Apunen, Osmo, and Helena Rytövuori, Ideas of 'Survival' and 'Progress' in the Finnish Foreign...

7/28/2019 Apunen, Osmo, and Helena Rytvuori, Ideas of 'Survival' and 'Progress' in the Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition

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Ideas of 'Survival' and 'Progress' in the Finnish Foreign Policy TraditionAuthor(s): Osmo Apunen and Helena RytvuoriSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1982), pp. 61-82Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423850 .Accessed: 19/04/2011 06:24

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ISSN 0022-3433 Journal of Peace Research No. 1, Vol. XIX, 1982

Ideasof 'Survival' nd'Progress'ntheFinnishForeignPolicy TraditionOSMO APUNEN & HELENA RYTOVUORI

Theauthors roceedroma postulationf a dialecticalelationshipetweenmeansandends: heessenceofavailablemeans s taken o constitutehenatureof the desired ndstate. Survivalsdefinedas an end statepursuedwithhuman ction ndicativef twoconceptionsf power: epressivendprogressive.Witha con-ceptualrameworkenteringround hesenotions wo fieldsof researchn Finlandareanalyzed:he tradi-tionalforeignpolicy houghtandpeaceresearch.Thequestionaskedbythe authors s to whatextent woschoolsor modesof thoughtndicated ytherepressivendprogressiveonceptsof power anbediscernedandwhat s the stateof thepostulated ialecticalelationshipetweenmeansand endswithin hetwo fields.Analysiss carried ut from woangles: hecognitive spectmanifest n research ubstance ndthepersua-siveaspect eferringothe roleof thescholarnsocial ettings.As thestudy s ata preliminarytage, hepur-poseof thearticle s to elaborateheanalyticalramework ndto providellustrationsnthefirstcategory.On the basis of the pilot studyit is concluded hat the two schools tend to exhibitdistinctive ognitivefeaturesof their own. Within he traditionalpattern, here s a cognitivedistance o global problems;amongsthepeace esearchers,persuasiveandicapxistsas to the means n theimmediate ocialenviron-ment.Instead f a mutualdialogue r aconfrontation,hetwoschools howtendencies f cognitivensula-tion. Nevertheless, non-discriminationf the use of violentmeanswouldseem o provide omemeetinggroundfor the two schools.

1. Two concepts ofpower: 'repression' and'progress''It is true hat there s not a singlepeoplewhichhas beenso powerful hat it has not bentto historicalnecessitiesoutsideof its control. Even less can a small and weakpeoplebe an exception o this. But such a peoplecanprove tsstrengthnsubmissiontselfbecause herearenosuch fates over which t cannotattainby developingntermsof its own limits. In the case a nationreallyhasacquired erself ulturet is conscious f this: tsright osubmit o the external onstraint f history n ordertosafeguardts own future.Only gnorant eoplesare seento fightuntil heirfinalcollapse.'

These words were written in 1863 by J. V.Snellman, a Hegelian philosopher and states-man who formulated the philosophical pre-mises of the Finnish national emancipationand existence, in an article bearing the head-line: War or Peace to Finland? Snellmanemphasizedthat Finland cannot establish her-self as an autonomous entity with violence.The power of its culture would be the onlyrescue.

Snellman naturally contemplated in termsof his days' historical circumstances whenFinland was still part of the Russian empire,conquered by force of arms and controlled bythe Russian administrative system. But whathe said in his philosophical writings andpolemical articlesin newspapers crystallizedaway of reasoning which actually had oriented

political action since the end of the Swedishrule in 1808-09. Snellman's mode of thoughtbecame an even more important issue in Fin-nish politics during the last decades of the19th century as Finland's autonomy wasthreatened by rising Russian chauvinism andby imperial military interests.The writings of Snellman reveal clearly thedialectical pattern in which the end state ofaction is constituted through the essence ofavailable means. He employed two dichoto-mous concepts as means: repression andemancipation.Taking these distinctions as a point of de-parture, we may discern something whichcould be called an emancipatory concept ofpower, for simplicity here called progress. Itindicates that power as an organizing conceptis defined in terms of ability. Individual orcollective autonomy and existence as an endstate is gained through efforts to gain fullcontrol of own capabilities. In relation toothers, it suggests integrativeand cooperativeactions in order to gratify such needs, andgratifying experiences in such efforts lead toincreasingly integrated action and to positivediscrimination of self from outer world. AsBerenice A. Carroll remarks, this emancipa-tory concept of power has its philosophical


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62 OsmoApunen/HelenaRytovuoribackground, e.g. in Rousseau's concept of aharmonious society.'1To do justice to Snellman we have to addthat his conception of the natureof social dy-namics was not limited to the emancipatorynotion of power or to progressiveaction as itwill here be called.

The repressiveconcept of power was equal-ly elaborated in his writings. Snellman con-sidered that opportunities (or initial condi-tions) for cultural emancipation were of atemporarynature as are the periods of repres-sive action. Together they constitute therhythm of history which philosophers andstatesmanhave to graspin order to guide theirnation:

'Even f the doctrine f civilizedpeople,whichhas noothertask in historybut to take its siteamong ndepen-dentpeopleswith he forceof speeches ndwritings,s afiction,so we cannothoweverdenythat the historyofeverypeoplemaycomeuponperiodswhichallowpossibi-litiesonlyto suchpeacefulworkforculture.Withgoodreasonswemay saythatsuchperiodhas nowdawnednFinland.'2The fundamental task of the state is to im-

prove, to develop its power and might pro-gressively and in competition with otherstates.3 This indicates another aspect, the rep-ressive pattern, which implies power in termsof control and dominance over others.

Power in terms of domination is clearlytheprevailing pattern in theories of internationalpolitics. For example, K. J. Holsti states thatpower means 'the general capacity of a stateto control the behaviorof the others'. Controlrefers here to 'any physical or mental objectof quality available as an instrument of in-ducement, to persuade, reward, threaten, orpunish'.4 Such a definition of power seems toextend to the uses of knowledge. This is re-vealed, to quote the words of Anatol Rap-oport, by the fact that the strategists do notmake really searching questions but use most-ly formalized assumptions of standard clichesbecause of their 'libidal commitment to powerover the other, not to knowledge of theother'.5This dichotomy is naturallynot any specifi-cally Finnish dilemma. In the field of peaceresearch and more broadly in war and peace

studies, it clearly provides some fundamentalchoices. This is apparent in the comments ofElizabeth Converse (1972) on what she named'Carroll's Fork', two concepts of power ela-borated by BereniceA. Carroll:'Butin everynationandculture, suspect, here s adichotomybetween 1) scholarsand otherswho believethat the humanneed for power-as-social-dominationl-wayshasprovided ndalwayswillprovidehebasic truc-turesfor humancommunities nd humanconflicts,and(2)otherscholars nd otherordinaryitizenswho believethat the humanneed for power-as-social-competencesreal, effective,and contradistincto that otherneed. Forscholars, s forother, hesedichotomousssumptionsreusually acit- perhaps ometimes nconscious amongthepeaceresearchesf our time.'6The power of man is his present means toobtain some future apparentgood. This state-ment of Thomas Hobbes reveals that human

action is understood in terms of a teleologicalmode of thought. To attain this apparentgood one has to follow his internal appetitesand aversions.7If we take it that individual and collectiveexistence indicate essential end states of hu-man action, the apparent good envisioned, itprovides some substance to the abstract Hob-besian concept. And, further, if we take forgranted that the qualities of end states in hu-man action are constituted through the pro-pertiesof the means used to attain these appa-rent goods, one methodological judgment ofpre-theoreticalnature has been done. One hasonly to add some substanceto this conceptualframework.

The Hobbesian element, an essential fea-ture of the prevailing mood in internationalrelations nowadays, enters with the notion ofdanger or threat. If there is a common andpersistent feeling that the existence of indivi-duals and collective entities are threatened,the mere question of survival as the end stateof action becomes paramount or at leastacute. Small nations in the vicinity of big, ex-panding powers often experiencesuch feelingsof survival more or less permanently. Hencethe conceptions of Snellman, even thoughthey were designed from a very narrow Fin-nish point of view, seem to bear some rele-vance to the global feelings of insecurity


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 63which seem to lie behind the Hobbesian noti-ons of politics emerging rapidly after the fee-lings of trust in the 1960's and of relaxation inthe 1970's. This background reasonably justi-fies us to state that our world is obsessed withpower and survival. And Thomas Hobbeswas an analyst of power, as C. B. Macpher-son says in his opening remarks to the transla-tion of Leviathan. Why not proceed with thenotions of Hobbes? But equally justified andurgent seems to be the question raised abovewith the quotations of Snellman, that is,whether the issue of survival will be solvedwith progressiveor repressive usage of power.

