Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1988

8/22/2019 Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1988

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UNITED STATES ARMY


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PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN1-88-4 APRIL 1988

1 Survivabi lity Equipment Trainer II, MG Ellis 0,Parker2 Standardization of Cockpit Controls, Mr.11 Threat: Engaging Attack Helicopters With Tanks-TheWarsaw Pact View, Dr. Donald E. Nease14 Training to Standard is Key to Reducing Accidents16 PEARL'S18 No Harm Intended, Brian A. Dean20 AH-64, A Total System for Battle, Mr. Ron Brunelle andMr, A. 1\111"\, ....... .:'"27 USAASO Sez: VFR Flights Near Noise-Sensitive Areas, Mr.Robert28 DES Report to the Field: Operator's Manual Changes-User Influence, Kidrick30 Aviation Personnel Notes: ROTC Accessions;Standards are Rising; Enlisted Personnel; AviationWarrant Officers; Aviation Commissioned Officers;32 Dynamite in Small Packages, CW2 Michael D.35 Fuel Tanks Added to Black Hawks, Ms. Linda S. Dura36 To Be Measured By, Dennis E. Dura38 Metric? Metric? Who Needs Metric?, Mr. Nathan H.

Cleek Jr.40 ARMA SAT, An Aeromedical Regulation That PilotsShould MAJ Kevin T. M.D.IMC With Low Ceilings,

Back Cover: ATC Focus Introduction, Ms. J.Cover: In this month's lead, "Standardization of Cockpit

the author addresses advantages standardizationoffers in improved safety, pilot proficiency and costeffectiveness. Article begins on page 2.

Major General Ellis D. ParkerCommanderU.S. Army

of the Army:Carl E. VuonoGeneral, U.S. ArmyChief of Staff


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In this article are shown several of the cyclic and collective controls from thecurrent Inventory of aircraft. Take a few minutes to look at them to see howmany you can Identify and the aircraft to which they belong. As you evaluateeach one of these controls, note the different switches and their locations.Answers are on page 10.

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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As AVIATORS transitionfrom one type of aircraft to another,they no doubt suddenly find themselvesconfronted with the problems of becoming comfortable in the cockpit andfinding the controls. A certain switchthat the aviator needs to locate is foundin one place in one type of aircraft butis often located in a different place inanother type ofaircraft. Along with theproblem of switches being in differentlocations is the problem of switchesand controls having the same functionbut different names in different aircraft. The myriad of controls andswitches seem to increase with eachnew aircraft. This trend has appearedwith the current inventory of aircraftand may increase as new equipment isprocured for placement in unitsthroughout the U.S. Army.During th-e process of procurementand design of new aircraft, the methodsand procedures for cockpit controls,switches, instrumentation and terminology have become nonstandardized.Readers who serve on aircraft configuration boards should not becomedefensive at this point about this asserted nonstandardization; they should

APRIL 1988

wait until they have tackled the identification and comparison of cycliccontrols on page 2.Pilots need standardized cockpits.Pilots need a cockpit that they can become proficient in, and they need toknow where all of the basic controlsand instruments are or where theyshould be. Standardized cockpitswould allow for a much easier transition from one aircraft to 'another. Pilotswould become proficient quicker.Standardization would reduce thepossibility of accidents and cause lessdestruction of equipment. It would alsoincrease the availability of pilots because it would cost less money to trainthem, and it would provide for a standardized force of aircrews and aircraftneeded to transport troops and provideprotection and fire support.As pilots transition from the UH-IHuey to the UH-60 Black Hawk, theyare suddenly exposed to a multitude ofdifferent switches, instrumentation andterminology. The only control that isthe same on the UH-I and the UH-60collective is the search light control.The cyclic control stick grip is the sameshape in both aircraft. Most of the

Mr. Jim Steelman

cyclic grip switches are the same;however, they are in different locationson the cyclic grip. A pilot in trainingmay ask, "What is the big deal aboutchanging switches around? I can flyanything and changing of switchesdoesn't bother me." However, thesepilots are few and far between. Pilotsmay ask, "Why change the name andlocation of switches?" They may further assert, "If the buyer wants thecargo hook release switch changed onthe cyclic from the lower left side ofthe cyclic stick grip to the top right sideof the cyclic grip, the seller will certainly do that to sell his product. Theseller will no doubt think that is thelocation desired by a majority of thepilots who fly or will fly his aircraf t. "The truth is, however, pilots are rarely asked their opinion on where switches or instrumentation should belocated.How does the placement of switchesaffect pilots who have been flying aUH-I or a CH-47 Chinook and havejust been, or are in the process of being, qualified in the UH-60? Whenthese pilots are thrown into a criticalsituation, while flying, more than like-

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TRIM FEELSWITCHWEAPONS ACTIONSWITCH (MOMENTARY) TRIM FEELRELEASE SWITCH

ROCKER - - I - - - - + - f - r - . ~

RADIO,ICSROCKER SWITCH

INOPERATIVESWITCH

GUARDEDTRIGGER SWITCHFIGHT MODESYMBOLOGYSWITCH

REMOTETRANSMITIERSELECTORSWITCH

GUARDEDTRIGGER SWITCH

FLIGHT MODESYMBOLOGYSWITCH

DASE RELEASESWITCH DASE RELEASESWITCHCENTERING

DEVICE RELEASE RADIO-ICSAFCS

--TRIM~ ' ~ ~ : . ; : ; - ~ SWITCH

FLARE DISPENSER - -""

CARGO HOOK RELEASE

ly they will revert back to their standard cyclic grip, press the night visiongoggles panel lights kill switch in a dayvisual meteorological condition andcause a normal slingload mission todevelop into a major accident. Why?Because a cyclic switch was changedand negative habit transfer has occurred.First, let us compare three cyclicstick grips: the UH-I, CH-47 and theUH-60. The switches have been completely changed around in these three

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GUARD-..rrTRIGGER SWITCHACTION SWITCH

aircraft. Note the feature of the intercom/transmit switch on the UH-60cyclic stick grip. It is extremely difficult for aviators who transition intothe UH-60 to adapt to this switch. Theupper position is for intercom, and thelower is for transmit. This switch isreversed from what aviators are accustomed to using in other aircraft.I am qualified to fly in more than 30aircraft, and this switch is a first forme. This switch, the one different feature on the cyclic stick grip, is not only

distracting, but it is also awkward touse. The only aircraft in which I havefound the two cyclic stick grips almostthe same, with switches in similar positions, are the UH-I and the CH-47. Allother cyclic grips have switches in different places.From 1956 through 1966, helicopterswitches were standardized on the CH-34 Choctaw, CH-21 Shawnee, CH-37Mojave, UH-l and the UH-19Chickasaw. Since the procurement of theAH-l Cobra, AH-64 Apache, OH-58



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STICK TRIMGO AROUNDENABLE SWITCH CARGO HOOKRELEASE SWITCH/

CARGO RELEASE

PANELLIGHTSKILLSWITCH

CYCLICCONTROLS

Kiowa and the UH-60, the concept ofstandardized cyclic and collective controls and switches has vanished.The problem of nonstandardizationdoes not stop with cyclic controls; itcontinues with collective controls andswitches. The same collective controlsin different aircraft do not have thesame names. For example, theOH-58collective control is called pilot collective lever; the AH-l, collective controlstick; the AH -64, collective stick control; the UH-60, collective pitch con-

APRIL 1988

TRIGGERSWITCH

trol stick and the CH-47, thrust control. These controls all have the samefunction: they change the pitch in therotor system.Second, let us consider some of thecurrent design features of collectivepitch controls that need standardization. The UH -1, programed to be in useuntil around the year 2010, has agovernor increase/decrease (INCRDECR) switch and a search light extend retract control installed adjacentto one another. In any night operation,

NOT USED DEPRESS IELEVATEGUN SWITCHNOT USED

FORCETRIMRELEASESWITCHICSSWITCH

after making a good approach, or notso good as the case may be, and aftercompleting a prelanding check, a pilotadjusts the search light and, in doingso, presses the revolutions per minute(rpm) DECR switch; as a result, thehelicopter settles to an unintendedlanding surface. The pilot may havethought the engine had failed when theaudio and rpm warning light came onand may have swiftly lowered the collective, thus driving the aircraft into theground and causing major materiel

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LANDINGLIGHTS

4 - l + - : : : ~ STARTERSWITCH

ENGINEIDLERELEASE

CONTROL

LANDINGLIGHT /SEARCHLIGHTSWITCHES

GOVERNORRPMSWITCH

SEARCH LIGHTCONTROL SWITCH

(()J)4.--IDLE STOP RELEASESWITCH

ENGINE IDLE STOPRELEASE SWITCH

RPM NO 1& 2INCREASE /DECREASE

S ITCH SEARCHLIGHTSEARCH LIGHTSWITCHJETTISONSWITCH

SEARCH LIGHTCONTROLSWITCH RPM NO 1INCREASE /

DECREASESWITCH

EXTEND/RETRACTSWITCH

IGNITION --=- !.STARTERSWITCH

damage to the UH-l and possible injuries to those onboard.For another example, consider theAH-l with the same feature as the UH-1. As an added feature on the AH-1 ,a jettison switch is placed just abovethe INCR-DECR switch so that, ifpilots are not careful while adjustingtheir rpm, they may "pickle" a fullload of rockets or even the pods.The CH -4 7, UH -60 and the AH-64also have the same design features asthe UH-I and AH-I . In the CH-47, the

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WIRE CUTSWITCH

number 1 and 2 engine INCR-DECRswitches are adjacent to the search lightextend-retract switches. With the aircraft carrying a heavy slingload atnight, the pilot's repositioning thesearch or the INCR -DECR by mistake,thinking there was a problem with theengine, could cause a mishap . In theUH -60, the emergency cargo hookrelease switch is located immediatelyabove the push/on-off landing lightswitch. I f the pilot presses the cargorelease switch by mistake after com-

TRUST CONTROLBRAKE TRIGGER

pleting a cargo flight , the cargo willdrop and , if he is not aware of the cargobeing r e l e ~ s e d he can land on it. Acopilot recently released a slingloadwhile adjusting the landing light for thepilot. The cost of the 10 t slingload was$40,000 . A crewchief of a CH47caused a similar accident. Pressing apendant to talk , he pressed the wrongswitch near the intercom switch andreleased the slingload.Some systems use audio signals toalert pilots of problems. The stabilator



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BUCS TRIGGEROPERATIONAL(CPG ONLY)COLLECTIVE

NIGHT VISION.-...-- SWITCH

BORESIGHTHMO/POLARITYSWITCHENGINE CHOP

GRIP - -+ - COLLAR

COLLECTIVECONTROLS

LANDINGLIGHTCONTROL

audio in the UH-60 has a tone similar tothat of the low rpm audio in the UH -1.In the event the stabilator should failin a UH-60, and if the pilot has had recent UH-l time, he is inclined to lowerthe collective, thinking the engine hasfailed. This could be a fatal move. TheUH-60 operator's manual contains awarning that, if acceleration is continued or collective is decreased withthe stabilator in a trailing edge downposition, longitudinal control will belost.

