“If Slocum wasn’t Slow”...July 1, 1863 - Northeast of Geysburg An ADF Scenario “The Corps could easily have joined in the bale the first day. The distance from our starng point to the balefield might have been traversed by noon.” E.R. Brown, 27 th IN, 3 rd Bde, 1 st Div, XII Corps Historical Situaon: Two Taverns was a pleasant stop along the Balmore Pike on the road to Geysburg and Major General Henry W. Slocum had decided that it was an appropriate place to rest the Army of the Potomac’s XII Corps and for the past two hours that was what he and his corps were doing. It was somewhat past noon – lunch me – and Two Taverns was only four to five miles from Geysburg and should the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George C. Meade, order him and his corps forward to support what sounded like a growing bale, his corps would be rested and ready. But, as yet, he had not received any clear cut orders to advance, and Henry Slocum was a sckler for orders. Earlier that morning he had received an ambiguous and possibly discreonary order which said, “...assume posion for offensive or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest the troops.” Prior to that he had received General Meade’s Pipes Creek Circular which to him, strongly suggested that Meade’s preferred plan was to fight a defensive bale along Pipe’s Creek and that for that bale Henry Slocum would be acng as a wing commander with command over both the XII and the V Corps. With these two communiques in hand, Henry Slocum chose the opon to rest and wait for more direct orders from General Meade or from Meade’s designated field commander, Major General John F. Reynolds -- who, unknown to Slocum, was already two hours dead. As the day wore on, the noise of bale increased and Slocum had received two messages from Major General O. O. Howard, the commander of the Union XI Corps that things were not going well and that he needed help. But, it was a request and not an order, and Slocum did not take orders from General Howard, he took them from General Meade. So, XII Corps connued to rest. By late aſternoon, Slocum had received a message that whenever he finally arrived at the new Union posion on Cemetery Hill, he would be in command of the field unl General Meade arrived. With the news that he would in charge – he finally got the XII Corps on the road and even diverted its first Division under Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams northward to support XI Corps’ right flank. But, it was too lile and too late. By 6:00 PM, Williams was in posion to move on Wolf’s or even Benner’s ill – but, the bale was very much over and Howard’s hard luck XI Corps had again been rolled up two hours earlier by Jubal Early’s veteran Confederate division. And with that sad news, Williams and his division was ordered to rejoin the rest of the XII Corps on the Balmore Pike. However, had Henry Slocum simply decided to march to the sound of the guns three hours earlier, he could have easily had Wil- liam’s First Division arriving on XI Corps flank by 3:00 PM. Had that happened, Early’s division would have had to turn and face Wil- liams rather than easily steamrolling over Barlow’s Knoll and the poorly deployed XI Corps. Would it have made a difference on the first day of Geysburg? Maybe, as it probably would have bought enough me for XII Corps’ second division to also get into the fight and perhaps even the lead elements of V Corps. At best, it probably would have resulted in the first day ending in a draw This scenario assumes that Slocum orders William’s division with the XII Corps Arllery Brigade forward to the right flank of XI Corps, in much the same way that was actually done – but three hours earlier. In reality, since everything about the XII Corps was leisurely, Lockwood’s large green brigade did not arrive unl early on July 2 – but, since this scenario assumes that XII Corps re- sponded with more urgency, we have Lockwood arriving in the late aſternoon on July 1. Scenario Setup -- Within the indicated brigade areas the respecve player can set up the regiments in either Bale Line or Extended Line. Also each full brigade that begins on the board may deploy up to two regiments up to three inches forward as skirmishers. This opon is not available for the two regiments from Von Gilsa’s brigade – the 45 th NY and the 153 rd PA. Due to the openness of the terrain northeast of Geysburg, the normal half inch requirement for adjacent and/or supporng units is extended to one inch. Scenario Victory Condions -- If by the end of the last turn of the game, the Confederates have five regiments south of the York Pike and west of the Hospital Woods OR across Rock Creek south of the Harrisburg Road, they have won. The Union wins if the Confederates have three or less regiments south of the York Pike and west of the Hospital Woods or across Rock Creek. Anything in between is a draw. The Confederates may count any one regiment that is across Rock Creek north of the Harrisburg Road towards their required five regiment Victory Condions. The scenario is six turns long, beginning at 3:00 PM and ending at 6:00 PM. The Order of Bale, Special Scenario Rules -- The Confederates