Appellant Reply Brief: NCOPM v Gov. Brown, Attorney General Harris, Labor Commissioner

8/13/2019 Appellant Reply Brief: NCOPM v Gov. Brown, Attorney General Harris, Labor Commissioner

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Case No. 13-55545

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

__________________________________________________________

National Conference of Personal Managers, Inc.

Plaintiff-Appellant

vs.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr. et al

DefendantsAppellees

__________________________________________________________

Appeal from United States District Court, Southern District of CaliforniaDistrict Court Case Number CV 12-09620

The Honorable Dean D. Pregerson, Judge, Presiding__________________________________________________________

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF

__________________________________________________________

STEPHEN F. ROHDE (SBN 51446) CHRISTOPHER B. GOOD (SBN 232722)LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN F. ROHDE RYAN H. FOWLER (SBN 227729)1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400 FRANK W. FERGUSON, II (SBN 211694)Los Angeles, CA 90067 FOWLER & GOOD LLPTel: (310) 277-1482 15303 Ventura Boulevard, 9

thFloor

Fax: (310) 772-0405 Sherman Oaks, CA 91403Tel: (818) 302-3480Fax: (818) 279-2436

Attorneys for Appellant National Conference of Personal Managers, Inc.

Case: 13-55545 01/16/2014 ID: 8941711 DktEntry: 36 Page: 1 of 42


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1

II. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 4

A. APPELLEESFAILTOADDRESSFLAWSINTHETAA ............................ 4

B. APPELLEESFAILEDTOADDRESSAPPELLANTSCLAIMSTHETAAISUNCONSTITUTIONALLYVAGUEINVIOLATIONOFTHEDUEPROCESSCLAUSE ............................................................................................11

C. APPELLEESFAILEDTOPROPERLYADDRESSCLAIMSTHETAABURDENSANDRESTRICTSCOMMERCIALSPEECHINVIOLATIONOFTHEFIRSTAMENDMENT ................................................................................17

D. APPELLEESDONOTADDRESSCLAIMSTHATTHETAAVIOLATESTHECOMMERCECLAUSE ..............................................................................21

E. APPELLEESFAILEDTOADDRESSCLAIMSTHATWITHOUTAPENALTYPROVISIONTHELABORCOMMISSIONERHASNOAUTHORITYTOUSETHETAATOIMPAIRCONTRACTS .........................23

F. APPELLEESFAILEDTOADDRESSCLAIMSTHATTHETAAIMPAIRS

THEOBLIGATIONSOFCONTRACTSINVIOLATIONOFARTICLEI,SECTION10OFTHEU.S.CONSTITUTION ....................................................26

G. APPELLEESIGNOREDAPPELLANTSCLAIMSTHATINVOIDINGTHERIGHTTOCOMPENSATIONFORLABORWITHOUTCLAIMSOFFRAUDORNON-PERFORMANCE,TAAENFORCEMENTVIOLATESTHETHIRTEENTHAMENDMENT ..........................................................................29

I. APPELLEESFAILTOADDRESSOTHERCLAIMS ..................................33

III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................34

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................36

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................37



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FEDERAL CASES

Bailey v. Alabama,219 US 219, 241 (1911) ...........................................................32

BMW of America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995) ..............................................24

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council467 U.S. 837 (1984)..............................................................................................................................13

Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142 (1922), .....................................................................27

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) ..................................................................20

Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 435 U.S. 149 (1978) ......................................................19

Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) ..................................18

Hoffman Est. v. The Flipside, Hoffman Est., Inc., 455 U. S. 489 (1982) ................18

New York Times v. Sullivan,376 U.S. 254 (1964) ..................................................19

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,436 U.S. 447 (1978) ..................................19

Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) ..........................................................19

Smith v. Bach,183 Cal. 259 (1920) .......................................................... 8, 9, 10, 28

Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 15 (2011) ......................................................18

Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1923) .............................................27

United States v. Evans,333 U.S. 483 (1948) ...........................................................25

United States v. Kozminski,487 U.S. 931 (1988) ....................................................30

Virginia State Board Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425U.S. 478 (1976) ....................................................................................................18

STATE CASES

Albaughv. Moss Constr. Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 126 (1954) ........................ 9, 10, 11

Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347 (1967) ............. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11

Loving & Evans v. Blick,33 Cal. 2d 603 (1949) ...................................... 8, 9, 10, 28



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Severancev. Knight-Counihan Co., 29 Cal. 2d 561 (1947) ......................... 8, 10, 28

Wood v. Krepps,168 Cal. 382 (1914) ................................................. 8, 9, 10, 28, 29

STATUTES

42 USC 1983 ........................................................................................................... 1

CA Business & Professions Code 6068 ................................................................24

CA Business & Professions Code 7028 ................................................................10

CA Business & Professions Code 9887.2 ............................................................... 7

CA Labor Code 1700 et seq. (Talent Agencies Act) .............................................. 1

CA Labor Code 1700.4(a).............................................................................. 15, 17

California Civil Code 1599 ...................................................................................26

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Brief for Music Managers Forum-US et al. as Amicus Curiae ................................. 8

Brief for SAG-AFTRA et al. as Amicus Curiae ......................................................11

Historical and Statutory Notes of Labor Code 1701 ............................................16

Report of the CA Entertainment Commission .........................................................16Strang, Lee J.,Federal Constitutional Law: Federalism Limitations on State and

Federal Power, Vol. 4 (2011) ...............................................................................28

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Art. 1, Sec. 8 (Commerce Clause) ............................................................ 1, 2, 21, 23

Art. 1, Sec. 10 (Contracts Clause)............................................................. 1, 2, 26, 28

First Amendment ..................................................................................................2, 17

Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................................................. 1

Tenth Amendment ................................................................................................2, 22

Thirteenth Amendment ........................................................................................3, 29



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LABOR COMMISSION DETERMINATIONS

Behr v. Dauer and Assoc. (TAC 21-00) .................................................................... 5

Blasi v. Marathon (TAC 15-03) ..............................................................................4,5