APRIL 1988

SEARCHLIGHTSWITCHSERVOSHUTOFFENGINESPEEDTRIM

Because of the location of switcheson the UH-60 collective, an emergency procedure was inserted in the operator's manual. I f a servo light comeson, the procedure requires a check tosee if the servo switch was inadvertently turned off. Should a pilot mistakenly tum one of these servos off, thereis the possibility that the other servowill fail. The UH-60 must have one ofthese systems operational to fly.

In a recent fixed wing accident, fourpersons were killed when an aircraft

EMERG SEARCHLIGHTHOOK RELEASE SWITCH

LANDINGLIGHTCONTROLSERVO

SHUTOFF

stalled and dived into the ground immediately after takeoff. The investigators concluded that ,the control leverswere mounted in a different locationfrom the previous aircraft the pilot hadflown. Previous engine controls weremounted as follows: propeller-throttlemixture, sequenced from left to right;while the fatal aircraft engine controllevers were mounted throttle-propellermixture. The pilot on takeoff mistakenly pulled back on the prop controlswhen attempting to reduce power after

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ENGINESPEEDTRIM


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takeoff. This could have imposedenough of a load on the engines to havecaused them to stall.Regarding our latest fixed wing aircraft, the C-12 Huron, which is a directspinoff of the King Air 200 already inproduction by Beech Aircraft, thecockpit was redesigned by Beech Aircraft at the request and specificationsoutlined by the U.S. Army, the U.S.Air Force and the U.S. Navy. Themilitary Services changed 80 percentof the controls and switches in a perfectly safe, efficient, pilot-orientedcockpit. Why? It certainly did not saveany money. I f anything, it cost thousands of dollars to retool to the newmilitary specifications.

In what way was the cockpitchanged? The fuel quantity indicatorsand fuel control panel, which wereoriginally on the left forward side ofthe cockpit where they could be easilyreviewed by both crewmembers during flight, were moved to an overheadposition. Now, the pilot almost has tolie across the center console and lookvertically up to observe the fuel paneland control switches. Also, otherflight-essential switches, such as autofeather, engine start, avonics masterswitch, the master switches, autoignition and other related flight-essentialswitches, were relocated and are nowcollocated with the fuel control panel.This creates a maze of switches overhead. With the new location of cockpitswitches and controls, pilots can become spatially disoriented or sustain aswirl effect while flying at night orunder instrument conditions.Engine instruments were placed onthe right side of the instrument panelcenterline, which causes the pilot in theleft seat to lean to the right during takeof f to prevent an overtorque or ensuretemperature limits are not exceeded.The UHF (ultrahigh frequency) radioand transponder were placed to the extreme rear of the avonics console,which causes the crewmember who isadjusting the radio or setting the transponder to become spatially disoriented.When getting into the cockpit, the crewmust fold down a panel and step on thecenter console to avoid stepping on the

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radios. In the King Air 200, one maybe 6 feet 6 inches tall and still get intothe cockpit. It is much more difficultfor a pilot to enter the C-12 cockpit.Placement of the electric toilet in theC-12 is another design change thatcauses some problems. The toilet islocated in the baggage compartment,the most aft position of the aircraft. Thecabin tapers from a height of 57 inchesto a height of about 40 inches at the aftbulkhead. During a flight of 3 to 4hours' duration with stowed baggage,using the toilet becomes difficult, evenfor one who is only 5 feet tall.The flight instruments are conveniently placed on the C-12 instrumentpanel and allow for ease of instrumentflying. They were left where they be

long-an excellent layout. Helicopterflight instruments should be standardized in the same pattern and locationas in the C-12.Army Aviation has worked hard tostandardize pilot training and flight

UH-60 Black Hawk1976

procedures. Considerable progress hasbeen made. However, nonstandardization of the cockpit has left the pilot ata disadvantage. To standardize pilottraining when flight equipment is notstandardized is not sufficient. Standardized equipment and terminologywould make the job complete.Procurement of new equipment doesrequire that some changes be made, butnot wholesale changes. Changes ofcockpit controls, instruments andswitches should be kept to a minimumby adding only those changes in hardware needed to perform the mission.I f a cargo release switch has workedsuccessfully in one position for 25years, why change it? Many controlsand switches that perform the samefunction have different names. Duringtransition and unit training, pilotsspend many hours memorizing terminology. For starters, let us considerthe volume control on navigation andcommunication radios. That control is~

AH-64 Apache1976



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referred to as volume,-gain and audiocontrol. These three tenns all mean thesame thing: control sound levels. Whynot use one tenn for the volume control? Some of the abbreviations usedin referring to turbine engine tem-.peratures are TGT, TOT, ITT andTIT. All of these abbreviations referto a measurement for operating enginetemperatures. The source of the limiting operating temperatures is not really that important to the pilot.Rotor speeds are referred to by different tenns. These abbreviations arerotor rpm, Nr and %rpmr. Gas turbinespeeds are referred to as Nt or Ng.Engine power turbine speeds are abbreviatedas Np, N2 and %rpm. Stability systems are referred to as SCAS,SAS, ASE and AFCS. Vne, whichmeans never exceed speed, is defineda different way in each operator'smanual. These abbreviations are merely a few of hose having the same meaning but different names.In chapter 1of the AH-64 operator'smanual, a statement is made that theabbreviations and tenns that are usedin the text clarify the text in that manualonly and they are not necessarily stan-dard abbreviations. This kind of nonstandardized aviation language notonly makes it difficult for one aviatorto converse with another but alsocauses confusion throughout the entireaviator chain of command. Investigations of accidents and correct conclusions can also be adversely affected bylack of standardized language.The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently made a ruling re-quiring standardized flight controls forPart 23 aircraft (small aircraft) to makeflight decks (cockpits) less confusing.The new FAA regulation requires allPart 23 aircraft certified after 11August 1986 to have aerodynamics,powerplants, fuel systems and auxiliary cockpit controls in the sameshape and a similar position. This action was taken to minimize accidentscaused by random location, operationsand arrangements of cockpit controlsfor small airplanes. This FAA policyis consistent with that established forlarger aircraft.

APRIL 1988

Pilots fonn habit patterns from thefirst time they start learning how to fly.The more aircraft that pilots transitioninto, the more habit patterns they mustexpand. The UH-6O copilot's pressingthe emergency cargo release locatednext to the landing light press-on-offswitch and the CH-47 crewchiefstransmitting the cargo to the ground areexamples of habit transfers that resulted in mishaps.The instructor pilot's (IP's ) missionis to train aviation personnel in theproper method and procedures for certain types ofaircraft. Their task is mademore difficult by the redesign, redesignation and the nonstandard placementof switches and controls that have thesame functions. The redesign andplacementof switches in different locations on new aircraft not only increasetraining time required for the individual to become proficient, but alsocreate inherent safety problems. Mostof the time, missions are accomplished and all goes well. Problems arise,however, when the crew is thrown intoa demand overload situation or whenthey become too relaxed and encountera pressured situation. As so often happens, they automatically will revertback to a previous habit pattern whileflying in a new type aircraft. Crewmembers press a switch, then look, instead oflooking and then actuating thecorrect switch or control.In a recent article in the Army TImes,General GlennK. Otis, the U.S. AnnyEuropean commander, addressed standardization of organizations and procedures. He stated that his goal is tostandardize organizations and procedures because, as they are, theycreate an unnecessary workload. Whatcan Anny Aviation do to correct thedesign of equipment and the placementof controls and switches? The answeris, "Don't ust preach standardization;initiate, monitor and/ollow up on standardization. Perhaps one agencyshould be in control of the cockpit configuration of aircraft. I have been a partof Army Aviation for 31 years. During this time I have not been asked foradvice on the configuration of cockpitsnor, to my knowledge, have any ofmy

line pilot associates. Personnel with ahigh level of operational experienceshould advise and recommend changesin the location of controls, instrumentsand switches. Given the maze and location of cockpit controls, it appears thatcontrol authorities who approve thesecockpit changes and designs do notcommunicate with those with operational expertise. Obviously, this communication is a must.The following summaries are typicalof the mishaps caused by inadvertentjettisoning of external stores, slingloads, doors and windows: A pilot was spraying for mosquitoes with a new type of sprayer slungbeneath his UH-IV. While spraying atabout 70 feet above ground level andat 50 knots speed, the pilot inadvertently pushed the cargo release button,releasing the load. The pilot was flying with his right index finger on theintercom switch and his middle fingeron the cargo release button. As hepressed the intercom switch, he inadvertently and simultaneously pushedthe cargo release button. The spray rigwas damaged when it hit the ground ina rice field. The damage to the rice fieldwas negligible.