Let us assume that survival is somethingwhich fundamentally ignites human appetitesand could hence be used in order to describeone fundamental apparentgood in human ac-tion. And, consequently, one may think ofstates of affairs which tend to arouse humanaversions. Let us say that they are issues offall. Relevant modes of action logically con-stitutingthese end states would be persistencefor survival and decay for fall. Thus we maytake it for grantedthat there exists an inherentand necessary logical unity between the endstates and actions, i.e. the means to attain theend states.

Obviously we may survive by developingour competence and faculties, but equally wemay need repressivemethods in order to safe-guard our existence individually or collective-ly. Logically one may conclude that if the es-sence of the means constitutes the nature ofan end state, then survival preserved orachieved through repressive methods bearsthe inherent marks of repression;it is in otherwords genetically of a repressivenature. Per-sistence may hence have two distinctiveaspects:progress and repreision. The processof decay may be split equally into two distinctcategories having both their respective terms.As a matter of simplicity we only state herethat decay is a process characterizedby failureto progress and repress. This judgment isguided by our interest towards the notions ofsurvival.

Our conceptual framework consists then offollowing elements:

End state of action SURVIVAL FALL

Processes consistinqof means used PERSISTENCE DECAY

Secific notions of eans / - Power Proressive Repressive Non-P -R(emancipatory)These concepts have been chosen by apply-ing two definitional criteria: Each pair musthave an inherentpositive feature providing anoverall character to it; each pair must bereasonablyexclusivewith each other (survival-fall, persistence-decay, progressive-repres-sive). As we now return to the dialecticaljudgment made above we are able to define

two types of persistence, one of progressive(Pp) and one of repressive (Pr) nature. And,consequently, if we assume that the meansconstitute the essence of end states, we maystate two types of survival:one of progressive(Sp) and one of repressive(Sr)nature.Pp, Pr, Sp, Sr are analytical categories butthey imply a fundamental dilemma of moralphilosophy which peace researchers have toconfront: Is Survival achieved with repressivemethods (Pr) morally acceptable to the pointthat one is ready to have it as a serious alter-native to Fall? Evidently we are confrontedwith similar moral philosophical problemseven though we are operating within theframework of traditional security policy. Thequestion is whether we have to sacrifice ourpersonal survival in order to guarantee or tofacilitate the survival of a collective entity. Intraditionalsecuritypolicy frameworktheissueof Sr seems to be less problematical: survivalachieved through repressivemeans is general-ly taken to be morally acceptable.In order to increase the substantial contentof our conceptual framework, we may specifyfurther the respectivenotions of progress andrepression. Tord Hoivik has split the conceptof progress into three operational aspects:quantitative, qualitative and structural.8Per-haps a parallel distinction in terms of repres-sion could be the one between overt, covertand structural. With respectto structuralpro-gress and repression we are of the opinionthat in both cases the concept must imply avoluntary option. That means that an actor or


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64 OsmoApunen/HelenaRytovuorigroup of actors must have ways and means tochange the state of affairs if they so decide.Otherwise we step outside of the ends-meansframework into causal relationshipswhere wehardly can speak about repression. This isnot, however, any obstacle to use causal rela-tionships as an element of initial conditionsand of environmental factors.

After this reverse 'reading' of our concep-tual framwork, we may specify the above fi-gure as follows:S Sp

End state SURVIVAL FALL

Means -- - _P PERSISTENCE P _ (left out), ----,, .I - W -],I Pros 1 IProgressive Repressive (left out)I ii l POWER I

L-uantive Overt--- - I

IiII 1L-. Quali.tative Covert- --

..-----.Structural Structural---(left out)

This conceptual framework is intended toserve as a tool in order to analyse to what ex-tent in Finland we may discern the twoschools or modes of thought indicated aboveby Carroll and implied in the writings ofSnellman. We crudely assume that the tradi-tional security policy pattern follows the linePr-Sr as their predominant strategy whereasthe peace research community, which is amuch move recent phenomenon in the Fin-nish society, is expected to outline in theirwritings the strategy line Pp-Sp. In order toaccomplish this empiricallywe need some ad-ditional tools of research.

Traditionally a scholar has two primarytaSks or functions in his social setting be itthen national or international: cognitive andpersuasive. The cognitive task refers to thefunctions of scholars to create meaningfulstructures of knowledge. In this case we areparticularly interested in such cognitive pat-terns which are action oriented. The persua-sive role in turn refers to the ways and meansby which the scholars try to incorporate theirspecific structuresof knowledge to the socialaction. Equally, we should enquire whetherscholars are influenced by their social settingsas they perform their cognitive functions. Ouridea is to researchhow Finnish scholars have

perceived and presented to their audiencesissues of survival since 1918, i.e. during theindependence period.In order to accomplish this empirical re-search task we have constructed a methodicaltool which is called Helen's box. Our purposeis to analyse two aspectsof scholars' social ac-tion: the cognitivepatterns and the social set-ting. The cognitive patterns will be outlinedusing the theoretical framework above. Thepresentarticlereportsresults from a pilot pro-ject. We intend to do a more detailed study ofindividual scholars covering the Finnish re-search communities since 1918, i.e. theindependence period.The traditional level of analysis distinctionin internationalpolitics is made between indi-vidual, state and system. This time we ap-proach the same problem from another angle.We ask what is the primary point of referenceone has in mind when relating oneself to theexternal world. The Hobbesan view proceedsfrom the notion of individual selfishness; thedynamics of human action are reduced to theidea that everyone is taking careof his own in-dividual interests. The perspective is henceegocentric.The egocentric point of view is on a higherlevel reflected by different chauvinistic no-tions concerningthe inherentrightsand dutiesof the 'own' state to attain its particularisticinterests. This individualistic pattern is inclear contradistinctionto what we simplymaycall collectivistic or community pattern evi-dent in, for example, Hegel's philosophy andRousseau's social theories.

Helen's box (see the figure) is constructedfrom two levels which we call 'Fundamentals'and 'Policy Channels'. And, as stated above,we are dealing with two aspects of scholars'social action: cognitive and persuasive. Thesubstance of the Finnish security issues is ac-cordingly divided into theoreticalfundamen-tals andpolicy statements. Theoretical funda-mentals will be analysed mainly in terms ofthe above theoretical framework, whereaspo-licy statements will be further divided intosentences indicating declaratorypolicies andpolicy implementation. By declaratory policy


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 65we mean statements of intent without any spe-cific references as to how this goal will beachieved. Policy implementation statements,in turn, refer to mobilization and allocationof available means, telling us thus not onlywhat should be done but also how this shouldtake place and by what means. Into policy im-plementation statemens we include even suchcausal explanations which indicate a 'volun-taristicoption'. By that we mean such structur-al relationshipswhich specific actors are ableto change or modify if they so wish. If a scho-lar points out in his study that there is a stateof affairs which should and could be changedhe opens the window of voluntaristic optionand hence expressesat least implicitlya speci-fic policy line. Without such a voluntaristicoption most structural relationships do notfulfil the criteria of policy orientation.The social settingof a scholar constitutes inour framworkthree distinctcategories:powerestablishment, academic establishment andsocial forces and movements. Because we donot report results from this part of the studywe do not go further into the operational de-tails of these categories either. It is sufficientto state that these three settings provide thescholar with fora for persuasiveaction and, atthe base level, the scholar normally shouldmake reflections on his relations to the diffe-rent social value bases these three settingsimply. SOCIAL SETING

power academic social forcesestablishment establishment and movements

declarator zpolicypolicy w- timplementation- mobilization- allocation

SOCIAL VALUE IBASE

2. The traditionalpatternIn the preceding section we made a crude as-sumption that the traditional security policypattern would predominantly follow the linePr-Sr, that is survivalby repressivemeans. Atthe same time one should bear in mind that

Snellman already indicated a dual-track ap-proach according to which the two strategies(Pp-Sp, Pr-Sr) actually alternate and are ofcomplementary nature depending on thehistorical circumstances. In order to test ourtheoretical reasoning we did the first readingnot trying to establish the individual patternsbut looking to see whether the relevant scien-tific literaturereveals appropriate factors forour further analysis. In the following we out-line how two basic policy issues have beendealt with in recent Finnish historical and po-litical science literature. The issues underenquiry are: (1) How environmental factorsinfluence the freedom of choice of Finnishforeign policy makers; is there in other wordsa voluntaristic option? (2) What types ofmeans has scientific research produced forpersistence and survival? We hope to gathersome evidence for the empirical feasibility ofour research framework. In the next chaptersimilarefforts are made with respect to peaceresearch in Finland.

2.1. Environmental issuesReading the Finnish scholars' assessmentsreveals that the environmental factors areanalysed mainly in terms of balance of powerand spheres of influence models as well as ofRussian/Soviet big power intentions.The Russian conquest in 1908-1909brought to Finland both continuity andchange. Swedish rule, which had lasted forover 600 years, was terminatedbut it had leftclear impressions on cultural and judicial in-stitutions of Finland. The Russian emperor,Alexander I, promised to respectthese institu-tions and consequently he conceded to Fin-land an autonomous position in the empireunder his personal rule. This meant continu-ity, and preservationof this continuity consti-tuted the essence of the Finnish securitypolicyduring the 19th century. Survival has hence alimited and specific meaning in Finlandduring these years. Especially because it was acentury of the Pax Russica. The Finns werenot confronted with war practically for 100years. Survival meant under these conditions


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66 Osmo Apunen/Helena Ryti6vuoriinviolability of the national institutions.

