Deterrence DA Seniors NDI 2010

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Northwestern Debate Institute 2010 1Seniors Deterrence DA

Deterrence DA---Link---Withdrawal General

Withdrawal kills US leadership perception of forward projection atrophe destroys soft power, the commitment of our allies

and global stability, creating a vacuum of power

Holmes 9 PhD from Georgetown University, former Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, at the FletcherSchool of Law and Diplomacy, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of its Washington AdvisoryCommittee, for the Defense Department, author and editor of many foreign policy publications and books, Vice President of Foreign

and Defense Policy Studies and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at Heritage(Kim R., Sustaining American Leadership with Military Power, The Heritage Foundation, 6/1/09,http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/sr0052.cfm)To witness the consequences when policymakers and politicians believe that hard and soft power are disconnected, one need look nofurther than Europe. The Europeans --many of whom believe that the peace that has broken out on their continent is the model for apost-sovereign world order--have become convinced that the anarchic order of the Westphalian system of nation-states can bebreached through the exercise of soft power alone. In their view,bridging the often hardened differences between states and shapingtheir decisions requires only negotiation and common understanding. Many liberals are now pressing the U.S. government to adopt this vision, butthe futility of this approach can be seen everywhere , from the failure of negotiations to deter both Iran and North Korea from theirnuclear programs over the past five years--a period in which their efforts have only matured--to the lackluster response to Russia'sinvasion of Georgian territory. Whether it is states like Iran and North Korea that believe a nuclear weapons program is central toregime survival, or human-rights abusers like Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, or rising powers like China, which continues to use itsmilitary to emphasize its sovereignty in the South China Sea, diplomacy alone has not been enough to bring about change in a

direction that is favorable to America's interests. At times, America and its leaders have also been guilty of this type of strategic myopia. Afterapplying pressure on North Korea so diligently in 2006, the Bush Administration relaxed its posture in early 2007, and North Koreaconcluded that it was again free to backslide on its commitments. Two years later, this weak diplomatic approach, which the ObamaAdministration continued even after North Korea's April 5 missile test, has only brought North Korea to believe that it can get awaywith more missile tests and nuclear weapons detonations. And so far, it has. Backing Carrots with Sticks Works In the past, when Americachose to flex its diplomatic muscle with the backing of its military might, the results were clear. During the Cold War, the foundationaldocument for U.S. strategy toward the Soviet Union, NSC-68, concluded that military power is "one of the most important ingredients" of America'snational power.This powergave the U.S. the ability not just to contain and , if necessary, wage war against the Soviet Union and itsproxies,but also , during tense diplomatic stand-offs like the Cuban Missile Crisis, to reinforce its political objectives with robuststrength. This same equation of military-diplomatic power proved effective in easing tensions during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996, when President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to demonstrate America's firm commitment to the Taiwanese democracy. Similarly, the display ofAmerica's military strength against a defiant Saddam Hussein in 2003 convinced Libyan President Moammar Qadhafi to abandon hisweapons of mass destruction program. Obama's Risky "Rebalancing" Act Before he became President, Barack Obama raised the important connection

between our hard and soft power, arguing that America must "combine military power with strengthened diplomacy" while also building and forging "stronger

alliances around the world so that we're not carrying the burdens and these challenges by ourselves."[1] While his statements are correct, his actions as President have

done little to demonstrate actual commitment to forging a policy that combines America's military power with its diplomatic authority. For America to be an

effective leader and arbiter of the international order, it must be willing to invest in a world-class militaryby spending no lessthan 4 percent of the nation's gross domestic product on defense.[2] Unfortunately, President Obama's FY 2010proposed defense budgetand Secretary Robert Gates's vision for"rebalancing" the military are drastically disconnected from the broad range of strategic prioritiesthat a superpower like the United States must influence and achieve . Instead of seeking a military force with core capabilities for the conventionalsphere to the unconventional--including a comprehensive global missile defense system[3]--in order to deter, hedge against, and if necessary defeat any threat,Secretary Gates argues that "we have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight."[4] He is echoing the view of President Obama, who has argued that we

must "reform" the defense budget "so that we're not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use."[5]v But the conventional Cold Warcapabilities that this Administration believes we are unlikely to use are the same platforms that provide America with both the airdominance and the blue-water access that is necessary to project power globally and maintain extended deterrence, not to mentionfree trade. The Importance of Sustaining Military PowerThe consequences ofhard-power atrophy will be a direct deterioration ofAmerica's diplomatic clout. This is already on display in the western Pacific Ocean, where America's ability to hedge against thegrowing ambitions of a rising China is being called into question by some of ourkey Asian allies. Recently, Australia released a defenseWhite Paper that is concerned primarily with the potential decline of U.S. military primacy and the implications that this decline would have for Australian security

and stability in the Asia-Pacific. These developments are anything but reassuring. The ability of the United States to reassure friends, detercompetitors, coerce belligerent states, and defeat enemies does not rest on the strength of our political leaders' commitment todiplomacy; it rests on the foundation of a powerful military. Only by retaining a "big stic k" can the United States succeed inadvancing its diplomatic priorities. Only by building a full-spectrum military force can America reassure its many friends and alliesand count on their future support .


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***South Korea***


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Deterrence DA---South Korea---1NC

US withdrawal emboldens North Korea to take the initiative and attack at the Souths weakest momentOHanlon 4 - senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (Michael, WHY THE U.S. FORCES/KOREA PLAN MAKESSENSE, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 6/15/04,http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/ohanlon/20040615.pdf)This does not make it safe for Americato dissolve the security alliance with South Korea ortake all of its forces off the peninsula. Such adrastic move could embolden North Korea to attack the South again, in the hope that surprise and perhaps its new nuclear arsenal couldproduce the reunification it still formally aspires to. As members of this committee know well, the stronger side does not always win in war. Luckand surprise and such intangibles play a role as well, so North Korea might elect to gamble if it thought it had a chance of success (asGeorgetown scholar Victor Cha has lucidly argued). That said, South Korea probably does now have the capacity to hold off any attempted North Korean invasionlargely on its own (with the support of American airpower, to be sure) until a major American reinforcement could occur. That reinforcement would then prepare theway for a joint, rapid, and decisive (though still quite bloody) U.S.-South Korea counteroffensive to overthrow the North Korean government.


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Deterrence DA---South Korea---Japanese Prolif---1NC

Korea withdrawal destabilizes the region, causing Japanese nuclear armament

Dao, 03 ( James, Why Keep U.S. Troops in South Korea?NYTimes, 1/5/03, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/05/weekinreview/05JDAO.html)Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's

presumptive supercop.Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raisingquestions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction

could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinesemight respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the

Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japanmore confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about theUnited States' commitment to the 40,000troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, heargues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troopwithdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much theUnited States asserts its commitment to the region. Chinamight take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldenedto continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries andindividuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "Themain one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimatebeneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political willby the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

Japan nuclear armament causes a chain reaction of counterbalancing proliferation

Halloran, 2009[Richard, Military correspondent for The New York Times for ten years, 5-24, The Dangers of a Nuclear Japan, Real Clear Politics,http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/05/24/nuclear_japan_96638.html]

That anxiety has reinvigorated a debate about whether Japan should acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own and reduce its reliance onthe US. Japan has the technology, finances, industrial capacity, and skilled personnel to build a nuclear force, although it would becostly and take many years. The consequences of that decision would be earthshaking. It would likely cause opponents to riot in thestreets and could bring down a government. South Korea, having sought at least once to acquire nuclear weapons, would almostcertainly do so. Any hope of dissuading North Korea from building a nuclear force would disappear. China would redouble its

nuclear programs. And for the only nation ever to experience atomic bombing to acquire nuclear arms would surely shatter thealready fragile international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The main reason Japan has not acquired nuclear arms so far has been a lack of

political will. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the Japanese experienced a deep-seated nuclear allergy. That and the threat from theSoviet Union during the Cold War kept Japan huddled under the US nuclear umbrella.