During a jump mission in a UH-60, the jumpmaster inadvertently jettisoned both escape panels from the leftcargo door when attempting to open theleft cargo door. The jumpmaster wasproperly briefed; however, he releasedthe escape panels, instead of openingthe cargo door. Upon landing, the aircraft was inspected for damage. Nodamage was found; the aircraft wasreleased for flight. To prevent this typeof mishap, it was recommended that adesign change be considered. Thisproblem still exists since no designCchange has been made. The latestmishap occurred in 1988 when an air-craft's windows were inadvertently jettisoned. Another instance of this type ofmishap occurred in a CH-47D. Theaircraft was at a stable hover with anexternal load about 35 feet above theground. The flight engineer and crewchief cleared the load and aircraft fordescent. As the copilot began the de-

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scent, he inadvertently depressed thecargo hook release button, allowing theexternal load to fall the remaining 30feet to the ground. The external loadsustained extensive damage to itsundercarriage and body. There wereno injuries. An external load was inadvertentlyreleased by the crewchief flying a CH-54A Tarhe. The crewchief used thecyclic intercom switch instead of thefloor switch, mistakingly pushing thecargo release button. The load sank.The crewchief notified the CoastGuard. The slings that were lost werelater retrieved. During recovery from diving fire,a student flying an AH-IS did not respond to the IP's command to "gocold" (safe the weapon system). As theaircraft was put into a left bank, therotor rpms started to increase. The IPapplied collective pitch (CP) to reducethe rotor rpm. Then he immediatelyreached for the CP master arm switchto safe the weapon system. In his haste,the IP unintentionally jettisoned all theexternal stores except for the left inboard M-200 rocket pod, which failedto release from its aft attaching point.One M-200 rocket pod and two TOWmissile racks were damaged, and oneM-200 rocket pod was destroyed. In still another incident, an AH-64A was on the ground with bladesstopped but auxiliary power unit(APU) running. The copilot receivedthe signal from the pilot in commandwho was out of the aircraft to completeaircraft shutdown. The APU was shutdown before the generator was turnedoff. The stabilator failure horn sounded. The copilot reached to reset thehom without visually checking the button and pressed the jettison all button.The rocket pods were jettisoned fromthe aircraft. Later, the pylons were removed, cleared, inspected, reassembled and reinstalled. While at cruise speed, the pilot ofan OV-ID Mohawk observed hydraulicfluid leaking and running on the floorin front of the cockpit next to his feet.The pilot noticed the No.2 hydraulicpressure gauge/system went to zero.The No. 1 hydraulic system was fluc-

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tuating. While performing emergencylanding gear extension, the pilot inadvertently pulled the emergencystores release handle, jettisoning theright drop tank before landing. The leftdrop tank did not release from the wingstore and remained on the aircraft. Thelanding was uneventful. The pilot mistakenly pulled the emergency storesrelease handle instead of the emergency landing gear release handle. Bothhandles are painted yellow and blackstriped. The wiper motor seal failed,causing hydraulic fluid leakage in thecockpit.Such types of mishaps have cost theU.S. Government more than $622,000since 1983. Army Aviation cannotcontinue supporting such costs in damages to its aircraft. Certainly, an ounceof prevention is worth a pound of cure.Standardization of cockpit controls isthat ounce of prevention that could ensure the pound of cure is not needed.

Answers to cyclic andcollective controlsidentification from page 2.Cyclic Controls

1 AH-64 (pilot)2. AH-64 (copilot gunner)3. CH-474. UH-605. AH-16. OH-587. UH-1Collective Controls8. OH-58

9. UH-110. AH-111. AH-6412. CH-4713. UH-60 (earlier model)14. UH-60 (NVG adapted)

ABOUT THE AUTHORMr. Jim Steelman was an aviation warrant officer for

20 years, graduating from the U.S. Army Aviation FlightSchool at Ft. Rucker, AL, In December 1957. He retiredIn 1977 as a CW4. Mr. Steelman's last aaaignmentbefore his retirement was with the U.S. Army ForcesCommand Flight Detachment, Ft. McPherson, GA,where he performed the duties of flight standardizationofficer and was the primary pilot for General BernardRogers.He Is qualified In flying more than 30 aircraft, having

had 8,000 hours of fixed wing and 6,000 hours of rotarywing flying time. He Is currently a Department of theArmy civilian Instructor pilot teaching In the UH-60Black Hawk aircraft qualification course at Ft. Rucker.



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THE WARSAW PACT VIEW-

Engaging

Dr. Donald E. NeaseThreat Division

Directorate of Combat DevelopmentsU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker, AL

Attack Helicopters WithTanks

SNeE WORLD WAR II, tanks have been the primary ground striking force on the battlefield. Their lethalityhas called forth various responses, among them antitankguided missiles (ATGMs) and attack helicopters. Firstmaking their appearance during the Vietnam conflict, U. S.modified UH-l Hueys and AH-l Cobras impressed Sovietobservers so much that they quickly produced their ownattack helicopter, the Mi-24 Hind. At the same time, theSoviets became increasingly aware and concerned thatdedicated ai r defense systems might not be able to neutralizethis new antitank threat on the battlefield.

During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the Sovietsand their Warsaw Pact ally, Poland, forthrightly addressedthe issue in several publications. First, antihelicopter defense is the responsibility of all elements of the combinedarms force. Interestingly enough, the U.S. Army, during

APRIL 1988

the last 2 years, has adopted much the same philosophyagainst Soviet antitank attack helicopters with the fo rwardarea air defense system.

Second, because of their relatively low speed, low flying altitude and lack of armor protection, helicopters arevulnerable to the firing of all weapons in a combat unit,including tanks: Of course, the modern Soviet tank isequipped with a dedicated antiaircraft system, the 12.7 mmmachinegun mounted on the turret. However, even withthis weapon, the Soviet Union and Poland have developedhelicopter engagement tactics and doctrine for tank mainguns.

Initially, on the battlefield, the Sovie t battalion tank commander will brief his subordinates concerning naturalscreens from which North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) helicopters could deliver attacks; moreover, along

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Engaging Attack Helicopters With Tanks

the main axis ofadvance probable ambush locations, helicopter approaches and attack positions are noted. To bringgreater reliability into this integrated system, ai r surveillance sectors for tank companies, ai r defense weapons andbattalion observation posts overlap. Supplementary observation posts are situated on probable helicopter approachaxes. Finally, detection and early warning of airborne helicopters are also the responsibility of combat reconnaissancepatrols and the flank companies.

Target selection takes place as soon as a group of helicopters launches its attack. The helicopter posing the greatest threat receives first priority. Individual tanks of a platoon or company open fire on targets assigned or on thosetargets being engaged by the commander.

The primary technique employed against helicopters bytank main guns is the barrage-firing technique. Employedby an entire platoon or only one tank, the first barrage willbe fired when the target is at a range of4 kilometers (Ian);the second barrage will be launched when the helicopteris 3.5 Ian away; and the third barrage will be fired whenthe target reaches a range of 3 Ian. Consisting ofone round

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SovietT-55 tankplatoon.

from each tank, the number of barrages is a function ofthe target's range at the moment of its detection, the effectiveness of the preceding barrage and the number of targetsin the attacking group. Barrage firing by severa l tanks will

FIGURE 1: Clustered salvos (simultaneousexplosion of five shells).

Source: (U) A Polish article titled " GroundForces Handbook on Anlihelicopter Defense ."

Trajectoriesof shellsfired bytank platoon.

U.S. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


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FIGURE 2: Graduated salvos.

ensure a higher probability of kill because of the concentration of fire.Employing 100 mm antiaircraft cartridges (U0-415) with

time fuzes (VM 30), Polish T-54/55 tanks could executethe barrage-firing operation in one of four ways:

A clustered salvo (figure 1) calls for all tanks ofa givenunit to simultaneously fire one round each at the same initial target-coordinate settings.

A second method is the graduated salvo firing technique (figure 2). Here all tanks in a unit proceed as in theclustered-salvo method except with the rounds havingslightly different time-fuze settings. This technique produces a fragment impact zone that extends along the lineoffire. Such a technique is employed when the helicopter 'srange has not been determined accurately. This method willincrease the probability of ' 'covering" the target with anarea ofexplosions and fragments. (Generally, a change of2 settings on the timed fuzes increases or decreases the burstby 200 meters.)

The third technique advocated is the rapid concentratedfiring method, whereby a tank platoon or company firesat a helicopter whose range has been precisely determinedand remains unchanged while the firing is in progress. Inthis case, tank crews will quickly prepare weapons, takeaim and fire on their own initiative. Firing ceases whenit has been ascertained that the target has been destroyedor hit. Such a technique makes it possible to open fire morequickly and consumes less ammunition than the clusteredsalvo firing technique. One disadvantage is that this methodmight "warn" the helicopter crew since a few shells arebound to miss their target.

The fourth technique is the graduated-burst method,whereby a tank platoon fires on a helicopter by aiming atthe same target with different time-fuze settings and with

APRIL 1988

identical range settings. However, the tanks do not fire theirguns simultaneously on a single command, thus creatingbursting fragmentation explosions at different ranges andat different times. Such a method could prove very distracting to the crew of a helicopter.

The U.S. Army also has been concerned with the vul-nerability of attack helicopters to tank main guns. The firststudy (Army Aerial Direct Fire Support Systems) involvedcalculating the effectiveness ofa Soviet T -62 tank, 115 mmgun against helicopters. In this study the helicopters wereplaced in one of three modes: hover flight, 50 knots (lets)flight at right angles to the tank and 100 lets per flight atright angles to the engaging tank. At a range of up to 1,500meters, the tank has a better than 50 percent probabilityof hitting the helicopter in the hover mode. On the otherhand, in the crossing scheme the probability ofhit is muchless. The hit probability is 74 percent at 250 meters anda speed of 50 lets per flight. At the same range and a speedof 100 kts per flight, the hit probability drops to 50 percent. At 1,500 meters this capability is reduced to 10 per-cent and 6 percent with the respective flight speeds of 50and 100 lets per flight.

