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Trustees of Princeton University
Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence
Authors(s): Robert Jervis
Source: World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jan., 1989), pp. 183-207
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010407
Accessed: 28-03-2016 10:40 UTC
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RATONALDETERRENCE
Theoryand Evdence
By ROBERTJERVS*
AMONGt h e mot mport an t q u e t on n o c a c e n ce are t he
c au e an d e f fe c t of t h re a t an d f orc e n n te rnat on ap o t c w e
arepartcuary nteretednwhenthreatprotectthe tateandwhen by
c ont ra t t h e y e t of f a p ra of c oun te rth rea t t h at e av e b ot h d e w ore
offthantheywoud havebeenhadthe tateadoptedanaternatvepo
cy2Schoar andtatemenwoud fndtheprobemea y ftheeffect
w ere n v arant e f ap rop ery c on t ru ct e d p o c y of t hre at aw ayp ro
tectedthe tatea tmghthaveprotectedBrtan andFrance nthe
930 orf t h re a t aw ay p rov e dn e ff e ct v e orp rovo c at v e a mayh av e
beentheca ebeforeWordWar 3But nfactboththreat andconc a-
toncanproducetheveryconequencetheywerede gnedtoavod
Of e c onc e rn t o t a te me n t han t o c h o ar are met h od oog c ad e
bateoverthereatve advantageofdeductonand nducton4andthe
me rt of t h e orzn gb ae d on t h e a umpt on t h at a c to r b e hav orc an b e
* am gratefu to Davd Badwn Heen M ner Kenneth Oye Robert Shapro and Jack
Snyderforcomment andugget on
For an assessment of the relevant evidence from outside international politics considered
wth n the frameworks deveoped by studes of nternatona deterrence see Pau Stern et a
eds PerspectvesonDeterrenceNew YorkOxfordUnverstyPressforthcomng
2 For an extended dscusson see Robert Jervs Percepton and Mspercepton n nternatona
Politics (Princeton Princeton University Press, I976), chap 3 Also see Aaron Wildavsky,
Practca Consequences of the Theoretca Study of Defense Po cy Pub c Admnstrat on
Review 25 (March i965), 90-I03 For a recent summary of the evidence, see Martin Patchen,
Resovng D sputes Between Natons Coercon or Conc aton? Durham NC Duke Unversty
Press 988 A comp catng factor s that many abstract and seemngy hstor ca or scentf c
arguments are drven by po tca preferences because debates about deterrence are centra to
Amercan foregn po cy Thus many dsagreements about the org ns of Word Wars and
orKhrushchevsratona tyn puttngmss es nCubaarenotpurey academc
3 These cases are more comp cated than the stereotypes commony used by po tca sc-
entsts See Robert Jervs War and Mspercepton Journa of nterdscp nary Hstory 8
(Spring 1988), 685-88 Patrick Glynn, The Sarajevo Fallacy, National Interest, No 9 (Fall
987 3-32 Rchard Ned Lebow and Jance Gross Sten Beyond Deterrence Journa of So-
c a u e 4 3 N o 4 9 88 3 3- 35 -
4 See for exampe Oran R Young Professor Russett ndustrous Taor to a Naked Em-
peror Word Pot cs 2 Apr 969 486-5 Bruce Russett The Young Scence of nter-
natona Po tcs Word Pot cs 22 October 969 87-94 K aus Knorr and James Rosenau
eds Contendng Approaches to nternatona Po tcs Pr nceton Prnceton Unversty Press
9 6 9 e s p M a r onLev y Jr Do es tM a t te r f He s N a ked ?Bawed theCh d
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184WORLDPOLTCS
bet nterpreteda thoughtheywereeekngtomaxm zether ubectve
e x pe c te d u t t e S EU 5n t he e d e b a te of c oure mu ch d e p en d on
w h et h erap art c u armet h od d e nt f e d a on e of e v era t h at are u e fu
ora theonyu efumethodFurthermorea ChrtopherAchenand
DuncanSnda note6method dffern therut tydependngon the
p e c f c q ue t on b e n g ak e d and t h e p art of t he c e n t f c p roc e u n de r
c on d e ra t on M ot obv ouy w t h ou t c a e t u d e w e c an h av e n o e v
d e nc e E v en f d e du c t ve mod e are p ar mon ou rg orou an dp roduc e
f a c n at n gp rop o t on t h eyw re man t t e more t h an t oyun e t h ey
canbeverfed
Wh en c on d e rn g SEU w e mu t re membert h at th e u t t e an d e x
pectedconequence ofaternatvepo ce areexogenou BeforeSEUcan
t e u mu ch t h e n w e h av e to t e t ag re a t d ea We mu t f orn t an ce
p e c fyw h at t u at on t h e a ct o rt h nk h e f ac ng h ow h e ran k h
g o a w hat op t on h e p e rc e v e an dh ow h e t h n k ot h er are k e y t o
reactCae tude havedevotedmuchefforttodetermnng thetate
man b e e f ab ou t h e nv ron me n t an d ad ve rare an dh ow an dw hy
heformedthem a we a to dentfyngcommonerror ofprocedure
andubtance
Thechocebetweenthedeductveapproachandonethatbud on
c a e t u d e n v ove a t rade of f b e tw e en rg oran d rc h ne Ad e du c t ve
t h eorymu t m manyf ac et of an yn dvdu ac a e t h e t u dy of a t he
c omp e x t e of an yp e c f c e x amp e w f a h ort on g e ne ra z a t on and
p e rh ap on t h e c on f d en c e w t h wh c h c au are a t on h p c an b e e t ab
h e dn p art t h e c h o c e amat te rof n dvdu at a t e B u t t may a o
refecta udgmentoran ntuton abouthowreguartheword
5Goodrevew oftheek nd oftheore arePauSchoemaker TheExpectedUt ty
M ode t V arant P u rp o e E vd en c e andLmt at on Journ aof E c on omc L t era tu re 20
June982 529-63andMarkMachna ChoceUnderUncertantyProbem Sovedand
U n ov e d E c on omc P erp e c t ve S umme r987 2 54D e b at e ab ou t th ap pro ac h are
n o t un qu e t op o t c a c e n ce n an th rop oogy t h e argumen t on e d f ore x amp e byM ar
h aS ah n S t on e Ag e Ec onomc Ne w York Adn e 1972 an dMarvn H arr C u t ura
Matera m TheStruggeforaSc enceofCutureNewYorkRandomHoue 979 Arecent
ummary of t he argume nt b e tw e en py c h oog t an d e con om t n t h e a t t er ow n f e d c an
b e f ound n t h e p e c a u e of The Jou rn aof B u n e 59Oc t ob e r986 F ort he argume nt
n o c o ogy e e P auH rc h S t uart M c hae an dRayF re dman D rt yH an d V eru
CeanMode Socoogy nDangerofBengSeducedbyEconomc? TheoryandSocety
6 M ay 987 37-36A o e e M ark Grav ove t te r E c on omc A ct on an d S oc a S t ru c tu re
Th e P rob e mof n d e b te dne Amerc an Journ aof S o c o ogy 9 Nove mbe r985 485 0
A o e e B ran B arry S o c o og t E c on omt an dD emocracyC h c ag oU n v e rt y of C h
c agoP re 1978 F ort he p u rpo e of t h art c e w e q uat e rat on at yw t h probab t y
u t t y c a c u u a m o t a ut ho r d o b ut t h g o e o v e r th e qu e t o n of w he th er t a w ay
ra t ona t o c hoo e by t h c rt eron D on g o f ore xamp e c ou dme an foow n g a p o c y t h at
e n ta e d ome c han ce of e n ormou o an dw e mght n o t w an t t o ay t h at ap e ron w hoc h o e
a af erp o c yw t h aow e re x pe c te d u t t yw a v o a t n g t h e t en e t of a ra t ona mode
6AchenandSnda RatonaDeterrenceTheoryandComparatveCaeStude Word
P o t c 4 Janu ary 989 156-59
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS185
whetherthephenomenawearemot ntereted nmoreco eyre embe
c ou d orc o c k 7Sm ary e mpoyngSEU t he ore mp e t h at t h ere
me th odn w h at e e m k e madn e t h o e w hore e c t t h ap p roa c h
oftenhavea verydfferent eneofthepatternof humanbehavor
t of te n a d t h at ca e t u d e are a t he ore t c a n t h at t h ey c an no t g e n
eratenewandpowerfu dea Th gve thembothtoomuchandtoo
t t e c re d t 8On t he on e h an d t h e mp c at on t h at t h e c h o aro ok at
theevdencewthoutanypreconceptonandexpectaton thatcoudd
t ort h e rf n dn g B u t of cou re t h c ann o t be w t h ou t p rev ou yf orme d
d e a n oone c ou dmake an y e n e of t h e w ordOn t h e o t he rh and f n d
n g c au a n k n on e c a e o r t ob e more a c c ura te t h n k ngon e h a
foundthem notony eadto theexpectatonthattheymaybeoperatng
nothercae butcangeneratenewpropo ton aboutforexampe the
othercondton thatmghtproducethe ameeffectorthea ternatve
conequence ofthendependentvarabe underd fferentcrcumtance
The nebetweennductonanddeducton oftenb urredtheunder
t andn gp rodu ce d by c a e t u d e e ad t o c on d t ona an dp rob ab t c
deducton abouthowtatemenareexpectedtobehave
Th e e u b e c t are ob v ouy t oo arge an d c omp e x t ob e f uy c ov ere d
h e re omyt re at men t w b e e e c t ve Af t e rmak n g ome d t n c t on
w k e tc h t he mp edme nt t od e ve opn g an e x pe ct e d u t t ymod e of
d e te rre n ce an d t he n t urn t o t he u e of c a e t u d e f rt o ok ng at t h e
b a e n c a e e e c t on an d t he n d c u n gw hat h ab e e n e arne dby
tudyngdeterrencefa ure Thecentra quetonhere whetherthee
f n dn g c an b e e x p an edby ara t on at h e ory S ome of t he mc an be a