Extinction

Utgoff 2 , survival v. 44 no 2 summer 2002, p. 90

Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have asubstantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped,we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury thebodies of dead cities or even whole nations.


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***Japan***


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Deterrence DA---Japan---1NC

US-Japan Relations High-Deters Conflict in the region

Talmadge 6/22. [Eric. Associated Press Writer. US-Japan Security Pact Turns 50, faces new strains

Associated Press. June 22, 2010.

http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2010/06/22/us_japan_security_pact_turns_50_faces_ne

w_strains/]"Keeping our alliance with the United States contributes to peace in the region," Kan said in a televised question-and-answersession with other party leaders. "Stability helps the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that between China and Japan and, in turn,China and the United States." The U.S.-Japan alliance, formalized over violent protests in 1960, provides for the defense ofJapan while assuring the U.S. has regional bases that serve as a significant deterrent to hostilities over the Korean Peninsula orTaiwan. Under the pact, promulgated 50 years ago Wednesday, nearly 50,000 American troops are deployed throughout Japan.The U.S. forces include a key naval base south of Tokyo where the only permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier has itshome port; Kadena Air Base, which is one of the largest in Asia; and more than 10,000 U.S. Marines on the southern island ofOkinawa. The large U.S. presence over the past five decades has allowed Japan to keep its own defense spending low, to about 1percent of its GDP, and focus its spending elsewhere -- a factor that helped it rebuild after World War II to become the world'ssecond-largest economy. "Even though there are some small problems here and there, in the bigger sense the relationship remainsstrong," said Jun Iio, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. "Very few people think that it isactually necessary to make major changes in the alliance." But while the alliance is one of the strongest Washington has

anywhere in the world, it has come under intense pressure lately over a plan to make sweeping reforms that would pull backroughly 8,600 Marines from Okinawa to the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam. The move was conceived in response to oppositionon Okinawa to the large U.S. military presence there -- more than half of the U.S. troops in Japan are on Okinawa, which wasone of the bloodiest battlefields of World War II. Though welcomed by many at first, the relocation plan has led to renewedOkinawan protests over the U.S. insistence it cannot be carried out unless a new base is built on Okinawa to replace one that hasbeen set for closing for more than a decade. A widening rift between Washington and Tokyo over the future of the FutenmaMarine Corps Air Station was a major factor in the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama earlier this month. It couldwell plague Kan as well. Kan has vowed to build a replacement facility on Okinawa, as the U.S. demanded, but details areundecided. Implementing the agreement would need the support of the local governor, who has expressed opposition to it. Kanwas scheduled to visit Okinawa on Wednesday for ceremonies marking the end of the 1945 battle there that hastened Japan'ssurrender. Recent tension on the Korean peninsula and China's growing military assertiveness have undoubtedly driven home theimportance of the U.S. security pact with Japanese leaders.

Aff Destroys Deterrence, Forward Deployment key to Power ProjectionBush 10. [Richard. Director at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Okinawa and Security in EastAsia, Brookings Institute. March 10, 2010http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx]More attention, however, is focused on China, which has gradually developed a full spectrum of capabilities, including nuclearweapons. Their current emphasis is on power projection and their immediate goal is to create a strategic buffer in at least the firstisland chain. Although Taiwan is the driver for these efforts, they affect Japan. Of course, capabilities are not intentions. However,how will Japan feel as the conventional U.S.-China balance deteriorates and a new equilibrium is reached, especially knowing thatChina has nuclear weapons? There are also specific points of friction within Northeast Asia such as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, theEast China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan, some of which involve and concern more than one government. Although we can hopethat China will not seek to dominate East Asia at the U.S. and Japans expense, we cant be sure of their intentions either. Hope is noa policy. The most sensible strategyfor both the U.S. and Japanis to try to shape Chinas intentions over time so that they movein a benign direction; so that it has more to gain from cooperation than a challenge. This has been the U.S. and Japans strategy since

the early 1970s. The strategy has a good foundation in economic interdependence. However, it is easier said than done and is one ofthe biggest challenges of this century. The strategy requires at least two elements: engaging and incorporating China as much aspossible, and maintaining the strength and willingness to define limits. This combination of elements is important becauseengagement without strength would lead China to exploit our good will while strength without engagement would lead China tosuspect that our intentions are not benign. If engagement-plus-strength is the proper strategy for the U.S. and Japan each to copewith a rising China, it only makes sense that Japan and the United States will be more effective if they work together,complementing each others respective abilities. The strength side of this equation almost requires Japan to rely on the alliance sincehistory suggests that it will not build up sufficiently on its own. An important part of strength is positioning your power in the rightplaces. That is why forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan has always been important. That is why our presence on Okinawa isimportant.


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Deterrence DA---Japan---1NC

Extinction

Strait Times 2k. [No One Gains in War over Taiwan. June 25, 2000. Lexis Nexis]THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China . If Washingtonwere to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict

on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing hasalready told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forcesattacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to alesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there asopportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefineEurope's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia,hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army whichfought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the USfrom military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and itsimplications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or abroadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat Chinalong before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using

nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijingalso seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a reviewof its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institutefor Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although thegovernment still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leadersconsidered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. GenRidgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war.While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China putssovereignty above everything else.


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Deterrence DA---Japan---2NC---Uniqueness

Presence in Japan key for deterrence

USAToday 5/28. [USATODAY. U.S, Japan to keep U.S Military Base in Okinawa. May 28, 2010.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-28-us-japan-okinawa_N.htm]U.S. military officials and security experts argued it is essential that Futenma remain on Okinawa because its helicopters and

air assets support Marine infantry units based on the island. Moving the facility off the island could slow theMarines'coordination and response in times of emergency. Under a 1960 security pact, American armed forces are allowed broad useof Japanese land and facilities. In return, the U.S. is obliged to respond to attacks on Japan and protect the country under itsnuclear umbrella. The U.S. and Japan "recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan, includingin Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regionalstability," said the statement, which was issued by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of DefenseRobert Gates,Japanese Foreign MinisterKatsuya Okada and Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa. Reaffirming the 2006 deal comes as arelief for Washington. In a phone conversation with President Obama Friday morning Japan time, Hatoyama said Obama"expressed appreciation that the two countries could reach an agreement."

