times, 9-16-2002]The truth is, no matter what we do about Iraq, if we don't stop proliferation, another five or 10 potentiallyunstable nations may go nuclear before long, making it ever more likely that one or more bombs

will be set off anonymously on our soil by terrorists or a terrorist government. Even an airtight missile defensewould be useless against a nuke hidden in a truck, a shipping container, or a boat. [Continues] Unless we get serious about

stopping proliferation,we are headed for "a world filled with nuclear-weapons states, where every

crisis threatens to go nuclear," where "the survival of civilization truly is in question from day today," and where "it would be impossible to keep these weapons out of the hands of terrorists, religious cults, and criminalorganizations." So writes Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., a moderate Republican who served as a career arms-controller under sixpresidents and led the successful Clinton administration effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The only way to avoidsuch a grim future, he suggests in his memoir, Disarmament Sketches, is for the United States to lead an international coalitionagainst proliferation by showing an unprecedented willingness to give up the vast majority of our own nuclear weapons, exceptingonly those necessary to deter nuclear attack by others.

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