Externally the Finns were obsessed fromthe very beginning with a fear that the Rus-sian rulers would get free hands to deal withFinland as they liked. They were taught theirfirst lesson about this during the NapoleonicWars when the Russian emperor got freehands from Napoleon to conquer Finlandandto annex it to his empire. After this the Rus-sian emperor regarded Finland as an internalRussian matter and thus no issue in interna-tional conferences and negotiations. This wasmade clear at the Congress of Vienna whereFinland was kept off the agenda. During theHoly Alliance period Finns knew that theywere practicallyat the mercy of the emperor.Things had to be settled directly with the em-peror without external interventions or sup-port.9The idea of externalguaranteesto the inter-national status of Finland was activated dur-ing the First World War when the internal de-cay of the Russian empire increased and theGerman government was plotting to decom-pose the multinational Russian state perma-nently. Even the rebellious groups in Finlandwere reluctant to resort to force during thewar without firm big power guarantees. Suchguarantees were not, however, available. TheGermans wanted free hands for a possible se-parate peace agreementwith the Russians andso the Finnish activistsgot only vague promis-es from Berlin. Neither were the Westernpowers interested in giving any guarantees toFinland for fear that it would alienate Russiafrom the Entente. o

The Ribbentrop agreementin 1939betweenMoscow and Berlin manifested the worstfears in Finland: a big power agreementwhichleft the Soviet rulers with free hands. By theagreement, Germans had neutralized them-selves with respect to Finland. The Westernpowers, in turn, were too far away and toomuch occupied with the Germans to play anysignificant counter-balancingrole in Finland.The German-Soviet agreement and the fol-lowing war years provided Finland with hardevidence to draw the conclusion that securityof this exposed country could not be built on

the balance of forces between competing bigpowers.11In 1944 the Finns had only one choice left:their relations to the Soviet Union must bebuilt on other premises than the balance ofpower between big powers. This conclusionhas left its mark on the researchcommunity,too. Balance of power as a concept in war andpeace studies in Finland has been used only inan unclear manner. Some vague notions refer-ring to an overall East-West balance inEurope or globally can be found. But eventhen balance of power is understood ratherinterms of an existing state of affairs than as apurposeful policy aimed at keeping a balance.This applies to Northern Europe as well,where the concept of 'Nordic balance' hasbeen common since the early 1960's. By theend of the 1960's it compriseda policy of con-straints but later it has been used as a meredescription of the existing status of alliancecommitments and basic statements ofpolicy.12To Russian observers, Finland was duringthe first half of the 19thcentury a remote andbackward corner where hardly anything hap-pened and which did not deserve any specificattention. Sweden was no securityrisk to Rus-sia any longer. In a way, Finlandwas a cornerleft over from big power dealings: it was notpart of Sweden but it was not incorporatedinto the Russian empire either. This experi-ence nurtured n Finland the idea that Finlandreally had a special status, i.e. that its interna-tional position was somehow unique.An absolute condition to a policy of invisi-bility was that Finland had no essential valuein the Russian securitycalculations. That wasthe state of affairs for most of the 19thcentu-ry.The Crimean War in the 1850's raised theissue of war and peace in Finland. Attacks ofthe British navy against Finnish coastal citiesdemonstrated that Finland really could bedrawn into conflicts to which the Russian em-pire was a party. After this, world politics be-came a serious issue in Finnish publicdebate.13 Russian suspicions were, however,headed off with a loyal attitude towards the


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 67mother country and its foreign policy pro-blems.

A more serious turn took place during the1880's and 1890's: Finland was involved inRussian security interests. This brought theconsequence that war and peace issues wereevaluated in an increasingmanner in terms ofthe concept spheres of influence.It all started with the military interests ofthe Russian empire for the northern capearea. Count Witte propagated in the begin-ning of 1980's that Russia should establish amajor naval base in the Kola peninsula. Fin-nish railway lines provided then the best pos-sible access to the Murmansk area and conse-quently such a connection was planned. Onlythe death of the emperor rescued Finlandfrom this fatal construction work. Witte'splan was abandoned and the Russian navywas based in Libau on the Baltic Sea. TheFinnish railway lines had still some militaryvalue to Russia.14

During the First World War Russia finallyestablished permanent access to the high seasvia Murmansk. At this stage Finland was not,however, considered to be safe for communi-cations between the capital and Murmansk.Railway lines were constructed outside theproper Finnish territorybut very close to theborder. East Careliawas the Finnish irredentain 1920's and this ambition involved unavoid-ably the question of the Murmansk railwayline."5In German war plans, the Kola areawas one of the targetsand the railwayline hadagain great political and military value be-cause of the allied supplies delivered throughthe northern route. The Finnish troops evenreached the railway but the Soviet commandcould keep the northern route open by using aroundabout way to Archangklsk.16After World War II, the Kola area remain-ed a securityissue to Finland. Its military va-lue as one of the primarynaval bases even in-creased in comparison with the situation inthe 1920's and 1930's. Soviet nuclear subma-rinesoperating from Murmansk involved Fin-land in the Soviet-Americanstrategicbalance,a development which still continues, causinginstability in Northern Europe as a whole."7

The Russian empire suffered a militarydisaster in the Russo-Japanese war in 1905and this activated a new external concern forthe Finns. Shifts in military balance exposedthe Russian capital, St. Petersburg, to Ger-man and British military and naval threats.This possibility surfaced alreadyin the 1890's.Russian military planners began to ask whatpossibilities and threats the Finnish territoryoffered to the defense system of St. Peters-burg. A serious threat was perceived. Thisseems to be one of the reasons why the Rus-sian authorities came to the conclusion thatFinland should be incorporated more closelyinto the empire. Revolutions in Russia in 1905and 1917relievedthis pressure, but only for awhile. The Soviet government raised the issueagain in the late 1930's. Soviet territorialde-mands concerning the security of Leningradwere satisfied only after the two wars in 1939-40, and in 1941-44. But already during thewar the Finnish leadership tried hard not toinvolve the country too heavily in Germanwar efforts against Leningrad. This restraintpossibly had some political impact later on, asFinland had to negotiate peace as a defeatedcountry. Anyway, the problem remained:What was Finland's share in the sufferings ofLeningrad?18It seems to be unavoidable that after warthe question was raised: Was all this necessa-ry? War and peace studies in Finland comerepeatedly back to the issue of Russian andSoviet intentions. Why did the Russiangovernment resortto political and administra-tive repression in the 1890's and again afterthe revolution in 1905? What did the Sovietleadership really have in mind when they de-manded political and territorial concessionsfrom Finland referring to the security needsof Leningrad? What really was at stake: apainful but still tolerable concession fromFinland in order to safeguard the survival ofLeningrad?Or survival of the Finnish peopleitself as an independent nation?Researchhas provided us with several alter-native models which outline some possibleanswers to these crucial questions. Thereseems to exist two modes of explanations


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68 Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytovuoriwhich both proceed from the assumption thatbasically Finno-Soviet relations should beseen in terms of power-as-dominance. Thiswas expressed, for example, by J. K. Paasiki-vi, the founding father of Finnish foreignpolicy since 1944, when he stated in April1948, on the occasion when the Treaty ofFriendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assis-tence was signed:'As long as the conflicts between big powers are settledwith the force of arms, the big ones do not let the legalpoints of view prevent them from measures which theyesteem necessaryfrom a militarypoint on view, quite irre-spective of the fact whetherthey injure the small ones ornot. This is a regrettablefact, which we smallones cannotchange but which we have to take into consideration if wewant to stay on realisticground and to get unscathed outof the mortar of life.'19One of these explanatory modes impliesthat Finland may obtain political leeway bymaking skillful use of the constraints whichinternational factors impose on Russia andthe Soviet Union. Another explanation con-cerns the legitimacyof Russianvs. Soviet pol-icies towards Finland. Being inherently of apolitical nature, the Finnish responses as theyare indicated in the existingliteraturecould becharacterized as persistence by progressivemeans (P,).Let us begin with the problem of legitimacyclaims. There are research references to theeffect that Finland has survived as an inde-pendent nation and as a pluralisticdemocracybecause the Russian emperor stayed true tohis legal commitments and to his liberal prin-ciples or because of the consistent policy ofthe Soviet government to observe the princip-le of national sovereigntyand the rightto self-determination. The policy of legitimacy pre-serve aims at measures which strengthen andpreservesuch Russian/Soviet feelings of legiti-mate commitments. The realist pattern, indi-cated, for example, in the statement of Paasi-kivi, takes these assertions with some mis-givings. Undisputably, there are several suchperiods in Finno-Russian/Soviet relationswhich do not fit into the power-as-domina-tion mould. This dilemma is often solved byreferring to the 'window dressing' functionwhich Finland is supposed to play in Russianand Soviet world politics.