Japan wants US presence

Associated Press 09. [Japan wants US Marine Base to Stay in Okinawa October 23, 2009.

http://us.asiancorrespondent.com/breakingnews/japan-wants-us-marine-base-to-stay-.htm]

Japan's new government moved Friday to defuse a deepening rift with Washington over the future of a major US Marineairfield, saying it supports keeping the sprawling base on the southern island of Okinawa, although in a less populated area.Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, under intense pressure from top US military officials in Tokyo to push the matter this week,said that moving the base now located in the crowded city of Futenma off of tiny Okinawa "is not an option." It was hisgovernment's clearest statement to date that it will implement a sweeping pact negotiated with Washington years ago thatwould relocate the base and move some 8,000 Marines to the US territory of Guam in the Pacific.

Japan wants US to act as a deterrence to foreign powers

Japan Today 4/28. [Okada Says US Marines Needed for Japans Defense. April 28, 2010.

http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/okada-says-us-marines-needed-for-japans-defense]Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada told representatives from Okinawa on Tuesday that U.S. Marines are necessarydeterrence to defend the lives of Japanese and their property against threats from overseas, as Okinawa politicians andcitizens called for the removal of a Marine base from the prefecture. Zenshin Takamine, chairman of the Okinawa prefectural

assembly, quoted Okada as saying he does not think of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station abroad andthat the Marines presence is indispensable as the nations Self-Defense Force alone cannot defend Japan. Prior to themeeting, Okada said in a press conference that the SDF has limits in appropriately responding to any contingency on theKorean Peninsula and military buildups of Asian countries such as China.
http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Military+and+Paramilitary/US+Marine+Corpshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Military+and+Paramilitary/US+Marine+Corpshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Military+and+Paramilitary/US+Marine+Corpshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Hillary+Rodham+Clintonhttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Robert+Gateshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Robert+Gateshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Katsuya+Okadahttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Military+and+Paramilitary/US+Marine+Corpshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Hillary+Rodham+Clintonhttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Robert+Gateshttp://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Katsuya+Okada


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Deterrence DA---Japan---North Korea Impact---Uniqueness

1. Quantifiable Brink Precedes the Link- If we withdraw troops from Japan, North Korea will see

Japan as weak, which causes wars, means we only need to win a small percentage of our link to

access our scenario.

2. North Korea will Perceive Japanese weakness, Japan Today 7/18, If there is no deterrencefrom the United States, theres nothing stopping North Korea from attacking

3. Plan causes Troops to pull out from Japan, effectively triggering the link

Bases will remain in Japan-Despite Opposition

AOLNews 5/28. [Despite Protests, US Base to Stay on Japans Okinawa May 28, 2010.

http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/despite-protests-us-base-to-stay-on-japans-okinawa/19495094]A U.S. Marine base will stay on the Japanese island of Okinawa despite deep opposition by locals, according to a jointstatement today by the U.S. and Japan that sought to convey stability as tensions escalate on the neighboring Koreanpeninsula. But the deal to keep some 25,000 American troops stationed on Okinawa represents a broken promise by JapanesePrime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who was elected last year on a campaign pledge to move the base off the island. Heacknowledged last month that he would probably go back on his promise, and his political future is uncertain now, just weeks

ahead of nationwide mid-term elections. Instead, the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma will be relocated to a less populatednorthern area of Okinawa, the statement said. The move fulfills a 2006 agreement between Washington and Tokyo over thebase. The $10.3 billion plan will also move about 8,000 Marines off Okinawa and onto another U.S. base in Guam. TheOkinawa base has been deeply unpopular with local residents for years, after a series of high-profile incidents soured localsentiment toward American troops there. Locals have staged huge rallies in recent months with up to 100,000 protesters, in aneffort to force Hatoyama to keep his campaign promise. In 1995, three U.S. servicemen were convicted of kidnapping andraping a 12-year-old Japanese girl there. Another Marine was charged in 2008 with raping a 14-year-old Okinawan girl. Andin 2004, a Marine Corps transport helicopter crashed at a nearby university, damaging the campus but causing no injuries onthe ground. Locals also complain of noise and air pollution stemming from the base. Okinawa hosts more than half of the47,000 American troops on Japanese soil. The military base was originally an imperial Japanese facility, which the U.S. tookcontrol of after World War II. It's a strategic one for Washington, because of the southern island's proximity to China, Taiwanand the Korean peninsula, where tensions have skyrocketed in recent weeks over the sinking of a South Korean warship. Aninternational panel implicated North Korea, which denied any involvement, but the flareup has pushed both countries closer

than ever to renewed war.

US will stay in Japan

Christian Science Monitor 5/24. [In Reversal, Japans Hotoyama says Marines can stay on Okinawa

May 24, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0524/In-reversal-Japan-s-Hatoyama-

says-Marines-can-stay-on-Okinawa]Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama backed away from a campaign promise to close the Futenma US Marine base onOkinawa, saying the base should remain open "considering the current situation on the Korean peninsula ." Prime MinisterHatoyama saidJapanwill honor the terms of a 2006 agreement with Washington, which calls for the base to be relocated to a lessdensely inhabited part of the island. The current base in Ginowan City houses about 4,000 Marines. The new base, complete withrunways built on land reclaimed from the sea, will be built near Camp Schwab in the more remote Cape Henoko district of northernOkinawa. Mr. Hatoyama's Democratic Party of Japan promised the base closure ahead of its historic election win last August, and

there has been domestic anger over his failure to take action since.The Ginowan City base is deeply unpopular with Okinawans.Okinawa houses almost half of the 47,000 US service personnel in Japan and three-quarters of the US military bases, despiteaccounting for only 0.6 percent of Japans total land mass. Hatoyama claimed he would ease the burden of the military presenceon Okinawa, both while in opposition and after becoming prime minister.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0514/US-base-in-Okinawa-looms-in-Japan-electionshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0514/US-base-in-Okinawa-looms-in-Japan-electionshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0514/US-base-in-Okinawa-looms-in-Japan-electionshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0514/US-base-in-Okinawa-looms-in-Japan-electionshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0523/Cheonan-warship-sinking-Will-South-Korea-blame-Kim-Jong-il-directlyhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0523/Cheonan-warship-sinking-Will-South-Korea-blame-Kim-Jong-il-directlyhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Topics/Japanhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Topics/Japanhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Topics/Japanhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0302/Japan-stymied-on-US-base-in-Okinawa-as-deadline-nearshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0302/Japan-stymied-on-US-base-in-Okinawa-as-deadline-nearshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0514/US-base-in-Okinawa-looms-in-Japan-electionshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0514/US-base-in-Okinawa-looms-in-Japan-electionshttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0523/Cheonan-warship-sinking-Will-South-Korea-blame-Kim-Jong-il-directlyhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Topics/Japanhttp://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0302/Japan-stymied-on-US-base-in-Okinawa-as-deadline-nears


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Deterrence DA---Japan---North Korea Impact

If US were to leave, there would be nothing to stop North Korea from attacking-US deters

Japan Today 7/18. [North Korea would attack Japan in the event of war: U.S Scholar. July 18, 2010.http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/n-korea-would-attack-japan-in-event-of-war-us-

scholar]

North Korea would attack Japan if another war with the reclusive country erupted as a result of efforts to implement recentlystrengthened U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang over its second nuclear test, a U.S. scholar said Wednesday. SeligHarrison, Asia Program director at the Washington-based Center for International Policy, who visited North Korea in January,sounded the warning during a House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee hearing on North Korea policy. In theevent of another war with North Korea resulting from efforts to enforce the U.N. sanctions, it is Japan that North Koreawould attack, in my view, not South Korea, he said. Nationalistic younger generals with no experience of the outsideworld are now in a strong position in the North Korean leadership in the wake of the illness suffered by the countrys leaderKim Jong Il last year that led to his reduced role in day-to-day management, he said. Earlier this month, the U.N.Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution to punish North Korea over its second nuclear test in late May, centeringon tougher financial sanctions and the stricter enforcement of North Korean cargo inspections. North Korea reacted withanger to the resolution, saying it would weaponize more plutonium, begin uranium enrichment and react militarily toblockades. Harrison attributed North Koreas eagerness to attack Japan to the U.S. military presence in Japan. The reasonU.S. bases in Japan, in all likelihood, he said.