though uchatheorywoudbequted fferentfromourtandardmode
of deterrenceOther arencompatbew thevenareformuatedSEUthe
ory
DEBATESANDDSTNCTONS
Thedebate mentoned ntheprevou paragraphoverapon y n
partFr t deductvetheorzngandexpectedut tymode arenotnec
7S ee G ab re Amon d and S t eph en G e nc o C ou d C o c k an d t he S t udy of P o t c
WordP o t c 29Juy 977 489-522 an dAb ert H rc h man Th e S e arc h f orP arad gm a
aH n dran ce t oP o t c a U nd e rt an dn g WordP o t c 22Apr 970 329-43
8F org oodd c u on e e H arryE ck t e n C ae S t udy an dThe ory n P o t c aS c e n ce
n F redGre en t e n an dNe on P o by e d H andb ook of P o t c a S c e nc e V o 7 Re adn g
MA Addon We e y 97579-37 A e x an d erL G e org e andTmot hyM c Keow n C ae
Stude andTheore ofOrganzatonaDec onMakng nRobertCouamandRchard
Smt h e d Advan ce n n f ormat on P roc e n gn Org an zat on V o 2 Gree nw c h C T JA
P re 985 21-58D on adC ampb e D e gre e of F re ed oman d t he C ae S t u dy C omp ar
t v e P o t c a S t ud e 8 J u y 9 75 7 8- 93
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186WORLDPOLTCS
e ary t h e ame Th e a t te rc an b e app e d t op art c u arc a e w t h ou t
attemptngtogeneratenewpropot on ndeed muchofh toryand
o t c a c e nc e co n t o f n fo rm a a n a y a o ng t he e n e S c ho a r
of te n e e k t oun de rt and t h e g oa b e e f an dp erc ep t on of d e c on
mak er t hat c an mak e t he rp o c e n t e gb e a t h ough app e d t o an y
n g e c a e t h e e xp an at on mu t re man adh oc an dp o t h o c Th u
muchoftheearchforanexpanatonof whyKhruhchevputm e
ntoCubaha nvovedtryngtod coverwhetherhefet thattherewere
g re at g a n t o b e m ad e o r o e t o b e a vo d ed b y d o n g o t hu u t f y ng
c on d e rab e r k orw h et h erh e b e e v e d t hat h ac t on w ere n o t p art c
u ary r k y e t h erb e c au e t h e U n t ed S t a te w ou d acq u e c e o rb e cau e
h e w ou db e ab e t o c on tro an yd ang e rt h at mght ar e
Th e o th e r d e of t h c on t hat d e du c t ve t h eorzn gn e edn o t a ume
rat ona t y on t he p art of a ct o r M ot t h eore n py c h oogy are of t h
t ype F ore x amp e c ogn t v e d on an c e w h c h p o t t h at p e op e e e k t o
reducepychoogca confctaftertheyhavefreeymadean mportant
d e c on e ad t oman y count e rnt u t v e p rop o t on Th e a tt emp t t o
mod e b e e f y t e mof p e op e n g e n era p e op e of a c e rt an k n d orp ar
t c u arn dvdu a a of t n t o th e c a te g ory of d e du c t ve b u t non rat ona
t h e ore 9
Secondone houdnotequateexpectedut tyargument wththe
c amt h at a p e op e w b e hav e t he ame w ayn t h e ame t u at on t h at
w t h argume nt t hat gn ore th e n dvdu a e v e of an ay f e a ch p e r
on rat ona b u t ha d f f ere nt v au e an dmean e nd b e e f t he n b e
h av orw b e d o yn cra t c Th u e x p ec t ed u t t y t he ore are n o t n ec e
ar yp armon ou t oy e dp re d c t on ore x p anat on t h e y oft e n
re qu re ag re at d e aof n format on ab ou t p art c u arn dvdu a an d t
u a t on B y c on tra t p rev a e nt rrat on at e c an produ c e t rong an d m
pe pattern
Th rd t h e re n o mp e re a t on h pb e t we e n me t hod oog ca an d
u b ta nt v e ar gu me nt T h t ru e n t wo e n e F r t t he re n o n ev
tabeconnectonbetweenanSEUtheoryandonethattre e theueand
e ff c a cy of t h rea t E c on omc t h rv e on SEU mode C onv e re y a t he ory
of d e t erren c e ne edn o t a ume rat on at y n d ee d t q u t e p o b e t h at
threat woudhavebeenchaengedmuchmorefrequentywere tate
me n fuy rat ona Th e o th e rc ap ab t y an d c re d b t ymayb e ov e r
e t mat edw t h out w arran t n p art b e cau e of t h e f ac t or d c u e d b e ow
thatunderothercrcumtancecanundermnedeterrence Furthermore
9See forexampethepathbreakng tudybyRobertAbe onandM tonRoenberg
Symbo c Py c h oog c B e hav oraS c e n ce 3 Janu ary 958 1-13 Art f c a n te g e nc e
m od e a re n t h t ra d t o n
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS187
n ome c a e a ma c h an c e th at an a e rt v e p o c y c ou d e ad t owar
mayd et e re v en t h ou gh u c h c au t on n o t ea y q u are dw t h t he re t of
t h e t a te v au e an db e hav or n d ee d t of te n argu e dn c orrec t y
b e e v e o t h at n u c e ard e t erren c e of at t ac k on a t a te a e k n ow n a
extendeddeterrence ncompatbe wthfu ratonaty Second a
t h ou gh th e u e of c a e t u dyme t hod oogymay c a ra t ona t he ore n t o
qu e t on t h n o t aw ay t he c a e n d ee d e v eraof A e x an de rG e org e
andRchardSmoke fndng partcuarythatdeterrencecanfa when
c h ae n g er are ab e t od e gn aroun d t hre at t ou e f a t a c c omp h ort o
exertcontroedpre urecanbe fodedntoa uffcentycompexra-
tonatheory
Fn ay w e mu t n o t e qu a te f au re of ad e te rre nc e p o c yw t h f au re
ofdeterrencetheory12Mot obvou y thefaureof adeterrentthatwa
badyde gnedormp ementedwoudnotfa fythetheory athought
woudra ethequeton ofwhythetateproduced ucha uboptma
p o c y F u rt h ermore a t a te c an ra t on ay c h oo e t of gh t aw art t h n k
t w prob aby o e f t he g an of w n n n g and/ort h e c o t of a t e rn at v e
p o c e are g re a t en ough 3Sm ary d e te rre nc e u c c e e d on o t con f rm
thetheory ftheyoccurundercrcumtance nwhchthetheorynd
c at e t h ey h ou d f a 4 P a ra e r ea o n n g h ow t ha t u c ce f u p o c e
arenotnecear ytheproductofratona procee norcantheyaway
b e a c cou nt e d forby rat ona t he ore f au re m aryd on o t p rov e r
r at o na t y T o t a ke u t t he m p e t c a e w d g a mb e o me t me p ay
of f an dp o c e t h at are op t ma c an p rov e d a t rou n an yp art c u ar
cae
RATONAL DETERRENCETHEORES
Th e f rt t ep n u dgn g t h e v ad t y of ra t ona d e te rre n ce t h eoryRD T
t o e t abh w he t he rt n te n de d t ob e d e c rp t ve p re c rp t v e or
b o th 5 f p re c rp t v e t ayw h at a ct o r h ou dd o t omaxmze t h e r
o Se eRo b er tJ erv s De te r renceTheo ry Rev s t ed Wo rd Po t c s 3 J a nua ry 9 7 9 2 9 9-
30 an dThe og c of Amerc an Nuc e arS t ra t egy t h ac aNY C orn e U n v er t yP re 984
AexanderL GeorgeandRchardSmokeDeterrencen AmercanForegnPocy New
Y ork C oumb aU n v e rt yP re 974 59-33A A c he n and Sn d a f n 6 n o te h owe v er
theepropo ton werereachednductvey
12F orf urt he rd c u on e e A ch e n an d Sn d a f n 6 52Rc h ardNedL e b ow D e
t e rre nc e AP o t c a an dPy c h oog c aC rt q u e n S t ern f n Ge org e Que t e r S ome
Thought onDeterrenceFaure bd
3 J er v f n 3 6 77 -7 9-
14Forfurtherd cu on eeGeorgeandSmoke DeterrenceandForegnPo cy Word
P o t c 41Jan uary 989170-82
15A c he n an d Sn d a a e rt on t h at RD Th a n f u en c ed p o c y t h e n mpe t hat t c ou dn o t
p r ev o us y exp a nt A chena nd Snd a fn 6 1 5 3 Fo r a d s cuss o no fthe a t e rna tvep ur -
po e of S EU mod e e e S ch o emake rf n 5 538-4
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188WORLDPOLTCS
t t y bu t t h ayn o t h n g abou t h ow t h ey ac t uay b e hav e n mc ro
economc SEUtheore canbebothdecrptve andprecrptvebecaue
oftheargumentthatonythoe whobehaven accordancewththemcan
f ou rh n n t e rnat ona p o t c t h e argume n t e v en e c onvn c n gb e
c au e t h e n umbe rof act o r mu ch mae r t hu dmn h n g t h e p ow er
of t he e v ou t onary og c 6 n d ee dman yRDTw rt n g are c e arymean t
t on f u e nc e t a t e me n w h c h mpe t h at t h e rb e hav ord o e n o t ora t
e a t d d n o t fo ow t he p re c rp t on 7 Th e ca e t u dy t e ra t ure by
c ont ra t e x p c t yd e c rp t v e an d e xp an atorybu t u u ay mpe t h at
betterreu t woudhavefo owedf tatemenhadbehaveddfferenty
n de e d a w e h a e e b e ow t of te n argu e t h at d et e rre nc e w ore a
precrptonthana decrpton manym fortune areattrbutedto
t a te me n f oow n g ap art c u arv e ron of t
A re a t ed ambgu t y t he e v e a t w h c h RDTapp e d o e t d e aw t h
natonabehavor nternatonaoutcome orboth?f theformer what
a umpt on are t h e a c to r mak ng ab out h ow t he o t h erw re ac t ? n
ome c a e e ff e ct v e b e hav or p rem e d on t he ad v erarymak n g an
error fnotbehavngrratona y SEUandgametheorymaybecompat
b e b u t th e y are n o t d e nt c a Tu rn n g t oou tc ome t c e art hat w h at
ra t ona f ort he n dvdu a mayb e b ad f ort he c o e c t v e t h e P ron e r
Demmafurtherhow thatftwopeope areratona theycaneachbe
woreoffthantheywoudhavebeenhadbothbeen rratona fboth
de actonRDT w eachbebetteroffthanf thadbehavedd fferenty?