Creative Artists Group v. Jennifer ODell(TAC 26-99) ........................................... 5

Gittlemann v. Karolat (TAC 24-02) .......................................................................4,5

Jewel v. Inga Vainshtein(TAC 02-99) ...................................................................... 5

Macy Gray v. Lori Leve Management (TAC18-00) ...............................................4,5

Park v. Deftones (TAC 9-97) ..................................................................................4,5

Parker Posey v. Lita Richardson(TAC 7-02) ........................................................... 5

Solis v Blancarte, TAC 27089 (October 2013)................................................. 5, 6, 8

Tool v. Larrikin Management(TAC 35-01) .............................................................. 5

Transeau v. 3 Artist Mgmt.(TAC 73-06) .................................................................. 5

Wesley Snipes v. Delores Robinson (TAC 36-96) ..................................................... 5



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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellants Opening Brief ("AOB") details how the California Talent

Agencies Act ("TAA") is facially and as applied unconstitutional, in violation

of the Contracts Clause, Commerce Clause, First, Thirteenth and Fourteenth

Amendments of the U. S. Constitution. As a result, Appellees under color of the

TAA have subjected Appellant and its members to the deprivation of their

rights, privileges and immunities secured by the U. S. Constitution in violation

of 42 USC 1983.

Appellees Answering Brief ("AAB") attempts to support the District

Court's ruling dismissing the Complaint with prejudice. As detailed below,

Appellees arguments fail as a matter of law, are unsupported by case law or

rely upon misleading, incomplete, false or nonexistent citations. Appellees

often simply fail to dispute or challenge Appellants arguments, conceding their

merit.

Attempting to persuade the Court that the TAAs Fourteenth Amendment

constitutionality is well settled, Appellees fail to recognize that the one

precedent on which all TAA determinations are founded is legally

unsupportable. Appellees ignore how the TAA fails to provide clear notice of

who is regulated, what if anything is regulated and what are the consequences

for ignoring a regulation. Appellees also fail to address Appellants claim that



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without a penalty provision enacted by the Legislature, the Labor

Commissioner has no authority to invoke the TAA to impair contracts or order

disgorgement.

As a direct result of the lack of adequate notice in violation of their rights

to due process, Appellants First Amendment right to free speech is greatly

hindered and restrained. Regardless of his intent or motivation at the time a

statement is made, a personal manager cannot be certain whether what he says

may someday be used against him in support of a claim that his words violated

the TAA. Commercial speech proposing a transaction is afforded protection

under the First Amendment.

Appellees mislead the Court by refusing to acknowledge or ignoring the

fact that no TAA licensee is wholly domiciled outside the State of California.

Under the Tenth Amendment, states are powerless to license business

occupations or premises outside their sovereign borders. The TAA imposes a

license tax on interstate commerce and is an economic protectionist act favoring

in-state licensees over out-of-state competitorsall violations of the

Commerce Clause.

Appelleesargument that the TAA does not violate the Contracts Clause

fails as a matter of law and legislative intent. Appellees fail to establish that the

Legislature ever considered voiding contractual rights for TAA violations and



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concede that forfeitures denying compensation for services already rendered are

not favored in law.

Appellees also fail to dispute that the Commissioner's enforcement of the

TAA unconstitutionally voids contractual rights to compensation without

findings or fraud, non-performance or criminality, in violation of the Thirteenth

Amendment.

Appellees do not credibly dispute Appellants contention that the District

Court abused its discretion by failing to consider the Complaint in its entirety.

Appellees have quoted citations inappropriately, out of context or falsely.

Appelleesoverriding theme is, If we say it is so and we say it is so over and

over, it must be so. Appellees attempt to defend an indefensible statute and its

unconstitutional, unlawful enforcement; resulting in the forfeiture of an

estimated $500,000,000 in otherwise-owed compensation.1

It is manifest that the Complaint alleges plausible, indeed highly persuasive,

constitutional claims, which were prematurely dismissed with prejudice. The

District Court's ruling should be reversed and the TAA should be declared

unconstitutional, or at a minimum, the case should be remanded to the District

Court.

1Johnson, Ted, Showbiz Managers Seek Appeals Court Ruling on Talent AgenciesAct, Variety(Oct. 9, 2013).



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II. ARGUMENT

A. APPELLEES FAIL TO ADDRESS FLAWS IN THE TAA

The Court needs look no further thanMacy Gray(TAC 18-00) and

Deftones(TAC 9-97), plus Gittleman(TAC 24-02) andBlasi(TAC 15-03) to

be provided with a front row seat to the unconstitutional inequities and

violations perpetrated on Appellants via the TAA. InMacy GrayandDeftones,

each artists manager arranged and coordinated a showcase for their clients

before music industry executives. After only one showcase, Gray procured a

recording contract. The Deftones manager tenaciously repeated approximately

83 times the exact same actions as Grays manager before his artist procured a

recording contract. Both artists sought to terminate their management contracts

and avoid paying their managers by claiming that their managers procured

employment in violation of the TAA. The same identical act of alleged

procurement occurred in each case, but the Commissioners rulings were

completely different. Grays manager was found not to have violated the TAA,

while the Deftones diligent manager was found to have violated the TAA.

These discrepancies are not limited to music. In the following cases, the

artist appeared on a TV talk show. Both artists later sought to have their

contracts terminated by claiming their managers had violated the TAA by

procurement. Gittleman (TAC 24-02) holds that a talent agency license is



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not required for the procurement of a guest appearance on a talk show

provided the appearance does not involve the rendition of artistic

services.Id

., p. 27. But inBlasi

(TAC 15-03), decided the same year

as Gittleman, the Commissioner ruled that helping an actress procure

appearances on three talk shows (where the actor was not acting) did

violate the TAA. Id., p. 21. Same facts, same year, opposite rulings. How is

the TAA anything other than unconstitutional?

The Commissionerscontrary decisions with identical fact patterns are the

epitome of arbitrary and unconstitutional enforcement. See Determinations2

Appellees ignored.AOB, pp.20-23.