Military Base removal Slows Japans Defenses in time of attack

SamoaNews 5/28. [US, Japan to keep US Military Base in Okinawa. May 28, 2010.

http://www.samoanews.com/viewstory.php?storyid=15508&edition=1275040800]Hatoyama came to office last September promising to create a "more equal" relationship with Washington and move theMarine base off the island, which hosts more than half the 47,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan under a 50-year-old jointsecurity pact. But after months of searching and fruitless discussions with Washington and Okinawan officials, the primeminister acknowledged earlier this month that the base needed to stay in Okinawa. His decision, which he had pledged todeliver by the end of May, has angered tens of thousand of island residents who complain about base-related noise, pollutionand crime, and want Futenma moved off the island entirely. U.S. military officials and security experts argued it is essentialthat Futenma remain on Okinawa because its helicopters and air assets support Marine infantry units based on the island.Moving the facility off the island could slow the Marines' coordination and response in times of emergency. Under a 1960

security pact, American armed forces are allowed broad use of Japanese land and facilities. In return, the U.S. is obliged torespond to attacks on Japan and protect the country under its nuclear umbrella.


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Deterrence DA---Japan---North Korea Impact

Retaining Bases on Japan crucial to security

Bush 10. [Richard. Director at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Okinawa and Security in

East Asia, Brookings Institute. March 10, 2010

http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2010/0310_japan_politics_bush.aspx]

Of course, our two countries and China are not the only ones concerned with the alliance. South Korea has important stakesinvolved in the presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. In the event of a conventional attack by North Korea, SouthKorea has a very strong military, but it also depends on the ability of the United States to move forces quickly to the Koreanpeninsula. It depends on those U.S. forces, including Marines, to dissuade and deter North Korea from even considering anattack. South Korea is comfortable with the relocation of 8,000 marines to Guam, in part because there are already other U.S.troops on the peninsula and in Japan, and also because moving Marines from Guam by air doesnt take long. However, SouthKorea would likely be concerned by signs that the U.S.-Japan alliance was slowly dissolving. If U.S. troops were to beremoved from, first, Okinawa and, then, the home islands, it would likely weaken deterrence. Taiwan also has concerns . TheMarines on Okinawa, plus the U.S. air force, serve to strengthen deterrence in the event of aggression by China againstTaiwan. China will be less likely to mount an attack because the U.S. has both ground troops and an air base on Okinawa. IfChina attacked U.S. installations on Okinawa, that almost ensures a serious conflict. The bases act as a tripwire.

Results is an Apocalypse on Earth

Africa News 99. [Africa Third World War: Watch the Koreas. October 25, 1999. Times of Zambia.http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/199910250010.html]

If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a hugesmouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in theearly 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remaineddangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Koreawill quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South

Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America

and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's

hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor

is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The

American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic

interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses

the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting

entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the

alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described

as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest

concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada

that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet

permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border

line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both

sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to

have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however

be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she

test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a

satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world isanxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore

significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with

North Korea.


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***Turkey***


14/36


Deterrence DA---Turkey---Iran---1NC

Military presence in Turkey deters Iran key to tangible response time and the perception of presence

in neighboring countries.

Rubin, 8 resident scholar at AEI (11/08, Michael, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Can a Nuclear IranBe Contained or Deterred? http://www.aei.org/outlook/28896)

[What Is Required to Contain Iran?Any containment operation against a nuclear Iran would require more than the single battle group that participated in OperationEarnest Will. Should the Islamic Republic acquire nuclear weapons, it may become dangerously overconfident as it convinces itselfthat its conventional, irregular, or proxy forces can operate without fear of serious reprisal from the United States, Israel, or anyother regional power. In order, therefore, to contain a nuclear Iran, the United States and its allies in the region will need to enhancetheir military capability to counter the likelihood of successful Iranian conventional action. There are two strategies that U.S. policymakersmay pursue separately or in tandem. First, U.S. defense planners might examine what U.S. force posture would be necessary for the UnitedStates unilaterally to contain a nuclear Iran. Second, U.S. officials must gauge what investment would be necessary to enable neighboring states to dolikewise. Put more crudely, this requires calculating under what conditions and with what equipment regional states could successfullywage war against Iran until U.S. forces could provide relief. If the Pentagon has pre-positioned enough equipment and munitions inthe region, this might take three or four days; if not, it could take longer. If U.S. forces are to contain the Islamic Republic, they will require basingnot only in GCC countries, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Without a sizeable regional presence, the Pentagon will not be able tomaintain the predeployed resources and equipment necessary to contain Iran, and Washington will signal its lack of commitment to every ally in the region. Becausecontainment is as much psychological as physical, basing will be its backbone.Having lost its facilities in Uzbekistan, at present, the U.S. Air Force relies upon air

bases in Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Oman, and the isolated Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia.


15/36


Deterrence DA---Turkey---Turkish Prolif---1NC

Plan is premature lack of US nuclear deterrence capability against Iran results in Turkish nuclear

weapons threatening international securityBell and Loehrke 9 * MD in International affairs and former Research Assistant for Nuclear Policy at the Center for AmericanProgress ** Ploughshares Fund Research Assistant (Alexandra and Benjamin, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/23/09, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)Then there is the issue ofTehran's nuclear program, which seriously complicates any discussion of the United States removing its tacticalnuclear weapons from Turkey. An Iranian nuclear capability could spark an arms race in the Middle East and bring about a"proliferation cascade," which could cause Turkey to reconsider its nuclear options--especially if the United Statespulls its nuclearweapons from Incirlik. When asked directly about its response to an Iranian nuclear weapon , a high-ranking Foreign Ministry official said thatTurkey would immediately arm itself with a bomb. This isn't Ankara's official policy, but it seems to indicate a general feeling among its leaders.Whether Turkey is primarily concerned about security or prestige, the bottom line is that it would not sit idly by as Iran established a regionalhegemony.A prescription for withdrawal. Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to internationalsecurity. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The

political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda

President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuageTurkish security concerns.