The second study (Equal Cost Firepower Study II) involved again a 115 mm tank gun against a maneuveringside-slipping helicopter. The Army found that the tank maingun had only a 10 percent hit capability at 500 meters anda 4.7 percent hit capability at 1,500 meters.

During the 1980s, the Soviet Union placed a new ATGM,the AT -8/Songster, on their T -64B and T -80 tanks. It isestimated that, with its distinct speed advantage over earlierATGMs and the use of a laser rangefinder, these tanks maybe able to acquire a helicopter and fire before the helicopterlaunches its ATGMs. To further assist the tank in suchtarget acquisition, it has been suggested that a small tankmounted battlefield surveillance radar be employed to identify helicopters. I f acquired, the tank could launch its pro-tective smoke grenades or engage helicopter with itsmain gun or machinegun.

The greatest danger to NATO helicopters from tank mainguns would occur when the tanks are not actively engagedwith enemy ground forces (e.g., during short halts on roadmarches, awaiting orders in an assembly area or in defensive positions awaiting the enemy).

In any case, the primary responsibility for destroyinghelicopters belongs to dedicated air defense weapons likethe ZSU-23-4 and SA-16 rather than to tanks. Therefore,although the Soviets and their ~ a r s a w Pact allies havedeveloped a doctrine for tanks to engage helicopters, U. S.and NATO helicopters face a far more formidable threatfrom dedicated air defense systems than from Soviet andWarsaw Pact main tank guns. ____ /-

13


16/48

u.s. ARMY SAFETY CENTER

Training to Standard is Key to ReducingHuman Error AccidentsHUMAN ERROR is a definite cause in more than 80

percent of all Army accidents-air and ground. Futurereductions in Army accident losses will be directly relatedto reducing human errors with accident -causing potential.

Accident experience shows that human-error accidentsare frequently clear indicators of training weaknessesthe same training weaknesses that would quickly depletea unit's capability to fight in combat.

The root cause of the problem is failure to train to standard or to the right standard. The solution lies in integratingsafety into training and operational processes.Too many people misunderstand the term "human error. " For example, when an aircraft accident investigation team lists pilot error as a cause factor, it doesn't necessarily mean the pilot went out and did something tointentionally cause the crash. Pilot error means the aircraftcrashed because the pilot made a performance error. Hedid something wrong or failed to do something that causedthe crash. The reason he made the performance error,however, could be lackof raining, lack of established standards or failure to follow standards.

The point is, when standards are not clear or practicalor do not exist and the pilot makes an error, that error isthe result of command failure-failure to establish standards. I f standards exist but are not known or ways toachieve them are not known, and the pilot crashes an aircraft because he does not know the standards, we have atraining failure. When standards exist and are known butleaders fail to enforce them, pilot error is the result ofleaderfailure. When standards are known, but not followedwhen pilots fail to perform to established and enforced performance standards-then we have individual failure.

14

While we realize that most accidents are caused by a combination of failures, we are deliberately emphasizing onlyone teaching point in the following accident 'summaries.

Major Reasons for Human ErrorStandards are not clear Commandor practical or do not exist Failure

Standards exist but are not Trainingknown or ways to achieve Failurethem are not known

Standards are known but Leaderare not enforced Failure

Standards are known but Individualare not followed Failure



17/48

Individual FailureAn OH-58 Kiowa pilot was approaching a landing areaat 85 knots. When the helicopter was about 10 feet off theground in a 20-degree bank left turn, and still traveling at85 knots, the main rotor blade hit gently sloping groundto the left. The OH-58 hit the ground and came to rest onits side. The pilot made an unnecessary high-speed landing approach. He knew the standard but failed to followit-an individual failure.

A UH-60 Black Hawk on a night vision goggles (NVG)mission hit wires 67 feet above the ground and crashed.The wires were marked on the wire hazards map in operations. The pilot knew that he was supposed to mark the wireson his maps, but he did not do it even though time and op-portunity were available for him to do so-another indi-vidual failure.

Leader FailureA UH 1 Huey was the lead in a flight of four proceeding

down a valley 100 to 150 feet above ground level at anairspeed of90 to 100 knots. The helicopter hit wires andcrashed. The mission was being flown at an airspeed ex-cessive for the terrain and altitude. No route/hazard recon-naissance had been made as required by the unit standingoperating procedure (SOP). The unit commander was on-board one of he aircraft in the flight yet took no correctiveaction. Standards were known but not enforced-leaderfailure.

Training FailureTwo UH-1H pilots decided to make a low-level, highspeed flyby. As the aircraft were in a side-by-side forma

tion, the wing aircraft converged on the lead aircraft. During an evasive maneuver by the pilot of the wing aircraft,the overlapping rotor blades of the two aircraft meshed.Both helicopters crashed.

This accident was the result of a training failure. Al-though regulations and SOPs prohibited this type ofmaneuver, almost all of the people interviewed after theaccident were unaware the maneuver was prohibited.

Command FailureAccident experience has shown that, in many instances,aviators decide what level of risk they will accept rather

than the command establishing operational parameters. A

APRIL 1988

UH-60 crew on an NVG training mission was asked to helplocate a downed CH-47 Chinook. The crew located the CH-47, led a MEDEVAC aircraft to the area and returned tothe airfield.

Half an hour later, the UH -60 crew was asked to leada CH-47 to the crash site. This was done, and the UH-60crew departed for the airfield. Before they reached the airfield, they were called by the tower operator and asked torelay a message to the CH -47 crew. The UH -60 pilot couldnot contact the CH-47 by radio, so he decided to go backto the crash site.

As the UH -60 neared the site, the pilot descended to about300 feet. He began flying up a valley at 10 to 20 knots andalmost immediately saw a wire strand through his rightwindshield. The aircraft hit several strands of wire andcrashed.

When the pilot accepted the missions back into the crasharea, he did so without command approval and without amission update briefing. There were no established pro-cedures in the unitfor pilots to receive command approvaland mission rebrief in the event ofa mission change. Inthis case, pilot error began with command failure.

Safe performance is a predictable result of performingto standard, and performing to standard is a result oftraining to standard. Training to standard leads directly todiscipline-both collectively and individually. And disciplined aviators are inherently safe.

The standards that guide our training must reflect therequirements of the battlefield. Leaders are responsible forthe establishment ofunit standards and ensuring that desiredobjectives are met.

Effective training is the key not only to sustaining acombat-ready Army but also to reducing human-error ac-cidents. ~

Trainingto StandardLeads toSafety!

15


18/48

PEARL:SPersonal Equipment And Rescue/survival LovvdoNn

Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) StudyAll aviation life support equipment (ALSE) personnel

interviewed in several studies and questionnaires expounded on the necessity for an ALSE military occupationalspeciality (MOS).

The ALSE MARC study document waS boarded at Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC) on 15 August 1987. Before the board, the studywas provided to the U. S. Army Aviation Center, U. S.Army Combined Arms Center, U.S. Army Logistics Center and TRADOC according to guidance contained in ArmyRegulation (AR) 570-2 with U.S. Army Materiel CommandiTRADOC supplement 1. TRADOC provided copiesof the study to U. S. Army Materiel Readiness Development Activity. Representatives from these commands,along with the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command andthe program manager (PM)-ALSE, made up the board.(PEARL'S is letting you know some of he participants andthe inner working of the ALSE MOS board. This shouldlet you know why the ALSE MOS has been so timeconsuming. )

Ninety-nine comments were provided by respondents onthis MARC study document. Eighty-two of the commentswere included in the final MARC study document.

The ALSE repairer supervisor's requirements will beaddressed in a separate MARC study. We cannot forgetthat we have many warrant officers and a number of com-

16

missioned officers working and supporting the ALSE effort and inspection requirements.

The proliferation of complex ALSE has increased theneed for personnel dedicated to the inspection, maintenanceand repair of ALSE and the aviation life support systemprogram. At least one ALSE specialist, above and beyondthe other career management field 67 manpower requirements, must maintain ALSE. The study conclusions,when implemented, are certainly a step in a positive direction. We sincerely appreciate the ALSE MOS board members for their continued support.Night Vision Goggles (NVG)/Aircraft Integratio nResponsibility

Some recent changes have been made in the responsibility for integrating NVG with the aircraft. The PM-ALSEpoint of contact (POC) and action officer is Mr. James Dittmer, AUTOVON 693-3215. The aircraft electronics management office now handles cockpit secure lighting; theoffice symbol is AMSAV-2. LTC(P) Richard Hassingeris the commander, and Mr. Tom Benbrook is the POC,AUTOVON 693-1391/1407.SRU-211P Survival Vest

Relocation ofcomponents of the SR U-21 IP survival vestand/or standard individual survival kits is permissable;however, these procedures should be followed: The net,



19/48

multipurpose, national stock number (NSN) 8465-00-300-2138, has been removed from the subject vests and transferred to each of the standard individual survival kits-NSNs 1680-00-973-1861, hot climate; 1680-00-973-1862,cold climate; 1680-00-973-1863, overwater.