Equally important,Buchwald v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 347

(1967), nearly twenty years prior to the 1985 enactment of the TAA, relied on

by Appellees (AAB, p.9) and the one precedent on which all TAA

determinations are founded when assigning remedies, is legally unsupportable.

Most recently, in Solis v Blancarte, TAC 27089 (October 2013) the Labor

Commissioner ruled:

2Wesley Snipes v. Delores Robinson (TAC 36-96),Creative Artists Group v.Jennifer ODell(TAC 26-99),Behr v. Dauer and Assoc. (TAC 21-00), Tool v.Larrikin Management(TAC 35-01), Transeau v. 3 Artist Mgmt.(TAC 73-06),Parker Posey v. Lita Richardson(TAC 7-02),Jewel v. Inga Vainshtein(TAC 02-99), Gittlemann v. Karolat (TAC 24-02),Blasi v. Marathon (TAC 15-03),MacyGray v. Lori Leve Management (TAC18-00),Park v. Deftones (TAC 9-97).



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Since the clear object of the Act is to preventimproperpersonsfrom becoming [talent agents] and to regulate suchactivity for the protection of the public, a contract between anunlicensed[talent agent] and the artist is void." SolisSupra,

p.9, lines 3-11; quotingBuchwald,p.351.

Appellees have offered no evidence Californias legislature ever sought to

prevent "improper persons" becoming talent agents or intended to void the

contracts of unlicensed persons who procure employment for an artist.

If California wanted to ensure "improper persons" did not become talent

agents, it would have codified conditions of competence, experience and/or

education as a barrier to obtaining a license, as it does for lawyers, contractors,

doctors, etc.

James Blancarte, Esq. is a transactional entertainment attorney, the first

lawyer whose contractual right to compensation were voided by the

Commissioner under the TAA. The Commissioner determined that Blancarte

had renegotiated sportscaster Mario Solis's employment contract without a

TAA license or working with a licensed agent. Solis supra, p.8, ln.1p.9, ln.2.

To practice law, attorneys must meet the academic qualifications to

graduate from law school, pass the bar exam and every three years thereafter

meet continuing education requirements.

Conversely, applicants for a TAA license need only complete a few forms,

(see http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/talent_agency_license.html) obtain two



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personal recommendations, submit fingerprints, remit a $50,000 bond and pay a

$250 fee (which violates the Commerce Clause).AOB pp.36-37. Even

applicants for an automobile lamp and brake adjustors license must

demonstrate basic experience and qualifications (CA Business and Professions

Code 9887.2.)

The TAA has no such requirements.

Transactional attorneys specialize in drafting and negotiating contracts, skills

that benefits artists. But as interpreted by the Commissioner, artists who want the

benefit of legal advice must also add the financial burden of engaging a separate

talent agent. As attorneys generally charge 5% and agents 10%, how does hiring a

non-specialist at twice the cost protect the artist, or three times the cost if both an

agent and attorney are used? Solis was not looking for a new job; he wanted help

renegotiating with his current employer.

Appellees argue the enforcement of the TAA should be affirmed despite

presenting no evidence that the Legislature wanted to reserve procurement to

proper individuals. Limiting procurement to licensees may be the Labor

Commissionerspurpose, but it clearly has never been the Legislatures, nor

does it serve artists or anyone else.

Appellees present a list of supposed protections offered under the TAA in

support of maintaining that the TAA serves an important public policy. Of all



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the claimed protections, not a single one is unique to the TAA and in fact all

protections listed by Appellees already exist in the law of contracts and

consumer protection. The TAA does not promote a necessary public policy. To

the contrary, it creates unnecessary confusion and uncertainty at the expense of

Appellants constitutional rights. This point reaffirms the foundational claim of

the Southwest Law Schools amicus brief: Appellees enforcement of the TAA

fails the rational basis test.

Appellees argument that the Commissioner only acts in a quasi-judicial,

not quasi-legislative capacityalso fails.AAB, p.25. By inventing prohibitions

and consequences to unlicensed procurement, the Commissioner acts as an

unelected super-legislator.

But beyond the fact that Appellees have invented a clear purpose for the

TAA that is directly contrary to the actual, documented and unrefuted purpose

of protecting artists from employers masquerading as agents (AOB, p.42), the

purported authority for voiding contracts is downright bewildering. The recent

Blancarte Determination and previous TAA Determinations founded upon

Buchwald ignore the five citations on whichBuchwaldis supposedlybased:

Wood v. Krepps,168 Cal. 382 (1914),Loving & Evans v. Blick,33 Cal. 2d 603

(1949), Smith v. Bach,183 Cal. 259 (1920), Severancev. Knight-Counihan Co.,

29 Cal. 2d 561 (1947) andAlbaughv. Moss Constr. Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 126



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(1954). In fact,Buchwaldconflicts with all five cases which actually hold that

voiding a contract is only proper under circumstances that do not exist in the

TAA.

Wood refused to void a contract because the relevant licensing scheme did

not, declare that a contract made by any one in the conductof the various

businesses for which licenses are provided to be procured under the ordinances,

shall, if a license is not obtained, be invalid; nor is there any provision therein

indicating in the slightest that this failure was intended to affect in any degree

the right of contract.Id., p.386. As the TAA neither declares contracts of

unlicensed people invalid nor in any way indicates such failures should affect

the right of contract, instead of supporting Wood, Buchwaldcontradicts Wood.

Loving & Evansheld,"it has been repeatedly declared in this state that a

contract made contrary to the terms of a law designed for the protection of the

public and prescribing a penalty for the violation thereof is illegal and void, and

no action may be brought to enforce such contract."Id., pp.608-609 (emphasis

added). As the TAA has no prescribed penalty whereby procuring employment

for artists without a license is "illegal and void,"BuchwaldcontradictsLoving.

Smith held, "the imposition by statute of a penalty implies a prohibition of

the act to which the penalty is attached, and a contract founded upon such act is



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void."Id., p.262 (emphasis added). Since the TAA has no penalty provision,

Buchwaldcontradicts Smith.