The U.S.-Turkish relationship cooled when Turkey refused to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom, after which Turkish supportfor U.S. policy declined through the end of the George W. Bush administration. Obama's election has helped to mend fences, and his visit to Turkey in Aprilwas warmly received. In fact, all of the administration's positive interactions with Turkey have been beneficial: Washington has supported Turkey's role as a regionalenergy supplier and encouraged Ankara as it undertakes difficult political reforms and works to resolve regional diplomatic conflicts. For its part, Turkey recentlydoubled its troop contribution to NATO's Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan--a boon to U.S. efforts there.By incorporating Ankara into its new European missile defense plans--intended to protect Turkey and other countries vulnerable to Iran's short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles--Washington could further shore up its military relationship with Turkey. Ship-based Aegis missile systems will be the backbone of thestrategy, with considerations left open for later deployments of mobile ground-based interceptors in Eastern Europe or Turkey. This cooperation could provide the

bond with Washington and perception of security that Turkey seeks in the face of a potential Iranian bomb.Because Russia weighs significantly in Turkish security calculations, reductions to Russian strategic and nonstrategic nuclear arsenals also would help improveAnkara's peace of mind. The United States and Russia soon will seek ratification of a follow-on agreement to START. And treaty negotiations in pursuit of furtherreductions to the U.S. and Russian arsenals should involve forward-deployed nuclear weapons, including the U.S. weapons in Turkey. During any such negotiations,

Turkey must be fully confident in NATO and U.S. security guarantees. Critically, any removal of the weapons in Turkey would need to happen inconcert with efforts to prevent Iran from turning its civil nuclear energy program into a military one. Otherwise, Washington wouldrisk compromising Turkey as a NATO ally and key regional partner.

Turkish proliferation will lead to an arms race in the Middle East.

Martin 2000 - research director @ the Nuclear Awareness Project (David H., Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean: TheCase Against Turkeys Akkuyu Nuclear Plant, http://www.cnp.ca/issues/nuclear-threat.html)The dark underside of nuclear power has always been its potential for nuclear weapons proliferation, either through the production of plutonium -- an inevitable

byproduct of reactor operation -- or through the transfer of sensitive nuclear information, technology and materials. Turkeys nuclear program will fan theflames of the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Turkey has also been implicated in nuclear arms aid to Pakistan. An earlier attempt to build anArgentinean-designed reactor was likely aimed at plutonium production for nuclear weapons. Evidence of nuclear smuggling based in Turkey, andTurkeys push for its own nuclear fuel capability and indigenous reactor design, all point to possible nuclear weapons development.The support of prominent Turkish citizens for nuclear weapons development lends credence to this evidence.

Prolif means extinction

Utgoff 2 , survival v. 44 no 2 summer 2002, p. 90Widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a

substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped,we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury thebodies of dead cities or even whole nations.


16/36



US nuclear umbrella acts as a secure deterrent currently no incentive to pursue independent nuclear weapons

NTI 9 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, Turkey Profile, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/turkey/index.html, Updated June 09)Turkey is not known to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or weapons programs, and is a member in good standingof all of the major treaties governing their acquisition and use. Turkey is also active in proliferation prevention efforts such as theU.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[1] While Turkey is situated in a notoriously "dangerous neighborhood"[2] and is often

mentioned as a possible proliferation domino should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, it has relied for its security on the nuclear andconventional deterrence provided by U.S./NATO security guarantees for more than half a century. Turkey's dedication to the nonproliferation regimeis further solidified by its commitment to the European Union accession process, as prospects for Turkish EU membership would be gravely diminished shouldTurkey choose to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.[3] Thanks in part to decades of U.S. military aid and cooperation, Turkey has robust conventionaldefense capabilities, including short-range ballistic missiles. Ankara is also working to procure advanced ballistic missile defense capabilities. Nuclear

Turkey signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1969, ratifying it in 1980, and is subjectto extensive IAEA compliance monitoring through both its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its voluntary membership in the Additional Protocol. Ankarahas also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and participates in nuclear export control efforts such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and theZangger Committee.

As part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, Turkey continues to host approximately 90 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory atIncirlik Air Base.[4] There is some speculation in the Turkish press regarding possible conflict between Turkey's leaders and theUnited States should President Obama's commitment to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" lead to thenear-term withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Turkey.[5] While the weapons serve little strategic purpose, they providetangible evidence of a continued American commitment to Turkish security.

Turkeys at a nuclear crossroads threat and deterrence perception is uniquely high due to Iran

Bell 9 MD in International affairs and former Research Assistant for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress(Alexandra, Turkeys Nuclear Crossroads, 8/25/09, http://www.good.is/post/turkeys-nuclear-crossroads/)The removal of these tactical nukes is an early step on the long road to zero. Getting the five NATO members who hold the tactical nukes torelinquish them quietly will take care, and Turkey may be the toughest piece in this particular part of the disarmament puzzle.I recently returned from a trip to Turkey, coordinated by the Truman National Security Project, an institute that recruits, trains, and positions a new generation of

Americans to lead on national security. In discussions with government officials, civil servants, retired military personnel, academics, andbusinessmen, two things became clear: First, that it is difficult to be positioned at a geographical and societal crossroads, and secondthat you are stuck with your neighbors.The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions. I was interested in what the Turks saw when theylooked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers variedsharply. Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran.

But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran. In fact,

when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry saidthat Turkey would follow suitimmediately.I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too,resulting in a cascade of proliferation. Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions,disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe.

Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I spoke to flippantly noted that it wasIsrael who would be in trouble).Nevertheless, nations acquire nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige.Having a nuclear capability elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club.At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered byNATOs strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey aboutdiscussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying theywere removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes.

They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb.


17/36



Removal of TNWs signals weakening US security commitments abroad - prompting proliferation in Turkey and elsewhere

Laird 9 - national security analyst in the Washington, D.C. (Burgess, A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama's NuclearAbolition Agenda, Carnegie Council, 7/21/09, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0025.html)Many disarmament advocates have argued for a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe for quite some time.The argument is that these weapons no longer have any operational utility as they were deployed to offset the sizeable advantage

enjoyed by Soviet conventional forcesa quantitative advantage that disappeared with the end of the Cold Warand the demise of theSoviet Unionand that their number, size and geographic dispersal makes both the U.S. and Russian weapons difficult and costly to control and secure. In short, they

are proliferation nightmares. Critics point out that such arguments neglect the views of our allies, who see these weapons as concretesymbols of U.S. extended deterrenceguarantees. And to be sure, the high value of these weapons has been frequently reaffirmed, most emphatically, in

NATO's 1999 "Strategic Concept." The Strategic Concept asserts that "The Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and

conventional forces based in EuropeThe Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make aunique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remainessential to preserve the peace." Many U.S. allies, the argument proceeds, especially the newer member states of NATO as well asTurkey and Japan would interpret a withdrawal of the non-strategic nuclear weapons as a significant weakening of U.S. securitycommitments and, in response, some allies might well undertake nuclear weapons programs of their own to ensure their security.