n d ee d b e c au e t d e a w t h t ra t eg c n t era ct on RD Tmayn ot b e ab e
topredctexactyhowa tatehoud behaveorwhat nternatonaout
c ome ac t on w produ ce t t h en h ard tod e v e op v e rf ab e p ropo
t on f romt h e t he ore E c on omt h ave n o t b ee n ab e t omode t h e b e
h av orof o g opo t n eary a d e te rmn t c a y a t h eyh av e t hat of t he
wheatfarmerfacngamarkethecannot nfuence ThegameofChcken
6B u t e e Ke n ne th Wat zTh e ory of n t e rnat ona P o t c Re adn gMA Addon We e y
979Th e ap p c a t on of t he d e aof ev ou t onarydyn amc n ot e nt re y t raght forward
Trat w t h u rvv av au e d on o t au tomat c ay ap pe art h ey c an u rvv e e v en f t h ey ac k u c h
vaue Agreatdeadepend ontheharhne oftheenvronmentandthecompetton For
g oodd c u on of e v ou t on and SEU mode e e Rc h ardNe on an d Sydn e yWn te rAn
EvoutonaryTheoryofEconomcChangeCambrdgeHarvardUnvertyPre 982 and
TmothyMcKeown TheLmtaton ofStructura Theore ofCommerca Pocy nter
n at ona Organ za t on 40W n te r986 52-55
17Wh et h erp re c rp t v e d e c rp t v e orb o t h t of te n unc e arw he t he rt h e c am t h at
t h e po c y an ap propra t e w ay t ore a ch t h e p eron g o a ort h e be t w ay t od o oTh e a t te r
an d t ron g erc am obv ouy e x t re me ydf f c u t t ov erf y n c e d ong ore q u re c omparn g
t he re u t of t he p o c yw t h t ho e mput ed t o a t e rnat v e n on e v er on t ho e p o c e t h e
peronthoughtofand nanotherver ona thoethatcoudhavebeenadopted A trct nter
p ret a t on of S EU w oud mpy t h at t h e p o c y t h e be t on e mot t e t n o c a c e n ce more
modety eektodemontratethatthepocy adequateforthegoa
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS189
d o e n o t h av e ad e te rmn an t ou t on n man y t u at on g ame t h eory
precrbe am xedorrandomzedtrategyOfcoure gametheoryye d
greatn ght ntohowactortrytoout thnkandoutbuffeachother
butthecompettveandvarab e umnatureofthe tuatonmeanthat
choar cannotproducedeductonon themode n tuatonXtheac
t o raw ay h ou d orw doY We c an t ry t oh ow t h at t h e a ct o rc a
c u a t on are c on t e nt w t h d e te rre n ce b u t th re qu re o ok ng n to t h e
b a c k b ox of de c on mak ng8
A t t h p on t h ow ev e rt h e g re a te t d f f c u t y n a e n gRD T d e te r
mn n g e x ac t yw h at t A A c he n and Sn d an o t e t h e g en e ra a ump
t on of S EU c an y e d an e n ormoun umbe rof u b t an t v e t he ore Th ere
thennooneRDT onecanarguethatthereareat eata manytheore
a thereareauthor orthattherearenotheore becauenooneha de
v e ope d on e w t h u f f c e nt rg orA c h e n and Sn d a b re f u b t an t v e
d c u on of d et e rre nc e u t ra te t h e prob e m9Wh e t t rue t h at
omeratona deterrencetheort havepontedto thenegatveapectof
d e fe n v e y t e m u c h ac v d e fe n e t he AB M an d SD o t he rre e c t
t h p o t on argun g t h at u n e t h e Un t e d S ta t e re t an ome ab t y t o
p rot ec t t e f t t hre at w ac k c re d b t y 20The d ag re eme nt p art y
rooted ndfference aboutthepoturethat betfora country kethe
U n t ed S t a te t h at n e ed t op rot e ct n o t on y t h ome an dbut a o t a
e t a o c a u ed b y d c r ep an t v ew o f t h e go a a nd b e e f o f t he
SovetUnonqueton that eout deageneratheoryofdeterrence
B ut w h at mport an t n t h c ont e xt t h at b o t h pon t of v e w c an be
mod e e d a RD TS
Th ambgutymake thetheoryextremeyhardtod confrmAre
wetocounttheReaganadmn traton advocacyofSD a evdence
g an t t he v ad t y of ra t on ad e t erren c e? t he f a c t f t af a c t th at
theSovetUnondoe notapprecatethevrtue ofmutuavunerab ty
evdencethatthearm anddoctrneofat eatoneof theuperpower
cannotbeexpanedby th theory? RDTconfrmedbythefactthatthe
Ru an w t h drew t h e rm e f romC ub aord c onf rmedb e c au e
theydepoyedthem nthefr tpaceand wereabetoexact ome
c onc e on f romt h e Un t e d S ta t e a t h e prc e f orw t h drawa?
18A good ummary of re ev ant t e ra t ure Robe rt W on D et e rre nc e n O gopo t c
C omp e t t on n S t ern e t a e d f n
9A ch e n and Sn d a f n 6 153
20S e e f ore xamp e Ab e rt Woh t e tt e r Sw ordW t hou t Sh e d Nat ona n t ere t No
8 S umme r987 3 57C o n GrayNu c e arS t rat egy an dNat on aS t y e L an hamMD
H amt on P re 986P art of t h e ex p an at on f ort h d pu te ad ag re e me nt on w h et he r
d ec o n m ak er f oc u o n r e at v e or a b o u te g a n a n d o e S ee J er v f n O 9 84 5 9- 63
ArthurSten Demma ofnterdependenceLogc ofnternatonaConfct andCooperaton
forthcomng
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190WORLDPOLTCS
EMPRCALCRT CSMSANDSECONDWAVEDETERRENCETHEORY
Weneedtod tngu hbetweentheknd ofRDTthatcoudbedeve
opedandthoethathavebeenmotthoroughy d cu edSomeofthe
c rt c m rae d by e mprc a t u d e 2are ame d at t h e f ormerman y
howeverarea medattheatter Thebetknownandbet deveoped
RDTknowna ca ca or econdwave deterrencetheory22
make an umbe rof re t rc t v e aump t on un re a te d t ora t on at y Th e e
n c u de t h e t a te ad ve rary h gh ymot v at e d to e x p an d t h e ad ve rary
un de rt and t h at t h e t a t e d e fe n v e an d t he e ade ron b o t h d e are
c onc e rn e dman yw t h t he e x t ern a t u at on Th p art y e x p an w h y
th e f oc u on t hre at an d o t t e ro e f ore e e n f or n duc e me n t M an y
f n dn g c on trad c t th e e au x ary a umpt on bu t cou db e a c commo
datedbya broaderRDT Thu RchardNedLebowandJanceStenhave
demontratedthat tatemenmayadoptdeterrencepoc e thatarenot
n t h e n at on a n t ere t b e c au e t h e y are a c t n g on t he b a of t he rd o
me t c orp e ron a n t ere t F ore xamp e on e re aon w hyNe hruman
tanedthe forwardpo cy n962agan tcredbe threat byChnato
t ake d pu te d t errt oryw a t h at h e h ad t ak edh d ome t c p o t c af or
t u ne on t an dn gf rm23Wh e t h k n d of b e hav ord o e n o t f t t h e
ec ondw av e mod e an d k e y t on c rea e c on f c t t he re n o th n g
n ec e ar y rra t on a ab out t a t hou gh a w e w n ote b e ow dome t c
p re u re of t e n e ad t o e v e re yb a e dn f ormat on pro ce n g
Sm ary ara t on at h eory c an e a y n c orp ora te a e c on d f n dn gby
t h e emprc a c rt c t a te may c re a te a c on front a t on org o t ow arn o t
n t h e h op e of mak ngp o t v e g an bu t n ord ert o av od t h e o e t h at
are f ore e e n un e t h eyd oSO24E x pe c te d u t t y t he ore of w ar are
omet me ummarze d a a e rt ng t h at t a t e w f gh t on yf t h e e x
p e ct e d g an are g rea t ert h an th e e xp e ct ed c o t e t h at t h e t a t e w n ot
f gh t f t t h n k t h e re u t w b e w ore t han t h e t a tu q u oB u t t h
an e rrort h e re n ore aon w hy t h e t a t e h ou db e e v e t h at af u t ure
21Forc onv e n en c e w t rea t t he e e mprc a t u d e a t hou gh t h e met h od an d re u t
w e re e n t re y c omp at b e w t h e ac h o th e rw h c h n ot th e c a e
2 2 F or a d c u o n o f th e e co nd w av e e e Je rv f n 0 9 79 2 9 3 0 t h o u d a o b e
n o te d t h at w h e t h e e w rt n g are g e n eray c a e d a t h e ory t h e yd on ot me et t rc t c rt era
f ort h d e gn at on
23SeeRchardNedLebowBetweenPeaceandWarBa tmore MDTheJohn Hopkn
U n v er t yP re 98 Robe rt Jerv Rc h ardNe dL eb ow an dJan c e Gro S t e n Py c h o
ogy andD e te rre n ce B at more MD Th e Joh n H opk n U n v e rt yP re 985L e b ow and
S t e n f n 3 amu n g t he Ne hru c a e d raw n f romRc h ardNedL e bow an dNev e M ax
w e n d a C h na W a r N ew Y or k P a nt he on 9 7 0 a a t y z ed u t r at o n a nd a m g n or
n g t he c omp ex t e an d ambgu t e
24F ora marargumen t e e Ph p Te t o c Te t n gD e te rre nc e Th eory S ome Con ce p
t u a a n d Me th od o og c a u e J ou rn a o f S oc a u e 4 3 N o 4 9 87 8 5- 92
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS191
w t hou t aw arw b e k e t he t a tu q u of t e x pe c t t h e f ut u re t ob e
b e tt er t c an ra t on ay e e k to av od aw art h at t t h n k w oudy e d g
n f c an t b en e f t f t e x pe c t t h e t a t u q u o t od e te rorat e b ady t c an
ra t ona yun de rtak e aw arwh oe e x p ec t ed u t t y mu ch e t h an ze ro
TheJapanee dec ontoattackPearHarborandtheGermandec on
t og o t ow arn 94may e x e mpf y t h t ype a t h ough w e h ou dn o t e
ag an t hat t h a ume t h e a ct o rp rob ab t y an du t t y e t mat e w h c h
nretropectmayappeartobe bzarre
Butathoughratonatyneednotbe nquet onherethe tandardfor
mu at on of d e t erren ce are Wh e n th e o e t h at t h e t a t e f ear t em
f romt h e ad ve rary t h re a t an dh o t t y n d c at n g t h e p re e n ce of a p
rap ro c e f u rt h ert h rea t f romt he a t te rw rare y re d uc e t he c onf c t
Th u w h e an SEU mode c ou db e app rop ra t e t h e u e of e c on dw ave
deterrenceprecrpton woudnot nfactmaxmze ut ty25
Ne ve rth e e on e p art c u arapp c a t on of t h e d e a t hat t a t e c ou d ra -
tona yfghtbecaue theyfearedadeteroratonofthe tatuquo fthey
ddn o t t and a a c e nt ra n gh t of e c on dw ave t h eort Th ey t re e d
t h e p rob e mof c r n t ab t y e t h e dan ge rt h at on e d e w ou d
au nc h af r t t rk e n o t b ec au e t w a aggre v e orb e e v e d th at w ar
w ap re f erab e t op ea c e b u t b ec au e t w a u re t hat t he o t h er d e w a
abouttoattackandbe evedthat trkngf rt wa betterthantr kng
econd26Secondwavetheor t coudhavebroadenedth n ghtntoa
genera argumenta tatedefendngthetatu quomut rea urethe
c h ae n ge rt h at t w n g t ore p ec t t he a t t e rv t a n t ere t e n u re