The power-as-domination model impliesthat the Russian and Soviet concessions toFinland should be explained in terms of theexternal constraints imposed by the foreignpolicy difficulties and prioritiesof the big po-wer. In 1809 the Russians skillfully pacifiedthe newly conquered country with politicalconcessions while the turmoils of the Napo-leonic Wars still kept the European situationunstable. In 1905, when Finland's autonomywas restored and far-reaching parliamentaryreform with universal suffrage was carriedout, the Russian empire undisputably hadgreat internal and external problems. A deli-cate issue for national history is whetherFinns achieved these political victories withtheir own resistance, which included a com-plete general strike in the country, or whetherit was a consequence of the revolutionarymovements in Russia and of internationalpo-litics.20In 1917, the newly formed Bolshevikgovernment faced an extremelydifficult situa-tion internallyand was exposed to externalin-tervention in which Finland possibly could bea staging area. It is arguedthat the Soviet go-vernment actually had no other choice but torecognize Finnish independence, and to hopethat the traditionally well organized andstrong Finnish labor movement would carryout its own revolution.21

Duringthe WinterWar, in 1939-40, the no-tion of an expansionist tendency in Soviet for-eign policy aims was nurtured by the estab-lishment of the so-called Kuusinen govern-ment in Terijoki, i.e. an exile government ofFinnish communists in the Democratic Repu-blic of Finland. This was an argument in fa-vor of the constraint model whereas the legi-timacy model clearly suffered a setback. Thegovernment in Terijoki was, however, aban-doned as the resistanceof Finland proper didnot collapse as was evidently expected in thefirst weeks of the war. In summer 1944, theSoviet forces gave up theirplans to occupy theFinnish capital and other core areas and con-sequently the border was established on thelines where the militaryfront lines were stabi-lized late in summer of 1944. The constraint


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FinnishForeignPolicy Tradition 69model explains this by the Soviet interest toremove their troops to more important areasin Eastern Europe.22Ater World War II, Finland clearly wasconsideredto be one of the defeated countriesheading through 'sovietization' to the Sovietorbit. Soviet declarations that the relationsbetween Finland and the Soviet Union wouldbe established on the policy of good neigbor-hood and on the principles of Lenin's policyin 1917 were taken in the West with misgiv-ings and references to window dressing. In1948, however, Finland broke the mold ap-plied in Eastern Europe and adopted a care-fully formulated course of its own. Referen-ces to external constraints were made again,especially to the fact that other Scandinaviancountries were about to make their decisionwhetherthey should join the Western defensecommunity or stay neutral, perhaps in aframework of a Scandinavian defense unionas was proposed by the Swedishgovernment.23The international framework in Scandina-via was stabilized in the beginning of 1950's.Stabilityof this security framework has clear-ly been in the interestof all parties concerned.Debate on security issues is thus mainly con-cerned with such issues which might disturbthe prevailing patterns of stability. In a verygeneral sense, this implies that the overallEast-West balance, politically and militarily,may function as a constraint to big power ac-tivity not only towards Finland but generallyin Northern Europe. But this constraint is ra-ther an environmental feature than a result ofconscious balance of power policy, even ifsuch points of view have been expressed re-cently.24These featuresof different explanatory mo-dels in scientific literature indicate that thetwo theoretical lines, Pr-Sr' Pp-Sp, clearlycoexist. Hence, inside the traditional schoolone may discern two 'wings'. Their propor-tional shares are at this stage hard to docu-ment but, hardlyas any surprise, one may saythat repressivereasoningseems to have an up-per hand which simply tells us that the realistschool seemsto be well establishedin Finland.

2.2. Strategiesfor persistence and survivalSomehow Finland as an international actorreminds one easily of a bee. Considering thelaws of aerodynamicsthe bee seems too clum-sy to be able to fly. But the bee itself does notknow this, it does not calculate - it flies.If we simplify things, we may state that theemphasis of the Finnish post-World War IIsecurity strategies lies in the power-as-social-competence. This governmental policy, how-ever, does not necessarily prevail in the viewsof the scientific communities. The principalsolution of the governmental policy has beenthe idea of progress in terms of the materialand social welfare of the people, its integrati-on and resoluteness, and its ideological unity.Of these factors the last one, ideological uni-ty, seems to be the most precarious one. Thispatternseems to have dominated Finnish poli-tics also before the 1920's, whereas the 1920'sand 1930's were clearly a time of repressivemodels of security.In the scientific literaturedifferent explana-tory models pertainingto the problems of per-sistence and survival alternate and overlap.They extend in terms of time from the begin-ning of the 19th century to the present. Theycan be describedin termsof the following mo-dels: bureaucraticpatriotism, national eman-cipation, emancipation through the classstruggle, legal defense, passive resistance, ac-tivism, chauvinism, cooperative neigh-borhood, and the policy of collaboration.Bureaucratic patriotism as a strategy pre-vailed during the first half of the 19th cen-tury. It left, however, more permanent traceson the Finnish foreign policy tradition. Someof these patterns are discernible even today.The term 'bureaucratic' refers to the fact thatpolitics was mainly the business of an elitemade up of civil servants. 'Patriotism', inturn, denotes that these persons acted for thegood of the country which above all meantFinland. One should remember that the Rus-sian empire offered as a whole excellent op-portunities for careers outside Finland pro-vided that the individual in question nurturedclear loyalties towards the empire. These op-portunities were made use of frequently. It


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70 OsmoApunen/HelenaRytovuoriwas crucial that during the 50 years of Russi-an rule of Finland, before the national move-ment on a broader basis emerged in Finland,there existed a loyal national body ofadministrators who took care of the politicalinterests of the country and not only of theempire.As a policy bureaucratic patriotism waspreemptive. Finnish administrators tried tosettle matterswith the emperor directly and ingood time to avoid that they should turn outto be controversial. Finland's political profilewas kept as low and unnoticed as possible andin Finland domestic affairs were conducted byFinnish officials under the supervision of theRussian Governor General. Dissenting politi-cal ideas and individuals were suppressed.Shortly, Finland was ruled in the spirit of theHoly Alliance, cautiously and conservatively.But under thiscalm a lot of material improve-ments were carried out. Many Russians werein the 1880's astonished, and even annoyed,that the remote and unnoticed corner of theempire, a country of bears and odd stubbornpeople in the prevailing Russian image, hadchanged so much during these decades. In the1880's the Russians met not only emergedFinnish national movements but a rising Fin-nish capitalism which penetrated the Russianeconomy vigorously and opened its trade tothe Western markets.25

The Finnish foreign policy line since 1944exhibits many substantial features which aresimilar to the patternsof bureaucraticpatriot-ism. A popular saying seems still to be: Staycool, in your hole, Finn!National emancipation was ideologicallyfounded on Snellman's philosophy and on theemerging modern mass media which togetherwith mass education disseminated modern

ideas in Finland during the last decades of the19th century. Politically, the social and cul-tural emancipation of the Finnish speakingmajority was founded on an accord with theRussian emperor. Provided that Finnsremained loyal to the throne, they could, inreturn, prosper and develop their cultural fa-culties. That was the reason why Snellmanstrongly opposed all political manifestations

of sympathy towards Sweden, or towards thePoles who resorted to armed struggle. All de-monstrations in Finland would be futile,Snellman lectured to his compatriots, who didnot want to stay cool in their holes. Theywould arouse Russiansuspicionsand repressi-ons in Finland but would not help a bit thePolish rebels.26Again, we may find a parallel in thepresent-day Finnish reasoning. Finland hasadopted a low political profile in cases wherethe Soviet Union has used force in order to se-

cure its interests. In Hungary 1956, Czecho-slovakia 1968, and Afganistan 1980, Finlandpractically abstained from protests. The rea-son was that it would not help Hungarians,Czechs, or Afghans if Finland protested, butthat it might help cause trouble for Finno-Soviet relations. The Finnish people lovesprotest politics, President Paasikivi used tosay, but it is often against its own interests.27Now, as Finland has adopted a policy ofneutrality, its credibilityprovides that parallelconstraints apply to the Finnish attitudes to-wards other countries. Accordingly, a lowprofile is kept with respect to such controver-sial issues where the blame lies in the quartersof Western powers, or even of more remotecountries.