have the iniave and will be acve first. For the Confederates: Carrington’s Baery is not released unl TURN TWO. Unl the 45 th NY and the 153 rd PA are driven off the board Gordon’s brigade must engage them with at least two regiments. Once those two Union regiments are driven off, Gordon’s two regiments are released for other dues. Confederate regiments may cross Rock Creek north of the Harrisburg Road. But, only one such regiment will count towards the Confederate victory condions. For the Union: The two regiments of Von Gilsa’s XI Corps Brigade – the 54 th NY and the 153 rd PA – cannot move, but only shoot. If they are forced to retreat off the board they are lost. The two Von Gilsa regiments were being supported by Wilkeson’s Baery firing over their head from Barlow’s Knoll and hence those two regiments get a +1 DRM when they fire unless the Confederate tar- gets are closer than two inches from the 54 th NY and 153 rd PA. If the Rebels move closer than two inches they loss that benefit. Figure Photo Courtesy Corwyn Ring The leſt wing of Gordon’s Brigade clears the Bringham farm as it moves against the just arrived XII Corps.
Transcript
“If Slocum wasn’t Slow”...July 1, 1863 - Northeast of Gettysburg An ADF Scenario “The Corps could easily have joined in the battle the first day. The distance from our starting point to the battlefield might have been traversed by noon.” E.R. Brown, 27th IN, 3rd Bde, 1st Div, XII Corps
Historical Situation: Two Taverns was a pleasant stop along the Baltimore Pike on the road to Gettysburg and Major General Henry W. Slocum had decided that it was an appropriate place to rest the Army of the Potomac’s XII Corps and for the past two hours that was what he and his corps were doing. It was somewhat past noon – lunch time – and Two Taverns was only four to five miles from Gettysburg and should the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George C. Meade, order him and his corps forward to support what sounded like a growing battle, his corps would be rested and ready. But, as yet, he had not received any clear cut orders to advance, and Henry Slocum was a stickler for orders. Earlier that morning he had received an ambiguous and possibly discretionary order which said, “...assume position for offensive or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest the troops.” Prior to that he had received General Meade’s Pipes Creek Circular which to him, strongly suggested that Meade’s preferred plan was to fight a defensive battle along Pipe’s Creek and that for that battle Henry Slocum would be acting as a wing commander with command over both the XII and the V Corps. With these two communiques in hand, Henry Slocum chose the option to rest and wait for more direct orders from General Meade or from Meade’s designated field commander, Major General John F. Reynolds -- who, unknown to Slocum, was already two hours dead.
As the day wore on, the noise of battle increased and Slocum had received two messages from Major General O. O. Howard, the commander of the Union XI Corps that things were not going well and that he needed help. But, it was a request and not an order, and Slocum did not take orders from General Howard, he took them from General Meade. So, XII Corps continued to rest. By late afternoon, Slocum had received a message that whenever he finally arrived at the new Union position on Cemetery Hill, he would be in command of the field until General Meade arrived. With the news that he would in charge – he finally got the XII Corps on the road and even diverted its first Division under Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams northward to support XI Corps’ right flank. But, it was too little and too late. By 6:00 PM, Williams was in position to move on Wolf’s or even Benner’s ill – but, the battle was very much over and Howard’s hard luck XI Corps had again been rolled up two hours earlier by Jubal Early’s veteran Confederate division. And with that sad news, Williams and his division was ordered to rejoin the rest of the XII Corps on the Baltimore Pike.
However, had Henry Slocum simply decided to march to the sound of the guns three hours earlier, he could have easily had Wil-liam’s First Division arriving on XI Corps flank by 3:00 PM. Had that happened, Early’s division would have had to turn and face Wil-liams rather than easily steamrolling over Barlow’s Knoll and the poorly deployed XI Corps. Would it have made a difference on the first day of Gettysburg? Maybe, as it probably would have bought enough time for XII Corps’ second division to also get into the fight and perhaps even the lead elements of V Corps. At best, it probably would have resulted in the first day ending in a draw
This scenario assumes that Slocum orders William’s division with the XII Corps Artillery Brigade forward to the right flank of XI Corps, in much the same way that was actually done – but three hours earlier. In reality, since everything about the XII Corps was leisurely, Lockwood’s large green brigade did not arrive until early on July 2 – but, since this scenario assumes that XII Corps re-sponded with more urgency, we have Lockwood arriving in the late afternoon on July 1.