t h at t h e adv e raryd o e n o t e e t a ag gre v e an dmn mze t h e e cu rt y
d e mma e mn mze t h e e x te n t tow h c h t he a c t on t h e t a t e t ak e t o
n cre a e t e c urt yd e cre a e t h e adv e rary e cu rt y 27That e c ondw av e
t he ort d dn o t d oo a t trb u tab e e t o t he rg e n era t h e ore of n
ternatona pot c thantotherbe efthattheSovetUnonundertood
thatAmercanm taryadvantagewoudonybeu edtoenhancedeter
rencenotto undermneSovet ecurty
25For this reason, Lebow and Stein argue that the resulting theory would not be one of
deterrence Rational Deterrence Theory I Think, Therefore I Deter, World Politics 4I
J a nua ry 9 8 9 2 1 2- 1 4A s o s e eG eo rg e a nd Smokefn 1 4 8 - 8 2
26 The classic statements are Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, Foreign
Affairs 37 (January I959), 2II-34, and Thomas Schelling, The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise
Attack, in Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge Harvard University Press, I 960), chap
9 Many previous wars developed because decision makers believed that the c hoice was be-
tween war now and war later Warner Schilling et al, American Arms and a Changing Eu-
rope (New York: Columbia University Press, I973), I72-74. For an argument that the main
danger of such dynamics today is largely psychological, see Robert Jervis, Implications of the
Nucear Revouton thaca, NY Corne Unversty Press, forthcomng , chap 5
27 Indeed these points follow from a full SEU model see John Mueller, Retreatfrom Dooms-
day The Obsoescence of Maor War New York Basc Books forthcomng
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192WORLDPOLTCS
An ot he rf n dn g t rou b e ome n ot on yf ort h e e c on dw ave b u t ao
formanyotherdeterrencetheore eventhoughratonaty agannot
a t u e Th e n ee d f oran dp o b t e of d e te rre nc e n p e rph era are a
dependn partoncommtment beng eena nterdependentThat
theUntedState cancredbythreatentore thot emove anywhere
becauetorefranfromdong owoud undermnecommtment
throughoutthegobeBut tappearthatother donotpercevecommt
menta otghty nkedandthattheoutcome ofconfrontatonare de
t e rmn e d t o ag rea t ere x t en t by e ac h d e n t rn c n t ere t n t h e u e a t
t ake Th e re u t c an b e mod e e dn t e rmof SEU bu t many of t h e e xt en
on of d e t erren ce t h eory t oow -e ve c onf c t w h ave t ob e modf e d
Toreturntotheframeworkeaborated ntheopenngparagraph
econdwavetheort wereamot excu veyworredthatdeterrence
w ou d f a b e cau e a t a tu q u op ow er ac ke d t he t ren g th k orre ov e
to re t o r e v en more k e y t h at an e x pan on t w ou dn c orre c t y b e
e v e th at th e t a t u q u op owe rw aw e ak n an y of t h e e w ay p art c u
ary t he a t n ame dTh eort w e re n o t c on ce rne d t hat p ra of h o t t y
andthreatperceptoncouddeveopoutoftheunntendedconequence
of e a ch d e b e hav orAg an t he re aon q u t e t ragh tf orw ard S ov e t
expanon mwa takenforgranted
t ofcoure perfecty egtmatefora theoryofdeterrencetotake
h o t t y a agv e n An y t h eoryh at o t art omew h ere an dp o c yb ae d
on e c on dw av e t he orymayb e w e d e gn e d t od ea w t h c e rt an k n d
of e xp an on t t a te B u t RDT h ave n od agn o t c t he y ayn o t h n g
abouthowtatemenaretodetermneother ntenton28 andcae tud
e re ve a t h at f t h e o t he r d e e e k man y e c urt y d e te rre nc e c an fa
throughthedeveopmentofconfct pra 29Secondwavetheorymay
t he n p rovd e ag oodd e c rp t on of Ame rcan p o c y n t h e C odWarbu t
am e adngp c t u re of t h e c on e q u en ce of t h p o c y Th e Un t e d S ta t e
mayhaveuedthreata theecondwaverecommend butthereut
mayhavebeentoncreaeconfct andmakethenatone ecure
Theprobemof boththeorzng andpocy makngwoudbemuch
ea er ftherewereonyone ourceofdeterrencefa ureBut ncethe
t a te c an no t e a y d e t ermn e t he ad v erary n t en t on an dh ow t w
28F oraf u rth e rd c u on e e G eorge an d Smok e f n 77-78G e orge an d Smok e f n
14 8 82Je rv f n 10 1979 Th e u e of t h e t erm d agn o t c n G e org e an d Smok e f n
14 8ore fe rt o t h e u t t y of d et erren c e th eoryn p on t n g ou t t he t u at on n w h c h d et e r
rence keytobe chaengedbutthetheorycannotte tatemenwhethertheyarefacng
u c h a t u at on
29Th a ow a t h e man p on t of e are rc rt c of t h e e c on dw av e e e f ore x amp e
C h are Og oodAn At e rnat v e t oWarorS u rren d er U rban aU n v er t y of n o P re
962
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS193
reacttowhatthe tatedoe tmut guardagantbothappeaementand
provocatonDec onmaker thenconfrontmoreptfa andhavea
wderrangeofchoce than truenthe tuatoncontempatedbythe
e c on dw ave An RD Tc ou dman t an a t re on t hre at an d f orc e b u t
c amt o ap py on yw h e n a t a tu q u o t a t e f a ce dw t h ara t ona e x
p an on t t a te Th w oudp re erv e muc h of t he t h eoryp ow e rand
parmon y at t he c o t of mt n g t d oman A t e rn at ve y RD Tc ou db e
broadenedtotakeaccountofa wderrangeofprobem andmoretoo
of tatecraftt coudthencovermorecae butwoudhavetobemuch
morecompexTh compextydoe notmeanthatratonaand/orde
d u ct v e t h eore are mpo b e b u t th e a tt e mp t t o e nc omp a b o th p ra
anddeterrencedynamc doemeanthatthereu tngtheorycannether
be extremeypar monou norconcernedpredomnantywththreat
forceandcoercon30
Th e f n dng p re e nt e d of arc a n t o q ue t on mport an t p art of
econdwavedeterrencetheoryand howthattherearemutp epattern
bu t th e y e ave un tou ch ed t h e b ac c am of SEU Aft e rab re f d c u on
of ame th odoog c ap rob e mw e w d c u t h e ca e t u dy argume nt
thatare ncon tentwthbothtandarddeterrenceandratona mode
BASN CASESELECTON
AchenandSnda havetre edthatdeterrencefa urecannotbecom
p e t e y und e rt ood by t u dyn gon yn t an c e n w h c h th e y o cc u rap on t
thatwh efrequentynotedn theabtractha oftenbeengnored3 So
c a c e n t t g e ne ray b e gn an d oft e n en d t he rre e arc h by oc at n g
exampe nwhchtheoutcomeofnteretha occurredandthenookng
b ack n t me f orf act o rt h at e e mt ob e n k ed t o t h e out c ome Th pro
c ed u re t e nd t o c h ara ct erze t u d e of a an ce armrac e t h e pro cu re
me nt of w e ap on c v un re t an d rev ou t on a w e a of w ar an dd e
30Thu Georgeha tre edtheneedtodeveopdfferentatedtheorebecaue cae areof
d f f ere nt t ype G e org e and Smoke f n A e x and e rLG e org e Ph pF are y an dA e x
an de rD a n e d U S S ov et S e cu rt yC oop era t on Ne w Y ork Oxf ordU n v er t yP re
988 c h ap an d 29G e org e and Smoke f n 4 170-73A p ara e argume n t froman
o th e rf e d t hat n o n g e t h eory c apab e of e x p an n gn t e rn at ona t rad e n a c om
mod t e an d at a t me A E Agra aTh e Th eory of n t ern at on aTrad e L ond on C room
H e m 983 85a o e e Robe rt Gpn Th e P o t c aE c on omyof n t e rn at on aRe a t on
P rn ce t on P rn c e ton U n v er t yP re 987 74-80 F orf urt he rd c u on of w hy t h e t he
orywoudno ongerbeoneof deterrence eeLebowandStenfn 25
3A c h en an d Sn d a f n 6 60-63a o e e L eb ow and S t e n f n 3 7-8G e org e an d
S mo ke f n 5 6 - 7 J e rv L eb ow a n d S te n f n 2 3 3 J e r v f n 2 3 68 -7 0 A r d L ev t e
nt e g e nc e and S t rat e g c S urp re Ne w York C oumb aU n v er t yP re 987 23-24 n
Th e WarTrapNe w H av e n Y ae U n v er t yP re 98 B ruc e B ue n od e Me qu t a argue
th at o c a c e n ce h ou d e e k on yn e ce ary c on d t on n w h c h c a e t h e p rob e mdoe n o t
ar e Th e mt at on of t h ap pro ac h are obv ou h owe v er
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8/19/2019 Rational Deterrence
13/26
194WORLDPOLTCS
terrencefaure tcannetherye d nformatononthereat ve
frequencyofthee event norprovethatthevarabe thatarea ocated
w t h t h e ou t come are more th an n ec e ary c on d t on Th at t he e v ar
ab e mayb e p re e n t n man y c ae n w h c h t he ou tc ome df f ere nt
n d ee d n p rn c p e t h e y c ou db e un v e ra
Ca e e e c t on n t u d e of d e t erren c e fau re p re e nt ome p e c a
p rob e m Ev en c omparn g c a e n w h c h c re e d t ow art o t h o e n
w h c h t he yddn o t w n ot cov era t he re e v an t u e w h e t h e a t t er
are e xamp e of u c ce n w h at P a t rck M organ c a mmed at e d et e r
ren c e n w h c h t he c h ae n g e re t edw t h out v o e n c e t h ey a o are
faure of generadeterrence n whchdeterrenceddnotpreventthe
c r f romar n gn t h e f r t p ac e 32E ve n f w e c an d e te rmne t h e f ac t or
thatdcr mnatebetweenthefaureand ucce ofmmedatedeter
rence wecannotextendtheargumenttogeneradeterrenceThevery
factthatacae ofmmedatedeterrencear e meanthatthedefender
thoughthehada defen bepo tonandthecha engerthoughtthathe
coudgeth waybyforceorcoerconThedetermnantofwhether
theeconfctng expectatoncanbe reconc edwthoutvo enceare
keytobe verydfferentfromthedetermnantof whethertheydeveop
a t a 3 3
Wemaywanttoexamnecae of uccefu genera deterrence nor
d e rto e t mate t u c ce ra te an dd et e rmn e w h at d t n guh e u c ce e
fromfaure Becaue wewanttoudgethe nfuenceofthreatby ak ng
whattheoutcomewoudhavebeenfc rcumtance orpo cyhadbeen
dfferent weneedetherhypothetcaorrea compar on Lebowand
S t e n mak e ag ood t art a t u n g t h e f ormer34bu t t he e n te rpr e ob
v ouy e x tre me ydf f c u t S t udyn grea c a e of u c c e n o t mu c h e a
e r t n o t c e arw h at t he re e v an t amp e h ou db e F ore xamp e f w e