Class struggle and emancipation. The Fin-nish labor movement had its origins in the1880's and 1890's. Since 1905it has drawn ap-proximately 50% support from the electorateand receivedalmost half of the parliamentaryseats, a few times even over. Labor and tradeunion movements naturally aimed for socialemancipation and political liberation of itsown group of reference, manual workers incountrysideand cities. In the beginning the la-bor movement was in common front for de-fense of Finnish autonomy and for the inte-grityof its political institutions. This is easy tounderstand: in Russia the revolutionary mo-vement was persecuted,whereas in Finland la-bor could operate legally. Political autonomyof Finland was in the interest of the politicaland trade union movements.28

Class relations developed toward violentconflicts since 1905. The Bolshevik revolution


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 71in 1917 posed real dilemmas for the Finnishlabor movement. Should it lean to the Rus-sian movement in order to accomplish socialrevolution in Finland? Internally split, theFinnish Social Democrats opted for nationalindependence in December 1917, a factorwhich from the Russian point of view was im-portant. In January 1918, an extreme leader-ship and radicalized masses of Finnish laborhoisted the red flag for independent andsocialist Finland. In the following civil war,Finnish labor was left practically alone andwas defeated by the united forces of Finnishwhite guardsand the German army. After theCivil War, which lasted for four months, theFinnish labor movement was definitely splitinto two independent parties: the Social De-mocrats operated legally in Finland, whereasthe Communist Party had its leadership in theSoviet Union and an underground organiza-tion in Finland.

After the split, the Social Democratic Partyadopted a loyal attitude to the new republic.Its efforts to promote social and politicalemancipationof the working class would takeplace in the frameworkof national unity. Thiswas tested in the wars of 1939-40 and1941-45. After World War II, the Commu-nist Party became legal in Finland again.Since then the problem of double-edged loyal-ties of the labor movement has been a perma-nent issue in Finnish security policy. The pro-blem is, how to fit together solidarity in thenational and in the international frameworks.For Communists this distinction naturally issharper than for Social Democrats, but withrespect to the legitimacy of foreign policyboth exhibit ideological demands.Legal defense as a strategir or national sur-vival developed as a result and in reaction tothe rising Russian chauvinism since 1880's.The Russian government took measureswhich violated the integrityof Finland's auto-nomous institutions. The literature concern-ing the causes of this conflict is rathervolumi-nous and contains several explanatory mo-dels. But out of the conflict emerged a modeof thought which J. K. Paasikivi transmittedto the post-World War II generations and

which constitutes the essence of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.As the integrity of the Finnish institutionswas threatened, the Finns tried to defendthemselvesby force of arguments. The consti-tutional history of Finland was studied andthe results used in debates with the Russian

expertsarguing againsttheir interpretations.29In Finland the optimistic mood prevailedthat, in the end, what is right must win in reallife. They only had to prove their case and theopponent would submit.Unfortunately, such days had dawned toFinland that not even the most elaborate

arguments and voluminous evidence couldconvince the Russians.Legal defense in the 1880's and 1890'sclearly failed in terms of action. But it leftdeep marks on conceptions in Finland as tothe premises of what is legitimate in politics.Since the legal defense of Finland's autono-my, Finns had a tendency to judge politicalproblemsin the framework of legal principlesand norms. This was clear even before the

Winter Warwhen in Finland there prevailed amood that the country had right on its side ina legal sense, as it really had, and that itshould resist the Soviet presssuresbecause theissue was a matter of principle. Later in 1940,the judicial wrangling went so far that J. K.Paasikivi sent a telegram from his ambassa-dorial post in Stockholm reminding thegovernment that the Kremlin was no munici-pal court.The coin has, however, always two sides:during the critical end phases of the war in1944 the Finnish government managed to de-fuse the Germanstranglingpolicy with a legaltrick.

Passive resistance went along with the legaldefense. Using civil disobedience and passiveresistanceby the domestic administrative offi-cials, the nationalist movement tried to ob-struct the Russian efforts. More importantthan the results in obstruction seems to havebeen the politically mobilizing effect of pas-sive resistance methods.

Passive resistance tried to some extent tocollaborate with the Russians and to avoid


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72 Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytivuoriextreme measures and illegal acts in order topreserve the political and judicial institutionsin Finnishhands. It was considered more pru-dent to bend even to illegal Russian measuresthan to leave the country solely under Russianadministration.

More important to the passive resistancethan the legal forms, which the legal defenseheld for paramountissues, was the substance,a working Finnishpolitical community. In the1910's it became evident that passive resistan-ce as a method of persistence could be usedonly for a rather limited period of time. Theinternal strainsgrew overwhelmingduring theresistance years. There was not much hopeleft when the First World War broke out andchanged the setting completely.After World War II, Finland was super-vised by the Allied Control Commission andheavily under Soviet influence. Under this cir-cumstance, passive resistance proved to offermodes of thought and criteria for legitimacywhich were of great avail. Since then the pat-tern of passive resistancehas been instrumen-tal in Finnish foreign policy doctrine.30

Activism emerged in the beginning of the20th centuryas methods of legal defense, andpassive resistance lost its effectiveness as theinternaldecay of the Russian empire proceed-ed. In practice it meant preparations for arm-ed struggle and cooperation with the under-ground Russian revolutionary movements.After 1905 activism was repressed but itemerged again during the First World War asthe Swedes and Germans encouraged Finnishrebels to work against the Russians. In Ger-many a special Finnish military unit got train-ing and combat experience on the Easternfront, but when it finally arrived in Finland,in 1918, it was involved in Finnish Civil Warinstead of a liberation war against Russia."3Chauvinism developed in the early 1920'sout of a mixture of activism, Finnish andSwedish chauvinist ideas, anti-Soviet feelingsand prefascist currents.32 This chauvinistmood had above all an impact on the internalpolitical climate in Finland. An integral partof the chauvinist mood was demand for astrong national defense. During the Interven-

tion Wars in Soviet Russia, Finnish volunteertroops tried to instigateand supportCareliansin Soviet Russia. The aim was to force seces-sion of Eastern Carelia from Russia to Fin-land. After the peace of Dorpat, in 1920, theactivity was slowly transformed into an ordi-nary right wing political current n Finland. Inthe 1930'sit revivedand had its heyday duringthe autumn of 1941 when Finnish troopsadvanced far into Eastern Carelia and the Ca-relian dream appeared to be at hand. WithGerman defeat in 1945 this Finnish irredentamovement finally faded away.33Cooperative neighborhood denotes the Fin-nish-Soviet relations since 1944. Its key termseems to be mutual trust. As a matter of sub-stance it refers to a set of principles and rulesgoverning the mutual relations of these twocountrieswith different social and political sy-stems.

The starting point of post-war Finnish-Soviet relations is that Finland has acknow-ledged the existence of a legitimate Soviet se-curity interest. To be legitimate, this interestmust, however, be defensive. The Finnish for-eign policy leadershiphas adopted the realisticpoint of view that the Soviet Union will any-way look after its interests, possibly evenagainstthe will of Finns themselves as the twowars witness. Thus it is in the Finnish interestto safeguard those defense interests as far asthey concern Finnish territory and as far astheir execution is within the limits of Finnishdefense capability. If Finnish capabilities areinadequate, it has treaty commitmehts to re-ceive Soviet aid in the case of an armed attackagainst Finland or through its territoryagainst Soviet territory.Non-interferencein internal affairs is clear-ly the topmost principle and criterion of mu-tual trust from the Finnishpoint of view. Thisimplies that the Soviet Union does not pursuein Finland any other but defensive interests.After the World War II Soviet leaders made itclear that they would not tolerate hostile go-vernments any more on their borders. Thisprinciple, clearly accepted in Jalta by the Al-lied Powers34, mplies that Finland shall havegood relations with the Soviet Union as its


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 73primary foreign policy objective. As Presi-dent Kekkonen has said, Finland will not andcannot pursuegood relations with the West atthe expense of its relations with the SovietUnion, but as a consequence of good Finno-Soviet relations. Finnish policy of neutralityproceeds from this premise and it is accord-ingly a delicate effort to balance betweencompeting demands from East and West.From the very beginningthe Paasikivi-Kek-konen line had strong emancipatory flavors.Damages caused by the war had to be repair-ed and compensations to the Soviet Unionhad to be paid. The moral and psychologicaleffects of two lost wars were deep. Peoplefrom ceded areas, amounting to 10% of thetotal population, had to be resettled and inte-grated. This work took time until the 1960's.Along with the Western trade ties, a Finnish-Soviet trade and economic cooperation pat-tern began to emerge since the 1950's, whenthe warcompensation deliveries ended. In thebeginning some political efforts were neededin order to give impetus to these transactions.But later in the 1960's and 1970's the comple-mentary nature of the Finnish-Soviet tradeand its stabilizingeffects becauseof long-termcontrol systemstransformed the economic re-lations so that they were driven more andmore by material incentives.Trade was used in the 1950's as a politicalinstrument a few times against Finland: sincethe 1960's it has been out of the politicalagenda."The policy of collaboration is a mode ofthought denoting certain features in Finno-Soviet relations. Actually it seems to be acommon denominator to the combination ofdifferent strategies n the Finnish foreign poli-cy tradition.36The best way to describe this'model' is to quote the source of the idea,Henry Kissinger's work A World Restored:

'Metternich was proposing a policy which can only becarried out by a state certain of its moral strength oroverwhelmedby the consciousness of moral impotence. Itis a policy which places a peculiar strain on the domesticprinciples of obligation for it can never be legitimized byits real motives. Its success depends on its appearance ofsincerity,on the ability, as Metternich once said, of seem-ing the dupe without beingit. To show one's purpose is tocourt disaster; to succeed too completely is to invite dis-

integration. In such a period the knave and the hero, thetraitor and the statesman are distinguished, not by theiracts, but by their motives. At what stagecollaboration da-mages the national substance, at whatpoint it becomes anexcuse for the easy way out, these are questions that canbe resolvedonly by people who have lived through the or-deal, not by abstract speculation. Collaboration can becarriedout successfully only by a social organism of greatcohesiveness and high morale, because it presupposes adegree of confidence in leadership which makes treasonseem inconceivable.'37

2.3 Concluding remarks to the traditionalpat ternReading of recent historical and politicalscience literature in Finland confirms thatthere exist distinct explanatory modelsamongst those who do not claim to be peaceresearchers. Several of these models are ofPp-Sp type, some clearly are mixed and manyagain of the type Pr-Sr. The traditional Fin-nish security patterns reveal that the funda-mental group of reference has been the na-tional unit. But there are, however, ideologi-cal cleavages in it. One of those cleavages canbe traced to the efforts to emancipate withclass struggle. Competing loyalties may arise,however, if one takes it for granted that weshould see our primary group of reference interms of more universal humanistic values.