Removing TNWs from Turkey will lead to Turkish proliferation, triggering European proliferation and relations

breakdowns

Lavoy and Walker 06 (Peter and Robin, Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School's

Department of National Security Affairs,http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/NuclearWeaponsProliferation2016Jul06_rpt.asp)Bruno Tertrais of the Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique began his discussion of potential European proliferators by explaining the path taken by Europesnewest nuclear power: France. Frances Fourth Republic lasted from 1946-1958, during which international status considerations trumped security concerns. Noactual decision was made to produce nuclear weapons; the program continued based on small decisions and bureaucratic momentum. Once the program was

operational the decision to test a device was made prior to de Gaulles return to power in 1958, but without regime change Frances program might havestayed virtual. With the start of the Fifth Republic in 1958 the U.S. security guarantee was seen as less credible and securityconsiderations were once again dominant. Being a nuclear power in both the civilian and military realms symbolized modernity and independence.Europe is a unique case in that, while only three countries are actual nuclear weapons states, five non-nuclear weapons states have nuclear weapons stationed on theirterritory and a nuclear security guarantee covers 26 countries. Many countries have been tempted to develop nuclear weapons in the past, primarily the three neutralcountries not in either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but the NATO nuclear guarantee was useful even to neutral countries such as Sweden. Those conditions andinstitutions still exist today, but the Warsaw Pact no longer exists as a threat, and NATO has enlarged, reducing European fears of insecurity.

While Tertrais stressed that nuclear proliferation of any sort is unlikely in Europe, he identified Turkey as the biggest long-term threat, with Ukraine andSerbia as even more unlikely and an EU member dismissed as wild speculation. If Turkey were to move toward nuclear weapons it would be in a post-2010

timeframe and follow the continued breakdown of U.S.-Turkey relations. Catalysts for Turkish proliferation would include failure to be accepted into theEuropean Union and the continued progress of Irans nuclear weapons program and would be exacerbated by a breakdown of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and

the United States withdrawing the nuclear weapons it has based in Turkey.Ukraine and Serbia would also become more inclined to initiate a nuclear program if the NPT broke down and they were denied entry into NATO and the EU, withUkraines decision probably triggered by continued Russian-Ukrainian tensions post 2010 and Serbia triggered by increased Serbian nationalism post 2015. Tertraismost improbably scenario involved a current EU member post-2020 following the perfect storm of a complete breakdown of European society, and serious military

threats in the European neighborhood. If Russia became hyper nationalistic again, Finland, Sweden, and Poland might attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. IfMiddle Eastern proliferation spilled over into the Mediterranean Italy and Spain might arm themselves, possibly followed bysecondary proliferation by Greece, Turkey and, once the nuclear taboo was broken, Germany.Although the prospects of a European proliferator are slim, some elements are factors in all the most likely scenarios. Maintaining the U.S. nuclear securityguarantee as a credible defense, even if the missile defense system becomes effective and is extended to cover Europe, is one keyelement in dissuading potential nuclear weapons states. Additional guarantees from France and the United Kingdom can add to this nuclear peace.Additionally, Europe itself can dissuade countries from arming themselves by allowing them to join the European Union.


18/36


Deterrence DA---Turkey---Turkish Prolif---2NC---Uniqueness

Turkey is committed to a nonproliferation agenda now, doesnt desire regional escalation

Kirecci 9 (Akif, Assistant Prof. Bilkent University, School of Economics Administrative and Social Sciences Jan 21st 2009Turkeyin the United Nations Security Council, SETA Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research)

Given Turkeys emphasis on peacekeeping, a major dilemma could arise for Turkey when the issues of using military power orauthorizing sanctions against another country are brought before the Security Council. The most immediate issue before the Councilwill inevitably be the case against Iran because of its nuclear program. The case against Iran has the potential to turn into aninternational military conflict. While Israel has pressed the US and the UN to take military action against Iran, the EU has shownreluctance. China and Russia likewise disfavor an immediate military operation. Turkeys position regarding Irans acquisition ofnuclear weaponry is clear; Turkey does not want a proliferation of nuclear arms in general, and in its neighborhood in particular.Whether Irans nuclear program is designed for peaceful civil use or to reach military capability, making Iran a nuclear power posinga viable threat to Israel seems to be at the core of the problem. Turkey has tended to accept Irans statements that its nuclear programis intended for peaceful purposes, while the US and Israel have not. The case against Iran in the UNSC seems to be deadlocked asthere is a disagreement among the permanent members: the US and the UK lobby for wider sanctions perhaps before a militarycampaign while China and Russia try to prevent it.


19/36


Deterrence DA---Turkey---Link---NATO

Turkeys faith in NATO is on the brink removing security umbrella encourages Turkish nuclear capabilities

Thrnert 8 Dr., Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin (Oliver, U.S. Nuclear Forces inEurope to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet, 12/10/08 )

Second: Nonproliferation within NATO. The U.S. nuclear presence in Europe was always intended to prevent nuclear proliferation withinthe Alliance. Without a clearly demonstrated nuclear deterrent provided by U.S. nuclear weapons based at Incirlik, Turkey couldhave further doubts about the reliability of NATO's commitment to its security.Turkey already feels let down by NATO's ambivalentresponse to its calls for support in the Iraq wars of 1991 and 2003. Sitting on the outer edge of the alliance, facing a nuclear-weapon-capable Iran, and possibly feeling that NATOs nuclear security guarantee would not actually be extended to it in a crisis, Turkeycould seek to develop countervailing nuclear capabilities of its own.


20/36


Deterrence DA---Turkey---Link---Iran Threat Perception

Alienated from the West, Turkey will seek nuclear weapons because of regional hegemonic deterrence implications, not direc

physical risk already has well developed nuclear program

International Institute for Strategic Studies 8 (IISS strategic dossier, Turkey: Power Balance Concerns,www.iiss.org/EasySiteWeb/GatewayLink.aspx?alId=23353)

In many respects, Turkey should be among the regional countries least affected by Irans nuclear activities. A long-standing memberof NATO, Turkey is formally protected by the collective security guarantee laid out in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thecountrys ties to the West are further strengthened at least in theory by its ongoing accession talks with the European Union(EU). Should these talks be successful, Turkey would receive an immense boost to its standing and prestige in the region. Both thesefactors make it less likely that Turkey would respond to a nuclearcapable Iran by seeking to acquire nuclear weapons itself.However, the Turks have a lingering scepticism about NATO guarantees, which they did not feel were forthcoming in the First andSecond Gulf Wars. A hardening EU mood against Turkish accession is adding to a growing alienation from the West in Turkey, andcould give the country more reason to consider its own deterrent. Turkish government officials have not yet thought through howbest to respond if Iran goes nuclear, in part because they are more preoccupied today with the issue of Kurdish separatism and theIraq imbroglio. The Turks are concerned about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, not because they fear Iran would threaten themwith such weapons, but rather because the development would upset the regional balance of power to Turkeys disadvantage. IfTurkey did seek to establish its own deterrent, it would do so with the advantage of already having in place a well-establishednuclear-research agency, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK). Furthermore, preliminary work has begun on a civilian

nuclear-energy programme that appears likely to move ahead, thereby expanding Turkeys nuclear expertise. If its current nuclear-energy plans are fulfilled, Turkey could have a functioning nuclear power reactor by 2020. Consequently, although Turkey is notlikely to be the country most threatened by Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is the Muslim neighbour most able technicallyto respond in kind.