Severanceheld, [i]f the statute does not provide expressly that its

violation will deprive the parties of their right to sue on the contract, and the

denial of the relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public

policy or appropriate individual punishment, the right to recover will not be

denied. (Citation omitted.)Id.,p.568. Instead of supporting Severance,

Buchwaldcontradicts Severance.

Albaughis a California Contractors Act dispute. CA Business &

Professions Code 7028 expressly prohibits non-licensees from engaging in

the activities of a contractor and 7031 expressly prohibits compensation for

unlicensed work. SeeId,, pp.131-132. As the TAA has neither a prohibitive

provision like 7028 nor a penalty provision like 7031,Buchwaldcontradicts

Albaugh.

We agree with Appellees that [w]hen interpreting state law, federal

courts are bound to follow the decisions of the states highest court.AAB,

p.20.Under Wood, Loving, Smith and Severance, administrative agencies only

have authority to impair contracts or void a contract when a statute provides

notice of the prohibition and prescribes a penalty.Buchwald does not claim to

be a change in law or interpretation; it claims to follow Wood, Loving, Smith,



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SeveranceandAlbaugh.This Court should follow the casesBuchwald

inexplicably contradicts.

Appellees blindly rely onBuchwald four times.AAB, pp.9,13,25,29.

Appellees even argue that TAA enforcement is constitutional because it has

been validly applied for more than 25 years,3an argument obliterated by

recognizing thatBuchwaldand therefore all subsequent TAA precedents are

founded upon misinterpretations of the law consistently recognized in Wood,

Loving, Smith, SeveranceandAlbaugh.4

B. APPELLEES FAILED TO ADDRESS APPELLANTS CLAIMS

THE TAA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN VIOLATION

OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

Due process requires that the procedures by which laws are applied must

be evenhanded, so that individuals are not subjected to the arbitrary exercise of

government power. This requires that the individual be given adequate notice.

Notice should provide sufficient detail to fully inform the individual of the

decision or activity that will have an effect on his/her rights or property or

person. There must be clear notice of prohibitions and the consequences of

3Contrary to Unions amicus claim, Courts have repeatedly upheld the [TAAs]constitutionality, no appellate court has ever ruled on its application.AOB, p.19.

4Appellees also fail to address how the applicability ofBuchwaldis evisceratedwith the recognition that in 1967, when it was decided, the scheme had a penalty

provision that was repealed in 1982.AOB, p.6.



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ignoring them. The TAA fails to provide adequate notice of who is subject to

regulation, what conduct is covered by regulation and what the penalty is for

violation of said regulation.

Under the canon ofExpression unius est exclusio arterius, courts are

obliged to assume that the only regulations the Legislature chose to enact are

those included in a list of requirements and/or prohibitions in the statute.AOB,

pp.18-19.

Appellees, in opposition to this basic tenet of law and without adequate

support or justification, argue the law of statutory construction should be

ignored in schemes like the TAA where the Legislature, delegates interpretive

and implementing power to administrative agencies.AAB, p.28.However, as

detailed by Appellants, the Labor Commission has continually provided

diametrically inconsistent rulings on matters with identical fact patterns. These

are unacceptable and unconstitutional interpretations of 1700.4 by the

Commissioner. Appellees concede that deference to an administrative agency to

interpret and implement a statute is revoked when the interpretation is plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.AAB, p.32.Despite this

concession, Appellees refuse to acknowledge that this is precisely what is

occurring with the interpretation and implementation of the TAA.



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conflicts of interpretation are of the Commissioners own making. It was the

Commissioner who ruled procuring talk show appearances violated the TAA

and months later, did not.AOB, p.22.It was the Commissioner who ruled

personal managers must be able to act proactively and not play a game of

Mother May I; but at other times ruled they can never act proactively.AOB,

p.21.If the Commissioner cannot discern the bright line between lawful and

unlawful behavior, the enforcement is unconstitutional.

In regards to who is subject to regulation under the TAA, Appellees argue

that the California Supreme Court has already considered and rejected the

claim the TAA applies only to the occupation of talent agent and provides

clarity as to whom the TAA regulates.AAB, p.20. This is incorrect.Appellees

do not and cannot refute Appellants claim that the term manager in 1700

refers to ones position in the company, not their occupation.

Appellees fail to refute Appellants argument that the TAA must be

interpreted similar to the licensing schemes that limit the use of occupational

titles to licensees, rather than limiting activities to licensees.AOB, p.17.

Just as gardeners and landscape designers can beautify outdoor areas,

bookkeepers can keep accounting records, and salespeople, teacher and lawyers

can use psychological techniques to change behaviorall without having the

requisite licenses simply by abjuring the labels of landscape architects,



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accountants and psychologists. So too can Appellants members procure

employment, as long as they do not label themselves talent agents. Appellees

do not and cannot explain why TAA enforcement should be different.

Instead Appellees incorrectly argue, If appellants logic were accepted

and the TAA only applied to those who self-identify as talent agencies, then

anyone can circumvent the statute by simply abjuring the label talent agency.

AAB, p.21.

In regards to regulated conduct, Appellees argue, the text of [Labor Code

1700.4(a)] makes it plain that procuring employment is the activity for

which talent agencies must obtain a license.AAB, p.5.

Appellees incorrectly argue only one of the three defining activities of a

talent agent creates prohibitions; the other two are irrelevant.AAB, p.18.

However, the surplusage rule cannot be discarded even if it interferes with the

Commissioners desired enforcement policies. If only one defining activity

creates a prohibition, there must be written exceptions to explain why the others

do not.AOB, p.17.

In their Summary of the Case, Appellees pretend to paraphrase the

Complaint: According to appellant, if a person has procured employment for

an artist without a license, the Labor Commissioner is empowered to impair the

contract. ER p.182, 38.AAB, p.3.This is false, misleading and inaccurate as



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Appellants state just the opposite. The California Legislature never adopted

any statute that instructs, guides or provides the Labor Commission, which is

empowered to hear all relevant controversies, to impair the contract when i[t]

finds an individual or business has violated the [TAA].ER, p.182.