Without any doubt, the traditionalperspec-tive has been strongly ethnocentric. Foreignpolicy issues were flavored by the fact thatRussia and the Soviet Union are so close andEurope so far away. It took time before Finnslearned that there are global issues which areimportant to them. The effect of ethnocentricbias among intellectuals is possibly still aliveand it may be summarized as follows:

'Typical for the academic intellectuals (of the 19thcen-tury)was belief in developmentas a kind of absolute idea.It was conceivedto have own internal aws and similarlyitwas conceived that progress will take place with the forceof its own dynamics. All this did not imply anything tothe effect that Finns themselves should somehow have ashare in revolutionary changes. Their role was one of aEuropean bystander. It was not so essential how manysupporters progress has, because the firm belief was thatit will go on anyway.'38We do not suggest that his descriptioncould as such apply to the present Finnish in-tellectual climate. But we wish to remind that


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74 OsmoApunen/HelenaRytoivuorithese intellectualpatternshave their origins inthe formative period of Finnish nationalism.With the wisdom, and limits, of this traditionthe present generation meets new problemsand issues.

3. Peace research: issues of global survival3.1 Environmental issuesIn comparison with the traditional pattern,the domain of peace research is theoreticallymore compact. Methodologically a bulk ofthe research is causal analysis within theframework of the behavioral approach. Theless diffuse nature of the research is also dueto the shortness of the time period relevantfor analysis:judged according to institutionalcriteria, peace research is only somewhatmore than a decade old in Finland.39Our ana-lysis is kept within this temporal framework.The value components in the researchreviewed may be summarized in three words:equality, autonomy, and development. By thesame token, aversions arerelated to such con-cepts as underdevelopment and dependence,globalizingtechnological and economic struc-turesof dominance and control etc. These no-tions would not be very informative to thoseacquainted with peace research. In its philo-sophical considerations, peace research byand large originally developed as a reactionagainstthe 'realist' assumptions of power po-litical thinking. Also, the idea of peace re-searchgoes againstthe hidden values of beha-vioralist ideals of ivory tower science. It is,however, worth while digging somewhatdeeper in the concept of science actuallyprevailing in the research.Within the conceptual framework of posi-tive and negative peace characteristic of theScandinavian tradition, an analysis of une-qual structures or relationships refers to astate of affairs where certain conditionsrequiredfor the creation of positive peace arelacking. The moral philosophical premisesareto be found in distributivejustice, a basis also

manifested in the Marxist idea of unevendevelopment. Taking this combination of va-lues and an inclination for causal analysis typ-ical of behavioralist methodology, we maydescribe the predominant orientation in theresearch as postbehavioralist. As is the casewith most of the peace researchcarried out inother Nordic countries, the Marxist valuepremises have been mediated through thedependencia school, whereas the more directinfluence of Marxism or neomarxism is onlyslight.In the research reviewed, we may discerntwo types of cognitive models. The predomi-nant one may broadly be termed the 'organi-zational' model: the focus is on internationalorganization, above all on the impact oftransnational corporations on dependencyand its relatedphenomena. Only a minor partof the researchmay be said to reveal a bud ofa different pattern. In line with Etzionianconcepts we may call this the 'preformistic'model. The concept bears elements of func-tionalist thinking and assumes that a 'primi-tive' social unit contains, in embryonic form,all the basic modes of social relations that la-ter become structurallydifferentiated.40In the researchcarried out on North-Southor global issues, the predominant causal rela-tionship conceived as an environmentalfactorfocuses on transnational corporations (cause)and dependence(effect). In these generalcate-gories there exist only minor variations,whereas interpretations of the 'laws' con-ceived to connect these two variables differslightly. A research on problems of interna-tional food politics provides an illustrativeexample of the organizational model.4'The researchtakes its point of departureinthe notion that the world food problem is alogical syndrome resulting from the skewedstructure of the world food economy, whichrepresents a particularly polarized aspect ofinternational inequality. The cause is seen inthe position and policies of transnational cor-porations, by whose commercial interestsrather than the basic needs of the people indifferent countries the world food productionand consumption is steered. The problem


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 75formulation and analytical tools utilized areillustrative of an implementation of theconcept of structural power-as-social-domination: the effect of the structuralpowerof the TNCs, manifested in increasing con-centration and internationalization in worldagribusiness, is dependence and the loss ofself-reliance in national food production,which in turn results in starvation in LDCs.The 'law' combining these variables ratherge-nerallyrefersto the inherent characteristicsofmarket mechanism, the free reign of whichhas resultedin increasing internationalizationand concentration. In addition to this line oftheorizing, elements of the structural violenceschool can be traced in the project, as thenumber of years lived by a person considera-bly dependson the nutritional situation. Herethe dependent variable would, instead of de-pendence, be ratherstarvation, in the structu-ral violence terminology a gap between the ac-tual and the potential.42In the approach represented by the study,the active element is included in environmen-tal processes, whereas the countries becomingmore and more dependent on food exportsare treatedas objects of structuralpower. It isargued that food politics need to be studiedon the international or global level since indi-vidual states arebecoming increasinglydepen-dent on these processes in their nationaldecision-making. From the perspective of the'underdogs' the methodology thus tends tobringalong deterministicundertones, whereasthe voluntary aspect is rather - but only mo-destly so - manifested on the part of the 'top-dogs' in references about the interests of theTNCs and especially the US 'food power'.

A similar approach is takyenn a number of'political economy' studies dealing with therole of the TNCs in international trade, com-munications, seabed minerals, and the inter-national patent system, among otherthemes.43 The identified contradictions do,however, differ slightly in focus. The studiesof the early seventies tend to stress somewhatmore the contradiction between the structuralpower of corporations (and sometimes banks)- pressuring governments in dominant coun-

tries - and the masses in the periphery, where-as 'the NIEO wave' research puts more em-phasis on the state level contradiction betweenindustrializedand developing countries.44Theexplanatory models in these studies tend tovary from the inherent logic of capitalism tothe historical perspective of colonialism andneocolonialist mechanisms of control and do-minance.Studies on armaments and militarizationwith a focus on the North-South axis havesimilarly mainly dealt with the detrimentalrole of internationalizing(arms) industries onsocio-economic development in LDCs. E.g. ina research carried out on the relationship oftransnational and domestic arms productionin developing countries, it is concluded thatincreaseddomestic production capabilitydoesnot lead to a lessening of dependency in deve-loping countries. On the contrary, this meansstrengthened dependence on foreign militarytechnology, which tends to perpetuate and re-produce other forms of economic, technolo-gical and, in the last instance, political depen-dence. As the problem formulation concernsthe impacts of armaments on development,the fundamental contradiction conceived fol-lows the patterns of neocolonialist controland dominance, with a focus on structuralpo-wer and a need to disengage from it. Al-though the point of departure in these studies- which represent a recent emphasis in peaceresearch more generally, too - is the global-ization of technostructures and increasing de-pendencies, i.e. structuralpower with tones ofenvironmental determinism, the focus on al-ternativestrategiesalso means an emphasis onvoluntarististic and emancipatory aspects.45More voluntaristic philosophical under-pinnings are also reflected in a research ana-lyzing mobilization in Africa.46The scientificand conceptual points of departure can betraced to the antidomination tradition ofpeace research and development studies inNordic countries. Taking its starting point inthe global economic relations and processesrelated to NIEO, the research focuses on therelationship between international and natio-nal development processes with a nexus in the