The net, multipurpose, is not considered as a short-termsurvival item; therefore, to reduce the bulk of the survivalvest, a more appropriate location for this item was determined to be in the individual kits.Survival Matches

New survival matches, NSN 9920-01-154-7199, nolonger require the inclusion of match box, NSN 8465-00-265-4925, as a survival kit component. The above changes,and those of the survival vests and standard individual survival kits, can be accomplished during the next scheduledinspection. These changes will be incorporated in the nextchange to Technical Manual (TM) 1680-317-23 and P. Theaction officer is PM-ALSE-L, Mr. Boone Hopkins,AUTOVON 693-3215.Water Purification Tablet, Iodine, 8 Milligram (mg)

Activities will destroy the following materiel accordingto AR 40-61, paragraph 3-52, under the provision of AR735-11, paragraph 2-10, as unsuitable for issue: NSN 6850-00-985-7166, water purification tablet, iodine, 8 mg,manufactured by Wisconsin Pharmacal, all contracts, alllots manufactured in 1984. Reason: Serviceability testingis not considered cost effective since reporting quantitiesindicated that only limited quantities are available. Creditand replacement do not apply. Standard Army IntegratedLogistical System ABX 8701095 does apply. Materiel isa component of these kits and may be a component of othermajor assemblies: NSNs as follows: 6454-00-927-3000,6545-00-927 -4925, 6545-00-823-8165, 6545-00-231-9421, 6545-00-116-1410, 6545-00-139-3671, 6545-01-094-8412 and 6545-01-120-2632. U.S. Army MedicalMateriel Activity will confirm this information in Department of Army (DA) Supply Bulletin 8-75 series publications. The POC is T. Bess, SGMMA-OC, AUTOVON343-2045.SPH-4 Helmet Liner Silicone Adhesive

Sometimes a "good" thing should be repeated. Unfortunately, quite a number of people missed the article onthe SPH-4 helmet silicone liner adhesive in the January1987 Aviation Digest PEARL'S article. We are quotingit again as it was listed.

"We have received several calls pertaining to the correct adhesive for SPH -4 helmet l iner material."The correct silicone adhesive for the helmet liner is

NSN 8040-00-833-9563; this is also listed in the new TM10-8415-206-12 and P, dated 4 May 1986."

The action officer is Mr. Boone Hopkins, AMCPMALSE-L, AUTOVON 693-3215.ALSE/Survival School

The sponsor for the Army Western Region Aviation LifeSupport Equipment/Survival School (A WRASS) is theDeputy Chiefof Staff for Training, Sixth U. S. Army, whois responsible for establishing school policy, proceduresand the resources required to support the school's programof instruction. The mission of this school is to provideALSE training for ALSE technicians and officers. SeeFebruary 1988 Aviation Digest, PEARL'S, Army WesternRegion Aviation Survival School, for additional information and more details about issue, title, dates and numbers.

Eligible students will be members of the Ready ReserveUnit (Troop Program Unit, Active Guard Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve, or Individual MobilizationAugmentee) on extended Active Duty, or Department ofArmy defense civilians. Other personnel applying for thecourse must be approved by the Deputy Chiefof Staff forTraining, Sixth U.S. Army. Aircrew personnel must showevidence of medical clearance to fly. Other personnel mustshow evidence of a military-approved physical examination within the last 48 months. Active Duty personnelshould request approval from their local training officers.Procedures For the Destruction of ALSEWhat are you saying? Destroy ALSE? Yes, it is trueunder certain combat conditions. TM 750-244-1-2 prescribes equipment priorities, methods and techniques thatwill be used to destroy ALSE to prevent enemy use whencapture or abandonment of the equipment is imminent. Werecommend your unit secure a copy of this TM since it contains much information as to what, and the appropriate procedures to destroy ALSE. Your commander will issue theorder when destruction is required in a combat situation.PEARL'S Articles

We could use some appropriate PEARL'S articles. Sendthem to PEARL'S, 4300 Goodfellow Boulevard, ATTN:AMCPM-ALSE-L, St. Louis, MO 63120-1798; we willget them published and give you credit. PEARL'S will ap-preciate your effort. --:p;7J

Ifyou have a question aboutpersonal equipmentor rescue/survival gear, write PEARL'S, AMCProduct Management Office, ATTN: AMCPMALSE, 4300 Goodfellow Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63120-1798 or call AUTOVON 693-3817 or Commercial 314-263-3817.

APRIL 1988 17


20/48

NoHarmIntended

Lieutenant Colonel Brian A. Dean

18

As SHE SAT contentedly. watching the hills andtrees around her, the sun reddened in the east and slowlybrightened the sky. She had awakened early. Hungry andimpatient as always, she had gone fishing and had caughta migrating salmon that she devoured immediately. Hungersated, she returned to her main occupation these days, preparing for the birth. Her concept of time was measuredonly by the rising and setting of the sun and by the changing seasons, but she knew instinctively that the birth wasnot far away.

As the sun crept above the horizon, it bathed the earthin a reddish glow, and her snow-white head reflected thecolor as a dazzling pink. She cocked her head, first to oneside, then to the other, straining her keen ears to pick outthe sound. Something was disturbing the wilderness, butthe sounds were indistinct and strange. Suddenly the soundwas sharper, and her heartbeat and breathing increaseddramatically as she realized that the sound was caused bythe only thing in the world that she feared . . . man.

She hunched down over the two speckled eggs in the nest,protecting them with her warmth as she watched the horizontoward the direction oftht? fearful sound of he approaching



21/48

helicopter. She had seen the huge man-birds before butalways at a distance where 'they seemed not threatening.Now, for the first time, she was a mother, and with amother's protective instincts, her fear for her offspring wasparamount. As an eagle, she would stand and fight for herchildren, willing to die rather than run.The sound grew louder as she watched without moving.One moment it was just the sound; the next it was a fearfulshape rapidly approaching from 2 miles away. Perched atopan old, dead fir tree, her great nest had always been impervious to predators. Now it stood out in sharp reliefagainst the sky, and she knew the man-bird could see her.As it approached, the beast began to slow its flight and thesound level increased until it was more than even thethunderstorms. Now it turned slightly away from her, andshe realized that it would fly past but very close. As it wentpast, it turned to circle behind her. This was an act of aggression! It was going to attack from the rear! Her heartscreaming in her breast, she rose to her feet and turnedto face her tormentor. She spread her 6-foot wings andshrieked her defiance, her razor-sharp beak open and prepared to slash. Now it came very close once again and circled and circled the terrified bird. She maneuvered quickly about the nest, hopping from side-to-side, keeping theman-bird always in front of her.

As quickly as it had come, the helicopter moved awayand flew from sight. After long minutes when it did notcome back, her breathing returned to normal and she settledback down to keep her eggs warm. Immediately, she knewthat something wasn't right. Standing up again, she lookeddown to see that both eggs were cracked. In her panic, shehad stepped on them. Not knowing anything else to do,she again settled onto the eggs with her soft breast to keepthem warm.

In the cockpit of the helicopter, the conversation wasspirited:

"Man! wasn't that some sigh t!""Yea, she was beautiful!""I've seen pictures but I've never seen a real one

before. ""Yea, the symbol of America. Sure makes you proud!"Three miles away, in the top of an old, dead fir tree, twotiny bald eagles died in their shells.

Every year, unthinking pilots cause damage to our naturalresources. The pilots of the helicopter in our story werenot intentionally cruel. They were genuinely interested inwhat they saw and totally ignorant of the damage theycaused. They were only using their advantage of heightand mobility for a unique look at an eagle. Unknown tothem, they were in patent violation of a number of Federaland state laws. Despite their' naivete," conviction could

APRIL 1988

cost them their fortunes and years of their freedom. That,however, is not the point. The point is that those eagletsdied and an endangered species came a little closer to extinction.

The agencies charged with stewardship of our naturalresources report that aircraft incursions are becoming morefrequent and more damaging every year. The damage mostoften occurs to wildlife that is sensitive to trespass into itshabitat. The sight and soundof a low-flying aircraft generates panic amid wild species. Birds kick eggs out of theirnests. Breeding patterns are interrupted. Fleeting animalsrun into fallen logs and over cliffs, breaking legs and condemning themselves to death.

The ironic part of this story is that many of these actsoccur on lands set aside for the protection and preservation of these species. National wildlife refuges, parks,forests and various state lands are supposed to be inviolatehomes for these critters. As a pilot, do you know how todetermine where these critters are? As a pilot, military orcivil, do you have a responsibility to protect our naturalresources? Think of it this way. What you do each timeyou fly affects the legacy you will leave your grandchildren.Every tiny chip in the ecology multiplies over . he yearsunless time is sufficient for healing. Weare chipping awayfaster than nature can repair the damage.

The note in the margin of your sectional aeronauticalchart requests that you maintain at least 2,()()() feet altitudeabove these lands. Take a few minutes to read that noteagain. You notice that it is a request. It isn't a rule and isnot enforceable, at least from the Federal Aviation Administration's point of view. Do the aviators not care? Ido not believe that this is the case, at least on an individualpilot basis. More likely, aviators are frequently seen harassing wildlife because they had no idea of the damagethey are causing. Now you have a better understanding.May we count on your cooperation to help protect ourwildlife from needless decline? r

ABOUT THE AUTHORLTC Brian A Dean, U.S. Army Reserve, holds anindividual mobilization augment.. position In theoffice of the Department of the Army RegionalRepresentative, Southwest Region, Federal AviationAdministration, Ft. Worth, TX. In his other life he Isthe National avlatl9n safety manager, Bureau ofLand Management, Department of Interior, and theImmediate past president of the InternationalAssociation of Natural Resource Pilots.

19


22/48

Mr. Ron BrunelleMr. Philip A. Mooney

20

This article is the tenth in a series on the AH-64A Apache aircraft and weapons systems. Thesystems addressed include the external storessystem and the aerial rocket control system. Theinformation contained in this article is forfamiliarization with the AH-64A. It must not beused to operate or maintain the aircraft.



23/48

External Stores System

The helicopter has four externalstores stations (figure 1), two on eachwing. For identification, the stores stations are numbered I through 4, starting with the left outboard station.At the present time, the externalstores below are available. Many symmetrical combinations of stores may becarried. M272 launcher with up to fourM34, M36 and/or air-to-ground missile (AGM) 114 HELLFIRE missilesper launcher. M261 19-shot rocket pods. Auxiliary fuel tanks.