e x amn e on y c a e n w h c h one t a te h ad amarke dd e re t o c h ae n g e
an ot h er w e e xc u d e c a e n w h c h d et e rre nc e u pp re e d t h d e re
e t h e r t ob v ouh ow of te n c a e h ou db e c ount e d f c oun tryA
de t erred f romatt a ck n gB f oro y e ar h ou d t h b e one u c ce O u c
c e e on e fore a ch y e ar or3650on e f ore ac h d ay ? F romt h t f oow
thatweprobabycoud notcacuatea ucce rate
B u t a t e a t f orome pu rp o e t h e e c omput a t on are n ot n e ce ary
We may care e ab ou t h ow of t en d e te rre n ce f a t h an h ow t f a Th e
32M org an D e te rre n ce A C onc e pt u aAn ay B ev e ryH C AS ag e 977 3 43
33Pau HuthandBruceRu ett DeterrenceFa ureandCr Ecaat on nternatona
S t ud e Qu art ery 32 M arc h 988 a t 30a c k n ow e dge t h bu t ome of t he ran ay t he n
p roc e ed a t h ou gh t h w e re n o t th e c a e a t h e t u de n t n mygrad u at e e mn arp on t ed ou t
tome
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS195
r ea o n t wo fo d F r t a t ro ng f or m o f RD T f a f e d f t he re a r e an y
ca e n w h c h t he c ond t on p o t e d a n ec e ary an d u ff c e n t f ord e
terrencearemetandyetdeterrencefa Granted onecanarguethat
e v en t h e mot rg orou o c a c e n ce t h eory on yprobab t c b u t t
n o t c e art h at u c h an ap pro ac h c omp at b e w t h t he b a c a umpt on
ofSEU35Seconda concernwthhowcr e andwar haveoccurredn the
p at an dmgh t o cc u rn t h e f ut u re e ad u t o ak w h y t ate me n un
d e rt ake e e mngy e f d e f ea t n g act on k e c ha e n gngp ow erf u c re d
b e c ommt me nt ort ak ngp o t on t h at c ann o t b e u t an e d F ort h
pu rp o e f req u en c e are rre e van t a t hou gh c omp aron are t re
qured
Th e f o cu on mme d ate d e te rre nc e b o th u c ce e a w e a f a
u re t rou b e ome h ow ev e rb e cau e t c an e ad u t om p e rh ap
themot mportantfeatureofthea tquartercenturythepauctyof u
perpowercr e Whetherth ha beencauedbythepotencyofgenera
deterrence the maturng ofetherorboth de ora decne nthecon
f c t of n t ere t b e t we en t h em df f c u t t od e te rmne B u t t h e e q u e t on
cannotevenbeakedwhenwe ookonyat howconfct arereo ved
ratherthanathowoftentheyoccurWehavenumbere bookandar
t c e on t he C u b an m e c r an d amot n on e on t h e f ac t t hat t h w a
t he a t u ch c on fr on ta t on P o c y a w e a c ho a r h p h a u ff er ed a
e te andthegenera pubc havenothadtoconder whetherther tan
d ardb e e f ab ou t t he S ov e t U n on an d t he C odWar h ou db e c a e d
n t o q ue t on by t h e a c k of S ov et c h ae n ge t mgh t a ob e n o t ed t h at
thecommonfauretonotcenoneventdog thatdonotbarkcan
on yb e e xp an e dbypy c hoog c ab a e u c h at h o e e x amn edb e ow
ra t on ad e c on make rw ou d e e t he r gn f c anc e
GCENERALZATONSFROMCASESTUDES
Whathavewe earnedfromthecae tude?To begnwth thereap
p e art ob e re a mt t oou rab t y t og e n era ze d oyn c rac e are man y
andpowerfu m aroutcomecanbereachedbymanydfferentpath
an d app are n t y mar n t a c ond t on d on o t aw ay y e d t h e ame re
u t 36P art y f ort h re aon andp art yb ec au e of t he mt at on of t h e
e x t n gre e arc h w h at w e h ave n ow more a t t h an at gh t th e oryB u t
t notwthouttructureandcoherenceManyofthegenerazaton
p rodu ce d by t he c a e t u d e are n ke d t h e n f e rre d p ro c e e c an g en
35SeeGeorgeandSmokefn 14 179
3S e e G eorge an d Smok e f n 4 173-74andG e org e F are y an dD a n f n 30 5 11-12
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196WORLDPOLTCS
c rat e ad d t ona p rop o t on an d th e argumen t ap py t o aw d e rang e of
probem naddton todeterrenceanddeterrencefaure Forexampe
theuboptma dec onmakngthatproducedtheChaengerd ater
an d th e h oo t n gd ow n of an ran an ar n e rby th e Ame rc an warh p
V n c en ne an t c p at e d by th e e f n dn g
B e cau e mot of t h e e g e n era z a t on are f am aran dp ac e mt e d
w on y k et c h th e momt t n gu pp ort n g e vd en c e 37Th e y fa n t o
t h re e c a te g ore Th e f rt d e a w t h c ogn t v e mt at on on n f ormat on
p ro ce n g t h e e c on dw t h wh at c an b e c a e d mot v at ed b a e an d
t h e th rd t e mf romt he f ac t th at p o c y of te n made an d amot aw ay
mpementednotby ndvdua butbyorganzaton
F rt b e cau e t h e w ord v e ry c omp ex an dp e op e n format on p ro
c e n g ca pa b t e a re h a r p y m t e d w e m u t a e mp o y a n um be r of
hortcutto ratonaty ncudngmanythatgobeyondthoe org
n ay p e c f ed byH e rbe rt Smon 38Th e b e e f p e op e h od an d t he n f e r
encetheydrawdonotchangequcky nrepon eto nformatonthey
re ce v e p e op e t a t e me n c e nt t an dn dvdu a n t h e re v eryday
ve tendtoactn accordancewth theore theyareadyub crbeto
ratherthantofrehdata
A e con d c ogn t v e b a t h at b e e f t e nd t ob e t ron gyn f u e n ce d by
h t orc a an aog e t ore c en t mport ant c a e t hat t h e pe ron orh c oun
tryha experencedfr thand Amercanpocy ntheCod Warand
econdwave deterrencetheorycannotbe undertood apartfrom the
experenceofH ter
Thrd theroeof accdentandconfuontend tobeunderetmated
Ot he rt a t e an d a an ce t e nd t ob e e e n amu c h more c en t ra ze d t han
theyactuay are
Fourth ratherthan ntegratngmanyvaue wthoutreaz ngt peo
p e of t en d e c d e on th e b a of a n g e mportan t v aue dme n on
F f t h t h e w ay t a te v e w ot he r c apab t e an dn t en t on of te n
trongynfuencedbythewaytheyvewtherownro eand tuaton
Whattheythnkof themeve areferencepontbywh chtheyudge
muc h e e n t h e w ord
A e c on d e t of g e n era z a t on d e a w t h mot vat ed b a e e d e v a-
t on f romw h at u u a y c on d e red ra t ona t y t hat t e mn ot f rom
37Supportngevdenceanddeta edargument canbefoundnG ennSnyderandPau
D e n gC on f c t Amon gNat on P rn c et on P rn ce t on U n v e rt yP re 977G e orge an d
S mo ke f n M or ga n f n 3 2 L eb ow f n 2 3 J er v f n 2 J er v L eb ow a n d S te n f n
23 A e x an d erL G e org e D av dH a an dW amSmon Th e Lmt of C o erc v e D p omacy
B o t on L t t e B row n 971 rvn gJan an dL eon M ann D e c on M at ng Ne w York F ree
P re 977an dRaph Wh t e F e arf uWarror Ne w York F ree P re 984
38Smon Mod e of M an Ne w York W e y 957
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS197
pu re y c ogn t v e m t at on bu t f rompy c hoog c ap re u re an dn e ed
S ome of t h e e ov erap t h e c ogn t v e b a e an dp roduc e p ara e o rre n
forcngeffect
F rt an dn k e d t o t he a t c ogn t v e b a t a te me n k e t o t h nk w e
ofthercountre Theythereforebe evethatother w undertandthat
theyarefo owngapproved tandard ofnternatonaconductandare
notthreatenngother egtmate nteret
Second andreatedtothefourthcogntveb a peopetendtomn
mze p e rce v e d v au e t rad e off Ap e ron w hob e e v e t h at ap o c y
b e tt e rt han t h e a t ern at v e on one v au e dme n on k e y t ob e e v e t hat
t b e tt e ron o th e rmport an t a t h ou gh og c a y un re at ed dme n on
a w e n t h w ayp eop e d e ve op v e w of t he e n v ron men t t hat av od
thepychoogca panofbe evngthatforexampe theymutendanger
arge n umbe rof n n oc e nt v e n ord ert od e f en d t he rn at on n te re t
Thrd andreatedtotheprevou pont when tatemenfeethatthe
aternatveareb eaktheyare keytoexaggeratethechancethatthe
c h o e n po c yw u c ce e d F u rt h ermore t h e yw n ot g at he rt h e n f or
mat on orp e rformt he an ay e t h at c ou dn d c a t e t hat t h p o c y k e y
tofa
Fou rt h at h ou gh t h e e v de n ce on t h p on t gh t t e em t h at t h e
pre ureto m percevetheenvronmentncomfortngwayare greatet
w he n t he p e ron f ac ng e v ere o e an d/orw he n h e t ron gyn f u
e n ce d by av au e t h at h e w ou d rath e rn ot re c ogn ze e g h p o t c a
take
Th e t h rd e t of g e n era z a t on b rn g ou t t he ro e of d ome t c p o t c
andorganzatonabehavor theatterofpartcuar mportanceforhow
p o c e are mp e men t ed
F rt d ome t c p o t c an d c oa t on bu dn gp rovd e ome of t h e ex
p an at on f orw hy t ate b e come e xp an on t 39Th e t a t e n o t au n f e d
ac to ran dp o c e t h at t rea t t a on e mayb e e t han op t ma y e f fe c t ve 40
Secondpo ce areoftenmpemented nway thatareverydfferent
fromthoeorderedandexpectedbythedec onmaker Statemenoften
f a t o re a z e t h an d t hu are gn orant or w ore y et m n f ormed
ab ou t w hat h ab e e n d on e n t h e n ame of t h e rt a t e S omet me t h c an
39Th e b e t t re a tme nt Jack Sn yd e rMyth of Empre D ome t c P o t c an d S tra te g c d e o
ogy t h ac aNY C orn e U n v er t yP re f ort h comn g
40Re ce n t t u d e of t h e orgn an d t ermn at on of t h e WordWar c onf c t b e t we en
Amerc a an dJapan h ow n f ac n at n gd et a t h e op p ort un t e t h at w e re m e dw he n one
c oun try f ae d t op e rce v e t h e nat ure of t he c o a t on a t rugg e w t h n t ad ve rary e e M
c hae B arn hart Jap an P re p are f orTot aWar t hac aNY C orn e U n v e rt yP re 987 an d
L e on Sg a F gh t ng t o aF n h Th e P o t c of WarTermn at on n t h e Un t e d S ta t e an dJapan
9 45 t ha ca N Y C or ne U n ve r t y P re 9 88
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198WORLDPOLTCS
t ren g th e n de t erren c e n o t h e rc a e t w d e fe a t t G e ne ray t h e e
me ch an m n cre a e b o th t h e e xt e nt t ow h c h e a ch d e e e t he o t h era
h o t e an d t he c h an c e th at e ve n t w e c ap e con tro4
Whatareomeof themp caton oftheef ndng fordeterrence?