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76 OsmoApunen/HelenaRytiovuorirole of the state and, more concretely, analy-zes the potential and possibilities of realizingself-reliant development strategies in thestructural-historical context of the Africancontinent. In the problem formulation wefind the preformistic model: the relevantquestion concerns the control mechanisms tobe createdin order to realize the developmentpotential. Within the conceptual frameworkof mobilization, development is defined as ateleological process to be consciously plannedand manipulated. However, the actual con-tent given to the concept of power-as-social-competence or progressis by and large that ofmobilization potential in terms of power ca-pabilities, economic resources to be more spe-cific. Thus, although the very concept of mo-bilization indicatesteleological explanation ofaction, what is analyzed is rather (structural)emancipatory potential in the context ofstructural repressive power. This, we feel, ismainly a result of the methodological premi-ses: the structural approach typical of peaceresearchin Scandinavia tends to leave the vo-luntaryaspect in a secondary place. However,as capabilities or resource power (mobiliza-tion potential) are conceived as a means to at-tain more self-reliantdevelopment or autono-my, the concept of structuralpower is basical-ly emancipatory here.By way of a tentative conclusion, we maysay that in the analysis of environmental fac-tors (the structural variation of) the line P,-S,seems to have predominated, but that this ne-vertheless increasingly tends to be combinedwith the emancipatory concept (P,-S,). Infact, it seems that whereas the structuralanalyses of the early seventies were more of adeterministic nature, the 'NIEO wave re-search'has itspointof departuren more volun-taristicapproaches. At this point we may onlyraise the question about the impact of the ser-vered internationalclimateof 'the after NIEOera' on the cognitive patterning of environ-mental issues in research.3.2 Strategies for global persistence and sur-vivalAccording to the widely accepted guidelines

for peace research, the research should be apeace search with an intentionally orientedgoal. 'A peace researcherhas no fatherland.'47To put it slightly differently, the concept ofsecurity, instead of the state, should be takento refer to the community (world and local)and the people. And, although a peace re-searcher has no fatherland, he or she never-theless has a field of action and influence inthe immediate environment.

As peace research by definition proceedsfrom the notion of distributive justice, theprimary group of reference is constituted bythose subordinated in social relations. Fromthe aspect of policy implementation, a pointof departure s often taken in the opinion thatwhat (critical) peace researchhas to offer canonly be put into practiceby or with the help ofthose most seriously affected by the lack ofpositive peace.48 Suggesting policies todecision-makers need not, however, by defi-nition contradict this perspective; the statemay constitute one of the channels utilized bythe researcher in his endeavours - althoughdelicate problems no doubt are involved inthis policy. Our intention here is to approachthese issues only empirically, i.e. to investi-gate how the dilemma of choosing betweenindividualistic (egocentric national) motiva-tions and collectivistic or international com-munity orientations of the researchhas beenapproached in Finnish peace research.The need for a logical linkage between endsand means has strongly been advocated inGandhian thinking: 'There is no road topeace. Peace is the road.' In Scandinavianpeaceresearch his idea is manifested n theverydevelopment of the Galtungian concepts ofnegative and positive peace; positive peace,which lays emphasison cooperativemeasures,ability and emancipation, makes the pointthat (negative) peace may be created by re-pressive means and, consequently, as an endstate bear elements of repression. In the cau-sal analysisof peace conditions the interpreta-tion of such requirements s necessarily,moreor less explicitly, derived from a vision aboutthe desired end state. An analysis of peacestrategies again is methodologically based on


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FinnishForeignPolicy Tradition 77the teleological or finalistic explanation of ac-tion and - what is our empirical problem here- the means dimension may or may not con-tain the qualitative elements of the desiredend state.

Following from the inclination towardscausal analysis in the research, the dimensionof action is dealt with in terms of (structural)interest conflict.49Therefore, strategies mustbe 'scarved out' from the analytical elementsof structuralpower/violence. For this reason,our intention is to make an experimenton uti-lizingthe analyticaltools offered by Galtung'sstructuralviolence framework. The Galtung-ian elements of social order are thefollowing:5?

structure, level nhigher

a ..ang

actorlowerrangsy stems

structure,level n-i

systems

In this conceptualization, actors areorganized in systems through particulartypesof interaction, whereas the entiretyof systemsforms a structure. Structures may be distin-guished at various levels. The concept of arank refers to actor status in a particularsy-stem.From these concepts we are able to derivefive theoretical models and related strategies:(1) Level equalization model aims at reducinghierarchy between structures, whereas (2)structural change refers to internal transfor-mation of this unit (relationships between sy-stems). As to the individual systems, we candistinguishbetween (3) systemtransformationand (4) system differentiation models. Final-ly, there is the (5) status equilibrium model,which refers to equalizing the actor status invarious systems.

Level equalization as a strategy may befound in most of the research n the form of ge-neral references to the need to realize a newinternational (economic) order; the object isequalization of structures of the developedand underdeveloped worlds. E.g. in the con-text of problems of food politics it is emphasi-zed that solutions to these should not be look-ed for in isolation but as part of comprehensi-ve international measures."5More generally,typical of the approaches we have called theorganizational pattern is to concentrate onanalysingthe means of repressionin the modeof causal analysis, and then to refer to NIEOby way of a solution. As a consequence thepolicy formulation in these studies tends tofavor the declaratory manner. The mobiliza-tion researchwhich in its problem formulationrather exemplifies the preformistic model fo-cuses similarlyon structureequalization, butinstead of only treatingthis as a solution alsotakes it as the very object of analysis.52The system transformation strategy is rep-resented by a number of studies dealing withe.g. the international patent system, com-munication networks, international bankingand trade etc.53The concept of a 'system'tends to point out the internationally depen-dent nature of the field in question.54A line ofreasoning characterizingthe approach is thatin the light of growing internationalizationand concentration (structuralpower of TNCs)national policies alone are not of much rele-vance. Instead, solutions should be looked forin the revision of the system internationally.Consequently, changes at the internationalle-vel are often conceived as a precondition forchanges to take place at the national level.Also in this case the policy formulations aremainly declaratory and, naturally enough,focus on internationalmultidiplomacy.Thesystem differentiation strategy compri-ses the research advocating different policiesfor different actors within the system context.The main categories here focus on more self-reliant agricultural, industrial, and securitypolicies in LDCs, disengagement from the in-ternational context in other words. Since theresearchon alternativesecurity policies offers


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78 Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytiivuorisome interesting points of comparison in res-pect to the 'political economy' studies, our fo-cus is on this here.

In line with the organizational model, evenstudies with a securitypolicy orientation tendto concentrate on reasoning about why alter-native security strategies should be adopted(repressive power of armaments industries)rather than primarily focussing on analysingthe elements and implementationof such stra-tegies. In this type of research the societal di-mension is often more clearlyarticulatedthanis the case with a bulk of the 'political econo-my' researchmainly focusing on internationalmultidiplomacy. The reason for this is partlydefinitional: it is emphasized that in this con-text measures(reorientationof armamentsin-dustry)must take place separatelyin the indu-strialized and developing countries since itwould be politically very difficult to createmultilateral and intergovernmental arrange-ments.55An emphasis on the societal contextis, however,also a logicalconsequence f anapplicationof approaches ocusingon inter-nal domestic(bureaucratic olitics,military-industrialcomplex,autismetc.) ratherthanexternal (action-reaction,power game etc.)factors in the arms race.

Studies of this type by definition concen-trate on policy implementation, nd conse-quently he end state- developmentwithin-creased autonomy - remains the value basisbehind. In policy formulation the declaratoryaspects efer o theillegitimacy f armaments,whereaspolicy implementations concernedwithwaysandmeansof mobilizing esourcesfor development (slowing down R&D indeveloped countries and channelling the re-leaseto the LDCs).56n thiscontext t is easyto hypothesize that the fact that the specificpolicy implementations moreclearlyarticu-lated in mattersof militarization and the armsrace is related to the fact that peace research shere more 'professional' han in the moregenuine ield of developmentssues.In the policy proposals concerning alterna-tive militarystrategies,we are confrontedwith the dilemma of repressivemeans consti-tutinganendstateof a repressive ature.The

legitimation here lies in the argument that apeople's army also representsa form of socialdefence, which contributes to the creation ofdemocratic social structures and, above all,does not undermine self-reliant economic de-velopment. Two kinds of cognitive patternscan be identified here. The firstgoes along theline of arguing for the case of the least evil: ifwe take it that an army is needed anyhow, itshould be of a kind which is least harmful tothe harmonious development of civilian sec-tors, economic growth, and political demo-cracy. Within this context it may also be re-called that nonviolent forms of defence maybe better combined with a military systembased on a people's army. According toanother line of argument, the military is noevil by definition, but what is decisive are itsfunctions and purposes in society; in a parti-cular societal and historical context the mili-tary may have a positive role to play inincreasing the emancipatory powers of thepeople. In concrete analyses these argumentsare not very clearly distinguished from eachother.It seems,however,warranted o concludethat in the final analysisthe values of distribu-tive justice tend to weigh more than the prin-ciple of non-violence.