It controls the position of all ejectorracks simultaneously.Each pylon contains a pylon actuatorcontroller (PAC), a pylon actuator andan ejector rack.

External stores pylonThe external stores pylon (figure 2)provides mounting for the station director, pylon multiplex remote terminal unit, PAC hydraulic actuator and

The external stores system (ESS)provides for the mounting and positional control of external stores. TheESS consists of a pylon assembly andan external stores controller. The aircraft may be configured with either twoor four pylons. Each pylon is held onby four mounting bolts. Hydraulic andelectrical quick-disconnects betweenthe pylon and wing mate when thepylon is installed and bolted into place.

r ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ EXTERNAL STORES STATIONS

The external stores controller is located behind the aft ammo feed fairing.

M272 LAUNCHERW/UP TO 4 MISSILESPER LAUNCHER

FIGURE 1: External stores.

FIGURE 2: External stores pylon.

APRIL 1988

STATIONOIRECTOR

: ___ ____,:, 1II I ,I ______

~ UXILIARYFUEL TANKS M26119 SHOT ROCKET PODSPYLONMRTU

21


24/48

ejector rack. The pylon is enclosed inan aerodynamic fairing for minimumdrag.Rack assemblyThe rack assembly (figure 3) is usedto attach the external stores to the aircraft. It rotates about a pivot point toallow stores articulation for fire control system range solutions.Each rack has a self-contained capability for stores jettison. In autorota-

tion, the ejector assembly is capable ofjettisoning empty external fuel tanksclear of the helicopter.The rack uses two hooks to retain thestore. A lock/unlock indicator will indicate a lock condition only when bothstore bail lugs are engaged by bothhooks simultaneously.A manual release is provided to release the hooks from the store bail lugs.Rotating the manual release drivecounterclockwise will release the

~ EJECTOR~ A S S E M B l Y

FIGURE 3: Rack assembly.

nEECHASSEMILY

SEAIIU . I A G E ~

HOOK LOCKED

FIGURE 4: Stores jettison.

22

~

METERED_1'L-._- ORifiCE

PIVOTPOINT

JETTISON

store. A ground safety pin is providedto prevent accidental store release onthe ground.Before a store may be attached to therack, the hooks must be opened manually. When the store is in position,both hooks will close automatically andthe lock/unlock indicator will showlocked.A bail retention arm is attached to thefront of the rack. The arm is used topull the electrical quick-disconnect tothe store when the store is jettisoned.During boresight procedure for theaircraft, the racks are boresighted tothe armament datum line. Since theracks are boresighted, any stores attached are also boresighted; furtherboresighting is not required.ESS operationBased on inputs from the bus controller, the ground maintenance switch,squat switch, pilot fire control panel(FCP) and copilot gunner (CPG) FCP,the external stores elevation controller(ESEC), through the PAC in each pylon, control the position (elevation) ofeach pylon rack simultaneously.When the ESEC receives the on-theground signal from the squat switch,it will position all pylon racks to theground stow position (-5 degrees) 5seconds after landing. When the ESECreceives the in-the-air signal, it willposition the racks to the flight stowposition (+4 degrees). Once the rackis in either position, it is locked in thatposition (lock signal through PAC toactuator).For maintenance purposes, the momentary ground maintenance switch(left forward avionics bay (LFABmay be used to position the rack to theflight stow position (up) or groundstow position (down) with electricaland hydraulic power on the aircraft.When neither crew member has actioned either the missile or rocket system and the aircraft is airborne, theESEC will position and lock the racks

in the flight stow position at allairspeeds.If either crewmember places hisrocket (RKT) switch in the ground



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stow (GND STOW) pOSItlOn, theESEC will position and lock the racksin the GND STOW position at airspeeds below 100 knots. (That crewmember's FCP must be in the safe orarmed condition.)If neither crewmember selects RKTto GND STOW and one selects RKTnormal (NRML) and actions the rocketsystem, the ESEC unlocks the actuators and positions the racks based onbus controller commands derived fromcrewmember's line of sight (rangesolution). When airspeed exceeds 100knots, the ESEC will override rangesolution, positioning and locking racksin the flight stow position.If a crewmember places his missile

(MSL) switch ON and actions the missile system (opposite crewmember'sRKT switch is not in GND STOW), theESEC will respond to the bus controller command derived from the remote HELLFIRE electronics (RHE) asfollows, overriding rockets. Lock on before launch positionsthe racks 4 degrees above the lockedon missile(s) seeker line of sight. Lock on after launch positions theracks 4 degrees above the heading andaltitude reference set horizon.When airspeed exceeds 100 knots,the ESEC will override the RHE solution, positioning and locking the racksin the flight stow position.Stores jettisonEach rack contains an ejectorassembly, which consists of the cartridge, breech assembly and foot assembly (figure 4). When activated, theejector assembly will cause the storeto be released, and then drive the storeaway from the rack.When the cartridge is fired, expanding gases will be restricted by themetered orifice, thus driving the servo piston to activate the sear linkage,retracting the hooks and releasing thestore.The expanding gases will passthrough the metered orifice, and willdrive the foot assembly downward,thus pushing the store away from theaircraft.

APRIL 1988

Jettison controlsThe jettison subsystem (figure 5)will cause the immediate release of external stores when commanded byeither crew member The pilot stationhas a selectable and emergency jettisoncapability for the external stores.Four guarded two-position springloaded toggle switches located in apanel on the pilot's left-hand consoleprovide the selectable jettison capability. Lifting the guarded cover and mov-

SELECTABLE

ing the switch forward will jettison theselected store.A recessed button that will immediately jettison all the external stores provides the emergency jettison capability. This capability has two electricallyindependent circuits, one poweredfrom the primary bus and the otherfrom the emergency bus.The CPG' s station has one emergency jettison capability for the immediaterelease of all external stores.

EMERGENCY

~ ~ @)STORESJET T ~a LEFT LEFT AT AT e'[ '" ' ' ' ' '00 "00 MOO =;~ Q ~ &J ~ ~PILOT

FIGURE 5: Jettison controls.

FIGURE 6: ARCS components.

M261ROCKETLAUNCHER

PILOT AND CPG

23


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Aerial Rocket Control SystemThe aerial rocket control system(ARCS) (figure 6, page 23) provides

the pilot with the capability to selectand set warhead/fuze combinations. Italso provides the capability to firerockets from the selected launcher configuration so that up to five differenttypes of rocket/warhead/fuze combinations can be used on each mission.The ARCS consists of the rocketcontrol panel unit (RCPU) , the stationdirectors and the M261 19-shot rocketpods.Rocket control panel unitThe RCPU (figure 7) is located in thepilot's crewstation in the left console.It receives operating power from thepilot's PCP when the panel is in eitherthe safe or arm condition.The RCPU provides several functions. These functions are as follows: Zone inventory informs the firecontrol system of the type warhead/fuze combination loaded in that zone. RND REM provides the pilot withrockets remaining in each zone.

ZONE SEL enables the pilot toselect one type of rocket (warhead/fuzecombination) for firing. QTYenables the pilot to select themaximum number of rockets to belauched when the trigger is pulled. PEN-M enables the pilot to selectthe penetration depth of the time setfuzes . RNG-KMenables the pilot to selectthe range the fire control system willuse for line of sight range.

Rocket station directorsThe station director provides acharging signal (fuze set) and/or a firing signal to each rocket tube. One station director is in the leading edge ofeach pylon.The station director interrogates thequantity of rockets in each zone andsends this information to the RCPUthrough the pylon multiplex remoteterminal unit and the fire control systern. It also sets the fuze of selected

24

rockets, as determined by the RCPU,and fires the rockets as selected by theRCPU. The launch signal (fire pulse)is at least 3 amps for 10 milliseconds.

Lightweight rocket launchersEach launcher has three zones(figure 8). (A total of 19 rockets maybe loaded.) Zone 1 has 12 rockets.

ZONE INVENTORYr--- OUTBD INBD ---.

rID

PEN-M QTY RNG-KM

FIGURE 7: Rocket control panel unit.

FRONT VIEWILOOKING AfT)

FIRINGCONTACTORS

I FIGURE 8: Lightweight rocket launchers.

FUZING CONNECTOR

M261ROCKET LAUNCHERRIGHT - REAR VIEW



27/48

Zone 2 has 4 rockets. Zone 3 has 3rockets.I f he fuze can be remote set, the connector from that fuze is plugged intothe fuze plug adjacent to the rocket tubewhen the rocket is loaded. Emptyweight is 80 pounds. A fully loadedpod, used as a shipping container, maybe uploaded using the built-in hoist ineach pylon rack.

ARCS operationZones are identified by their location, both by pylon and by rocket tube.When the pilot's FCP is in the safeor armed condition, power is appliedto the RCPU. When either crewmember positions his rocket switch out ofthe OFF position, the RCPU will perform built-in test, then set the rocket/fuze combination as set on the ZONEINVENTORY.The fire control system receivesrounds-remaining data through thepylon multiplex remote terminal unit,and passes these data to the RCPU fordisplay.The fire control system, through theLFAB multiplex remote terminal unit,will remove the firing enable signal tothe RCPU (inhibit the ARCS) when- The missile system is actioned. Vertical acceleration is 0.5 G ormore, or Pylon position is more than 3.5degrees out ofcoincidence from commanded position of the integratedhelmet and display sight system(lHADSS) or 0.5 degrees from the target acquisition and designation sight(TADS).

When the crewmember actioning therocket system has the FCP in the armedcondition and no inhibit signals arepresent, an enable signal is sent to eachstation director. At the same time, theESS responds to articulation commands.When the trigger is pulled, theRCPU will send fire signals to the appropriate station director(s) to includefiring sequence (zone), time betweenlaunches, quantity to be launched androcket fuzing.