F rt n amot n on t e ra c t on d o t wo ad v erare u n de rt and e a c h
o t he r g o a f e ar me an e n db e e f an dp erc ep t on Empat hy df
f c u t a nd u u a y a ck n g 42 A a r e u t t at e o me t me f a t o d ep o y
threat thatwoudbeneftthemandon other probaby morenumerou
occaon empoythreatthatprovokeratherthandeterState oftenun
deretmatethedeperatonthattheradverare feeand ncorrectybe
evethattheother donot eethema athreatThu thenteractonof
t h e tw o d e p o c e c an n c re a e c onf c t u n n ec e ar y
S e con d t h e adv e raryw m orm pe rc e v e man y of t he t a te g
n a Th e f n e t un n gof p o c e an d t he u b t e b arg an n g t ac t c t h at
w ou db e c a e d f orn a w ord of c e arc ommun c at on can no t w ork n
ou rw ordp o c e b a e d on t he a umpt on t h at t h ey c an w b e n e f fe c
tve fnotcounterproductve43
Thrd commtment byoneactorthatareobectveycear andcred
b e a me au re d by t he p e rce p t on of d n t ere t e d th rdp art e mayn ot
bepercevedbyanotherFurthermore ntheeca e thetatemakngthe
c ommt men t ort hre at n o t k e y t og rap t he o t he r p e rc e pt on b e
evng nteadthattheothercorrectyundertandthe tuatonThe
tate thereforekey topredctand nterprettheother behavor
wrongy thudefeatngdeterrenceand ncrea ngconfct
Fourth actor tendtooveretmatethepotencyofthreat andunder
e t mat e t he u t t y of rew ard an d rea u ran c e
Ffththreat andconc atongenerayneedtobe combnedbutther
op t mamx t u re an d t mn g e x tre me ydf f c u t n p art b ec au e t d e
p e nd on t he ad v erary g o a an dp erc ep t on w h c h are h ard fort h e
tatetod cern44
Sxththe ucce ofmmedatedeterrencecanweakengenera deter
4S e e f ore xamp e GrahamA on E e n ce of D e c on B o t on L t t e B row n 971
R c h ardNe dL eb ow Nu c e arC r M anag eme nt t h ac aNY C orn e U n v er t yP re 987
ScottSagan NucearAert andCr Management nternatona Securty9 Sprng 985
9 9- 3 9 J e rv f n 2 6 c ha p 3
42Forconfct ngargument aboutthereatve frequencyoftheerror ofmrror magng
an d ac k of e mp ath y e e Wat erL aq ue u rAWord of S e c re t Ne w York B ac B ook 985
90-94272-77Wh t e f n 37 60-67Rob e rt Je rv B ey ondWh at th e F act W B e ar
nternatonaJourna ofnte genceandCounternte gence Sprng 986 46-48
43F oran c e e x amp e e e Waac e Th e Wh en Gove rnme nt C o d e B e rke e yU n v e rt y
o f C a f o rn a P r e 9 80
4 4S ee G eo rg e H a a nd S m o n f n 3 7 S ny de r a nd D e n g f n 3 7 J er v f n 0 9 79
Jan c e S te n D et e rre nc e andRe a u ran ce n Ph pTe t o ck e t a e d B e hav orS o c e t y
an dNuc e arWarV o 2 Ne w York OxfordU n ve rt yP re f ort hc omng
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS199
re nc e n t h e f u tu re byn c re an g t h e o e r g re v an c e c on vn c n g t t h at
t he t a te ag rave me nac e n c re an g t n c en t v e t o t and f rm n t h e
nextconfrontaton oreveneadng ttof ghtn ordertochangea tua-
tonwhchha becomentoerabe or expectedtodeterorate45Succe
f u c o e rc on may e nc ourage t h e o th e r d e t ob u du p t arm t p o
b e f ore xamp e t h at U Sn u c e art hre at n t h e Taw an t ra t c r e of
1954-1955and1958mayhavecontrbutedtoChna dec ontodeveop
nucearweapon andthatt moremutedthreatto nda n1971may
have m aryaffectedthatcountry dec ontoproceedwthanucear
tet
WHATCANNOTBEEXPLANEDBYARATONALTHEORY
Th e ce n traq u e t on h e re w h et h ert h e e mprc a f n dn g c an b e e x
panedby anRDT abet onethathanotyetbeendeveopedTheanwer
may t u rn n p art on w h et h erS EU t ake t he a c t or b e e f a gv e n a t
d o e g o a an du t t e o rak f t h ey are re aonab e 46F ore xamp e c an
wecontructanSEUaccountofaperon whoeatthreepoundof brocco
ad ayn t h e be e f t h at t h w ard of f dragon ? Wh at f t h e U Sp o c y of
ntervenngn countre ketheDomncanRepubc andVetnam
make e n e on t h e p re me t h at t h e re v ou t on t h ere w e re S ov e t n
predandthatther ucce woudundermneUS nfuencearoundthe
w ordbu t w e t h n k th at t he e e x p ec t at on are n o t on yf ae b u t c e ary
contradctedbytheevdence?CanweappySEU fthepo cyfa year
afteryearbecauethe upportngbe ef arecon tentyncorrect? tw
bedffcut toverfythetheoryfwe arerequredtoudgewhetherthe
b e e f are reaon ab e b u t f w e acc e pt a b e e f h owe v erou t rag eou w e
w havetretchedthetheoryattheexpene ofcommonene andut ty
Furthermore nordertoarguethatthebehavormade ene nterm of
SEUwemayhavetognorepeope account oftherownreaon and
g o a F ore xamp e f U S p o c yh ad t h e ef fe c t of con t en t yn c re an g
rad c a man d an t U S f e e n gn t h e t h rdw ordw ou dw e u dg e t a
ra t ona f t a te me n t od u t hat t h e rn t en t on w ae x act y t h e oppo t e?
P u tt n g a d e t he ra t ona t y of t he u b t anc e of t he b e e f t c an b e
c ame d t h at t h e c ogn t v e b a e are c on t e nt w t h rat ona b e hav or
propery undertood47 nformatonand nformatonproce ngarecot
45F orap ara e argumen t e e G eorge an d Smok e f n 14 182
4 6 Fo r d c u o n o f t h u e e e Jo n E t e r n t r od uc t on n E t er e d R at o na C h o c e
New Y ork Ne w York U n ve rt yP re 986 4-5 3-6 B arryONe G ame Th eory and
t h e St u dy of t h e D et e rre nc e of War n S t ern f n L e bow an d S te n f n 25 26-8
47Thefam aranaogytoathete putforwardbyM tonFredmanandLeonardSavage
Th e Ut t yAnay of C hoc e n v ovn gRk Jou rna of P o t c a E c on omy56 Augu t
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8/19/2019 Rational Deterrence
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200WORLDPOLTCS
p e op e maxmze u t t yw h e n th t ake n n t o c on d e ra t on 48Thu SEU
notd turbedbythefactthatpeopemantan ncorrectbeef thatup
port f an gp o c e w e p at t h e p on t a t wh c h t h eyh av e u f f c e nt n
formatonthatwoudrevea th faureto anyonenotcommttedtothoe
b e e f a t t h e ou t e t A f u c on d e ra t on of e ac h b t of n e w n f ormat on
an d th e c on tan t rec on d e ra t on of mag e an db e e f w ou db e mpo
by c o t y A t h ou gh e c ondw av e t he ory d t u rb e dbyf ore xamp e
t he c a e n w h c h an ob e ct v e y c re d b e t hre at gn ore d b ec au e t he p e r
ceverdd notexpectt anSEUaccountcon derngnformatonproce
n g c o t w ou dn ot b e
Th argumen t h a ome v aue b u t th e t re t ch n g of t h e norma me an
n g of u b ec t ve u t t y m a x m za t on n ot t o n y p ro b em F r t t a
umethatpeope omehow topgatherngandproce ngnformaton
u t a t t h e p on t a t w h c h th e c o t ou tw e gh t he e x pe c te d g an t n o t
c e arh ow t h p on t c ou db e e t mate dn d e ed t ryn g t od oow ou d
t e f b e v e ry c o t y S e c ond t h argumen t mpe t h at c ogn t ve b a e
h ou d ope rat e mu ch e w h en t h e d ec on v e ry mport an t b u t t h
h an o t b e en d e mon t rat ed 49n d e e d t h ab e e n t u d e of c ruc a c h o ce
thathavereveaedtheroeof theeba e NetherJapann1941norNeh
ru n d an 962g at h ere d ag rea t d ea of n f ormat on on h ow t he rad
v erare w ou db e k e y t ore ac t Sm ary at h ough mu ch of B rt an
pocy durngthe1930 retedonbe ef abouttheeffcacyof trategc
bombardment theupportnganaye werefewandweak50Thrd t
farfromcearthatth approachcancapturea thehortcuttorat on
a tythatoperate etaoneantcpateone notyetd coveredForexam
pe th expanatonprobabycannotaccountforthemethod bywhch
peope eeaca ea fttng ntoageneracategoryandthedfferent
948an dA ch en an d Sn d a f n 6 64d o e n o t rea yh e p S t a t e men ac t n a re amof mu ch
greatercompexty deaw thmanyfewer ntance andonyrarey receveunambguou
f ee d bac k F orad c u on of t he more n t ere t n g u e of w he t he rn f ormat on p roc e n g
b a e an d f a a c e re ay c an b e c on d e red d e v a t on f romrat on at y e e LJon ath an
Cohen CanHumanrratonaty beExpermentay Demontrated? Behavora andBran
S c e nc e 4 S e pt e mb e r98 37-3 an d t he c omme n t bd 3370 F oran SEU mod e t h at
take nformatonproce ngcot ntoaccount eePauAnderonandT mothyMcKeown
Ch angn gAprat on Lmt e dA t te n t on an dWar WordP o t c 40Oc t ob e r987 29
48W amRk e randP e t erOrd e h ook An n t roduc t on t oP o t v e P o t c aTh e oryEn g e
w oodC f f NJPre nt c e H a 973An t hon yD ow n An E c on omc The ory of D e moc rac y