Finally, we areto note that the categoriesofstructural change and status equilibrium re-main scarce in our pilot study. In the case ofthe former this would indicate that entire unitchanges (revolutions) are not very commonlyproposed strategies. 'Structuralchange' is in-deed one of the most repeatedterms in the re-search but the concept is not, stricto sensu,used in its Galtungian meaning. The scarcityof studies with a rank equilibriumfocus againindicates the hegemony of more comprehen-sive system approach over actor relations inthe research. There are, however, indicationsof a 'come back' of the more traditionalactorstatus approach, above all representedby stu-dies on regional power centers."573.3. Finland and the internationalcommunityThe policy statementsin the researchreviewedas a rule focus on the state level in a generalsense. In the researchcharacterizedby the or-


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 79ganizational model, it is sometimes pointedout that Finland, too, is becoming more inter-nationally dependent within the system con-text in question."58n the few studies particu-larly emphasizing Finland as the channel forinternational community measures, basicallytwo types of cognitive patterns may be distin-guished: the active support and the passivefollow-up model. The active support model ischaracterized by attempts to 'steer' the Fin-nish input in international cooperation to-wards qualitativeagreementwith the commu-nity as against the egoistic national approach.E.g. in an analysison Finnish food aid it is ar-gued that multilateral agencies - The WorldFood Programme is advocated - should beused for channelling the aid, because egocen-tric motives (own agriculturalsurplusrelievedby food aid) easily intrude in bilateral aid.The logic of the argument is thus that, in or-der to avoid the distorting impact of self-interest, collectivistic measures should be pre-ferredto own initiatives."59Elements of the activist model can also bediscerned, e.g. in a study dealing with Fin-land's relations with the Republic of South-Africa. An increase in the aid to ANC andSWAPO is suggested in order to speed up thebreak of repressive structures in SouthernAfrica: the aim is to contribute actively to theemancipation of the black population.6The more passivefollow-up model takes in-ternationally formulated norms as a point ofdeparture and emphasizes that Finland, too,should contribute to progressivemeasures in-ternationally. Characteristicof this model is aconcentration on UN issues and a concernabout the Finnish foreign policy image. Do-mestic interestgroups suffering from the rea-lization of internationally formulated norms(like NIEO principles, economic sanctionsagainst 'pariah' states etc.) may be identifiedand the costs involved calculated. As a rule nomajor hindrances for the implementation ofpolicies formulated internationally are con-ceived and, consequently, a question aboutpolitical willingness is often raised by the re-search community.6' The approach taking apoint of departurein a contradiction between

norms advocated within the internationalcommunity and Finnish self-interests is by de-finition declaratory in its policy formulationand as such also reflects Finland's historicalrole as a bystanderand the relatedlack of tra-dition in Third World policies.3.4. Concluding remarks in peace researchOur findings indicatedthat in the researchthedependent variable(structuresof dependency)is kept relativelyunchanged- only the notionson starvationimplied a different patternhere.The independentvariable, again, is more mul-tidimensional. In moral philosophical consi-derations the premises are to be found in dis-tributivejustice. Thus ideas of non-violence inconcrete analyses tend to be related to the endstate only, whereas these issues in the meansdimension are not problematized- rathertheyare typologized. Consequently, this proble-matique - from the perspective of which ouranalytical framework has been constructed -turns up in the categories of just/unjust; theuse of violence is qualified, but not discrimi-nated. Hence, the value premisestend to dis-tance themselves somewhat from the Gandhi-an ideas of reaching the principle of non-violence also to include the means utilized. Inthis sense, ideas are shared with the tradi-tional school: violence as a means is qualifiedin both, although in a different manner.Empiricallyour conclusions are merelybas-ed on a tentative analysis of Finnish research,but the questions opened should neverthelesshave relevance in the wider Scandinavian tra-dition more widely, too. Perhaps we need toemphasize that we do not here argue for anyparticular value basis for peace research butinstead wish to point out a need to reflect onthese premises.We would also conclude that an egocentricnational bias in Finnish peace researchwouldbe hard to find. The explanation is, however,more intricate than a mere preference for acommunity or collectivistic international ap-proach - although this explanation by nomeans should be excluded. The first reserva-tion relates to our focus on North-South is-sues, which, until more recently, have remain-


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80 Osmo Apunen/Helena Rytiivuoried peripheral for Finnish foreign policy con-cerns; studies on more regional mattersmightmodify our conclusions. The point about theso far relatively peripheral significance ofthese matters to Finland is also supported bythe fact that in most studies Finland is not anyobject of interest. To this there is, however,also another explanation, viz. the preoccupa-tion of the research tradition with interna-tional dominance structures and patterns ofdependency, in the global context of whichFinland in many respectsratherbelongs to thesemiperipheral than center countries. How-ever, the reason we would regard as the mostimportant one refers to the sociologicalaspects in a particular research community,i.e. that research influences are rathergainedfrom the international or Scandinavian peaceresearch community than any nationally bas-ed research traditions or domestic problems.With regard to our conclusions we areobliged to make the reservationthat in a smallresearch community like the Finnish merelystochastical processes by necessity play a rolein the various choices made - but probablynot in the more fundamental premises pos-sessed.4. An absolute idea of progress?Comparing the two traditions in Finland, se-curity policy and peace research, one easilyperceivesthat they do not confront each othera great deal over the same issues. As a result,such an intellectual particularismcan be bestillustratedwith the distinctcognitive distancesthese two traditions or schools exhibit in Fin-land. In spite of this cognitive particularism,the two schools do, however, perform persua-sive roles within the same and overlappingso-cial settings.The traditional security pattern, as one al-most by definition may expect, is preoccupiedwith issues of paramount importance to Fin-land as a state actor in international relations.This has resultedin a small power perspectivein the research, too. Authors of this schoolare not much preoccupied with 'distant' pro-blems; global issues of survival and worldcommunity points of view are, to say the

least, left in the background. The peace re-search community, in turn, is intellectuallypreoccupied with global issues and has clearlya world community point of view. But peaceresearchersare not very specific with respectto the means to be used in order to attain thedesiredend states. If traditional security poli-cy scholars keep at a clear cognitive distancewith respect to the world community point ofview and North-South issues, then the peaceresearchcommunity in turn exhibits a similarpersuasive handicap: peace researchers arenot very specific as to the means of persis-tence their immediate social setting, the Fin-nish society and state, should utilize. And sothe two 'communities' - the word written inparentheses because of the small number ofindividualsrespectivelyinvolved - do not me-et or confront each other intellectuallyin anysubstantial manner. Hence the idea ofdevelopment as an absolute idea, i.e. progressthat takes place with the force of its own dy-namics, seems to prevail in both traditions.One is not very much concerned with whattakes place outside the immediate ethnocentricperspective;the other is not too much preoc-cupied with how its social setting may contri-bute to the persistenceof the global communi-ty.

NOTES1. A definition of A. Kardiner,quoted in Berenice A.Carroll, Peace Research: The Cult of Power, J.ournalofConflict Resolution, vol. XVI, N:o 4, December 1972, p.

590.2. JussiTeljo, Valtiojayhteiskunta Snellmaninvaltiofilo-sofiassa, (State and society in Snellman's philosophy),Helsinki 1934, p. 873. Teljo, op.cit. p. 84.4. K. J. Holsti, International Politics, EnglewoodCliffs, N. J. 1977, p. 165.5. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience, NewYork 1969, p. 124.6. Elizabeth Converse, A. Post-editorial, Journal ofConflict Resolution, vol. XVI, No. 4, December 1972 p.617.7. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. Macpher-

son, Aylesbury 1976, p. 118.8. Tord Heivik, Basic goals of development: Survival,integrity, and progress, PRIO publication S-26/77.


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Finnish Foreign Policy Tradition 819. Paivio Tommila, La Finlande dans lapolitique euro-peenne en 1809-1815, Helsinki 1962.10. Osmo Apunen, Suomi keisarillisenSaksan politii-kassa 1914-1915 (Finlandin Germanpolitics 1914-1915),Helsinki 1968; Deutschland und die finnische Freiheits-bewequng in 1914-1915, gedenkschrift Martin Gohring,Wiesbaden 1969.11. Max Jakobson, TheDiplomacy of WinterWar,Anaccount of the Russo-FinnishWar, 1939-1940, Cambrid-

ge, Mass. 1961.12. Five roads to Nordic security, ed. by J. J. Hoist,Cooperation & Conflict 3/4 1972.13. Lauri Hyvaimki, Suomalaiset ja suurpolitiikka,Venaijaindiplomatia Suomen sanomalehdiston kuvasti-messa (Finns and the World Politics 1878-1890), with anEnglish summary, Helsinki 1964.14. Tuomo Polvinen, Die finnischen Eisenbahnen inden militirischen und politischen Pliinen Russlands vordem ersten Weltkrieg,Helsinki 1962.15. Stacy Churchill, The East Karelianautonomy q

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Apunen, Osmo, and Helena Rytövuori, Ideas of 'Survival' and 'Progress' in the Finnish Foreign...

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