21/36


Deterrence DA---Turkey---Turkish Prolif---Impact 2NC

1. Turkish soft power

a. The consequences of Turkish proliferation will cause a breakdown and international shun of Turkey

Udum 07 (Sebnem, Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3,

No. 2, 2007 57-65 //www.scienceandworldaffairs.org/PDFs/Vol3No2_Sebnem.pdf)

On the other hand, a decision for Turkeys acquisition of nuclear weapons would not be a rational choice: if Turkey would decide to go nuclear,international pressure would be intense. Turkey is already a candidate to the EU, and has a membership perspective, which ties Turkey firmly to the Westand the Western liberal zone. Becoming an EU/EC member has been a state policy, based on the modernisation process dating back to the Ottoman times. Turkeysnuclear aspirations would jeopardise this process and would have high political costs. Likewise, it would have adverse effects on relations with the United States,

which is an indispensable ally despite all the tensions. Economic sanctions would be applied to the already sensitive Turkish economy, whichwould impair micro and macro balances. Condemnation and isolation from the international community would be unbearablemilitarily, politically and economically. What is more, the place of nuclear weapons in the military strategy is doubtful, that is, against which country wouldTurkey use it or threaten to use it? If it were Iran, there are other more powerful international and regional actors. Turkey has other leverages that it could use against

Iran in diplomatic relations. Last but not least, it would make Turkey a target [20]. Turkeys non-nuclear weapon status 63 What would draw Turkey intomaking a choice would not only be questions on its alliances and threat perceptions. Turkeys difference from the other states in the Middle East,which are concerned about Irans nuclear program, is its EU perspective. Turkey is materially and ideationally between the East and the West. Its EU prospects keepthe country in cooperative mechanisms to address security issues. If this perspective is lost, it is highly likely that it will be drawn into the Realist zone of

international security in the East, and could base its security policy on material capabilities. Considering the status of relations with the United Statesand the instability in the region, the country could be motivated to seek self-sufficiency, and perhaps to seek a nuclear weaponscapability. Most of the issues that are brought forward in the United States and the EU accession negotiations touch upon Turkeys national security referents,

basically social and territorial integrity, which lead the country to take a defensive position and to prioritise its security interests over political goals. Thus, it isintegral to understand Turkeys security concerns, and to keep it in the Western liberal zone of security.

b. Turkeys diplomatic ability key to Middle East stability

etinsaya 8 (Gkhan etinsaya, Ph.D., Professor of History and International Relations at Istanbul Technical University,Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, The New Middle East, Turkey, and the Search for Regional Stability, AtlanticCouncil, http://www.acus.org/publication/us-turkey-relations-require-new-focus/cetinsaya)

Finally, it appears in recent months that there emerges a new division or a new cold war in the Middle East: on the one hand the socalled radicals (or anti-American actors: Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hizbullah); on the other, the so called moderates (or pro-Americans: Saudi Arabia,Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait). They struggle for power over Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and both sides fight proxy wars. In this new picture,

all groups look to Turkey, and all groups want Turkey in their camp. But Turkey is extremely anxious over these developments in theregion. What Turkey wants? Turkey does not want confrontation or a new cold war in the Middle East between the Shiites and Sunnis or pro-Americans and anti-Americans; Turkey wants an engaging dialogue, security building measures, peace and stability, cooperation and integration. Turkeywants to play a constructive, facilitating and balancing role in the new Middle East. Turkey wants to establish balanced and equalrelations with all actors on all levels. Turkey argues that discourses based on confrontation should be abandoned; an active, constructive andmultidimensional discourse and policy which emphasizes peace, security, democracy and stability should be developed. To this effect, Turkey is ready topursue a comprehensive public policy towards the people and actors of the region and international actors. On the level of discourse,participatory democracy based on territorial integrity, effective use and fair share of resources, ethnic-sectarian integration, pluralist unity, security for all, constitutionof basic rights and freedoms, political consensus and stability should be emphasized as Turkeys expectations. From Turkeys point of view, the new Middle Eastneeds four fundamental features for peace and stability: a) a regional security system for all; b) mutual political dialogue; c) economic integration andinterdependence in the region; d) cultural pluralism in the region.


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Deterrence DA---Turkey---NATO Cohesion---1NC

US nuclear deterrent in Turkey key to NATO security umbrella and cohesion

Bell and Loehrke 9 * MD in International affairs and former Research Assistant for Nuclear Policy at the Center for AmericanProgress ** Ploughshares Fund Research Assistant (Alexandra and Benjamin, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11/23/09, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey)

Roadblocks to removal. In 2005, when NATO's top commander at the time, Gen. James L. Jones, supported the elimination of U.S.nuclear weapons in Europe, he was met with fierce political resistance. (In addition to the 90 B61 bombs in Turkey, there are another110 or so U.S. bombs located at bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.) Four years later, some U.S. and Europeanofficials still maintain that the political value of the nuclear weapons is enough to keep them deployed across Europe. In particular,they argue that the weapons are "an essential political and military link" between NATO members and help maintain alliancecohesion. The Defense Department's 2008 report on nuclear weapons management concurred: "As long as our allies value [thenuclear weapons'] political contribution, the United States is obligated to provide and maintain the nuclear weapon capability."Those who hold this view believe that nuclear sharing is both symbolic of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the UnitedStates and NATO have committed to defending each other in the event of an attack. They argue that removing the weapons woulddangerously undermine such cohesion and raise questions about how committed Washington is to its NATO allies.

Escalating global conflicts

Jackson 99 (Bruce, President of US Committee on NATO, The Conservative Case for NATO, Policy Review, Apr/May,Http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3552212.html)

NATO is at the center of all U.S. military strategies. Critics have read far too much into the current absence of a serious rival to U.S. interests on theworld stage. This happy circumstance will surely change. If, for example, a threat were to emerge from a resurgent Russia (and given the events of the

past six months in Russia, that is at least conceivable), there would not be time in which to reconstitute a NATO-like alliance on the front line.In the event ofconcerted aggression by militant Islamic states, perhaps in possession of weapons ofmass destruction,NATOwill protect ourflank and secure our supply lines. And, finally, if the security interests of the West are drawn to the containment of Chinese expansion,NATO will guard the strategic rear of the alliance and make the forward deployment of U.S. forces possible. In all cases, NATO isthe common denominator in the grand strategy of the West. The imperative of consolidating the center is axiomatic in military strategy, and NATOstands at the center of our alliance structure. If the centrality of NATO were not enough, there is also the appeal of the plasticity of the alliance, particularly our

ability to refocus its strategic concept. Conservatives, especially, who have a proud tradition as realists, must conclude that the new threats to transatlantic securitycome from out-of-area, and that NATO can be adapted to counter these threats to our interests. NATO reflects the American way of war.Politically untidy though they may be, our arrangements with Europe reflect a national consensus on the part of Americans that we intend to prosecute ourobjectives in warnot unilaterally but in coalition with our allies. Having made this decision, mechanisms like NATO become a fact of life. In order to figheffectively as a coalition, an alliance has to plan and train together as well as exchange views on the concept of joint operations. Without themechanisms of coordination developed within NATO, the success of ad hoc coalitions, like Desert Storm, would be doubtful. Obviously,there is concern about the inevitable compromises that keep coalition partners in the fold and that may impinge to some degree on U.S. sovereignty. But conservatives

should recognize that these modest measures are necessary in the conduct of foreign affairs. Moreover, conservatives, in particular, should tend to favorcoalitionmechanisms because they limit the potential overseas ambitions of governments even our own and they provide the means to share the financialburdens of defense with our European allies. NATO remains "the military expression of a community of shared values." It is often said that NATO is morethan just a military alliance; it has served as the political foundation on which Europe has been rebuilt over the past 50 years. NATO played and still plays adecisive role in consolidating the victory of the West in the Cold War. It is also the only institution that appears capable of countering the crimesagainst humanity being committed in the Balkans. It is not unreasonable to foresee that NATO as a political vehicle will continue to broaden the Euro-Atlantic community to include democracies as distant as Estonia or Finland in Northern Europe and Romania and Bulgaria in Southeast Europe. Over time, non-