N ew Y or k H ar pe r & R ow 9 57 A o e e Je rv f n 2 c ha p 4
49For omereevantfndng eeDavdSear andJonathanFreedman SeectveExpo
u re t on f ormat on AC rt c aRe v e w P u b c Opn on Qu art e ry 3 Summe r967 94-213
W amMc Gure S e e ct v e E x pou re A Summn gU p n Rob ert Ab e on e t a e d Th e
ore of C ogn t v e C on t e nc yC h c ag oRandM c Na y 968 797-800 Ph pTe t o ck A c
countab tyTheNegectedSoca ContextofJudgmentandChoce nBarryM Stawand
L L C ummn g e d Re e arc h n Org an zat on aB e hav orV o 7 Gree n w ch C TJA Pre
985
5?RobertJerv DeterrenceandPercepton nternatonaSecurty7 Wnter982/83 4-
7
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS201
w e ght t h at p e op e gv e t od f fe ren t k n d of n f ormat on Norc an t a c
countforthefactthatpeopedenythevad tyofmanyofthe aw of
probab ty51
Of c oure on e re py t h at n one of t h re e van t w e w an t amod e
t h at w matc h mot of t h e t a t e b e h av or n o t rec on t ru c t t he d e c on
mak n gpro ce B u t t h ard t o e e h ow SEU w n f ac t u c ce e dn d on g
on gh t of th e n f u e nc e w e h av e t e dNot on yd ow e ob e rv e t a t e
menfa ngtopayattentontofactor necearyforratona cacuaton
butn manyn tance thereaonngproce e theyreportwhchtrack
n c e yw t h ab ora to ry re u t n w h c h p eop e a c tu aymak e c h o ce
nvoveerrorof nferenceandcacuaton Ony fthee wereomehow
t o c anc e ou t c ou d t he re u t f t w t h SEU n d ee d on e mu t w on de r
whether ntrcateandcounterntutveSEUargument canexpan tate
me n b e h av or D e c on mak e rw on y ad opt c ou re of a c t on t h at
theyexpecttobeeffectvef the keyadvantage canonybe d covered
ordemontratedwth thead ofcompexmathematc twoud eemun
keythat tatemenwoud eetheadvantageof thebehavor Further
more n man y cae t h e ot h er d e p e rc e pt on are c ru c a Th u f w e
c ou d h ow th at c ont rary t ow hat amot un v e ra y b e e v e d a c ert an
t u at on ort a ct c h ou dgv e t he t a te ab arg an n g adv ant age t h w
ac tu ay b e t rue on y f t h e o th e r d e re a z e t an d o n f act more w
ngtomakeconce on whenfacedwththat tuatonortactc
Theargumentthatpeope behavorcanbe expanedbya umng
thattheyacta thoughtheywereratonamaycope omewhatbetterw th
motvatedba e Whentheeoperate theexternaenvronment d
tortedto ervepychoogca orpo tca functon 52Butthefactthatthe
p o c y ow e t t e t o ad n t ere t e d app rec a t on of t he e x te rna e nv ron
mentdoenotmeanthatt cannotbeexpanedby SEUTo returntoan
exampementonedear erthefactthatNehruavodedthepychcpa n
thatwoudhavereutedfromtherecogntonthathewa puttngh po
t c af ort un e ah e ad of th e g ood of t h e c oun try n t ere t n gf orapy
c h oog t b u t t rre e van t t o t he argume nt t h at w e c an e xp an n d a
p o c y a t h ou gh n d aw e re ac t n g t omaxmze Ne h ru p e rona u t t y
Furthermore fa peronha nochocebuttoundertakeacoure ofac
t on t h e mot v at e d d t ort on mayn ot n f u en c e he rb e hav ora t a 53
5S e e f ore x amp e t h e work ummarze dn D an e Kahn e man P au S ov c an dAmo
Tv erk y e d Judgmen t und e rU nc e rt an tyH e u rt c an dB ae C ambrdg e C ambrdg e Un
v e rt yP re 982 an dTve rk y an dKah n eman Rat ona C ho c e an d t he F ramngof D e
c o n n J ou rn a o f Bu n e f n 5 S 25 7 8
52Th e c a c a c c ou n t MB re w t erSmt h Je rome B rune ran dRob ert Wh t e Opn on
andP e ron at yNe w Y ork W e y 956
53F orf urt he rd c u on e e Je rv f n 2 374-78an dArt h urS t e n Wh e n Mpe rc ep t on
M att er WordP o t c 34Juy 982 505-26
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202WORLDPOLTCS
Th e f ac t t hat h e b adyun d ere t mat ed t h e r k orc o t of h erp o c y
doe notmeanthat hewoudhavebehaveddfferentyhadheranay
beenaccurateForexampe n1941 motvatedb a mayhaveedJapa-
needec onmakerto overetmatethechancethattheUntedState
w a w n g to w a ge a nd o e a m t ed w ar b ut f t h e r u t t e e ft
themnochoceotherthantof ghtth errormayhaveonyratona zed
notnfuencedtherbehavor
Evenwhenmotvatedba e producemorecompexand eemngy r
ra t ona b e hav oran EU t he orymgh t t h od n an od e r e n e t h an
S c he n g t he re mayb e ra t ona t yn rrat on at y 54We uu a y ay t h at
ap eron w h oc on t en t y ac t n e f d e f ea t n gw ay prob abyd rv en
byu b c on c ou e g odynamc B u t th n o t od f f e ren t f romayn g
thatthecot of acrfcng certangoa aremorethancompenatedfor
bytheavodanceofthepan thatwoudcomefromdrectyfacngthe
u n con c ou mpu e c oup e dw t h t h e g an on o t h erv au e dme n on
e g t h e me ry c au e d by t he p e ron ac t on c an g rat f yd ee py f e t
need tobedebaed
Th coudevenbethecae whentheperon woudhavebeenbetter
offhadhefo owedanaternatvepocy thathecoudhaved covered
t h t he av a ab e d a t aTh a t ron g erc h ae n g e t o S EU b e cau e t h e
p o c y c h o e n d o e n o t maxmze e v e n th e h dd en u t t e To c ont n u e
wththeNehruexampea umethatfhe hadundertoodthe tuaton
h e c ou dh av e d ev e op ed ap o c y t hat h e w ou dh av e e e n a k e y t op ro
du ce ab e t te rou tc ome n t h c a e t h e mot vat ed b a w ou dh av e e d t o
u b op t mab e h av orh adh v on n o t be e n c oud e dbyfe aran dn e ed
hecoudhavemanagedthetradeoffbetweennatonaandperona n
t e re t b et t er An dye t an S EU ac c oun t t p o b e on c e we c on d e rt h e
pa nNehruwoudhave ufferedhadheconfrontedthevaueconfctand
h ow n ambt on We mgh t mary d e aw t h b e hav ort hat f o ow
f romp e ron a c a o rn at ona d e o og e t h at p rovd e au t f c a t on f or
au e f u p o c ybyd ev e opn g ad t ort e d v e w of th e e xt e rn ae n v ron
me n t Th e re u t t op u rc h ae mme d ate n dvdu a an d o c a h armony
a t t he c o t of a a t erd a t e rn o t on yf ort h e c oun try a aw h oe b u t a o
f ort he c ont ron g n dvdu a an dgrou pTh e b e e f an dp o c e of
W hemneGermanyprovdeanexampethecountryandrung e te
werehedtogetherattheexpeneofa rea tcappra a ofthethreatand
op portun t e t h at o t he rof f e re d n c a e k e t h t h e bargan n o t
t ruc k c on c ouy an dn re trop e ct may appe art ob e ab ad one b u t t
canbeca medtobecompatbew thSEU
54S c he n gf n 26 36-43
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS203
Toputth anotherway themmedategratfcatonprovdedbya
motvatedba coudoutweghtheantcpatedongrunco tthatwoud
b e n c u rre dw he n t he p o c y e v e nt u ay f a P e op e mayh ave h gh d
c oun t ra te e w h at w h app e n n t h e f ut u re c ount f are t h an m
medateconequence andpartoftherut tycanbepeaceofmnd and
ad e re d e f mage F ore x amp e t h e fa c t t hat d e te rre nc e f a b e cau e
t h e t a te man av od e e n g t hat h p o c y p rov ok ngrat he rt han re
tranng theadverary canbencorporatedntoSEUoncewecon derthe
u t t y t o t he e ade ran d t he c ount ry a a w h oe of t he b e e f t h at t n o t
ame nac e and c ou dn o t b e e e n a u c h
u p e c t th at man yre ad e rw f n d t h argumen t a t o rt u ou an dun
a t f a c to ry a d o t t h e eq u v ae nt of ayn g t hat t he p e ron w hopu t
of f e e n g ad o c torf orf eart h at h e rumpw b e d agno e d a c anc e r
ra t ona on ce w e c on d e rt he mmed at e c o t of g e t t n gb adn e w An y
t h eory t hat h at o t ak e a cc oun t of u t t e k e t he e w b e f arremove d
fromanyRDTthatha beenadvanced Furthermoreth kndoftheory
c ou dy e dd e d uc t on on y f p e op e are c on t e nt n t h e rd c oun t rat e
andn theubectve cot ofextendedearche andknowedgeofther
ow n ut t e B u t ev e n f t h e e re q u re men t are me t t h e b eh av or t
mgh t n ot b e ra t ona by ome d e f n t on f t h e h ort run g an pu r
chaedattheprce ofgreaty mtng orharmngtheactor futurepro
pect 55
A t e a t a d f f c u t f ormot n o t on of S EU are t h e c a e n w h c h p o c y
ra t ona ze d n aw ay t h at c h an g e a t erp e rce p t on an du t t e F or
e xamp e a ume th at d ome t c p o t c e ad a t a te man t o ad op t a h ard
ne po cyandthathethenreduce thetradeoffbetweendomet cand
f ore gn p o c yv au e by c omng t ob e e v e t h at t t h e a t te rt h at re q u re
t h p o c yB u t f t h e d ome t c e n v ronme nt c h ang e t h e po c ymay c on
tnuebecaue t upportedbythenewycreatedperceptonofthefor
egnenvronment56Whatut te arethenbengmaxmzed?
BEHAVORCONS STENT?