Scenario Setup -- Within the indicated brigade areas the respective player can set up the regiments in either Battle Line or Extended Line. Also each full brigade that begins on the board may deploy up to two regiments up to three inches forward as skirmishers. This option is not available for the two regiments from Von Gilsa’s brigade – the 45th NY and the 153rd PA. Due to the openness of the terrain northeast of Gettysburg, the normal half inch requirement for adjacent and/or supporting units is extended to one inch.
Scenario Victory Conditions -- If by the end of the last turn of the game, the Confederates have five regiments south of the York Pike and west of the Hospital Woods OR across Rock Creek south of the Harrisburg Road, they have won. The Union wins if the Confederates have three or less regiments south of the York Pike and west of the Hospital Woods or across Rock Creek. Anything in between is a draw. The Confederates may count any one regiment that is across Rock Creek north of the Harrisburg Road towards their required five regiment Victory Conditions. The scenario is six turns long, beginning at 3:00 PM and ending at 6:00 PM.
The Order of Battle, Special Scenario Rules -- The Confederates have the initiative and will be active first.
For the Confederates: Carrington’s Battery is not released until TURN TWO. Until the 45th NY and the 153rd PA are driven off the board Gordon’s brigade must engage them with at least two regiments. Once those two Union regiments are driven off, Gordon’s two regiments are released for other duties. Confederate regiments may cross Rock Creek north of the Harrisburg Road. But, only one such regiment will count towards the Confederate victory conditions.
For the Union: The two regiments of Von Gilsa’s XI Corps Brigade – the 54th NY and the 153rd PA – cannot move, but only shoot. If they are forced to retreat off the board they are lost. The two Von Gilsa regiments were being supported by Wilkeson’s Battery firing over their head from Barlow’s Knoll and hence those two regiments get a +1 DRM when they fire unless the Confederate tar-gets are closer than two inches from the 54th NY and 153rd PA. If the Rebels move closer than two inches they loss that benefit.
Figure Photo Courtesy Corwyn Ring
The left wing of Gordon’s Brigade clears the Bringham farm as it moves against the just arrived XII Corps.
Terrain Description and Effects -- There are two high ground areas. There is a long, low, gradually sloping hill in the center of the area. There is no extra movement cost to go up or down it and its crest is not high enough for artillery to fire over the heads of any infantry below it. But, it is high enough to block line-of-sight (LOS) for LOS attempts across it crest – which is marked by a fence line. Units that get within one inch of its crest line can see over the hill without any blind spots. The three Confederate batteries of Green, Garber and Tanner can all fire at some element of McDougall’s Brigade.
The second high ground is the higher hill in the southeast corner of the area. It is higher and steeper. Units going upslope – de-fined as moving closer to the “high hilltop field” area do so at the broken terrain rate. Those units moving across the slope or down the slope do so at the normal open terrain rate. Artillery batteries in the high hilltop field area can fire over the heads of any friendly units provided those units are not on the adjacent “green” slope areas and provided they are not within three inches of the intended enemy target unit.
Rock Creek is considered rough terrain and units entering it are immediately in disorder. The small streams cost one inch or noth-ing extra if the whole move is made as if in broken terrain. The woods around Rock Creek are treated as Heavy Woods for all effects. The woods elsewhere are treated as Light Woods for all effects. Orchards are treated as broken terrain for movement and block LOS if trying to see completely through them – but, no impediment to see into them. Orchards provide a “-1 DRM” target benefit from infantry fire; but, no benefit from artillery fire. Each fence costs one inch of movement or a unit can make the whole movement as if in broken terrain with unlimited fence and stream crossings. If a unit is in a built-up farm area – an enclosed fenced area with a building in it – the target gets a “-1 DRM” from artillery fire, and a “-3 DRM” from infantry fire – but no “additional” benefit from the fences. Units in a farm area do receive the “-1” morale benefit for being in cover. The railroad has no effect on anything, except where it passes through woods, and then it can be used as a trail.