Appellees also misappropriate legislative history. Under the guise of

providing legal background and historical legislative support, Appellees

adamantly argue that, the California Legislature reaffirmed the need for the

TAA and the TAA is necessary for the public welfare, citing the Historical

and Statutory Notes of Labor Code 1701.AAB, p.8.

Appellees are aware and know that 1700 and 1701 are not the same

statute. 1701 is aprovision of CA Labor Code Chapter 4.5 regarding Fee

Related Talent Services, not the TAA. Yet despite this difference, Appellees

have employed 1701, a completely different and irrelevant code section, to

support their position regarding legislative intent. Appellees argument by any

measure is wrong in light of their faulty and improper reliance on 1701.

Appellees are aware that the legislative intent for the TAA is provided for

in the report of the CA Entertainment Commission (CEC). In fact they cite it in

their brief. AAB, p.19.But they pointedly omit the Reports specific finding

relevant to the Legislatures intent:

The principal, andphilosophically the most difficult, issuebefore the Commission, the discussion of which consumed a



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substantial portion of the time of most of the meetings of theCommission, was this first issue: When, if ever, may a personalmanager or, for that matter, anyone other than a licensed talentagent, procure employment for an artist?

No clear legislative intent can be discerned to assist inanswering this critical and fundamental question.Id.at 7.5

As the CEC clearly found no evidence of legislative intent after studying

this issue for three years,6 Appellees assertion that the Legislatures intent is

made plain byreading 1700.4(a) is wholly disingenuous and completely

inaccurate.AAB, p.5.

For all of the aforementioned reasons as well as the accurate detailing of

the legislative intent it is clear that the TAA is unconstitutionally vague and

violates Appellantsright to due process.

C. APPELLEES FAILED TO PROPERLY ADDRESS CLAIMS THE

TAA BURDENS AND RESTRICTS COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN

VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Appellant has presented a substantial case that the restrictions imposed by

the TAA on commercial speech cannot be justified under the current test for

restraints on commercial speech.AOB, pp.38-43.

5 The parties filed slightly different versions of the CEC Report. Both includeidentical information but vary in where the TAAs Background is placed. Thiscitation appears on p.7 of the version submitted by Appellees and p.15 inAppellants submission.

6The CEC was created in 1982; (Id., p.2) the report submitted on December 2,1985.Id., p.34.



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Appellees argue this claim fails because Appellant failed to challenge the

TAA as overbroad.AAB, p. 38. This is not the case. "It is irrelevant whether

the ordinance has an overbroad scope encompassing other persons' commercial

speech, since the overbreadth doctrine does not apply to commercial

speech."Hoffman Est. v. The Flipside, Hoffman Est., Inc., 455 U. S. 489 (1982).

Appellees argue that based on Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336

U.S. 490 (1949), the commercial speech claim fails because the TAA regulates

conduct, not speech.AAB, pp.39-40.Again, this is not the case. As Giboney

considered codified provisions that prohibited the disputed conduct and the

TAA has no such provisions, Giboneyis not applicable. Further, Appellees

conspicuously ignore thatGiboneypredates the Supreme Courts reformulation

of the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Board Of Pharmacy v.

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 478 (1976).AOB, pp. 40-41.

Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 15 (2011) affirms that conduct of creating

and disseminating information to propose a commercial transaction is

expression protected by the First Amendment. Since 1976, speech that does no

more than propose a commercial transaction is nonetheless of such social value

as to be entitled to protection.Id., AOB, p.40;see Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,

564 U.S. 15 (2011).



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Next, Appellees incorrectly cite Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,436

U.S. 447 (1978).AAB, p.39. Rather than commercial speech, Ohralikdealt with

a lawyer engaged in the general misconduct proscribed by the Disciplinary

Rules regarding a lawyers solicitation of business through direct, in person

communication with the prospective clients.Id., p.454.

Appellees then argue this claim fails because enforcing the TAA is not a

state action. They rely onFlagg Brothers v. Brooks, 435 U.S. 149 (1978),

which dealt with private enforcement of a statutory lien and involves neither a

state agency nor state action; andRendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).

AAB, pp.40-42.Rendall-Bakerconsiders a private school teacher fired by a

private school. It, too, involves no state action. Here, Appellant is challenging

the interpretation and enforcement of a statestatute by a stateadministrative

agency, on its face and as applied, which obviously involves state action. See

New York Times v. Sullivan,376 U.S. 254 (1964).

Appellees correctly admit, [o]nly when a public official takes affirmative

steps to enforce those remedies does state action arise.AAB, p.42. The

Commissioner takes the affirmative steps of accepting Petitions for Controversy

for actions where there are no prohibition or penalty provisions in the statute

and stays any court actions by the talent representatives to enforce their

contractual rights. Then, if violations are found, the Commissioner voids



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contracts and orders disgorgement, assigning remedies that must be

characterized as criminal, despite there being no criminality. The Commissioner

accepting controversies, holding hearings without basic protections such as the

right to discovery, to confront the accuser within a court of law, a decision

being made not bound by the judicially constructed rules regarding evidence

or civil procedure,and voiding contracts is inarguably state action interfering

with private commerce.

Appellees argue, even if procuring employment was protected expressive

conduct, the TAA would still pass muster because the states interest in

regulating talent agents, may give it concomitant interest in expression itself.

AAB, p.43, quotingEdenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). However,

Edenfieldheld that Floridas ban on direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation by

CPA's cannot be sustained under the First Amendment.Id. At 767. This has

absolutely nothing in common with the facts, circumstances or issues presented

in this matter.

Appellees ignore and do not address the four-prong test established by the

Supreme Court to measure the validity of restraints on commercial expression

despite state interests.AOB, pp.41-43. The reason for this conscious omission

is that any attempt to apply the aforementioned Supreme Court created test to

this matter would fail.