APRIL 1988

RCPU operationZONE INVENTORY is set initially when uploaded and verified by theaircrew before flight. The position informs the fire control system what typeof warhead/fuze combination is loaded in each zone (figure 9). These combinations are as follows:Type MotorMK40 MK66PD4 6PD DescriptionPoint detonation,high explosive (HE)RC4 6RC Penetration, HEDP4 Point detonation,WP4 HE, dual purposePoint detonation,white phosphorusIU 6IL Time, illuminationSK4 6SK Time, smoke6MP Time, mUltipurposesubmunition

I f the type set is incorrect, the firecontrol system will attempt to set theloaded rocket as selected on the ZONE

ZONE SELECTSWITCHES

PENETRATION AND TREEHEIGHT SELECTOR(FOR M433 FUZES)

FIGURE 9: RCPU operation.

INVENTORY. No fault will be displayed in this case.The QTY REM displays quantity ofrockets remaining in each zone. Thestation director can interrogate quantity, not type.ZONE SEL enables the pilot toselect the type of rocket for firing bydepressing the switch. The dot patternon each switch represents the rockettubes comprising that zone.When one zone is selected, all otherzones that are set by the same in theZONE INVENTORY will automatically be selected. The switch(es) of heselected zone(s) will illuminate whenselected. Selecting another zone willdeselect any selected zone.RCPU operationThe bottom thumbwheels on theRCPU are used as follows:PEN-M sets the time constraint (RC)for the M433 fuze (RC4 or 6RC

OUANTITY SWITCH RANGE SELECTOR(FOR M439 FUZES)

25


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selected on the ZONE SEL).Intervals are as follows:BNK - Bunker penetrationSPQ - Super quick1015202530354045

Forest penetration,in meters, afterinitial contactwith trees (fordouble and triplecanopy forests).QTY selects the quantity of rocketsto be fired per triggerpull if the trig

ger is held in the firing position. Releasing the trigger before the selectedquantity has been fired will stop the firing sequence and reset for the next.RANGE SELECTOR is used to pro

vide manual range input to the fire control system for the pilot's line of sight.This range is in kilometers (km) andtenths of a km (maximum 8.9 km).By selecting the letter' , A " in the leftthumb wheel , automatic ranging(lHADSS line of sight triangulation) isused for pilot's line of sight range(maximum 32.6 km).Rocket symbology

The rocket steering curser (NRML)(figure 10) indicates the required orientation to align the helicopter into constraints for rocket engagements. Thesymbol is directional, based on thecrewmember's line of sight. Fly thecurser to the target.This symbol will appear only to thepilot when the pilot actions the rocketsystem; it will appear to both crewmembers when the CPG actions therocket system.

To engage the target (either crewstation), hold the line of sight reticle onthe target and maneuver the aircraft toplace the verticle bar on the target. Thelength of the bar represents the articulation limits of the pylon. The fire control system will position the pylon rack(pod) based on range to target. As longas the vertical bar and line of sightreticle are on the target, the rocketsmay be employed.

The rocket steering curser (fixed)symbol also indicates the orientation toalign the helicopter into constraints,

26

but it will be displayed in place of theNRML curser when one of the crew-station RKT switches is in the GNDSTOW position, or airspeed is morethan 100 knots true airspeed.

When this symbol is displayed, thepylons are inhibited from articulating.The open space in the symbols verticalbar is the predicted impact point for therange.

To engage the target, maneuver theaircraft until the line of sight reticle andthe open space of the vertical bar areon the target, then fire the rockets.

I f he target is more than 20 degreesof f the nose of the aircraft (azimuth),the curser at the edge of he display indicates direction to the target.

Cooperative precision engagementTo maximize the inherent capabilities of the aircraft and to obtain maximum accuracy using the rocket system, a cooperative, or precision,.engagement may be used.

When the CPG selects the TADS,the laser is armed , both crewmembersplace the rocket switch to the NRMLposition and both action the rocketsystem. Then the fire control systeminterprets this as a cooperative engagement, and will use laser range.The CPG tracks the target using theT ADS and lases the target for accuraterange.

The pilot flies the aircraft to bringthe rocket steering curser on the target.Since the fire control system is usingthe CPG's line of sight for rangelazimuth, the pilot does not need tomaintain his reticle on the target. Whenthe rocket steering curser is on thetarget, the pilot fires the rocket.:This procedure uses the stability andaccuracy of the T ADS line of sight, theaccurate laser range and the reflexesof the pilot, as he can gauge aircraftmovement and pull the trigger whenconstraints are satisfied.The article has addressed capabilitiesand characteristics of the AH-64Apache weapons system in the subsystem ofESS and ARCS. The next article in the Apache series will addressthe point target weapons system and thearea weapons system. f

~ i f ' , ( " If II] 'at'l,a-

ROCKET STEERINGCURSOR(NORMAL )ROCKET STEERINGCURSOR(FIXED)

FIGURE 10 : Rocket symbology .

ABOUT THE AUTHORSMr. Ron Brunelle is responsiblefor the design, development andpresentation of the Apacheaircrew training courses as well asdefining training devicerequirements, specification,modifications and implementation.He has more than 20 years ofexperience in aviation includinginstructional system backgroundin both the flight simulators andclassroom environment. He isretired from the U.S. Navy and isa private pilot.

Mr. Philip A. Mooney has beenresponsible for managing themarketing activities for theApache and Defender helicopterssince joining the McDonnellDouglas Helicopter Company in1984.He has more than 21 years'aviation experience in both rotaryand fixed wing aircraft. Mr.Mooney's assignments includedtours as a commander, aircraftmaintenance officer, instructorpilot and aviation research anddevelopment program manager.He is retired from the U.S. Army.



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USAASOSEZVFR Flights NearNoise-Sensitive Areas Mr. Robert C. Coleu.s . Army Aeronautical Services OfficeCameron Station, Alexandria, VA

BECAUSE OF the increasing number of congressionaland Department of Army level noise complaints received,it appears prudent to publish extracts from the FederalAviation Administrative Advisory Circular 91-36C, "VFRFlights Near Noise-Sensitive Areas."

This advisory circular encourages pilots making visualflight rules (VFR) flights near noise-sensitive areas to flyat altitudes higher than the minimum permitted by regulation and on flight paths that will reduce aircraft noise insuch areas. The advisory circular extract follows:

BACKGROUND.The Federal Aviation Administration continually receives complaints concerning low flying aircraft over noise-sensitive areas.These complaints have promptedrequests for regulatory action prohibiting low altitudes flight overidentified noise-sensitive locations.We believe that a satisfactory solution can be realized by means of apilot/industry cooperative endeavorrather than through the regulatoryprocess.Increased emphasis on improvingthe quality of the environment requires continued effort to providerelief and protection from aircraftnoise.Excessive aircraft noise can resultin discomfort, inconvenience, or interference with the use and enjoyment ofproperty, and can adversely affect wildlife. It is particularlyundesirable near outdoor assemblies of persons, churches, hospitals, schools, nursing homes, noisesensitive residential areas and national park areas which should bepreserved as important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national heritage.Adherence to the practices described below would be a practical

indication of pilot concern for environmental improvement, wouldbuild support for aviation and forestall possible regulatory action.VOLUNTARY PRACTICES.A voidance of noise-sensitiveareas, if practical, is preferable tooverflight at relatively low altitudes.Pilots operating fixed and rotary

Iwing aircraft under VFR over noisesensitive areas should make everyeffort to fly not less than 2,000 feetabove the surface, weather permitting, even though flight at a lowerlevel may be consistent with theprovisions of Federal Aviation Regulations 91.79, Minimum Safe Altitudes. Typical of noise-sensitiveareas are: outdoor assemblies ofpersons, churches, hospitals,schools, nursing homes, residentialareas designated as noise-sensitiveby airports or by an airport noisecompatibility plan or program andnational park areas (includingparks, forest, primitive areas, wilderness areas, recreational areas,national seashores, national monuments, nationallakeshores, and national wildlife refuge and rangeareas).

For the purpose of this advisorycircular, the surface of a nationalpark area is defined as: the highest

terrain within 2,000 feet laterally ofthe route of flight, or the uppermost rim of a canyon or valley.NOTE: The intent of the 2,000 feetrecommendation is to reduce potential interference with wildlife, andcomplaints of noise disturbancesfrom low flying aircraft in canyonsand valleys.During departure or arrival from/to an airport, climb after takeoff anddescent for landing should be madeso as to avoid prolonged flight atlow altitude near noise-sensitiveareas.This procedure does not applywhere it would conflict with air traffic control clearances or instructions or where an altitude of lessthan 2,000 feet is considered necessary by a pilot in order to adequately exercise his or her primary responsibility for safe flight.COOPERATIVE ACTIONS.A viation/ airfield commanders,aircraft operators and others areasked to assist in implementing theprocedures contained herein by publicizing them and distributing information regarding known noisesensitive areas.

Information regarding the U.S. Army fly neighborly/noise abatement program is available by calling Mr. Robert Cole,AUTOVON 284-7796/6304 or Commercial 202-274-7796/6304.