ThemnmumrequrementofSEU thatbehavorandthu then
ferredpreferencebe con tentButweknowthatanaton keany
c o e c t ve may ac t n c on t e nt y at h ou gh e a ch p e ron n t f uy c on
tentthu maknganSEUexpanatonoftheformerbutnottheatter
5 5E t e r fn 4 6 O 1 2
56 For related arguments, see Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i983), chaps. 3 and 4, and Deborah Larson, Origins
of Contanment Pr nceton Prnceton Unversty Press 985
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204WORLDPOLTCS
mpo b e F e w fore gn p o c y c a e t u d e h av e e xamn ed t h qu e t on
rg orou y an dmore a t te n t on h a b e en p ad t o t n t h e are aof p o t c a
e c on omyt h an n e c urt y n t h e a t te rarea t g e ne ray a umed t h at
thecompeng natureoftheexterna envronmentandthemportanceof
thenatona nteret ubmergedvergentdometc nteret andcoat on
dyn amc t h at c ou dp roduc e n c on t e nt p o c e B u t ce rtan y t h n o t
aw ay t h e c a e
nterna barganngcanundermnethea umptonthatthetateact
a a r a t on a u n t ar y a ct or n e v e ra w a y F r t o me c oa t o n c an b e
bu t an dmant an ed on yby n c u dn gp o c y e e men t w h c h pu n op
p o t e d re c t on F ore xamp e p t n t h e B rt h c abn e t b ef ore Word
War meantthata moracommtmentwa ncurredto tandbyFrance
ntheeventofanattackbyGermanybutthatGermanycoudnotbe o
nformedThere utwa aparodyofdeterrenceprecrpton France
fetembodenedbytheexpectatonofBrt h upport Germanywa em
bodenedbyoveretmat ngthechancethatBrtanwoud remanneu
t ra A ft er t he w ar m a r p t e d Br t a n t o g ve t he W h te R u a n
ut enough upporttoen urethattheBohevk woudbeenragedbut
notenoughtooverthrowthenewregmeGovernment thataredeepy
dvd e d oft e n do t h n gby t w o Th at t h ey are k e y t oman tan
d ome t c un t ybymak n gp are d d ec on at h ou gh t he re u t n g ac t on
w contradctorundercuteachother57
S e con dd ag re eme nt c an b e od e e p t hat n od e c on p o b e e
p e c ayw h e n c o e t o c on e n u re qu re dTh u t h e Jap ane e g ov ern
mentremaneddeadockedoverthequetonofwhethertoaccedeto
Germany dere to trengthentheAnt ComnternPactdepte thecon
derabecot oftheyearongprocrat natonandthefactthatJapan
wa unabetorepondto thechange ntheexterna envronmentdurng
thatperod58
Th rd n c on t e nc e ov ert me app eara f rt on e f ac t on and t h en
anothercome topowerEvenf broadnatonagoa remanbecaue
theyare etbytheexterna envronmentd agreementonhowto reach
themaredeepandfrequentThu whe muchofAmercanforegnpo
cydurngthecod warcanbecharacterzeda contanmentthe up
portngbehavorvared a dfferentadmn tratoncameto powerwth
d f fe ren t d e a an dd f f e re n t prort e f ort he u e of re ou rc e 59 t t h en
57Warn e rS ch n g The P o t c of Nat on aD e f en e F c a 950 n Warne rS c h n g
PauHammondandG ennSnyderStrategyPo tc andDefene Budget NewYorkCo
u mb a U nv er t y P re 9 62 2 66 T h e f n 43
58Oh at aTokuh ro Th e An t C omn t ern P act 1935-1939 n Jame M ore y e d D e te r
rentDpomacyJapan Germany andtheUSSR1935-1940NewYorkCoumba Unverty
P re 9 76 4 7-
59Se e John G add S t ra t eg e of C on t anme nt Ne w Y ork OxfordU n ve rt yP re 982
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS205
w t h u t f c a t on t hat a e an d adv e rare a k e c omp an t h at th e y are
contantyforcedtoadut tounpredctabechange nAmercanpo ce
e n e ra t ed by h f t n gd ome t c p o t c Of c oure on e can mpy t rea t
eachadmn tratona ad fferentactorw thdfferentpreference One
can m aryaccommodatethechange durnganadmn tratonpro
du ce d byh f t n g a gn me nt B u t th e re u t n g t h eore w n ot b e ve ry
par monou andpowerfu
F ourt h w h e t h e n atu re of t he d e c on mak ngp ro ce make t h ard
todemontratethentrant vtyofpreference thefactthatpo cyoften
ar e f romt h e n t era ct on of e v e raf a c t on make c y c c amaort e
q u te k e y t p o b e t ha t th e n t a b t y o f r ec en t U S f or e gn p o c y
c an be e x p an e dn p art by t he dv on of e t e opn on mak er n t o cod
w ar n t er na t on a t p o t c o d w ar n t er na t on a t a nd e m o a t on
t 6o Sm ary opn on ov ert h e w ar n Korea an dV e t namw an ot ar
raye d on a mp e h awk d ov e c on t n uumw h c h w oud at e a t h av e
yededa coherentpocy butratherd vded ntothreegroup wthdf
ferentorderof preferenceforthea ternatve ofeca atng contnunga
mtedwar andwthdrawng6
Fn ay n t h e f ormat on an d e v e n more t h e mp e men t at on of p o
cyd vergentbureaucratc nteret andperpectveoftenremanunn
t e gra te d an d th e re u t n g n at ona p o c y n c on t e nt n Juy1914
t h e c v an an dm t ary e ade r n G e rman y e n t c on f c t n gn t ruc t on
t oV e n na n duc n g t h e e ade rof Au t ra -H ung ary t o ak Wh oru e
nBern? 62 nothercae dfferenteement ofthegovernmentwork
eparateyonwhattheythnkareunreatedprobem buttheoutcome
havecontradctorympact onforegngovernment Forexampewhen
omepartof theUS governmentweretryngtod couragethrdword
t a te f romc on tro n g t he f u n u c earf u e c y c e an d t h u g an n gre ady
a cc e t of e mat era t h at c ou db e u e d f orb omb t he ag e nc y t hat
w ad e an gw t h t h e c apa c t y and af et y of U Sp u t on um e p ara t on
pant cutoffforegncontractforreproce ngnucearfue therebyn
advertenty howngotherthattheUntedStatecoud notbecounted
ontomeettherneed Nethergroupwaengagedna truggewththe
o t he rf orc on t ro of p o c y n t e ad ea c h u t c arre d ou t t re p on b t e
60Oe H o t an dJame Roe n auAme rc an L e ad e rh pn WordAff ar V e t naman d t he
B re akd own of C on e n u B o t on A e n & U n w n 984
6 -An dre M odg an H aw k an dD ov e o a t on m an dP o t c aD t ru t Ame rc an
P o t c a S c e nc e Re v ew 66S e p t emb er1972 960-78F orra t ona c h o ce d c u on of h ow
n t t u t on c an p rovde ou t on t o c y c c a maort e e e Ke nn et h Sh ep e an dB arryWe n
g at P o t c a S ou t on t oM arke t P rob e m Amerc an P o t c a S c e nc e Re v ew 78M arc h
984 47-34 andKennethShepe andBarryWengat StructurenducedEqu brum
an dL eg at v e C ho c e P ub c C h oc e 37No3 982 503-9
62Japan e e an dU Sp o c e a t t h e en d of WordWar p rovd e e v e ra e x amp e e e S g a
f n 40
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8/19/2019 Rational Deterrence
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206WORLDPOLTCS
n t ow n ph ere w t h ou t muc h aw are ne of t he t o t ap o c y mpc a -
ton a tuatonwhchendedupundermnngratherthanmaxmz ng
n a t on a u t t e
Furthermore evenfnaton acteda thoughtheywerendvdua
p rob e mmgh t ar e n t h e re v eryday v e p e op e re ve a n con t e nc e
t h at v o a t e SE U T h r ea y n o t u r p r n g n d v du a d e p t e th e r
kn maybenomoreunf edthanargeand egmentedorganzaton Of
c oure o c a f e w ou db e mpo b e f b e hav orw ere rand ombu t w e
houdnotexaggeratethedegreeofcon tencythatpreva Thu SEU
mode of c on ume rb e hav orh ave n o t b ee n t rk n g u c ce e p o t c a
p ref ere nc e an du t t e c han ge f re qu e nt y n w ay t h at d on ot e a y f t
t and ard ra t ona t y 63n e ek n gmu t p e g o a p e op e of t en ac t n c on
tradctoryway Recentpychoogca reearchha a odemontratedthat
peopechooedfferentydependngonhowthequet on framed Con
d e rth e e e x amp e F rt y ou o e a$ 20t c k et w h e w ak n g t o t he
theatera ternatvey a yougotopurchaeyourtcket youfndthatyou
h ave o t a$ 20b f romyou rw ae t Y ou are p rob abymore k e y t ob uy
at c k e t n t h e e c ond c a e t h an rep u rc h ae t n t h e f rt a t h ough t he
c h o ce are f ormay d e nt c a S e con dy ou are abou t tob uy a$ 25c a c u
a t orw h e n youh eart h at t h e ame t e m av a ab e f or$ 20n an o t he r
t ore af e w b oc k aw ay t h e ame t u at on h od t rue e x ce p t th at t he t em
at e e v on e t an d t h e re p ec t v e p rc e are $ 5oo an d $ 495 Y ou are
more k e y t o av e t h e $ 5n t h e f rt t u at on t h an t h e e c ondF n ay
M rRbou ght a c a e of g oodw n e n t h e a t e 5o f orabou t $ 5ab o tt e
Afewyear aterh wnemerchantofferedtobuythew nebackfor$oo
abotte Herefued eventhoughheha neverpad morethan$35fora
botteof wne The eeffect havebeendemontrated nthe aboratory
andtheameproce e probaby operaten foregnpocy makng64For
e x amp e f t a te me n udg e p o c e by c omp arn g t he e x pe c te d re u t
w t h t h e t a t u q u o a t he y e e mt o t h e ymayrun h gh r k rath ert h an
a c c e pt t h e c ert ant y of ao t hat ma c omp are d t o t he rov e rav au e
63S e e Robe rt Jerv Re a m Game Th e ory an dC oop e ra t on WordP o t c 40Apr
988 324-28340-44-
64Thewneexampecome fromRchardThaer TowardaPo tveTheoryofCon
umerChoce Journa ofEconomc BehavorandOrganzaton March980 43 theother
e x amp e are f romAmoTv e rk y andD an e Kah n eman Th e Framn gof De c on an d
h e Py c h oogy of C h oc e S c e nc e 2 Janu ary 98 453-58A o e e D av dGre th e rand
Chare Pott EconomcTheoryofChoceandthePreferenceRevera Phenomenon
AmercanEconomcRevew69 September 979 623-38TverkyandKahnemanfn51
JackKnetch RchardThaer andDane Kahneman ExpermentaTet oftheEndow-
mentEffectandtheCoae Theorem unpub KennethMacCrmmonandDonad
We hrung Tak n gRk Ne w York F ree P re 986F orap p c a t on t of ore gn p o c y e e
e rv f n 26 c h ap 5 an dNan c yKan w h e r C ogn t v e H e ur t c an dAme rc an Se c urt y
Pocy JournaofConf ctReo uton forthcomng
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RATONALDETERRENCE JERVS207
po t on Th e p o c e w t h en b e n c on t e nt w t h o t he rb e hav oran d
defymanynorma deterrenceprecrpt on Sm ary whenpeope re
ducecogntved onancebycomng to eethechoenaternatvea even
betterthantheyaw twhentheyreachedtherdec on ther aterbe
h av orw b e n f u e nc ed n aw ay t h at mak e t n c on t en t w t h t he r
earer preference Ba ed nformatonproce ngdengratngre ected
coure ofacton andbo terngthee ectedonenotony maketheper
on more c omfortab e w t h h d e c on t h ey a o c h ang e t h e wayh e e e
t h e word an d t he v au e h e p ac e on v arou ou t c ome f SEU t he ore are
tobedeveopedfurthertheyw havetodoa betterob ofcomngto
g rp w t h t h e th e ore t ca an d e mprc a q u e t on of t h e c on t e nc y of
natonabehavor takngntoaccountboththecoa tonnatureofpo tc
andtheoperatonof ndvdua pychoogy
SUMMARY
E ve n f w e p ut o m e o f th e e d f f cu t e a d e n a ny S E U th at w f t
t he e mprc af n dn g t h e u b e c t ve e e me nt w oomarg e Th
tru e n ot on yf orv au e an du t t e b u t ao f ort he c ru c ame an e n d
b e e f p e rc e pt on of t h e o t he r d e an d e t mat e of t h e p rob ab e c on
e q ue n ce of a t e rn at v e po c e Th e e f a ct o rare a e x og e nou an d
t u dyn g t h em n n dvdu ac a e t ryng t o e e h ow an dw hy t h ey f orm
an d o c at n gw h at e ve rp a tt ern e x t are c ruc a t ak P rop o t on on
thee ubectcon ttutemuchoftheworkbengdonebySEUexpana-
t on 65Of c ou re d e du c t ve t h eore c an p ay aro e h e re b u t a e rt on
t h at p e op e a ct a t hou gh t h eyw e re maxmzn gu t t yw n ot he p an
wermanyofthehardqueton
65 See Herbert Smon Human Nature n Pot cs The Da ogue of Psychoogy and Po t-
ca Sc ence Amercan Pot ca Scence Revew 79 June 985 292-303 Jervs fn 63 324-29