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This Court should declare the TAA as written and enforced burdens and

restricts commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment and order the

District Court to enjoin the enforcement of the TAA.

D. APPELLEES DO NOT ADDRESS CLAIMS THAT THE TAA

VIOLATES THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

Appellant claims the TAA, facially and as applied, impedes the flow of

commercial trade across state lines, deprives out-of-state competitors from

equal access to the lucrative California talent market and directly burdens

interstate commerce; all in violation of the Commerce Clause.AOB, pp.30-39.

Appellees do not address any of Appellantsfollowing interstate commerce

claims:

(1) The TAA requires payment of a license fee for carrying on an occupation

engaged in interstate commerce, which burdens interstate commerce.

AOB, pp.36-37.

(2) The channels, instrumentalities and activities of Appellant have a

substantial effect on interstate commerce. AOB, pp.30-31.

(3) The TAA facially regulates commerce that takes place outside of

Californias borders. AOB, p.35.

(4) Unlicensed parties can enter Californias talent marketplace only by

involving an in-state licensee, economic protectionism discriminating in



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favor of in-state interests over out-of-state competitors. AOB, p.35.

Appellees argue Appellants entire [Interstate Commerce] claim rests on

the premise that only persons who reside in California may obtain a talent

agents license andAppellant, cites no authority for this notion other than an

unwarranted inference from the fact where the statute requires a license to state

the licensees address, it omits to include the state of residence.AAB, pp.34-

35.

These arguments misrepresent the facts. Appellant cites the Commissions

website and the 719 listed TAA Licensees (as of October 1, 2013); none of

whom are wholly domiciled outside California.AOB, p.34.Appellees do not

contest Appellants claim that the handful of listed out of state licensees all

have California residency status.AOB, p.33.

Appellees fail to refute that the TAA requirement to use licensed agents

even when engaging in out-of-state commerce is protectionist and

unconstitutional. SeeAOB, p.38,where personal managers for The Platters and

Anita Baker lost their contractual rights for utilizing out-of-state agents to get

their clients work in Midwest venues and France, respectively.

Appellees fail to refute Appellants claim that the Commissioner lacks

Tenth Amendment authority to license occupations or premises located outside

of Californiasborders.AOB, pp.31-32.



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Appellees speak to the import of the entertainment industry to Californias

economy.AAB, p.44. Perhaps, but the Commerce Clause prohibits licensing

schemes from protecting a state or occupations economics, as the TAA does,

or payment of a license fee by in-state practitioners to engage in interstate

commerce.AOB, pp.36-37.

Nothing presented by Appellees moots the argument that the District Court

erred in finding Appellant did not state a plausible claim for a violation of

interstate commerce and that no amendment to the Complaint could cure any

pleading insufficiency. The Court should find the TAA on its face and as

applied is unconstitutional in violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S.

Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.

E.

APPELLEES FAILED TO ADDRESS CLAIMS THAT WITHOUT

A PENALTY PROVISION THE LABOR COMMISSIONER HASNO AUTHORITY TO USE THE TAA TO IMPAIR CONTRACTS

The AOB presented multiple authorities all concluding administrative

agencies cannot invent and mete out penalties without codified guidelines enacted

by the Legislature.AOB, pp.24-25.

Appellees argue because TAA disputes are civil, the cases cited by

Appellant are irrelevant as all concern the creation of crimes and penalties

imposed by government action.AAB, pg.24 fn.11.They also argue one of



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Appellants authorities,BMW of America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1995),

actually undermines Appellants argument.Id.

Once again Appellees misrepresent the facts. BMW is a civil matter. More

important, Appellees again provide only half of a citation; distorting its true

holding. They quoteBMWto the effect that, strict constitutional safeguards

afforded to criminal defendants are not applicable to civil cases, (Id.) without

including the remainder of that sentence: but the basicprotection against

'judgments without notice' afforded by the Due Process clause [citation] is

implicatedby civil penalties. (Id.)

As the TAA contains no civil penalty, Appellees interpretation and

enforcement results in unconstitutional penalties without notice. Rather than

undermining Appellants argument,BMWs holding, that a person receive

fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also

of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose, affirms Appellants

claim and establishes the Complaint should not have been dismissed with

prejudice.Id.7

7According to BPC 6068, attorneys may counsel or maintain those actions,proceedings or defenses only as appear to him or her legal or just, and may never

seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement offact or law. Appellees have submitted several misleading statements.AAB,p.3,8,19,24,27,33,35,39.



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Appellees argument that the Legislature built in extraordinary due process

provisions into the TAA by allowing for de novoappeal to a superior court

(AAB, p.5) is groundless. It is analogous to arguing an arrest without probable

cause is not a civil rights violation because there are subsequent remedies for

police abuse. It is a civil rights violation to wrongfully arrest someone,

regardless of a subsequent appeal. Without the Legislature enacting any

prohibition or penalty in the TAA, the Commissioner violates the Constitution

the moment a controversy is accepted, which stays any efforts by the personal

manager to enforce his/her contractual rights.

Appellees argue a prohibition on assigning penalties, would thwart the

TAAs remedial purpose, to protect artists seeking professional employment

from the abuses of talent agencies.AAB, p.23.Even assuming the Legislature

did intend to keep improper people from becoming talent agents, exercising

authority to mete out penalties despite the Legislatures failure to create such

penalties finds no support in the law. According to United States v. Evans,333

U.S. 483 (1948), assigning penalties is outside the boundsof judicial

interpretation, it is up to legislators to revise the statute than for [adjudicators]

to guess at the revision [a legislature] would make in determining the severity

of recourse.Id., p.495.