APRIL 1988 27


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u.S. . . . .y~ ~ ~ ~ ~Directorate ofEvaluation/Standardization ~

REPORT TO THE FIELD lVl.TIONSTUDAlDlIlTIOtt '

Operator's Manual Changes-User InfluenceCaptain Jerry KidrickDirectorate of Evaluation and StandardizationU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker. AL

THE u.s. ARMY Aviation Systems Command(AVSCOM) and the U.S. Army Aviation Center JointOperating Agreement (JOA) has tasked the LiteratureReview Branch, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES), at the Aviation Center, to represent you, the user, for all recommended changes andrevisions to operator's technical manuals (TMs) andchecklists (CLs). Specifically, the branch providesall procedures and techniques for chapters 8 and 9 ofthe applicable TMs and the CLs and represents youat AVSCOM manual review conferences.As a further tasking, per the JOA, the AviationCenter hosts an annual user review conference for eachaircraft. To accomplish this, a message similar to theone below is sent to all major Army commands(MACOMs) (having a particular aircraft) requestinguser participation.SUBJECT: USER REVIEW CONFERENCE FORTM 55-1510-213-10 and CL1. A USER REVIEW CONFERENCE COVERING ALL CHAPTERS OF TM 55-1510-213-10and CL (OV-ID/RV-ID) WILL BE HELD ATUSAAVNC ON 22 THRU 26 FEB 88. THEMEETING WILL CONVENE AT 1300,22 FEB,AT THE RECREATION CENTER, BLDG 9204,FT. RUCKER, AL. ALL USERS ARE REQUESTED AND ENCOURAGED TO SUBMITRECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THIS OFFICE NLT 8 FEB 88.

28

2. POINT OF CONTACT FOR THIS CONFERENCE IS MR. JAMES, AV 558-4770. MAILINGADDRESS IS CDR, USAAVNC, ATTN: ATZQESO-L, FT. RUCKER, AL 36362-5211.The MACOMs select subject matter experts to at

tend the reviews as representatives of users in thatcommand.

After the user review conference, all recommendations will be forwarded to A VSCOM for their consideration.

Since it is not possible for every user to attend ouruser review conferences, you are encouraged to participate by submitting your recommended changes.Mail DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes toPublications and Blank Forms) or DA Form 2028-2(Recommended Changes to Equipment TechnicalPublications), located in the back of the operator'smanual, through your commander (per Army Regulation 95-1, "Flight Regulation"), to Commander, USAAVSCOM, ATTN: AMSAV-MPSD, 4300Goodfellow Boulevard, St. Louis, M 0 63120-1798.This policy permits you to discuss problems with yourunit standardization instructor pilot and commanderto get their concurrences and recommendations beforeforwarding your proposal. A reply will be furnisheddirectly to you.

The A VSCOM will forward a copy of your DAForm 2028 to DES for evaluation and recommendations. I f he recommendations appear to be of an urgent



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nature, A VSCOM will ~ h o n e DES and discuss theproposed changes to minimize the time delay in formulating a safety-of-flight message or an urgentchange. Be assured th'at the moment your DA Form2028 is received, it will be carefully reviewed. I f twarrants an urgent change or a safety-of-flightmessage, one will be prepared and transmitted as soonas possible.

Write the proposed changes exactly as you thinkthey should be printed in the operator's manual witha reason for the recommendation. This does not meanyour recommended changes will be published immediately. Those suggestions that do not warrant asafety-of-flight or urgent change will be retained until the next scheduled user review conference whenthe attendees wiil review them. Recommendedchanges may be adopted as written or, in part, withsome modifications. Your recommendations areseldom rejected. However, because of budget constraints and soaring costs ofpublishing revisions, only

necessary changes will be published. (If it ain't broke,it won't be fixed.)

The operator 's manual is not a maintenance or training manual. As its name clearly states, it is a manualintended to help operators fly their aircraft. Note atthe beginning of chapter 1, "This manual contains

, the best operating instructions and procedures for theaircraft under most circumstances. The observanceof limitations, performance, and weight/balance dataprovided is mandatory. The observance ofproceduresis mandatory except when modification is requiredbecause of multiple emergencies, adverse weather,terrain, etc. Your flying experience is recognized;therefore, basic flight principles are not included. "

Remember, DES, Literature Review Branch,represents you, the user. To help us better representyou, we need your participation in developing appropriate changes. Your recommendations are an important part of the manual development and revisionprocess. ~

DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attention on an area of major importance. Write to us at: Commander, U.S. ArmyAviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-ES, F. Rucker, AL 36362-5208; or call us at AUTOVON 558-3504 or Commercial 205-255-3504. After duty

hours call Ft. Rucker Hotline, AUTOVON 558-6487 or Commercial 205-255-6487 and leave a message.

u.s. Army Class A Aviation Flight MishapsArmy Total CostNumber Flying Hours Rate Fatalities (in millions)

FY87 (through 31 March) 16 753,292 2.12 19 $36.9FY88 (through 31 March) 11 822,277 1.34 28 $31.8

"estimated

APRIL 1988 29


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AVIATION PERSONNEL NOTESReserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Accessions

The 1988 ROTC Accessions Board met in December1987. The Aviation Branch enjoys the benefits of an exciting, challenging opportunity. This gives us access tosome of the very best cadets with academic degrees. Fiscalyear (FY) 1988 selections consistof an impressive 92 per-

TOTAL RA ENGR SCIENCE BUSINESS OTHERMEN 111 103 15 16 37 43WOMEN 17 15 0 3 6 8TOTAL 128 118 15 19 43 51MINORITY 10 7 4 0 4 2

FIGURE 1: FY 1988 ROTC selections.cent Regular Army (RA) officers and 40 percent withengineering or science degrees.Figure 1 gives the full breakdown of FY 1988 ROTCselections.

Aviation Branch Active Duty accessions are targetedagainst lieutenant requirements and are apportioned amongROTC, Officer Candidate School and the United StatesMilitary Academy. Each year a number of late graduatingand educational delay students are branch-selected then carried forward to the next FY. The complete FY 1988 aviation accessions program is shown in figure 2.Enlisted Standards are RisingEvery year in February the centralized promotion boardcycle starts. The Aviation Branch has to brief the enlistedboard members on the status of the personnel within theA viation Branch. The averages for the specific areas theboard is interested in have been rising over the past few

MEN WOMEN TOTALUnited States MilitaryAcademy 96 4 100Officer Cane idate School 37 2 39car6 vers From FY 1987R TC Selections 102 11 113FY 1988 Accessions Board 107 21 128Total FY 1988 Accessions 342 38 380

FIGURE 2: FY 1988 accessions.

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years. To give you an idea on where you stand with yourpeers, the information in figure 3 was provided the sergeants major (SGM) command sergeant major selectionboard in February 1988. These averages were computedfrom the personnel files of master sergeants being considered for the FY 1988 SGM selection board.

Military Occupational SpeCialty3SP 67Z 930 93J 93P

AverageCivilian 2 years 1year 1 year 2 years 1 yearEducation colleQe college college college collegeMilitary Education ANCQC* ANCOC ANCOC ANCOC ANCOCLast SkillQualification TestScore Averages 90 87 90 88 83

Advanced Noncommissioned Officers CourseFIGURE 3: Average civilian and military education by MOSs.Enlisted Personnel

The Military Personnel Center was restructured to better serve the soldier. Part of this restructure was to changethe name to the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA).The enlisted side of the Aviation Branch is shown in figure 4.

The professional development noncommissioned officers(NCOs) each manage a series ofmilitary occupational specialties (MOSs), and inquiries should be directed to theNCO managing your MOS.

SFC Billy R. Goodwin manages 35K, 35L, 35M, 35P,35R, 68B, 68D, 68F, 68G, 68H and 68K.

SFC Michael J. Morris manages 66 and 67H, 66 and67U, 67Z, 66 and 68J, and 68M.

Branch Chief LTC Danny L. Rhodes AUTOVON: 2218323124Commercial: 703-3258323/24AviationlTransportation SGM Walter Cole AUTOVON: 2218323/24Division SGM Commercial: 703-325-8323124AviationBranch MSG Randy B. Newman AUTOVON: 221-8322NCOIC Commercial: 703-325-8322Sehior Career Professional . AUTOVON: 2218322Division Development NCOs Commercial: 703-325-8322

FIGURE 4: Aviation Enlisted Branch.



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Mr. Ronald J. Floden manages 66 and 66N, 66 and 67R,66 and 67S, and 66 and 67T.

SFC Robert E. Wolfgram manages 66 and 67V, and 66and 67Y.

SFC Floyd A. Weaver manages 93B.SFC Joseph D. Prescott manages 93C, 93D, 93H, 93Jand 93P.SFC Floyd A. Weaver and SFC(P) Esquire McCoymanage force modernization.To reach your professional development NCO by mail, theaddress is as follows: Commander, USATAPA, ATTN:DAPC-EPL-TA, Alexandria, VA 22331-0453.Aviation Warrant Officers

Within the Warrant Officer Division (WOD) of TAPA,the aviation career managers are organized under the Warrant Officer Aviation Branch. Branch managers continuallyattempt to provide the best possible service in spite of thelimited telephone service. The WOD plans to provide theAviation Branch with more than two telephone lines. Until that time, however, Aviation Branch managers will continue to do the best job possible for the nearly 7,000 aviation warrant officers. Figures 5 and 6 list the current organization for the Aviation Branch. Address correspondence to: Commander, USA TAPA, ATIN: DAPCOPW-AV, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, V A22332-0400.

WOO Chief COL Billy Miller AV 221-7831WOO Deputy Chief LTC GeorQe F. Copping AV 221-7832Personnel ActionsBranch Chief CW3 AI Delucia AV-221-5285/6ProfessionalDevelopmentBranch Chief CW4 John R. Dougherty AV 221-7843/4

FIGURE 5: Warrant Officer Division.

Aviation Branch Chief CW4 Thomas Story (AV 221-7835/6)MOSs Branch Manager154B, 154C, 1550, 155E,

156A, 151A CW4 Harry Arthur1530 CW4 William Clark153B CW4 Timothy Cline152G CW4 Don Conaway152F CW4 Mead Roberts152B, 152C, 1520, 153C CW4 Chris Vermillion

FIGURE 6: Aviation Warrant Officer Branch.

APRIL 1988

Aviation Commissioned OfficersWithin the Aviation Branch, prof

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Army Aviation Digest - Apr 1988

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