Now, about all those woods fences – historically there were a lot of them in the Gettysburg area and the map reflects where they were according to best historical estimates. However, if your collection of fences is not up to the quantity indicated – first lay out the farm areas and then an adequate representation of this battlespace could be very adequately simulated with about half the indicated numbers by only portraying every other fence.
Game Board Size -- Depends on Figures Used For 6/10mm figures, each square is 12 inches. For 15/20mm figures, each square is 18 inches. For 25/28mmfigures, each square is 24 inches.
“If Slocum Wasn’t Slow”
Maj. Gen’l. Jubal Early - the cranky veteran commander of an excellent veteran divi-sion of Ewell’s II Corps.
Brig. Gen’l. Alpheus Williams - a dependable division com-mander of Slocum’s XII Corps
II Corps / Early’s Division - Major General Jubal Early, Leadership Benefit (LB) = 1
Gordon’s Brigade - BG John Gordon (LB = 2)
13th GA - 330 men - 6 figs - R/M - Elite 26th GA - 333 men - 6 figs - R/M - Elite 31st GA - 269 men - 4 figs - R/M - Veteran 38th GA - 343 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 60th GA - 318 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 61st GA - 307 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran
Hays’ Brigade - BG Harry Hays (LB = 1)
5th LA - 209 men - 4 figs - R/M - Elite 6th LA - 232 men - 4 figs - R/M - Elite 7th LA - 248 men - 4 figs - R/M - Elite 8th LA - 314 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 9th LA - 366 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran
Smith’s Brigade - BG William Smith (no LB) Arrives on Turn Three Northeast Edge In Any Formation 1st VA - 280 men - 4 figs - R/M - Veteran 49th VA - 280 men - 4 figs - R/M - Veteran 52nd VA - 271 men - 4 figs - R/M - Veteran
Early’s Divisional Artillery Battalion - Lt Col. Hillary P. Jones - all batteries are Vet
Setup Conditions -- Regiments can be set up in any order within their brigade designed areas. Batteries are positioned as illustrated. Brigade leaders are setup within one inch of any of their regiments. Early is within three inches of any of his brigade commanders. All infantry units have opening volley. A commander’s leadership benefit (LB) applies to any adjacent unit of their command only for morale checks, not for firing.
XII Corps / 1st Division - Brig Gen’l Alpheus Williams, (LB) = 1
1st Brigade - Col. A. McDougall (LB = 1)
5th CT - 318 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 20th CT - 380 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 3rd MA - 242 men - 4 figs - R/M - Elite 123rd NY - 472 men - 8 figs - R/M - Veteran 145th NY - 264 men - 4 figs - R/M - Veteran 46th PA - 296 men - 4 figs - R/M - Elite
2nd Brigade - BG Harry Lockwood (LB = 1)
1st MD Eastrn Shore, 583 men, 10 figs, R/M, 1/1st MD Pot Hm Bde, 370 men, 6 figs, R/M, 2/1st MD Pot Hm Bde, 370 men, 6 figs, R/M 1/150th NY, 323 men, 6 figs, R/M 2/150th NY, 323 men, 6 figs, R/M For ADF all are trained units
3rd Brigade , BG Thomas Ruger (LB = 1)
27th IN - 339 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 2nd MA - 397 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 13th NJ - 360 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 107th NY - 346 men - 6 figs - R/M - Veteran 3rd WS - 285 men - 4 figs - R/M - Elite
XII Corps Artillery Brigade - Lt. Edward D. Muhlenberg (no LB)
All XII Corp batteries start limbered, in column, on Wolf’s Road.
Setup Conditions -- Regiments can be set up in any order within their brigade designed areas. Batteries are positioned as illustrated. Brigade leaders start or come in within one inch of any of their regiments. Williams starts at the Wolf farm. All infantry unit’s have opening volley benefit. A commander’s leader-ship benefits (LB) apply to any one adjacent unit of their command morale checks, movement or firing.