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Appellees incorrectly argue the remedy of voiding contracts is a

straightforward application of the California Civil Code 1599 (the doctrine of

severability).AAB p.25.Adjudicators, including administrative agencies, only

consider severance after finding unlawfulness, which first requires prohibition

and penalty provisions within the TAA. Accepting 1599 as the remedy

provision for unlicensed procurement would be the epitome of accepting

unconstitutional vagueness.8

F. APPELLEES FAILED TO ADDRESS CLAIMS THAT THE TAA

IMPAIRS THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS IN

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 10OF THE U.S.CONSTITUTION

Appellees enforcement of the TAA, from the moment a Petition of

Controversy is accepted, staying efforts to enforce an otherwise lawful contract,

violates Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution: No state shall enter into

any ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts.

AOB, pp.43-46.

Appellees argue that this claim fails because, the contracts with which

appellant is concerned presumably arose after the 1985 enactment of the

8Appellees spend pages arguing that applied challenges must focus on a specific

statute. Appellant cannot point to penalty or prohibition provisions that do notexist. It is the enforcement of non-existent laws and the TAAs written gapsAppellant is challenging.



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TAAAAB, p.37. Appellant is challenging the enforcement of prohibitions

and sanctions that have never been enacted.The violation of the Contracts

Clause by Appellees application of the TAA has always violated the

Constitution, irrespective of whether it occurred before or after 1985.AOB,

p.44.

Both parties concur that the Contracts Clause does not protect illegal

contracts, which undermines Appellees citing of Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142

(1922), using a quote that does not exist.9

AAB, p. 37. Both parties also agree

the Contracts Clause protects legal contracts. As the TAA has neither

provisions authorizing impairing contracts nor provisions prohibiting

unlicensed procurement, 1700.4(a) only defines what talent agents do, the

TAA does not reserve any activities exclusively to licensees, the enforcement

clearly violates the Contracts Clause.

Appellees argue, the Contracts Clause is directed against impairment by

legislation, not by judgments of courts.10

AAB, p.37, quoting Tidal Oil Co. v.

Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1923). Appellant is not challenging the judgment

of courts, but the enforcement of an administrative agency that wrongly results

9The contract clause does not protect expectations that are based upon contracts

that are invalid, illegal, unenforceable, or which arise without the giving ofconsideration.10 The AAB said adjudication whereas the case itself says judgments of courts.



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in an unsupportable interpretation of legislation. Appellee fails to cite any

legislation directing impairment exists and wholly ignores applicable case law

such as Wood, Bach, Loving, Severance, etc.

Appellees do not challenge Appellants claim that the TAA fails the three-

part test for whether a law conforms to the Contracts Clause.AOB, p.44

Further, it is undisputed that forfeitures are not favored in law when they result

in inequitable consequences and the rendering of services that benefit another

without compensation.AOB, p.45.

The Contracts Clause was codified to protect the rights of creditors:

The Contracts Clause was drafted and inserted into the

Constitution to prohibit states from passing debtor relief legislationwhich had become, in the view of the Framers, an all-too-common

practice. The Contracts Clause was designed to prevent statesfrom retroactively eliminating or reducing the contractual rights ofcreditors. Strang, Lee J.,Federal Constitutional Law: Federalism

Limitations on State and Federal Power, Vol. 4 (2011).

Appellees enforcement is precisely what the Contracts Clause was

designed to prevent.

As Appellees offer no acceptable legal rationale to challenge Appellants

Contract Clause claims, this Court should declare the enforcement of the TAA

as applied violates Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution and enjoin its

enforcement.



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G. APPELLEES IGNORED APPELLANTS CLAIMS THAT IN

VOIDING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR LABOR

WITHOUT CLAIMS OF FRAUD OR NON-PERFORMANCE,

TAA ENFORCEMENT VIOLATES THE THIRTEENTH

AMENDMENT

Appellees state no opposition to Appellants claim that there are only three

ways that the right to compensation for labor expended can be disgorged:

claims of fraud, non-performance or when the labor itself is found to be

criminal.AOB, p.6.

Artists filing TAA controversies alleging unlicensed procurement do not,

as a rule, claim damages by fraud or non-performance. Instead they petition to

be excused from their contractual obligations solely because the service they

contracted for, benefitted from and agreed to pay for, in retrospect, was

allegedly unlawful.

According to Wood v. Krepps, licensing failures are questions between the

government and the person engaging in the regulated business, and the relevant

remedies are, not a matter in which third parties are interested. Whatever

penalties are imposed upon business delinquencies are not intended to

afford [the third party] an opportunity of repudiating indebtedness or acquiring

property without paying for it.Id., p.86. The Commissioners enforcement

does just that; wrongly affording artists opportunities to repudiate indebtedness

and past benefits without cost.



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With no fraud or non-performance claims inBlancarte, the only

constitutional way Blancartes compensation could be forfeitedwould be if the

forfeiture was punishment for a criminal conviction.AOB, pp.9, 29.Forfeiture

of compensation for work that benefits others instead of leaving them less than

whole is axiomatically a criminal penalty.AOB, pp. 28-29.

The TAA controversy retroactively compelled attorney Blancarte through

legal process to have labored against his will in private business for the benefit

of another without conviction of a crime. He was subjected ex post factoto

involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.AOB, p.28.

Appellees incorrectly argue that because United States v. Kozminski,487

U.S. 931 (1988) (AAB, p.33) referenced involuntary servitude [f]or purposes of

criminal prosecution, it has no bearing on Appellants civil action under 42

USC 1983. But as Appellees concede forfeiture of compensation for labor

without claims of fraud or non-performance is only appropriate after a criminal

conviction, they concede these prosecutions mete out criminal penalties.

Appellees argue, the fact plaintiffs members can choose not to manage

artists, or can avoid procuring employment for them, or can collaborate with a

licensed talent agency or simply get a license,takes this matter outside of the

Thirteenth Amendment.



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Appellees concedepersonal managers serve as the entitys chief executive

officer who oversees the other talent representatives.AAB, pg.3.. The

CEOsobjective is to maximize the quantity and quality of the artists

employment opportunities and it is what every artist signs up for. Staying arms-

length from the creation and maintenance of artist revenue is virtually

impossible. It is impossible for personal managers to find the line between

lawfully marketing their clients and unlawfully procuring employment.