NATO allies of the United States in our hemisphere, such as Argentina and Chile, may seek a closer political relationship with NATO. Inthe future, and in the context of new missions, NATO might also institutionalize coordination with Israel, which maintains an historical relationship with the UnitedStates and has recently concluded a strategic arrangement with Turkey, NATOs easternmost member. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that a reformed alliance

focused on a new set of missions might welcome a more formal relationship with a country that shares our values and could contribute materially to the security andstrategic depth of the Euro-Atlantic region. Regardless of how NATOs political role is manifested in the next decade, conservatives will tend to support institutionsof invested values dedicated to their protection. It should not come as a surprise to conservatives that Judeo-Christian values over the past millennium and democraticideals over the past 350 years have required protection by force of arms. For the past 50 years, NATO has provided that protection with a very light hand. NATOsmission in Europe is unfinished. Even if one concedes that Americas interests will eventually diverge from those of our European allies, it is still far too soon for theUnited States to disengage from Europe. The most obvious reason for this is that the Europeans do not want us to leave in the foreseeable future. We have seen anumber of instances in which other institutions have been unable to cope with serious European problems. NATOs effectiveness compares favorably to the

performance of UNPROFOR at Sebrenica and throughout Bosnia. And with the failure of the October 1998 Kosovo agreement which called for peace monitors

from the OSCE Europeans and Americans agreed that only a NATO mission could keep the peace. While critics have argued that U.S. vital interests arenot at stake in Bosnia or Kosovo, the persistent pattern of political and military failure at the periphery of our power (by coalitions other than NATO) should

produce renewed respect for NATOs singular role in protecting the Atlantic democracies. The European experiment for which NATO is the predicate isincomplete, and it would be foolish in the extreme to disassemble the security structure that has made modern Europe possible. A unified Germany is only sevenyears old and much remains to be decided about its direction, its purpose, and how it intends to manage its preponderant power in Europe. A European currency is a


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Northwestern Debate Institute 2010 23Seniors Deterrence DAfew months old, and the political affects of partial monetary union are as yet unknown. While 60 million souls in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are nowformally NATO allies, the integration of these countries into NATOs military structure and the achievement of full interoperability are at least a decade in the future.Moreover, there are another 50 million people in Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria who hope to come into Europe from the coldand who aspire to join the economic and security institutions of the Euro-Atlantic. Finally, and most important, there is a war of aggression and genocide in theBalkans where NATO forces are engaged. To paraphrase Lady Thatcher, now is not the time to go wobbly on NATO. If it is the end of NATO, it is the end of a lotmore than NATO. Advocates of NATO expansion, and proponents of NATO in general, often ask critics to imagine the past fifty years without the alliance. Criticswho argue that NATO is unnecessary must also maintain that U.S. security is defensible in the future without what has come to be regarded as the Wests insurance

policy. A world without NATO would be a world with a radically changed political order one about which we know little, and what we can

imagine is troubling. We can imagine that the United States would be without an immediate brake on Russian imperial recidivism. We would be unable tomoderate and guide the rise of German power. We would lack incentives to keep Turkey engaged in Europe. The reinforcement anddefense of Israel in extremis would be vastly more difficult. The boundary lines within which we now contain rogue states andpursue the containment of weapons ofmass destruction would have to be abandoned and moved thousands of miles closer to the territory of the UnitedStates. The defense of the Gulf States would be problematic at best. And a credible Pacific security policy would be heavily burdened by therequirement to maintain major forces in an unsettled Atlantic region. At a minimum, the disestablishment of NATO would require military expenditures at near

wartime levels. A conservative view and I believe the correct view is that the current international system in which NATO serves ascornerstone has been remarkably friendly to U.S. interests and has not imposed particularly onerous financial burdens on our economy. Overturningthe conditions that brought about such a relatively felicitous state of affairs risks exposing the United States and our remaining allies to a much harsherinternational environment, one that may make far greater demands of American blood and treasure.


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Deterrence DA---Turkey---NATO Cohesion---Link

The nuclear sharing deterrent is a crucial sign of security commitment to NATO members that binds them together

NATO 4 (NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environment, 6/3/04,http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NATOissue060304.pdf)

The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces that remain is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion. NATO's nuclearforces contribute to European peace and stability by underscoring the irrationality of a major war in the Euro-Atlantic region. Theymake the risks of aggression against NATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that conventional forces alone cannot. Togetherwith an appropriate mix of conventional capabilities, they also create real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage

through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance. The collective security provided by NATO's nuclear posture is sharedamong all members of the Alliance, providing reassurance to any member that might otherwise feel vulnerable. The presence of U.S.nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provides an essential political and military link between the European andNorth American members of the Alliance. At the same time, the participation of non-nuclear countries in the Alliance nuclear posturedemonstrates Alliance solidarity, the common commitment of its member countries to maintaining their security, and the widespreadsharing among them of burdens and risks.
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NATOissue060304.pdfhttp://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NATOissue060304.pdf


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Deterrence DA---Turkey---NATO Cohesion---Spillover Impact

Removal of TNWs signals weakening US deterrence commitments abroad - prompting proliferation in a host of nations

Laird 9 - national security analyst in the Washington, D.C. (Burgess, A Guide to the Challenges Facing President Obama's NuclearAbolition Agenda, Carnegie Council, 7/21/09, http://www.cceia.org/resources/articles_papers_reports/0025.html)

Many disarmament advocates have argued for a withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe for quite some time.The argument is that these weapons no longer have any operational utility as they were deployed to offset the sizeable advantageenjoyed by Soviet conventional forcesa quantitative advantage that disappeared with the end of the Cold Warand the demise of theSoviet Unionand that their number, size and geographic dispersal makes both the U.S. and Russian weapons difficult and costly to control and secure. In short, they

are proliferation nightmares. Critics point out that such arguments neglect the views of our allies, who see these weapons as concretesymbols of U.S. extended deterrenceguarantees. And to be sure, the high value of these weapons has been frequently reaffirmed, most emphatically, in

NATO's 1999 "Strategic Concept." The Strategic Concept asserts that "The Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and

conventional forces based in EuropeThe Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make aunique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remainessential to preserve the peace." Many U.S. allies, the argument proceeds, es

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