Union Arrivals - Enter at south edge in march column on Wolf’s Road TURN 1: 3rd Bde TURN 2: 2nd Bde - 1st MD, Eastern Shore TURN 3: 2nd Bde - 1st MD, Pot Home Bde TURN 4: 2nd Bde - 150th NY
1st Brigade (-), 1st/XI Corp 54th NY - 216 men 4 figs - R/M - Veteran 153rd PA - 569 men 8 figs - R/M - Veteran Units can’t move, only shoot If retreat, they are lost.
AP
PR
OX
IMA
TELY
1.2
5 M
ILES
McDO
UGALL’S BRIGADE
XII CORPS A
RTY BRIGA
DE
CARRINGTON
Not Release
d
until TURN 2
GRE
EN
GAR
BER
TANNER
HAYS’ BRIGADE
GO
RDO
N’S BRIG
AD
E
Artillery in this area can fire
over the heads of units not
on the light green slope
areas and not within three
inches of the target unit.
HOKE’S BRIGADE
HOSPITAL WOODS
153rd PA
54th NY
XI C
OR
PS
UN
ITS
HOSPITAL
WOODS
2:00 PM GORDON’S BDE 2:00 PM
HAY’S BDE 2:30 PM
JONES’ ARTY BN 2:00 PM
HOKE’S BDE 3:00 PM
Early’s Division Has the Initiative Infantry arrives in any formation within the designated area . Artillery arrives limbered on the road.
SMITH’S BDE 4:00 PM
2:00 PM
XII CORPS ARTY BDE 2:30 PM
3:00 PM RUGER’S BDE
LOCKWOOD’S BDE 4:00 PM
1st Div / XII Corps
Slocum Arrives -- 2:00 PM Start This version of the scenario has the scenario beginning at 2:00 PM and going to 6:00 PM for a total of eight turns and can be linked with the other Gettysburg July 1 afternoon scenarios. By itself, the Victory Conditions are the same.
DEVIN’S CAVALRY BRIGADE - Col. Thomas Devin (1 LB)
1/6th NY - 110 men - Elite - Sharps Carbine - 4 figures 2/6th NY - 110 men - Elite - Sharps Carbine - 4 figures 1/9th NY - 183 men - Elite - Sharps Carbine - 6 figures 2/9th NY - 183 men - Elite - Sharps Carbine - 6 figures 1/17th PA - 190 men - Vet - BL Carbine - 6 figures 2/17th PA - 190 men - Vet - BL Carbine - 6 figures 3/17th PA - 130 men - Vet - BL Carbine - 4 figures
Special Rules - Devin’s Cav. Bde.
Due to previous fighting that morning, roll 1D6 for total figure losses for Devin’s Brigade. Dis-tribute losses as equally as possi-ble among the regiments.
All units start dismounted in a cavalry line or skirmish order.
Due to being engaged all morning all regiments have a +2 MMP modifier due to fatigue and have no opening volley benefits.
If any unit fails a morale check it must remount and retires off the board via the York Pike.
If any unit remounts, it must re-tire of the board as above.
Once two units have begun retir-ing off the board for any reason, all the rest of the brigade will remount and retire off the board via the York Pike.
DEVIN’S CAVALRY BDE
DEVIN’S CAVALRY BRIGADE
Game Board Square Sizes 6/10mm uses 12 inch squares 15/20mm uses 18 inch squares 25/28mm uses 24 inch squares
Combined Scenario If this scenario is combined with the Barlow’s Knoll scenario then the restriction against Early’s units crossing Rock Creek does not apply. Likewise, in the com-bined scenario XI Corps units from the Barlow’s Knoll scenario are also free to cross Rock Creek.
Movement Restrictions Early’s units may not cross Rock Creek north of the Heidelsburg Road -- but are free to do so south of the Heidelsburg Road.
Artillery on the highest elevation in this area can fire over the heads of units at least two eleva-tions lower.
![Our campaign around Gettysburg by John Lockwood (publ 1864) [Actions near Harrisburg PA in 1863]](https://static.documents.pub/doc/80x56/577ce4821a28abf1038e82a9/our-campaign-around-gettysburg-by-john-lockwood-publ-1864-actions-near-harrisburg.jpg)