Affirming the District Courtsruling would virtually outlaw personal

management, something entirely alien to the Legislatures intention and express

enactment.

If transactional attorneys obtain a talent agency license to negotiate artists

contracts, they become talent agents. Then if a separate talent agent, a non-

lawyer, procures an opportunity, the attorney either splits fees with the non-

lawyer in violation of Californias State Bar Act or works without

compensation, further reinforcing the finding of involuntary servitude. The

current enforcement creates a Hobsons choice where being compensated for

acting lawfully has become impossible; thus confirming the District Courts

ruling virtually outlaws entertainment transactional attorneys.



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Involuntary servitude is to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by

which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for another's

benefit.Bailey v. Alabama,219 US 219, 241 (1911).

When the Commissioner allows artists to dispose of otherwise-lawful

compensation for services already provided, the personal manager is left having

provided services without compensation against his will. That is what makes

this a Thirteenth Amendment issue: Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,

except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly

convicted, shall exist within the United States.

H. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE

COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY

Appellant lists many issues in the Complaint that the District Court did not

consider, (AOB, pp. 46-47) including whether:

The TAA provides notice as to who is and what specific behavior is

regulated;

There is statutory and constitutional foundation for Appellees

enforcement without a specific statute restricting activity to licensees;

The voiding of compensation is a criminal remedy, since there are no

allegations of fraud or non-performance;

Any sanction without a codified penalty provision, be it fine or forfeiture,

is unlawful, unconstitutional, and



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Appellees enforcement violates the rules of statutory construction.

The District Court left these questions unaddressed, thereby justifying

reinstating the Complaint.

I. APPELLEES FAIL TO ADDRESS OTHER CLAIMS

The AOB includes three pages of case law to buttress the claim that

District Court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend.AOB pp.9-11.

Appellees ignore this issue entirely, a concession that requires this matter to be

remanded.

AOB Section IX.A.4 claims the TAA As Applied Exceeds

Commissioners Statutory Authority. Appellees never once use the term

statutory authority, conceding there is none.

AOB Section IX.A.5 claims the Commissioner selectively enforces the

TAA, an issue Appellees do not contest. Nor do Appellees refute the Amicus

Letter claim that immunity is not available to any of Appellees because no

damages are sought. (Amicus Letter from Waisbren et al., pg. 7.)

Californias Constitution requires Appellees to defend their enforcement

until an appellate court finds it unconstitutional. A remand would require the

parties to return and make the same claims and defenses. In the interim,

personal managers would be left under this cloud of arbitrary and

unconstitutional enforcement.



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III. CONCLUSION

Appellant requests that this Court find the TAA is facially and as applied

unconstitutional, violates the Contract and Interstate Commerce clauses, the

First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal

Protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Appellant also requests injunctive relief; that this Court enjoin Appellees

from subjecting Appellant and other citizens to the deprivation of their rights,

privileges and immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution in violation of 42

USC 1983.

At the very minimum, Appellant requests this Court remand this matter to

the District Court for further proceedings, including amendment of the

Complaint.

Dated: January 16, 2014

By /s/ Stephen F. RohdeSTEPHEN F. ROHDESTEPHEN F. ROHDE (SBN 51446)LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN F. ROHDE1801 Century Park East, Suite 240Los Angeles, CA 90067

Tel: (310) 277-1482 Fax: (310) 772-0405

By /s/ Ryan H. FowlerRYAN H. FOWLER

By /s/ Christopher B. GoodCHRISTOPHER B. GOOD



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By /s/ Frank W. Ferguson IIFRANK W. FERGUSON II

RYAN H. FOWLER (SBN 227729)CHRISTOPHER B. GOOD (SBN 232722)FRANK W. FERGUSON II (SBN 211694)FOWLER & GOOD LLP15303 Ventura Blvd., 9th FloorSherman Oaks, CA 91403Tel: (818) 302-3480 Fax: (818)279-2436

Attorneys for AppellantNational Conference of Personal Managers Inc.



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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief does not exceed the type-volume limitation

imposed by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B). The brief was

prepared using Microsoft Word 2010 and contains 6,989 words of proportionally

spaced text. The typeface is Times New Roman, 14-point font.

By /s/ Stephen F. RohdeSTEPHEN F. ROHDESTEPHEN F. ROHDE (SBN 51446)

LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN F. ROHDE1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400Los Angeles, CA 90067Tel: (310) 277-1482 Fax: (310) 772-0405


By /s/ Christopher B. GoodCHRISTOPHER B. GOOD

By /s/ Frank W. Ferguson IIFRANK W. FERGUSON II

RYAN H. FOWLER (SBN 227729)CHRISTOPHER B. GOOD (SBN 232722)FRANK W. FERGUSON II (SBN 211694)FOWLER & GOOD LLP15303 Ventura Blvd., 9th FloorSherman Oaks, CA 91403Tel: (818) 302-3480 Fax: (818)279-2436




42/42

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing Reply Brief for

Appellant with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system on January 16, 2014. All

persons who are required to be served are registered CM/ECF users, who will be

served by the appellate CM/ECF system.

By /s/ Stephen F. Rohde

STEPHEN F. ROHDESTEPHEN F. ROHDE (SBN 51446)LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN F. ROHDE1801 Century Park East, Suite 2400Los Angeles, CA 90067Tel: (310) 277-1482 Fax: (310) 772-0405


By /s/ Christopher B. GoodCHRISTOPHER B. GOODBy /s/ Frank W. Ferguson II

FRANK W. FERGUSON IIRYAN H. FOWLER (SBN 227729)CHRISTOPHER B. GOOD (SBN 232722)FRANK W. FERGUSON II (SBN 211694)FOWLER & GOOD LLP15303 Ventura Blvd., 9th FloorSherman Oaks, CA 91403

Tel: (818) 302-3480 Fax: (818)279-2436



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Appellant Reply Brief: NCOPM v Gov. Brown, Attorney General Harris, Labor Commissioner

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